<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:61296.wais]
Y2K AND NUCLEAR POWER: WILL THE REACTORS REACT RESPONSIBLY?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 22, 1999
__________
Committee on Government Reform
Serial No. 106-58
Committee on Science
Serial No. 106-55
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and the
Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-296 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JIM TURNER, Texas
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GREG WALDEN, Oregon MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
DOUG OSE, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Matt Ryan, Senior Policy Director
Bonnie Heald, Communications Director/Professional Staff Member
Chip Ahlswede, Clerk
Trey Henderson, Minority Counsel
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., (R-Wisconsin), Chairman
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York RALPH M. HALL, Texas, RMM**
LAMAR SMITH, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
JOE BARTON, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
NICK SMITH, Michigan ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan* SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
DAVE WELDON, Florida DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois NICK LAMPSON, Texas
CHRIS CANNON, Utah JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
KEVIN BRADY, Texas MARK UDALL, Colorado
MERRILL COOK, Utah DAVID WU, Oregon
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
Washington MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
GARY G. MILLER, California VACANCY
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South
Carolina
JACK METCALF, Washington
Subcommittee on Technology
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland, Chairwoman
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan**
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota* DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan
THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois MARK UDALL, Colorado
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DAVID WU, Oregon
KEVIN BRADY, Texas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MERRILL COOK, Utah MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin BART GORDON, Tennessee
STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
GARY G. MILLER, California
Ex Officio
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., RALPH M. HALL, Texas+
Wisconsin+
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on October 22, 1999................................. 1
Statement of:
Beedle, Ralph, senior vice president and chief nuclear
officer, Nuclear Energy Institute.......................... 51
Miraglia, Frank, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor
Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission............... 30
Rhodes, Keith, Director, Office of Computer and Information
Technology Assessment, Office of Management and Budget..... 28
Willemssen, Joel, Director, Civil Agencies Information
Systems, U.S. General Accounting Office.................... 8
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Beedle, Ralph, senior vice president and chief nuclear
officer, Nuclear Energy Institute:
Nuclear utility readiness information.................... 78
Prepared statement of.................................... 53
Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California:
Letter dated December 18, 1998........................... 328
Prepared statement of.................................... 3
Miraglia, Frank, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor
Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, prepared
statement of............................................... 33
Rhodes, Keith, Director, Office of Computer and Information
Technology Assessment, Office of Management and Budget,
prepared statement of...................................... 9
Turner, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas, prepared statement of............................ 5
Willemssen, Joel, Director, Civil Agencies Information
Systems, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement
of......................................................... 9
Y2K AND NUCLEAR POWER: WILL THE REACTORS REACT RESPONSIBLY?
----------
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1999
House of Representatives, Committee on Government
Reform, Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology, joint with the
Committee on Science, Subcommittee on
Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in
room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Horn
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology) presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology: Representatives Horn, Turner,
Mink, Biggert, Kanjorski, Ryan, Davis, Ose, and Maloney.
Present from the Subcommittee on Technology:
Representatives Morella, Bartlett, Capuano, Baird, Gutknecht,
Ehlers, and Udall.
Staff present from the Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information, and Technology: George Russell, staff
director and chief counsel; Matthew Ryan, senior policy
director; Bonnie Heald, communications director and
professional staff member; Chip Ahlswede, clerk; P.J. Caceres
and Deborah Oppenheim, interns; Trey Henderson and Michelle
Ash, minority counsels; and Jean Gosa, minority staff
assistant.
Staff present from the Subcommittee on Technology: Jeff
Grove, staff director; Ben Wu, professional staff member; Joe
Sullivan, staff assistant; Michael Quear, professional staff
member; and Mary Ralston, staff assistant.
Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, we will begin the
hearing.
There are more than 430 nuclear power plants in the world,
including 103 in the United States. Domestically, nuclear power
plants provide an estimated 20 percent of the Nation's power
supply. Regardless of the year 2000 computer challenge, safety
has historically been a paramount concern at all U.S. nuclear
facilities; however, the risk of even one failure at one plant
is one too many.
Today we will hear from a panel of witnesses who will
describe the work that has been done to mitigate the risk of a
nuclear accident related to the year 2000 computer problem.
In December 1998, I and my colleagues, Congressman Dennis
Kucinich, the former ranking member of the Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information, and Technology, and
Congressman Donald Manzullo wrote to the former chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission expressing our concern over the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's plan to perform detailed audits
on only 10 percent of the Nation's 103 nuclear facilities.
Because of the potentially devastating consequences of a
nuclear accident, we strongly recommended that the audits be
performed on all nuclear facilities. Our recommendation was
rejected.
Today we want to be assured that the Nation's nuclear
facilities are free of year 2000 risks. We want to provide an
accurate portrayal of nuclear year 2000 readiness.
I welcome our panel of expert witnesses and look forward to
their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Mr. Turner has official business that he's
working on right now, and when he comes back his statement
during the question period will be automatically part of the
record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jim Turner follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Are there any statements that any of the Members
would like to say at this time?
