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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

December 2008: 

Immigration Benefits: 

Actions Needed to Address Vulnerabilities in Process for Granting 
Permanent Residency: 

Permanent Residence Application Fraud: 

GAO-09-55: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-55, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Available data show that of the approximately 917,000 applications for 
LPR USCIS received from January 1, 2006, through May 31, 2007, 516 
(0.05 percent) were referred to USCIS’s Office of Fraud Detection and 
National Security (FDNS) for national security concerns. According to 
FDNS, the cases referred to it involved individuals on a watch list 
which included names of known and suspected terrorists, or posed other 
national security concerns such as individuals who associated with 
suspected terrorists or engaged in espionage. While USCIS’s application 
case management system was not designed to capture and routinely 
generate detailed statistics on those posing national security 
concerns, FDNS has developed a separate system to capture such data. 

USCIS had encountered delays in obtaining the results of FBI name 
checks—FBI checks of its investigative files—for LPR applicants and 
others, and had issues regarding the usefulness of these results, but 
USCIS and the FBI have taken a number of actions that have improved 
these checks. The FBI dedicated more staff to process name checks, and 
USCIS provided additional funding and training to FBI staff. As a 
result, the number of pending name checks has decreased 90 percent, 
from 329,000 in May 2007 to 32,000 as of September 30, 2008. The FBI 
plans on being able to complete all name checks within 90 days of 
receipt by June 2009. 

USCIS has taken some actions to address vulnerabilities identified in 
one of its assessments of fraud, called Benefit Fraud and Compliance 
Assessments (BFCA), but has yet to complete actions to address 
vulnerabilities identified in four other BFCAs. To conduct BFCAs, FDNS 
selected a sample of petitions to determine the extent of fraud and 
identify any systemic vulnerabilities in USCIS’s adjudications 
processes. Internal control standards call for agency managers to 
promptly evaluate findings from audits and reviews, determine proper 
actions to take, and complete them within established time frames. 
Although FDNS completed all of these assessments between June 2006 and 
September 2007, USCIS has not established time frames for evaluating 
these findings and implementing any necessary corrective actions. Until 
USCIS takes corrective actions, vulnerabilities identified by these 
BFCAs will persist, increasing the risk that ineligible individuals 
will obtain LPR status. Lack of verification of the evidence submitted 
with petitions is one of the major vulnerabilities identified in these 
BFCAs. For example, FDNS staff found that individuals claiming to be 
married were not, employers did not exist, and aliens did not have the 
education or skills they claimed. USCIS procedures give its staff 
discretion on deciding whether to verify evidence submitted with 
petitions. The BFCAs have shown that adjudicators following these 
procedures have approved fraudulent petitions. Verifying all petitioner-
submitted evidence is impossible. Procedures that require verifying 
certain evidence under certain circumstances would help adjudicators 
better detect fraud and help USCIS maintain the balance between fraud 
detection and USCIS’s customer service and production-related 
objectives. What GAO Found: 

Since September 11, 2001, a concern has been that terrorists or their 
supporters would seek to immigrate to the United States (i.e., seek 
lawful permanent residency (LPR)). The Department of Homeland 
Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) conducts 
background checks and the FBI conducts name checks for those applying 
for LPR. GAO was asked to review USCIS’s processes for screening 
individuals applying for LPR. GAO assessed: (1) what available data 
show about the extent to which national security concerns were 
discovered during USCIS background checks for LPR applications, (2) 
what issues USCIS has encountered in its background check processes and 
what actions have been taken to resolve those issues, and (3) the 
extent to which USCIS has addressed fraud vulnerabilities in its 
adjudication procedures for LPR. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed 
USCIS background check and adjudication procedures, USCIS data on 
adjudications, and its assessments of fraud in applications for LPR, 
and interviewed USCIS and FBI officials. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Director of USCIS (1) establish timetables for 
addressing findings from its four benefit fraud assessments, and (2) 
establish requirements in LPR adjudications procedures on what evidence 
petitioner should be verified. USCIS agreed with our recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-55]. For more 
information, contact Rich Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Available Data Show That USCIS Has Identified Some Lawful Permanent 
Residence Applicants with National Security Concerns: 

USCIS and the FBI Have Taken a Number of Actions to Improve the 
Timeliness and Usefulness of FBI Name Check Results: 

USCIS Has Not Completed Actions Necessary to Address Identified 
Vulnerabilities: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: USCIS and FBI Joint Plan Milestones for Processing All Name 
Checks within 90 Days: 

Table: 2 Status of Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments, July 2008: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: USCIS's Organization: 

Figure 2: Percentage of Aliens Granted Lawful Permanent Residence 
Status by Major Category of Admission, 2007: 

Figure 3: Process for Adjudicating Applications for Adjustment of 
Status to Lawful Permanent Residence: 

Abbreviations: 

BFCA: Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessment: 

CCD: Consolidated Consular Database: 

CLAIMS: Computer Linked Application Information Management: 

System: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FDNS: Fraud Detection and National Security: 

ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

INA: Immigration and Nationality Act: 

KST: Known or suspected terrorist: 

LPR: Lawful Permanent Residence (or Resident): 

Non-KST: Non-known or suspected terrorist: 

NSRV: National Security and Records Verification: 

OIG: Office of Inspector General: 

OSI: Office of Security and Integrity: 

TECS: Treasury Enforcement Communications System: 

TSC: Terrorist Screening Center: 

USCIS: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

December 5, 2008: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

In 2004, the staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (the 9/11 Commission) reported that, while there were 
efforts to enhance border security prior to the September 2001 
terrorist attacks, no agency of the U.S. government thought of the 
immigration process as an antiterrorism tool at that time. The 9/11 
Commission's staff found that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service's "inability to adjudicate applications quickly or with 
adequate security checks made it easier for terrorists to wrongfully 
enter and remain in the United States throughout the 1990s." While all 
19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were issued 
nonimmigrant visas, the 9/11 Staff Report stated that terrorist group 
members could seek to become lawful permanent residents, thus 
"embedding" themselves in the United States indefinitely, to conduct or 
support terrorist activities. Becoming lawful permanent residents would 
also allow them to travel freely in and out of the country, thus making 
it easier to plan a terrorist attack. 

Aliens granted lawful permanent resident status are formally classified 
as immigrants and receive a permanent residence card commonly referred 
to as a green card. Aliens can obtain lawful permanent resident status 
in the United States in one of two ways. Aliens overseas can apply for 
an immigrant visa with the Department of State and enter directly as an 
immigrant. Aliens already in the United States with a temporary visa 
(nonimmigrant status), such as foreign students and certain temporary 
workers, can apply to adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent 
resident if they are eligible for an immigrant visa category. Asylees 
who have been in the United States for 1 year also may apply to adjust 
their status in the United States while individuals admitted as 
refugees are required, by regulation, to apply for adjustment of status 
after one year of admission. Within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is primarily 
responsible for processing applications of aliens seeking the ability 
to either live or work in the United States permanently or on a 
temporary basis or to become United States citizens. In recent years, 
the majority of aliens who became lawful permanent residents were 
already in the United States and applied to USCIS for lawful permanent 
residency. In general, aliens who seek to immigrate permanently must be 
sponsored by a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or a business 
entity. Immigration law identifies a number of different immigration 
categories that allow aliens to become lawful permanent residents, such 
as family members of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents or 
employees of companies in the United States. 

USCIS has instituted three background check procedures to identify 
applicants for lawful permanent residency who may pose a risk to 
national security or public safety.[Footnote 1] USCIS checks an alien's 
name against the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) 
which includes data exported from the Terrorist Screening Center's 
(TSC) watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists (KST). 
USCIS also conducts fingerprint checks carried out by the Department of 
Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to determine if an 
alien has a criminal conviction that may make the alien ineligible to 
become a permanent resident. In addition, USCIS requests that the FBI 
conduct a name check against the FBI's administrative and investigative 
files to identify individuals the FBI has investigated due to national 
security or public safety concerns. While TECS and FBI fingerprint 
checks are completed early in the application process, USCIS data have 
shown the FBI name check results may not be completed for several 
months or more, thereby delaying a final adjudication decision. Such 
delays may allow individuals with potential national security concerns 
to remain in the United States for an extended period of time before 
USCIS becomes aware of these concerns. 

In response to your request, we reported on the fraud risks that 
complicate the Department of State's ability to screen certain visa 
applicants.[Footnote 2] You also requested that we review USCIS's 
processes for screening aliens already in the United States applying to 
adjust their status: 

to that of a lawful permanent resident. This report addresses the 
following questions: 

* What do available data show about the extent of national security 
concerns discovered during USCIS background checks for lawful permanent 
residence applications? 

* What issues has USCIS encountered in its background check processes 
and what actions have been taken to resolve those issues? 

* To what extent has USCIS addressed identified vulnerabilities in its 
adjudications procedures for permanent residency? 

