DATE: December 29, 1999

INTERVIEWEE: GERALD RAFSHOON

INTERVIEWER: Martha Kumar

[Disc 1 of 1]

MK: When you'd like to go off-the-record or on-background, that's fine as well. Ultimately the material goes into a presidential library; it will go into the [Jimmy] Carter Library. We're working with the National Archives on it. The full interviews don't come out publicly until 2001, when a new President comes in, and also you've had a chance to go over the transcript.

GR: Okay.

MK: It's going to be used in various ways. It's a group of presidency scholars and we're doing profiles of seven offices. We've selected seven offices. And we'll go back over time to the [Richard] Nixon administration, and profile what the functions have been, the responsibilities, different ways in which they've been organized. I'm writing the one by myself on communications. I'm doing press and communications by myself. The pieces themselves are going to be short, although they'll be on a pass-coded website for people coming in so they can then—in addition to reading the fifteen pages about some of the general things about the office—they'll be able to select items within it as well. We'll have links in to longer pieces. And then we're doing what we call "Standards of a Successful Start" in the spring, which are isolating maybe eight elements that are common to successful transitions.

GR: Interesting. Did you read Bob Woodward's latest book, *Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate*?

MK: Yes.

GR: He went down to the Carter Library and got my memos that I had sent to the President. Bob's a friend of mine. I didn't know some of the things he got in there. I saw him at Christmas dinner at somebody's house the other night. I said, "I didn't say these things." He said, "Bullshit."

MK: There's certainly nothing particularly damaging in any of the material.

GR: No. I just didn't like some of it. I thought his thesis regarding Carter when he talked about—the thesis of the book I understand. Every president has had to worry about the tradition of Watergate and it has shaped some of the things they've done or ignoring some of the lessons of Watergate they've done at their peril. But I thought his conclusions of Carter not being a very social person and not mixing with the Congress, some of the things he had quoted me about, I didn't think fell into his thesis. I did tell him that I thought that we got in because of Watergate and some of our problems were because of Watergate. We came in with a very skeptical press after Nixon, especially coming in and saying "I'll never lie to you." That was an invitation to see the lies, catch the lies. "He must be lying."

White House Interview Program, Interview with Gerald Rafshoon, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., December 29, 1999. Gerald Rafshoon served as Director of Communications in the administration of President Carter.

MK: There are ways in which statements made during a campaign tend to come and haunt an administration in one way or another. That's one of them.

GR: As we say, "Bite you on the ass."

MK: Right. So you all got a couple nips. The other one that comes to mind was a commitment to cut the White House staff by 25 per cent.

GR: Big mistake.

MK: Were you surprised, during [Bill] Clinton's campaign in 1992, he said that he was going to cut the White House staff by 25 per cent?

GR: No. I wasn't surprised. It all sounds good. It is so infinitesimal. The one place you don't need to cut is the White House. Not especially, in case Jimmy is, I think—you would know—but I think our communications and press staff was rather small—

MK: It was.

GR: —compared to other presidencies, and certainly to what they have now. And here we're up against, not the enemy, but you've got 535 members of Congress, each of whom has a press secretary.

MK: Then, in addition to that, you have interest groups all over town that have their press people—

GR: And money.

MK: —and many of their press people come from earlier White House experience so they know where all the gears and levers are, and how to work everything. Then, in addition to that, they have polling operations, too; a lot of interest groups have their own polling operations. Did you feel that, that press from all over Washington, that you were being pressured with people trying to get into your story?

GR: Setting the story, not setting the agenda, but putting out the story before we ever got to play. I remember, I think Hamilton [Jordan] and I after a year in office just went back and looked at the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Star*, just kind of looking at where our negative stories were coming from, just an analysis of the press that we had. We found that, on the Hill, the majority of the stories that were hurting us were coming from Democrats on the Hill. They just had their own agenda. They weren't being malicious but Carter was a guy who came here—they didn't know him; he didn't have a lot of friends; he didn't come with their permission and they didn't want him to stay particularly. And a lot of them said, up there were people who said, "Why not me? This guy from Georgia is the President." The same attitude we had when we saw presidential candidates come to Georgia in 1972: "If these guys can do it, we can do it." So I think that a great majority of the bad press was coming from the press operations on the Hill, and they had some very adept people. [Patrick] Moynihan had a guy by the name of Tim Russert working for him.

MK: And then he had [Mike] McCurry at one time, too.

GR: Yes. So we were certainly not overstaffed.

MK: Once you had that feeling that the Hill was killing you—your "friends"—what kinds of things did you try to do to win them over and to shut down those operations, or divert them?

GR: Keep them better informed, send out reams of material that fit into the initiatives, that helped define and sell the initiatives that we were trying to sell.

MK: You had situations like, for example, when you had that tax rebate. There were people that were out slugging for you. I think it was John Murtha at the very time he was talking about the importance of it, you all ended up compromising it out, and he didn't know about it.

GR: I wasn't in the White House at the time but I don't think anybody knew. I think the President's economic advisers made the decision and put it out. It was either our press operation was overworked or it was bad coordination.

MK: In looking at the staff, what does a good staff buy for a president? Say a new person is coming in, and they want to think about where they're going to put their time once they get elected in November? Where they're going to put their time in staffing up, both in terms of their cabinet and in the White House? When they're thinking about the White House, what should they think of that the staff is going to do for them?

GR: Well, let's talk first about the Cabinet. I think one of the mistakes we made was we approached the idea of cabinet government very idealistically and we let the cabinet people pick their own people. That was a mistake. They were picking people in many respects who had been [Ted] Kennedy people and [Mo] Udall people and some [Henry] Jackson people: their people. The truth of the matter is we should have had some of our own people in every cabinet department, especially in the communications area, because we were not speaking with one voice. There were times we would have a certain take on an issue in the White House, and we'd have cabinet members saying an entirely different thing. We weren't able to control it entirely, as well as we needed to. So I think that when you get into office, you need to be cognizant, be sensitive to the political realities that your campaign is not over. You have to run a campaign to govern. You have to inform; you have to advertise, so to speak—not paid advertising—and the skills that may have gotten you into winning an election should also be used—not in a manipulative way particularly—but used to sell the programs that you have.

The Clintons have a very good organization for that. Unfortunately, I have got a feeling that so much of it has been used for personal damage control and then coming back and not really doing much of a job on issues, especially recently, on things like the nuclear test ban or WTO [World Trade Organization].

