

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 30, 2006

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for the Week Ending June 30, 2006

Mr. Quirk was out of the office this week.

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP): The site rep observed the drilling activities on entry hole number 1 at the WTP. On June 29, 2006, the depth passed 275 feet and signs of ground water and indications of the Ringold Formation could be seen in the extracted soil. Contracted geologists are taking samples of the cuttings every five feet. As the drilling breached 220 feet, additional safety controls were implemented because 220 feet is the historic level of the static water on the Hanford site. To date no radioactivity or harmful chemicals have been detected but, as a precaution, an exclusion area has been set up around the drilling area and the cuttings are being placed in 55-gallon drums. Plans are being made to add a second shift to the entry hole drilling activities and the core hole drilling contractor is scheduled to mobilize on-site next week to start coring operations.

The site rep met with various Bechtel National, Inc. managers this week. A discussion was held with a Project Engineering Manager on the installation and testing of fire protection coatings for steel members. Additional information has been requested on the planned qualification testing of intumescent coatings. The site rep conducted a walk-down with the Construction Manager and discussed construction planning, lay-up and maintenance of the High Level Waste and Pretreatment Facilities, and construction problems, including a commodity support beam that was mistakenly cut during the removal of temporary shoring. The site rep also discussed plans to promote and enhance a nuclear safety culture and overall site construction quality with the new Project Director, new Project Manager, and the Manager of Engineering.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): The demolishing of the 232-Z building (former incinerator building) was completed this week (see Hanford Activity Report 6/9/06).

K Basin Closure (KBC): Earlier this month a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis (PISA) was declared for the process bay doors in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (see Hanford Activity Report 6/2/06) and it has been concluded that a positive Unreviewed Safety Question exists because the doors are not thick enough to withstand a wind-driven projectile.

The site rep attended a seminar for KBC Line Managers on conduct of operations. The seminar focused on promoting good communications, using human performance tools, and sharing lessons-learned. The site reps have noted good conduct of operations during the integrated acceptance tests of the hose-in-hose transfer system.

Richland Operations Office (RL): Earlier this month RL hired a Fire Protection Engineer (FPE). RL had been without their own FPE since late last year.