To determine what available data show about the extent of national 
security concerns discovered during USCIS background checks for lawful 
permanent residence applicants, we obtained data about the number of 
permanent residence applications that were referred to USCIS's Office 
of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) for national security 
reasons from January 2006, when FDNS began capturing these data, 
through May 2007, the date of our request for this information. We 
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the source of the data 
and the controls FDNS had in place to maintain the integrity of the 
data and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of our report. We also interviewed USCIS and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials on the extent to which individuals 
posing threats to national security or public safety applied for 
permanent residency under various immigration categories, such as 
special immigrant religious workers and alien relatives. We also 
obtained statistics on the national security cases referred to FDNS. 
Because FDNS's system that tracks national security cases does not yet 
capture the visa categories used (e.g., family-or employment-based 
applications) and whether the immigration benefits were granted or 
denied, we requested FDNS to provide these data by matching FDNS's data 
with data in USCIS's application case management system. We analyzed 
USCIS procedures and guidance for referring national security cases to 
FDNS, as well as eligibility requirements defined in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA). To better understand the nature of the 
national security cases and the related information provided by the FBI 
about them, we performed a content analysis of a random sample of 100 
FBI name check responses received from January through June 2007. FDNS 
originally selected this sample to determine how often the FBI name 
check provided unique information not available from the other two 
background checks. To identify what issues USCIS has encountered in its 
background check processes and what actions have been taken to resolve 
those issues, we analyzed (1) USCIS policies and procedures for 
conducting TECS queries, FBI fingerprint checks, and FBI name checks, 
as well as related interagency memoranda of understanding on requesting 
and conducting FBI name checks, (2) USCIS data on the number of pending 
FBI name check requests, and (3) the FBI's and USCIS's actions to 
improve the name check program. We interviewed knowledgeable agency 
officials about the source of USCIS's pending FBI name check data and 
the controls USCIS had in place to maintain the integrity of the data 
and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of our report. We discussed the actions USCIS and the FBI had 
taken and planned to take to improve the name check program with key 
agency officials, including the Associate Director of USCIS's National 
Security and Records Verification Directorate (NSRV) and the Section 
Chief of the FBI's National Name Check Program. To determine the extent 
to which USCIS was addressing vulnerabilities in its adjudications 
procedures for permanent residency, we analyzed current USCIS standard 
operating procedures and other guidance provided to adjudicators for 
processing applications for lawful permanent residency. We also 
analyzed FDNS reports on assessments it completed to determine the 
extent and nature of fraud in certain application types that may lead 
to permanent residency, known as Benefit Fraud and Compliance 
Assessments (BFCA). We interviewed FDNS managers responsible for 
administering the BFCAs, reviewed documentation outlining the BFCAs' 
design, methodology, and implementation, and determined that the 
results were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We 
also compared how USCIS addressed the findings of its BFCAs with 
criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government[Footnote 3] and with standard practices in program and 
project management for defining, designing, and executing 
programs.[Footnote 4] We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 
through November 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix I includes more detailed information on our scope and 
methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

Summary data provided by FDNS showed that of the approximately 917,000 
applications for lawful permanent residency USCIS received from January 
1, 2006, through May 31, 2007, 516 were referred to FDNS for national 
security reasons. According to FDNS officials, approximately 10 percent 
of all the cases referred to it--including applications for lawful 
permanent residency and other benefits--involved individuals on TSC's 
watch list. The other national security cases referred to FDNS involved 
individuals who were not on the terrorist watch list, but whose 
background checks indicated other possible national security concerns, 
such as those having associations with known or suspected terrorists or 
terrorist organizations, or involved in espionage. USCIS's case 
management system that tracks applications was not designed to capture 
and routinely generate reports on the extent, type, and nature of 
national security threats posed by applicants. Therefore, to provide 
USCIS with more comprehensive data on those applicants who may pose a 
national security threat and those who try to obtain immigration 
benefits through fraud, FDNS is developing a separate system to capture 
and analyze information such as visa category and eligibility decision 
information on those cases referred to FDNS for national security 
reasons. However, this system does not yet routinely provide statistics 
on the visa categories used (e.g., family-or employment-based 
applications) and whether the immigration benefits were granted or 
denied. Having the capability to analyze trends in application types 
used and strategies employed by individuals with national security 
concerns on a continuous basis should help identify those types of 
applications that may need additional scrutiny and whether USCIS 
adjudications procedures need strengthening. FDNS plans to have this 
capability by the middle of fiscal year 2009. 

Of the three background checks--TECS check, FBI fingerprint check, and 
FBI name check--conducted on lawful permanent residence applicants, 
USCIS raised concerns about the timeliness and usefulness of FBI name 
check results, and has taken several actions in conjunction with the 
FBI to address these issues. To improve timeliness, in April 2008, 
USCIS and the FBI announced a joint plan with the ultimate goal of 
completing 98 percent of the name checks within 30 days of receipt by 
the FBI, and the remaining 2 percent within 90 days, by June 30, 2009. 
To achieve this goal, the FBI assigned additional staff and hired 
contractors, with funds contributed by USCIS, to work exclusively on 
USCIS name check requests. The FBI also developed plans for improving 
its business processes and file management systems. As a result of 
these actions, significant progress has been made in reducing the 
number of pending name checks. As of September 30, 2008: 

* the total number of pending name checks decreased 90 percent, from 
about 329,000 in May 2007 to about 32,000; 

* the number of name checks pending longer than 90 days decreased about 
92 percent from about 211,000 in May 2007 to about 18,000; 

* the number pending more than 2 years decreased 99 percent from about 
24,000 in May 2007 to 46; and: 

* the FBI had eliminated all name checks pending more than 3 years. 

According to FDNS, the name check results USCIS received from the FBI 
were often vague or not useful for making eligibility determinations. 
To improve the usefulness of the FBI name check results, USCIS began 
assigning staff to the FBI name check program in February 2008 to train 
FBI staff on identifying and providing more relevant information to 
USCIS adjudicators when making eligibility determinations. USCIS 
officials told us that since USCIS staff began working with FBI staff, 
the quality of the information the FBI provides has improved, for 
example, by including such things as summaries of the nature and extent 
of the national security concerns. 

USCIS has taken actions to address vulnerabilities identified in one of 
six Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments (BFCA) of certain 
immigration petitions and applications that may lead to permanent 
residency, did not need to take action on one BFCA, but has not 
completed the actions necessary to address the vulnerabilities 
identified in the remaining four BFCAs. Standards for Internal Control 
in the Federal Government require that agency managers complete, within 
established time frames, all actions that correct or otherwise resolve 
the matters brought to management's attention. Also, standard practices 
for program management call for establishing specific milestones to 
achieve results. Standard practices for program management also call 
for assigning responsibility and accountability for ensuring the 
results of program activities are carried out. FDNS issued reports on 
three of the six BFCAs begun in 2005 and 2006. One of the three reports 
contained recommendations to address vulnerabilities related to 
petitions for religious workers, another for petitions for skilled and 
unskilled workers. One report related to applications to replace green 
cards did not recommend any changes to existing procedures. USCIS has 
taken some actions to implement recommendations to mitigate fraudulent 
petitions for religious workers, but has yet to address the findings 
from its BFCA on petitions for skilled and unskilled alien workers and 
has not established a timetable for doing so. In addition, USCIS has 
yet to address the findings from three other BFCAs--petitions for alien 
spouses, for alien relatives from Yemen, and applications for asylum. 
As of July 2008, FDNS officials told us they were still collecting 
comments about what actions are needed to address the findings from 
these BFCAs from various USCIS offices that would be involved in 
implementing any proposed recommendations. However, USCIS management 
had not established timetables for collecting these comments, 
evaluating and making decisions about what actions are necessary to 
address the findings and any recommendations from these assessments, 
and implementing any agreed upon actions as called for by internal 
control standards. 

Until USCIS addresses vulnerabilities identified in the BFCAs and 
implements corrective actions, these vulnerabilities will persist, 
increasing the risk that ineligible individuals will obtain lawful 
permanent residency. Failure to verify the evidence applicants and 
their petitioners provide is one of the vulnerabilities identified in 
these BFCAs and one that we reported on in 2006.[Footnote 5] USCIS's 
standard operating procedures give adjudicators the discretion to 
decide when and under what circumstances they will check petitioner- 
submitted evidence against internal and external databases. The BFCAs 
have shown that adjudicators following these procedures have approved 
fraudulent petitions. The findings from the BFCAs have also shown the 
kinds of petitioner-submitted evidence that may need to be verified, 
such as whether couples claiming to be married live together, whether 
employers exist, and whether aliens seeking employment have the 
education or skills they claim. Procedures that require verifying 
certain petitioner-submitted evidence under certain circumstances, as 
indicated by BFCA findings, would help adjudicators better detect 
fraud. 

To help ensure that findings from USCIS benefit fraud and compliance 
assessments are acted upon, and to enhance USCIS's overall fraud 
detection efforts, we recommend that the Director of USCIS take the 
following actions. 

* Prepare a roadmap for each of the four outstanding benefit fraud and 
compliance assessments (petitions for skilled and unskilled workers, 
spouses, relatives from Yemen, and applications for asylum) that 
delineates (1) timetables for deciding what actions to take, (2) what 
USCIS organizational units will be responsible for implementing those 
actions, and (3) a timetable for implementing agreed upon actions. 

* Modify adjudication procedures for family-and employment-based 
petitions to include requirements on what evidence should be verified. 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of Justice 
for official comment. DHS and USCIS agreed with our recommendations and 
their comments are reprinted in appendix II. USCIS also provided 
technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where 
appropriate. The Department of Justice had no comments on the report. 

Background: 

USCIS is responsible for processing applications for immigration 
benefits--the ability of an alien to live and in some cases work in the 
United States either permanently or on a temporary basis. As of 
September 2008, USCIS had a staff of 10,477 federal employees and 8,005 
full-time equivalent contractor staff and a budget of over $2.6 
billion. Approximately $2.5 billion was from fees it collects from 
applicants for immigration benefits and the rest was from congressional 
appropriations. Figure 1 shows USCIS's organization. 

Figure 1: USCIS's Organization: 

This figure is a chart showing the hierarchy of USCIS organization. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: USCIS. 

