Buck
Rogers or Rock Throwers?
Conference Report
14 October 1999
This conference
was sponsored by the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) with Armed Forces Journal International
and the National Security Studies Program at the
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University. The views expressed in this
conference summary are those of individuals and
do not represent official US intelligence or policy
positions. The NIC routinely sponsors such unclassified
conferences with outside experts to gain knowledge
and insight to sharpen the level of debate on
critical issues.
The
DCI�s Strategic Estimates Program
In
1999, the NIC began undertaking a systematic research
and development program on broad crosscutting
issues for the new millennium, which constitute
the DCI�s Strategic Estimates Program. We envision
engaging with experts outside the Intelligence
Community in understanding these issues. The program
includes a series of conferences, gaming exercises,
and other activities to expand on analytic capabilities
in these areas:
Warning in a Changing Security Environment
This project is exploring alternative scenarios
for several of the more immediate warning concerns
and seeks to expand warning competence on newly
emerging security issues.
The Future of Military Conflict
We are assessing the nature and character of future
conflicts that affect the United States, both
directly and from a distance.
The Information Revolution
This project is considering how effectively various
regions, countries, and sectors of society can
cope with the information revolution and related
issues.
Declining Authority of the Nation-State
This project examines how globalization, ethnic
particularism, and the permeability of borders
are challenging the ability of states to remain
the guarantor of the security and well-being of
their populations.
Global Economic Threats
We are considering how unprecedented market volatility
is threatening the economies of various countries
and the �Washington Consensus� on such issues
as the liberalization of trade and capital flows.
Challenges to the Surviving Superpower
The United States is having increasing difficulty
translating its unparalleled power into influence
on key developments in the international community;
this project focuses on understanding the factors
affecting this issue.
Global Trends
2015. The above issues will serve as building
blocks as the NIC produces a follow-on to our
1996 study, Global
Trends 2010, which identified population growth,
economic progress, food, communications, energy,
and military technology as key factors in shaping
the world.
The
event, co-hosted by the Georgetown University
National Security Studies Program, the National
Intelligence Council, and Armed Forces Journal
International, will examine the role technology
plays in the modernization and doctrinal developments
of militaries around the world. The goal is to
present analyses that shed light on the international
response to the revolution in military affairs
so that scholars and analysts might better understand
the role technology will play in the development
and use of armed forces in the early decades of
the 21st century. The first three panels will
examine the military modernization plans of various
countries critical to international security and
US foreign policy. Panelists will consider the
following issues: strategic thinking, declared
intentions, procurement, and expected results
of modernization of the country in question. The
fourth panel will provide a broad assessment of
the consequences for American policy as a result
of international trends in technology diffusion
and the revolution in military affairs.
Agenda
8:15
am - 8:45 am Check in and registration
8:45 am - 9:00 am Opening remarks Stephen P.
Gibert, Director, NSS
John Gannon, Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Robert Gallucci, Dean, SFS
9:00
am - 10:30 am Panel 1: Asia China: Michael
Pillsbury (National Defense University) India:
Timothy D. Hoyt (Georgetown University) Korea:
Victor Cha (Georgetown University) Taiwan: John
Copper (Rhodes College)
10:30
am - 10:45 am Break
10:45
am -12:15 pm Panel 2: Europe Britain: Robbin
Laird (ICSA) and Timothy D. Kilvert-Jones (UNITECH)
Germany: Holger Mey (Institute for Strategic Analysis,
Bonn) France: Yves Boyer (Fondation pour la Recherche
Strategique) Russia: Stephen Blank (Army War College)
12:15
pm - 1:30 pm Keynote Speaker Luncheon Andrew Marshall
(US Department of Defense, Office of Net Assessment)
Location: Copley Formal Lounge
1:45
pm - 3:15 pm Panel 3: Second- and Third-Tier
States Australia: Michael Evans (Land Warfare
Studies Centre, Duntroon Australia) Case Studies
Among Third-Tier States: Chris Demchak (University
of Arizona) Israel: Shimon Naveh (Tel Aviv University)
Persian Gulf: Anthony Cordesman (CSIS)
3:15
pm - 3:30 pm Break
3:30
pm - 5:00 pm Panel 4: Implications Paul Bracken
(Yale University) Dan Gour� (CSIS) Williamson
Murray (Institute for Defense Analyses) Joseph
Nye (Harvard University)
5:00
pm - 5:10 pm Concluding Remarks Don Fruehling, Chairman
and Publisher, AFJI Participants
Summary
About
150 participants, including an international gathering
of experts, examined whether and how technology may
be leading to a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct
of warfare, a shift that has been generally categorized
as a �revolution in military affairs� (RMA).They concluded:
-
US
successes in developing RMA capabilities will drive
potential adversaries toward asymmetric responses
including weapons of mass destruction and information
warfare. Some countries probably would be able to
pose serious operational and strategic challenges
to the United States by acquiring military technologies
and capabilities that were in their eyes, �good enough.�
- Also, countries
can exploit �sidewise� technologies�old by US standards
but still new to many other countries�to pose significant
security threats and complicate US military operations.