MK: A communications operation really is a part of the whole policy organization.

GR: It should be.

MK: All of that stuff has to be integrated.

GR: It has to be. And the communications people and the press secretary have to know, have to be close enough—and we were close enough to Jimmy to know we had access to what was going on, but I think it needs better coordination with the rest of the people in the cabinet.

MK: And it requires such advance work. The CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] really needed to have been done—that work needed to have been done—so much earlier. Groundwork needed to be laid.

GR: Which?

MK: The treaty, the current one. It really required laying out what it was about, and building a whole campaign of public awareness.

GR: And they have good people over there. They have Ann Lewis, and they have Sid Blumenthal and all that. But those are people working on Monica [Lewinsky] and all that other garbage. These things are all victims of the President's folly.

MK: So, in some ways, it both reflects and complements this President, the operation they set up; because they were able to set up two tracks. Just like he could keep two tracks, they were able to keep two tracks and just keep stuff going. But it was just day to day; it was putting one foot in front of the other.

GR: The substantive track had to take second fiddle—

MK: Yes.

GR: —take second place to the personal track in his case, too.

MK: You could say, in many ways, the presidency has been about him—and about him as a political leader, and that that's what he leaves behind. As opposed to a broad group of reform policy items.

When looking at the White House staff, and putting it together, what would it do for a president? What would you tell somebody coming in, that they should expect a White House staff to do for them, and the kinds of people they should pick in order to sell your programs and to know that some of the campaign people are going to be important to have in governing?

GR: You know, we didn't have a communications department when we first started. Jody [Powell] was the press secretary. I had no desire to go in to the White House. He had it all under his belt, and it was tough.

MK: It was impossible.

GR: It was impossible.

MK: It was beyond tough.

GR: The point is, even when I came in, we used to talk about long-range communications and long-range was [next week]. Next week is long-range in the White House, because every time I would say: "I'm going to stay in my office today and just write a communications plan for SALT [Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty]…," or Middle East peace, and all that stuff something would happen. You can't just close your ears to it. I think I was probably the wrong person for that job, because I was too close to the President, so that I could not stay out of things that should have been done by his personal political [staff].

MK: Like what kinds of things?

GR: Any kind of damage. The Bert Lance case. Things that were strictly political.

MK: Except, that's not just political—

GR: True.

MK: —because it just eats away immediately.

GR: In that case I was sort of like another hand with Hamilton and Jody. I spent too much time. My inclination was to get involved in everything when it's maybe possible that in something like a communications job, per se, that it should be probably somebody who is a seasoned practitioner of communications, who has political instincts, but can grind away in getting the things done, the planning, the preparation of materials, and things like that. I would say, going in, you need to have—I would tell any Administration: they need to certainly have a well-staffed Press Office. I wouldn't be stingy on how you staff it because, look at how much press there are now, as compared to then. I would certainly have people who—I would have a platoon of specialists when it came to electronic media, television, cable now, three cable news networks; not to try to have one person do it all. I would have that under the communications operation, working very closely with the Press Secretary. I think also—have you talked to Jody?

MK: I haven't talked to him on this one yet.

GR: Jody was a great press secretary.

MK: I've talked to him many times.

GR: Having said that, I think—Jody says—whenever they talk about him being one of the great press secretaries of all time or in recent years—he says with the president who came out with 20 per cent approval rating: "He must have been really good!" But the problem there was: he was too close to the President. I don't think the spokesman should be in a substantive role. He should be kept informed. I think the Clintons got it right. Mike McCurry was not that close to the President.

MK: Right.

GR: There was no way that Jody could recuse himself on anything, because you knew damn well that he would be one of two or three people—sometimes the only person—that Jimmy would turn to on everything.

MK: On the other hand, that really worked well for his own credibility.

GR: It worked well for his credibility, but it also kept him too involved in the solving of the problems rather than the reporting.

MK: That's true. You can see in memoranda that Carter wants him to do everything. There was one I remember looking at where—.

GR: Remember, Jody was his driver at one time.

MK: And his suite mate in their trip all around the country for two years. Jody had written on a memo that somebody should make some changes in a speech, that they needed certain changes, and Carter had written back, clearly irritated: "Well, why don't you change it? Why don't you do it?" I wondered how he did not have a sense of the kind of day that Jody had, that it's a daily operation. You look at McCurry, and how good he is at long-range planning, and at strategy, but he couldn't do that kind of stuff, because the daily just eats up a press secretary.

I was struck by your picture here that has the four of you, [Pat] Caddell and Jordan and…. [pollster Pat Caddell, Hamilton Jordan, Jody Powell, and Mr. Rafshoon].

GR: [Inaudible]

MK: What kinds of things did the four of you do together? That seems like it's a really good mix in pulling together for communications because you have the pollster who's going to be able to tell you what's out there—

GR: We didn't do as much polling as these people [Clinton administration] do, not even close. But Pat was also—

MK: But there are also a lot of other polls out there that one can look at and tap into. Then you've got Hamilton who's going to be involved—sort of across-the-board and everything—and in particular policies—

GR: A great political strategist.

MK: —and Jody who has a sense of what's happening in the press and how to sell something, and you combine a variety of those. So what kinds of things did the four of you do together? That was at Camp David; what did you do there?

GR: That was Camp David, the "malaise summit," what led to the malaise speech. We never used the word "malaise" but—

MK: Was it [Walter] Mondale that used the word malaise?

GR: It was Roger Mudd who used the word malaise in an analysis of the speech. He spoke about a malaise in the American people. By the way, that speech was well received, but that's beside the point.

That's why I would really urge that you keep—there was a lot said about the "Georgia mafia" as there was about a "Texas mafia" for [Lyndon B.] Johnson, the "Massachusetts mafia" for Kennedy, and a "California mafia" with [Ronald] Reagan. The truth of the matter is: there's a reason for that, because you really need people who have been with you on the long haul. Clinton, on the other hand, has had mostly hired hands when he started to run for president. All his close friends are people like Web Hubbell and Mack McLarty who couldn't find the bathroom except they knew where the money was.

[Off the record.]

And I think you need to utilize those people and have people who are not turf conscious. The one thing I would say about our—.

MK: You'd have to create a new gene, wouldn't you?

