<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:62410.wais]
THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S HANDLING OF ALLEGATIONS OF VISA FRAUD AND OTHER
IRREGULARITIES AT THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN BEIJING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 29, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-79
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-410 WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 29, 1999.................................... 1
Statement of:
Bergin, Peter, Acting Assistant Secretary and Director of
Diplomatic Security; Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers,
Inspector General; Bonnie R. Cohen, Under Secretary for
Management, accompanied by Edward W. Gnehm, Director
General of the Foreign Service; Mary A. Ryan, Assistant
Secretary for Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State;
and Don Schurman, Regional Security Officer................ 26
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bergin, Peter, Acting Assistant Secretary and Director of
Diplomatic Security, prepared statement of................. 29
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana:
American Foreign Service Association statement........... 3
Letter from Mr. Chen..................................... 23
Majority reports and exhibits............................ 93
Prepared statement of.................................... 13
Cohen, Bonnie R., Under Secretary for Management:
Information concerning alleged consular malfeasance...... 71
Prepared statement of.................................... 51
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of counsel to Mr.
Parish..................................................... 75
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., Inspector General, prepared
statement of............................................... 33
THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S HANDLING OF ALLEGATIONS OF VISA FRAUD AND OTHER
IRREGULARITIES AT THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN BEIJING
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Burton, Morella, Shays, McHugh,
Horn, Mica, McIntosh, Scarborough, Barr, Miller, Hutchinson,
Terry, Biggert, Ose, Vitter, Waxman, Maloney, Kucinich, and
Schakowsky.
Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; Barbara
Comstock, chief counsel; James Wilson, chief investigative
counsel; David Kass, deputy counsel and parliamentarian; Kristi
Remington, senior counsel; Kevin Davis, senior investigator;
Marc Chretien, senior investigative counsel; Mark Corallo,
director of communications; John Williams, deputy
communications director; Corinne Zaccagnini, systems
administrator; Robin Butler, office manager; Michelle White,
counsel; Carla J. Martin, chief clerk; Lisa Smith-Arafune,
deputy chief clerk; Phil Schiliro, minority staff director;
Phil Barnett, minority chief counsel; Kenneth Ballen, minority
chief investigative counsel; Michael Raphael and Michael
Yeager, minority counsels; Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk;
and Jean Gosa, minority staff assistant.
Mr. Burton. The committee will be in order. We have some
motions we have to go through before I make my opening
statement here.
A quorum being present, the Committee on Government Reform
will come to order, and before the distinguished ranking member
and I deliver our opening statements, the committee must first
dispose of some procedural issues.
I would first like to take a moment to welcome the newest
member of our committee, David Vitter from New Orleans.
David, welcome. Glad to have you with us. I know that my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle are really glad to have
you on the committee, and we look forward to working with you.
I move that the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources be expanded from 16 members to 18
members with 10 members from the majority and 8 members from
the minority party. All in favor of the motion will signify by
saying aye.
Those opposed will signify by saying no.
In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it and the
motion is agreed to.
I also move that Mr. Vitter of Louisiana be appointed to
the majority vacancies on the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources Subcommittee and the National Economic
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs Subcommittee.
All in favor of the motion will indicate by saying aye.
All opposed will signify by saying no.
In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it and the
motion is agreed to.
I ask unanimous consent that all Members' and witnesses'
written opening statements be included in the record, and
without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits, and
extraneous or tabular material referred to, be included in the
record, and without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that one staff report and
compilation of exhibits regarding this hearing be included in
the record.
[Note.--The majority report and exhibits referred to may be
found at the end of the hearing.]
Mr. Waxman. If I may inquire, Mr. Chair, I think our staffs
were in consultation about holding back one of the staff
reports until later.
I withdraw my reservation.
Mr. Burton. Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that a statement from the
American Foreign Service Association be included in the record,
and without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Burton. And finally, I ask unanimous consent that
questioning in the matter under consideration proceed under
clause 2(g)(2) of House rule 11 and committee rule 14, in which
the chairman and ranking minority member allocate time to
committee counsel or members as they deem appropriate for
extended questioning, not to exceed 60 minutes, divided equally
between the majority and minority; and without objection, so
ordered.
As I said earlier, I have been involved in a number of
congressional hearings and investigations over the years. I
have learned a few things along the way. One thing I have
learned is that sometimes you begin investigating one problem,
and in the process, you uncover other problems you weren't even
aware of. By exposing the problem, shining the light of day on
it, hopefully you begin the process of fixing it.
That's what happened under my predecessor Bill Clinger. We
began investigating the firing of seven Travel Office
employees. In the process, we discovered that the Clinton White
House had obtained over 900 confidential FBI files of
Republicans who no longer worked there.
It happened again during our investigation into illegal
foreign fundraising. When Johnny Chung appeared here in May, he
testified that a general in charge of China's military
intelligence agency gave him $300,000 to donate to the
President's campaign. They said they liked the President and
they wanted to see him get re-elected. But Mr. Chung also
testified about another problem, one we were not expecting,
visa fraud. Mr. Chung testified that he saw one of the senior
officials at the United States consulate in Beijing, Charles
Parish, accept a shopping bag full of cash in exchange for
providing visas to Chinese nationals. Now, that's a very
disturbing allegation.
Mr. Chung testified that Mr. Parish asked him for $500 to
pay for a computer class for his secretary. Chung said he did
it. Chung testified that Mr. Parish asked for $7,000 to pay for
tuition for several Chinese students studying in California.
Mr. Chung said he did that, as well. This happened at a time
when Mr. Parish was approving 25 to 30 visas for Chung's
business associates.
My staff called Johnny Chung this week to ask him for more
information about this. He told us that he was riding in a car
with Mr. Parish in Beijing. He said that Mr. Parish didn't
really ask for the money; he demanded it. Chung said that the
tone in Mr. Parish's voice sent a very clear message, ``I want
you to do it, you have to do it.'' Chung said that Mr. Parish
was so insistent that Chung called his wife on the cell phone
in the car and told her to go to the bank right away and get a
cashier's check and take it to the school.
Mr. Chung says he provided his copy of this check to the
Justice Department. We have asked the Justice Department to
provide this documentation to us. We asked Janet Reno and the
Justice Department almost 2 months ago. We are still waiting.
Once again, we are getting no cooperation from the Justice
Department and Attorney General Reno.
Mr. Parish is here today, and we are going to ask him about
all of these issues.
A U.S. visa is a very difficult thing to get. People line
up for blocks outside U.S. Embassies all over the world. They
wait all day to ask for a visa, some all night. Most of them
get turned down.
It has been estimated that the street value of a visa in
some countries is worth as much as $20,000.
If a Foreign Service Officer is taking advantage of his
position by accepting bribes or illegal gratuities in exchange
for visas, that is a very serious problem, a crime. So we
started looking into it.
What we found out was that Johnny Chung wasn't the only one
making allegations about Mr. Parish. Employees at the consulate
had been filing complaints about him for over a year and a
half. American citizens complained to senior Embassy officials.
Articles started to appear about him in the Chinese press, in
the Chinese papers. We have a copy of a State Department cable.
It says that a Chinese Government official approached an
Embassy staffer at a reception. The Chinese official told him
that he was amazed at how many unqualified Chinese were getting
visas. He said it was common knowledge that if you took the
right Embassy official to dinner and bought him a gift, you
were guaranteed to get a visa. It seems like the only ones who
weren't asleep at the switch were the Chinese.
So what happened with Mr. Parish? Was he fired? No. Was he
prosecuted? No. Was he disciplined in any way? No. He was
transferred back to Washington. He was given other sensitive
assignments. Instead of getting fired, he got a raise. In fact,
he got four raises.
We took a hard look at the State Department's investigation
of Mr. Parish. What we found was very disappointing. Three
separate offices conducted investigations of Mr. Parish, and
all three dropped the ball. Documents were destroyed without
being reviewed. Witnesses were not even interviewed. Bank
records were not subpoenaed. We found allegations of serious
wrongdoing that weren't even checked out in a cursory way.
The result was that a Foreign Service Officer who had been
accused of serious wrongdoing got shifted from one job to
another without any action taken against him whatsoever. It
looks to me like nobody wanted to deal with this problem.
Everyone dropped the ball.
Mr. Parish was put to work reviewing visa applications from
Iraq and Iran. In his employee evaluation form--in which he
received a glowing rating, by the way--it says that his
position, ``coordinates with the intelligence and law
enforcement communities in the handling of the most sensitive
visa applications, those from persons suspected of terrorism,
espionage, or other serious threats to U.S. national
interests.''
When Mr. Parish was placed in this job, was it known that
he was under criminal investigation?
Now, if this was just an isolated incident, maybe it would
not be such a big deal. One of the reasons I called this
hearing today is to try to find out just how widespread the
problem is. There are signs that it may not be an isolated
incident at all.
I was talking to one of my caseworkers just the other day,
and she was trying to help a constituent get a visa for a
relative in Romania. They were denied. But I learned that there
are rumors about Embassy officials taking bribes in Romania. I
have no idea if they are true or not. But these are things we
need to look into because we have that oversight
responsibility.
I was reading an article in the Los Angeles Times. They
have done an excellent job reporting on this issue. I want to
read a couple of quotes from the article. ``Of a dozen cases
known to the Times, a majority of diplomats, suspected of
wrongdoing in issuing of visas, retired or were moved to
another post. Cases that were opened took years to develop and
usually ended up being dropped.''
``Those suspected of issuing visas in exchange for money,
gifts or sexual favors often are allowed to retire or move to
another post rather than face extensive investigation or
prosecution.'' The Times article cited cases of fraud that
happened in Asia, Africa, South America, all over the world.
I wanted to say something as a matter of fairness. People
who work in U.S. consulates have a tough, tough job. They face
tremendous pressure. They face lines of hundreds, even
thousands, of people who want visas every day, and they have to
make snap decisions. I think that most of our consular officers
are honest and hardworking, and do their jobs under very
difficult circumstances, but it is fairly obvious that there is
a very small minority that are willing to take advantage of
this situation.
I have a statement from the acting president of the
American Foreign Service Association. They represent all of the
Foreign Service Officers. I would like to submit this statement
for the record. He says, ``We deplore them, corrupt diplomats,
because these isolated incidents besmirch the reputation of the
overwhelming majority of Foreign Service people who conduct
themselves with absolute integrity.''
If the State Department doesn't have the resources or the
will to punish corrupt officials, then these problems are only
going to get worse. The consequences are serious. We have a
serious illegal immigration problem. We have a problem with
international terrorism. We have a problem with international
drug trafficking. If Embassy officials can be tempted or
bribed, these people that I just mentioned are going to take
advantage of the situation.
Mr. Parish is here today. I issued a subpoena for him to be
here. I know he doesn't want to be here. I am sorry to put him
in this situation, but nobody else has seen fit to ask him
about these allegations under oath, so we are going to do it
today. I have also asked several people from the State
Department to appear and answer questions about their
investigations of Mr. Parish. We are going to ask them some
tough questions about whether an adequate job was done. Looking
at the record, I think it would be pretty hard for an objective
person to say yes to that question.
I want to say one thing in their defense before we get
started. We have had a difficult time with the State Department
in the past. We have had senior officials refuse to testify. My
colleague, Mr. Gilman, at the International Relations
Committee, has had similar problems. I have had to issue
subpoenas just to get witnesses for hearings. That should never
have to happen, and it hasn't happened this time.
I doubt if our witnesses really want to be here today.
Nobody likes having their work questioned. But they have come,
they have agreed to testify and answer the committee's
questions without a subpoena, and I appreciate that. Under
Secretary Cohen has agreed to testify. I understand that she
has been traveling recently, and I appreciate that she is here
today. I hope that she will be able to shed some light on how
widespread the problem is. I also hope that she will be able to
inform us about what, if anything, is being done to improve the
State Department's efforts to investigate these cases. We have
had pretty good cooperation from the State Department this
week, and as I said, I compliment them for that.
I wish I could say the same thing for the Justice
Department. I am absolutely furious about what happened
yesterday as we were preparing for this hearing. The Inspector
General is here today. Her office worked with the Justice
Department to investigate the Parish matter. She got a call
from the Justice Department yesterday. They told her that she
couldn't testify about the work her office has done because it
is covered by grand jury secrecy laws.
I have it on pretty good authority that the Justice
Department has a plan to close this case, but is keeping it
open, I believe, to keep us from having the Inspector General
testify; and I believe I know of a number of other cases where
the Justice Department is deliberately keeping cases open so
this committee cannot have access to witnesses. I say to my
colleagues that I think this goes beyond being unconscionable.
It is an obstruction of justice. If the Justice Department
plans to close a case, and they keep it open only for the
purpose of keeping Congress from doing its investigations, then
that is almost criminal.
This is absolutely the most ridiculous thing I have ever
heard. It is typical of the kind of stonewalling that Janet
Reno's Justice Department has engaged in. For 2 years, they
have hidden behind the so-called 6(e) rule. They won't share
any information with Congress. They won't let us immunize
witnesses. They won't let us interview Charlie Trie or John
Huang, and now they want to say that other agencies can't share
information with us. Janet Reno is doing a disservice to the
Congress, and she is doing a disservice to the American people
who are represented by the Congress of the United States.
I would like to make two final points before I yield to my
colleague, Mr. Waxman.
First, for most people from other countries, the first
place they come into contact with anyone from the United States
is at one of our Embassies. If they are confronted by
corruption at the Embassy, think about the message that sends
about our entire country. Think about how that reflects on all
of the dedicated Foreign Service Officers who are following the
rules and doing their jobs well. That is why I think this is a
very important issue.
Second, this particular case is important because of where
it happened. Mr. Parish wasn't working in Canada or France or
Israel. He was working in China. China has been conducting very
aggressive espionage at some of our nuclear facilities. They
have stolen nuclear weapons secrets from us, thus endangering
every man, woman, and child, at some point in the future. China
has illegally funneled millions of dollars into the United
States to try to influence our elections. China has been
exporting nuclear technology and missile technology to rogue
nations.
The United States Embassy in Beijing is one of our most
sensitive posts. If allegations of corruption weren't being
followed up in Beijing, I don't have a lot of confidence that
they are being pursued more diligently elsewhere. I hope that
our witnesses today can persuade us otherwise.
I now yield to my colleague from California, Mr. Waxman,
for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]
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Mr. Waxman. We are here today to look into the State
Department's response to allegations that one of its Foreign
Service Officers, Charles Parish, may have accepted gifts from
visa applicants and their sponsors while he was posted in
China, may have committed visa fraud or other crimes, and may
have violated the State Department's code of ethical standards.
These are serious allegations against Mr. Parish. They have
appropriately been the subject of investigations by the State
Department's Diplomatic Security Service, the State
Department's Office of Inspector General, and the FBI. It
appears that all these investigations determined that there is
insufficient evidence to bring charges against Mr. Parish, and
now our committee is investigating Mr. Parish.
