COST CONSIDERATIONS 8

8.1 INITIAL COSTS 
The initial construction cost of protection has two components: fixed and variable. 
Fixed costs include such items as security hardware and space requirements. These 
costs do not depend on the level of an attack; that is, it costs the same to keep a truck 
away from a building whether the truck contains 500 or 5000 lbs. of TNT. Blast 
protection, on the other hand, is a variable cost. It depends on the threat level, which 
is a function of the explosive charge weight and the stand-off distance. Building 
designers have no control over the amount of explosives used, but are able to define a 
stand-off distance by providing a secured perimeter. 
The optimal stand-off distance is determined by defining the total cost of protection 
as the sum of the cost of protection (construction cost) and the cost of stand-off (land 
cost). These two costs are considered as a function of the stand-off for a given 
explosive charge weight. The cost of protection is assumed to be proportional to the 
peak pressure at the building envelope, and the cost of land is a function of the 
square of the stand-off distance. The optimal stand-off is the one that minimizes the 
sum of these costs. 
If additional land is not available to move the secured perimeter farther from the 
building, the required floor area of the building can be distributed among additional 
floors. As the number of floors is increased, the footprint decreases, providing an 
increased stand-off distance. Balancing the increasing cost of the structure (due to 
the added floors) and the corresponding decrease in protection cost (due to added 
stand-off), it is possible to find the optimal number of floors to minimize the cost of 
protection. 
These methods for establishing an optimum stand-off distance are generally used for 
the maximum credible explosive charge. If the cost of protection for this charge 
weight is not within the budgetary constraints, then the design charge weight must 
be modified. A study can be conducted to determine the largest explosive yield and 
corresponding level of protection that can be incorporated into the building, given 
the available budget. 
Though it is difficult to assign costs to various upgrade measures because they vary 
based on the site specific design, some generalizations 
COST CONSIDERATIONS 
Figure 8-1	Plots showing relationship between cost of upgrading various building 
components, standoff distance, and risk 
can be made (see Figure 8-1). Below is a list of enhancements arranged in order from 
least expensive to most expensive. 
. _ Hardening of unsecured areas 
. _ Measures to prevent progressive collapse 
. _ Exterior window and wall enhancements 


8.2 LIFE-CYCLE COSTS 
Life-cycle costs need to be considered as well. For example, if it is decided that two 
guarded entrances will be provided, one for the visitors and one for the employees, 
they may cost more during the life of the building than a single well designed 
entrance serving everyone. Also, maintenance costs may need to be considered. For 
instance the initial costs for a CBR detection system may be modest, but the 
maintenance costs are high. Finally, if the rentable square footage is reduced as 
8-2	COST 
CONSIDERA
TIONS 
a result of incorporating robustness into the building, this may have a large impact 
on the life-cycle costs.


8.3   SETTING PRIORITIES 
If the costs associated with mitigating man-made hazards is too high, there are three 
approaches: (1) reduce the design threat, (2) increase the building setback, or (3) 
accept the risk. In some cases, the owner may decide to prioritize enhancements, 
based on their effectiveness in saving lives and reducing injuries. For instance, 
measures against progressive collapse are perhaps the most effective actions that can 
be implemented to save lives and should be considered above any other upgrades. 
Laminated glass is perhaps the single most effective measure to reduce extensive non-
fatal injuries. If the cost is still considered too great, and the risk is high because of 
the location or the high-profile nature of the building, then the best option may be 
to consider building an unobtrusive facility in a lower-risk area instead. In some 
cases, for instance for financial institutions with trading floors, business interruption 
costs are so high they outweigh all other concerns. In such a case, the most cost-
effective solution may be to provide a redundant facility. 
Early consideration of man-made hazards will significantly reduce the overall cost of 
protection and increase the inherent protection level provided to the building. If 
protection measures are considered as an afterthought or not considered until the 
design is nearly complete, the cost is likely to be greater, because more areas will 
need to be structurally hardened due to poor planning. An awareness of the threat of 
man-made hazards from the beginning of a project also helps the team to decide 
early what the priorities are for the facility. For instance, if extensive teak paneling of 
interior areas visible from the exterior is desired by the architect for the architectural 
expression of the building, but the cost exceeds that of protective measures, than a 
decision needs to be made regarding the priorities of the project. Including 
protective measures as part of the discussion regarding trade-offs early in the design 
process often helps to clarify such issues. 
Ultimately, the willingness to pay the additional cost for protection against man-
made hazards is a function of the "probability of regrets" in the event a sizable 
incident occurs. In some situations, the small probability of an incident may not be 
compelling enough to institute these design enhancements. Using this type of logic, 
it is easy to see why it is unlikely that they will be instituted in any but the highest-risk 
buildings unless there is a mandated building code or insurance that requires these 
types of enhancements. This scenario is likely to lead to a selec-
COST CONSIDERATIONS 
tion process in which buildings stratify into two groups: those that incorporate no 
measures at all or only the most minimal provisions and those that incorporate high 
levels of protection. It also leads to the conclusion that it may not be appropriate to 
consider any but the most minimal measures for most buildings.


8.4 FURTHER READING 
Bryant, L., & Smith, J., 2003, Cost Impact of the ISC Security Criteria. General Services 
Administration & Applied Research Associates, Inc., Vicksburg, Mississippi. 
http://www.oca.gsa.gov 
Department of Defense, 1999, Interim Antiterrorism/Force Protection Construction Standards. 
[For Official Use Only] 
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, 1998, UserŐs Guide on Security Glazing 
Applications, UG-2030-SHR, Port Hueneme, California. 
8-4 COST CONSIDERATIONS