<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:70058.wais]
DRUG TREATMENT OPTIONS FOR THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 4, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-184
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
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_______________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Sharon Pinkerton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Steve Dillingham, Special Counsel
Lisa Wandler, Clerk
Cherri Branson, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 4, 2000.................................... 1
Statement of:
Belenko, Steven, senior research associate, National Center
of Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University; Dr.
Sally L. Satel, M.D., adjunct scholar, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, DC; and Martin Iguchi, co-director,
Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA.. 47
Tauber, Judge Jeff, president, National Association of Drug
Court Professionals; and Charles J. Hynes, Kings County
District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY............................ 10
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Belenko, Steven, senior research associate, National Center
of Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University,
prepared statement of...................................... 50
Hynes, Charles J., Kings County District Attorney, Brooklyn,
NY, prepared statement of.................................. 34
Iguchi, Martin, co-director, Drug Policy Research Center,
RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA, prepared statement of........ 73
Mink, Hon. Patsy T., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Hawaii, prepared statement of..................... 6
Satel, Dr. Sally L., M.D., adjunct scholar, American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, prepared statement of 61
Tauber, Judge Jeff, president, National Association of Drug
Court Professionals, prepared statement of................. 13
DRUG TREATMENT OPTIONS FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room 2254, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Mica, Ose, Towns, Mink, Kucinich,
and Schakowsky.
Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief
counsel; Steve Dillingham, special counsel; Don Deering,
congressional fellow; Lisa Wandler, clerk; Cherri Branson,
minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Mica. Good morning.
I would like call this hearing of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order.
With concurrence of the minority, we are going to go ahead
and begin our hearing. We will be joined by other Members who
are currently at other meetings. It will allow us to proceed
with the business before us.
This is a hearing on drug treatment options for the justice
system. We have two panels of witnesses before us today. We
will start the proceedings with opening statements. I will
begin and will yield to other Members. We will also leave the
record open for 2 weeks for additional statements by unanimous
request and so ordered.
This morning's hearing is going to focus on drug treatment
options for our judicial systems. Our subcommittee will examine
drug treatment programs and options that hold promise, we hope,
in reaching eligible, nonviolent offenders.
The focus of our hearing is very straightforward and of
critical importance to our Nation. Can we identify approaches
and programs for eligible, nonviolent offenders that are
successful in bringing the chains of drug addiction and
reinforcing individual responsibility and also restoring
productive workers to our work force, which result in
substantial cost savings to our American taxpayers?
If that is possible, we hope that it is an objective we can
meet and also shed some light on through today's hearing. If we
can, we should act without delay in supporting these programs
on a national level.
First, we will examine a growing program for handling
eligible offenders and drug abusers within the judicial system
that has been used for almost a decade in some jurisdictions
and appears to be enjoying continued success. The approach I am
referring to is generally referred to as drug courts.
Drug courts were first implemented by States and local
governments which contain our true laboratories of democracy.
One of the original drug courts was established more than a
decade ago in my home State in Dade County, FL. Specialized
drug courts are designed to improve the processing of drug
cases, and to respond better to the needs of eligible offenders
with drug abuse problems.
Another benefit of drug courts is cost savings resulting
from reduced burdens on our jails and on our prisons. Federal
funding to support this effort first began in 1989 and took the
form of Department of Justice discretionary grants to expedite
the processing of drug cases.
By 1991, the Department also funded what are known as drug
night courts, both under its discretionary grants of the Edward
Burn Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance
Program, also referred to commonly as Burn grants.
This program was named for Eddie Burn, a slain New York
City police officer who was brutally murdered in 1988 while
enforcing drug laws. For many years, the Burn Program has also
served as the primary source of Federal funding for State and
local assistance, law enforcement, and drug control efforts.
President Bush kept Eddie Burn's badge in his desk drawer
in the Oval Office at the White House. I am perplexed, however,
today at how the Burn Grant Program and antidrug effort have
fallen out of favor with the Clinton administration. Last
month, the Clinton administration's budget submission to
Congress proposed reducing the funding of the Burn formula
grants by $100 million. Congress previously funded the program
at the $500 million level. The administration also requested
that funding for local law enforcement block grants be
eliminated.
I feel strongly that the administration should refocus its
efforts on drug control and that, in fact, our Department of
Justice should do everything possible to once again incorporate
antidrug elements into all of our block and discretionary grant
programs.
Congress has continued to increase Federal funding for drug
courts, prosecutor training, and drug treatment for offenders
since 1989, eventually leading to the creation of a special
funding program for our drug courts.
As we will hear today, there are now more than 400 drug
courts nationwide. For the past 2 years, Congress has funded
the drug court program at the level of $40 million annually
with additional funding eligibility under our Burn Grants
Program and also under our Juvenile Block Grants Program.
We will hear from experienced analysts who will testify on
the operation and impacts of our drug courts and describe how
they have successfully spread across our Nation. We will also
hear of another innovative approach and a 10-year success story
in providing drug treatment to eligible, nonviolent offenders.
That program has been operating since 1990 in Brooklyn, NY. It
has received quite a bit of notoriety for its success. That
program is called the Drug Treatment Alternatives to Prison
[DTAP].
Although this program has not received the level of
attention and Federal support as the Drug Court Program, I plan
to do whatever possible to ensure that this successful approach
receives increased attention and also bipartisan support in the
future.
I am very pleased to have a distinguished witness before us
today; the District Attorney for King's County, NY, Mr. Charles
Hynes, one of those individuals responsible for the development
of this program. He will explain in detail the workings of this
alternative prison program.
As we know, as much as 90 percent of State and local
criminal prosecutions are resolved through plea bargaining
today. Plea bargains prevent our criminal justice system by
bringing it to a screeching halt with the sheer volume of cases
that they are incurring today.
The DTAP Program is managed by the local prosecutor. It
allows prosecutors to select only eligible, nonviolent
offenders for a rigorous program that mandates drug treatment
and strict observance of program rules and conditions. The
prosecutor uses the leverage of a substantial prison sentence
which can be invoked if an offender violates the program
requirements.
The program provides a common sense, cost effective option
for prosecutors, as well as a valuable opportunity to offenders
who are serious about reforming their lives. As we will learn
today, evaluation results of the program indicate high
treatment retention rates, low recidivism, and significant cost
savings, all elements that the subcommittee and Congress are
interested in pursuing.
The 1 year retention rate in drug treatment is as much as
66 percent. The recidivism rate for participants is less than
half for comparable offenders, 23 percent compared to 57
percent. Nearly all employable program graduates, 92 percent,
are working in vocational programs; only 26 percent were
employed prior to entering the program. The program has saved
the city and State of New York more than $15 million.
Our subcommittee was able to visit this program last
December and I was able to see firsthand some of the positive
results of this program. Today, I am announcing my plans to
introduce legislation which I am entitling, ``Prosecutor Drug
Treatment Alternatives to Prison for Nonviolent Offenders
Program,'' a little lengthy but it does describe what we are
trying to achieve with this initiative.
It will provide seed funding for State and local
prosecutors to establish their own drug treatment alternatives
for eligible, nonviolent offenders who desire to turn around
their lives, and we are going to use the success of DTAP in
Brooklyn as a model.
I hope to enlist the support of other Members of Congress
who are also interested in enhancing our arsenal of successful
approaches to reducing the demand for drugs across this Nation.
This program is an innovative, proven program and I think it
will also supplement the role of our drug courts which has also
been another successful program.
This program represents a first important step in fighting
the war on drugs in addressing the treatment needs of eligible,
nonviolent offenders. That is an area I think we have ignored
that needs our attention. Experience has shown that this
approach can break addictions, protect lives, assist families,
promote employment, and save substantial tax dollars.
When I visited the DTAP Program and talked personally with
the offenders in this drug treatment program, I saw that it was
making an important difference in their lives and some of them
their whole lives. Almost all of them I talked to, some in
their mid-30's, had spent half their lives in prison or in the
revolving door of our criminal justice system or victims of
addiction.
This program will give them an alternative. This program
will be funded, that I propose, through grants administered by
the U.S. Department of Justice. The funds will go to every
State and directly to urban, suburban, and rural communities
with demonstrated needs and interest in programs of this
nature.
I welcome all of our distinguished witnesses today and
thank each of you for taking time out of your schedules, your
busy professional lives, to share with the subcommittee both
your experience and your recommendations on this important
topic. I hope we will be able to work together to ensure that
the future drug demand reduction successes such as the ones I
have talked about are put into place immediately. Time is short
and lives really remain in the balance. We must act now if we
are going to make a difference, particularly for so many of
those that have no alternative but prison today.
I am pleased at this time to yield to the gentleman from
California, Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. None.
Mr. Mica. No opening statement.
Mrs. Mink has not arrived at this point, but we shall
proceed. We have Ms. Schakowsky. Did you have an opening
statement?