This is not a situation where allegations of serious
wrongdoing went unnoticed or where political appointees
allegedly interfered with the normal processes of government.
Apart from a tenuous connection to Johnny Chung, the facts
surrounding Mr. Parish appear to have nothing to do with the
campaign finance investigation.
It appears that the State Department acted reasonably in
the investigation of Mr. Parish. Junior officers raised
concerns about his management practices to the second in
command of the U.S. Embassy on April 11, 1996. By May 1, the
regional security officer had begun an investigation and
confronted Mr. Parish with allegations of misconduct. Shortly
after that, Mr. Parish asked to curtail his assignment in
Beijing. By May 17th, he was out of China and reassigned to
Washington while an investigation continued.
That is not to say there weren't some problems with the
investigations. Some documents and gifts found in Mr. Parish's
office were retained as relevant to the investigation. Other
material was discarded. It obviously would have been preferable
to retain the material until the investigation was completed.
Mr. Parish was posted to Washington after he curtailed his
assignment and may have had continued involvement in visa
issues during the investigation of this case. The State
Department probably should not have put Mr. Parish in this
position until all serious allegations were resolved.
Even though we can point to mistakes in retrospect, it is
important to keep the investigation of Mr. Parish in the proper
perspective. Everyone involved in the investigation of his case
had other responsibilities. Unlike this committee, which can
devote unlimited resources to pursuing even the most fruitless
inquiries, State Department investigators have to make
responsible choices about priorities and how to allocate their
scarce time and resources. The evidence indicates that these
career officials acted in good faith in determining that there
was insufficient evidence to pursue a criminal investigation
any further.
Now, I won't take the time of the committee now to go and
make a point-by-point correction of a lot of factual
inaccuracies in the chairman's statement. I will do so for the
record, but let me say that it lacked the judiciousness that we
ought to apply when investigating anybody of wrongdoing.
The attack on the Justice Department seems to me to be
particularly unwarranted. If the Justice Department were
continuing an investigation, they obviously still think there
is more for them to learn; and the chairman thinks there is
more yet to learn. So they are being criticized for continuing
their investigation. The chairman says they are continuing
their investigation but they should close it and then he can
continue to investigate it.
Well, that just seems to me contradictory. If they close
their investigation, they would be criticized because it should
be taken more seriously. If they keep it open, they are
criticized because they haven't closed it so that witnesses can
come before this committee to give evidence that wouldn't
otherwise be permitted.
But the fact of the matter is, whether they opened it or
closed it or kept it going, there are some witnesses that are
not permitted to come, by court order--not in this case, but
generally, to come and comment, especially Inspector Generals,
about information that they derive from grand jury testimony.
That would just be illegal. So it seems unfair to me to
criticize the Justice Department for not allowing an IG to come
in and give testimony, violating the law with regard to grand
jury testimony.
Well, I am interested in hearing the testimony of the
witnesses today. Perhaps we will learn something new and
significant about this case or in the way the State Department
handles allegations of wrongdoing; I hope so, and I will look
forward to seeing whether that would be the case.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.
If we have no other Members who wish to speak, Mr. Parish,
would you come forward. Would you rise, Mr. Parish, please.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Mr. Parish, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Parish. No, I don't.
Mr. Burton. I know you are the attorney, and I would like
to state for you, because I understand you would like to speak,
House rule 11(k)(3) provides that witnesses at investigative
hearings may be accompanied by their own counsel for the
purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional
rights. As Mr. Lantos, one of my predecessors--I guess it was
on a subcommittee--told lawyers for Secretary Pierce in the
hearings he chaired in 1989, ``In essence, gentlemen, at this
hearing you are in fact a potted plant.'' I don't consider you
a potted plant, but I do think it is important that you
understand that according to the rules you can confer with your
client, but you can't make any kind of a statement. So your
client will have to speak for himself.
Mr. Martin. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Burton. Well, you are not a witness, and you are not
allowed to make any kind of a statement. You can confer with
your client, but your client is going to have to answer the
questions or invoke his constitutional rights. I just want you
to understand what I just said.
Now, I don't want to press the point, but you are not a
witness, and you are not allowed to make any comments. You can
confer with your client, but you are not to speak to the
committee, OK?
I will now yield to our counsel, who will start the
questioning.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Parish, good morning.
Mr. Parish. Good morning.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much for being here. My name is
Jim Wilson. I am the majority counsel for this hearing. Again,
thank you very much for being here.
For the record, you are here pursuant to a subpoena that
was issued by this committee, correct?
Mr. Parish. Yes.
Mr. Wilson. Now, you worked at the United States Embassy in
Beijing from July 1994 until May 1996; is this correct?
Mr. Parish. Mr. Chairman, on advice of my counsel, I must
respectfully invoke my constitutional right to decline to
answer.
Mr. Wilson. When you were at the Embassy in Beijing, what
was your title?
Mr. Barr. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, could I ask on what
basis is that privilege being invoked? Is it because the
witness believes that answering the question of whether or not
he worked at the Embassy may tend to incriminate him? I think
that if the witness is going to claim a privilege, he needs to
be specific about the basis on which it is invoked.
Mr. Burton. The witness can speak for himself on that.
Mr. Martin. I gave the chairman the statement----
Mr. Barr. Counsel, you are not a witness here.
Mr. Burton. I think that the witness will speak for himself
regarding that, Mr. Barr.
Go ahead. Proceed.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Parish, when you were in Beijing at the
Embassy, how many bank accounts did you have?
Mr. Parish. On advice of my counsel, I must respectfully
invoke my constitutional right to decline to answer.
Mr. Wilson. Will you at any time after this hearing provide
the committee with any information about your bank accounts in
Beijing?
Mr. Parish. On advice of my counsel, I must respectfully
invoke my constitutional right to decline to answer.
Mr. Burton. Let me interrupt because I don't want to
prolong your appearance here, Mr. Parish. Is it your intention
on advice of counsel to assert your fifth amendment privilege
on every question the committee puts to you today?
Mr. Parish. Yes, it is.
Mr. Burton. Well, I am very disappointed. You are a former
public servant of the U.S. Government; and to take the fifth
amendment when your salary has been paid by the taxpayers of
this country, and there are some allegations about alleged
wrongdoing that only you can possibly clarify, it is just very
disappointing that you will not talk to the elected
Representatives of the U.S. citizenry.
So I am really disappointed, but it is your position that
you will not answer any questions and you will assert your
fifth amendment privileges?
Mr. Parish. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. If I could again ask the witness if he could
enlighten us as to what are you asserting this privilege? Is it
because you believe that answering questions on your service as
a former public official will tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Parish. Mr. Barr, on advice of my counsel, I must
respectfully invoke my constitutional right to decline to
answer.
Mr. Barr. So you are refusing to tell this committee even
the basis on which you are asserting that privilege; is that
correct?
Mr. Parish. On advice of my counsel, I must respectfully
invoke my constitutional right to decline to answer.
Mr. Martin. Counsel did submit that basis to the committee.
Mr. Burton. Counsel, you need not make any comment. I think
based upon the--Mr. Waxman, we have the time, but we will yield
to you.
Go ahead. That's all right. Go ahead.
Mr. Waxman. The witness is asserting a constitutional right
to refuse to testify against himself. That constitutional right
applies even if he is a government employee, because he is a
citizen of the United States. I am disappointed. I would rather
have heard from the witness and received information so that we
could look into the matter that is before us today; but the man
does have a constitutional right to assert that privilege not
to give testimony against himself. I guess if there is any
further--Mr. Barr, as a prosecutor, if he wants to know
further, some legal matter, we ought to let the lawyer speak.
Otherwise, the Constitution speaks for itself, and the man does
have a right.
Mr. Burton. Let me reclaim my time, and just say that in my
opening statement I mentioned that the Justice Department, I
believe--and I think I have it on very good authority--that it
has been recommended, that the case on Mr. Parish be closed. If
that is the case, then the IG should be able to testify.
Evidently, though, there is more to this than Mr. Parish wants
to divulge. If that is the case, then I cannot understand why
the Justice Department has recommended that this case be
closed.
If the Justice Department has recommended this case be
closed and the witness himself doesn't wish to testify because
he may incriminate himself, then the Justice Department is not
doing its job, in my opinion, because this case should be
thoroughly investigated. As you will hear as we go through the
hearing today, Mr. Waxman, I think you will hear from some of
the witnesses some of the facts that we have been able to get
in our investigation, that there is a lot more here that needs
to be investigated that was not investigated; and on three
separate occasions, the State Department, the FBI, and others
dropped the ball. That is why we are going on with this
investigation, not because we want to just prolong this thing,
but because an adequate job wasn't done.
We have information that one of the people that was
investigating this went into Mr. Parish's office, destroyed a
lot of documents that Parish shouldn't have had in his office
in the first place and kept very few of the others. Now, those
documents were relevant to the investigation. Why they were
destroyed may have been an error in judgment, I don't know, but
we are going to try to find out. But why those documents were
destroyed when they are relevant to the investigation is beyond
me.
We had, in Chinese newspapers, people at very high levels
indicating that there were bribes being paid at the consulate
to a specific individual for visas. That was not pursued.
We had a letter from a Mr. Chen, which will be submitted
for the record, where Mr. Chen said it is very clear that the
gentleman in question, Mr. Parish, was involved in accepting
bribes; and that was not even followed up on.
[The letter referred to follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Now, you know, you can criticize us for going
on with the investigation, but if it is apparent these things
have not been followed up on, and the integrity of the U.S.
Government is in question, and that people who are trying to
get in this country are getting the impression that if you pay
a bribe, you can get in--and this sends the wrong message
around the world. In addition, if China, which has been
involved in espionage and illegal campaign contributions, could
get access to the United States through bribery of an official
of our Government, then, boy, we have got real problems.
And so all I would like to say is that, and I will then
yield back our time unless Mr. Barr would like a minute, I
think that this investigation is justified and warranted, and
we intend to pursue it.
Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire of the witness
if he has been interviewed by the State Department, by anybody
at the State Department, or any other Federal agency concerning
the allegations which were summarized earlier and you heard by
the chairman?
Mr. Parish. The same answer, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Which is.
Mr. Parish. On advice of my counsel, I must respectfully
invoke my constitutional right to decline to answer.
Mr. Barr. Were you present, Mr. Parish, during the opening
remarks of Chairman Burton, and did you hear them?
Mr. Parish. Same answer.
Mr. Barr. Which is?
Mr. Parish. On advice of my counsel, I must respectfully
invoke my constitutional right to decline to answer.
Mr. Barr. Are you familiar with Title XVIII of the Criminal
Code, section 201, relating to bribery of public officials and
witnesses?
Mr. Parish. Mr. Barr, on advice of my counsel, I must
respectfully invoke my constitutional right to decline to
answer.
Mr. Burton. Representative Barr, I understand the questions
that you want to ask, and I am just as concerned as you are
about this, but it doesn't appear it is going to be fruitful to
get Mr. Parish to answer any questions because of his
constitutional right.
Mr. Barr. Then would it be your intent, Mr. Parish, your
unequivocal intent to not answer any question that I pose to
you?
Mr. Parish. That is correct, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Apparently it would be unfruitful, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Unless other members have something they would like to say,
I don't think questions would be fruitful. Unless they have
something they would like to say, I will yield back our time
and yield to Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. There's a vote on the House floor. The witness
is asserting his constitutional right not to answer questions.
I have nothing to ask.
Mr. Burton. That being the case, Mr. Parish, you will be
excused, and we will recess until the fall of the gavel right
after this vote. Chair stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. Committee will come to order. I ask unanimous
consent that a staff report regarding Mr. Parish's improper
actions be included in the record, and without objection, so
ordered.
[Note.--The majority report may be found at the end of the
hearing.]
Mr. Burton. Let me just say that we have now Under
Secretary Bonnie Cohen, and I just told Ms. Cohen that my
mother's name was Bonnie. I have a soft spot for that. It means
very pretty. Under Secretary Bonnie Cohen; Inspector General
Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers; Acting Assistant Secretary Peter
Bergin; and Donald Schurman.
And Mr. Gnehm, are you going to add to their knowledge as
this goes on?
Mr. Gnehm. If they so desire.
Mr. Burton. Well, then I probably ought to have you stand
and be sworn as well.
Would you all stand.
Ms. Cohen. Excuse me, could I add Mary Ryan.
Mr. Burton. Well, not as a testifier, but as an adjunct. If
she is going to give you information, you can have her stand as
well.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Be seated. We will start with you, Under
Secretary Cohen. You are recognized, if you like, to make an
opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF PETER BERGIN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND
DIRECTOR OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY; JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-
BRIDGERS, INSPECTOR GENERAL; BONNIE R. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY
FOR MANAGEMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD W. GNEHM, DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE; MARY A. RYAN, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND
DON SCHURMAN, REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER
Ms. Cohen. Thank you very much. I think we are all
pleased----
Mr. Burton. Pardon me, if we could, we would like, if it is
possible, to keep your statements to 5 minutes because we have
a lot of ground to cover.
Ms. Cohen. We are pleased to be here to explain our visa
operations and the procedures for investigation of consular
malfeasance. You did introduce everyone. I think we would like
to start with a very brief statement from Pete Bergin, who is
the Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. Then
the Inspector General Jackie Williams-Bridgers, has a
statement, and then I have a statement.
Mr. Burton. OK. Fine.
Mr. Bergin.
Mr. Bergin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my
written statement be made part of the official record, sir.
Mr. Burton. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Bergin. Thank you.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee
to discuss the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's role in
investigating Charles Parish.
Embassy Beijing's management first became aware of the
allegations against Mr. Parish on April 11, 1996, from junior
officers of the Embassy, who expressed concern about the lack
of managerial controls in the consular section. The next day,
the Deputy Chief of Mission initiated an inquiry into the
concerns and uncovered additional allegations that Mr. Parish
gave special treatment to some of the organizations that
sponsored visa applicants and to his personal contacts and
friends. These allegations stemmed from a birthday party given
by a Chinese national who was a friend of Mr. Parish.
Embassy Beijing Regional Security Officer Don Schurman
promptly advised the Diplomatic Security Visa Fraud Branch in
Washington that post officials had received allegations of
questionable management practices and possible unethical
activities by Mr. Parish in his position as Chief of the
Nonimmigrant Visa Section. Post reported that they had no
evidence that Mr. Parish might be accepting money or other
benefits in exchange for issuing visas. Nevertheless, our Visa
Fraud Branch opened a criminal investigation on Charles Parish
based on these reported allegations concerning his suspect
managerial conduct and the potential for involvement in visa
malfeasance, which is a violation of the U.S. Criminal Code.
