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United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

For Release on Delivery: 

Expected at 3:00 p.m. Wednesday, November 9, 2005: 

DOD Personnel Clearances: 

Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing Problems with DOD's 
Program, But Concerns Remain: 

Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director: 

Defense Capabilities and Management: 

GAO-06-233T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-233T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause up to 
exceptionally grave damage to national security. The Department of 
Defense (DOD) is responsible for about 2 million personnel with 
clearances that allow them access to classified information. While most 
of these clearances are for servicemembers and DOD’s employees and 
contractors, DOD is also responsible for contractors’ clearances for 
more than 20 other agencies, as well as for congressional staff. Due to 
long-standing problems with DOD’s clearance program, GAO designated it 
a high-risk area in January 2005. In February 2005, when DOD 
transferred its personnel security investigative functions to the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the average wait for a top secret 
clearance governmentwide was over 1 year. In June 2005, Executive Order 
13381 gave the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) authority to 
retain or assign to any executive agency any process relating to 
determinations of eligibility for access to classified information. OPM 
is assisting OMB with the development of the plan. 

GAO was asked to assess the government plan. This testimony will 
provide GAO’s preliminary review of how well the government plan (1) 
adheres to the standards of comprehensive strategic planning and (2) 
addresses the timeliness and quality of the security clearance process. 
Finally, GAO will discuss the actions required to remove DOD’s program 
from GAO’s high-risk list. 

What GAO Found: 

We are encouraged by the level of commitment demonstrated by OMB in 
overseeing the preparation of the government plan for addressing 
problems in the personnel security clearance process. The plan 
represents an important step toward addressing some long-standing 
concerns GAO has raised in this area. It includes some elements that a 
comprehensive strategic plan should contain, such as metrics that will 
be used to monitor the timeliness of the security clearance process 
governmentwide. However, the plan provides few details on other 
features that GAO looks for in a comprehensive strategic plan. For 
example, in some cases, the plan does not provide details on discrete 
actions the government would take or their projected completion dates. 
In addition, the plan does not always include details on the resources 
required to accomplish the plan’s objectives. Finally, the plan does 
not describe potential risks or mitigation plans to address potential 
risks. 

Although the government plan establishes metrics to address the 
timeliness of the security clearance process, they focus on some phases 
of the process more than others. Specifically, the plan identifies a 
wide variety of metrics for monitoring the timeliness of security 
clearance investigations, but it does little to address timeliness in 
the adjudication phase of the process. The government plan also 
provides quarterly goals for different types of investigations. 
However, the plan does not identify baseline measures or interim goals 
for average adjudication processing time. 

Although it explicitly acknowledges that agencies have concerns about 
the quality of investigations and adjudications, the government plan 
devotes little attention to monitoring and improving the quality of the 
personnel security clearance process. The plan’s primary metric for 
measuring the quality of investigations—the percentage of 
investigations returned by requesting agencies due to incomplete case 
files—is not, by itself, a valid indicator of the quality of 
investigative work. Other or additional statistics, such as the number 
of counterintelligence leads generated from security clearance 
investigations, may be needed. The government plan did not identify a 
metric for assessing the quality of adjudications, although GAO and 
other agencies have identified actions that would facilitate monitoring 
and improvement of the quality of this portion of the personnel 
security clearance process. 

DOD must correct previously identified problems before its personnel 
security clearance program can be removed from the high-risk list. 
Before removing DOD’s personnel security clearance program from the 
high-risk list, GAO will examine whether OMB, OPM, and DOD have 
satisfied certain criteria, including the establishment of leadership 
support, sufficient resources to resolve the risk, and a corrective 
action plan. GAO’s criteria also include the presence of a program to 
monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability 
of any corrective actions and the agency’s ability to demonstrate the 
implementation of corrective measures. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-233T. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at (202) 
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Chairman Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the government plan for 
addressing problems in the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel 
security clearance program. Clearances granted through such programs 
allow personnel access to classified information. Unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information can cause exceptionally grave 
damage to national security. As you know, Mr. Chairman, in January of 
this year, we added DOD's personnel security clearance program to our 
list of government high-risk operations.[Footnote 1] Our high-risk list 
focuses on those major programs and operations that need urgent 
attention and transformation in order to ensure that our national 
government functions in the most economical, efficient, and effective 
manner possible. Also, some federal programs and operations are 
designated high risk because of their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, 
waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

We declared DOD's personnel security clearance program a high-risk area 
in January 2005, in part because of long-standing delays in completing 
requests for security clearances. We have reported backlogs and 
impediments to timeliness and quality throughout DOD's personnel 
security clearance process. DOD has faced challenges in the past in 
setting and projecting the requirements for clearances, submitting 
requests for investigations, conducting timely investigations, and 
adjudicating, or determining, whether someone is eligible for a 
clearance. We also found that DOD had been unable to accurately 
estimate the size of its clearance backlog. 