Ms. Schakowsky. No.
Mr. Mica. She doesn't have an opening statement at this
time. Again, we will leave open the record for a period of 2
weeks for additional statements or for additions to the record.
With no additional opening statements at this time, I am
going to introduce our first panel of witnesses. The first
panel consists of Judge Jeff Tauber, president of the National
Association of Drug Court Professionals from Alexandria, VA.
The second witness is the Honorable Charles J. Hynes, the Kings
County District Attorney for Brooklyn, NY.
Let me welcome both of our panelists. Let me also inform
you that we are an investigations and oversight subcommittee of
Congress. For that, we do swear our witnesses. If you will
stand to be sworn, raise your right hands, please. Do you
solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before
this subcommittee of Congress is the whole truth and nothing
but the truth?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. Mica. The witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Welcome, both of you. At this point, normally we run the
clock. However, we won't run the clock today, because we only
have two witnesses on this panel. If you have additional or
lengthy statements you would like made a part of the record or
some data or information that deserves to be entered into the
record, I would be glad to grant that request.
We have been joined now by the ranking member of our
subcommittee, the Honorable Member from Hawaii. Before we
proceed with our two witnesses who I have introduced and sworn,
it is my pleasure to recognize the gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs.
Mink, for an opening statement.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is perfect timing.
I want to personally thank you for accommodating my
concerns about the drug problem in Hawaii and enabling the
subcommittee to have a hearing in Hawaii on this very important
matter. I thought the hearings were very productive.
Mr. Mica. I am still recovering from my 22-hour flight back
here.
Mrs. Mink. I am sorry you could only stay 36 hours. That is
not our fault, that is the leadership. We would have loved to
have you stay longer.
This matter of the criminal justice system's use of drug
treatment as an alternative to incarceration is a very
important subject. I believe that our discussions today will
add a great deal to what we have already learned.
The trip we took to Hawaii, we met and talked extensively
with inmates who were undergoing drug treatment in the closed
prison system environment. They were eligible for this
treatment I believe 14 months before their release. We had an
opportunity to sit around and talk with about five or six of
them, to hear the various details of their experience and how
the treatment was going to impact their ultimate release and
their ability to stay out of prison again. The difficulties
that they anticipated upon release were quite profound.
We also had an opportunity to visit the drug court and to
see how that system operates as an alternative to imprisonment,
and to see whether that works. Definitely the criminal justice
system has a role, not only in law enforcement but in this very
difficult area of drug treatment.
I look forward to our discussion today and ask unanimous
consent that my statement be put in the record at this point.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Patsy T. Mink follows:]
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Mr. Mica. I know that many who didn't get to go to
Honolulu, HI, and visit are disappointed. I had envisioned
sandy, beautiful beaches, young women in grass skirts. Instead
I was greeted by the ranking member who took me immediately to
the Honolulu Police Station and from there took me to the State
prison where we spent most of the afternoon. Next, we went to a
housing project with local authorities. The next day we had a
5-hour hearing and then I thought maybe those beaches were
still going to be seen, but we ended up in drug court for the
afternoon before catching our flight to fly all night. I have a
new admiration for our ranking member who does this on a
regular basis, going back and forth.
Mrs. Mink. That just shows you, Mr. Chairman, how important
treatment is.
Mr. Mica. Yes. I needed treatment when I got back.
[Laughter.]
Again, I thank the ranking member for her invitation. It
was a very productive hearing and visit. I thank her for that
opportunity.
Once again, we have our two witnesses, Judge Jeff Tauber,
president of the National Association of Drug Court
Professionals and the Honorable Charles J. Hynes, Kings County
district attorney, Brooklyn, NY. I will recognize first, Judge
Jeff Tauber. You are recognized and I also understand you have
a video. You are free to proceed.
STATEMENTS OF JUDGE JEFF TAUBER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS; AND HON. CHARLES J.
HYNES, KINGS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BROOKLYN, NY
Judge Tauber. Good morning.
Chairman Mica, Representative Mink, and esteemed members of
the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Reform, my
name is Jeff Tauber. I am a former judge of the Oakland-Alameda
County Drug Court and president of the National Association of
Drug Court Professionals.
Thank you for affording me this opportunity to testify
before you today to address drug courts and other innovative
drug treatment and drug testing programs in the criminal
justice system. Before I begin speaking about these programs, I
would like to show you a brief 5 minute video. A little bit of
background, last year was our 10th year of drug courts. ABC
national news did a short, 3-minute news tape on the national
conference. I think it portrays in a very visceral way where
drug courts have come from, their effectiveness, and where they
are going.
Following the film is an actual visit or segment of a visit
to a drug court in San Diego where Judge Sue Finley sits. I
might add that Judge Finley is a former judge, recently
retired, but previously had been dean of California Judicial
College and a well respected judge in the California State
system.
You will see her dealing with someone who is in relapse in
a very different way than you would expect in a traditional
court system. The significance of the two I think demonstrates
the effectiveness of drug courts. I might add that when we
first began our association in May 1994, there were 24 persons
sitting in a room in Alexandria from 12 drug courts. Today, I
am pleased to announce that our conference in Miami had some
2,400 persons and roughly 700 drug courts existing and being
implemented. So we have come a long way in a short time. If we
could roll that short segment now?
[Video presentation.]
Mr. Tauber. Perhaps for those who haven't seen a drug
court, that gives you just a glimpse at the kind of balance,
both toughness and support that a drug court provides to the
offender coming through the program.
At this time, I would like to continue my remarks. Senator
Ben Nighthorse Campbell stated in the Congressional Record on
May 26, 1999, ``Drug courts are revolutionizing the criminal
justice systems. Statistics show us the drug courts work, they
are clearly cost effective and help convert many drug-using
offenders into productive members of society. Traditional
incarceration has yielded few gains for our drug offenders.''
What is a drug court? A drug court is a special court that
is given the responsibility to handle cases involving drug
using offenders through comprehensive supervision, drug
testing, judicial monitoring, treatment services, immediate
sanctions, and incentives. Drug courts bring the full weight of
all intervenors to deal with their substance abuse problems.
That means judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, substance
abuse treatment specialists, probation officers, law
enforcement and corrections personnel, educational and
vocational experts, community leaders, and others.
In addition, they ensure consistency in judicial
decisionmaking and enhance the coordination of agencies and
resources increasing the cost effectiveness of programs. The
design and structure of drug court programs are developed at
the local level to reflect the unique strengths, circumstances,
and capacities of each community. Since 1989, the drug court
phenomena has been sweeping the Nation. It is very difficult to
get a hard number because as we speak, drug courts are being
created. We know that there are easily over 700 that are
existing or in the planning stages. Sometimes it is hard to
know exactly where we are within those numbers.
Since 1989, approximately 200,000 persons have actually
entered drug court programs. Many of these programs have
achieved remarkable success in reducing the levels of drug
abuse, incarceration, and criminal recidivism among drug using
offenders. That interest is heightened by the realization that
these same offenders would otherwise clog our court calendars,
strain our treasuries, and flood our jails and prisons.
In 1997, the General Accounting Office reported that over
70 percent of those who entered drug court programs since 1989
have either successfully completed their programs or are still
currently participating. General Barry McCaffrey, Director,
Office of National Drug Control Policy, has stated, ``The
establishment of drug courts with their judicial leadership
constitutes one of the most monumental changes in social
justice in this country since World War II.''
More recently, Columbia University's National Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse has provided the first major
academic review and analysis of drug court research to date and
Dr. Steven Belenko is here and will speak specifically to that
at a later moment.
Drug courts make sense as a single drug court judge and
dedicated program staff apply a direct, immediate and personal
approach to the drug offender handling all drug cases from
start to finish. Court procedures are adapted to reflect the
realities of the offender's substance abuse, a cost effective
approach to the use of sanctions and incentives is applied, and
coordinated programs are created for all participants, not just
the offender. All participants are held accountable for their
performance and government agencies and community organizations
work together as part of a unified drug court system.
With almost 80 percent of arrestees testing positive for
illegal substances, drug courts and drug testing are logical
modifications of the traditional criminal justice system. Drug
courts, in fact, mark a turning back of the judicial time clock
to a time when judges ran their own calendars and were
responsible for their court's operations. Defendants had to
answer directly and immediately to the judge for their conduct,
and cases moved slowly and purposefully through the judicial
system instead of relying on negotiated pleas and other
structures to speed up the court process.
I would like to add that this extraordinary phenomena is a
non-partisan phenomena. Both Democrats and Republicans have
strongly supported it, Conservatives and Liberals as well. I
would add it has been endorsed by the National District
Attorneys Association as well as the National Sheriffs
Association and on the other side, the National Legal Aid and
Public Defender Associations.
For those who think of drug courts as perhaps being soft on
crime, I might add that of the judges who have been drug court
judges and are drug court judges, 58 percent are former
prosecutors, while only 23 percent are former defense
attorneys.