The Visa Fraud Branch, working with Mr. Schurman, initiated
its investigation by reviewing all relevant visa documents and
related information. The RSO conducted a thorough search and
retrieved and forwarded copies of 27 visa applications from
individuals who were sponsored by a friend of Mr. Parish. In
addition, the RSO sent a list provided by post's consular
section containing anecdotal examples of alleged activities
which gave the appearance of impropriety, specific instances in
which visas were allegedly issued under questionable
circumstances and cases where visas were issued to individuals
previously refused.
The Visa Fraud Branch in Washington reviewed the materials
and discovered sufficient anomalies to warrant further inquiry.
The investigation focused on the United States operations of
two Chinese nationals and their New York-based companies that
appeared to benefit from the issuance of the visas Mr. Parish
had approved. The two Chinese nationals provided information
and documentation to the Visa Fraud Branch that they claimed
supported the legitimacy of their operations. The Visa Fraud
Branch also obtained official documentation from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service on the two companies.
This documentation indicated that INS had approved a number of
petitions for Chinese nationals who had been sponsored by these
two companies. The Visa Fraud Branch's investigation found no
indication of any involvement by Mr. Parish in any criminal
activities. In the absence of further leads from Beijing, and
given unproductive investigative results to date, the status of
the investigation into Mr. Parish was considered inactive
pending any additional information.
In January 1998, Mr. Chairman, the FBI and the Department's
Office of Inspector General made inquiries about Mr. Parish and
complete access to Diplomatic Security files was provided to
them. In March 1998, our Visa Fraud Branch also helped
facilitate the Inspector General's investigation at post with
the regional security officer. The Federal Government actively
pursued leads in the Charles Parish case. However, the
investigations did not reveal criminal wrongdoing, nor did the
Diplomatic Security investigation find any basis for referral
to the Bureau of Personnel for any further administrative
action.
Mr. Chairman, the Department does not generally discuss in
public the details of a personnel investigation in view of the
Privacy Act. The Department is prepared to provide such details
in this case because of the committee's strong interest and in
response to a specific request.
At this time, sir, I would like to turn the testimony over
to Ms. Bridgers. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bergin follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Ms. Bridgers.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for your invitation to testify before this committee on the
role of my office in the investigation of Mr. Parish.
For reasons that I will explain in a moment, I am unable to
testify on the specifics of our investigation. I would,
however, like to provide both in my statement for the record
and in oral summary, information that the committee has
requested regarding my office's investigations of visa fraud
involving U.S. consular officers since 1990. I have also
addressed in some detail in my written statement the Office of
Inspector General's [OIG] general oversight of the Department's
consular antifraud efforts.
I am unable to testify regarding OIG's investigation of Mr.
Parish because of concerns expressed by the Department of
Justice [DOJ] that my testimony would or could disclose
information in violation of rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
DOJ's concern stems from a recent decision by the Chief
Judge of the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia.
Originally issued under seal, this opinion was not unsealed
until October 30, 1998, and has not been published in any
official legal reporter. My office was unaware of this decision
and its full ramifications for my testimony, until yesterday
morning when Department of Justice attorneys, who had been
given a draft of my testimony, provided their final comments.
My office's investigation of Mr. Parish was conducted
jointly with the FBI, which served as the lead agency. The
investigation was initiated as part of DOJ's larger Campaign
Contribution Task Force probe for which a grand jury was
impaneled. Based on the recent court decision, DOJ has
cautioned that any discussion of our investigation could
implicate rule 6(e) concerns. Thus, DOJ has advised me that
even interviews conducted by my agents of witnesses who were
not called before the grand jury could be considered subject to
the restrictions of rule 6(e) and, thus, grand jury protected.
Under the circumstances, I feel the only responsible
approach is for me to err on the side of caution so that there
cannot be any suggestion that I have acted in a manner other
than in full compliance with the court's decision. Nonetheless,
I am pleased to appear before the committee to discuss my
office's oversight of consular fraud.
My office's Office of Investigations conducts passport and
visa fraud investigations, including those targeted against
employees of the Department. Often the investigations involve
cooperative efforts with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and
other law enforcement agencies. Visa and passport fraud
currently comprises over 25 percent of our workload. Our cases
include a broad range of malfeasance related to consular fraud.
Mr. Chairman, in your recent letter to Secretary Albright,
you requested information on our investigative cases of alleged
visa fraud by U.S. consular officers. Since 1990, our office
has opened 283 consular fraud investigations. Of these, 206
were visa fraud investigations and 77 were passport fraud
investigations. Some of the subjects in these investigations
are Foreign Service national employees in our Embassies.
However, the majority are not employees of the U.S. Government,
but individuals in the United States or overseas who act as
``brokers'' to extort money from individuals in exchange for
visas.
Approximately 10 percent of the 283 investigations have
involved allegations against U.S. diplomats. Since 1990, we
have opened 29 cases on Foreign Service Officers alleged to
have engaged in visa fraud. Four of these cases have resulted
in a referral to the Department of Justice for prosecutorial
consideration. DOJ declined prosecution on three, and one
resulted in an indictment. However, this individual was
acquitted by a jury trial. Of the 29 cases, 2 resulted in
referrals to the Department's Director General for
administrative action. According to our records, both employees
who were the subject of these two investigations received
letters of reprimand for appearances of impropriety and/or
improper visa issuances.
The 283 cases, however, do not fully disclose the extent of
our efforts in the passport and visa fraud area. Any one case
may involve multiple subjects. For example, one case in 1998
resulted in the indictment of 11 subjects, all nongovernment
individuals.
Attempts to falsify, alter, or counterfeit U.S. visas or
passports, or to obtain genuine documents by fraudulent means
are a constant problem, both in the United States and overseas.
Fraud associated with these official documents focuses on
either the document itself, through counterfeiting or
alteration, or on the issuance process through bribery or
trickery. Defeating these efforts requires secure documents
that are difficult to counterfeit and easy to detect when they
are altered. Additionally, countering fraud requires officials
who are well trained and informed about common methods of
fraud.
The Department has faced significant challenges in its visa
processing operations over time. In recent years, the
Department has made significant progress in visa processing
operations. The Office of Consular Fraud Prevention Programs
has shifted focus from looking at individual fraud cases to
identifying systemic fraud-related issues across a large number
of cases.
Currently, my office is reviewing the Department's consular
antifraud programs. While we have not yet issued our final
report, my written statement details more specific observations
on our ongoing review.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my summary. I would be happy
to answer questions at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Ms. Cohen, were you going to go next?
Ms. Cohen. Yes, thank you. I will submit my complete
statement for the record.
I would like first to give you a larger perspective on the
State Department's visa processing operations. We have about
800 consular officials worldwide. They adjudicated 7.4 million
nonimmigrant visas in 1998, including 156,000 in Beijing. In
addition, in 1998, our consular officers worldwide processed
over 725,000 immigrant visas, handled over 6,000 deaths of
Americans abroad, visited Americans in foreign prisons 4,800
times and orchestrated, in 1998, 13 evacuations of Americans
from countries that had become dangerous.
In cases where allegations of wrongdoing by government
personnel do emerge, investigations, as Pete Bergin has said,
are conducted by the Department of Diplomatic Security
Services, or DS, whose job it is to enforce the laws of the
United States pertaining to U.S. visas. DS agents are trained
law enforcement officers who, in any investigation, follow
codified procedures contained in the U.S. Criminal
Investigators Handbook.
The Department of State's Office of the Inspector General,
as Ms. Williams-Bridgers has said, also has a mandated
investigative role concerning all employee misconduct, and DS
and the OIG cooperate to ensure that the law is enforced.
DS also works closely with the Bureau of Consular Affairs
on cases involving employee corruption, attempted bribery of
consular officials, and counterfeit issuances. Cases that
implicate consular employees most often involve illegal
activities designed to facilitate the travel of illegal aliens
to the United States.
DS maintains a three-pronged strategy of deterrence,
enforcement, and education to maintain the integrity of the
U.S. visa issuance program worldwide. In addition, the training
program for all consular offices includes classes in internal
controls and malfeasance. The value of U.S. travel documents,
as you yourself have indicated, the nature of the overseas
environment, and the U.S. official's potential vulnerability
are emphasized in training provided every officer by the Office
of Fraud Prevention Programs in Consular Affairs. The Bureau of
Consular Affairs also publishes a consular management handbook
that serves as a key reference guide to all posts.
Finally, the regional security officer provides a mandatory
orientation on security and malfeasance to every arriving
officer at post. If an investigation of a consular employee by
diplomatic security reveals misconduct, but Justice declines to
prosecute, the case is referred to the Office of Employee
Relations in the Bureau of Personnel. That office reviews the
information and drafts a proposal for discipline, which is
reviewed by the Office of the Legal Adviser and the grievance
staff for legal sufficiency.
The proposal for discipline is sent to the employee for
response and then forwarded to a senior Department official for
decision. In making a decision, the deciding official takes
into account the report of the investigation, the proposed
discipline, all information submitted by the employee and the
aggravating factors, i.e., prior discipline, seriousness of
offense, or mitigating factors.
The process for investigating allegations of wrongdoing and
referrals for disciplinary action for Foreign Service employees
also has built-in protection for the rights of the employee.
Until the investigation is completed, no basis exists for
taking adverse action against the employee. This protects the
employee against false allegations and accusations. Except in
very unusual cases, the Foreign Service employee does continue
to serve, to be assigned and evaluated, and to compete for
promotion during the investigation. However, the Department
does monitor the employee's assignment carefully during any
investigation to ensure that the people's interest is
preserved.
Once investigation finds potential wrongdoing, appropriate
disciplinary actions are taken by the Bureau of Personnel.
These range from admonition to suspension to termination,
depending on the seriousness of the offense.
Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that the State
Department and all its career and political employees take visa
malfeasance very seriously. We have procedures in place to
handle accusations of malfeasance of consular officials, to
investigate these cases and to take disciplinary action if
necessary. At the same time, the Department has procedures to
protect employees who have been wrongly accused.
We welcome this hearing. I think you can tell by the number
of people and the expertise that I have here that we are ready
to really answer any of the questions you have, to share with
you how our operation is implemented, to tell you the steps
we've taken to improve it, and to hear from you your ideas and
questions. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Ms. Cohen.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cohen follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Mr. Schurman.
Mr. Schurman, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Schurman. I do not have an opening statement.
Mr. Burton. That being the case, we will start the extended
questioning. I will start by asking all of you, you talk about
all of the things that you did. Did you get his bank records,
any of you? Did you get Mr. Parish's bank records?
Mr. Bergin. Diplomatic Security did not get his bank
records, because in the view of the agents who were conducting
the case, in consultation with the Assistant U.S. Attorney, the
threshold for prosecutorial merit of the case, there was
insufficient probable cause. So on the basis of that, there was
no follow-on to request a subpoena from the magistrate.
Mr. Burton. Do you have any idea how many bank accounts he
had?
Mr. Bergin. I do not, sir.
Mr. Burton. Given all of these allegations, don't you think
that it would have been wise to check into these things?
Mr. Bergin. Yes, sir, but in the course of the criminal
investigation, it was determined that there was insufficient
probable cause.
Mr. Burton. Who made the determination that there was
insufficient probable cause?
Mr. Bergin. That decision was made by the case agents
involved in the investigation.
Mr. Burton. For whom does the case agent work?
Mr. Bergin. For the Chief of the Criminal Investigations
Division.
Mr. Burton. What division oversees that, is that the
Justice Department?
Mr. Bergin. No, sir, that is within DS.
Mr. Burton. So this was a judgment call that there was not
enough probable cause to check his bank records?
Mr. Bergin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Even though there were allegations in
publications and in letter form that he was taking bribes?
Mr. Bergin. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Burton. What in the world do you need for probable
cause? My goodness.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers, you can't answer anything. Are you
aware of any information that the task force and the FBI have
closed their investigation? Or are you aware that the Attorney
General is--they are just waiting for her to finally close this
case out?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Upon the concurrence of the Campaign
Contribution Task Force lead attorneys, the FBI has closed its
case on Mr. Parish.
Mr. Burton. So the FBI has closed its case, and I
understand that the task force has agreed with that; is that
correct?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. So it is only awaiting the Attorney General's
final determination, right?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I am not sure.
Mr. Burton. Trust me. It is very clear that the Attorney
General is holding this case open, and it has been pending for
some time, and now they are hiding behind 6(e) and will not let
the committee talk to you because of 6(e). If that does not
sound like an obstruction of information to the Congress and, I
believe, an obstruction of justice, I don't know what is.
Did you get any bank records?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Respectfully, I cannot speak to the
specific investigative steps that we may have taken during the
course of the joint investigation.
Mr. Burton. Because of 6(e)?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Because Janet Reno and the Justice Department
says it is 6(e), even though the case by the task force and the
FBI has been closed, and it is sent to the AG for the final
disposition?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. It is my understanding that the
Chief Judge's opinion extends to disclosure of any information.
Mr. Burton. I understand what you are saying. I wish the
American people could hear what is going on around here. The
Congress of the United States is being blocked by keeping cases
open and hiding behind 6(e) because of Judge Johnson's decision
and their interpretation of it, so we can't get information. I
have 121 people that have taken the fifth amendment or fled the
country, and many of them are hiding out in China.
Janet Reno must dislike me a lot, or she is working for
somebody that she should not be working for. This is terrible.
Mr. Schurman, you served as a regional security officer at
the Beijing Embassy, correct?
Mr. Schurman. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. As part of that job you were in charge of
determining whether any of the Embassy's officers were breaking
the law? You were supposed to look into that?
Mr. Schurman. Yes.
Mr. Burton. We know in April 1996 the Embassy commenced an
investigation of Charles Parish. Can you tell us how your
investigation started?
Mr. Schurman. I received a call from the Deputy Chief of
Mission to come to a meeting in his office. That basically
started the inquiry into Mr. Parish.
Mr. Burton. Is it not true that junior officers had been
complaining about Mr. Parish, people who were under his
control, and about him overstepping what decisions were made?
Mr. Schurman. I am not aware--that is a fairly broad
question. Had they complained to me about Mr. Parish; is that
what the question is, sir?
Mr. Burton. Yes.
Mr. Schurman. No.
Mr. Burton. Had they complained to anybody, to your
knowledge?
Mr. Schurman. I am not aware that they complained to
anybody about--I mean, there were certainly--I am aware that
there were complaints that Mr. Parish was easier than the other
visa officers in terms of providing visas, but that was not
necessarily a complaint of criminal activity.
Mr. Burton. But if we brought junior officers in here, we
would probably have some additional information, I am sure.
Did you ever hear any complaints about Mr. Parish before
April 1996?
Mr. Schurman. In terms of, he was easier to--getting a visa
from Mr. Parish was supposed to be easier than the other
officers.
Mr. Burton. Did you hear that Mr. Parish was more likely to
grant a visa to a young attractive woman than other candidates?
Mr. Schurman. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Did you see an article in a local Beijing
magazine about the Embassy's nonimmigrant visa section?