Problems with timeliness and quality in the personnel security 
clearance process can affect our national security. For example, delays 
in renewing security clearances for personnel who are already doing 
classified work can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of 
classified information. Moreover, delays in providing initial security 
clearances for previously noncleared personnel can result in other 
negative consequences, such as additional costs and delays in 
completing national security-related contracts, lost-opportunity costs, 
and problems retaining the best-qualified personnel. Given the vast 
scope of DOD's personnel security clearance program, these negative 
effects resound across government. Within DOD, the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is responsible for the clearances 
issued to approximately 2 million personnel and for coordinating and 
implementing DOD-wide policies related to accessing classified 
information. While most of the clearances DOD handles are for 
servicemembers and DOD's federal employees and contractor personnel, 
the Office of the Under Secretary for Intelligence is also responsible 
for the clearances of contractors for more than 20 other federal 
agencies, as well as the clearances of staff in the federal 
government's legislative branch. 

My testimony today will focus on the government plan and its relevance 
to improving DOD's personnel security clearance process and how well it 
addresses our past concerns. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
took the lead in developing the government plan, and the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), which is now responsible for 90 percent of 
the clearance investigations in the federal government, assisted OMB in 
developing this plan. Because we have had a limited time to review the 
government plan, we have been unable to conduct a thorough assessment. 
Therefore, my preliminary observations will focus on four key areas. 
First, I will describe how well the government plan adheres to the 
standards of comprehensive strategic planning. Next, I will provide our 
evaluation of how well the plan addresses concerns about the timeliness 
and the quality of personnel security clearances. Finally, I will 
discuss the actions required to remove the program from our high-risk 
list. I would like to note that, at your request, we have recently 
begun a review focusing on the quality of top secret security clearance 
investigations and adjudications for contractor personnel. As of 
February 2005, these personnel waited, on average, over 1 year for DOD 
to determine clearance eligibility. As part of that review, we will 
examine the government plan more fully and provide an assessment in our 
report to the Subcommittee. 

My statement is based on our preliminary review of the government plan 
and previous GAO reports and analyses. Our work was performed from 
October 2005 through November 2005 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. In our preliminary review, we 
considered what was presented in the government plan in light of 
elements from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 as well as relevant prior reports from GAO and DOD's Inspector 
General. 

Summary: 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the government plan represents an important 
step toward addressing some of the long-standing concerns we have 
raised about the personnel security clearance process. We are 
encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB has demonstrated in 
preparing this plan. The government plan provides many metrics that 
will be used to monitor the timeliness of the clearance process 
governmentwide, but it provides few details on other elements that a 
comprehensive strategic plan might contain. For example, in some cases, 
the plan does not provide details on discrete actions the government 
would take or projected completion dates for actions the plan 
identifies. In addition, the plan does not always include details on 
the resources required to accomplish the plan's objectives. Finally, 
the plan does not describe potential risks or mitigation plans to 
address potential risks. 

The government plan identifies a wide variety of metrics for monitoring 
the timeliness of security clearances. Passage of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 addressed many of our past 
concerns about metrics and monitoring the program. For example, the act 
requires that, during the period between December 17, 2006, and 
December 17, 2009, each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a 
determination on at least 80 percent of all applications for personnel 
security clearances within an average of 120 days of receiving the 
security clearance request. However, the government plan is 
inconsistent in its treatment of some timeliness issues. Specifically, 
the plan provides quarterly goals for different types of 
investigations, but it does not identify interim goals for average 
adjudication processing time. In addition to metrics, the government 
plan describes the use of information technology to positively affect 
the timeliness of clearances. 