These technologies, if employed in a �novel� operational
manner rather than high-end technologies, could drive
development of the next RMA.
- Participants
believe that�of the countries considered for discussion�China,
Russia, India, and Australia have the greatest potential
to achieve an RMA, should they decide to pursue the
option.
Buck
Rogers or Rock Throwers?
What Constitutes
a Revolution in Military Affairs?
History
demonstrates that military revolutions are complex events
in which technological change is often a key enabler but
not necessarily the major driver. Panelists identified
necessary drivers as the presence of a clearly defined
opponent, a strategic purpose, and the ability to integrate
technological capabilities into warfighting doctrine,
training, and professional military education; without
this combination, technological breakthroughs will do
little more than facilitate defense modernization.
Is an RMA Underway?
Based
on this definition of an RMA, some experts question whether
the activities we see underway are more along the lines
of a high technology modernization rather than an RMA,
even in the United States. Joint Vision: 2010 is the JCS
concept of how to leverage technology to achieve new levels
of effectiveness in joint operations. One panelist argued
that JV 2010 lacks the fundamental elements of identifying
who the United States might fight, for what purpose, or
when. Another argued that current US military culture
minimizes the importance of both doctrine and professional
education�particularly knowledge of foreign languages,
culture, and history. A �genuine� revolution, instead,
would require profound changes in the intellectual foundation
of military doctrine, personnel, and training.
One
speaker cautioned against mistaking the expanding body
of RMA writings coming out of US and foreign think tanks
as a commitment to implementing the concept. Theorizing
about an RMA is much easier than putting it into practice,
particularly if the theory is based on technologies that
are just emerging.
Rock
Throwers or Buck Rogers: Which Future is More Likely?
Panelists
were skeptical that any country other than the United
States is intent on achieving a high-technology RMA.
Most
countries lack the resources to make the necessary investment,
the political determination to pursue the associated advanced
technologies, and the perceived need or the industrial
capacity to support a high-technology military. In addition,
decisions about high-technology research, development,
and production are being dominated by the private sector,
not military establishments. Consequently a state�s drive
to acquire breakthrough military capabilities is increasingly
constrained by a skeptical private sector. This sector
is attentive to commercial and market imperatives rather
than government needs for products that respond to unique
military requirements.
No
country is likely to match the United States in the broad-based
technological sophistication of its military capabilities�or
even to try. Nonetheless, conference participants expect
to see growing interest in alternative strategies for
integrating advanced technology into defense planning.
Several countries are pursuing �niche modernization� and
will procure pieces of the RMA suitable to their own security
needs. Others will look to older technologies and perhaps
asymmetric warfighting strategies to counter US superiority.
Panelists
also cautioned that we should be careful about how to
visualize military revolutions. The current RMA is generally
portrayed as linear progression of technological change
driven by the United States. Focusing on the highest end
of the technology spectrum could overlook the possibilities
that other states could exploit �sidewise� technologies�old
by US standards but still new to many other countries.
A prime example is the diffusion in the Middle East and
Asia of the 1950s-1960s era nuclear weapon and ballistic
missile technologies. Older technologies such as these
can still pose significant security threats and complicate
military operations, and these technologies, rather than
those at the �cutting edge,� could drive development of
an RMA if employed in a �novel� manner.
Where
is an RMA possible?
In
addition to the United States, panel members identified
China, Russia, India, and Australia as having
the potential to achieve an RMA. Japan was not a subject
of the conference, but panel members assessed that Japan
merited further study.
