Summary
After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had no army or functioning police and, before September 11, 2001, was a haven for international terrorists. In April 2002, the United States and several other nations agreed to reform the five pillars of Afghanistan's security sector--creating an Afghan army, reconstituting the police force, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the Afghan militias. As the leader for the army pillar, the United States has provided about $3.3 billion. For the German-led effort to reconstitute the Afghan police, the United States has provided over $800 million. We examined the progress made, and limitations faced, in developing the army and police forces. We also identified challenges that must be addressed to complete and sustain these forces.
As of March 2005, Defense had trained more than 18,300 Afghan combat troops--over 42 percent of the army's projected total of 43,000--and deployed them throughout the country. During 2004, the Department of Defense significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training. However, Defense efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat troops have fallen behind, and efforts to establish sustaining institutions, such as a logistics command, needed to support these troops have not kept pace. Plans for completing these institutions are not clear. Germany and the United States had trained more than 35,000 police as of January 2005 and expect to meet their goal of training 62,000 police by December 2005. However, the Department of State has just begun to address structural problems that affect the Afghan police force. Trainees often return to police stations where militia leaders are the principal authority; most infrastructure needs repair, and the police do not have sufficient equipment--from weapons to vehicles. Furthermore, limited field-based mentoring has just begun although previous international police training programs have demonstrated that such mentoring is critical for success. Moreover, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (which oversees the police force) requires reform and restructuring. Finally, neither State nor Germany has developed plans specifying how much the program will cost and when it will be completed. Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces and concurrent progress in the other pillars of security sector reform, Afghanistan could again become a haven for terrorists. However, establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly take years and substantial resources. Available information suggests that these programs could cost up to $7.2 billion to complete and about $600 million annually to sustain. Furthermore, the other lead nations have made limited progress in reforming Afghan's judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the militias.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change
from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
Charles M. Johnson Jr
Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade
No phone on record
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: Because of Afghanistan's prolonged conflict and its limited financial resources, the Secretaries of Defense and State should develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces. The plans should include clearly defined objectives and performance measures; milestones for achieving stated objectives; future funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to Afghanistan. The Secretaries should provide this information to the Congress when the executive branch next requests funding for the Afghan army or police forces.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. Update pending.
Agency Affected: Department of State
Status: In process
Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally concurred with our recommendation and suggested that existing reporting requirements addressed the need to report. Update pending.
Recommendation: Because reform in the other pillars of the Afghan security sector--building an effective judiciary, curbing the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics, and disarming and reintegrating militia fighters--is critical to the success of the army and police programs, the Secretaries of Defense and State should work with the other lead donor nations to help ensure that progress in the other pillars is congruent with the progress made in the army and police programs. The Secretaries should regularly report to the Congress, but no less than annually, on the progress made in addressing these other security pillars.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with this recommendation. Update pending.
Agency Affected: Department of State
Status: In process
Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally concurred with our recommendation and suggested that existing reporting requirements addressed the need to report. Update pending.