The government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and 
improving the quality of the personnel security clearance process, 
although it explicitly acknowledges that agencies have concerns about 
the quality of investigations and adjudications. The primary metric 
found in the government plan for measuring the quality of 
investigations is the percentage of investigations returned by 
requesting agencies because of incomplete case files. Because the 
number of investigations returned for rework is not--by itself--a valid 
indicator of the quality of investigative work, use of other or 
additional statistics such as the number of counterintelligence leads 
generated from investigations may be needed. The government plan did 
not identify a metric for assessing the quality of adjudications, 
although we and other agencies have identified actions that would 
facilitate monitoring and improvement of the quality of this portion of 
the security clearance process. However, the government plan contains 
provisions for an investigator training and quality assurance program. 

Before removing the security clearance process from our high-risk list, 
we will examine whether OMB, OPM, and DOD have satisfied the criteria 
we have established for removing a high-risk designation. As we 
established in November 2000, these criteria include leadership 
support, sufficient resources to resolve the risk, and a corrective 
action plan. Our criteria also include the presence of a program to 
monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability 
of any corrective actions and the ability to demonstrate the 
implementation of corrective measures. DOD must undertake many 
corrective actions to implement our recommendations and to correct 
previously identified problems before its personnel security clearance 
program can be removed from its high-risk list. 

Background: 

On June 28, 2005, I testified before this subcommittee on DOD's 
personnel security clearance program.[Footnote 2] I noted that while 
DOD has taken steps to address some of the problems that led us to 
designate its personnel security clearance program a high-risk area, we 
found continuing challenges in each stage of DOD's clearance process. I 
also noted that, despite partially concurring with our May 2004 
recommendation,[Footnote 3] DOD had not developed and implemented an 
integrated, comprehensive management plan to eliminate the backlog, 
reduce the delays in conducting investigations and determining 
eligibility for security clearances, and overcome the impediments that 
could allow such problems to recur. 

On the day before your June hearing, the President signed Executive 
Order 13381, which is to expire on July 1, 2006, and has the stated 
purpose of strengthening processes for determining eligibility for 
access to classified national security information.[Footnote 4] The 
order stated that the Director of OMB may assign, in whole or in part, 
to the head of any agency, either solely or jointly, any process 
relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified 
national security information. 

At the request of the OMB Deputy Director, OMB and GAO officials met on 
July 12, 2005, to discuss OMB's general strategy for addressing the 
problems that had led to our high-risk designation for DOD's personnel 
security clearance program. Among other things, the Deputy Director 
indicated that (1) OMB staff would work with DOD and OPM to develop 
preliminary milestones and metrics for correcting problems associated 
with the program and (2) GAO would be asked to comment on that 
information in August or September. We indicated that GAO would need to 
remain independent, but could provide general comments to OMB about 
milestones, timeframes, criteria, and other materials developed by OMB 
and other executive branch agencies. The timeframe of August or 
September for the next meeting with OMB corresponded roughly with the 
up to 90 days after selection that was specified in the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 for the head of the 
identified lead agency to develop, in consultation with the appropriate 
committees of Congress and each authorized adjudicative agency, a plan 
to reduce the length of the personnel security clearance 
process.[Footnote 5] 

Plan Identifies Metrics but Lacks Details on Other Critical Elements of 
a Strategic Plan: 

The government plan provides many metrics that will be used to monitor 
the timeliness of the clearance process governmentwide, but the plan 
detailed few of the other elements that a comprehensive strategic plan 
might contain. The Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993[Footnote 6] identified some of the elements that might be found in 
a comprehensive strategic plan. Those elements include a comprehensive 
mission statement, general goals and objectives, a description of how 
the goals and objectives are to be achieved, key external factors that 
could significantly affect the achievement of the goals and objectives, 
and a description and schedule of the program evaluations used in 
establishing and revising general goals and objectives. GAO has also 
published an evaluator's guide to use in evaluating strategic plans. 
This guide discusses key performance indicators and the means to verify 
and validate the measured values.[Footnote 7] 

The government plan provides numerous metrics to monitor the timeliness 
of the clearance process. For example, the plan requires more accurate 
projections of the numbers of clearances needed, statistics on how long 
it takes to process a request for the investigation once the request 
has been made, information on the time required to perform various 
types of investigations, and the amount of time needed to determine 
clearance eligibility. Many of the metrics will be monitored on a 
quarterly or yearly basis according to the example tables contained in 
the plan. Another positive feature of the plan is that the same metrics 
will be used in many governmental agencies, making it possible to roll 
the data up and obtain a larger federal government perspective. 