GR: Those four people there [gesturing at group photo] were not turf conscious. We had been together so long. Caddell was a Johnny-come-lately, but he fit in very well in the campaign. I go back to when that farmer from South Georgia came to my office and wanted to run for governor; he was a state senator. Hamilton was the youth coordinator. Jody, three years later, came on as his driver. But the point is: we didn't worry about how we stood with Jimmy. We could talk frankly to him, and we could talk frankly to each other, and he would not have tolerated any kind of bickering, any kind of turf battle. We bickered; we fought among ourselves, but we didn't worry that the loser of an argument is going to be out. I think that's so essential for a president. So I think you have to have people who are loyal and have really good political instincts, and can do tasks, too; write or analyze or do speeches or can lead other people to do it. But I think you need a hard core of staffers. And I would urge subsequent presidencies not to be swayed by the complaints from, say, the Washington insiders that you have a bunch of people who have never been here before, never done it before. All presidencies in modern times, every one of them, have been won by first-timers, by amateurs and people who are smart enough to look at the past and know what has to be done but also innovate, adapt to whatever the rules, the current zeitgeist is.

MK: Now, you didn't want to come in. Why did you decide you didn't want to come in to the White House?

GR: I had a business in Atlanta. I was in the advertising business. I didn't really see a role for me, I think. And somebody offered me, "Don't you want to be head of USIA [United States Information Agency]. Wouldn't that be fun?" And I had three children about to go into college and I had just gotten divorced. There were a number of personal reasons. And I said I would come up to Washington and open an office here—I kind of wanted to hang around a little bit—and maybe do some work for my advertising agency up here. I didn't want to lobby or any of that stuff. I had lots of opportunities for that and it's anathema to me plus, with a guy like Jimmy, it wouldn't have been good. It didn't interest me. So I said I would come in and I would consult. So Caddell and I had an office on Pennsylvania Avenue. We had a White House pass and we would come over and consult, sit in on meetings. Hamilton Jordan was my closest friend. So I'd advise.

Within a year, things started going a little south, ratings in the polls and some of the things we saw weren't happening in the White House, that the selling apparatus wasn't functioning properly. I would start complaining and I was writing memos to the President and Hamilton and people that would listen to me about what they needed to do. Finally, the President said—I was bitching about something and he said, "You think it's easy, don't you?" He said, "You come in here and then talk about things we ought to do and go off"—as he said—"on some Caribbean hideaway with some cutie"—which wasn't true—"and come back and complain. Why don't you try coming in here and see what it's like, see what you can get done?" He finally said, "I want you to come in." Hamilton talked to me about it. So that's when I came in. That's when we started up the communications operations. Immediately, the press said Jody was in disfavor, and there would be big tension between Jerry and Jody. He was glad to have help, and we worked very smoothly together.

MK: What did you find [as] the difference between being outside consulting and being inside? What was the difference both in terms of the kinds of things you were involved in and—?

GR: I got involved in everything but I had things I didn't do. I didn't have to supervise people on the outside. I didn't have line responsibilities. But when I came in, I knew more of what

was going on, and I was better informed, so I could make judgments. On the other hand, I lost a little bit of my detachment and my objectivity. I started feeling the hunkering down at times. I also found myself a little more hesitant to bother the President, since I was seeing him on a day-to-day basis and saw all the problems he had, and I kind of bought into –"this is tough, let's pull back some."

MK: When you were coming in from outside, how often would you come in, and who would you see?

GR: Well, when I was in town I would maybe come over every day, sometimes just to have lunch. Usually I went to Hamilton's office. If I had something, I'd either write a memo to the President, or I'd go over and see him. I had unlimited access with him. But, then again, he was busy. I would try to respect that. But the thing that those four people [in the group picture at Camp David] were able to do, we could always—we understood Jimmy; we knew his moods. We knew when he was right and when he was wrong, or at least we knew – when he would say something – we'd say, "Let's not frontally oppose it but let's sit around and strategize how to get it changed." There was always talk about the fact that Carter needed more Washington insiders. The truth of the matter is, the ones that we did have around us never disagreed with the President and never argued with him. They would come to us if they had—.

MK: Let's say Lloyd Cutler. What did Lloyd Cutler do for you?

GR: Lloyd didn't come in until the third year. He came in 1979. But Lloyd was good. Lloyd coming in as White House Counsel was a vast improvement to Bob Lipshutz. But, in our Cabinet, Joe Califano who is a friend of mine now, but Joe Califano—

MK: Was not a team player.

GR: —was not a team player at all. When he finally had to go, you read about how he disagreed with Carter. He never did that in the meeting; he never did that in public. I could say, "You are full of shit, Mr. President." Those people never did.

MK: In Woodward's book, clearly Califano was one of the sources on the Carter stuff, because Woodward presents their relationship as if Carter had dealt badly with Califano in letting him go, that he did so in a precipitous kind of manner without any discussion of all of the ways in which Califano had undermined—whether it's tobacco—.

GR: The tobacco, the Department of Education. We had Congressmen calling up Frank Moore saying, "Wait a minute. You guys are for the Department of Education, or against it? How do you want me to go?" We said, "It's our thing!" They said, "Well, Califano was up here saying to vote against it."

Remember Edward Bennett Williams, who was Joe's partner in the law firm, kind of a tough, gruff Irishman? Califano came in almost crying when he—. "I'm stunned. I've been fired." "Joey, I don't know why you're so stunned. You've been fucking him for three years."

So we were frank with him. But I can also remember, though, there were times when you'd open the door to the study to talk to him about something, the Iranian crisis: "I'm going in, I'm going to have it out with Jimmy because this has got to stop; this is wrong—and he'd look up and you'd see the kind of burden this whole stuff, 'Yes, what is it?' 'Nothing, Mr.

President.'" Maybe if I'd still been on the outside I'd have known less and been able to say more. I think he needs outside advisers but I think he needs to keep his friends close.

MK: One of the things you can see—

GR: As long as they're loyal, and they don't try to capitalize, and they don't try to profit by that. Unfortunately the culture and the people—

MK: That's one of the things that looks like it's changed. There are going to be a lot of people that stay on the outside. You could see it in this administration, the people that stayed on the outside. They found that they had the best of both worlds in a way.

GR: They cashed in. They didn't wait for a second term. They'd stay a year or so and then they'd start cashing in.

MK: They cashed in very early. So there were a lot of people that were able to do that.

GR: [Al] Gore seems to have those kinds of people. His chief of staff wound up after a year becoming the chief lobbyist for the cable industry which was, of course, an issue of telecommunications.