[End of figure] 

USCIS carries out its function through its headquarters office in 
Washington D.C., and its network of service centers and field offices. 
USCIS has three main operational directorates. The Directorate for 
Domestic Operations is responsible for adjudicating immigration 
benefits for those individuals in the United States, including those 
seeking permanent residency and citizenship. Adjudicators--USCIS staff 
that determine eligibility for immigration benefits--are located in 
four service centers that generally adjudicate applications that do not 
require interviews with the applicants, as well as 90 offices (26 
districts responsible for 64 field offices) located around the country 
that generally adjudicate applications that require interviews with 
applicants. In addition, the National Benefits Center, within Domestic 
Operations, serves as a central processing hub for certain immigration 
benefit applications that are ultimately adjudicated in USCIS field 
offices.[Footnote 6] The Directorate for Refugee, Asylum, and 
International Operations adjudicates applications for asylum in eight 
offices in the United States, has staff located in 27 countries, and 
according to a directorate official, deploys officers to 50-70 
countries to interview approximately 100,000 refugee applicants each 
year. 

The Directorate for National Security and Records Verification (NSRV) 
is responsible for detecting fraud, facilitating the resolution of 
national security-related background check cases and other concerns, 
and maintaining files on aliens, commonly known as A-files. FDNS within 
NSRV is responsible for detecting, pursuing, and deterring immigration 
benefit fraud, and identifying persons seeking benefits who pose a 
threat to national security and public safety. As of July 2008, FDNS 
had 474 staff (including 10 contractors), 359 of which were located in 
USCIS service centers, asylum offices, and district offices. FDNS is 
USCIS's primary conduit to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
FDNS staff, among other things, also review applications forwarded by 
adjudicators to determine if there is sufficient evidence to forward 
the case to ICE for criminal investigation. In addition, FDNS staff 
conduct site visits and follow up with law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies on potential national security risks identified during 
background checks on immigration benefit applications. 

One of FDNS's main goals is to identify and evaluate vulnerabilities in 
USCIS policies, practices, and procedures that threaten the integrity 
of the legal immigration benefit process and make it vulnerable to 
exploitation by individuals--including potential terrorists--seeking 
benefits for which they are not eligible. To help achieve this goal, in 
2005 FDNS began a series of assessments, called Benefit Fraud and 
Compliance Assessments (BFCA), to determine the extent of fraud for 
selected immigration benefits it considered high risk for fraud and 
identify any systemic vulnerabilities in USCIS's adjudications 
processes. The results of these assessments would serve as a basis for 
any proposed changes in policies, procedures, or regulations to 
mitigate any identified vulnerabilities. 

Over the last 3 years, USCIS processed about 6 million applications for 
immigration benefits each year, of which about 1 million individuals 
were granted lawful permanent resident status each year. For example, 
in 2007, of the 1,052,000 aliens who were granted lawful permanent 
residence status, about 621,000 (59 percent) were already living in the 
United States under a different status, including refugees, certain 
temporary workers, foreign students, and family members, or were 
undocumented.[Footnote 7] 

Immigration law gives priority, or preference, to foreign nationals who 
have a close family relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident, have needed job skills, or who have refugee or 
asylum status. Immigration law limits the number of family-and employer-
sponsored immigrants.[Footnote 8] There is no limit, however, on the 
number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens seeking lawful permanent 
residency.[Footnote 9] In 2007, immediate relatives represented 47 
percent of all aliens granted lawful permanent resident status. Figure 
2 shows the percentage of aliens granted lawful permanent resident 
status in 2007 by major categories of admission. 

Figure 2: Percentage of Aliens Granted Lawful Permanent Residence 
Status by Major Category of Admission, 2007: 

This figure is a pie graph showing the percentage of aliens granted 
lawful permanent residence status by major category of admissions, 
2007. 

Immediate relatives: 47%; 
Family based: 19%; 
Employment-based: 15%; 
Refugees and asylees: 13%; 
Other: 6%. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: DHS's Office of Immigration Statistics. 

[End of figure] 

Adjusting status to lawful permanent residency is a two-part process. 
First, in general, an eligible U.S. citizen or lawful permanent 
resident, called a petitioner, must file a petition with USCIS on 
behalf of the alien applying for lawful permanent resident 
status.[Footnote 10] Generally, the petitioner can be either a relative 
or employer.[Footnote 11] The purpose of this step in the process is 
for USCIS to determine if the relationship claimed between the 
petitioner--either as a family member or a prospective employer--and 
the alien is valid. USCIS requires petitioners to include evidence that 
supports the claimed relationship, such as a marriage or birth 
certificate (for family-based applications) or evidence of a job offer 
and the alien's work qualifications (for employment-based 
applications). An adjudicator then reviews the information in the 
petition and the evidence submitted and makes a decision about the 
petitioner's eligibility to sponsor the alien intending to adjust 
status in the United States. 

If USCIS approves the petition, the alien seeking lawful permanent 
residency in the United States must file with USCIS a form I-485, 
called an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, 
along with evidence supporting the applicant's eligibility, such as a 
birth certificate or diploma.[Footnote 12] An adjudicator is to then 
review the information in the application and the evidence submitted, 
as well as the results of USCIS background checks, and make a decision 
about the alien's eligibility to adjust status.[Footnote 13] 
Adjudicators at field offices generally interview aliens applying for a 
family-based adjustment of status. Employment-based applications to 
adjust status are generally adjudicated at a service center and the 
interview waived. Even though USCIS may determine that the relationship 
between the petitioner and the alien was valid, the alien may be 
ineligible for permanent residency under immigration law. USCIS tracks 
these applications and petitions in its Computer Linked Application and 
Information Management System (CLAIMS). Figure 3 provides an overview 
of the general process for adjudicating applications for lawful 
permanent residency. 

Figure 3: Process for Adjudicating Applications for Adjustment of 
Status to Lawful Permanent Residence: 

This figure is a flowchart showing the process of adjusting 
applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of USCIS data. 

[A] USCIS may determine that any applicant--including an employment- 
based adjustment of status applicant--is required to undergo an 
interview. However, some family-based applicants are granted interview 
waivers, such as children or parents of U.S. citizens, or Cuban 
nationals filing under the Cuban Adjustment Act. 

[End of figure] 

As part of the process of adjudicating applications for lawful 
permanent residency, USCIS requests that the FBI conduct a name check 
against the FBI's administrative and investigative files to identify 
individuals the FBI has investigated due to national security or public 
safety concerns. In fiscal year 2007, USCIS requested the FBI conduct 
about 2.1 million name checks, including nearly 796,000 relating to 
adjustment of status applications. According to USCIS officials, nearly 
all FBI name checks (over 99 percent) result in either no record of the 
individual in the FBI's files or the information contained in the files 
is not relevant to the permanent residency application. According to 
USCIS officials, 0.14 percent of all FBI name checks historically yield 
information about an applicant, and about 0.12 percent of these results 
yield criminal or national security-related information that may be 
pertinent to the adjudication. 

In June 2008, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) raised concerns about the quality of the FBI's name check 
process.[Footnote 14] Specifically, the DOJ OIG reported that the 
algorithm used to match submitted names against the FBI's files was 
outdated and potentially ineffective, increasing the risks that 
submitted names were not accurately searched and matched against FBI 
files. The FBI agreed with the OIG's recommendations to improve the 
algorithm.[Footnote 15] 

If, however, any of the background checks (TECS, fingerprint, or FBI 
name check) indicate a potential national security concern, it is 
USCIS's policy to withhold the adjudication of the application until 
any national security concerns are resolved with the appropriate law 
enforcement or intelligence agency. While some background checks could 
indicate that an applicant has, or may have, criminal or national 
security issues, such information will not always render the applicant 
ineligible for the benefit. For example, inclusion on TSC's watch list 
does not automatically prohibit an individual from obtaining a visa, 
entering the United States, or adjusting status to remain in the United 
States.[Footnote 16] After consulting with law enforcement or 
intelligence agency officials, USCIS decides whether or not to grant 
the benefit and accordingly makes an eligibility determination. 

In 2006, USCIS embarked on a transformation of its business processes 
and technology aimed at increasing national security and integrity, 
improving customer service, and achieving operational efficiency. 
According to the USCIS Transformation Program's Concept of Operations 
announced in March 2007, the objective is to transform USCIS from a 
fragmented, paper-based operational environment to one that will use 
state of the art case management tools and adjudicate applications in a 
paperless environment. USCIS plans to change its business processes by, 
for example, obtaining biometrics from all individuals who petition or 
apply for immigration benefits to verify identity, something it does 
now only for asylum benefit applications. The operational concept calls 
for USCIS to link all individuals' transactions with USCIS based on 
biometrics enabling USCIS adjudicators to see all of a person's 
transactions with USCIS. The concept paper also calls for USCIS 
adjudicators to be able to directly access other automated systems, 
such as those of other government agencies, to verify information 
submitted by applicants. USCIS anticipates completing the 
transformation at the end of 2013 at an estimated cost of $545 million. 

Available Data Show That USCIS Has Identified Some Lawful Permanent 
Residence Applicants with National Security Concerns: 

Available data show that USCIS background checks identified individuals 
who were (1) KSTs, (2) associates of terrorists, (3) involved in 
providing material support to terrorists or terrorist organizations, 
and (4) agents of a foreign government involved in espionage. From 
March 2003 through December 1, 2007, FDNS received about 14,500 
national security referrals for all application types. According to 
FDNS officials, about 10 percent involved individuals on TSC's watch 
list and the balance of these cases involved individuals who were not 
on the terrorist watch list, but whose background checks indicated 
other possible national security concerns, such as those having 
associations with known or suspected terrorists. USCIS identified these 
nonwatch list cases based on information placed in TECS by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, FBI checks of names in its 
investigative files, and through other referrals. 