Mr. Schurman. No.
Mr. Burton. Did you see that it contained a statement that
it was easy to get a visa from Mr. Parish?
Mr. Schurman. I didn't see that article. I don't read
Chinese.
Mr. Burton. Have you heard of the article?
Mr. Schurman. Since then, yes.
Mr. Burton. You were aware of the article?
Mr. Schurman. Not at that time.
Mr. Burton. Were you aware of it when you started your
investigation?
Mr. Schurman. Not at the start of the investigation.
Mr. Burton. As the investigation progressed, were you aware
of it?
Mr. Schurman. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Why didn't you start an investigation of Mr.
Parish earlier based upon the information that you received
about his activities?
Mr. Schurman. Being easier in terms of giving visas is not
an illegal activity.
Mr. Burton. After the April 1996 meeting with Mr. Hallford
and the Embassy's junior officers, you were ordered to
investigate Mr. Parish; is that correct?
Mr. Schurman. After the meeting with Mr. Hallford and the
consul general, I prepared a telegram which I sent to
Diplomatic Security. Based upon that telegram, Diplomatic
Security opened a case. At that point, the official
investigation began.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Hallford was indicating that there should
be an investigation? That is why you sent the wire?
Mr. Schurman. Mr. Hallford--the primary purpose of the
meeting was to discuss management, internal controls, and some
of the ethics issues with Mr. Parish. After attending the
meeting, I felt that I should prepare my perceptions from the
meeting and send those to Diplomatic Security in a telegram.
Mr. Burton. What triggered your feeling like that?
Mr. Schurman. Because of the concerns about the ethical
conduct of Mr. Parish.
Mr. Burton. So they were discussed in that meeting?
Mr. Schurman. Yes.
Mr. Burton. After the April--now I want to talk about the
destruction of documents. One of the first things that you did
was seal Mr. Parish's office and change the locks.
Mr. Schurman. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. Why did you seal his office?
Mr. Schurman. To ensure that if there were pieces of
evidence in there, I would be able to get them and----
Mr. Burton. And they would not be destroyed?
Mr. Schurman. Or removed.
Mr. Burton. Destroyed or removed; is that correct? You were
protecting them because you didn't think that they should be
destroyed or removed?
Mr. Schurman. Headquarters directed me. Headquarters was
running the investigation, and they asked me.
Mr. Burton. If you seal an office, you are trying to
protect the evidence?
Mr. Schurman. Possibilities of evidence, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. So you want to make sure that no documents or
evidence is destroyed; is that correct?
Mr. Schurman. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. Did you have an opportunity to review what Mr.
Parish had in his office?
Mr. Schurman. Yes, I did.
Mr. Burton. Did he have a lot of documents?
Mr. Schurman. Yes, there were a lot of documents in the
office.
Mr. Burton. How many?
Mr. Schurman. Thousands.
Mr. Burton. Thousands, OK. In fact he had so many documents
in the office that you sent a cable to Diplomatic Security in
Washington and asked them to send someone to help you review
the material, right?
Mr. Schurman. Yes.
Mr. Burton. What was DS's response to your request for
help?
Mr. Schurman. They asked me for specific pieces of
information, which I provided them.
Mr. Burton. Did they send help?
Mr. Schurman. No.
Mr. Burton. Why not?
Mr. Schurman. I can't answer that.
Mr. Burton. Given that you had to do this investigation by
yourself, were you able to review all of that material?
Mr. Schurman. I spent probably in excess of 50 hours going
through all of the material in the office.
Mr. Burton. You went through every document?
Mr. Schurman. At least on a cursory review, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Did you look at them in any detail or did you
just kind of shuffle through them?
Mr. Schurman. Diplomatic Security gave me guidelines for
looking through the material in the office, and that is
basically what I did. I used those guidelines.
Mr. Burton. Were you able to take an inventory of all of
the materials?
Mr. Schurman. No.
Mr. Burton. It is my understanding that you destroyed most
of the materials in Parish's offices and saved only several
stacks of documents out of a whole room of documents. Why did
you do that?
Mr. Schurman. I did not destroy any document in the office.
After going through all of the documents in the office, I had
it sealed for about a month. The consulate wanted the office
back because it is a very cramped office area; they really
needed the space.
I had basically felt that I had been through everything in
the office and found anything that was--could have been obvious
evidence; and therefore, I turned it back over to the
consulate. They cleaned out the office themselves. I did not
destroy any documents.
Mr. Burton. What do they do with the documents, do you
know?
Mr. Schurman. Any of the documents that were official, I
understand they were going to file them. Anything else that
they saw as unnecessary, they disposed of it in whatever way
they wanted to.
Mr. Burton. It is my understanding, when you talked to our
staff, you told them you had not looked at all of the
documents--when you talked to our staff prior to this hearing.
Mr. Schurman. There were many files. Some of the files were
basically brochures on companies. I reviewed the brochures and
to the extent that I believed they were promotional information
on Chinese companies. I didn't go through those documents in
detail.
Mr. Burton. Of course, Mr. Schurman, you know that you are
under oath?
Mr. Schurman. I understand.
Mr. Burton. You told our staff you did not look at all of
the documents. Did you look at all of the documents?
Mr. Schurman. I looked at all of the documents, but not
every detail of each document.
Mr. Burton. So you did a cursory look?
Mr. Schurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Now, when the documents were turned over to the
Embassy, did you say anything to them that the documents should
be kept secure because this was still an open investigation?
Mr. Schurman. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. So what happened to the documents?
Mr. Schurman. They went into the normal files at the
consulate.
Mr. Burton. Are they still there?
Mr. Schurman. It was the policy of the consulate to destroy
visa application records after 1 year.
Mr. Burton. Do you know if they were destroyed?
Mr. Schurman. I don't know.
Mr. Burton. So they may still be there?
Mr. Schurman. I have no information on that.
Mr. Burton. Do you think that maybe those should have been
secured because the investigation was ongoing and there might
have been something in there that was relevant to the
investigation? I mean, you are making this judgment call all by
yourself, and there were publications that said he was taking
bribes and there were letters that said he was taking bribes.
Didn't you tell anybody that these documents ought to be
kept in a storeroom someplace for further review?
Mr. Schurman. I did not.
Mr. Burton. Why?
Mr. Schurman. I felt I had looked through the information.
Mr. Burton. You just said you did a cursory look. If you
just did that, why in the world would you not say I have not
had time to go into these in detail, they ought to be stored
because this investigation is not closed? Why?
Mr. Bergin. As I mentioned in my statement, the focus of
the investigation was on these two Chinese nationals, one, Ms.
Zou----
Mr. Burton. Wait a minute. You are saying that the focus of
the investigation was on these two Chinese nationals, but the
investigation was into Mr. Parish, and these documents were in
Mr. Parish's office and they contained a lot of information
regarding visas; and there was some question about whether or
not he was taking bribes. Why would you allow these documents
to be disposed of?
Mr. Bergin. The instruction from Washington to Mr. Schurman
was to go through this information and locate that information
which Mr. Parish had in his office which was relevant to the
relationships that he had with these two Chinese nationals.
Mr. Burton. Why was it limited to just those two?
Mr. Bergin. Sir, in my view, with 20/20 hindsight, this was
not a model investigation.
Mr. Burton. You have got a guy who is accused of
wrongdoing. There is an investigation going on. There have been
allegations about this in Chinese publications. It is pretty
well known. There is a letter from Mr. Chen that says it is
going on. It is no secret he had people who were subordinates
who said there was something funny going on, and an
investigation has started and you limit it to two people. I
don't understand that.
Mr. Bergin. We were reacting to the allegations stemming
from the meeting that Mr. Schurman attended with Mr. Parish and
the DCM regarding the----
Mr. Burton. Two people. I understand it was regarding two
people, but if he had hundreds and thousands of files in his
office, wouldn't it be logical that there might be more? And if
there were more, you should keep those files so they could be
reviewed thoroughly before you closed that investigation?
Mr. Bergin. Mr. Chairman, we did some things right and we
could have done a lot better on other things.
Mr. Burton. Who ordered from Washington that this be
limited to those two individuals?
Mr. Bergin. This was a judgment made by special agents
within the Visa Fraud Branch.
Mr. Burton. Who were the special agents who made this
judgment?
Mr. Bergin. Their names, sir?
Mr. Burton. Yes. Who were they?
Mr. Bergin. I would have to check, and I will get back with
you.
Mr. Burton. We would like that for the record.
Mr. Bergin. The Visa Fraud Branch of Diplomatic Security
today has 14 agents assigned to it. They have global
responsibilities. In the case of Mr. Parish, in 1996, because
of resources, there was one agent, one special agent assigned
to all East Asia and Pacific.
Mr. Burton. I don't want to get into that. I understand
that they had a very heavy workload and it was very difficult.
Mr. Bergin. If I can just put it in some context.
Mr. Burton. You can, but make it limited.
Mr. Bergin. This agent was responsible for a case in Seoul
where he was TDY for 6 weeks. After that, he was assigned to
the Olympics, and he was involved in that.
So what I am suggesting, sir, he was involved in a number
of activities. Therefore, in terms of prioritizing of the case,
it was decided to narrow the focus to Mr. Parish's
relationships with these two Chinese nationals.
Mr. Burton. Well, in those stacks of documents which were
in Mr. Parish's office, there was a credenza that was full of
files regarding Chinese companies and also an extensive set of
visa applications in his office. Those were probably destroyed
as well.
Now if there was some evidence that he had been involved
with two companies, and there were brochures and visa
applications from other companies, why would you limit the
investigation to those two and just shut the case down and send
the boxes back to the Embassy?
Mr. Schurman. In addition to removing the material
specifically requested by DS, I went through and pulled out
everything that might have some interest, and I retrieved those
and put those in a box in my office.
At that point I felt I had gone through everything in
sufficient detail. And as I say, I put a number of hours in
there myself. My normal duties were basically taking up my full
day, and I was spending nights and weekends doing this.
Mr. Burton. Was it normal for an employee who worked in
Beijing to have a bank account in Hong Kong?
Mr. Schurman. Hong Kong was the medical evacuation point.
It was the nearest sort of First World city to Beijing. So I
know that a lot of members from the Embassy went down there on
a regular basis. I don't know----
Mr. Burton. When you went through the records, you found a
bank account of Mr. Parish's in Hong Kong. You did not pursue
that at all?
Mr. Schurman. I looked at the paper itself. It looked like
it was an insignificant amount of money, and therefore, I
decided it was not anything that was out of the ordinary for
somebody to have an account down there.
Mr. Burton. I know it was an insignificant amount of money,
but how did you know that he might not have had $1 million in
there the week before?
Mr. Schurman. I didn't know that.
Mr. Burton. But you put it in the box and it was destroyed,
and so we don't have that bank account number. Here is a man
who is accused of taking bribes, and all of the evidence that
might be there is gone.
In retrospect, do you think that the statement of Mr.
Parish's Hong Kong bank account might have been useful to see
what kind of balances there might have been in there from time
to time?
Mr. Schurman. Possibly.
Mr. Burton. There is another category of documents that
have been destroyed, and the absence of these documents has
harmed the committee's investigation. These are the Embassy's
copies of visa applications processed by Mr. Parish.
The committee, along with the Inspector General's Office,
asked the State Department to provide a list of all the visas
approved by Mr. Parish. It turns out we cannot be provided with
this list because all of the visa applications were destroyed
pursuant to an Embassy policy of destroying old files after a
year.
That was the policy, to destroy the old files after 1 year?
Mr. Schurman. That is my understanding.
Mr. Burton. So if there was bribery that took place, and
the person got away with it for a year, the evidence would have
been destroyed in due course. It would have just been destroyed
as a matter of regular actions of the Embassy, correct?
Mr. Schurman. Yes. I am not involved with the consulate's
normal policy and their normal----
Mr. Burton. Mr. Schurman, at the time the investigation was
going on, didn't it occur to you to save the visa applications
that he had processed? You are investigating a man for possible
bribery, and you have visa applications and there are
applications on record during that year that have been
processed. Did it not occur to you to maybe save those visa
applications just in case there might have been a bribe paid on
one of those during that current year?
Mr. Schurman. I saved all of the material that DS asked me
to save, and then I saved a bunch of additional material.
The consulate that year processed something in the
neighborhood of 125,000 visa applications. So I would assume
that Mr. Parish had a reasonable percentage of those.
Mr. Burton. I know, but don't they keep track of who
approved visas for record purposes? They have some record that
Mr. Parish or somebody approved it, don't they?
Mr. Schurman. The OF-156 form, which is the application
form, has a block on it for the individual, the officer who
either approves or disapproves it.
Mr. Burton. Did you not think maybe it would be advisable
to pick out all of them for that current year, that had not yet
been destroyed, with Mr. Parish's name on it--especially if a
subordinate had maybe disapproved it, and he approved it later
for some reason--and keep those with records so they could be
reviewed when the case was open?
Mr. Schurman. Diplomatic Security was basically running the
case. If they had asked me to do that, I would have. I probably
would have asked for the help to do it. That would have been a
very significant undertaking.
Mr. Burton. To find the ones with his name on?
Mr. Schurman. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Don't they have a computer that lists which
ones were approved by each agent?
Mr. Schurman. There were 125,000 processed that year. I
would assume that Parish had 30,000 of those, if not more.
Mr. Burton. So why would it have been so difficult to have
those spit out and put into a box?
Ms. Cohen. Many of the committee members, especially Mr.
Horn, are familiar with the computer capabilities in the past
of the State Department; and there would have been no
capability to spit out this kind of information. We have Mary
Ryan here, who can address this in detail, but basically the
State Department, with bipartisan support, has been investing
in computer systems for the last 2 to 3 years.
Mr. Burton. Let me ask you this. If you have a corrupt
employee who is handling the visas and taking money, what you
are telling me if they get away with it for a year, they have
gotten away with it. And these visas are worth $10- to $20,000
on the street. So if a person is pretty slick and they can get
away with it for a year and the documents are destroyed, and
they are sitting with a bank account in Hong Kong that nobody
is checking on, is that what you are telling me, no check and
balance?
Ms. Cohen. I am not saying that. All cases of visa
malfeasance are taken very seriously. There has been increased
training both for consular officers and for DS officers in the
last couple of years. In addition, people have access to a line
to the Inspector General to report these things themselves and
we followup directly.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Schurman, did you interview the junior
officers in the nonimmigrant visa section as part of your
investigation?
Mr. Schurman. I did not formally interview anyone.
Mr. Burton. Nobody?
Mr. Schurman. Not formally.
Mr. Burton. Did you talk to anybody?
Mr. Schurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. What did they say?
Mr. Schurman. They basically had the same--told me the same
things that they had told Scott Hallford.
Mr. Burton. That was?
Mr. Schurman. There were concerns that he was overriding
some of the visas.