MK: But at the same time they can go back and talk as well. Some of them just maintain their state as a political person. Like [James] Carville was able to do both things. Probably we're going to see more of that because it is so profitable—but rewarding at the same time in a psychic sense—when people get involved.

Well, looking at the Washington insiders that you did bring in, one of them was Anne Wexler. What was she able to bring?

GR: A massive rolodex, able to tap into all the Washington lobbyists of the Washington establishment figures and business people to give at least an image of our asking, soliciting their advice and being friendly to them. I think she did a good job of it. Anne wasn't that close to us; she was closer to those people. As we see subsequently, she's got the soul of a lobbyist so she got along well with the lobbyists because she is one now. I think she helped in soliciting advice and telling people our story. Having said that, the people that she had to deal with were no friends of ours; they were either Republicans or Democrats who had other fish to fry.

MK: It took a while for her to be able to knit in the White House. While Washington people are needed for the kinds of relationships they have that can be leveraged in the President's direction, but it just seems difficult to bring those people in and marry them with the team that's already there. They come in sometimes—in that case she didn't come in at the beginning, either. So it takes a while to bring them in, and then knit them in. How is that accomplished? How do you find them, number one?

GR: Well, you find them—in Anne's case, she was not a supporter of Carter's in the beginning of our campaign, but before we won the nomination I remember going up to her apartment, the apartment of her and Joe Duffy, the day after we won the Florida primary. We still had a long way to go but we were pretty sure we were getting the nomination. Hamilton and I and someone else went up there and she wanted to help. So you need them in the campaign but then, when it looks like you're going to get the nomination and then when you get the

nomination, you are flooded with good, bad, fair, satisfactory, wonderful people. You're not short of resumes and people coming in. It's just that you have to have some judgment.

MK: Figuring out the ones that are going to fit.

GR: Exactly.

MK: Do you tend to—?

GR: Campaigns are a good breeding ground for that. You can see who's going to fit.

MK: What kind of work did she do in the campaign?

GR: Outreach.

MK: Were there other people that you can think of, that you brought in, that were similarly useful in the kind of contacts they had, both their knowledge and their relationships?

GR: [Bob] Strauss, of course. Best friend of the next president of the United States, whomever he may be, somebody once said. Strauss. Lloyd came in.

MK: Was Cutler important earlier? Before he came in, did he do things?

GR: He was given some assignments. He worked on SALT and he worked on some foreign policy summits and then he came in as counsel. Unfortunately, a couple of things like the invasion of Afghanistan, the fall of the Shah and the Iranian hostage crisis sort of skewed our priorities. But early on, I think, there were a lot of people from the outside who helped on the Panama Canal treaties which was a very controversial and very gutsy thing for the President to do: Camp David, people who had contacts to the Jewish community. Harry McPherson was somebody who had—he actually came in through Anne. Well, I can't say he came in through Anne. Harry was Harry; he had been in the Johnson administration. Remember, we came in in 1976. It had been eight years since the last Democratic administration with Johnson. So there were a lot of Johnson people who came and offered their assistance. I used to talk to Bill Moyers a lot. I went to college with Bill at the University of Texas. I used to see Bill and he helped.

MK: What kinds of things did he work on, or talk to you about?

GR: He advised me about who to talk to, who to see, just ideas that could be done in television. Some of them were ideas that he had, that would be self-serving to himself, such as a special show that Carter could do. That's when I instituted call-in radio shows. I talked to other press secretaries and communications people.

MK: Who in particular did you talk to that was helpful?

GR: Moyers, as I said. George Reedy used to come around. I even talked to some Republicans. You couldn't be mad at people who were in communications, in the press area. You knew what they had to go though.

MK: What kinds of things are they helpful on? In talking to them, what does one learn? I know people have said that they learned most about their job from talking to other people.

GR: It's bouncing things off—what always surprised me was when the Clinton people came in, we tried to help: Hamilton and I and Jody - give some advice to them. Of course, they didn't want to be associated with our sort of government and all that. The truth of the matter is: the advice we were giving was based on our mistakes, not "look how great we were." It was, "Look. Look how we fucked up here."

MK: Who did you talk to in previous administrations, and when?

GR: For example, Ted Sorensen used to help with speeches.

MK: What kind of help did he give?

GR: He'd send some speech text. We'd send him speeches and ask him to do some editing.

MK: When these people were coming in, like, say, during the campaign in 1992, did you talk to any of the people that were with Clinton—that you figured were going to come in, like [George] Stephanopoulos?

GR: Yes.

MK: When did you talk to Stephanopoulos first?

GR: When?

MK: Yes.

GR: I didn't. Hamilton and Jody did. I didn't talk to Stephanopoulos. When we were coming in, Jack Valenti used to come around with ideas for presidential addresses. We used to get a lot of advice about what the President thought when he'd talk to the country and what he ought to say. It was not just people who had been in government but people who were communicators.

MK: Was it useful?

GR: Sure. [It was] useful in that you couldn't really give people assignments, because when you need something, you need something. You have to be able to dictate: "I want it now and you get that deadline at five o'clock; when I fly back from Paris I'll get to you." But they were good for bouncing things off, and when they would feel to call and call you up and shore up things. And also there were some press people that I respected that came to get briefed by me. I got a lot from them.

MK: Who were some examples of people?

GR: [Inaudible] if I told you. I used to talk to Woodward; I used to talk to [Ben] Bradlee. The anchors, the television people. Jim Lehrer.

MK: What about regular White House correspondents?

GR: All the time. You get more from them than you give, in many respects. [Inaudible]. Remember when the Clintons first came in, they shut off access to the Press Secretary's area.

MK: The upper press, right.

GR: This was counter-productive, because you find out things by having them around. You could go to your ten o'clock meeting with the president and say, "This is what they're talking about." You want them to walk in informally and start nosing around. If you're smart enough, you give them less than you get. You give them what you want to give them.

MK: You can definitely do both things in that morning meeting.

GR: If you don't have any contact with them, you're really in a vacuum.

MK: Now the morning meeting is pretty informal. It's held in the Press Secretary's office. McCurry had it at nine-fifteen and now it's slid to nine-thirty. I think it's now pretty much nine-thirty.

GR: And who goes to it every day, any press?

MK: That's right. Any of the press people. Trudy [Feldman] could go.

GR: I'm sure she does. She's still there, isn't she?

MK: She certainly is. She is definitely going to go out feet first.