Terrorists and other individuals posing a threat to national security 
have applied for lawful permanent residency. At our request, USCIS 
provided summary data regarding lawful permanent residence applications 
with potential national security concerns by comparing information from 
CLAIMS and FDNS's national security data. These data showed that of 
approximately 917,000 applications for permanent residency filed from 
January 1, 2006, through May 31, 2007, 516 (about one-half of 1 
percent) were referred to FDNS for national security reasons. Of these 
516 national security referrals, USCIS identified 109 as KSTs on TSC's 
watch list and 407 were referred to FDNS for other national security 
reasons. According to USCIS officials, these non-KST cases included 
associates of KSTs, unindicted co-conspirators, terrorist organization 
members, persons involved with providing material support to terrorists 
or terrorist organizations, agents of foreign governments, and 
individuals involved in espionage[Footnote 17]. USCIS denied or 
rejected 41 applications to adjust status to permanent resident, 
including 18 KSTs and 23 non-KSTS, and granted permanent resident 
status to 9 KSTs and 41 non-KSTs following resolution of the national 
security concern. Another 15 applications were either administratively 
closed or abandoned. The remaining 410 applications were still pending 
adjudication decisions as of August 2008. 

In addition to identifying potential national security concerns from 
checking an alien's name against watch lists in TECS, name checks 
against the FBI's investigative files have uncovered individuals who 
raised national security concerns. We reviewed a random sample created 
by FDNS of FBI name check results provided to USCIS to ascertain the 
types of national security concerns identified during the name check 
process. We found that the FBI provided information to USCIS that these 
individuals: 

* had associated with terrorist organizations, 

* were agents of foreign governments, 

* were involved in criminal activities, or: 

* had engaged in espionage against the United Sates. 

In addition, these FBI name check results included individuals whose 
names were mentioned in FBI national security investigations, but who 
were not subjects of the investigation or believed to be involved in 
other criminal activity. For example, as part of the 9/11 terrorist 
attack investigation, the FBI interviewed many individuals who were not 
involved in the 9/11 attack, but may have been able to provide the FBI 
with investigative information. Some of these individuals eventually 
applied for an immigration benefit and their name was matched against 
FBI files during the name check process. 

While USCIS has some data on applicants with national security 
concerns, the data are limited because USCIS's CLAIMS system was not 
designed to capture and routinely generate reports on the extent, type, 
and nature of national security threats posed by applicants. For 
example, this system does not routinely provide statistics on the visa 
categories used (e.g., family-or employment-based applications) and 
whether the immigration benefits were granted or denied. Such 
information could be useful to help identify the characteristics of 
applicants who could pose national security and terrorism-related 
concerns, and the avenues they may use to stay in the United States. 

Therefore, to provide USCIS with more comprehensive data on those 
applicants who may pose a national security threat and those who try to 
obtain immigration benefits through fraud, FDNS is developing a data 
system called FDNS-DS. FDNS-DS is designed to collect data from 
applications referred to FDNS for reasons of national security and 
public safety as well as suspected fraud, and includes the disposition 
and resolution of these referrals. Currently, FDNS-DS's analytical 
capability is limited. For example, FDNS-DS cannot generate reports on 
how often and under which immigration categories individuals with 
potential national security concerns applied for lawful permanent 
residency. Also, FDNS-DS is not yet integrated into CLAIMS and 
therefore cannot track related adjudication decisions for these 
national security referrals. FDNS officials told us that they plan to 
have visa category and eligibility decision information automatically 
integrated into FDNS-DS, but the date for this is uncertain. These 
officials also said that by the middle of fiscal year 2009 FDNS-DS 
should have the capability to analyze national security referral data 
when USCIS completes other information technology improvements as part 
of its information technology transformation program. FDNS officials 
said that having an automated analysis capability will facilitate 
identifying trends in application types used, and strategies employed 
by individuals with national security concerns on a continuous basis. 
According to FDNS, this type of analysis will help identify those types 
of applications that may need additional scrutiny and whether USCIS 
adjudications procedures need strengthening. 

USCIS and the FBI Have Taken a Number of Actions to Improve the 
Timeliness and Usefulness of FBI Name Check Results: 

Of the three background checks--TECS query, FBI fingerprint check, and 
FBI name check--conducted on lawful permanent residence applicants, 
USCIS raised concerns about the timeliness and usefulness of FBI name 
check results and has taken several actions in conjunction with the FBI 
to address these issues. The number of pending FBI name check requests 
increased from about 236,000 in May 2006 to about 329,000 in May 2007, 
about a 40 percent increase. Also, the number of USCIS's FBI name 
checks requests pending more than 90 days increased 38 percent, from 
about 153,000 in May 2006 to about 211,000 in May 2007. As a result of 
having to wait for the name check results, USCIS could not adjudicate 
applications, resulting in some applicants waiting years before USCIS 
made a decision. 

In Spring 2007, USCIS began working with the FBI to develop solutions 
to improve the processing times for the name checks as well as the 
usefulness of the name check results provided to USCIS. As part of this 
effort, USCIS and the FBI recognized that additional staff were needed 
for researching FBI's investigative files and that FBI staff would 
benefit from additional training and guidance about which investigative 
files should be reviewed and what information was relevant to USCIS 
adjudicators for determining an applicant's eligibility. 

In April 2008, USCIS and the FBI announced a joint plan with a goal to 
process 98 percent of all name check requests within 30 days and 
process the remaining 2 percent within 90 days by June 30, 2009. USCIS 
and the FBI have taken a number of actions to achieve these goals. The 
FBI has assigned additional FBI staff and hired contractor staff 
jointly funded by the FBI and USCIS out of recent fee increases by 
USCIS and the FBI[Footnote 18] and from USCIS and FBI appropriations 
for fiscal year 2007 and 2008. Specifically, the FBI increased its 
USCIS-dedicated name check program staff from 50 to 61 and hired 290 
contract staff to work exclusively on USCIS name check requests. The 
FBI also plans to improve its business processes and case management 
and file management systems that will allow electronic access to 
investigative files rather than the time consuming process of locating 
and reviewing investigative files manually. The FBI also plans to 
eliminate investigations of nonrelevant administrative files, for 
example, administrative files containing the names of government 
employees and individuals who may have had a background check performed 
for employment purposes. As a result, fewer names will require 
additional vetting. Table 1 shows the milestones FBI has set to 
eliminate the oldest pending name checks requested by USCIS. 

Table 1: USCIS and FBI Joint Plan Milestones for Processing All Name 
Checks within 90 Days: 

Process all name checks pending more than: 3 years; 
By: May 31, 2008. 

Process all name checks pending more than: 2 years; 
By: July 31, 2008. 

Process all name checks pending more than: 1 year; 
By: November 30, 2008. 

Process all name checks pending more than: 6 months; 
By: February 28, 2009. 

Process all name checks pending more than: 3 months; 
By: May 31, 2009. 

Process all name checks pending more than: Process 98 percent of name 
checks within 30 days, and remaining 2 percent within 90 days; 
By: June 30, 2009. 

Source: FBI and USCIS. 

[End of table] 

The FBI has made significant progress in decreasing the overall number 
of pending name checks requested by USCIS. As of September 30, 2008: 

* the total number of pending name checks decreased 90 percent, from 
about 329,000 in May 2007 to about 32,000, 

* the number of name checks pending longer than 90 days decreased about 
92 percent from about 211,000 in May 2007 to about 18,000, 

* the number pending more than 2 years decreased 99 percent from about 
24,000 in May 2007 to 46, and: 

* the FBI had eliminated all names checks pending more than 3 years. 

On the basis of the progress to date, the Section Chief of the FBI Name 
Check Program told us that he is confident that the November 2008, 
February 2009, and June 2009 goals will be met. 

To help the FBI provide more useful information for adjudicators in 
making eligibility determinations, USCIS has assigned staff to the 
FBI's Name Check Program office. On the basis of a review in 2004 of 
nearly 400 name check results provided to USCIS in formal FBI 
letterhead memoranda, FDNS found that, among other things, the 
information the FBI provided was often vague or not useful for 
adjudicators to determine whether or not an individual was eligible for 
an immigration benefit. Since February 2008, USCIS staff have 
participated in training FBI analysts to identify and provide 
information that USCIS adjudicators can use in making eligibility 
determinations. According to USCIS officials, this effort resulted in 
more detailed and relevant information being provided in letterhead 
memoranda summarizing the nature and extent of the national security 
and other public safety concerns. 

USCIS Has Not Completed Actions Necessary to Address Identified 
Vulnerabilities: 

USCIS has taken actions to address vulnerabilities identified in one of 
its BFCAs, but has not completed the actions necessary to address the 
vulnerabilities identified in four of its other BFCAs. During 2005 and 
2006, FDNS initiated six BFCAs and has taken some actions to address 
the findings in one of these related to petitions for religious 
workers. USCIS determined that no actions were necessary based upon the 
findings of the BFCA for the replacement of lost, stolen, or destroyed 
permanent resident cards (green cards). For the remaining four BFCAs, 
USCIS has not determined what actions are necessary to address the 
findings, nor has it established timetables for deciding on what 
actions to take and for implementing any agreed upon actions. Until 
USCIS takes these steps, the vulnerabilities FDNS identified in these 
BFCAs will persist, increasing the risk that ineligible individuals 
will obtain immigration benefits. Lack of verification of the evidence 
applicants and their petitioners provide is one of the vulnerabilities 
identified in these BFCAs and one that we reported on in 2006.[Footnote 
19] USCIS's standard operating procedures give adjudicators the 
discretion to decide when and under what circumstances they will check 
petitioner-submitted evidence against internal and external databases. 
The BFCAs have shown that adjudicators following these procedures have 
approved fraudulent petitions. Procedures that require verifying 
certain petitioner-submitted evidence under certain circumstances, 
where the BFCAs have indicated potential fraud, would help adjudicators 
better detect fraud and help USCIS maintain the balance between fraud 
detection and its customer service and production-related objectives. 
Finally, internal conspiracies and employee misconduct have compromised 
the adjudications process allowing ineligible individuals to receive 
lawful permanent residency. To address these internal vulnerabilities, 
USCIS's Office of Security and Integrity (OSI) is developing a 
systematic approach to identifying internal fraud and evaluating its 
internal fraud controls related to detecting and deterring such fraud. 