Drug courts are providing a model for other kinds of court
involved, community based programs such as DUI drug courts,
drug courts that deal with multiple DUI offenders, mental
illness courts that deal with those who are duly diagnosed,
domestic violence offenders and juvenile and family drug court
participants and finally, most recently, reentry drug courts
which actually deal with offenders who are leaving jails or
prisons and enter drug courts as a means to monitor their
behavior and also to provide rehabilitation services to them.
Finally, I wanted to indicate that this idea, system, or
approach has spread now to the international community. There
is an International Association of Drug Court Professionals.
The United Nations Drug Control Program has developed its own
standards for drug courts and there are some six nations now
that have drug courts besides the United States and 12 more
that are in the planning stages.
We believe this is an extraordinary phenomena and one we
hope this committee and the Congress will continue to support.
Thank you very much for your patience.
[The prepared statement of Judge Tauber follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you, Judge Tauber.
I would now like to welcome the Honorable Charles Hynes,
District Attorney, Kings County, NY.
Mr. Hynes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Ose. I
surely want to thank Chairman Mica and Congresswoman Mink and
the other members of the committee, and my distinguished
colleague from Brooklyn, Ed Towns, for the opportunity to speak
to this committee about our drug treatment as an alternative to
prison.
I have copies of the annual report which I have submitted
and I would like to touch on a few highlights of the program.
My county is known to most people as Brooklyn and is the
largest county in New York State. It has 2.3 million people,
the seventh largest county in the United States and were it a
city, it would be the fourth largest.
At the time I became district attorney in 1990, our slogan
was, ``Brooklyn, a nice place to visit, a great place to
live,'' a cruel joke because by 1990, Brooklyn had become the
fifth most violent municipality in the United States per
capita. There were 765 murders in Brooklyn in 1990, more than 2
a day. There were 36,000 armed robberies, 39,000 burglaries and
nearly 55,000 larcenies. Obviously, anybody looking at the
problem knew it was fueled by drugs. It was out of control and
there didn't seem to be any way of looking at this other than a
jail being only solution.
It was a decision I made in 1990 that we had to do
something about reducing the demand for drugs in society. So we
had to do something about ending the revolving door that
literally had people going to jail for life on the installment
plan, getting arrested, going to jail, getting out, going back
to the neighborhood without a job, getting arrested again, and
off they go to jail and so on.
We decided to try a coercive form of rehabilitation, that
people who were charged with selling drugs for their own drug
habit would have a choice, come into our program, go into long-
term drug rehabilitation, 15 to 24 months, and if you
successfully complete it, we will give you something you have
never had before, an education opportunity or a job
opportunity.
I hired a job developer, and worked with a business
advisory council in Brooklyn to identify jobs for these
graduates. If you don't do it, or leave the program, we have an
enforcement theme that will pick you up and when 96 percent
effective within 9 days on the average, you will plead guilty
before we will put you into the program to a felony that sends
you to prison for as much as 9 years. If you get caught after
leaving the program, you are going back to prison, or you are
going to prison and will get no credit for any time served in
the program.
Ten years after this program started, I am proud that it is
a successful model which I am very grateful to Congressman Mica
for considering legislation to advance it for other prosecutors
throughout the country.
It is controlled by the prosecutors, and is very selective
about who we take. Typically, we take one in three. These are
all people who are facing a second felony offense, a minimum of
2-1/3 to 4 years in prison and up to 4 to 9 years in prison. We
have had the toughest laws in the country called the
Rockefeller drug laws. We followed those laws up with mandatory
minimum sentences for second felony offenders. The problem has
been that we have had no alternative to the use of those
programs. There was no opportunity to have people try another
way. We think the drug treatment alternative is that other way.
No one with any history of violence is permitted into the
program, no one with a history of absconding is allowed in the
program, no one with any very serious psychiatric problems--we
are beginning to deal with the problems of those affected in a
dual way with psychiatric problems but we are very careful as
to who we put into the program.
If the person successfully completes the 15 to 24 months in
drug treatment and is in job development, we then dismiss the
felony charge. The enforcement team is a critical part of this
effort as well as the fact that we have job opportunities.
We compared a study of recidivism and our graduates have a
23 percent recidivism rate as compared to 47 percent of those
who go to prison who are eligible for our program but don't
accept it. It cuts the recidivism rate in half.
Its retention rate for 1 year is 66 percent, much higher
than the national average and 60 percent of our participants
who have graduated are still in treatment.
DTAP is a money saver. It helps our graduates find jobs
because of our job training program and 92 percent of our
employable graduates are working or in some form of job
training programs. Of the 441 graduates, they have saved the
taxpayers of New York State over $16 million in reduced costs
for incarceration, health care, and public assistance and with
their increased tax revenues based on their jobs.
DTAP is less costly than incarceration. A typical drug
offender in New York State, spending 2 years in prison, will
cost our taxpayers $82,000 for that period. In the same period,
a drug treatment placement costs $42,000. The saving in prison
cost is at minimum, $11 million during the period of the
program.
DTAP has credibility with other prosecutors. All of the
other four district attorney offices in New York City are using
the program as is our citywide Special Narcotics Prosecutor.
I am very confident that based on the track record, DTAP
can be successful in other States because it has shown a high
retention rate, lower recidivism rates, and cost savings of
millions of dollars. As I have said to Congressman Mica and his
staff, I would be more than happy to help any other
jurisdiction in this country to create their own DTAP
initiative.
I would be happy to take any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hynes follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony.
We have been joined by the gentleman from Brooklyn, with
whom I have had the honor and privilege of working together on
this subcommittee and other subcommittees. One of which he
chaired visited Brooklyn under his chairmanship and also
recently conducted a hearing in New York City at his request;
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Towns. You are recognized if
you want to make a statement or proceed in any way at this
point.
Mr. Towns. I would like to insert my statement in the
record but I would also like to say to the witnesses,
especially my friend from Brooklyn, the District Attorney Joe
Hynes, that we know of his great work, so I am happy to hear
his testimony. I will just hold any further statements until
the question and answer period.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, your statement will be made a
part of the record.
First of all, in the video we saw, Mr. Tauber, at the end
it said the drug courts had an 80 percent success rate. Is that
an accurate statement?
Judge Tauber. It is very difficult to give statistical
analysis. I am going to leave that to Dr. Belenko. For one
thing, every community is so different that to ascribe a
specific ratio, to compare Brooklyn to Scarsdale, for example,
you have very different populations, different drugs of choice,
and the level of addiction can be very different. I don't feel
like I personally ought to respond to that. I will allow Dr.
Belenko to do that.
Mr. Mica. Is there any percentage you would care to provide
for the subcommittee as far as the success rate through the
drug courts, 50 percent, 25 percent? Is there any collection of
data that is available that would substantiate some success?
Judge Tauber. Yes, I think there is. There have been a
number of studies completed. One study by the Government
Accounting Office looked at those persons who have entered drug
courts since 1989 and found that over 70 percent have either
successfully graduated from the program or were still actively
participating.
It is interesting to note; American University revised or
looked at that data again since 1997 in 1999 and found the
numbers were consistently over 70 percent.
I also think Dr. Belenko can speak to this better than I
but in his statistics, he shows that of those who do not enter
drug courts but enter treatment, half leave within 90 days.
When you look at drug courts, 60 percent of those who enter are
still in drug courts after a year, which shows an extraordinary
retention rate. All the scientific data and investigation I
have ever seen has created a direct correlation between the
length of time a person stays in treatment and the success of
that person in the program and the length of sobriety they
enjoy afterwards. On those two bases, we can see there have
been great successes in drug courts.
In my own drug court we found that we had half the number
of days persons spent in custody over the 3-years following
drug courts and as a matter of fact, double those who succeeded
and graduated from the program. Once again, that is just one
program and was a number of years ago.
I think more significantly Dr. Michael Finigan from the
University of Oregon did a cost benefit analysis of the
Portland Drug Court which has been around since 1992 and found
that for every dollar spent in the drug court, the county was
saving $2.50. When he looked at the State savings, he found
some $10 saved for every $1 saved.
There is one other point I would like to make in that
regard. The typical drug court costs approximately $2,000 to
$2,500 a year per participant. The typical jail and/or prison
starts at $20,000 to $25,000 per year to incarcerate. Clearly,
there is a very strong cost savings element as well.
Mr. Mica. The other question I would have would be what
percentage of those involved in committing some type of a drug
offense are eligible for drug courts?
Judge Tauber. Drug courts are a grassroots phenomena. That
is where its strength is. They reflect their communities
politically, economically as well as otherwise, so it is very
difficult to describe to you the population that is going to
get in because in one community, honestly, it will be persons
charged with possession of small amounts of drugs, and in other
communities, they will be dealing with people charged with
burglaries, minor felonies, and others who are not even charged
with drug offenses but where it is clear the offense is related
to drugs.