GR: The President used to use me to get away from Trudy. "I want to do that. You see Jerry." And then she'd come say, "Jimmy said that he wants to do this and you're in the way."

MK: There's a wonderful memo in the Carter Library that deals with Trudy. It's in the first year. It's one from Jody to Carter. It said, "Our friend Trudy wanted an interview"—he categorized her all kinds of ways. [She] "…wants an interview and I recommend you do it. She wants it for *Redbook* or *Good Housekeeping*."

GR: Soft pieces. The first one-on-one interview after Monica Clinton gave—you know what he was doing to the press there. Go ahead.

MK: He said, "I recommend a tight fifteen minutes." So Carter wrote back on the side, yes he would do it but he really did just want to do it for fifteen minutes. Then he said, yes, he'd do it. He said, "Besides, we need a CIA director." I was bowled over by it because it certainly was a humorous—.

GR: Jimmy had a great sense of humor; people never gave him credit for it.

MK: So that certainly was a clue to me.

GR: I remember one time I took to [bicycle] riding—we lived on California Street right by the Washington Hilton. I had been avoiding Trudy all day. I had a bike. Once in a while I'd take my bike to work, so I was biking home. It might have been on Saturday. When I would go down on Saturday I would bike. I was just approaching the Washington Hilton on my bike—there's traffic; it was a Saturday afternoon—and all of a sudden out of a taxi flies Trudy coming up to me, "Jimmy said and you're supposed to." Go away. Go away. Leave me alone. I was afraid to turn onto California Street because she'd know where I lived and follow me home.

MK: That's one of the reasons she's been so successful, because she finds out where people live, and just badgers them at night. Actually the gaggle, the nine-thirty, usually has radio and television people and wires. The newspaper people come sometimes for the general atmosphere, but it's people that have the immediate needs who use it. And they do give good clues of what they're doing during the day and they also find it useful to find what the White House has to sell for the day. So it's a good example of the mutual kinds of cooperation.

GR: Absolutely.

MK: What kinds of regular meetings did you have with the press?

GR: I would meet with each—we only had three networks. It was easy. I would meet with news magazine people weekly. Then I would make it a point to have a breakfast or a lunch meeting with the columnists. I did it only when solicited, the regular White House correspondents in Jody's area. They would come to me as a source, but I didn't regularly talk to them.

MK: When you're talking to the news magazines, what is useful in talking to the news magazines? What does talking to them do for a White House?

GR: You could be thematic. You could be somewhat long-range. You can talk about—that's about the only time you could talk to the press, because they have long leads. You could say, "We have SALT coming up; this is how we're going to try to sell it. We have the SALT summit in two months; the President is very interested in it—." Just talk about long-range themes. And you could schmooze politics. The people you're talking to have a wide range on their beat. You could get to the political future with them. Part of my reason for going to the White House was hoping it would help us toward 1980.

MK: A lot of energy in a White House in a way is spent with news magazines and they continue to give the same kind of time.

GR: They were more important then than they are now.

MK: I wonder what it ends up buying people.

GR: At that time they had the space and—

MK: They had the readership.

GR: —they had the readership and more of a leisurely pace of laying out your stories.

MK: I guess also it helps them in planning. A correspondent you might talk to, if you're going to talk about a large trip, then that person can get going—

GR: He can get going and he can get onto other people and you could wind up getting editorial support. They all used to work through me because there was always a point when the people in New York, the editor, is going to want to come to the White House and have an exclusive with the President. Bob Ajamian, who was the bureau chief or Chris Ogden, the correspondent, has to look good in front of those people, so they really would try to cultivate a relationship. So that when the VIPs came in for their semi-annual meeting they had access.

MK: You arranged a group of dinners, in fact, for media people with Carter.

GR: So Carter could get to know these people, because he hadn't grown up in Washington.

MK: How did you sell it to him, and what did you and he—because you may have had different views—think about them both, at the time and in retrospect?

GR: Well, it wasn't hard to sell. He liked it. The whole idea, my idea, was that we'd have everybody. We'd have the dinner, say we'd have *Washington Post* and NBC *Tonight*. It would be Katharine Graham and Ben Bradlee and John Chancellor and Tom Brokaw, people he wasn't seeing on a regular basis. We went through a whole list—it went over several months—with the idea that they would get to know Jimmy who was so smart and could be very personable and could do that over dinner. Both he and Rosalynn were a delight to spend an evening with. My hope was that he would get to see who he liked and didn't like, and possibly then start cultivating, continuing a friendship.

It didn't quite work that way. He compartmentalized his life in many respects. If you told him: "Have a dinner once a week with these people," it was fine and probably I was at fault. I should have continued doing that. But after the first round, I said, "Would you like to continue?" He said, "Sure. Who would you like me to have?" I figured it was time for him to get to know people. There was an opportunity there—that was missed because he could have—Ben Bradlee is a real good friend of mine. I always said, "You and Jimmy would have gotten along."

MK: Kennedy once observed that the White House is a poor place to make friends.

GR: He had friends going in.

MK: So the difficulty is that once you get there—because everybody is always going to want something from you. So those relationships are hard to establish. You can use the relationships of others.

GR: Both Johnson and Kennedy had friends as senators.

MK: Were there any media people that Carter knew coming in?

GR: Jack Nelson of the *L.A. Times,* because Jack was from Georgia. He had been on the [*Atlanta*] *Constitution* and won the Pulitzer Prize. Carter had met everybody in the four years he was running around running for office, but his media friends were people who were Georgia-oriented. He got to know Hedley Donovan who used to come down to Georgia but he was editor of *Time* at the time. He knew Scotty Reston [*New York Times* columnist] and he would meet with them. But he didn't suffer fools gladly. There were columnists who would come in and start giving him advice; they thought they were principals. He was a little skeptical about that.

MK: As with news magazines changing, columnists were changing; their impact was changing at that time as well. Joe Kraft was still alive at that time and still writing.

GR: Joe Kraft made a trip to Iran, and then he said he wanted to see the President. I figured he really wanted to talk to him and get his ideas about Iran. I put them together and Carter was

just appalled. He [Kraft] started saying, "I've seen Colonel so and so…" It was like he was a conduit from the Shah. He was like trying to advise on policy. But those people, that kind of thing, is obsolete now.

MK: Were there other people like Kraft that would come in and report, columnist types?