USCIS Lacks Timelines for Evaluating and Addressing Findings and 
Recommendations from Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments: 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for 
agency managers to complete, within established time frames, all 
actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to 
management's attention.[Footnote 20] In addition, internal control 
standards require that findings of audits and other reviews are 
promptly resolved. These standards also state that managers are to (1) 
promptly evaluate findings from audits and reviews, (2) determine 
proper actions in response to findings and recommendations for audits 
and reviews, and (3) complete, within established time frames, all 
actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to 
management's attention. Moreover, standard practices for program 
management call for specific milestones to be established to achieve 
results.[Footnote 21] Standard practices for program management also 
call for assigning responsibility and accountability for ensuring the 
results of program activities are carried out. 

As of July 2008, FDNS had conducted six BFCA's of immigration benefits 
that may lead to lawful permanent residency.[Footnote 22] For each 
BFCA, FDNS selected a random sample of completed or in-process 
petitions and conducted activities, such as visiting sites, checking 
internal USCIS systems and other external databases, and reviewing 
administrative files to determine if any of the information that 
petitioners submitted was false. For each of these assessments, FDNS 
prepared a report on each of the assessments' findings, which in some 
cases has included suggested changes to regulations, policies, or 
procedures that could address systemic vulnerabilities found during an 
assessment. Table 2 summarizes the status and results of the six BFCAs. 

Table 2: 2 Status of Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments, July 
2008: 

Benefit assessed: Petition for religious workers; 
Initiation date: Feb. 2005; 
FDNS report date[A]: Final report issued Aug. 2005; 
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Identified 33 percent fraud 
rate; 
USCIS actions taken or planned: Actions taken: Increased site visits 
and requirements to verify legitimacy of petitioning religious 
institutions; 
Actions planned: Employ contract staff for site visits; 
proposed change in rulemaking to require institutions to petition for 
religious workers instead of applicant petitioning for self; 
established FDNS compliance review procedures to verify petitioner- 
provided information, including additional checks of law enforcement 
databases, targeted site visits, and electronic and telephone 
verifications. 

Benefit assessed: Application for green card replacement; 
Initiation date: May 2005; 
FDNS report date[A]: Final report issued Nov. 2005; 
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Identified less than 1 
percent fraud rate[B]; 
USCIS actions taken or planned: FDNS recommended no changes and USCIS 
determined no actions were needed. 

Benefit assessed: Petitions for skilled and unskilled workers; 
Initiation date: May 2005; 
FDNS report date[A]: Final report issued June 2006; 
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Identified 11 percent fraud 
rate; 
USCIS actions taken or planned: Actions planned: Assign FDNS staff to 
overseas offices to verify application information, such as whether the 
alien worker has the required education and/or skills. 

Benefit assessed: Petition for spouse; 
Initiation date: Apr. 2006; 
FDNS report date[A]: Draft report completed Mar. 2007; 
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Circulated for comment within 
USCIS in April 2007 and again in June 2008; 
USCIS actions taken or planned: None to date. 

Benefit assessed: Petition for Yemeni relatives; 
Initiation date: Mar. 2006; 
FDNS report date[A]: Draft report completed June 2007; 
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Circulated for comment within 
USCIS June 2008; 
USCIS actions taken or planned: None to date. 

Benefit assessed: Application for asylum; 
Initiation date: Feb. 2006; 
FDNS report date[A]: Draft report completed Sept. 2007; 
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Circulated for comment within 
USCIS January 2008; 
USCIS actions taken or planned: None to date. 

Source: FDNS. 

[A] USCIS issued public versions of the reports for the religious 
worker and green card replacement BFCAs in July 2006, but has not 
issued a public version of the skilled and unskilled worker BFCA. 

[B] Of the 245 application files sampled, USCIS found one case of 
fraud. In this case, had the adjudicator compared the photo of the 
applicant with the photo stored in USCIS databases as required, USCIS 
would not have approved the application. On the basis of the assessment 
results, FDNS determined that its procedures for adjudicating 
applications for a replacement green card did not need to be changed. 

[End of table] 

USCIS has taken some actions to address vulnerabilities identified in 
its assessments of petitions for religious workers. In August 2005, 
FDNS issued its report on religious workers, finding that 33 percent of 
the petitions in its sample were fraudulent.[Footnote 23] In some cases 
FDNS found that the religious institution cited on the petition did not 
exist or that the applicant was not in fact a religious worker. FDNS 
recommended USCIS strengthen its procedures for adjudicating religious 
worker petitions by verifying, prior to granting the petition, that the 
religious institution exists and that the applicant is in fact a 
religious worker. In addition, USCIS has proposed a regulatory change 
that would require a religious institution to file a petition for a 
religious worker. Under current law, an alien seeking to enter as a 
religious worker can "self-sponsor," that is, the alien does not need 
the religious institution to file a petition on behalf of the alien. 
Based upon the results of the assessment, USCIS changed its 
adjudications procedures in July 2006 to require additional systems 
checks, including examining public records to verify the legitimacy of 
the religious institution for which the applicant intended to work, as 
well as conducting site visits. 

USCIS plans to take other actions it believes will help deter and 
detect religious worker fraud. USCIS officials told us in July 2008 
that it planned to hire contract staff to conduct site visits to verify 
both the legitimacy of the religious institution as well as the 
applicant. In April 2007, USCIS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
that would, among other things, require religious institutions to file 
a petition on behalf of the immigrant and not allow an alien to 
petition for him or herself. USCIS anticipated issuing a final rule 
before the end of 2008. 

While USCIS has taken some actions to address vulnerabilities found in 
the petition for religious workers, USCIS has yet to take action to 
address vulnerabilities identified in four other BFCAs. In June 2006, 
FDNS completed its report on fraud in petitions for skilled and 
unskilled workers. For these petitions, in general, the petitioner must 
be a legitimate employer with the ability to pay the alien the 
prevailing wage. Skilled workers must be aliens with at least 2 years 
of specialized training or experience. Unskilled workers can have less 
than 2 years of training or experience. Both skilled and unskilled 
workers must be coming to perform labor that is not temporary or 
seasonal and for which qualified workers are not available in the 
United States. 

Overall, FDNS found that 11 percent of the petitions in its sample were 
fraudulent, but FDNS believed the actual fraud rate was higher because 
FDNS's sample included only approved petitions. FDNS did not include in 
its sample those petitions that USCIS had denied or where the 
petitioner withdrew the petition. According to the FDNS report, the 
overall fraud rate reported would have been higher had the sample 
included petitions that had already been adjudicated and denied for 
fraud, but limitations in CLAIMS did not allow their identification and 
potential inclusion in the sample drawn. 

Evidence of fraud that FDNS staff found included: 

* tampering or fabricating supporting documentation, or material 
misrepresentations within a document, 

* misrepresentation of the alien beneficiary's qualifications, that is, 
the beneficiary did not have the required education or work experience, 

* nonexistent employers, and: 

* failure of the employer to pay the alien the salary noted in the 
petition. 

To address these vulnerabilities, FDNS recommended a number of 
enhancements to USCIS procedures for adjudicating petitions for skilled 
and unskilled workers, including the following. 

* Perform a name and address check on the petitioner to help establish 
the legitimacy of the petitioner. Current USICS policy only requires 
record checks be done on the alien beneficiary. 

* Conduct targeted site visits to verify the legitimacy and eligibility 
of both the petitioner and alien beneficiary including, for example, 
verifying the location of the employer and the employer's ability to 
pay the offered wage, as well as the alien beneficiary's credentials. 

* Enable adjudicators to electronically e-mail or telephone the 
employer to verify that the employer filed the petition and intends to 
employ the alien beneficiary. 

* Verify the work experience alien beneficiaries claim to have acquired 
outside the United States because their work experience is vital to 
determining their qualifications and therefore whether they are 
eligible for the benefit sought. 

* Require the employer to notify USCIS or withdraw the petition when 
the position is no longer available, or when there is a change in 
employment. According to FDNS's report, many of the alien beneficiaries 
do not report to work for the employer, or the applications are for 
family members or friends. In these cases, the employer had no intent 
to hire the alien beneficiary and the beneficiary had no intent to work 
for the employer. According to FDNS's report, both were using the 
employment petition as a vehicle for the alien beneficiary to obtain 
lawful permanent resident status. According to FDNS, to close this 
loophole, a regulatory/statutory amendment would have to be made that 
requires an employer to notify USCIS every time the alien beneficiary 
leaves employment, or when the job offer is no longer valid. This 
notification would have to be performed before the alien beneficiary 
adjusts status to permanent resident. 

* Require that the beneficiary be placed in a 2-year conditional 
resident status and requiring that the beneficiary remain employed by 
the petitioner in the stated capacity for a minimum of 2 years. If the 
beneficiary remains employed in the stated capacity during the 2 year 
time period, the conditions on their residence would be removed. If the 
beneficiary fails to report or remain on the job in the stated 
capacity, then the beneficiary would be subject to termination of 
status and removal from the United States. According to FDNS, this 
would require regulatory and statutory changes. 

