

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 29, 2008

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. P. Duncan and M. T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending February 29, 2008

**Waste Solidification Building:** DNFSB staff and an outside expert were at SRS to review the structural and geotechnical aspects of the Waste Solidification Building design.

**Interim Salt Disposition Project:** The DOE Operational Readiness Review identified two pre-start findings dealing with conduct of operations at the Defense Waste Processing Facility and the safety and reliability of the shielded sample station. The five post-start findings address ASME B31.3 code compliance, Quality Assurance (QA) audits, DOE facility representative and QA staffing, and DOE review of occurrence reports. The team also identified a site-wide programmatic issue because procedures allow the procurement of safety-significant materials by suppliers not on the Qualified Supplier List.

**Emergency Preparedness (EP):** Significant weaknesses were observed during the 2007 annual EP exercise that was conducted at H-Canyon. (See 7/6/07 weekly report). After spending months implementing corrective actions, a remedial evaluated EP exercise was conducted at H-Canyon using the same shift crew. The Site Reps observed both the control room and incident scene. The exercise simulated a red oil deflagration triggering an ammonium nitrate explosion on the Process Vessel Vent filters. The simulated explosion ruptured an instrument air line, giving a worker a head injury and highly contaminating him. The drill will likely be declared a success. Command and control at the incident scene, incident command post, and control was better. Barricades clearly defined the hot/warm/cold zones at the incident scene and precluded widespread cross-contamination like last time. The victim was evacuated in a timely manner although some areas of improvement were identified. The contractor is preparing responses to Site Rep observations concerning the handling of the initial responders who became contaminated while dealing with the medical emergency.

**Saltstone:** The Saltstone facility resumed operations this week with newly installed contamination controls. On Thursday, DOE met a milestone for demonstrating the viability of the Deliquification, Dissolution, and Adjustment process by disposing of more than 100,000 gallons of higher curie salt waste at the Saltstone facility. This satisfies Commitment 2.9 of DOE's implementation plan for Board Recommendation 2001-1.

**K Area:** After performing destructive evaluation of a DOE-STD-3013 can, a taped, slip lid daughter can was bagged out. During this activity, a 6-7" section of the plastic sleeve split allowing the can to contact the worker's gloved hand. No contamination was released.

**H-Canyon:** After exceeding the Radiological Work Permit's suspension guideline, maintenance workers took actions to put the system in a safer configuration. While the workers did have radiological data to show it was safe to do so, management will reinforce the expectation to get authorization before resuming work once the guideline is exceeded.