GR: By report, they would give you their—

MK: Right. That they were thinking of their coming in and telling a president rather than what they might glean from the president's thinking - for their own columns?

GR: Right.

MK: Any others you can think of?

GR: Well, Scotty Reston, but Scotty was not as persistent. Carter liked him. He liked Walter Cronkite. He would talk to him. I kind of concentrated a lot on electronic media—

MK: In looking at the media today—

GR: —and trying to brief them. For example, on the day we were going to recognize China, it was a secret, but on that afternoon I had them come down, the anchors, and meet with the President. And he told them it couldn't go out on the air what was going to happen. So when they did announce it, they were all prepared, the President had told them. We used to do things like that.

MK: Was it helpful?

GR: Sure. When we had time to do those really nuts-and-bolts things, they worked and they worked in some areas. Also, when we had time to plan an initiative, the selling of various initiatives; for example, when Carter vetoed the nuclear carrier. Everybody said, "We'll never sustain the veto…", but we were able to launch a very good campaign and we did sustain that veto. There was a lot of flack; people were saying that I had talked him into vetoing it so he would look strong. The truth of the matter is his inclination was to veto a boondoggle like that. He would look bad signing something he didn't believe in. So, when we followed our original political instincts, we usually did well: they were Jimmy's political instincts. When we tried to accommodate other views—.

MK: Why do you think that is?

GR: Because, in the long run, telling the truth is a good strategy. Believing in something and being true to it is a better strategy than the other way.

MK: When you had anchors in and whatnot, say for something on the veto, was there any group that you dealt with there, that you were trying to explain it, and let them know what the President's thinking was? And did it help, if you did do it?

GR: I don't know if it helped. What group? When we had anchors?

MK: Did you have some anchors in around that time?

GR: Yes. When we could do it informally and had time to bring in people and explain our policies or our initiatives, if we truly were doing what we wanted to do, what we thought was right, we could get a sympathetic ear.

MK: Did you do it before the State of the Union?

GR: Sometimes.

MK: Take me through the State of the Union, what you looked at it as, and when you got started, and that sort of thing.

GR: Well, we always looked at it as the opportunity to start anew, to redeem, to justify. And we would start planning the State of the Union—it was [delivered] in January—around November. We'd start soliciting information from all the departments. We'd meet; we'd always constantly strive to make them thematic and inspirational and visionary - as opposed to programmatic, political, and boring. It was a constant fight with special interests—I'm not even going to say special interests—our departments to keep out laundry lists of things. I, in meetings with others, would try to shape what the theme would be. I kind of look at it like an advertising program. What is the slogan? I'm not saying a slogan. But what is the theme we're trying to get through, whether it was the economy—let's not have anything here that's not one of the three E's, economy, efficiency and energy; I don't want to talk about anything else.

I remember our labor coordinator coming up and saying he had just talked to [labor leader] Lane Kirkland and Lane Kirkland said that George Meany, who had died the year before, on his deathbed said: "…to please have the President mention labor law reform in the State of the Union address." I said, "Are you kidding me?" He said, "That's what he said; if we don't have it in there, we're in deep shit with labor."

And then Carter would come back and say, "Strong defense; put in strong defense and better schools." You'd fight and fight to keep that out. Then you'd get some of it out and then you'd get a lean speech and you'd circulate it to all the departments, and everybody would come in for a piece of it. I should have been firmer; the President should have been firmer. The Reagan people knew how to do it. They didn't really care what those idiots out there wanted; it was what's best for the president. Therefore, he always came out—and Clinton, too, with being thematic, being inspirational. Clinton's amazing. He's wonderful. He's the best actor that's ever been in the White House.

MK: Better than Reagan?

GR: Yes. Reagan was a "B" actor. Clinton is Academy-Award caliber.

MK: Well, he certainly has a range of drama that he brings to the office.

GR: Yes.

MK: Never short on that.

GR: No.

MK: In fact, it's sort of a dream, I guess, if you're a White House correspondent - in some ways.

GR: They're going to miss him, except he's not going away; believe me, he'll be around.

MK: The cast of characters: they're going to be around, too. Monica Lewinsky is going to be here. She's going to be going from Jenny Craig [a weight loss franchise system] to who-knows-what, but she'll be there, and we'll follow her through her life. There's no doubt.

One of the things that the Clinton people have done is: they've taken the State of the Union and, instead of having it as a speech, they've turned it into an event—and an event that has many parts to it. I noticed in the preparations for this one, going back the year before Monica broke—it was for the speech in 1998, but going back to December of 1997—they started with a *New York Times* interview about his leadership and what he was planning to do from that point forward. Then they had the State Department press conference where he dealt with a broad range of policy very, very effectively. They've done that again, recently. Then each week would be a particular thing like Education was one week and Welfare Reform, say, another. The week of Monica was going to be Social Security, but they were so well organized that, in a way, and having organized in that way, really got them through—because all he had to do is just prepare reading the speech. It was in the can.

GR: I remember everybody said: "What's going to happen?"

MK: And then he got more people watching it. He certainly was the man with nerves of steel. But they've been able to get publicity—

GR: Not just nerves.

MK: —when the Congress has gone out. Look at this time. The Congress has gone out until January 24. That gives him—he's had months, not just weeks, where he can do week-by-week what he wants, without an opposition.

GR: And what's the date of the State of the Union, the twenty-fourth or twenty-fifth [of January]?

MK: Yes.

GR: A week before the New Hampshire primary. It might pull Gore through.

MK: The only area where he's suffering, in getting the publicity for his stuff, is that the campaign is on. You can just see the energy moving out of the White House.

GR: Exactly.

MK: Even the briefing room. The briefing room is half full.

GR: And, frankly, it's to Gore's advantage that it moves out of the White House. He's got to swap that for what Clinton can do for him. It's probably marginal now.

MK: If you look at setting up a year, clearly the time for getting off on the right foot is the State of the Union. What are the other opportunities during a year that occur—as you're looking at a year, you say: "We'll do this in a State of the Union?" Are there other points in the year where you're thinking of other kinds of things that you're going to do?

GR: Well, you have the budget. The budget fight. There's always one or two major foreign policy initiatives that you pretty much can control in a way.

MK: Did you think of them at certain times of the year that you would do those?

GR: Well, we had such a strong agenda. Carter wanted to do everything: 1977 was the year of the Panama Canal Treaty; 1978 was the year of Camp David peace process; 1979 was supposed to be the year of SALT or arms control, and 1980 was supposed to be the year of reelection. [And] 1977 did work. It was a tough, bruising battle for the—and energy also was big that year—Panama Canal Treaty. It was the right thing to do.