Mr. Burton. Give me a few examples. Did they say it was
because of a woman? Because she was pretty? Was it because of
money?
Mr. Schurman. As I remember it, as you said, there were
complaints that he would more likely give a visa to a young
pretty woman than someone else.
Mr. Burton. OK. Did anybody ever say anything about money,
that there with a suspicion that he took money for visas?
Mr. Schurman. No.
Mr. Burton. Nobody ever said that?
Mr. Schurman. The visa officers, I do not recall them
making that statement.
Mr. Burton. When you were doing the investigation, did
anybody say that there was a suspicion that he took money for
visas?
Mr. Schurman. The consul general and the other gentleman
who was acting consul general, Dan Piccuta, both stated that
they did not believe that he was taking money for visas.
Mr. Burton. Were you aware that he took his secretary and
another Chinese woman to Las Vegas and California, were you
aware that a maid went into his room and said she saw $10,000
lying on the bed, and that he was there at the expense of a
company?
Do you know who paid for that room? Is it legal for a
company to pay for those rooms? Isn't there a limitation on how
much a Foreign Service Officer can take from a company?
Mr. Schurman. The first part is--I was not aware of any of
the information in Las Vegas. I was aware that he went with his
secretary and another woman. That was reported in my first
telegram back to the Department. I was not aware--nothing was
reported----
Mr. Burton. Did you find out who paid for their
accommodations?
Mr. Schurman. I asked Mr. Parish in the first meeting, and
he said that he paid for his trip back there himself.
Mr. Burton. Did anybody check to see if it was being paid
for by one of the people who had been the beneficiaries of his
visas?
Mr. Schurman. I don't know if anybody checked or asked.
Mr. Burton. Did you ask him about whether he had violated
the Embassy's nonfraternization policy with Chinese?
Mr. Schurman. Yes, I did.
Mr. Burton. And what did he say?
Mr. Schurman. He did not answer that question.
Mr. Burton. You didn't pursue it? He just said that he
wouldn't answer it?
Mr. Schurman. I am not--he did not answer the question.
Mr. Burton. When you interviewed him, did you talk to him
about the gifts that he had received and the value of those
gifts that were in his office?
Mr. Schurman. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Were they all under $20?
Mr. Schurman. No.
Mr. Burton. Were they expensive?
Mr. Schurman. Some were.
Mr. Burton. How much?
Mr. Schurman. The one I recall, there was a pair of cuff
links from one of the local department stores, and it was in
excess of $200.
Mr. Burton. After the interview, you and Mr. Hallford sent
a cable back to Washington stating that you thought Mr. Parish
was not accepting money for services. How did you come to that
conclusion?
Mr. Schurman. Would you repeat that, please.
Mr. Burton. How did you come to the conclusion that Mr.
Parish wasn't getting money? You wired back to Washington
stating that you and Mr. Hallford thought that he was not
accepting bribes for visas.
Mr. Schurman. I don't recall stating that I thought that.
Mr. Burton. Was there a cable sent back? Who sent the
cable?
Mr. Schurman. I originated all of the telegrams regarding
the case from Beijing.
Mr. Burton. But you never searched his apartment or bank
records?
Mr. Schurman. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. I see that my time has expired.
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I listened to the chairman's questioning, it sounds like
an autopsy of the investigation that took place, and perhaps we
can learn, for the future, how to handle these kinds of
investigations better.
Is it your position, each of you, that you tried to do your
best, given the resources you had available, given the fact
that you had to make some prioritization of all other things
that you needed to do, but now that we look at it perhaps it
wasn't a perfect investigation? Is that what we are hearing
from all of you?
Mr. Bergin. Yes, sir. I would say both the agents in
Washington and Mr. Schurman acted completely in good faith.
Mr. Waxman. Let me ask you this. Were any punches pulled?
Was there any kind of sinister interference by anyone to try to
protect Mr. Parish, to try to hinder the investigation?
Mr. Bergin. From my reading of the record of the case,
absolutely none.
Mr. Waxman. Let me ask all of the other witnesses. Do any
of you have any evidence or can you think of any kind of reason
that more wasn't done in pursuing this investigation because of
anything other than lack of resources?
Mr. Schurman. No one attempted to interfere with my
investigation. My impression was that many of the officers
would have liked me to have found evidence, and if they had
some, they would have presented it.
You are correct, there was no interference at all with the
investigation.
Mr. Waxman. In hindsight we can talk--yes.
Ms. Cohen. I wasn't there at the time, but I have had the
opportunity to look at this, and to remind everyone, this has
now been investigated three times: first by Mr. Schurman in DS,
then by the IG, and now by the FBI. To the best of my
knowledge, no one has found any criminal activity, and I think
the chairman alluded to that.
Obviously, we agree in hindsight that more could have been
done, and perhaps more done more carefully. But we are in the
process of addressing that.
We do have new leadership in DS, Peter Bergin. In addition,
we have for the first time a security professional as the
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.
Mr. Waxman. I think the best thing that we can do now is
learn for the future.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Mr. Waxman, as the Under Secretary
just mentioned, the Office of Inspector General conducted its
investigation quite separate from that of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and subsequent to the investigation by
Diplomatic Security. And we pursued all viable leads and
determined, in consultation with the Justice Department and the
FBI, that there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations
that we were pursuing.
Mr. Waxman. I know that. Did you find any evidence of
anybody interfering with the investigation so that all of the
evidence wouldn't come forward and that Mr. Parish was going to
be protected?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can say that no one interfered
with the course of our investigation.
Mr. Waxman. That is just not on the radar screen of anyone
who reviewed this investigation; is that correct?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I have not had any experience with
interference with any investigation that we have conducted.
Mr. Waxman. You would think that the Diplomatic Security
Service had nothing to do, but to devote all of its resources
to investigating Charles Parish.
Mr. Schurman and Mr. Bergin, let me see what overseas
diplomatic service personnel, and particularly a regional
security officer, might be responsible for doing. You manage
all of the programs to protect State Department's facilities;
isn't that right?
Mr. Bergin. Correct.
Mr. Waxman. That means managing the security force and
assessing threats by terrorists or others against the Embassy,
consulate, and other buildings?
Mr. Bergin. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Waxman. You are also responsible for protecting all of
the State Department personnel from criminal or terrorist
threats while they are abroad?
Mr. Bergin. That is correct.
Mr. Waxman. And you are responsible for safeguarding all of
the classified and sensitive information used by our diplomats
every day in their work?
Mr. Bergin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. And you are also responsible for conducting
investigations into all allegations of visa and passport fraud;
is that correct?
Mr. Bergin. That is correct.
Mr. Waxman. And you serve as the principal adviser to the
Ambassador on security matters; is that correct?
Mr. Bergin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. That is obviously a lot of ground to cover and
you have to make a lot of hard decisions as to allocating your
time and resources; isn't that a fair statement?
Mr. Bergin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. I am impressed to hear that for the whole world
we have 14 investigators who look at, what, diplomatic visa
fraud?
Mr. Bergin. We have 14 agents in our Visa Fraud Branch, and
their responsibility is global for every Embassy; and there are
200-plus Embassies and consulates around the world where visas
and passports are issued, not to include the----
Mr. Waxman. Is there only one for East Asia?
Mr. Bergin. Back in 1996, yes, that is correct.
Mr. Waxman. So it seems to me if you didn't have the
resources, it is unfair to criticize you for not making this
the highest priority. After all, we don't have any basis for
letting you appoint a special prosecutor on Mr. Parish the way
that we have special prosecutors sift through people's personal
life for every possible wrongdoing, from the President of the
United States to members of the Cabinet; and I hardly think an
accusation against a person means that person ought to be
investigated for every possible crime that he may have possibly
committed.
Mr. Bergin. Back in 1996, we had approximately 640 special
agents who were responsible on a worldwide basis for all of
those missions that we perform on behalf of the American
public.
Today we are approaching 980, thanks to the Congress,
thanks to Secretary Albright. In the aftermath of the East
African bombings, we have been given 200 special agents, and
their first mission is the protection of life. Protection of
the integrity of our passports and visas is a corollary
responsibility.
Mr. Waxman. I am pleased to hear that.
Now let's go back to this case, and now we are looking at
how this case should have been a higher priority than
everything else, and so there were more resources devoted to
it.
In this case, you received information that a midlevel
officer may have mismanaged his office and may have breached
the State Department's Code of Ethical Conduct.
Mr. Schurman, you conducted an investigation into Mr.
Parish's activities. Did you have unlimited time and resources
to do that job?
Mr. Schurman. No, I didn't.
Mr. Waxman. Do you think you and your superiors made
reasonable decisions about the amount of investigative
resources to put into this investigation?
Mr. Schurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. It wasn't just Mr. Schurman that was involved
in this inquiry. It was Ambassador Sasser and his Deputy Chief
of Mission, both of whom personally looked into the matter.
Ms. Cohen, would you say that our Embassy in China is one
of our more important posts in the world?
Ms. Cohen. It is critically important.
Mr. Waxman. In addition to worrying about personnel
matters, do the Ambassador and his DCM have to worry about a
host of other issues, some of which impact our foreign policy
interests?
Ms. Cohen. Absolutely.
Mr. Waxman. In addition to Mr. Parish, they were spending
time thinking about most favored nation status, which was
coming up for a vote, and thinking about the imminent transfer
of Hong Kong to China's control. They were probably thinking
about sanction decisions relating to China's sale of nuclear
technology to Pakistan. And they might have been thinking about
human rights issues, nonproliferation, global environmental
issues, tensions between China and Taiwan, tensions between
North and South Korea, and a whole host of issues which are
very important to the United States; isn't that correct?
Ms. Cohen. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. In light of everything going on in the United
States Embassy in Beijing, do you think that the State
Department acted too slowly or was derelict in its
responsibility in investigating Mr. Parish and resolving the
accusations made against him?
Ms. Cohen. I think the State Department acted very
promptly. Whether now, in hindsight, we need to tighten
procedures or tighten training, which we have done, to make
these kinds of investigations more thorough, we are looking at
that.
Mr. Waxman. These hearings that we are having today, or
this hearing today, arose out of Johnny Chung's testimony
before the committee in May. Mr. Chung made allegations that
some people told him information relating to Chinese attempts
to influence our elections. He also said that he had some
dealings with Mr. Parish. After hearing these allegations, our
committee began to investigate Mr. Parish to see if he was
connected with the Chinese plot to influence our elections.
Let me ask, are any of you aware of any evidence that the
Chinese Government tried to influence our elections through
Charles Parish?
Mr. Schurman. I am not.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I am not.
Mr. Bergin. I am not.
Ms. Cohen. I am not.
Mr. Waxman. The investigation did not even concern
violations of our campaign fundraising laws at all, did it,
that you conducted? In other words, did your investigations
involve campaign finance laws?
Mr. Schurman. No, mine did not.
Mr. Waxman. Did any of yours?
Mr. Bergin. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. The investigations by the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security at the State Department and by the Office of Inspector
General seem to have involved routine investigative decisions
by career employees such as, who do you interview and when do
you stop investigating; was everyone involved in the
investigation at the State Department a career employee rather
than a political appointee?
Mr. Schurman. To my knowledge.
Mr. Bergin. To my knowledge, yes, sir.
Ms. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Are any of you aware of any attempt by any
political appointee to stop or otherwise affect the
investigation of Mr. Parish?
Mr. Schurman. I am not.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I am not.
Mr. Bergin. I am not aware.
Ms. Cohen. I am not aware.
Mr. Waxman. It seems to me what we have at this hearing is
one particular case which may not be much of anything. It does
not have to do with a Chinese plot to influence our elections.
In fact, it does not appear to have anything to do with
political fundraising. It seems to be about a routine
investigation performed by the State Department and by its
Inspector General, and whether you did enough in investigating
what is a serious violation. If there were, in fact, bribes
being taken by Mr. Parish, or anybody that works at Embassies,
I would want it investigated, and it seems to me that you did
what you thought was appropriate.
Now I have a few questions for Ms. Williams-Bridgers about
the Inspector General's investigation. Do I understand that the
Office of Inspector General opened an investigation into Mr.
Parish's possible misconduct on January 22, 1998?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. And your agents conducted a number of
interviews in the course of the investigation?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I cannot speak about specific
investigative steps that we took during our Parish
investigation, but it is normal practice for us to conduct
numerous interviews.
Mr. Waxman. Did your office investigate jointly with the
FBI and the INS?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. We were engaged jointly with the
FBI.
Mr. Waxman. And your investigators joined with the FBI to
interview Johnny Chung; is that correct?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I cannot speak about any specific
interviews that we conducted, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Is it the case your office closed the
investigation on February 23, 1999, and concluded that ``No
evidence had been developed which substantiates criminal
conduct by Parish in this matter. Since all logical leads have
been completed with a negative result, no further investigative
activity appears warranted,''?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. Now the chairman has said that the Justice
Department has not officially closed its investigation, and he
is accusing the Justice Department about the motives of the
Justice Department in not concluding their investigation. He
says that he thinks that they don't want this committee to be
able to do its job. Have you heard of any evidence that points
to that conclusion?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. The FBI has officially closed their
investigation of Mr. Parish with the concurrence of the
Campaign Contribution Task Force lead attorneys on this case.
I am sorry, was----
Mr. Waxman. The FBI has closed its investigation and the
Justice Department still won't allow you to testify?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Because of their interpretation of
the Chief Judge's opinion, which would consider any and all
information collected during the course of the investigation as
being 6(e) protected, meaning I should not disclose any of that
information.
Mr. Waxman. If the Justice Department officially closed its
investigation, does it have discretion in any way to allow you,
even if the investigation were completed, to talk about 6(e)
materials?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. It is my understanding that the 6(e)
protection extends indefinitely beyond the closure of the case.
Mr. Waxman. What is the reason for that? What is the
rationale? I know that there is a court case that said that,
but what is the rationale for a judge not allowing Congress to
have grand jury information?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I am not in a position to answer
that, but if the Chair indulges me, I would call upon OIG
Counsel, Rick Reback, or we can provide that information for
the record.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Waxman has asked me a question that I am
not able to respond to accurately. But if I can call----
Mr. Burton. For the record, you are welcome to respond.
Mr. Waxman. Let me see if I can get the information another
way.
The Justice Department advised you not to discuss the
Parish matter because discussion could improperly disclose
evidence taken from the Federal grand jury. My understanding is
that these concerns aren't just the imaginings of the Justice
Department, but are founded on rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and a ruling by Judge Norma Holloway-
Johnson of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.
We have heard Chairman Burton accuse the Attorney General
of keeping a criminal case open on Mr. Parish just so the
Inspector General would be barred from discussing grand jury
material protected by rule 6(e). Rule 6(e) imposes a broad
blanket of secrecy which under these circumstances can only be
lifted by a court order and only then upon a strong showing of
particularized need and the court's careful balancing of
whether the interests served by disclosure will outweigh the
interests in secrecy. The protection given by rule 6(e) does
not end when a criminal investigation closes.