Although FDNS's June 2006 report recommended a number of proposed 
enhancements to address vulnerabilities in the process for adjudicating 
petitions for skilled and unskilled workers, USCIS has yet to take 
action. In July 2008, the NSRV Associate Director and FDNS Chief told 
us that USCIS had not taken any actions to address the findings and 
proposed enhancements made in FDNS's June 2006 report,[Footnote 24] but 
could not explain why USCIS had not taken any action and had no set 
timelines for (1) deciding what actions to take, (2) identifying which 
USCIS components would be responsible for implementing these actions, 
and (3) establishing timetables for implementing these actions. Until 
USCIS decides what additional actions are needed to address the 
vulnerabilities related to petitions for skilled and unskilled alien 
workers, and assigns responsibility and establishes timetables for 
completing them, these vulnerabilities will persist, allowing 
ineligible applicants to continue to obtain lawful permanent residence. 

FDNS has prepared draft reports summarizing the findings related to its 
three other assessments involving (1) petitions for alien spouses, (2) 
petitions for relatives from Yemen, and (3) applications for asylum. 
FDNS officials told us that in conducting these assessments, FDNS staff 
also identified vulnerabilities in USCIS adjudication procedures. 
According to NSRV officials, the vulnerabilities were generally similar 
to those reported in previous assessments: petitioners submitted false 
documents or made false statements on their petitions. For example, 
FDNS staff found that couples claiming to be married and living 
together were not living together or they had submitted false marriage 
and birth certificates to support their marriage claim. Some asylum 
applicants submitted false arrest and medical reports to support their 
claims of persecution. Some of the fraudulent applications detected 
during the BFCAs had been approved by USCIS adjudicators. 

USCIS had not yet completed its review of the findings from these three 
BFCAs or decided on actions needed to address identified 
vulnerabilities, although the draft reports were made available by FDNS 
in March, June, and September 2007, respectively. In July 2008, FDNS 
officials told us that they were still collecting comments about what 
actions are needed to address identified vulnerabilities from the 
various USCIS offices that would be involved in implementing any 
proposed recommendations. However, USCIS senior management had not 
established timetables for collecting these comments, evaluating and 
making decisions about what actions are necessary to address the 
findings and any recommendations from these assessments, and 
implementing any needed actions as called for by internal control 
standards. 

Not addressing these vulnerabilities can lead to further immigration 
benefit fraud as well as impede the opportunity for other legitimate 
applicants for lawful permanent residency. For example, there is a 
statutory limit on the number of employment visas that can be issued 
each year. Applicants who fraudulently obtain lawful permanent 
residency through employment limit the ability of legitimate applicants 
to obtain employment in the United States because the limit may have 
already been reached when the legitimate applicant applies, thereby 
denying legitimate applicants the opportunity to immigrate based upon 
their occupation, profession, or specialized skills. In addition, 
applicants who have fraudulently obtained lawful permanent residence 
can subsequently file applications to become U.S. citizens or petitions 
for their alien relatives, further perpetuating their fraud. 

As part of its ongoing program to transform its business processes for 
adjudicating immigration benefits, in late 2009, USCIS plans to develop 
and implement technologies and new business processes for immigration 
benefits leading to permanent residency. The BFCAs could be an 
important source of information on risks USCIS faces from external 
fraud in evaluating what actions may be required to manage these risks 
and in deciding upon new business processes to address them. However, 
without established timetables for completing the fraud assessments-- 
including reaching agreement on and implementing those changes that are 
needed in response to findings and recommendations--there is less 
assurance that decisions about USCIS's transformation efforts will 
benefit from those assessments. 

NSRV recognizes that improvements are needed in the linkage between 
reporting BFCA findings and recommendations and USCIS's process for 
reviewing and evaluating BFCA findings and recommendations, and 
deciding what actions to take and implement. As part of its 2008 
strategic plan, NSRV has an objective to enhance and expedite the 
current assessment review process in part by involving other USCIS 
components earlier in the process to help identify BFCA priorities and 
research approaches that would yield useful results and 
recommendations. However, without a timetable for promptly evaluating 
BFCA findings, deciding on what corrective actions are necessary, and 
implementing them, it will be difficult for USCIS to ensure that needed 
procedural improvements will take place that will preclude, for 
example, the granting of fraudulent petitions that may lead to lawful 
permanent residency. 

Lack of Requirements to Verify Petitioner-Submitted Evidence Continues 
to Leave USCIS Vulnerable to Fraud: 

In 2006, we reported that an obvious vulnerability to the immigration 
benefit system was the submission of false eligibility 
evidence.[Footnote 25] USCIS procedures did not require the 
verification of any eligibility evidence for any benefit, despite the 
potential for verification to help mitigate vulnerability to fraud. We 
also reported that verification of such evidence--by comparing it to 
other information in USCIS databases, by checking it against external 
sources of information, or by interviewing applicants--is the most 
direct and effective strategy for mitigating this vulnerability. On the 
other hand, we reported that verifying all key information or 
interviewing all individuals would be impossible and that verifying 
applicant-submitted evidence represented a resource commitment that 
would need to be balanced with its customer service and production- 
related objectives. At that time, USCIS had just begun its BFCA program 
that was intended to identify ways to strengthen USCIS procedures, 
including identifying the kinds of information that needs to be 
verified. 

USCIS procedures, in general, do not require adjudicators to verify 
petitioner-submitted evidence. Guidance provided in USCIS's 
adjudicator's field manual instructs adjudicators to consider taking 
steps to verify information submitted by a petitioner--such as 
conducting internal research, requesting additional evidence, 
interviewing individuals, or requesting site visits--if they cannot 
decide whether to approve a petition based solely on their review of 
the evidence submitted. However, standard operating procedures for 
these petitions generally do not require adjudicators to take these 
additional steps. The decision as to when, and under what 
circumstances, to verify petitioner-submitted evidence is left to the 
discretion of the adjudicator. 

USCIS guidance suggests a variety of sources, both internal and 
external, against which to check petitioner evidence. The Adjudicator's 
Field Manual states that USCIS's internal systems, such as CLAIMS, are 
some of the most valuable, yet often overlooked, sources of information 
to verify a claimed family relationship, such as a spouse. In addition, 
a 2003 USCIS report prepared by an independent consultant highlighted 
the need for additional checks to verify evidence submitted by 
immigration benefit applicants.[Footnote 26] In particular, the report 
recommended that, at a minimum, USCIS check all family-based (I-130) 
and employment-based (I-140) petitions against records in CLAIMS to, 
among other things, identify previously filed petitions that could be 
an indication of fraud. According to FDNS, based upon BFCA findings, 
those adjudicators who choose not to verify information will be more 
vulnerable to approving fraudulent applications and petitions. 

Verifying petitioner-submitted information prior to making a decision 
will reduce the likelihood of adjudicators approving ineligible 
applicants. As discussed earlier, FDNS's BFCA for skilled and unskilled 
workers found that 11 percent of the approved petitions were fraudulent 
and recommended a number of actions to verify petitioner-submitted 
information. In addition, ICE agents told us that much of the 
immigration fraud they encounter--such as applicants submitting false 
documents and lying on their applications--could be mitigated by USCIS 
adjudicators checking internal and external databases to verify 
petitioner information. These agents suggested that USCIS adjudicators 
could use other agencies' databases, such as the State Department's 
Consolidated Consular Database (CCD),[Footnote 27] and commercially 
available databases, such as AutoTrack, Choice Point,[Footnote 28] and 
Lexis/Nexis,[Footnote 29] to confirm certain information such as 
whether a petitioner and spouse reside at the same address or whether 
an employer petitioning for an immigrant worker appears to be a 
legitimate firm with a valid employment offer. Adjudicators at all 
USCIS's district and field offices and service centers can access these 
databases. According to FDNS officials, taking such steps to verify 
petitioner information led to FDNS officers identifying fraud in the 
BFCAs. For example, FDNS stated that commercial databases such as 
Choice Point and Lexis/Nexis can yield valuable information about the 
identity, residence, and duration of time an individual has been in the 
United States. By checking government and commercial databases and 
conducting site visits, FDNS officers determined that individuals 
claiming to be married were not, employers did not exist, and aliens 
did not have the education or skills they claimed. 

Marriage fraud continues to be a problem, according to USCIS and ICE. 
In some cases, U.S. citizens have, in return for money, married and 
filed multiple petitions for several different aliens. For example, in 
one fraud investigation, ICE agents arrested a Miami woman in December 
2007 who was charged with nine counts of bigamy. In January 2008, ICE 
arrested the woman's boyfriend for allegedly marrying four other women 
for profit so that the four women could obtain lawful status. According 
to these ICE agents, the investigation revealed that USCIS's personnel 
had not identified the prior petitions filed for the other claimed 
spouses. According to these ICE agents, a check of USCIS's CLAIMS 
system would have revealed the previously filed petitions by these 
individuals. However, adjudicators are not required to verify 
petitioner-submitted evidence, including routinely checking CLAIMS to 
determine whether a petitioner had previously filed for another 
spouse.[Footnote 30] 

Verifying petitioner-submitted evidence has been shown to better detect 
and deter fraud. As discussed previously, in July 2006 USCIS changed 
its procedures and began verifying certain information submitted with 
religious worker petitions, such as whether the religious institution 
existed. According to FDNS, the number of petitions filed for religious 
workers decreased 21 percent from July 2006 to July 2007. In addition, 
over the same time period: 

* the approval rate of religious worker petitions fell from 76 percent 
to 44 percent, and: 

* the denial rate of these petitions, including petitions withdrawn, 
increased from 24 percent to 55 percent. 