It was one that people said Carter should not do it; "It's a second term thing." It was gutsy. It needed to be done. If it hadn't been done then, god knows what would have happened. There was a good chance that they were going to blow up the [Panama] Canal. So, in a way, winning that was sort of a pyrrhic victory. It was a victory and it showed Carter as gutsy. We thought it would play as gutsy. Unfortunately, it was a bit of a pyrrhic victory because there was so much political opposition to it, even the people who voted for it like Howard Baker.

The President said to Senator Baker, "You did the right thing, Howard." He said, "I know, Mr. President. A couple more right things and I'm going to be out of office." Then in 1978 the major opportunity was peace in the Middle East. That helped to an extent to show Carter's leadership. It showed the unique quality he had, that huge bladder he has to be able to sit there and negotiate and negotiate and, "… you don't go home until I get my way and we do the right thing." Having said that, it didn't help us that much in the polls, because it was a very even-handed approach to the Middle East problem. The Jewish constituency really was divided on what we were doing—which was unfortunate.

Then in 1979 it was going to be—in fact, there's a memo in the Carter Center where I said, "Let's run for re-election with SALT, nuclear arms control being the cornerstone of our campaign; let's not run on the economic numbers and stay in the dugout and the trenches talking about the Consumer Price Index and domestic policy things. Let's go all out: are you for getting rid of nuclear weapons or are you going to go—?" We realized Ronald Reagan was going to be our opponent, and that he was at best pretty fuzzy as far as people's ideas of being stable enough to control the button. I felt we had a good chance to go to the country because we're talking about peace, we're talking about preventing nuclear annihilation. Big issues; big initiatives. Then Afghanistan happened and we had to take down the SALT treaty. Then the hostages happened.

MK: Then the economy, the misery index, was up. Is there anything that one can do in going for reelection when people's view of the economy is that it's weaker? Is there any way of tackling that?

GR: We tried to explain it. We tried to talk about the causes, and what we could do. We tried to show fiscal restraint. Carter was a different type of Democrat. Clinton was more successful at it. We were just trying to push our own party, kicking and screaming, into the twentieth century and we had the [Ted] Kennedy challenge, which really was debilitating. We never thought we'd lose to Kennedy, but he really kept us in a political mode all year and hurt us in the general election. But the economy, those numbers were there. And as much as you could explain them, there was a worldwide recession. So much had to do with oil, energy prices, loss of Iran, loss of—so it was, in retrospect, almost impossible.

MK: In looking at your life in the White House, in some ways it was going from one crisis to another and from one big thing to another, what kind of burnout is there? Did you feel that you were working these huge, long days and they really caught up with you?

GR: It was very gratifying. I was used to working long hours. I built a business, an advertising business. I was very happy, had gotten remarried. I didn't feel burnt out. However, I was not going to stay a second term. I don't think Hamilton was going to stay. I think one term is enough, that you need a different type of person if you get reelected. So I wasn't physically burnt out but probably had done it all; and possibly, in a second term, had we been successful in being reelected, I might not have been as effective…. I don't know.

MK: What are the rewards of working in a White House?

GR: In my case, the reward that I felt was truthfully seeing my friend, Jimmy Carter, doing the right thing and being a part of it. By and large he did the right thing. [Inaudible] Camp David accords, Middle East peace, going to summits, fighting for things like nuclear arms control and changing the way people use energy; reforming, fighting special interests as much as we could. We didn't do enough of it. It was better than making ads for Sears-Roebuck. I'd leave a meeting at the White House and I always felt that was a privilege to work there and being around him, being around somebody who, no matter what you think of the Carter presidency—we really didn't succeed the way we'd have liked to—I think it was better than the rendered judgment lately. But to know that you're involved in things that are bigger than yourself is very gratifying.

MK: Do you think that one tends to judge a presidency, particularly if there's a second term, on whether you win?

GR: Absolutely. It's just a strange phenomenon. If you lose an election, then your term has been judged a failure by people in the press. If you lose big, a gigantic failure. It's just now people are recognizing the accomplishments of the Carter administration but coming off of it it was like you're a pariah that nobody wants to be around. Carter was a pariah. And yet we kept the peace and we had an honest administration. We brought peace in the Middle East, the only one that's endured, taking Egypt out of the equation, so you don't have major conflagration in the Middle East. We made people aware of energy conservation, reformed the Civil Service; we fought lobbyists. Certainly the President never did anything personally to dishonor the office. He told the truth. So those were things that weren't recognized when he lost the election. Harry Truman had the same type of thing, too.

MK: Well, the second cut of history really looks differently because it's looking at different kinds of documentation.

GR: And also it's seeing what happens in successive administrations.

MK: When you leave a White House, what kind of benefits have working in a White House been? I'm not talking about one can make more money.

GR: I didn't stay in the Washington culture; that's the obvious—

MK: But what kinds of working, for example, or maybe networks of relationships?

GR: The relationships I have, the greatest relationships—those guys in the picture—those will go on forever. You learn to deal with all types of people. You also lose any sense of awe. You

meet every head of state, you meet the great, the near great, the not so great as you thought. So you tend to get a seasoning that allows you to go into any situation. You learn, especially if you worked in the press and communications area, to be skeptical; you learn that what you see is not always what you get. So you become, I think, more savvy.

MK: Do you also see where the opportunities are of doing things? You say you're more savvy about how the news operates, and part of that is also a sense of how you can shape things—

GR: Yes.

MK: —and how things can work.

GR: You have a unique knowledge of certain things.

MK: So, in some ways, it makes you bulletproof in certain kinds of situations, because you're not going to get awed by the head of a *Fortune 10* company.

GR: I started making films and I can remember chewing out a writer about something, saying, "you're late." He said, "You can't take pressure, can you?" The writer was a Hollywood writer; he had been goofing off and everything. I said, "You think this is pressure?" I talked to people in the movie business saying: "The pressure, the pressure; let me tell you pressure; let me tell you embarrassment." So you learn to roll with the punches a lot more, know the situation.

MK: In running your office, how many people were in it and how were the responsibilities—?

GR: I had a deputy, Greg Schneiders. I had an executive assistant, Becky Hendricks. I had the speechwriting operation under me, the press advance and the photographers, the radio, TV people, the communications.

