DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 4, 2000

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: M. Sautman and S. Stokes, Hanford Site Representatives

SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending August 4, 2000

A. Management Changes: Harry Boston has replaced Dick French as the Office of River Protection Manager. Beth Bilson will be the acting Department of Energy-Richland (DOE-RL) Deputy Manager for Site Transition until August 11.

B. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP). The SNFP has completed repairs to the Integrated Water Treatment System (IWTS) Sand Filters resulting from the leaky hand-hold. The cause of the leak was determined to be a misaligned gasket. The remaining 17 hand-holds were visually inspected to assess the degree of gasket engagement and successfully passed technically defensible screening criteria. A confirmatory leak test, at 125 psi, was successfully completed and the final integrated test of the IWTS and Fuel Retrieval is planned to begin this weekend. (1-C)

C. Management Field Presence: The attached table summarizes the number of facility entries by selected senior DOE-RL and Fluor Hanford (FH) managers over the last 10 months. Most of the numbers are mediocre with a few exceptions. The most disappointing finding is that the Assistant Manager in charge of field assessments and the facility representative program had no entries. There were also no entries into Bechtel nuclear facilities by management. (1-B)

D. Rec. 95-2: DOE-RL has created an Integrated Safety Management Closure Team to manage the corrective actions associated with the verification review. The Site Rep met with the DOE-RL Manager and Deputy Manager (Project Lead), to discuss project team make-up, roles and responsibilities, and their approach to corrective action management. This initiative is being managed as a project with the appropriate project controls and leadership clearly in evidence. Due to the recent change in Deputy Managers, impacts may be unavoidable but are likely to be minimal given the keen interest expressed by the DOE-RL Manager regarding project priority and his personal level of involvement. The project team has developed a project schedule, corrective action plans, schedule of deliverables, and plans to do an independent verification prior to any decision by the DOE-RL Manager regarding ISMS implementation status. Overall, the team appears to have a clear mission, sufficient senior management involvement, is well organized, and has adequate resources for its assigned task. Due to the proximity to 9/30/00, this team must become fully functioning almost immediately. Therefore, the Site Rep will review their basis for corrective actions and the criteria used for their closure. This team is also chartered to follow through on the DOE-RL Manager's desire to fully revise DOE-RL's management systems, therefore, the team will likely not be discontinued immediately after September 30, 2000.

A Site Rep review of all the assessments, appraisals, and surveillances, performed by DOE-RL over the last 3 quarters found that nearly all the reviews had been conducted by facility representatives. The Office for Engineering and Standards did not perform any reviews. The Analysis and Evaluation (A&E) division only conducted 11 reviews. Lack of resources is the excuse for the low number of reviews. With resources so tight, it was surprising that reviews of office safety and a safety leadership course were among the highest priorities. Many of the technical reviews were in response to Board inquiries (i.e., readiness reviews, welding quality assurance). The absence of field assessments is reflected in the scarcity of facility entries by DOE engineering staff. During the last 10 months, the average Engineering staff had only 1.8 entries, and the Occupational Health and Safety and the Nuclear Safety team members were considerably lower. Unfortunately, a review of Engineering procedures found that nearly all the responsibilities can be met without ever leaving the Federal building. The repeated response from the Engineering organization is that they will go to the field if asked, but will not do so on their own initiative to oversee their area of expertise. (1-B,1-C)

Table 1: Summary of Entries into Nuclear Facilities by Management

Position	Number of Entries
RL Manager	15
RL Deputy Manager for Site Transition	6
RL Assistant Manager for Performance Evaluation	0
RL Deputy Assistant Manager for Performance Evaluation	1
RL Operations Oversight Division Director	7
RL Analysis and Evaluation Division Director	0
RL Assistant Manager for Engineering and Standards	5
RL Authorization Basis Division Director	1
RL Engineering Support Division Director	2
RL Assistant Manager for Nuclear Materials & Facility Stabilization	8
RL Facility Transition Division Director	2
RL Materials Disposition Division Director	5
RL Assistant Manager for Environmental Restoration and Waste Mgmt	1
FH President/Chief Executive Officer	7
FH Chief Operating Officer	12
FH Nuclear Material Stabilization Vice President	4
FH River Corridor Vice President	8
FH Waste Management Vice President	3
FH Environmental, Safety and Health Vice President	5
FH Project Support Vice President	1

Please note that this only reflects entries using the Access Control Entry System as well as entries made into Bechtel facilities that require the use of a radiological work permit (RWP). Therefore, entries into Radiological Buffer Areas or entries into multiple facilities under the same RWP may not be reflected above.

cc: Board Members