And so what we have here is a matter that is irrelevant for
purposes of whether the Justice Department's investigation of
Mr. Parish is open or closed; isn't that correct?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. The guidance provided by the Justice
Department attorneys reflected on their interpretation of the
Chief Judge's opinion and not on the existence of the
investigation.
Mr. Waxman. Well, we are committed to an oversight
jurisdiction over the State Department, Justice Department,
over the whole Government, and we want to be sure that our
Government is doing everything that it should be doing, and if
need be, we change the laws; if resources are needed, we
provide additional resources.
It seems so strange that we are now taking on a
congressional investigation of allegations against one man--
serious--but that have been investigated three times and led to
no criminal prosecution. And we bring him before a committee of
Congress where he asserts his constitutional right, which he
has an opportunity as an American citizen to do, and then you
are brought before us and criticized in retrospect on what it
appears that you have done properly, maybe not as completely
and not as perfectly as it could have been done, but you had
other things to do.
And so I guess the only thing that I can see of value in
this hearing is to see if you have any recommendations on how
future investigations should be conducted, given that we don't
want to tolerate any corruption or wrongdoing.
Do any of you want to respond now, or perhaps we can leave
the record open and have some further submissions to us? That
seems to me to be the value of this hearing when all is said
and done.
Ms. Cohen. I think that we all agree that is the value of
the hearing, and we welcome the hearing on that basis. We have
been evaluating our procedures. DS has been working with the
Inspector General, and we welcome the opportunity to submit for
the record the steps that we have taken and are taking and also
would be glad to hear any additional suggestions you all have.
Thank you very much.
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Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I would be glad to submit our
comments for the record.
Mr. Waxman. Do you know whether you need more resources to
do the job and can you tell us how much more money you will
need?
Ms. Cohen. I have said this in other forums.
This agency is strapped for resources on an operational
basis. I am not talking about foreign policy investment, but
the costs of operating around the world. We are certainly a
great superpower, yet on an operational basis, our Department
of State is underfunded.
Any of you who take a trip--and I know that some of you
have, in the Dominican Republic or Haiti or China and have seen
people waiting for visa services, know what I'm talking about.
China is a good example; people were storming the Embassy in
China and we only have a 10-foot setback. We are on record
looking for more resources, particularly for security
operations. We are very appreciative of the bipartisan support
that we got for the emergency security supplemental this
summer, but that is only a start in rebuilding the
infrastructure of this department.
Mr. Waxman. I think if Congress is going to call you in to
respond to the job that you have done, and then does not take
seriously the requests for additional resources so you can do
the job, I think that is somewhat hypocritical.
And none of us wants to see any kind of corruption go on in
our Embassies. We know that you have a lot of responsibilities,
sometimes including taking care of Congressmen when we travel
officially to meet with people. I think that is an appropriate
function for Members of Congress in doing our job, but
certainly it doesn't seem fair to ask you to do everything and
then not give you the resources to do what is important to be
done.
One last question: Do any of you think that we ought to
look into the idea of having an unlimited special prosecutor
investigate anybody who is accused of any offense, such as
those offenses that were alleged against Mr. Parish? Do you
think that makes sense?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers, you are a prosecutor.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. No, I am not an attorney.
Mr. Waxman. Are any of you prosecutors? I guess you are not
the right ones to ask.
Ms. Cohen. This is not in response to that question, but I
think in this context it is helpful to know that allegations of
visa fraud come up all the time. I think if you think about it,
perhaps even where you are, people will say--will advertise or
say that they can get visas because they know somebody. People
overseas say they can get visas because they know somebody. It
is a way for them to take advantage of something which is in
very short supply.
We do investigate all accusations that come to our
attention. We refer some to the IG. In addition, she gets words
of allegations through her own channels. So we take them very
seriously. But people like to portray themselves as connected
to the visa system.
Mr. Waxman. I would imagine that when you have somebody who
can make the decision whether you get a visa or not, that is an
important decision. And if somebody who has that kind of
discretion is corrupt, they can get bribes. That is why we need
a whole way to make sure that we are checking on people.
Mr. Bergin. Can I add something, Congressman? This
particular hearing focuses on a Foreign Service Officer who
allegedly made some bad decisions.
I had the very good fortune before taking this job of being
the RSO in India, and had the privilege of working with a
Foreign Service Officer, a consular officer by the name of
James Waller, who worked closely with us on a visa fraud case
in which a travel broker, using a foreign national employee of
that consulate in Bombay as an intermediary, tried to bribe Mr.
Waller to issue 31 visas for $130,000. It took a nanosecond for
him to report this bribe to the RSO in New Delhi. We acted
swiftly and meaningfully and were able to encourage this travel
broker to travel back to Galveston, TX, where she was
interviewed and apprehended and arrested.
In India, we filtered through hundreds of allegations of
visa fraud. These are very complex, complicated, time-consuming
investigations. In many cases, we cannot get to the threshold
that a crime was committed. Yes, there was an appearance of
improprieties. And we have a relationship with the Director
General of the Foreign Service to ensure that these
improprieties are dealt with from a personnel perspective.
Mr. Waxman. I would hope that you can do everything
possible to stop these improprieties from happening because it
is a serious matter; but I have to tell you, from the
perspective of a Member of Congress, in my time, I have had
people come forward with immigrants in my District and act as
if they can represent them to get me to do something that I
would ordinarily do for anybody that lives in my district, and
we try to make it clear that no one is to get compensation for
the work that we do in our office.
We had a situation once where the caseworker received a
gift from an immigrant family because they were so grateful and
they thought that is what they were supposed to do. You have to
be vigilant. Sometimes it is the culture where people think
that they are supposed to pay as a way of showing appreciation
or to get what they want, but this should not be tolerated by
our Embassies or consulates or by our congressional offices or
by the INS. The rules should be followed and apply to
everybody.
The counsel for Mr. Parish wanted to make a statement and
you properly ruled that he wouldn't be permitted to speak, but
I want to submit for the record his statement.
Mr. Burton. Without objection, so ordered.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2410.037
Mr. Waxman. Let me just ask any of you, is there anything
else that you want to add to the subject matter that is before
this committee today on this hearing that you haven't had a
chance to talk about?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. No.
Ms. Cohen. Well, at the risk of overstaying my opportunity
to talk, again, having been there only 2 years, the people who
apply to the Foreign Service, who get selected, who dedicate
themselves to this career are extraordinary. Everyone is
required to do 2 years overseas in consular duty, and they are
extraordinarily dedicated to serving both America and to
serving the communities in which they find themselves.
I think an example of that is the consular official--again
in China, which seems to figure large these days--who in the
midst of the attacks on the American Embassy left the Embassy
where she was, managed to get out with the records of Americans
who were applying for adoptions of Chinese children and were
waiting in hotels in China with these children, and processed
them even as the attacks on the Embassy continued.
So while there are allegations, and they all have to be
investigated, we have a very dedicated group of people joining
the Foreign Service.
Mr. Waxman. I think we all appreciate that and the chairman
made that comment, as well, in his opening statement. He knows
that most of our Foreign Service personnel all around the world
do a great deal of service to our country and we do appreciate
it.
We need to hear from you your recommendations on how we can
help them do their job better. And if there is a problem, help
you do the job of dealing with those problems and investigating
properly and prosecuting, if necessary, anybody who has acted
corruptly.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have been interested in the discussion so far. Let me try
to get a few things straight in my own mind.
Mr. Schurman, in the investigation of the office of Mr.
Parish, were the records all written in English or were there
also Chinese notations? Because we do have native personnel in
every Embassy in the world and not everybody can know the
language. What did you find on those records? Were the records
in English or were the records in Chinese, yes or no?
Mr. Schurman. The official records, the official
application, has both English and Chinese on it.
Mr. Horn. What you were looking for, what kind of records
did they have, were they all in English or Chinese or a mixture
thereof?
Mr. Schurman. Since I didn't speak Chinese, I would have to
say I was looking for anything in English.
Mr. Horn. Did anybody translate what was on the documents,
whether they are just notations or not, of Chinese? You can't
read Chinese characters?
Mr. Schurman. That is correct. No one came in.
Mr. Horn. So you couldn't look at the cards that were being
kept or the visa applications and--they were not all in
English; is that correct?
Mr. Schurman. That is correct.
Mr. Horn. Why didn't you get somebody that could read
Chinese to help you with that?
Well, it is just obvious. You are looking like a blind man
at the cards and you don't know what is there, and I don't see
how you can even do an investigation.
Mr. Bergin. Sir, if I may add, the official forms, the
156s, they are in English. Those are the official applications
for a visa.
Mr. Horn. And you feel that by going through those in just
the English part, you are going to find out whether Mr. Parish
has done what he has been accused of or not?
Well, Mr. Chairman--either you do or you don't. You are
telling me all you did was look at was the English part of the
record?
Mr. Schurman. I looked at both the official records and
other documents in that office. I would say there were numerous
documents.
Mr. Horn. What was the date that you looked into that
office, do you remember the date?
Mr. Schurman. Not specifically, but it was between--toward
the end of May 1996, to the end of June 1996.
Mr. Horn. Do you have available there exhibit CP-29, and if
we can put that on the screen. That is a memorandum from the
political officer at the Embassy in Beijing to the Deputy Chief
of Mission, the person who is acting in lieu of the Ambassador
often when the Ambassador is away on travel. Do you know at the
time who was the DCM for our Embassy there? It is redacted out
on my copy.
Let me just read the text of this. ``At a May 30 dinner in
Qingdao, hosted by the local foreign affairs office,'' that was
our people,
the political officer was told by Chinese officials, as
well as local Chinese businessman, that ``everyone knew'' that
it was ``very easy'' to get a nonimmigrant visa from the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing. The Chinese said if you anticipated that
you might have difficulty in obtaining a visa--for instance,
you were applying for a visa allowing you to work in the United
States, but you did not speak English--you simply took ``the
black official'' in the Embassy to dinner, gave him a gift and
you were guaranteed a visa.
The next paragraph,
Responding to a question, a Qingdao Foreign Affairs Office
representative said he had first learned of this ``procedure''
over a year ago when he was living in Los Angeles. He stated
that at that time he had met ``many'' obviously unqualified
Chinese people who, ``he was surprised to learn,'' had been
issued PRC passports. He commented that he was even more
amazed, however, that the U.S. Government had issued these
people visas. According to the official, it should have been
obvious that these people were not qualified for certain types
of visas which would normally go to trained business people or
scholars. He reportedly questioned a number of these people as
to how they were able to obtain U.S. visas and was told about
``the black official,'' at the consular section in the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing.
Now, did you see that memo at all?
Mr. Schurman. I don't recall this memo.
Mr. Horn. Did anybody here at the top end in Washington?
Did you ever see that, Mr. Bergin?
Mr. Bergin. This is the first time I have seen this, sir.
Mr. Horn. What I am waiting for, and I finally got a little
bit of it, enough for a little finger, where is the outrage by
the people in charge of the Department of State? I am outraged
and I don't need some Justice Department attorney or somebody
else telling me. If I had been there, that person would have
been out of there so fast that they wouldn't have known what
hit them.
Now, if you have allegations of $10,000 on beds in Las
Vegas and all of that nonsense, it seems to me that you move
fast and you get them out, whether they are stealing $10 or
$10,000.
Mr. Bergin. Yes. Congressman, this memo is dated June 5. I
believe that Charles Parish departed post May 30 or 31, about a
week in advance.
Mr. Horn. Well, here then the Embassy finally finds out
that they are the laughingstock of China by other Chinese who
openly tell our own Embassy personnel in Qingdao what is going
on.
Then it seems to me, Mr. Schurman, you have got to make
awful sure those records are kept somewhere, and it looks like
nobody did. And I realize it is face and all that bureaucratic
nonsense, but if you have got somebody that is demeaning the
United States and demeaning their office after they take an
oath and are a Foreign Service Officer--I assume Mr. Parish was
a Foreign Service Officer?
Mr. Schurman. That's correct.
Mr. Horn. OK. What rank was he as a Foreign Service
Officer? Does anybody know?
Mr. Gnehm. He's a 2.
Mr. Horn. He's a 2, OK. And he was sort of in that consular
phase all new Foreign Service Officers are assigned to or
what--or was that his permanent station?
Mr. Schurman. He was Chief of the Visa Section.
Mr. Gnehm. Sir, he was a consular officer within the terms
of the personnel system.
Mr. Horn. Well, you know, I look at you all, and I don't
see any outrage by it, and it just upsets me, I want to tell
you. I just wonder how much bureaucratic nonsense we can take
like this, and State doesn't seem to be worried about it.
Sure, you don't have enough people. Fine. You have enough
people to get a few people, and that is all you need to do in
order to tune up the organization. There ought to have been--
the 5 you had somewhere, or the 14, they ought to have
descended on that Embassy to help.
I don't understand--I don't think you were around then, Ms.
Cohen, but it just seems to me good management is dealing with
these things, and that is why we have an Inspector General who
can't talk now because of the judicial ruling, and that is why
we have the General Accounting Office and a number of things to
try to safeguard what people are sworn to do and uphold the
laws of this land.
So, anyhow, I guess I would ask--none of you saw this memo,
so I guess no outrage was from you, but you did know a number
of things and allegations that were going on besides this memo.
Are there any memos you are aware of about this time?
Mr. Gnehm. Mr. Congressman, I would like to express my
outrage.
Mr. Horn. Yes.
Mr. Gnehm. I would like you to hear it from me, and I would
like to have the chairman----
Mr. Horn. Yes.
Mr. Gnehm. I work every day of my life. I have been 31
years in the Foreign Service. I happen, thanks to the Secretary
and the President and the Senate, to be Director General of the
Foreign Service. I consider it my job, amongst many other
things, to see that these kinds of things are dealt with.
In this particular case, what I would say to you is, it
isn't always--and this is I think the point you all were trying
to make earlier--it doesn't have to be criminal to still be
bad. In fact, our ethics regulations are quite clear about
that, that perceptions are critically important in the kind of
work we do as public servants. Unfortunately, I think, as the
Under Secretary said, we don't have sufficient people. The
numbers the Inspector General gave you----
Mr. Horn. I understand that, and I think you ought to get
at that point in the record what resources you have asked for,
where has it been chopped, either at the Secretary, at OMB, the
President, Congress, wherever, let us get it in the record.
Mr. Gnehm. I wanted to respond particularly to the point
that there is a mechanism that a Chief of Mission has to remove
an officer that is not performing or is creating a problem,
particularly even a perceptual, public problem, and he
exercised that in this case.
Mr. Horn. Yes. This Deputy Chief of Mission at least knew
about it around June 5th, might have known a bit earlier.
Well, let me move on here because time is limited.