Mr. Mica. Are they designed for first time offenders and
also for minor offenses?
Judge Tauber. They started out in Miami dealing
specifically with divertees and first-time offenders. As they
have become more successful, and as they have proven themselves
in places like Las Vegas, San Bernardino, CA, they have gone
from small programs with 100 or 75 persons in San Bernardino to
where Judge Pat Morris now has some 1,400 in his drug court or
Las Vegas where they started out with 100 persons and now have
1,800.
By the way, the Nevada Governor has instituted and passed
legislation so that individuals presently in prison for drug
offenses, some 300 this next year are expected to be released
into the drug court rather than go to parole because the drug
court has proven more successful than parole and is far
cheaper.
Mr. Mica. I have additional questions but I would like to
yield to the ranking member, Mrs. Mink.
Mrs. Mink. Judge Tauber, the system that we have in
existence switched from giving courts discretion in sentencing
to a huge array of mandatory minimums. In the drug court
situation, how does that system circumvent the mandatory
minimum requirement that the States impose upon the conviction
of individuals for certain very specific crimes?
Judge Tauber. Many States don't have mandatories or if they
do, judges are able to sentence people to jail or prison and to
suspend the sentence and allow them to enter the drug court
program with the condition that if they successfully complete
the program, the probation will be terminated or the sentence
will not be served.
There are several kinds of drug courts. One is a diversion
court which goes back to Miami which is a pre-plea court and
most recently, we are seeing more and more, perhaps 70 percent,
of courts now are post-plea courts dealing with more serious
offenders and many, many courts, perhaps the majority of
courts, have both divergent courts dealing with light, first
offenders and post-plea courts dealing with more serious
offenders.
Mrs. Mink. My question was, in jurisdictions where you have
minimum mandatories, how do you overcome those statutes in
existence and place individuals who have pleaded guilty into
this program rather than serve their minimum mandatory jail
sentence?
Judge Tauber. I couldn't respond except to say that there
are drug courts in every State in the Union.
Mrs. Mink. They are not abiding by the law?
Judge Tauber. I can tell you there are 110 drug courts in
California and I think there is one in Rhode Island.
Mrs. Mink. I realize that. I am just wondering how they get
started under the circumstances of these prior existing
mandatories.
Mr. Hynes. Can I help out because we have mandatory
sentencing in New York State.
Mrs. Mink. So do we in Hawaii and I have a drug court. I
was wondering how they balance it.
Mr. Hynes. Preindictment, I have total authority in my
county.
Mrs. Mink. Is that by statute?
Mr. Hynes. Yes.
Mrs. Mink. So the legislature, in my case, would have to
pass a law which says that the courts would have the right.
Mr. Hynes. Once there is an indictment, there is no
discretion in New York, so I do it pre-indictment.
Mrs. Mink. Or you don't require them to plead guilty?
Mr. Hynes. No, I require them to plead guilty to a State or
Supreme Court information but it is pre-indictment, so I retain
the discretion.
Judge Tauber. There is a drug court in Brooklyn that I
believe, Mr. Hynes. Do they use the same procedure?
Mr. Hynes. Yes.
Mrs. Mink. I think that in order for people to understand
exactly what the drug court is, we have to be able to explain
how an individual is selected for the program. Some go to jail,
some go to drug court. What is the definition between those two
areas? Obviously it is better to be in drug court. Obviously it
works better, obviously it is cheaper for the government. The
question is, are there statutory steps that must be taken.
In the selection process, we have to be very careful that
we are not selecting people out by various factors of
discrimination. I believe it works. We went to see one in
Hawaii as it is practiced. The foundations of it seem somewhat
hazy, as to exactly how the program distinguishes between those
that go to jail and those that don't.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I would like to recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. I have a couple of questions on the testimony from
District Attorney Hynes. There is a phrase in here that I
didn't understand on page 2. I know what the word means in
normal language. I don't quite understand it in this context.
It says, ``The program is offered only to non-violent,
predicate drug offenders for a certain punishment.'' What does
that word mean?
Mr. Hynes. Predicate means they have been previously
convicted of a sale of drugs for their own habit. If you
remember the young fellow who testified before you and the rest
of the committee several months ago, Fred Cohen; he was someone
who had been convicted of selling drugs for his own habit. Then
he got arrested again. He was a predicate offender. New York
State law has a mandatory jail sentence unless I exercise
discretion pre-indictment.
Mr. Ose. The second question I have, I noticed in your
testimony you highlight a recidivism rate of 23 percent and a
retention rate of 66 percent.
Mr. Hynes. Yes.
Mr. Ose. I am hopeful that you can explain. If I
understand, the recidivism rate is someone who has been through
the program and a retention rate is someone who is in the
program?
Mr. Hynes. Within the first year of the program, the
retention rate is 66 percent.
Mr. Ose. Retention rate meaning?
Mr. Hynes. Staying in the program.
Mr. Ose. So they are clean, have stayed in the program for
a year, two-thirds of the people have complied. So one-third
have not?
Mr. Hynes. Yes, which to the national average is like 12-15
percent retention rate for this population.
Mr. Ose. In terms of a non-drug court.
Mr. Hynes. For this population in non-drug court. These are
the people who have hit bottom, Mr. Ose. This is their last
chance.
Mr. Ose. Pre-indictment?
Mr. Hynes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. The recidivism rate is people who have completed
the program whether it be drug court or non-drug court and it
is 23 percent?
Mr. Hynes. Our population is 23 percent for the drug
treatment alternative to prison.
Mr. Ose. I think District Attorney Hynes said there is a
retention rate in treatment of 50 percent and courts, 66
percent. The treatment you are referring to there, would that
be private treatment?
Mr. Hynes. It is not 50 percent.
Mr. Ose. I have lost the reference. I will come back to
that.
Judge Tauber, if I understand correctly, your testimony is
``District Attorney Hynes very clearly says that 96 percent of
the absconders are returned to court in a median time of 9
days.'' Your testimony says, ``The failure to appear rate has
dropped from 36 percent to 3 percent.'' So that would be
consistent. You would be at 97 percent and he is at 96 percent.
Mr. Hynes. It is a different population, Congressman.
Judge Tauber. It is a different population. I think
different parameters as well.
Mr. Ose. You talk here in terms of a drug court?
Judge Tauber. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. Talking about the rate at which people fail to
appear. You are talking about the DTAP program where the
prosecutors have control?
Mr. Hynes. These are people actually in treatment,
residential treatment. The coercive part of it is if they leave
the program, they are picked up.
Let me say a word about the drug court. I was not a great
fan initially of the drug court. I am now convinced that the
drug court is an exceptionally efficient way to do cases in my
county for misdemeanors and a selected number of felonies, so
we are very satisfied with the success of our drug court in
Brooklyn.
Mr. Ose. I want to make clear that the appearance rate
under the prosecutor-driven process is 96 percent and the
appearance rate within a 9-day median under the Drug Corp is
different.
Mr. Hynes. Let me try and explain. When someone leaves my
program, they are in Daytop Village and are in the middle of
their 15 or 20 month stay at Daytop Village. If they leave,
there is a 96 percent chance they are going to be grabbed
within 9 days. So 96 percent of the people who left our program
are picked up within a median time of 9 days. They are in the
program and they just walk off.
Mr. Ose. Those are the only questions I have, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Mr. Mica. I would be pleased to recognize the gentlelady
from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you very much.
I am not an attorney but I was a State legislator and there
was a period where we were every other day passing some kind of
mandatory minimum sentence relating to drugs. Like my colleague
from Hawaii, I am a bit confused about the interface between
these mandatory minimum sentences and this alternative
programming. Am I to understand that what really matters here
is what people end up being charged with, what the indictment
is, and that there is discretion there. Once there has been an
indictment, if there is a mandatory minimum, there is no way
around it?
Mr. Hynes. In New York state, once we have an indictment,
we lose discretion.
Ms. Schakowsky. What we are talking about here is the
prosecutor's discretion? Is that what enables this?
Mr. Hynes. They need our involvement in the drug court. We
have to agree to it. We are a partner in the DTAP program. We
totally control the process because we are dealing with a much
more severe kind of population.
Under the State constitution in New York State, the
district attorney is the chief law enforcement officer of the
county. He or she decides who is going to be prosecuted and
under what charge. Using that authority before indictment, I
exercise discretion. Once we get an indictment, I have lost
discretion.
Ms. Schakowsky. I understand that.
Judge Tauber. I might add. It may not sound like a very
satisfactory answer but there are 50 States and every one of
them has a different statutory setup. Drug courts have managed
to find ways to deal with mandatories to my knowledge in every
one of them.
In some places, it is like New York where you have to move
either preindictment. Washington, DC, the place where they find
room to maneuver is between the time of plea and the time of
sentence because once a person is sentenced, they must be
sentenced to a mandatory minimum. So they enter the person into
the drug court at the time of plea and the person is not
sentenced until they complete the program or flunk out.