MK: WHCA [White House Communications Agency].

GR: Well, WHCA isn't under you except that you have more to do with—

MK: In setting up stuff, yes.

GR: They worked for the military.

MK: News summary?

GR: The news summary was under me. It was and then we took it out. They operated on their own.

MK: Media liaison, did you do that at all?

GR: Media liaison? Yes. No. That came under Jody. It was mostly newspapers, right? Walt Wurfel.

MK: [He] ran that. In all of those operations that you had under you, how many people were there total?

GR: Not a lot. I can't remember. Somehow the number seventeen jumps up. It must have been seventeen.

MK: Did you use interns?

GR: Yes.

MK: A lot?

GR: One of my interns was Anita Dunn, who is now head of communications for the [Bill] Bradley Campaign. She went to work on the Hill afterwards.

MK: And your speechwriters certainly went on—

GR: Rick Hertzberg.

MK: Chris Matthews. And he was able to use his White House experience, I thought, when he went on the Hill and worked for [Tip] O'Neill. He just knew what the dynamics are.

GR: Chris is smart.

MK: Since the newspapers were not going to give him a lot of space, who's getting the space? Reagan. And he got himself into Reagan's stories.

GR: He got Tip O'Neill to recognize television, too. Chris is a character. He's a good friend.

MK: In looking at where polling comes in, how was it used?

GR: We only polled about quarterly, and it was never used to make a decision on what to do. It was used to see how effectively what we were doing was working, and it was used for message development; but you couldn't go to Carter and say, "The majority of the people don't like us giving back the Panama Canal," and expect him to change policy. So it was useful in message development and for just taking a reading on how we were doing is perceived. It was after-the-fact.

MK: In the case of the Panama Canal, you knew going in that this was going to be a tough sell. Did the polling show areas where there were strong arguments to be made?

GR: Yes. We could see that, where there were some arguments to be made. We could also see where there were areas—we were trying to influence sixty-six people, what states might have a chance to turn it around.

MK: What kinds of things did the polls come up with that you were able to use on Panama Canal, and then some other things too?

GR: I remember it encouraged us to get [Hollywood actor] John Wayne to do us a film, because John Wayne was for it—we needed a conservative spokesperson and he was a friend of General Torijos. So we got him to do a film which we ran in all states. It gave it a flashy kind of patina. We found that when certain arguments were made about Latin America, that we could neutralize people's antipathy toward the treaties. Part of it was, "Would you go to war?" "Would you fight if it meant endangering our relations with our neighbors to the south, not just Panama?" The same thing with—we polled about SALT. We found that

most people wanted nuclear arms control but we also found that they didn't trust the Russians to keep their word. How do you balance that?

MK: In the Camp David meeting when you got together and were going to do the energy speech—I've read Caddell's memo—what was attractive about that?

GR: Nothing.

MK: I read Mondale's too, and Mondale just wanting to cry over it.

GR: But the truth of the matter is, Caddell was right. The country was in a funk. A lot of that was misinterpreted, but the country was in a funk and we found that just constantly—we were going to make this energy speech and nobody was listening and that constantly bringing it up, talking about energy, talking about the problems didn't help the problems, didn't help our situation, but made it even more acute. If you talked about the problem then he became more and more to blame for it. It was decided that Carter wanted to do something else. We were very tired. We had been to the SALT summit in Vienna, then flown to Japan and came back. We'd canceled the vacation in Hawaii, which was a mistake. So the timing was wrong. But the press overemphasized—he was going to make a speech and he canceled a speech. So what?

MK: It did develop more interest once that speech was given.

GR: Yes.

MK: Then you gave the speech—it got a lot of good reviews—and took it on the road, and then fired everybody. How did that happen that those two things came together?

GR: No comment. You'll have to wait for my book. Some people made some bad judgments.

MK: That's a good example of stepping on one's lead because you had a good story going. It was kind of a way of treating a speech, of making it go for several days that was successful. Reagan would do it and Clinton certainly does it, too. And everybody does that with the State of the Union now.

Are there any areas that you think would be helpful to people? For example, how you learned your job. Is it all just on-the-job training?

GR: You hope you have some background and have a real familiarity with your boss. Don't let yourself be pushed aside. You should know everything; get as much access as possible to what's going [on], not just with the boss but—.

MK: What meetings would you go to on a regular basis?

GR: Cabinet meetings, senior staff meetings, special senior staff meetings. Go to a nine-thirty meeting with the President which would be Hamilton, Jody, me, Stu Eizenstat, Frank Moore. Jody would talk about what the press might be talking about, and get information.

MK: What were the other meetings you had each day?

GR: Task forces on different issues, meetings on SALT, meetings on Civil Service reform. Whoever was taking an initiative to have a meeting, the meeting on what various programs we were working on. Sometimes I wouldn't go; I'd send a deputy. Greg would go.

MK: Did you ever put together task forces that related to the selling of particular programs?

GR: Yes. That's what I'm talking about. And also we'd have trip meetings, speech meetings.

MK: In the communications meetings, would those be ones that you would run?

GR: The selling of a program would be congressional—it would be people from each department. It could be run by somebody from Congressional Relations, whatever the initiative was, or some specialist or Hamilton. The Chief of Staff would run it. I would consider communications people a resource to that meeting.

MK: Were there weekly meetings that you might have had, or monthly meetings where you might have looked back, or looked ahead?

GR: Scheduling meetings, agenda.

MK: Who would be involved in the schedule? Was schedule and agenda the same meeting?

GR: No. Agenda, political agenda, substantive program agenda. The scheduling meetings would be for trips and the monthly schedule. There would be somebody from the press, somebody from my area, somebody from advance, somebody from the First Lady's office.

MK: Thank you very much.

GR: Have you been watching the series "West Wing"?

MK: I've seen one of them. It was very funny. I certainly enjoyed it. It certainly doesn't look anything like it. One can hardly imagine how small the space is in the West Wing.

GR: And yet there's people running around like it's a big emergency room. It's the producer of ER.

MK: That's right. These huge hallways. And you never see people in the hallways, either.

GR: Not in that White House.

MK: Not in the White House.

GR: That looks like the traffic is just—it's like a hotel lobby, an emergency room or a hotel lobby. It's doing well.

MK: It seems to be. It's a good cast of people.

GR: How did you get involved in this? You've been doing this for a while. Did you work in the White House?

[End of Disc 1 of 1]