

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 2, 2007

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for Week Ending February 2, 2007

Mr. Owen was out of the office from Monday through Thursday to attend a meeting of the DOE Readiness Review Working Group held near the Hanford site.

A. Rolling and Forming. This week, the site rep. met with BWXT management to discuss the plans for restart of the Rolling and Forming activity. BWXT had previously planned to restart this activity in early-2006 (see the 1/13/06 site rep. report); however, restart was delayed due to equipment issues and other priorities. A Readiness Assessment for this restart is now planned for next week to confirm readiness for operations, with restart now planned by the end of February.

B. Warehouse Characterization Activity. This week, the Warehouse Operational Safety Board met to discuss the resumption of a characterization activity for uranium items that may be contaminated with plutonium. This activity will be conducted in a temporary glovebag that was constructed for this operation. The Readiness Assessment for this activity was completed in May 2006 (see the 6/2/06 site rep. report); however, only a single characterization activity was conducted following startup because of facility conditions and other priorities.

In September 2006, a small fire occurred in a similar glovebag during inspection of legacy uranium items (see the 10/6/06 site rep. report). Subsequent investigation of this event identified a number of corrective actions (see the 1/5/07 site rep. report) some of which apply to this characterization activity. The site rep. met with YSO and BWXT personnel to review the revised process description, Automated Job Hazard Analysis (AJHA) and operating procedure. The AJHA has been revised to identify the potential fire hazard and the following associated controls: use of fire retardant plastic for glovebag construction and staging portable fire extinguishers in the area. The site rep. noted, however, that the AJHA revision does not identify the fire hazard with the associated job step/task, where other hazards/controls are identified (and analyzed), but instead identifies the hazard and controls in notations at the end of the AJHA. BWXT personnel noted that the current "automated" system only allows AJHA modification in this manner (this appears to be a system weakness impeding proper analysis and warranting correction). The characterization activity will be reviewed by the BWXT Management Review Board on Monday and be resumed following that review.

C. Quality Evaluation Relocation. As noted on December 15th, BWXT has begun quality evaluation operations in the relocated linear glovebox. BWXT is now working on the project to relocate the octagonal glovebox from the Quality Evaluation Building to the Assembly/Disassembly Building. To avoid potential conflicts with another future glovebox installation, BWXT plans to physically move the glovebox (in multiple pieces) late this Summer. Subsequent facility modifications to support the octagonal glovebox will continue in Fiscal Year 2008 with initial operations planned for early-2009.