I guess what I am suggesting is that there is flexibility
in systems. We would like more flexibility from the State
legislators but drug courts have been able to operate.
One of our disappointments is that perhaps we are reaching
3 or 4 percent of the eligible population throughout the United
States. There are some 2 million persons placed on probation,
according to the Bureau of Justice statistics for drug and
alcohol offenses who, BJA determined or concluded, have a
serious drug or alcohol problem. Of that, we have perhaps
250,000 involved in these programs. We would like to see drug
courts expand because as they are proving themselves, it is
important they have that opportunity.
Ms. Schakowsky. Let me ask you this, because I think that
is an important piece of it. Who gets chosen and how does that
happen? I am wondering if we have a profile of those
individuals who are diverted from the usual incarceration? Is
it a middle class phenomenon, are we talking also a
proportionate number of people of color?
Judge Tauber. This is my standard response; it depends on
the community. In communities where such is open, let me give
Oakland as an example. The persons entering the program were 80
percent African American males, because that reflected those
persons being charged with possession for small amounts of
drugs, typically crack-cocaine or other serious drugs. People
were actually diverted under the California statute out of the
regular system in California.
Ms. Schakowsky. By statute, you say?
Judge Tauber. By statute.
Ms. Schakowsky. People who might be eligible are
nonviolent.
Judge Tauber. I can tell you book and footnote about
California, that is one State. I could not do that for New
York, but in California if you did not have a prior felony, did
not have prior drug conviction for 5 years, and if you were not
charged with an offense that involved sales or violence, you
were eligible for diversion.
Hawaii, I am quite certain, has a very different setup but
drug courts, the genius of them, is that they are community-
based and that individual communities find what populations are
appropriate. That may be very different depending on the
politics, resources, and the socioeconomic background of that
community.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Hynes did you have a comment on that?
Mr. Hynes. It depends where the program fits. In Kings
County, a very high percentage of our client population are
Latinos, the largest population of participants are people of
color. If it was in Jefferson County or Clinton County in the
north country, it would be all Caucasian. The client population
are drug addicts who typically come from impoverished
situations, little or no education, almost no jobs and they
have drifted into this lifestyle.
We eliminate people charged with violent felonies, those
who have serious prior absconding records and we try and select
people we believe have a real interest in turning around their
lives. We are very, very careful in the screening process. I
think that is key because we are dealing with a population that
has hit rock bottom.
Representative Mink was here when Fred Cohen testified
before this panel. Here was a kid who for 20 years was in the
gutter. He now makes $45,000 a year and pays taxes on that, has
a wife and two kids but he was so bad, he used to take glasine
envelopes and sniff them to try to get residue to get high. It
was a tragic problem, but today he is actually the President of
our drug treatment association.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. I want to thank our panelists. You bring to the
Congress and to our subcommittee several alternatives to
incarceration. One is the drug court program which has been
successful in many jurisdictions; second, being the DTAP
Program, which again does offer some alternative and both good
examples of what we can do.
Unfortunately, these only address a small percentage of the
population we have to deal with, but they do provide us with
some positive alternatives and steps that hopefully can be
replicated.
Mr. Hynes. May I close with two points? First, thank you,
Congressman Mica, for having the foresight to introduce this
kind of legislation. You are right, it is not an
extraordinarily large population. As I said to a good friend of
mine and a Member of Congress 10 years ago when he said, ``what
is it, a damned 100 people?'' I said, ``it is a damned 100
people we have never tired to cure.''
We have 441 taxpayers out of that program and I am very
proud of them and pleased and grateful to you, Congressman
Mica, for this opportunity.
Mr. Mica. Thank you both and we look forward to working
with you and hopefully we can replicate these successful
programs across the country.
We will call our second panel which consists of Steven
Belenko, senior research associate, National Center of
Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University, New York;
Dr. Sally L. Satel, adjunct scholar, American Enterprise
Institute here in Washington, DC; and Mr. Martin Iguchi, co-
director, Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corp., Santa
Monica, CA. I am pleased to welcome all three of our witness.
If you will stand at this time to be sworn and raise your
right hands. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are
about to give before this subcommittee of Congress is the whole
truth and nothing but the truth?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. Mica. The witnesses answered in the affirmative.
We will hear first from Steven Belenko, senior research
associate, National Center of Addiction and Substance Abuse,
Columbia University, New York. Welcome and you are recognized.
STATEMENTS OF STEVEN BELENKO, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE,
NATIONAL CENTER OF ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY; DR. SALLY L. SATEL, M.D., ADJUNCT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC; AND MARTIN IGUCHI, CO-
DIRECTOR, DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, RAND CORP., SANTA
MONICA, CA
Mr. Belenko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to come before you this
morning and talk about my research on drug courts and
innovative prosecution programs.
I have been studying the impact of drugs on the justice
system, including policy and programmatic responses to this
problem, for some 15 years. During the past 8 years, I have had
a particular interest in drug courts and have visited many
around the country, studied their impacts and reviewed a number
of research reports and evaluations on their effectiveness.
In addition, for the past 5 years, I have been conducting
an extensive evaluation of the Kings County DTAP Program under
a grant from the National Institute on Drug Abuse.
My remarks will center on two areas, one, the lessons
learned thus far about the operations and effectiveness of drug
courts and the potential role of prosecutorial based treatment
in saving tax dollars by introducing treatment to other
segments of the criminal justice population.
The first program was implemented in Dade County in 1989.
The current generation of treatment drug courts has established
an important presence in America's criminal court system. In
many jurisdiction, drug courts have become the intervention of
choice for linking drug or alcohol-involved offenders to
community-based treatment and related interventions.
The key goals of drug courts are to reduce drug use and
associated criminal behavior by engaging and retaining drug
involved offenders in treatment and related services. Also, to
concentrate expertise about drug abuse and addiction and
treatment into a single courtroom under a single judge and
staff, and to address other defendant needs through case
management and clinical assessment.
The question of whether drug courts should be thought of as
coerced treatment is an interesting one but difficult to
answer. Drug courts are generally considered voluntary in that
offenders generally have the right to accept or decline
participation once screened for eligibility and to have their
case prosecuted through regular channels.
Some drug courts also allow offenders an opportunity to opt
out of the drug court after a week or two of trying it out with
no loss of legal rights. However, there are some coercive
elements to the drug court experience which may help to explain
their success in retaining offenders.
For example, defendants may feel subtle or direct pressure
to participate in drug court because of fears of the
consequences of prosecution. Also the close judicial
supervision and monitoring, regular drug testing, and graduated
sanctions typical of drug courts may be considered coercive in
their own right.
Also the immediacy of sanctions imposed in most drug
courts, unlike sanctions imposed under probation or parole
supervision, may increase the relevance and behavioral impact
of judicial responses.
When interviewed, participants have noted the importance of
the certainty, the swiftness and the predictability of the
sanctions for noncompilant behaviors.
My review of drug court research is based on an article I
produced in 1998 which was published in the National Drug Court
Institute Review in which I reviewed about 30 existing
evaluations. I recently updated that and that will be out
shortly in a new issue of the National Drug Court Institute
Review. I have reviewed another 30 evaluations so my remarks
and assessment about drug court impacts is based on review of
those 60 evaluations, as well as the GAO report from 1997 and
periodic surveys of drug courts conducted by American
University Drug Court Clearinghouse.
The structure and procedures in drug courts do result in
closer and more frequent supervision of offenders than
typically seen under standard probation or pretrial
supervision. The data indicate that a number of court
appearances, number of drug tests, the level of supervision and
the contacts with treatment providers are substantially more
frequent under drug court law than under other forms of
community supervision.
The drug court model also differs in important ways from
previous efforts to provide drug treatment of offenders. The
various components of the criminal justice and substance abuse
treatment systems work together to try and use the coercive
power of the court to promote abstinence and pro social
behavior, as well as treatment retention.
By comparison, the types of nonviolent drug offenders
typically targeted by drug courts will often receive probation
or short jail sentence with little treatment or close
supervision in the community. In addition, drug courts often
seek to standardize the treatment process by requiring discrete
treatment phases, a minimum length of program involvement or
specific requirements for the quantity and type of services.
This structure offers an opportunity for the judicial officer
to monitor compliance with the drug court requirements, provide
rewards for advancing through different phases or participating
in certain levels of treatment in a way that can be quantified.
That is predictable for the participant.
Some of my key conclusions are, first of all, in terms of
drug use and treatment history, there is some discussion about
the type of population generally served by drug courts. As
Judge Tauber pointed out, there is a lot of local variation in
the target populations but trying to generalize across the
country, drug courts generally serve a clientele that do have
extensive histories of substance abuse, but little prior
treatment.