Many portions of the government plan fail to include important elements 
of strategic planning that could influence how effectively and 
efficiently the plan is carried out. I will illustrate our concerns 
using two example sections from the plan. In the first case, the plan 
includes a section on how the government intends to address 
reciprocity.[Footnote 8] For those who are unfamiliar with that term, 
reciprocity is the extent to which departments, agencies, or military 
services accept clearances and access granted by other departments, 
agencies, or military services. The government plan does not include 
discrete actions with projected completion dates that could be used to 
monitor interim progress toward the goal of greater reciprocity. The 
plan overlooks such actions and related timeframes even though a June 
17, 2005, memorandum written by the Deputy Director of OMB indicates 
that the plan for each of the 25 areas on GAO's high-risk list should 
set goals and milestones that, if implemented will reduce the risk of 
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. A second example of the 
security clearance plan's failure to follow principles of strategic 
planning can be found in the plan's section on requirements for access 
to national, state, and local record systems. Nothing in this section 
of the plan mentions actions and milestones for actions, or how OMB or 
the federal government could affect access to state and local records. 
The plan also fails to consider whether additional monetary or human 
capital resources would be needed for that effort, what external risks 
could adversely affect the government plan, or what steps the 
government could use to mitigate those risks. 

Plan Emphasizes Timeliness of the Clearance Process: 

The government plan identifies a wide variety of metrics that can be 
used to track the timeliness of clearances, and it describes generally 
some initiatives for speeding the processing of clearances. In February 
2004, we expressed continuing concerns about the size of DOD's backlog 
and its accurate measurement.[Footnote 9] At that time, we recommended 
that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop timeliness 
definitions and measures, and monitor the security clearance backlog at 
each stage of the personnel security clearance process. 

Passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
addressed our concerns about metrics and monitoring within the larger 
context of the total federal government, specifying timeframes for the 
completion of both investigations and adjudications and requiring an 
annual report to Congress detailing the timeliness of the clearance 
process. Specifically, the act requires that not later than December 
17, 2006, and ending December 17, 2009, each authorized adjudicative 
agency shall make a determination on at least 80 percent of all 
applicants for personnel security clearances within an average of 120 
days--90 days to complete the investigation and 30 days to complete the 
adjudication--of receiving the security clearance application.[Footnote 
10] Also, not later than February 15, 2006, and annually thereafter 
through 2011, OMB must provide a report to appropriate congressional 
committees on the progress made during the preceding year toward 
meeting these goals.[Footnote 11] 

The government plan identifies numerous management reports and metrics 
that can be used to monitor all stages of the personnel security 
clearance process. To monitor the submission of requests for 
investigations, the plan indicates that the government will require 
that submissions be processed within an average of 14 calendar days of 
the subject completing the security clearance questionnaire. For the 
investigation stage, the plan shows baseline measures for how long it 
took to complete the average investigation and the investigative 
workload. This type of information is shown for multiple quarters in 
fiscal year 2005. The plan also provides quarterly goals--expressed as 
average days taken to complete an investigation--for different types of 
investigations. The adjudication-timeliness goals mandated by the 
National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 are 
noted in the plan, but it does not identify baseline measures or 
interim goals for average adjudication processing time. 

In addition to metrics, the government plan describes the use of 
information technology to positively affect the timeliness of 
clearances. For example, OPM has deployed the electronic Questionnaire 
for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) system for a subgroup of users 
and indicates that all agencies will be required to submit their 
requests for investigations with e-QIP by March 2006. OPM is also 
involved in an effort to streamline clearance processing by digitally 
sending completed investigation files to adjudicative agencies for 
review, approval, and submission to the investigation provider. 
However, the plan provides few details that would allow us to assess 
the maturity of either initiative. 

Plan Needs to Build More Quality into the Clearance Process: 

The government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and 
improving the quality of the personnel security clearance process. At 
the same time, the government plan explicitly acknowledges that 
agencies have concerns about the quality of investigations and 
adjudications. Specifically, the plan says that "a lack of reciprocity 
often arises due to reluctance of the gaining activity to inherit 
accountability for what may be an unacceptable risk due to poor quality 
investigations and/or adjudications." These concerns exist despite the 
fact that since 1997, all federal agencies have been subject to a 
common set of general personnel security investigative standards and 
adjudicative guidelines for determining whether service members, 
government employees, government contractors, and others are eligible 
to receive security clearances.[Footnote 12] 