FDNS attributed these changes to the additional verification efforts 
taken by USCIS since USCIS had made no other changes in its procedures 
for adjudicating religious worker petitions. 

USCIS's standard operating procedures allow adjudicators wide 
discretion on whether or not to verify petitioner-submitted evidence. 
The BFCAs have shown that adjudicators following these procedures have 
approved fraudulent petitions. The findings from the BFCAs have shown 
the kinds of petitioner-submitted evidence that may need to be 
verified, such as whether couples claiming to be married live together, 
employers exist, and whether aliens seeking employment have the 
education or skills they claim. Procedures that require verifying 
certain petitioner-submitted evidence under certain circumstances, 
where the BFCAs have indicated potential fraud, would help adjudicators 
better detect fraud and help USCIS maintain the balance between fraud 
detection and its customer service and production-related objectives. 

USCIS recognizes the fraud vulnerabilities in its current adjudication 
procedures. USCIS's transformation program's concept of operations 
describes the creation of a separate verification unit, apart from 
FDNS, to verify application information as part of a new business 
process model. According to USCIS officials, however, USCIS has not yet 
made a decision on whether to implement this new concept of operations 
as part of its new business model. 

USCIS Is In the Process of Addressing Internal Fraud Vulnerabilities: 

USCIS's adjudication procedures are also vulnerable to internal 
conspiracies that have allowed ineligible individuals to receive lawful 
permanent residency. For example, in June 2006, ICE arrested a USCIS 
adjudicator for conspiring with a business that prepared applications 
for permanent residency based on fraudulent marriages and 
documentation. According to ICE agents and USCIS officials familiar 
with the case, the adjudicator instructed applicants for permanent 
residency not to show up for their scheduled interview. According to 
USCIS field office officials, at the end of the business day, this 
adjudicator would find the application files of the applicants who were 
instructed not to show up for the interview that day, and process them 
himself. He would approve the application and order their permanent 
residency cards. As a result of this arrest, this particular field 
office has changed its procedures for assigning "no-show" cases to 
adjudicators. Instead of adjudicators being able to select which of 
these cases they will process, the field office now randomly assigns 
them to adjudicators. In another case, a former Supervisory District 
Adjudications Officer pled guilty to bribery of a public official who 
used brokers who were willing to pay for falsely made immigration 
documents. The former supervisor personally received $600,000 in bribes 
and the brokers together received more than $2,500,000. 

USCIS does not know the extent of this vulnerability or if others like 
it exist in other offices. According to the Chief of USCIS's Internal 
Review Field Programs, within OSI, USCIS is in the process of 
developing a systematic approach to identifying internal fraud and 
evaluating its internal controls to prevent internal conspiracies and 
employee misconduct that contribute to vulnerabilities in USCIS's 
adjudication processes. For example, OSI convened a task force that 
analyzed the results of previous DHS Inspector General investigations 
for internal fraud schemes. On the basis of this analysis, the task 
force identified several major internal controls, such as access to 
approval stamps and controls over the creation of alien files, that it 
plans to evaluate. On the basis of the results of these reviews, OSI 
plans to determine if changes are needed to USCIS's internal control 
procedures and whether to recommend such changes to USCIS's senior 
management committee. In addition, OSI is developing work plans with 
major milestones and time frames for implementing recommendations 
approved by USCIS's senior management. 

Conclusions: 

USCIS initiated a series of Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments 3 
years ago as the initial step toward mitigating or eliminating 
vulnerabilities in its processes for granting immigration benefits, 
including the benefit of lawful permanent residency. While four of 
these assessments--petitions for skilled and unskilled workers, 
spouses, and relatives from Yemen, and applications for asylum--have 
identified vulnerabilities that need to be addressed, USCIS has not 
established a roadmap with timetables for deciding what actions to 
take, what USCIS organizational units will be responsible for 
implementing those actions, and a timetable for implementing agreed- 
upon actions. Without such a roadmap, USCIS will not have reasonable 
assurance that the vulnerabilities will be addressed in a timely 
manner. Moreover, the vulnerabilities identified will persist, 
increasing the risk that ineligible individuals will be granted lawful 
permanent residency. 

Current guidance that leaves decisions to verify petitioner-submitted 
evidence to the discretion of adjudicators is not effective for 
identifying and preventing fraud. USCIS benefit fraud and compliance 
assessments have revealed that USCIS has approved fraudulent petitions 
and that verifying petitioner-submitted evidence could have mitigated 
this fraud. While various USCIS internal systems, as well as external 
databases, can be valuable in verifying petitioner-submitted evidence, 
USCIS procedures giving adjudicators discretion on whether to check 
petitioner-submitted evidence does not require that these valuable 
resources be used. We recognize that it would be impossible to verify 
all petitioner-submitted information and that verifying submitted 
evidence represents a resource commitment that needs to be balanced 
with USCIS's customer service and production-related objectives. 
However, without requirements on what evidence for family-and 
employment-based petitions should be verified, this vulnerability will 
remain, allowing ineligible individuals to obtain lawful permanent 
residency. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that findings from USCIS benefit fraud and compliance 
assessments are acted upon, and to enhance USCIS's overall fraud 
detection efforts, we recommend that the Director of USCIS: 

* prepare a roadmap for each of the four outstanding benefit fraud and 
compliance assessments (petitions for skilled and unskilled workers, 
spouses, and relatives from Yemen, and applications for asylum) that 
delineates (1) timetables for deciding what actions to take, (2) which 
USCIS organizational units will be responsible for implementing those 
actions, and (3) a timetable for implementing agreed-upon actions; and: 

* modify adjudication procedures for family-and employment-based 
petitions to include requirements on what evidence should be verified. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for official comment. 
DHS and USCIS agreed with our recommendations and their comments are 
reprinted in appendix II. Regarding our recommendation to modify 
adjudication procedures to include requirements on what evidence should 
be verified, USCIS stated that it will modify adjudication guidance and 
procedures when the results of a BFCA indicates the need to do so. 
USCIS also provided technical comments, which we considered and 
incorporated where appropriate. DOJ had no comments on the report. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, the Attorney 
General, and other interested parties. The report also will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Richard M. Stana: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report addresses the following questions: 

* What do available data show about the extent of national security 
concerns discovered during United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Service (USCIS) background checks for lawful permanent residence 
applications? 

* What issues has USCIS encountered in its background check processes 
and what actions have been taken to resolve those issues? 

* To what extent has USCIS addressed identified vulnerabilities in its 
adjudications procedures for permanent residency? 

To determine what available data show about of the extent of national 
security concerns discovered during USCIS background checks for lawful 
permanent residence applicants, we obtained data on the number of 
permanent residence applications that were referred to USCIS's Office 
of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) for national security 
reasons from January 2006, when FDNS began capturing these data, 
through May 2007, the date of our request for this information and 
related adjudication decision information about those applications. We 
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the source of the data 
and the controls FDNS had in place to maintain the integrity of the 
data and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for 
purposes of our report. We also interviewed USCIS and Immigration, 
Customs, and Enforcement (ICE) officials about the extent to which 
individuals posing threats to national security or public safety 
applied for permanent residency under various immigration categories, 
such as religious workers and alien workers, and obtained statistics on 
national security cases referred to FDNS. Specifically, we obtained 
FDNS data for all benefit applications showing the extent to which 
cases referred to FDNS for national security reasons involved known or 
suspected terrorists (KST) and non-KSTs. To better understand the 
nature of the national security cases and the related information 
provided by the FBI about them--i.e., whether the individual was the 
subject of an investigation or was mentioned in association with 
another investigation, and whether the concern was related to national 
security or criminal activity--we performed a content analysis of a 
random sample of 100 FBI name check responses received from January 
through June 2007. FDNS originally selected this sample to determine 
how often the FBI name check provided unique information not available 
from the other two background checks. We also analyzed USCIS's 
policies, procedures and guidance for referring national security cases 
to FDNS, as well as eligibility requirements defined in section 212 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and deportability provisions 
defined in section 237 of the INA. 

To identify what issues USCIS has encountered in its background check 
processes and what actions have been taken to resolve those issues, we 
analyzed USCIS policies and procedures for conducting queries of the 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), FBI fingerprint 
checks, and FBI name checks, as well as related interagency memoranda 
of understanding on requesting and conducting FBI name checks. We also 
analyzed USCIS data on pending FBI name check responses from May 2006 
through September 2008 and assessed USCIS's and the FBI's joint plan to 
eliminate the backlog of pending name checks and improve the FBI's 
efficiency in conducting name checks. We interviewed knowledgeable 
agency officials about the source of USCIS's pending FBI name check 
data and the controls USCIS had in place to maintain the integrity of 
the data and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of our report. We discussed the actions the FBI and USCIS 
had taken and planned to take to improve the name check program with 
USCIS's Deputy Director, the Directors of USCIS's National Security and 
Records Verification Directorate (NSRV) and FDNS, and the Section Chief 
for the FBI's National Name Check Program. We also discussed background 
check issues with officials from the FBI's Office of General Counsel 
and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force; ICE; and the Department 
of Homeland Security's (DHS) Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Ombudsman. 