The average age of adult drug court participants is in the
early 30's, as it is in the DTAP Program, and they have been
using illegal drugs for some 10 to 15 years.
In the survey conducted by the American University
Clearinghouse of drug court participants, only 26 percent of
the participants had been in a prior substance abuse treatment
program, although 72 percent had been in jail or prison. These
rates are similar for overall rates for both treatment
participation and prior incarceration found in surveys of
arrestees. Similarly for surveys of probationers.
In terms of treatment retention, I think that a key impact
of drug courts as well as the DTAP Program has been its ability
to retain offenders in treatment. The research on drug
treatment outcomes has consistently found that time in
treatment is closely related to successful outcomes, including
reduced relapse and reduced criminal behavior.
I estimate nationally about 60 percent of those who enter
drug courts are still in treatment after 1 year, although most
drug courts require a minimum program length of 1 year. The
percentage of all admissions who actually graduate from drug
courts is a little bit lower than that 60 percent figure. The
GAO report in 1997 estimated that 48 percent of those who enter
drug courts graduate. My conclusion is that is probably a
little low but generally around 50 percent of those who enter
drug courts would be expected to graduate.
These retention and completion rates are substantially
higher than seen in studies of community based treatment
programs.
In terms of drug use and criminal behavior while under drug
court supervision, the existing research suggests that drug
court participants have a low rate of drug use as measured by
urine tests which indicates high rate of program compliance.
For example, for 13 drug courts reporting test results in 1998,
an average of only 10 percent of those tests were positive for
illegal drugs, in contrast to drug tests of other defendants in
those jurisdictions under probation supervision where the
positive rate was 31 percent.
In terms of recidivism, a number of drug court evaluations
have found that rearrest rates were substantially reduced while
offenders are under drug court supervision.
There are probably four or five evaluations that have
looked at the costs and benefit of drug courts, although they
have used different measures, different time periods and it is
hard to generalize. But all have found in one area or another
reduced costs and the data thus far suggest that for the long
term, drug court economic benefits will outweigh the costs.
The study was done by Dr. Michael Finigan in Oregon and he
did find substantial local and State taxpayer savings as
measured with a number of outcome measures from that drug
court.
A key issue in drug courts is their effect on recidivism
and public safety. The studies I have reviewed thus far, 21 of
those evaluations have examined post program recidivism
generally measured by rearrest and generally for a time period
of 1 year after completing the drug court. Of those 21
evaluations that have also used a comparison group from which
we can measure the relative impact of drug courts, 16 of those
studies found that the drug court reduced rearrest for those
who went through the system, looking at everyone who went into
the drug court, not just those who successfully graduated. The
size of that impact does vary across jurisdictions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Belenko follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony.
We will now recognize Dr. Satel.
Dr. Satel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am also a staff psychiatrist at a local substance abuse
clinic, and worked in the D.C. Drug Court a few years ago.
I was asked to talk to you today about the clinical aspects
of mandated treatment and why it works. It certainly does work
as volumes of data can confirm. How can this be? How can it be
that drug abusers, many of whom actually have little interest
in going into the treatment--that is something you don't hear a
lot about but many of these folks are not interested in
treatment at first. They are interested in either avoiding the
mark on their record or avoiding potential jail or probation.
That is why they choose it. So how can people who don't have
that much interest in treatment benefit from it? How is it that
drug abusers can respond when they are told by the criminal
justice system that they either participate in this program or
something bad will happen to them, they will either go to jail
or get a record?
A lot of people can't believe that addicts who enter
treatment unwillingly or halfheartedly can still benefit as
much or more than addicts who show up freely at a clinic and
ask to be admitted. This reality forces us to rethink one of
the most trusted fictions in drug treatment; that a person has
to want to get better in order to benefit from treatment. That
is the fiction that drug courts and other forms of mandated
treatment put to rest.
The main reason that mandated treatment works is that it
keeps people in longer. You have heard that before. Retention
is key, the longer one stays, the better one does, the better
health, the less drug use, the less crime, the more employment.
Addicts who are levered into treatment do tend to stay longer.
This is for two reasons.
First, they stay longer because as I said before, the
alternative in their eyes can be worse, but later because they
really do see the benefits of treatment at the work programs
they participate in or the educational programs which do help
them feel more confident and more encouraged about their
future. They feel physically better and they often get
reabsorbed into the warmth of their families, something they
have been estranged from for quite a while.
I have introduced dozens of drug court patients and not
all, but a lot of them are enthusiastic from day one, but many
of them are not. One might say they weren't happy campers when
they came into the program but the longer they stayed, the
rehabilitation made sense to them. In other words, they stay at
first because they have to, but ultimately they complete it,
most of them, about 50 to 60 percent, because they want to.
Ultimately, without some sort of leverage, the standard
dropout rate is very large. We have heard this already and
refer to it as the retention deficit disorder. About half drop
out in the first 3 months and at the end of 1 year, between 1
and 10 and 1 and 20 remain.
When you think about the psychology of addiction, these
dropout rates make perfect sense. Residents who enter a
therapeutic community may rebel against the rigid structure and
the deprivation of getting high. A lot of addicts are very
ambivalent about giving up drugs, as destructive as they have
been. There is a powerful psychological force pulling them back
to the street.
Even patients with strong motivation make experience
flagging resolve or intense drug cravings or they feel better
and think they either can handle life drug free or that they
can handle their drugs. Either way, they leave. Self
discipline, as you know, is not a strong suit of this
population. Again, when mandated to residential or community
treatment, the patient can't succumb to these pressures and
bolt without consequences.
In summary, these observations and the objective data that
support them tell us some very important things. First, they
expose two myths about addiction. The first is that in order to
benefit from treatment, all patients have to want it. Second,
to benefit from treatment, a patient has to hit bottom. We can
catch people before they hit bottom and hopefully you do
because otherwise, there are diseases to catch and overdoses to
be suffered.
Second, for treatment to work, patients have to stay in it
and one of the best ways to get hard core addicts to stay is
through leverage. As a clinician, I am certainly happy for all
the leverage I can get. It is very good to have an outsider
like a judge calling the shots with swift and certain
consequences so that I don't wait my time getting caught up in
negotiations with patients about the rules of compliance. The
rules are spelled out, and my job is to work collaboratively
with the patient to help him conform and progress.
When drug courts work well, they really represent a
marriage between the so-called moral and medical models of
addiction. The moral model is punishment, sanctions, and that
drug users should be held accountable with no assistance. The
medical model, on the other hand, is all help with no
expectation of accountability for the patient. I reject both of
them out right.
We know that neither of these alone are especially useful.
In other words, addicts who are incarcerated frequently relapse
once they are out of jail, but that hard core patients who
enter treatment 1 day are very likely to bolt the next.
Together the moral and medical elements complement each other
for an optimal chance to help addicted men and women.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Satel follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony.
We will hear next from Martin Iguchi with the RAND Corp.
from Santa Monica, CA. You are recognized.
Mr. Iguchi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this
opportunity to testify.
My name is Martin Iguchi. I am a senior behavioral
scientist and co-director of the Drug Policy Research Center at
RAND. I am also a psychologist. My specialty over the past
decade has been in development and evaluation of drug
treatment, drug treatment outcomes, as well as evaluation of
different policy initiatives such as drug treatment on demand.
Most recently, we have been also working with L.A. County
Probation to set up a DUI Court in Los Angeles, so we have
quite a bit of experience in this area.
While the statement is based on research conducted at RAND,
the opinions and conclusions are mine and should not be
interpreted as representing those of RAND or any other agency
sponsoring our research. I ask that my full written statement
be entered into the record.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to comment on the use
of treatment as an alternative to incarceration as I believe
that drug courts and other diversion alternatives are exciting
and valuable innovations by the criminal justice system. My
colleagues and I have had an opportunity to study this
relatively new phenomenon and while I may be counted as a
supporter of such courts, I do have a few comments about
problems that may arise in implementation.
Over the past several decades, lawmakers in the United
States have responded to the drug epidemic with tougher laws
and longer sentences in an attempt to deter drug use. The
increase in drug cases has resulted in seriously overloaded
judicial dockets and a need for reasoned alternatives.
In 1992, the Drug Policy Research Center conducted a drug
policy seminar game involving public officials in Florida and
Washington, DC, that anticipated such a scenario. The players
in that policy game focused, as we are today, on the need to
provide drug treatment for those involved in the criminal
justice system. This emphasis was consistent with our drug
policy modeling work that indicated treatment might well be a
more cost effective way to spend additional funds intended to
reduce cocaine use than other such options as domestic
enforcement, interdiction or source country control.
However, as the drug policy game progressed, players came
to realize that they had focused exclusively on the benefits of
treatment as an alternative to incarceration with no thought
given to the possible negative outcomes associated with the
approach in a larger context.