The primary metric found in the government plan for measuring quality 
of investigations is the percentage of investigations returned by 
requesting agencies due to incomplete case files, but use of that 
metric is problematic. In 1999, we reported that the number of 
investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator 
of the quality of investigative work, because adjudication officials 
said they were reluctant to return incomplete investigations in 
anticipation of further delays.[Footnote 13] Regardless of whether this 
metric remains a part of the plan, developers of the plan may want to 
consider adding other indicators of the quality of investigations, such 
as the number of counterintelligence leads generated from security 
clearance investigations and forwarded to relevant units. Our 1999 
review of a random sample of investigations is another example of a 
method that can be used to evaluate quality. This type of periodic 
review could be performed by an office of the inspector general or some 
other unit that is not affiliated with OPM's investigations facility in 
order to insure the independence of the findings. 

The government plan indicates that OPM has developed an investigator 
training and quality assurance program. This is a positive step. Our 
prior work has shown that investigation quality can be negatively 
affected when investigators are insufficiently trained. However, the 
plan does not discuss implementation of the training program or the 
metrics associated with the quality assurance program. 

The government plan does not identify a metric for assessing the 
quality of adjudications. As the Defense Personnel Security Research 
Center has noted, it is difficult to measure the degree to which 
adjudicative standards are met.[Footnote 14] Nevertheless, GAO and 
other agencies have identified actions that would facilitate monitoring 
and improvement of the quality of this portion of the security 
clearance process. For example, a 2001 GAO report recommended that DOD 
require adjudicators to use common explanatory guidance and document 
adjudication determinations.[Footnote 15] In addition, a 1998 DOD 
Inspector General report suggested implementation of a peer review 
program among DOD adjudication facilities.[Footnote 16] 

The government plan does not contain initiatives for improving 
adjudication quality. We have, however, previously reported 
recommendations for improving DOD's adjudication quality.[Footnote 17] 
In our 2001 report, we recommended that DOD make four major 
improvements to its adjudicative process. First, DOD should establish 
detailed documentation requirements to support adjudication decisions. 
Second, the department should require that all DOD adjudicators use 
common explanatory guidance. Third, it should establish common 
adjudicator training requirements and develop appropriate continuing 
education opportunities for all DOD adjudicators. Finally, DOD should 
establish a common quality assurance program to be implemented by 
officials in all DOD adjudication facilities and monitor compliance 
through annual reporting. DOD has indicated progress on some of these 
initiatives such as professional adjudicator certification and 
continuing education opportunities. The government plan may be able to 
broaden the DOD initiatives to governmentwide actions for improving 
adjudication quality. 

Actions Required to Remove DOD's Clearance Program from the High-Risk 
List: 

DOD must undertake many corrective actions to implement our 
recommendations and to correct previously identified problems before we 
will remove DOD's personnel security clearance program from our high- 
risk list. Many of the issues about timeliness and quality are being 
addressed in actions that OMB and OPM will monitor as part of the 
government plan. Those actions need to address the criteria that we use 
in determining whether or not to remove a high-risk designation. These 
criteria, which we defined in November 2000, are shown in Figure 
1.[Footnote 18] 

Figure 1: Criteria Agencies Must Meet Before High-Risk Designations Can 
Be Removed: 

* A demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support to 
address the risk(s); 

* The capacity (that is, the people and other resources) to resolve the 
risk(s); 

* A corrective action plan(s) that: 
- defines the root causes, 
- identifies effective solutions, and; 
- provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near 
term, including but not limited to steps necessary to implement 
solutions we recommend; 

* A program instituted to monitor and independently validate the 
effectiveness and sustainability of corrective actions; 

* The ability to demonstrate progress in having implemented corrective 
measures. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Since our high-risk list began in 1990, the government has taken high- 
risk problems seriously and has made long-needed progress toward 
correcting them. During the past 15 years, those efforts have resulted 
in 16 high-risk areas being removed from the list. For example, in 
January 2005, sufficient progress had been made to warrant the removal 
of a high-risk designation from three areas: student financial aid 
programs, Federal Aviation Administration financial management, and 
Forest Service financial management. 

We will remove a high-risk designation when agency actions, including 
those in response to our recommendations, result in significant 
progress toward resolving a high-risk problem. 