To determine the extent to which USCIS was addressing vulnerabilities 
in its adjudication procedures, we collected and analyzed FDNS reports 
on benefit fraud and compliance assessments (BFCA) of applications for 
replacement permanent resident cards, petitions for religious workers, 
and petitions for immigrant employment benefits, as well as the 
proposed rule changes for filing petitions for religious workers 
published in the Federal Register. We interviewed FDNS managers 
responsible for administering the BFCAs, reviewed documentation 
outlining the BFCAs' design and implementation, and determined that the 
results were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We 
also obtained information on high-profile ICE investigations of 
immigration fraud and discussed with ICE agents familiar with these 
cases the potential vulnerabilities in USCIS adjudications processes 
that facilitate fraud. In addition, we analyzed current standard 
operating procedures and other guidance provided to adjudicators 
related to permanent residence applications and related petitions as 
well as related policy memoranda. We also compared how USCIS addressed 
the findings of its BFCAs with criteria in Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 31] and with standard 
practices in program and project management for defining, designing, 
and executing programs.[Footnote 32] We also interviewed the Chief of 
the Internal Review Division and the Chief of Internal Review Field 
Programs within USCIS's Office of Security and Integrity (OSI) to 
determine the extent of internal fraud and actions being taken to 
mitigate internal fraud. Finally, we obtained USCIS's draft responses 
to recommendations in our previous report on immigration benefit 
fraud[Footnote 33] and discussed the status of USCIS's efforts to 
address those recommendations with appropriate USCIS officials. 

In addition to those officials mentioned above, we visited and 
interviewed officials in three USCIS service centers--the National 
Benefits Center, the California Service Center, and the Nebraska 
Service Center--to discuss their views on the extent to which 
individuals who pose threats to national security attempt to become 
lawful permanent residents, issues concerning background checks of 
individuals applying or petitioning for permanent residency, and 
vulnerabilities in current adjudications procedures. We also visited 
and interviewed officials in 4 USCIS field offices located in Atlanta, 
Georgia; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; and New York, New 
York, for the same purposes. We chose these offices because together 
they adjudicated about 35 percent of all permanent resident 
applications in 2007, as well as nearly half of all family-and 
employment-based petitions (48 percent and 47 percent, respectively). 
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of service centers and 
field offices to visit, the results from our interviews with USCIS 
officials in these offices cannot be generalized to USCIS offices 
nationwide.[Footnote 34] However, our interviews with officials in 
these offices enhanced our understanding of the extent to which 
individuals who pose threats to national security attempt to become 
lawful permanent residents, as well as issues with background checks 
and procedural vulnerabilities. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

December 2, 2008: 

Homeland Security: 

Mr. Richard M. Stana: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Stana:

Re: Draft Report GAO-09-55, Immigration Benefits: Actions Needed to 
Address Vulnerabilities in Process for Granting Permanent Residency 
(GAO Job Code 440628): 

The Department of Homeland Security appreciates the opportunity to 
review and comment on the draft report referenced above. The United 
States Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends that the 
Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) take two steps to help ensure that findings from USCIS benefit 
fraud and compliance assessments are acted upon and to enhance overall 
fraud detection efforts. 

Specifically GAO recommends that USCIS prepare a roadmap for each of 
the four outstanding benefit fraud and compliance assessments 
(petitions for skilled and unskilled workers, spouses, relatives from 
Yemen, and applications for asylum) that delineates (1) timetables for 
deciding what actions to take, (2) what USCIS organizational units will 
be responsible for implementing those actions, and (3) a timetable for 
implementing agreed upon actions. USCIS officials agree with the 
recommendation. 

GAO also recommends that USCIS modify adjudication procedures for 
family- and employment- based petitions to include requirements on what 
evidence should be verified. USCIS officials agree. When a Benefit 
Fraud and Compliance Assessment (BFCA) relating to an 1-130 (Immigrant 
Petition for Alien Relative) and/or 1-140 (Immigrant Petition for Alien 
Worker) petition is issued and modifications to the adjudicative 
processes are required, USCIS will modify its guidance and procedures 
to ensure compliance with the requirements outlined in the BFCA. Under 
documented special circumstances, officers may need to retain a certain 
amount of flexible discretion. 

Technical comments have been provided under separate cover and should 
help clarify particular statements prior to finalizing the report. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Jerald E. Levine: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Michael P. Dino, Assistant 
Director, and E. Jerry Seigler, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this 
assignment. Carlos M. Garcia and Danielle Pakdaman made significant 
contributions to the work. Amanda Miller and Virginia Chanley assisted 
with design and methodology. Frances Cook provided legal support, John 
Brummet and Kate Brentzel provided expertise on overseas immigrant 
application issues, and Avrum Ashery and Lydia Araya developed the 
report's graphics. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] USCIS would conduct these three background checks again for those 
Asylees who apply for permanent residency. 

[2] GAO, Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to 
Manage Diversity Visa Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1174] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 
2007). 

[3] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to the 
requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 
(FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining 
internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant to FMFIA, the 
Office of Management and Budget issued Circular A-123, revised December 
21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements for assessing the 
reporting on internal controls. Internal control standards and the 
definition of internal control in Circular A-123 are based on GAO's 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. 

[4] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management©, (Newton Square, PA: 2006). 

[5] GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions 
Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-259] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 10, 2006). 

[6] The National Benefits Center processes (1) applications for 
adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, (2) applications for 
employment authorization, (3) applications for travel documents, and 
(4) petitions for alien relatives. 

[7] In some cases, undocumented aliens living in the United States who 
are eligible for permanent residency cannot apply for adjustment of 
status in the United States and must return to their country of origin 
to apply for an immigrant visa. 

[8] There are, for example, four categories for granting permanent 
residence based on employment for priority workers, professionals with 
advanced degrees or persons with exceptional ability, skilled or 
professional workers, and special immigrants, and various visa 
subcategories. Family-based visa categories include the immediate 
relatives of a U.S. citizen and the spouse or unmarried son or daughter 
of a lawful permanent resident. 

[9] Immediate relatives include spouses, parents of citizens ages 21 
and older, and citizens' unmarried children under age 21. See 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1101(b)(1). 

[10] Eligible U.S. relatives file a Form I-130 Immigrant Petition for 
Alien Relative and U.S. employers file a Form I-140 Immigrant Petition 
for Alien Worker. Certain categories of immigrants, such as special 
immigrant religious workers and battered or abused spouses and children 
of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and others may file 
their own petition (Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or 
Special Immigrant) at this stage of the process. Other individuals may 
apply for certain kinds of immigration benefits, such as refugee status 
or asylum, which may lead to an application for lawful permanent 
residency. 

[11] For U.S. citizens who are petitioning for a relative, the family 
member must be (1) a spouse, (2) a son or daughter, (3) a sibling, or 
(4) a parent. For lawful permanent residents, the family member must be 
(1) a spouse or (2) an unmarried son or daughter. 

[12] Aliens outside the United States who are seeking lawful permanent 
residency also need an approved petition, but the second step for them 
is to apply for an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate in their 
current country of residence which enables them to seek admission to 
the United States as a lawful permanent resident. 

[13] U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Security Check Procedures for 
Immigration Applications and Petitions, Audit Report 08-24, 
(Washington, D.C.: June 2008). 

[14] We did not include an assessment of the quality of the FBI name 
check process as part of our review since the DOJ OIG had already begun 
its assessment. 

[15] See GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening: Recommendations to 
Promote a Comprehensive and Coordinated Approach to Terrorist-Related 
Screening, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-253T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2007). 

[16] According to FDNS, the status of a KST or non-KST may change over 
time by moving between these categories or a non-national security 
concern for a number of reasons, including the removal from or addition 
to the terrorist watch list. 

[17] The FBI raised its name check fees effective October 1, 2007, and 
USCIS raised fees for processing immigrant benefit applications 
effective July 30, 2007. 

[18] See GAO-06-259. 

[19] See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

[20] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management©, (Newton Square, PA: 2006). 

[21] In addition, in September 2008 FDNS released its BFCA on the H-1B 
visa for nonimmigrant workers in specialty occupations, such as 
computer professionals, engineers, accountants, attorneys, or 
university professors and teachers. However, because the H-1B visa 
pertains solely to nonimmigrants, we did not include the results of 
this assessment in this report. 

[22] FDNS sampled cases involving only special immigrant religious 
workers who can apply for permanent residency, not nonimmigrant 
religious workers who are not eligible to do so. 

[23] FDNS, however, plans to assign staff at overseas USCIS offices to 
assist adjudicators in the verification of aliens' educational or work 
experience claims. 

[24] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-259]. 

[25] U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Security 
Matrix Project Recommendations Report, prepared by BearingPoint, 
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003). 

[26] The CCD stores information about U.S. citizens, immigrant visa 
applicants, and nonimmigrant visa applicants, including names, 
addresses, birth dates, race, identification numbers such as Social 
Security numbers and alien registration numbers, and country of origin. 

[27] AutoTrack is a transaction-based service provided by Choice Point, 
Inc., that provides access to billions of publicly available current 
and historical public records. Choice Point is a commercial service 
that provides credentialing, background screening, authentication, 
direct marketing and public records services to businesses and 
nonprofit organizations, as well as information, analysis, and 
distribution solutions to advance the efforts of law enforcement, 
public safety, health care, child support enforcement, entitlement, and 
other public agencies. 

[28] Lexis/Nexis is a commercial provider of business information 
solutions to professionals in a variety of areas, including: legal, 
corporate, government, law enforcement, tax, accounting, academia, and 
risk and compliance assessment. 

[29] Procedures instruct an adjudicator to search CLAIMS only if the 
petitioner has not submitted evidence of being a lawful permanent 
resident or naturalized U.S. citizen. The purpose of this search is to 
verify the petitioner's status. 

[30] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[31] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management©, (Newton Square, PA: 2006). 

[32] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-259]. 

[33] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations 
are selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using 
specific characteristics of the population as criteria. Because each 
unit in a population does not have an equal chance to be selected, it 
is possible for a nonprobability sample to contain a systematic bias 
that limits its ability to describe the entire population. 

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