Specifically, they came to realize given the limited
availability of treatment slots for those convicted of crimes
and those not, they had created a policy that could be
characterized as ``use a gun, get a treatment slot.''
Now I don't mean to overstate the negative here as it is
clear that many communities, such as Brooklyn, NY, have been
able to implement drug courts without overburdening their drug
treatment system.
I do want to raise the issue, however, that we need to be
certain there is sufficient treatment capacity to support the
increase in drug treatment demand. We do not want those
voluntarily seeking treatment to be deprived of the opportunity
for treatment because the slot is filled with an individual
mandated to it.
To highlight how damaging such a scenario might be, I offer
a short anecdote. A colleague of mine runs a drug education
outreach and intervention program in south central Los Angeles.
This colleague spends a great deal of time educating young men
and women about the dangers of drug use and the advantages of
abstinence.
Recently, after multiple interactions, he finally convinced
two young men to consider treatment for their drug use problem.
Unfortunately, my colleague was unable to locate a treatment
program with available slots for the two young men. The only
publicly funded treatment slots available were set aside for
juvenile probationers. This scenario is a tragic one. We need
to be certain that we expand treatment in parallel with the
development of drug courts so that every person who wants drug
treatment can find it.
As a second and related issue, not all who participate in
drug use in drug courts are screened to determine if they meet
the diagnostic criteria for drug dependence. While this comment
does not apply to research rich programs such as the Brooklyn
Drug-Treatment Alternative to Prison Programs, many programs
are not as discriminating. This means that many individuals are
sent to drug treatment who do not require it, putting
additional pressure on an often overburdened system of care.
My third comment has to do with the question, ``who should
run drug courts, prosecutors or judges?'' A number of drug
courts are operated by the prosecutor's office rather than by
judges. While I do not question the integrity of prosecuting
attorneys, some public defenders and defense attorneys have
voiced concern that prosecutors might be tempted to offer
access to drug courts only to those who are ``cooperative.''
While the functional and daily operational characteristic
of prosecutor courts appear identical to drug courts run by
judges, I want to provide a word of caution about the
importance of avoiding perceptions of pressure on defendants.
For that reason, it seems reasonable that judges and not
prosecutors should be in charge of drug courts.
Finally, I want to say that I have been most impressed by
the dedicated and enthusiastic efforts put forth by those
involved in both the judicial and treatment communities to make
drug courts around the country work. While drug courts are
clearly responsible for a decrease in the pressures of
overcrowded court dockets, the daily workloads of everyone
involved in drug courts has actually increased.
So what leads these dedicated professionals to give so much
more of themselves for drug court? The answer from all involved
appears to be that the idea of restorative justice or
therapeutic jurisprudence is a hopeful one in a context that
breeds cynicism.
I attended a drug court graduation ceremony in Rancho
Cucamonga this month and had a conversation with the court
magistrate. He stated he looks forward to ending his week with
drug court every Friday evening. He elaborated that during his
normal work day, he is faced with doing unpleasant things to
people who have engaged in bad behavior. But on Friday evening,
he sees hope and the possibility of rehabilitation. He
concluded, ``It is definitely worth the extra work.''
Thank you for your attention to this important matter.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Iguchi follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony, each and every one
of you.
Unfortunately, I have to disagree with some of the products
of your corporation, Mr. Iguchi. I think in particular, the
RAND study has probably done more damage to this whole effort
than anything I have seen in 20 years of dealing with the drug
problem.
Last week, during the debate that we had on the floor, we
heard repeatedly this garbage that was spewed by the study some
years ago and used by many of those who come forward with a
solution that just treatment on demand is the answer. It has
created, I think, a disaster for this country. That happens to
be my personal opinion.
I think this administration took the RAND study and used it
as an excuse to shut down the source country programs and with
great difficulty we have been trying to get those programs put
back in place. The most recent is the ongoing effort starting
last week to get something targeted to Colombia where we know
shutting down the interdiction and shutting down the source
country programs has created not only a flood of narcotics
unlike we even saw in the 1980's, but a more deadly brand, so
that 15,973 Americans in 1998, the latest figure that I have
received as chairman of the subcommittee, didn't even get a
chance for voluntary treatment because they are dead.
I think that some of the trash that was put out that has
been used for substantiation of just provide treatment, we have
nearly doubled the amount of treatment money since 1992 than we
have the amount of money in interdiction in source country
programs. With $20-$40 million in Peru and Bolivia over the
last few years, we have dramatically cut the supply coming in
and stopped the programs in Colombia which are now the source
of 80-90 percent of 80 percent pure heroin and cocaine coming
into this country.
Your study, in my opinion, has done more damage and
substantiated a false and ineffective approach because you will
never end up treating all the people that you are now opening
up to addiction with the incredible supply that is coming into
this country. If you could stop the supply, we could put you
and your study colleagues out of business because we wouldn't
have to even deal with this topic before us.
Did you want to respond?
Mr. Iguchi. I am not fully prepared to respond to that
particular criticism. I, frankly, didn't come prepared to
defend our ``Controlling Cocaine'' report. We do, however,
stand by the integrity of our ``Controlling Cocaine'' report.
It was reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences and held up
as a very reasonable frame for viewing policymaking decisions.
People may quibble with some of the numbers that were input
into that model, but in evaluation after evaluation of it, we
have come away convinced that it is a very strong model and it
is a suitable basis for making policy decisions.
Mr. Mica. It is a strong model for what? It has been used
as an example for the treatment on demand. I don't have a
problem with treatment on demand, but if you have a torrent of
narcotics coming in and you are creating an addiction
population.
We went to Baltimore a week ago and the predictions are
somewhere in the neighborhood of 80,000 drug addicts where they
have had a liberalization, where they have focused primarily on
treatment. They can't keep up with the treatment. Then 50
percent of the folks don't even show up for treatment in the
program. I am very concerned that some of these think tanks
like yours put out things that are used as justification for
only treatment and then we shelve--and this administration
shelved the interdiction, cut by 50 percent, and took the
military out.
We have reports of now cutting out the surveillance to Peru
where we have had such great success, 66 percent reduction and
not providing that assistance so they could go after these
traffickers so that the stuff isn't in the country.
In order to qualify for treatment, the big myth in this
whole thing is when you get to the point of treatment, that
means you are addict. If you are an addict, that means the
testimony we have seen, the people we have interviewed in
prison have committed crimes of violence to the tune of habits
they support for $100 to $500 a day, many of them committing
felonies.
By the time they get to your treatment on demand, it has
made a joke of the whole system and we have created someone we
can't deal with. All the programs they are talking about here
today are only talking about tiny fractions--drug courts, tiny
fractions--even DTAP, a tiny fraction.
Yes, we want to help them, but in DTAP most of the people
we talked to had spent half their lives in prison or in the
judicial cycle. So the treatment on demand is great, but half
of those folks don't even want to get in the program or don't
show up for the program. The only reason they show up for DTAP
is they are in prison or they have no choice that they are
going to go back to prison.
Again, I think the RAND Corp.--it is nice to have you here
today but I think some of your past studies and conclusions
have done tremendous damage--maybe you were well intended--but
by people who were advocates of this one avenue of approach.
Mr. Iguchi. Mr. Chairman, we can only deal with the numbers
and data that we have. The studies that have been conducted
supply the data that go into those kinds of models, and we
stand by them.
The problem with focusing on supply reduction is that we
don't have demonstrated effective supply reduction
methodologies.
Mr. Mica. That is crap. That is baloney. I can get the
charts out here and we can look at what we did with the Andean
strategy, with the South Americans, and with the Vice
President's Task Force for going after the stuff. If you want a
concentrated program for a few bucks in some of these countries
where the peasants are getting a couple of pesos for that crap,
you can stop it. There is no question about it. We did it in
Peru.
Mr. Iguchi. We did it temporarily.
Mr. Mica. We did it with President Fujimora. Mr. Hastert,
who chaired this subcommittee before me, went down and we
talked to those folks. Ten years ago, you couldn't even walk on
the streets of Lima because there were bombs going off. The
Shining Path was ruling the roost and they were also profiting
from the drug trade. We brought that under control, cut it by
66 percent. We can do the same thing anywhere we want if we
have the will.
Even now the President's own Ambassador to that country has
sent letters to this administration that again, they are
changing their policy of not providing the intelligence and
surveillance information that allows them to shoot down the
drug traffickers. It sure as hell will stop anybody on
treatment if you shoot down a plane that is carrying cocaine
out of that country to the United States. Then you don't have
to worry about treating them because they don't have the drugs
in the first place to be addicted to get on the treatment
program that a lot of them won't even show up or are interested
in treatment in the first place.
Mr. Iguchi. I am well aware of----
Mr. Mica. Mrs. Mink, you are recognized.
Mrs. Mink. Mr. Chairman, that was an astonishing outburst,
unforgivable.
Mr. Mica. Sorry. I apologize.