Concluding Observations: 

Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged that OMB has undertaken the development 
of a governmentwide plan for improving the personnel security clearance 
process. Still, much remains to be done to develop a more comprehensive 
plan for improving the timeliness and quality of the security clearance 
process. Developing specific steps to address the general concerns that 
I identified today should move OMB and the executive branch agencies 
closer to that goal. As we stated in our high-risk report, perseverance 
by OMB and the agencies to implement our prior recommendations and 
continued oversight, such as that shown by you and this committee, are 
both essential to bringing lasting solutions to this high-risk area. In 
short, this is a good first step in the right direction. We will 
continue to monitor the security clearance program, as we do for all of 
the programs on our high-risk list. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 
have at this time. 

Staff Contact and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at 
202-512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions 
to this testimony include Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Kurt A. 
Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; Sara Hackley; Kenneth E. Patton; William J. 
Rigazio; and Jennifer L. Young. 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues 
Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-71SU. 
Washington, D.C.: November 2005. 

DOD's High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed for 
DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed. GAO-06-113T. Washington, D.C.: 
October 6, 2005. 

Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance 
Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles 
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk 
Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005. 

Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD 
Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, 
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05- 
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires 
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T. 
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005. 

GAO 2005 High-Risk Update. GAO-05-350T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 
2005. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 
2005. 

Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 
Commission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.: 
September 14, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce 
Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for 
Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs 
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry 
Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004. 

Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local 
Law Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2004. 

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its 
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332. 
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to 
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington, 
D.C.: February 9, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce but Additional Actions Needed. 
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for 
Top Secret Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 
2001. 

DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance 
Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.: 
September 20, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security 
Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: August 
24, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being 
Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose 
National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February 
16, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose 
National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 
1999. 

Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to 
Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.: 
September 7, 1999. 

Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History 
Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999. 

Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to 
and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245. 
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998. 

Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R. 
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996. 

Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R. 
Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996. 

Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive 
Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 
1995. 

Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM's Role in 
Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 
1995. 

Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations 
and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March 
24, 1995. 

Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the 
Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995. 

Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R. Washington, D.C.: 
March 4, 1994. 

Nuclear Security: DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance 
Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993. 

Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative 
Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 
1993. 

DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided 
When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.: 
May 5, 1993. 

Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security 
Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14. 
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. 

Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by 
Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 
1992. 

Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security 
Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990. 

(350778): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2005). 

[2] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but 
Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk 
Designation, GAO-05-842T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005). 

[3] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to 
Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance 
Eligibility for Industry Personnel, GAO-04-632 (Washington, D.C.: May 
26, 2004). 

[4] The White House, Executive Order 13381, Strengthening Processes 
Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified National 
Security Information (June 27, 2005). 

[5] 50 U.S.C. § 435b(g). 

[6] Pub. L. No. 103-62. 

[7] GAO, The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Agency 
Annual Performance Plans, GAO/GGD-10.1.20 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 
1998). 

[8] 50 U.S.C. § 435b(d)(1) provides that "all security clearance 
background investigations and determinations completed by an authorized 
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be 
accepted by all agencies." Exceptions to reciprocity are, however, 
permitted on a case-by-case basis under the conditions specified in the 
U.S. Code. 

[9] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to 
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004). 

[10] 50 U.S.C. § 435b(g)(3). Section (g)(2) also provides that the 
timeframe for completing clearances will reduce further once 5 years 
have elapsed from the enactment of the section. At that time, the 
section indicates that to the extent practical, the plan shall require 
each authorized adjudicative agency to make a determination on at least 
90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance 
within an average of 60 days--40 days to complete the investigation and 
20 days to complete the adjudication. 

[11] 50 U.S.C. § 435b(h). 

[12] The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968," 
Memorandum (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 24, 1997). This memorandum approves 
the adjudication guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and 
investigative standards required by Executive Order 12968, Access to 
Classified Information (Aug. 2, 1995). 

[13] GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations 
Pose National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 
27, 1999). 

[14] Ralph M. Carney, Joanne Marshall-Mies, Daniel G. Youpa, and 
Whitney B. Helton-Fauth, Quality Assurance in Defense Adjudication: An 
Adjudicator Workshop for Defining and Assessing Quality, PERSEREC TR 02-
04 (Monterey, Calif.: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, March 
2003). 

[15] GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining 
Eligibility for Top Secret Security Clearances, GAO-01-465 (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001). 

[16] DOD Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Department of 
Defense Adjudication Program, DoDIG 98-124 (Washington, D.C.: 1998). 

[17] GAO-01-465. 

[18] GAO-01-159SP.