Diplomatic Security began its investigation of Mr. Parish
about the same time, as I noted, as this memo, and then Mr.
Schurman informed the committee that when he was starting his
investigation he requested help from Diplomatic Security to
conduct his investigation. He was told that DS refused to send
anyone to Beijing. Why did DS refuse to assist him in the
investigation?
Mr. Bergin. That's a very fair question. I think sir, there
were judgments made that the information that Diplomatic
Security in Washington needed could be obtained by the RSO
there with the assistance of the assistant RSO. Given that,
they would make a determination to provide Don Schurman
additional support if needed beyond that. They believed at the
time that the RSO and his assistant could carry out these
functions, and that they would later be able to re-evaluate the
need for augmentation for Don.
Mr. Horn. Well, let me ask you, is it accurate to say that
your investigation focused on a company called Kwan Hau
International and several related companies in New York and
whether they were legitimate sponsors of visa applications?
Mr. Bergin. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. OK. Did Diplomatic Security investigate the
allegations relating to whether Mr. Parish had received
gratuities from, do we pronounce it COFCO or BNU?
Mr. Bergin. COFCO. I'm not aware of those companies, sir,
no. The only two companies that I'm aware of, Congressman, are
Bright City International and Guang Hua.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired. We will give
you more time, but let me just followup on that.
It is my understanding that there were 3 or 4 weeks in a
row that Mr. Parish was in the United States in Las Vegas, Los
Angeles, I think Texas and some other places, and his expenses
were paid by COFCO. From what I have heard today, nobody has
mentioned that. We are talking about thousands and thousands of
dollars of expenses paid. He had two women with him, one his
girlfriend and one his secretary. We don't know who paid their
expenses. He said he paid his own travel expenses.
I don't know that anybody has checked that out. Has anyone
checked that out, to see if he paid? Did he have receipts for
that? Did you check to find out if he paid his own way or did
COFCO pay that? Because flying from the Orient to all these
places, staying at posh places, and allegedly $10,000 on the
bed is a pretty good chunk of money. It seems to me that should
have been an integral part of the investigation.
Let me now yield to Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
identify with the remarks of Mr. Horn, who expressed his
outrage, and I am delighted that raised a response anyway.
I understand there are limited resources, but the problem
with limited resources is that you are unable to investigate
everything. In this case, you zeroed in on someone who had very
serious allegations, and generally you are able to focus
resources at that particular point.
So I have been a Federal prosecutor. I know how to deal
with limited resources. I know that there are only certain
cases you can investigate. But when you zero in, you finish the
job, and you do it right, particularly whenever there are such
serious allegations. So I know some of you weren't even around
then, but this is very, very disturbing whenever you see so
many people who are seeking visas and the fairness of that
process, particularly whenever you are dealing with our
American citizens that are administrating that process.
Now, Ms. Bridgers, you indicated in your testimony that you
submitted to the Department of Justice an advance copy of your
testimony in which they objected to the testimony because,
under their impression of Judge Johnson's decision, it violated
rule 6(e). Is that something you always do, is submit your
testimony before a committee of the Department of Justice?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. No, it's not routine, but in this
case, because it was a joint investigation, we thought it
prudent to share our testimony with our partners.
Mr. Hutchinson. So it was not required?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. It's not required, but actually,
under the IG community standards of conducting our work, it is
prudent that we share our testimony with all parties that might
be affected by public disclosure.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, whenever they objected, did you
consider going to Judge Johnson or asking the Department of
Justice to go to Judge Johnson to get a release from 6(e)?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. In fact, we do intend to pursue
further clarification of the interpretation by the Department
of Justice, but time certainly did not permit it for this
hearing, given that my conversation with Justice attorneys was
at 12 noon yesterday.
Mr. Hutchinson. So it is your intention to pursue a release
from 6(e) so that you can provide your testimony to us?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. It's my intention to pursue
clarification of the interpretation of the Chief Judge's
opinion.
Mr. Hutchinson. How are you going to do that?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I will be working with my counsel
and the Department of Justice and the Chief Judge to pursue an
appropriate course of action.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, let me just say that I think that is
an extraordinarily broad interpretation of rule 6(e). That is
not appropriate, that is not the intent of rule 6(e), and I
think that whenever you are looking at testimony that would be
totally appropriate before this body, I think it should be re-
examined.
I think that you can re-examine the opinion. I think you
can testify without any problem of violating rule 6(e). But,
second, if you did reach that conclusion, you need to go back
to Judge Johnson and get a release from it because that is an
extraordinary implementation of rule 6(e) that hampers our
legitimate work that we are doing.
Now, I want to understand, your agency, OIG, you have
administration subpoena power, do you not?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes, we do, sir, via an IG subpoena.
Mr. Hutchinson. And so you don't have to go to a Federal
grand jury in order to issue a subpoena.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That is correct, but in this
instance, since the Department of Justice was the lead, we were
following their instruction and guidance, and it was being
conducted under the Campaign Contribution Task Force. We
adhered to their guidance in this case. And, in fact, sir, I
might add that none of the information that our agents
collected was pursuant to grand jury subpoenas. None of the
interviews that my agents conducted alone were conducted under
grand jury subpoena.
Mr. Hutchinson. You have a responsibility here, and you
know, if you are going to share your work and decisionmaking
with another agency you are, in essence, giving over to the
Department of Justice all control that you have. And whenever
you are dealing with a State Department employee that needs to
be investigated--you know, this is troublesome to me. And, you
know, I respect in many areas the Department of Justice, the
work that they are doing, but I think they are flat wrong on
some things, and in this case it doesn't look good.
Now, you have got independent subpoena power, and all the
subpoenas you issued were not issued pursuant to a grand jury
subpoena. It looks to me like you should have severed that
investigation so it wouldn't hamper you and you can go ahead
and pursue it.
Now, when did you become aware of the allegations of Johnny
Chung?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. The allegations that we first became
aware of concerned Mr. Parish, and those allegations were
brought to our attention by the inspectors in the Office of
Inspector General that were conducting a routine management
inspection in the fall of 1997.
Mr. Hutchinson. Fall of 1997 you became aware of Johnny
Chung's allegation in reference to Mr. Parish?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. No, sir. We became aware of the
allegations concerning Mr. Parish. The allegations concerning
Mr. Chung were part of the larger investigation that I am not
in a position to speak about.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, is there any reason you cannot at
this particular point in time conduct an independent IG
investigation of the allegations that have been made against
Mr. Parish?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. We have conducted such an
investigation.
Mr. Hutchinson. And you have determined there is not any
evidence of criminal wrongdoing?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. We closed our case because we found
there was no evidence of wrongdoing as alleged.
Mr. Hutchinson. And that includes the allegations of Mr.
Chung?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. We did not investigate allegations
against Mr. Chung.
Mr. Hutchinson. I am not saying against Mr. Chung, the
allegations that Mr. Chung made in reference to Mr. Parish.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I cannot speak about the specific
allegations that we investigated. I cannot provide you the
details on the specific allegations that we investigated
because that is what could be protected by rule 6(e).
Mr. Hutchinson. Let me make it clear that I don't want to
prejudge any case, and I am not here to say that Mr. Parish
committed any criminal acts. I wouldn't want to do that. I
think everybody is entitled to a fair investigation.
But I did sit here and hear the testimony of Mr. Chung;
and, as a former Federal prosecutor, I believe there is
credible evidence of wrongdoing that has to be investigated.
And, you know, for you to shut down an investigation and say
there is not any sufficient evidence of wrongdoing that needs
to be pursued, particularly even in an administrative
standpoint, is amazing to me.
Now, if you eliminate the criminal wrongdoing, though, and
just look at it from an administrative standpoint--because the
IG has that responsibility as well, do you not?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Hutchinson. And so you made the determination there is
not any criminal wrongdoing. Have you made a determination
there is not any basis for administrative action?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. There was no basis for us to pursue
an administrative investigation against Mr. Parish because he
retired within 4 months of the start of our investigation.
Mr. Hutchinson. Which again makes no sense to me. This is
something of public interest, it is a matter of integrity, it
is a matter of all the other employees that work for the
Department of State, and I think that, whether he is retired or
not, you have a responsibility to get to the bottom of them and
make a determination.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. There is no avenue for us to provide
a referral to the Department for them to take administrative
action once a person terminates their employment from the
Department of State. The only reason that we could pursue any
allegations of wrongdoing against Mr. Parish is if they were
criminal in nature.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, that is an easy way out then.
OK. My time has expired.
Mr. Burton. If you want more time for questioning, we will
get back to you in just a minute.
You didn't investigate--you can't tell whether you
investigated any of the allegations made by Mr. Chung.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Burton. And you can't tell us whether or not you
investigated COFCO paying for all of his expenses when he came
back to the United States with those two ladies?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. You can't even tell us if you looked into that?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I cannot.
Mr. Burton. God, I hope everybody in the country is
watching this. You have got the Congress of the United States
trying to find out if somebody was giving visas to people who
may have been involved in illegal campaign contributions or
worse, and you can't tell the Congress of the United States
anything about it, not because of grand jury material--because
this wasn't done by a grand jury, was it? None of this--these
were all your subpoenas and your investigation?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. We did not issue any subpoenas in
this instance, but, under Justice's interpretation, the
information that we collected----
Mr. Burton. I know, but the point is that there really was
no grand jury involved.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. There were grand jury subpoenas--
excuse me. There was a grand jury impaneled under the campaign
task force; and, therefore, that reaches into all information
collected in the course of this joint investigation.
Mr. Burton. But the investigation that you conducted had
nothing to do with that grand jury.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. The interviews conducted by our
agents in our investigation were not subject to grand jury
subpoena, that's correct.
Mr. Burton. And so when you contacted the grand jury or
when you contacted the Justice Department, you expanded,
actually, those that were involved in your investigation
because you really didn't have to contact the Justice
Department, did you?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes.
Mr. Burton. You did? Why did you have to contact the
Justice Department?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. We are obliged by law to make early
consultation and coordination with the Department of Justice
whenever we are investigating allegations of criminal
wrongdoing, and we do that routinely on every case.
Mr. Burton. And so, once you did that, then Justice said,
well, this falls under the broad interpretation of 6(e)?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. No. Once we did--once we did that,
it fell within the Campaign Contribution Task Force, and then
later, during the course of the investigation by FBI, a grand
jury was impaneled.
Mr. Burton. If the case were closed by Justice, the part of
your investigation that had nothing to do with the grand jury,
we could have?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I wish that were the case, but the
FBI case is closed. Our case is closed and--and was closed as
of February 1999, and the Justice Department told me yesterday
that they still considered information that we collected as
being potentially subject to 6(e).
Mr. Burton. I think that we need to write a letter to Judge
Johnson asking for a clarification of her interpretation of
6(e), because the Justice Department has made this so broad
that they can obstruct anything Congress does. There is
absolutely nothing we can do if Janet Reno says it is covered
by grand jury or by 6(e). I mean, we have got to get an
interpretation out of the judge some way to make sure that we
have access. We have had 121 people take the fifth amendment or
flee the country, Congress is impotent, we are impotent right
now to do our job, and we represent the people of the United
States. This has never been done in the history of the country
that I know of.
Let me ask you a question. This is to Ms. Cohen. When Mr.
Parish was sent back to Washington, as your staff has stated,
he was under criminal investigation, correct?
Ms. Cohen. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Yet he was immediately put into a very
sensitive position involving visas for Iran and Iraq. Why?
Ms. Cohen. I really would like to have the opportunity to
clarify that, because I think specific knowledge of what he was
doing would help you understand the procedure that is followed
when someone is brought back. So I would like Mary Ryan to
answer that question since he was in her section.
Ms. Ryan. In the first place, I should say that the Bureau
of Consular Affairs was not aware that he was under
investigation for criminal activities. He had a full security
clearance when he came to us.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me for interrupting. A man is coming
back from a post in China, he is under criminal investigation,
and you didn't know about it, and therefore, he was put in this
position?
Ms. Ryan. He had a--he had a full security clearance.
Mr. Burton. Why were you not informed that he was under
criminal investigation?
Ms. Ryan. I believe it was to protect his rights.
Mr. Burton. And so because you were protecting his rights
or his rights were being protected, he was put into another
position regarding visas for Iran and Iraq in the office in
Washington?
Ms. Ryan. He was put into the visa office. We had a
congressional mandate to--we had to request--all of our posts
overseas had to request advisory opinions of the visa office on
every Iranian male over the age of 18.
Mr. Burton. And he was making these advisory opinion
decisions?
Ms. Ryan. He was canvassing the community who had an
interest in these cases and answering the post. He had no
direct involvement with the visa applicant. He had no--he had
no way of doing--he had no discretion.
Mr. Burton. Let me just followup on that. If he was
canvassing people, what was he doing when he was canvassing
people?
Ms. Ryan. He was asking the FBI, he was asking other
agencies if they had any derogatory information on the man
whose name was in the cable. The community would come back and
say yes or no, and then he would answer the post and say we
have derogatory information or we do not have derogatory
information.
All the incoming cables went to all the agencies, and all
of the responses went to all of the agencies, so it was totally
transparent. Mr. Parish had no control whatsoever. He had no
way of doing anything wrong, of giving an opinion that was not
the opinion of the community.
Mr. Burton. It just seems incredible to me that a man that
is under criminal investigation is put in a position where he
is perusing and checking with other agencies about criminal
wrongdoing or possible criminal wrongdoing of people who are
applying for visas and then giving a recommendation on that. It
just boggles my mind.
Ms. Ryan. He wasn't giving a recommendation, Mr. Chairman.
He was giving--he was giving the answer from the communities,
the various agencies who had an interest in these cases, but he
was not giving a recommendation.
Mr. Burton. He was compiling the information.
Ms. Ryan. He was compiling the information from the
agencies and telling the post what those agencies said.
Mr. Burton. Whether or not these people may have been
involved in some nefarious activity?
Ms. Ryan. That's right. Based on information that he got
from those agencies.
Mr. Burton. And he was under criminal investigation, and
you didn't know about it?
Ms. Ryan. I did not know he was under criminal
investigation.
Mr. Burton. I am going to yield to my counsel now. I don't
think there is going to be any objection.
Mr. Wilson. I apologize, I did not catch your name at the
beginning.
Ms. Ryan. Ryan.
Mr. Wilson. Ms. Ryan, if I could just followup on that, you
mentioned that there was no way that Mr. Parish could do
anything wrong in the post that he was assigned once he came
back to Washington. Did he have a security clearance?
Ms. Ryan. He had a full security clearance.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Is it not possible that he could have done
something wrong by misusing government information?
Ms. Ryan. That's total speculation. I would not be able to
speculate on that.
Mr. Wilson. My concern following up on that is you
mentioned there was no way he could do anything wrong.
Ms. Ryan. There was no way he could do anything wrong in
responding to those inquiries that came from the field on
Iranian visa cases.
