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Jordan's Role in Iraq is Modest, but Positive

by Scott Lasensky
(This commentary appeared in The Daily Star on December 19, 2005. Reprinted with permission.)

Jordan has made positive if modest contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. The U.S., lacking cooperation from most of Iraq's neighbors, turned to the kingdom early on. Despite King Abdullah II's public criticism of the war, Washington found a willing if behind-the-scenes partner. Amman has a major stake in the future stability and territorial integrity of Iraq and in the success of U.S. actions there. In terms of core objectives - a stable, free and unified Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors, an Iraq free from Islamist terror groups, and an Iraq that maintains a free market and safeguards Sunni rights—the U.S. and Jordan are in agreement.

Still, there are a growing number of sore spots between Amman, Washington and Baghdad. The Hashemites are uneasy about the new reality of a Shiite-majority, constitutional democracy on its border. Democracy in Iraq increases pressure on Jordan to reform. At the same time, post-Saddam Iraq raises larger Sunni-Shiite tensions that go beyond Jordan's borders. Jordan, like other Sunni regimes, is nervously watching as Iran increases its influence in Iraq.

Early on, the king raised these anxieties in public, which did not build goodwill with Iraq's new leaders. But recently Jordan has adjusted its rhetoric and has been playing a more positive role, including efforts to promote greater cooperation among Iraq's neighbors and build bridges between them and Washington. Unfortunately, the unease within the Jordanian monarchy is mirrored in Iraq, where anti-Jordanian feelings have run high among Shiites, who have not forgotten the kingdom's close ties with Saddam Hussein. The November hotel bombings in Amman, and an earlier rocket attack in Aqaba, may foretell further tension as Jordan's internal security becomes increasingly imperiled as a result of U.S. intervention in Iraq.

Still, the main story is one of cooperation between the U.S., Jordan and the new Iraq. For Jordan, cooperation has brought many positive economic benefits, including oil subsidies from Gulf states, substantial new American aid, a booming real-estate sector, and a growing Iraq-related trade and transport account. Jordan serves as a gateway to Iraq for businesses, diplomats, journalists and NGOs. The gateway role is a major asset for Jordan (though ironically it is an outgrowth of continuing instability in Iraq). The myriad material benefits of maintaining a close relationship with Saddam have largely been replaced, and in some cases exceeded, in the post-Saddam era.

But for the U.S., cooperation has come with trade-offs. Political space in Jordan has been constrained and reform efforts have slowed down. Moreover, there is a widening credibility gap between the governing elite and the governed. The war in Iraq, Jordanians say, has united the opposition as never before (although the Amman bombings have partly reversed this trend, at least in the short term). Furthermore, the situation in Iraq has exacerbated the already high level of Jordanian public disfavor with U.S. policy.

What accounts for Jordan's continuing alignment with the U.S. over Iraq? Five inter-related factors are at play. First, for Abdullah, Jordan's strategic relationship with the U.S. remains a centerpiece of Jordan's national security strategy. Even the Amman bombings have not shaken the regime's fundamental strategic choice to align with Washington.

Second, Jordan, a weak, perennially insecure state, has a long tradition of trend-spotting and watching which way the wind blows. After Abdullah decided the momentum was working against Saddam Hussein prior to the Iraq war, he refrained from opposing Washington.

Third, Jordanian leaders have been unwilling to bear the regional costs of sitting on the sidelines, as in 1990-91, when the kingdom alienated GCC states and suffered huge economic dislocations.

Fourth, there is the Palestinian dimension and Jordan's hope (since diminished) that cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq would lead to more engagement by Washington in the peace process.

Fifth, the U.S. fashioned an effective inducement package that has provided political cover, reassured Jordanian leaders, and offset real costs associated with the war.

Jordan has given an important though modest boost to the twin projects of reconstruction and stabilization in Iraq. The kingdom has cooperated by quietly allowing the staging of U.S. forces, training thousands of Iraqi security personnel, tightening border controls, and maintaining robust intelligence-sharing with the U.S. and the new Iraqi government. The kingdom has also been a leader in humanitarian assistance, including medical aid. And Jordan has reached out to Iraqi Sunnis to encourage its participation in the political process, though it is unclear how much influence it has on this question.

What are the implications for U.S. policy? In the short term, the U.S. should continue to address Jordan's economic and security needs and continue to encourage other key regional actors to do the same - especially on energy security. But as Jordan looks for further aid, seeks to continue oil subsidies and tries to obtain new U.S. weapons systems, Washington should be selective and should carefully consider the architecture of its aid programs.

In the long-term, if the situation in Iraq stabilizes, energy prices fall and Jordan's economy continues to grow, some direct assistance to Jordan (currently at an all-time high) could be curtailed. At a minimum, the architecture of U.S. assistance should be reconsidered to make a broader impact on larger segments of society, rather than channeling so much assistance through the government. The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) and the Free Trade Agreement represent positive and sustainable moves in this direction.

Whether or not the U.S. failed to develop an adequate strategy to deal with Iraq's neighbors before the war, or if these differences were simply unavoidable given conflicting interests and ambitions, Washington now recognizes it needs greater cooperation from the neighbors if the situation in Iraq is to improve. Relying on its smaller neighbors, like Jordan, is necessary but far from sufficient. For its part, Jordan will remain a steadfast partner in efforts to improve cooperation among Iraq's neighbors. Its interest in doing so is strong, although its ability to influence events in Iraq—not to mention the policies of neighboring states—remains modest.

Scott Lasensky currently directs the "Iraq and its Neighbors" project at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, and is conducting the project's study on Jordanian-Iraqi relations. He is a researcher in the USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. These views are his own. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.

The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.