China
The
expert on military affairs in China argued that the RMA
school in China is a small but vocal group within the
Chinese strategic community. Although some analysts believe
that China will be the first to seize the full potential
of RMA capabilities, others note numerous challenges that
will obstruct China�s pursuit.
Advocates
of an RMA-based modernization strategy in the Chinese
armed forces are heavily outnumbered by those defending
Mao�s concept of a �People�s� war and by those proposing
preparations for a �local war.� Current doctrine is built
around the concept of a People�s war, and advocates of
this strategy have considerable influence within China�s
political leadership, which is willing to overlook the
potential drawbacks of fighting the �last war� in order
to preserve the country�s ideological legacy. There is
no senior political sponsor for the RMA school in the
armed forces, and no one appears likely to emerge from
the current regime. Although China could incorporate selected
elements of a high-technology military, the doctrinal
changes and force reorganization necessary to achieve
a genuine RMA would place significant stresses on the
Communist system.
Some
participants also noted that most Chinese depictions of
a future RMA adversary resemble the forces of the United
States and its allies. Chinese RMA advocates, however,
believe their country, not the United States, will be
the first to exploit the RMA in two or three decades.
These advocates, both civilian and military believe this
situation will provide an opportunity for China, and other
countries that follow suit, to confront the United States.
A
follow-on discussion raised the possibility that China
might develop an asymmetric strategy for fighting the
West. Elements of such a strategy could include a launch
of preemptive strikes with antisatellite weapons and the
use of computer viruses designed to paralyze the enemy�s
nerve centers and upset logistics.
Russia
Russia
has key fundamentals in place to produce an RMA. They
are: (a) the intellectual foundation; (b) a demonstrated
capability to field world-class military systems; (c)
an advanced military industrial infrastructure and scientific
and technical experts; and (d) the desire to remain a
world power.
One
expert on Russian military affairs estimated, however,
that chances are small that Russia will achieve this potential�mainly
because of economic, political, military, and cultural
chaos. He also argued that Russian national security assessments
tend to be wildly inflated and link NATO��subjugated�
to US dictates�to threats ranging from support of ethno-separatist
movements in local wars to enemies at the theater and
global levels. The unwillingness of the Russians to see
the modern world beyond �antiquated old-regime categories�
encumbers them with unaffordable military requirements.
In the end, a lack of resources, discipline, and organizational
structures would stymie Moscow�s pursuit of an RMA, according
to this expert, who did not foresee dire economic constraints
serving as a catalyst to spur development of breakthrough
capabilities.
The
panelist concluded that Russia will continue to place
greater reliance on nuclear deterrence as a result of
the decline in its conventional forces and capabilities.
This Russian response is one of the few clear asymmetric
strategies adopted by an important power. Unlike the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany, Russia is not constrained
by the issue of interoperability with the forces of the
United States and has the�flexibility to pursue broad
innovation, niche capabilities, or asymmetrical responses.
India
According
to an expert on Indian military affairs, India has a large
and modern commercial high-technology base and has begun
to experiment with both offensive and defensive information
operations. Its military and strategic thinkers have paid
considerable attention to the writings of experts in the
United States and China on the RMA. Some of them cite
the experience of the colonial period to argue that India
must keep pace with RMA developments or become a servile
state. These writers are especially concerned over US
military preeminence and long-term US intent toward India.
The speaker argued that near‑term obstacles to India�s
pursuit of an RMA�namely lack of a strategy consensus,
bureaucratic obstacles, and budget constraints�will be
too significant for India to overcome and achieve an RMA.
The
expert noted that India�s strategic community must balance
several competing security interests including concern
over national unity and insurgencies, threats from Pakistan
and China, and India�s aspirations for a global leadership
role. These competing interests pull Indian force planning
and strategy in different directions. For example, some
missions such as patrol of the Himalayas are manpower-intensive,
while a refocus of Indian security to extra‑regional
threats is regarded as necessitating severe manpower cuts
to release funds to acquire world-class capabilities.
This particular divergence is far from resolved.
The
specialist also pointed out that India is hamstrung
by the nature of its indigenous defense research
and production. India has a significant high technology
commercial sector, a large pool of information-technology
talent from which it can draw, and a substantial
software industry. Indian defense research, development,
and production efforts, however, remain reliant
on state‑owned ventures and thus lack dynamic
input from the private sector, one of the key contributing
elements to the ongoing RMA in the United States.