Mr. Wilson. But he had come back under a cloud of other
ethical matters involving taking gratuities or bribes for
visas. Would it not be possible that there could be some
possibility of doing something wrong?
Ms. Ryan. It's too hypothetical for me, sir. I can't answer
you.
Mr. Wilson. I'd like to followup on one thing.
If we could take a document, CP-1, please, and put that up
on the screen, and if everybody could take a look at that in
their documents. It's a document from a fundraiser held here in
the United States. It's the very first document in the package.
And if you look down in the second column of names, the bottom
three names are Mr. Charles Parish, Ms. Fan Zhang, and Ms.
Diana Douglas. And my question here is, we have been told that
Mr. Parish attended a fundraiser that cost $1,000 per person.
He took his girlfriend and his sister to the fundraiser, and
Diana Douglas is the sister. Mr. Johnny Chung apparently paid
the $1,000 admission fee for this fundraiser.
The question simply is this, are you all, and I will go
down the line here, are you all aware of this document?
Mr. Schurman.
Mr. Schurman. No, I am not.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Bergin.
Mr. Bergin. This is the first time I have seen it, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Ms. Cohen.
Ms. Cohen. No.
Mr. Wilson. Ms. Ryan.
Ms. Ryan. No. First time I have seen it, too.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Now, Ms. Williams-Bridgers, I would like to
ask you the question. You mentioned that you had closed your
investigation because you had found that nobody did anything
wrong or that you were unable to find anything wrong. The
simple question here would be, would it be acceptable to take a
$1,000 gratuity to attend a fundraiser?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Responding in generic terms, there
is certainly consular guidance which suggests that there's
impropriety in accepting gifts in excess of certain amounts
from those who are potential visa applicants or with whom you
are doing business.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Now are you aware of whether Mr. Parish did
or did not provide a visa for Fan Zhang?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can't answer that, given the grand
jury protection.
Mr. Wilson. You can't answer it?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can't answer.
Mr. Wilson. You can't answer it, but you're not telling me
that you're not aware or you are aware?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I am not telling you that I am not
aware.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Now, just speaking about this very
generically as we are right here, would it be a matter of
impropriety, a statutory violation if there was acceptance of a
$1,000 gratuity in this particular case?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I'm not certain that there would be
a statutory violation. It would be a consideration of
impropriety.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Now this is something that--and I will ask
you this question--was or was it not taken into account in the
closing out of your investigation?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can't answer whether or not this
information was taken into account.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Turning to the question of whether the
gratuity was provided for people who were associated with Mr.
Parish, was that something that was considered by you in
determining whether there was an impropriety or not?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I cannot answer that question.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Turning to another matter, the issue of
reporting contacts with Chinese citizens by Embassy officials,
are you aware of whether Mr. Parish did or did not report this
particular attendance at the fundraiser to Embassy officials?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can't answer that question.
Mr. Wilson. Simply because you're not able to due to 6(e)?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Because of the 6(e) protection,
that's correct.
Mr. Wilson. Let us just ask somebody else.
Mr. Bergin, are you aware of whether the fact of the
attendance was even reported to Embassy personnel in Beijing?
Mr. Bergin. I'm not aware, but I defer to Don Schurman, the
RSO.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Mr. Schurman, are you aware of even the
fact of attendance at this expensive fundraiser?
Mr. Schurman. I don't recall this being reported.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Turning to another subject, when Mr. Parish
returned to Washington, DC, and assumed the position that he
was given, it's our understanding from personnel records that
he was given a series of raises; is that correct, Mr. Schurman?
Mr. Schurman. I left Beijing in October 1997 so----
Mr. Wilson. Maybe Mr. Gnehm--and I thank you very much for
coming back to the table. Perhaps you're aware of whether Mr.
Parish was given raises when he returned to Washington, DC.
Mr. Gnehm. Sir, the year that he was serving in this job
that you asked about earlier in CA, his performance file went
before the promotion--Annual Promotion Board. That board did
list him as a recipient for a step increase, called, in the
system, meritorious step increase in salary, based on what was
in his file at the time. I should tell you for the record,
they're not under management control. The board is an
independent board set up to make these decisions, and
management has no authority over the decisions.
Mr. Wilson. Are you aware of how many raises Mr. Parish
received from the time he returned from Beijing until the time
he retired from the Foreign Service?
Mr. Gnehm. I'm aware of the one you asked me about. There
may have been others, and I can check for you, but I wouldn't
want to definitively say one way or the other.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for that.
Mr. Bergin, I just wanted to ask you a question. You
mentioned in your statement a little while ago that when you
served in India you describe what appeared to be a sting
operation involving somebody about whom there were allegations
of impropriety. Was that ever considered as an option for Mr.
Parish?
Mr. Bergin. In conducting a visa fraud case, there are
several steps.
First, you have to determine what is the credibility of the
source? Is what the source is providing you valid? Is it
something that's detailed, that's specific, that's precise,
that would lead to us launching a full-blown investigation?
Then you have to determine to whom were the visas issued
and can you identify those people? Because what you want to do
in these cases is to be able to establish a relationship
between the person who was given the visa----
Mr. Wilson. If I could just interrupt you there, are you
telling us now that the visas issued in India were of greater
sensitivity or consequence than the visas issued in China?
Mr. Bergin. Not at all. Not at all.
Mr. Wilson. Then there's a difficulty there.
Mr. Bergin. What I'm giving you is a generic sense of how
you conduct these investigations; and in the case in India, we
had very specific, very precise information. The consular
officer volunteered to us, as soon as it happened, the
information that he was being bribed.
In the case of Mr. Parish, there was a lot of information
swirling around about improprieties, apparent improprieties,
and the agents, when they were conducting this investigation,
were not able to determine whether there was criminal substance
to this swirling wave of allegations.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I think our concern, Mr. Bergin, is that
when we have looked at the investigations, each sort of piece
of each investigation looked at one piece of the puzzle, and
when we scratched beneath the surface, we found many more
issues that were easily obtained.
For example, allegations by the colleagues of Mr. Parish in
this case, who were talking about the trading of visas that
followed from personal relationships with women, acceptance of
gratuities, and there were indeed gratuities that were easily
obtained from his office. So there were certainly things that
went beyond rank speculation.
Mr. Bergin. I think that's fair, counsel. I would only
remind the counsel of my statement earlier that this was not a
model investigation; and, in retrospect, 20/20 hindsight, those
consular officers should have been interviewed.
Mr. Wilson. I just wanted to followup on one other thing.
In terms of Mr. Parish's tenure in Beijing, I think we have
already learned that he had high security clearances during the
entire time he was in Beijing. Are you aware of whether Mr.
Parish was at the time receiving classified documents from the
Department of Justice and the FBI about ongoing criminal
investigations, Mr. Schurman?
Mr. Schurman. I was not involved with that part of the
consular operation.
Mr. Wilson. Well, now we can't get into the documents
because they are classified, but these are documents that have
been turned over from his own office. So did you review
documents obtained from Mr. Parish's office that were
classified investigatory documents from the Department of
Justice?
Mr. Schurman. Mr. Parish's office was a common area, and so
classified documents would not be kept in that area. I did not
find any classified documents in his office space.
Mr. Wilson. Having just reviewed a number of them and gone
through a number of issues with the Department of State over
documents that were provided to us--in fact, they were provided
to us in an open way, and we brought it to the Department of
State's attention that they should have been classified. They
had just been turned over to us in a box.
Mr. Burton. Let me just interrupt here. Mr. Schurman, you
said you looked at all these documents. Now, the documents that
he is referring to were given to us by the Department of State,
and in that box of documents were classified documents, and you
just said there were no classified documents. So are you
telling me that you looked at all the documents and you didn't
see those classified documents? They were there. We got them.
Mr. Schurman. I am not sure that the documents in that box
all came from that office. But I will say that when I was going
through the----
Mr. Burton. The State Department said they did. The State
Department sent us those documents.
Mr. Wilson. Perhaps if we could follow with Ms. Williams-
Bridgers, I will ask the same question of you. Were you aware
that Mr. Parish was privy to classified documents from the
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can say that, in the course of Mr.
Parish's business, he more than likely came in contact with
classified documents; and I do believe that the documents that
you're referring to were part of our collection of all
documents from his office. They were included in the submission
of documents that we provided to the committee.
Mr. Wilson. So they would have been in the universe of
documents that Mr. Schurman had access to when he had done his
investigation?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That's my understanding, yes.
Mr. Wilson. Actually, just one more point of clarification
for Ms. Williams-Bridgers. As far as your negotiations with the
Department of Justice go, with whom were you dealing over at
the Department of Justice to come to the 6(e) determination
that you arrived at?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I was dealing with attorneys out of
the Attorney General's office.
But I should also add that I, too, am terribly concerned
about the interpretation--the expansive interpretation the
Department of Justice has given. It has implications not just
for this case but for any other case in which grand jury
subpoenas have been issued in the District of Columbia. And
because we have just become aware of the expansive nature of
this opinion, it has implications for how we have handled
documents in the past related to other investigations. So I do
intend to seek some additional clarification from the Office of
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice and, potentially,
the Chief Judge.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for that answer. If you could--just
for the record's sake, if you could provide the names of the
people you were working with at DOJ.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes, I can.
Mr. Wilson. If you could right now, that would be helpful.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can provide it for the record.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Do you know them now? Are you able to tell
us right now what they are?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can't recall the last names of the
individuals, I am sorry.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Fair enough.
Mr. Burton. Does anyone with you have their name?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Craig Iscoe is the chief attorney
that we dealt with.
Mr. Burton. OK. Let me end up by saying this.
First of all, I am disappointed, Mr. Schurman, because you
told us under oath that you looked at--did a cursory look at
all these documents and there were no classified documents. Ms.
Williams-Bridgers said that the documents that were turned over
to us in the box came from his office. So you didn't look at
all of them; and, if you did, you didn't look very well. And
then all those documents were turned over to somebody else, and
ultimately they were destroyed, and it was an ongoing
investigation. This thing was botched, and it is just
unbelievable.
I would just like to say to the State Department people,
who in the future will be in charge of these investigations,
for goodness sake, if there is an ongoing investigation and you
lock up an office, don't burn up or destroy anything until the
investigation is concluded. The Justice Department says this
thing is still open, and a lot of the documents that might be
relevant are gone, and Parish had classified documents in his
office.
Now, the reason this is important, and you may think we
have been unduly critical today, but the reason this is
important is people were coming into this country that may have
been involved in espionage, that may have gotten visas
illegally, and the espionage that took place endangered every
man, woman, and child in this country. They got nuclear secrets
from Los Alamos and other nuclear laboratories, and we don't
know what kind of connection there might have been. So a sloppy
job could have led to all kinds of problems.
In addition to that, Johnny Chung was a main player in the
conduit contributions that were coming in that affected the
1996 Presidential election; and he has stated that Mr. Ji, the
head of the Chinese military intelligence, gave him $300,000,
along with other contributions that came in from Communist
China, to affect our elections in this country. And if visas
that were requested by Johnny Chung from Mr. Parish were
bringing people in who were affecting our elections by giving
illegal campaign contributions, then that is criminal, and to
do a sloppy job on investigating Mr. Parish, who may have been
involved in doing all this, is just unconscionable.
And I just tell you, I am really frustrated by this,
because none of this should have happened. If you need more
money, we will try to get it for you, if you need more
personnel. We are not talking about Ireland. We are not talking
about England. We are not talking about South America. We are
talking about the biggest country in the world population-wise
that is one of our potential major adversaries down the way,
and they were getting illegal visas from a person who was
involved in some nefarious activities, Mr. Chung, who is
helping get those visas, at least that is what he said, and it
is just unfortunate.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Mr. Chairman, may I just interject
please and add one point of possible clarification?
For the documents that we received, the classified
documents that we received, it is conceivable that they could
have come from Diplomatic Security and not from--not
necessarily from Mr. Parish's office. Because in our attempt to
collect any and all documentation, we asked for all the
contents from Mr. Parish's office as well as all DS
investigative files and any other information that Mr. Parish
may have had in his possession.
Mr. Burton. Well, where would it have come from if it
didn't come from his office?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Conceivably, it could have come from
elsewhere outside of Mr. Parish's office at the Embassy or from
Washington from the DS files. We asked for the collection of
documents from DS. All of the contents of Mr. Parish's office
in Embassy Beijing were sent first to DS in Washington, and
then DS transmitted that information to us. So it is possible
that classified information did not come from Mr. Parish's
office.
Mr. Burton. It is possible?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes.
Mr. Burton. But you don't know that?
Mr. Schurman. I did have classified files in Beijing, as
well as the unclassified files, and I assume that when they
asked for the files relating to Charles Parish in Beijing they
give them both, both the materials that were out of my safe and
the materials that were stored in a closet.
Mr. Burton. So you had stuff in your safe relating to
Charles Parish and classified material?
Mr. Schurman. The official file was in the safe.
Mr. Burton. And it had classified material in it?
Mr. Schurman. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. Relating to Charles Parish and some of the
things he was doing?
Mr. Schurman. That's correct.
Ms. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, if we're concluding, could I say a
few things?
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Ms. Cohen. Thank you very much. You did allude to the fact
that it's difficult to come up here to testify, but I think
nonetheless it's important. We recognize that this committee is
performing an important function, and it does help to have us
review what we have done to find weaknesses in what we've done
and improve. We have tried to do that, and we will continue to
try to do that.
I want to correct, I think, two impressions that we might
have left. The first concerns our limited resources. I never
meant to imply, and I don't think I did imply, that limited
resources ever justify not doing a very thorough job in an
investigation, and I think we would all agree here that
procedures needed to be tightened. We're in the process of
tightening them. We need additional resources, but when we find
a problem, we are prepared to direct resources to deal with it.
The final point I'd like the make is as to whether or not
we're all outraged. Again, I have only been there 2 years but
in those 2 years, I have not found an instance where people
have been accused of something that their fellow workers and
the people who are investigating it and really everyone who
knows about it are not outraged. It would be the same thing as
if someone were investigating a Congressman or a member of
somebody's staff. It casts aspersions on everyone, and it's
been my impression that the State Department is outraged when
one of their fellow workers is involved in something like this,
and the Department does its best to clean it up and improve it.
Mr. Burton. Well, let me conclude by saying I appreciate
you all being here and that we in the Congress believe that
99.9 percent of the people who serve this country at home and
abroad do an outstanding job. It is that one-tenth of 1 percent
that we are talking about, and in this particular case, it was
in a very sensitive area, in China, and it is really
unfortunate that happened.
I would just urge you, though, in the future if there is an
ongoing criminal investigation of anybody, if you need to store
the documents and you can't find a place for them, call me. We
will find a place to store the documents. Don't destroy
documents or anything that is potential evidence until the case
is closed.
And, with that, I want to thank you for being here. We
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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