Mr. Mink. The witness that I invited to this committee,
Martin Iguchi, I am sure had nothing to do with the 8-year old
report of the RAND Corp.
Mr. Mica. And I didn't accuse him personally.
Mrs. Mink. You kept saying, ``you, you'' and I found that--
--
Mr. Mica. The RAND Corp., for the record.
Mrs. Mink. He is not the RAND Corp., although maybe at
times he wishes he were. He simply is an investigator, senior
behavioral scientist, co-director of the Drug Policy Research
Center at RAND. He doesn't run the entire gamut of the RAND
Corp. investigative research activities, I am sure. Do you?
Mr. Iguchi. No, I do not.
Mrs. Mink. I apologize, Mr. Iguchi, for their asking you to
answer for the entire RAND Corp.'s research outcomes.
We debated this last week and that is why it is still very
much in the environment here because we were debating it last
week but the RAND Corp., Mr. Chairman, never stated
specifically that activities to curtail supply were not
appropriate for this government. I certainly support, as you
well know, all efforts that we can engage in to limit the
supply but our efforts should not be limited to only the
questions of supply but this country has not paid enough
attention, as I said on the floor last week, to the whole area
of treatment.
Efforts have to be made to encourage State and local
governments to do more as they are doing in the drug court area
and local prosecutors need to be encouraged to do more in their
specific areas. So the purpose of this hearing, the purpose of
inviting Mr. Iguchi to testify, was to get his insights on the
engagement of the criminal justice system into drug treatment
and whether it is efficient and whether it is appropriate. It
is a question of both.
We know that those that exist are efficient. I have visited
some, read some of the statements and documents and reports on
it. The question that Mr. Iguchi raises is the most important
question that we should be debating. That is the preferential
selection of individuals to go into these DTAP or drug court
programs, require that these two areas have special abilities
to get drug treatment programs for their clients.
They would be ineffective if while talking to a potential
enrollee, there was not a space somewhere to put that
individual into a drug treatment program. The whole thing must
be interconnected. Whether you are the judge or the prosecutor
is irrelevant; you have to have a special privileged line
somewhere to get into the program. Otherwise you are just
talking in the wind, if only 6 months from now a space will
open for you.
That is the condition of the public at large today. We
can't take everybody who voluntarily says I have a drug problem
and I really need help. Instead we say to that individual, you
have to wait 6 months; there is no space. But if you commit a
crime, you can go to drug court, and they will take care of
you. That is a terrible alternative. I think Mr. Iguchi raises
that point and that is a very troubling point which goes back
ultimately to what the chairman is upset about, and that is our
concern about the lack of availability of drug treatment
programs in this country.
Less than 50 percent of those who seek it are able to get
it. Our anxieties are really raised because we want to see more
of these treatment programs, not that it is the end all, cure
all, but that it is a necessity. If we are going to be honest
about trying to help people who have a drug problem, we have to
find more funds to create these treatment programs.
You testified, Mr. Belenko, that there was a 66 percent
retention rate in the treatment programs. That was a question
that Representative Ose asked. That is a confusing statement.
Exactly what is meant by that statement, there is a 66 percent
retention rate in the substance treatment program by those that
are in either drug court or DTAP?
Mr. Belenko. That figure was referring to the DTAP program.
What that means is that of those who start the program, 66
percent of them are still in treatment 1 year later. So it is 1
year.
Mrs. Mink. And already detached from DTAP, no longer under
the supervision?
Mr. Belenko. In DTAP. DTAP requires 15 to 24 months.
Mrs. Mink. Even with that coercion as an alternative to
going to prison, you only have a 66 percent retention in a
treatment program?
Mr. Belenko. I think you have to compare it to retention in
residential treatment generally which is quite low where only
probably 10 to 30 percent of those who enter residential
treatment are still there after 1 year. Generally, residential
treatment requires long term.
Mrs. Mink. What happens to that 34 percent then that don't
stay in the program? They are then pushed into the regular
criminal justice system and ultimately go to jail?
Mr. Belenko. They are prosecuted and under the DTAP model,
as the district attorney has designed it, these are offenders
who are subject to mandatory prison sentences. In fact, 96
percent of them are returned to court, are prosecuted and
sentenced to the prison terms they would have gotten had they
not gone to DTAP.
Mrs. Mink. The clients that are identified for either drug
court or DTAP, how are they able to assure their clients the
ability to enter a treatment program?
Mr. Belenko. In both models, there are treatment slots
dedicated by prior agreement.
Mrs. Mink. By prior agreement, by State law or whatever?
Mr. Belenko. Yes, through various funding mechanisms.
Mrs. Mink. So that sets the limits on the number that DTAP
can take or the number the drug court can take, the
availability of drug treatment slots.
Mr. Belenko. I want to also point out that generally drug
courts are set up with an existing treatment infrastructure in
place so that they know when participants come into a drug
court, there will be a treatment slot.
Mrs. Mink. They run their own, maintain their own?
Mr. Belenko. Some drug courts operate their own, others use
existing community-based providers, others contract with a
single provider in the community.
Mrs. Mink. But still, the limitation is availability of
drug treatment slots?
Mr. Belenko. That is always the limitation, yes.
Mrs. Mink. If there was not such a limitation and drug
treatment spaces were readily available through out the
country, what would be that effect on the number of people that
would be in the program? Would it double the program, triple
the program, quadruple it?
Mr. Belenko. There are still limitations because at some
point drug court staff would be overwhelmed with cases. As
under traditional probation where probation officers may have
150 to 200 probationers to supervise, you don't want a drug
course where a case manager or a judge has to supervise too
many cases because I think some individual attention is
required. So there may be limits in a single courtroom of how
many cases you want, but certainly there is room for expansion.
Mrs. Mink. In the usual congressional budget-type analysis,
the question would be put what is the average cost per client
in the drug court system, maintained in the drug court system
as against the DTAP system, as against going to prison?
Mr. Belenko. Judge Tauber mentioned the figure, I think, of
$2,000 per year.
Mrs. Mink. $2,000 in DTAP?
Mr. Belenko. For drug court. Drug courts generally use
outpatient treatment models which is much cheaper than
residential. DTAP uses a residential treatment model which is
more expensive, my guess would be $10,000-$15,000 per year.
Mrs. Mink. DTAP clients are typically detained in
residential centers?
Mr. Belenko. They are required to be in residential
treatment under a therapeutic community model which is very
intensive and long-term treatment. The average cost of a prison
nationwide, is probably about $22,000 a year or so. In New
York, it is closer to $30,000, I believe. Prison is clearly the
most expensive; residential is much cheaper. Outpatient
treatment, which most drug courts use, is even cheaper than
that. Relatively inexpensive, not cheap.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank the gentlelady. I am sorry for berating
your witness today. I just saw RAND Corp., and Mr. Iguchi has
been before us and I have been very polite to him.
Mrs. Mink. You should apologize to him for ranting and
raving.
Mr. Mica. After hearing a day and a half of debate.
Mrs. Mink. I thought it was a brilliant debate, especially
my part.
Mr. Mica. You were, in fact, brilliant, but using the RAND
Corp. study of past in such a distorted fashion.
Mrs. Mink. Don't start again or I will take another 5
minutes.
Mr. Mica. I don't know if Mr. Iguchi was involved in that
study, I am sure he wasn't.
Mr. Iguchi. I joined the RAND Corp. 2 years ago.
Mrs. Mink. You didn't extend him the courtesy of asking if
he was there.
Mr. Mica. Just representing the corporation that did the
study that I felt did a lot of damage.
Mrs. Mink. He specifically said in his opening, I do not
represent the corporation today.
Mr. Mica. He had to bear the brunt of it and if you want to
hear more, tune in tonight for 1 hour in special orders when I
will finish my comments about the misuse of the study. I am
sure the RAND Corp. does very good in compiling statistics and
data in a fairly level, non-biased fashion but again, the
misuse of that concerns me.
My concern is that the programs we have heard of today are
great. They do serve a very small portion of the population and
in order to qualify for those programs, those individuals have
had to reach addiction, the need for treatment, had to have
committed a crime, in many cases serious crimes and felonies,
and they have also had to face the possibility of prison and my
concern is that it is much more cost effective if we want to do
a cost benefit analysis, if those individuals are never
subjected in the first place to even using illegal narcotics
and then also a balanced approach. I have never advocated not
doing treatment or any of these programs. They are necessary
but when you take out key elements, you put yourself at risk,
again subjecting more people to becoming victims of illegal
narcotics addiction, use of treatment which follows and prison,
all of which have even marginal success rates, even these that
we have heard from today.
I do want to thank all of our witnesses for providing
testimony before us today. It does help us, particularly with
the model of the DTAP Program. We hopefully can support that
nationally. We are already supporting the drug courts
nationally and I hope that support will continue and we can
have successful programs in both areas.
There being no further business to come before the
subcommittee at this time, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]