

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 17, 2006

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for the Week Ending March 17, 2006

A. Quality Evaluation Relocation. As noted on February 24<sup>th</sup>, the site reps. had inquired with YSO and BWXT personnel about construction quality assurance for relocating the first of two Quality Evaluation gloveboxes and whether additional (compensatory) measures were being pursued given other recent construction quality issues. In response, YSO and BWXT had noted that compensatory measures had not been determined but that such measures would be developed. This week, BWXT project management noted to the site reps. that compensatory measures will include: development of a list of design requirements and features to be inspected by subsystem; and, conduct of field inspections of these requirements and features unless definitive, specific inspection records exist.

In August, the issue of whether both contractor and NNSA Readiness Assessments (RAs) would be conducted to confirm readiness was under discussion (see 8/12/05 site rep. report). BWXT subsequently proposed and YSO approved (via Startup Notification Report) conduct of contractor and NNSA RAs. YSO recently requested BWXT to reconsider this decision. In response, BWXT submitted a revised Startup Notification Report on Thursday that proposes only a contractor RA and that BWXT be the start-up authority. BWXT noted minor changes to safety systems and the readiness efforts on the New Disassembly Glovebox last fall in the justification for this change.

B. Uranium Processing Facility. Staff members Matt Duncan and David Grover visited Y-12 this week to review the status and conceptual design for the Uranium Processing Facility. The project team has developed corrective actions for the findings identified by the Independent Project Review (see 1/13/06 site rep. report) including additional definition and basis for the preliminary list of safety systems. Critical Decision-1 (i.e., alternative selection and cost range) approval is now expected to occur in July.

C. Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility. As noted last week, it was not clear that analysis of cause for more recently discovered non-conforming conditions was being performed. YSO management noted to the site rep. this week that BWXT is performing causal analyses for these conditions. YSO management noted that efforts to support resumption of concrete placements are now anticipated to be completed in about two weeks.

D. Small Fire. On Thursday, a small fire occurred in an air handling unit (containing an electrical motor and fan that supports ambient temperature control) in the Special Materials Processing building. The Y-12 fire department was called when smoke was seen coming from the unit's enclosure. Fire department personnel observed flames on the motor, a facility evacuation was ordered, and the fire was extinguished with a dry chemical extinguisher. The site rep. observed BWXT's critique of the event. Some issues associated with fire response/facility evacuation were noted. Also identified was that the unit was the subject of a November 2005 maintenance request to address an increased noise level; this maintenance request had apparently not been acted on. Follow-on actions identified during the critique dealt with fire response/facility evacuation issues but did not specifically address investigation of the disposition of the November maintenance request. The site rep. discussed this observation with various BWXT and YSO personnel.