In addition, some within the Indian strategic community
argue that for India to engage in high-technology
warfare is to fall ultimately into a Western trap
that would force India to fight on foreign terms.
Australia
The conference cited Australia as the only country that
has institutionally embraced the concept of an RMA and
is attempting to use it to guide a transformation of its
defense strategy and capabilities.
Discussions
described how Australia embraced RMA thinking because
of strategic policy changes. In the mid-1990s Australia
moved from a strategy of continental defense to
a maritime strategy that reflected a greater willingness
to project force in defense of national interests
in the Asia Pacific region. Defense planners see
the RMA as providing the enabling capabilities Australia
will need to execute its military strategy.
The
Australian Ministry of Defence has created an Office of
the Revolution in Military Affairs to review technological
developments and develop a strategy for adopting RMA technology
from the United States. The Ministry has increased spending
on research and development, has expanded military cooperation
with the US Army�s battle laboratories, has held conferences,
and has conducted experiments and exercises in a comprehensive
effort to provide a deeper understanding of the revolution.
In each of these endeavors, the Australians have sought
to formalize and institutionalize developments across
its three armed services. They also appear to view the
RMA in a �holistic� context, seeing the RMA as ultimately
evolving from an as yet undetermined blending of technologies,
doctrines, and organizational changes.
The
Australians have identified four key components of the
RMA�weapon lethality, force projection, information processing,
and intelligence collection. They consider the country�s
labor force well suited to take advantage of emerging
information technologies.
There
are, however, impediments to Australia�s pursuit of the
RMA. Money is the most significant. With limited defense
resources and increased operational expenses, acquisition
funds are strained. A 1997 review outlined a modernization
strategy that would apply information and communication
technologies to existing platforms. Australia also plans
to exploit off-the-shelf commercial technology. This �middle
way� is envisioned to allow Australia to hold down defense
spending, retain a competitive edge in the Pacific region,
and ensure necessary interoperability with US forces.
The
View From Western Europe
European
governments and military leaders were described by panelists
as skeptical of the concept of an RMA and as believing
that the United States has exaggerated the benefits of
high-technology warfare. They characterized European states
as generally wary about proclamations that technology
will eliminate the fog and friction of warfare; the European
riposte tends to be that technology cannot overcome deficits
in human leadership and sound strategy. Other European
concerns according to the panelists include the following.
Fiscal
pressures
Competing budget priorities�primarily social welfare
costs�have severely limited the funding available
for defense modernization. Technology offers, however,
both a solution and a formidable challenge. A high-technology
fighting force could reduce the demand for manpower
in states with unfavorable demographic trends. On
the other hand, a high-technology force is expensive
to outfit and sustain, particularly if the Europeans
attempt to keep pace with the United States.
Sensitivities
over industrial production
Because commercial technologies play a critical
role in the RMA, the issue of who will benefit economically
from defense modernization is contentious among
both the European governments and between Europe
and the United States. Furthermore, the Europeans
fear that the RMA could be a vehicle for the United
States to hold Europe hostage to US proprietary
standards and make it impossible for them to compete
successfully for defense contracts.
Preserving
a role for diplomacy
Europeans are wary of the impact of the RMA on overall
security policy. They worry that breakthroughs in
military capabilities will weaken the inclination
to use diplomatic tools to resolve conflicts. They
tend to downplay the significance of the RMA by
arguing that technology can only shape, but not
control, what remains fundamentally a political
world.
Preventing
US dominance of the Alliance
The French, in particular, were said by the panelists
to want to ensure that a focus on defense modernization
does not undermine or deflect Europe�s efforts to
define its own identity distinct from the United
States. Nor do Europeans want the transatlantic
defense relationship to become structured in such
a way that the United States provides an information
umbrella while Europe supplies the personnel. The
UK, France, and Germany have strong defense and
high-technology industries that are positioned to
exploit commercial spinoffs that also have military
applications. They resent, to varying degrees, both
the reliance on the United States for key technologies
and the restrictive access the United States places
over these technologies.
