

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 28, 2008

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. Linzau and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending March 28, 2008

Staff members J. Deplitch, S. Lewis, and J. Troan were on-site reviewing the corrective actions for the emergency management aspects of the S-102 Spill Type A investigation.

K Basins Closure: The Richland Operations Office formally removed restrictions it had placed on the contractor in their development of alternatives for critical decision (CD)-1 for treating the sludge in K West Basin. In addition to the direct grouting method specified in the September 2007 letter, the contractor is now to evaluate moving the sludge to the central plateau both with and without treatment. The alternatives must still meet the waste acceptance criteria for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Additional criteria to be used in developing the CD-1 package include lifecycle costs, technical risks, project funding profile, ALARA and personnel safety, and project execution risk. The contractor was also directed to continue the ongoing conceptual designs for in-basin and out-basin grouting.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): The contractor's construction organization turned over part of the Fire Service Water system to the startup organization. The Office of River Protection (ORP) is planning an assessment next month of the contractor's turnover program to determine if sufficient procedural guidance is in place to implement effectively a system turnover.

Solid Waste Operations Complex: The contractor completed a management assessment (MA) on the implementation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) that apply to the Low-Level Burial Grounds. The MA was conducted as part of the corrective action resulting from the Occurrence Report on recurring noncompliance with TSRs (See Hanford Activity Report 11/23/07). The review team found multiple instances where the TSR compliance matrix had not been effectively maintained to allow facility personnel to demonstrate implementation. The team also noted that many of the procedures contain references to administrative controls in the precautions and limitations section, but did not contain implementing or compliance verification steps in the performance section of the procedure. Similar reviews will be completed for the Criticality Safety Evaluation Report and the Fire Hazard Analysis to determine potential areas of risk and develop changes to safety basis documentation.

Tank Farms: The contractor completed the first phase of removing soil that was contaminated by the spill of waste from tank S-102. With the exception of the area immediately around tank riser 7, all soil that was discolored by the spill was placed into more than 60 55-gallon drums. The next phase will be to remove the contaminated soil around riser 7, which was the tank access point during waste retrieval. The final phase will be to remove any other soil necessary to meet the endpoint criteria for cleanup of the spill.

Office of River Protection: A reorganization of ORP goes into effect this weekend and includes the creation of two new assistant manager (AM) positions. J. Eschenberg will be acting AM for the WTP and J. Wicks will be acting AM for Engineering and Nuclear Safety. The Tank Farms Operations Division, WTP Construction Oversight and Assurance Division, and Quality Assurance Team will have dotted-line reporting access to the ORP Manager.