

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 23, 2005

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for Week Ending December 23, 2005

Mr. Owen was out of the office on Friday.

A. Specific Administrative Controls. In accordance with the Recommendation 2002-3 Implementation Plan, BWXT identified and implemented Specific Administrative Controls (SACs) as a part of recent safety basis annual updates for Y-12 defense nuclear facilities. YSO reviewed the selection and development of these controls as documented in facility Safety Evaluation Reports. Last week, BWXT completed field verifications of SAC implementation using the Implementation Validation Review (IVR) process. BWXT had previously developed the IVR process for review of safety basis implementation (see 4/29/05 site rep. report). For Building 9212, SACs are being developed and will be validated as a part of the Documented Safety Analysis effort.

B. New Disassembly Glovebox. Last weekend, BWXT successfully completed the first disassembly operation in the new disassembly glovebox. Additional disassembly activities are expected to occur next week.

C. Melton Valley Transuranic Waste Processing. Last week, the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) Operational Readiness Review (ORR) findings were verified closed by DOE-ORO and authorization to start processing contact-handled waste was granted by DOE-EM. This week, the first drums and boxes were received, some non-destructive evaluations completed and the first box processed in the box breakdown area.

D. Y-12 Disposition of Chemical Traps. BWXT recently started unloading of chemical traps used in the uranium enrichment process that have been stored for more than 15 years in a Y-12 facility currently undergoing deactivation (see 8/26/05 and 11/04/05 site rep. reports). To address the hazard of hydrogen fluoride (HF) potentially being present when removing the trap pellet material, monitoring of the trap opening and special personnel protective equipment was required. Several traps had been unloaded with no detection of HF. Late last week, however, HF was detected when unloading a trap. While work planning documents had addressed the HF hazard, the presence of HF was thought to be unlikely. BWXT is reviewing the safety controls for this activity now that the HF hazard is anticipated.

E. Rolling and Forming Operation. As reported last week, YSO was evaluating the need for a readiness review for the planned restart of the enriched uranium rolling and forming operation that has not been conducted in more than one year. The current BWXT Startup Notification Report does not address this restart. On Thursday, YSO management informed the site reps. that YSO considers a readiness review is necessary and has requested BWXT to formally propose the level of readiness review. YSO management also noted that BWXT contractual requirements and implementing procedures regarding restart of nuclear activities or operations after extended shutdown are being reviewed and will likely require revision.