Ensuring
interoperability
A key question raised in the UK�s recently completed
Strategic Defence Review was whether the Europeans
will be able to retain interoperability with US
forces if the gap in defense planning and resource
allocations continues to widen. Operation Allied
Force provided proof of a widening technological
and operational gap between the United States and
its allies. The Operation left many Europeans wondering
how they would retain interoperability with US forces
given the even greater advances being contemplated
by the US. Panelists agreed that the United States
could take two potential paths to the RMA�each one
would have major implications for the future of
interoperability between the US and its European
allies.
If
the United States insists on restrictive handling of technologies
and systems that it develops in pursuit of the RMA, the
Europeans would have to acquiesce to American �dictates�
in order to achieve interoperability.
Conversely,
if the United States tailors its RMA technologies and
operations on more widely available commercial systems,
the Europeans would have easier access to these systems
to achieve interoperability with the US.
Other
Perspectives
The
panelists indicated that, for the majority of the world,
the RMA is viewed primarily as the incorporation of advanced
information technologies rather than affording quantum
improvements to military capabilities. Countries, however,
increasingly perceive that a small, information-intensive,
professional armed force is the model for a 21st-century
military. Moreover, according to one expert, information
warfare represents a less expensive and less risky way
to �level the playing field,� particularly against adversaries
with large-scale conventional capabilities. Many countries
will be able to develop information warfare capabilities
with modest investments in the procurement of technology
and equipment. Few, however, are likely to be able to
organize and train their militaries in ways that will
take full advantages of these capabilities.
Iraq
and Iran are examples of states that will likely
explore the usefulness of information technology in the
pursuit of asymmetric conflict. According to one expert,
both states are more impressed with the overall military
capabilities of the United States than with US potential
for achieving an RMA. To counter US military capabilities�current
or those that emerge from the RMA�these states will explore
ways to exploit US vulnerabilities, including through
the employment of information warfare and cyberterrorism.
Israel
according to one of the panelists is not driving development
of an RMA, a surprising finding for a country that largely
has the reputation for operational innovation and for
producing state-of-the-art weapons. Although Israel explored
the concept of an RMA prior to the Gulf war, the security
community in Israel was said to advance leaders who have
demonstrated tactical success. This system of merit and
promotion favors those with narrow technical skills and
has inhibited broad strategic thinking. The panelist contended
that even if Israel did not develop an RMA, it would still
retain significant advantages in conventional warfare,
especially because its enemies are also unlikely to be
making progress toward an RMA.
Defense
modernization in some states�such as Thailand and
Chile�was said to be a mechanism by which civilians
can ensure support from military leaders and discourage
their intervention into domestic politics. In Saudi
Arabia and some other Gulf states, the acquisition
of advanced-technology systems has not been part of any
coherent effort to improve military cooperation and effectiveness
but is valued, in the words of a panelist, for its �glitter
factor.�
Defense
modernization in South Korea and Taiwan
has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary, largely
because of unremitting security threats and a dependence
on the US security umbrella. Both countries reportedly
conducted a calculated expansion of their sources of military
technology and equipment to reduce their reliance on the
United States. Capital expenditures for capabilities that
would free them from the US security umbrella, however,
were said to be prohibitive. In addition, neither Taiwan
nor South Korea would want to lose the US security umbrella
in view of ongoing security threats. The expert argued
that these defense planners may express interest in the
RMA�under the guise of advancing interoperability�as a
way to leverage access to US advanced armaments.
The
Impact of US Pursuit of the RMA
Establishing
the standard of the art
As the leader of the field, the United States is
driving the pace and nature of the RMA. The performance
of US forces in the Gulf war and in the Balkans
has highlighted the growing gap in technological
capabilities between the United States and the rest
of the world; perceptions of this gap are shaping
the responses of both allies and potential enemies
of the US.
Driving
the development of the operational counter
US successes in developing and fielding RMA operations
also will drive development of asymmetric responses�including
cyberterrorism, WMD use, or information warfare�by
potential adversaries, both state and nonstate.
Alliance
relations
US export policies, particularly with regard to
�proprietary� systems, will play a major role in
shaping alliance relations and establishing the
parameters for combined military operations.
Insight
into US intent
In a period with only a single global superpower,
countries will be closely watching trends in US
defense technology, strategy, and operational concepts
to gauge whether the United States could become
their strategic adversary. These perceptions will
spur countries to develop their own RMA breakthroughs
or asymmetric responses.
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