

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 30, 1998

TO: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: P.F. Gubanc & D.G. Ogg, Hanford Site Representatives

SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending January 30, 1998

Jan Preston and Doug Volgenau were on site this week to attend the Phase 1 ISMS verification for the K-Basins. Dan Ogg was on leave Thursday and Friday.

A. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): Events this week further delayed resumption of the DOE-RL Readiness Assessment (RA) for PFP "Phase 1" fissile material handling. Specifically:

- DOE-RL discovered that PFP managers are either not fulfilling or are unilaterally delaying prior commitments to Fluor Daniel Hanford (FDH) and DOE-RL (e.g., drill program improvements).
- A DOE-EH representative visited PFP this week and identified concerns to DOE-RL management over the scope of the PFP RA. (DOE-HQ participation was discussed.)
- DOE-EM representatives have requested a PFP "restart plan" for their review prior to "Phase 2". We will advise DNFSB Headquarters as soon as the DOE-RL RA restart date becomes evident.

B. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): The SNFP (managed by Duke Engineering & Services Hanford [DESH]) Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) baskets are being fabricated at the Site Fabrication Shop (operated by Dyncorp) from materials received and inspected by FDH (for Dyncorp). On January 8 and 15, DESH issued surveillance reports documenting receipt inspection deficiencies for the MCO basket material. On January 27, 1998, DESH issued a third surveillance report, placed a "stop work" on MCO basket material receipt and issuance, and requested a formal response by February 10. If the "stop work" is not lifted within the first week of February, the MCO basket fabrication schedule is expected to be delayed.

On January 30, Mr. Gubanc attended the critique for the above "stop work". Observations include:

- A lack of rigor in communications and documentation of deficiencies at nearly every level.
- Ignorance of procedural requirements, and therefore noncompliance, was obvious.
- A fundamental lack of appreciation for the above items by both workers and management.

These are problems of long-standing at Hanford. Resolution of DESH' concerns in early February will be difficult and will require *severe* corrective actions to have any lasting effect.

C. Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS): On January 30, DOE-RL completed its Phase 1 ISMS verification of the K-Basins. The conclusions which were briefed to senior management are:

- Numerous process and procedural deficiencies were identified but nothing which would question the safety of ongoing K-Basins operations.
- The contractors and DOE-RL's understanding of both K-Basins and ISMS were improved.
- Insufficient DOE and contractor management attention has been afforded ISMS implementation. Briefing notes are being sent to Jan Preston. DOE-RL's formal report is expected by February 20.

cc: Board members