[No response.]
Mr. Horn. None. The vice chairman, Mrs. Biggert, the
gentlewoman from Illinois.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have reached that critical point, with just under 70
days left before the new year, when systems work drills and
contingency plans should be complete, but, as we are going to
hear today, that might not be exactly true in the case of all
the Nation's nuclear power plants, which is why this hearing on
year 2000 nuclear power is so timely.
We have discussed Y2K's impact on commerce, government
services, transportation, and life at home, but even if we
address potential Y2K problems in these areas, none of these
systems will work without electricity. By providing 20 percent
of this country's electricity without contributing any air
pollution, our nuclear power plants are vital to the stability
of our electricity supply and the environment.
The issue of Y2K and nuclear power is particularly
important to my home State of Illinois. There are about a dozen
nuclear reactors located throughout the State, 10 of which
serve the northern 20 percent of Illinois, including Chicago.
Commonwealth Edison, the owner of the 10 reactors serving
northern Illinois, came before the Government Reform
Committee's subcommittee at a field hearing in July in the
district that I represent and reported that all nuclear
stations were Y2K ready in July. So none of these plants are on
the NRC's short list and never were, but we must remain
concerned about the nine systems and seven reactors that aren't
currently in compliance, and we must also be concerned about
other sources of electricity.
American nuclear power plants don't operate in a vacuum.
Commonwealth Edison admits that a failure at one of their
surrounding utilities could have some impact on their systems.
So I want to thank the panelists for coming here today and
updating us on the final preparations for Y2K, and I thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
Does any other Member have an opening statement? The
gentleman from Pennsylvania, the acting ranking member.
Mr. Kanjorski. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that the statement of Mr. Turner be entered in the
record.
Mr. Horn. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record between my own opening statement and the vice chairman's
opening statement.
Well, no other statements, let me now swear in the
witnesses.
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. Horn. Note that all four witnesses have affirmed.
The way we work is when we introduce you, your full
statement is automatically in the hearing record. We'd like you
to summarize it, not read it word for word, because we can
read--but if you summarize the high points, that will give us
more time for a dialog among the panel, as well as between the
Members and the panel. So we will start with Mr. Willemssen,
who is our regular presenter, and the first one doing it. The
U.S. General Accounting Office does a wonderful job for this
subcommittee and all committees in the House.
Mr. Willemssen, it is good to see you. We have seen you all
over the country this year, and we are glad to see you here in
Washington.
Please give your presentation.
STATEMENT OF JOEL WILLEMSSEN, DIRECTOR, CIVIL AGENCIES
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Willemssen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittees. Thank you for inviting GAO to testify today. As
requested, we will summarize our statement.
Our Nation's nuclear power plants continue to make progress
on their readiness for Y2K. Even with this progress, some risks
remain. These risks include not knowing the current Y2K status
of all 14 decommissioned plants with spent fuel, the lack of
information on the consistency and extent of independent
reviews of Y2K testing and emergency Y2K exercises, and the
lack of requirements for day one planning, which is that series
of events that should be planned for the end of December and
the beginning of January.
To address these risks, we have developed a set of
suggested actions for NRC to consider.
First, it is important that NRC know the status of all 14
decommissioned plants with spent fuel and report their status.
Second, NRC should determine what independent verification
and validation efforts have been completed at nuclear power
plants and determine whether additional reviews are needed.
Third, NRC should identify whether emergency contingency
exercises performed by nuclear power plants have incorporated
Y2K scenarios.
And, finally, we think it is especially important that NRC
ensure that all facilities have developed day one plans. We
have recently issued guidance in this area, which OMB has
encouraged Federal agencies to use.
Let me next turn to Mr. Rhodes, GAO's Director for Computer
and Information Technology Assessment, who will provide you
with some detailed information on the risks of nuclear plants
using a Powerpoint presentation.
Mr. Rhodes came to GAO from the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, one of two U.S. nuclear design labs. Since joining
GAO, he has been heavily involved in nuclear energy issues such
as stockpile stewardship, nuclear material tracking, and non-
proliferation. So I will turn it over to Mr. Rhodes and we will
see if we can have our slide show.
In addition, we have hard copies of the slides if the
Members would like to follow along.
Mr. Horn. We would like to have those, and the clerk will
get them and pass it out to the Members.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Willemssen and Mr. Rhodes
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF KEITH RHODES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COMPUTER AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Horn, members of the subcommittee, thank
you very much for inviting me here today. I would just briefly
like to discuss a few slides that can help illustrate some of
the issues we discussed in our testimony.
The first slide shows the distribution of U.S. domestic
nuclear power plants and their associated fabricationsites. The
blue dots are the plants themselves, and the green squares are
the fabrication sites.
The difference is that a nuclear plant generates
electricity, while the fabricating plant generates fuel used by
the power plant.
As of last Friday, there were only two plants, according to
the Nuclear Energy Institute, that are not Y2K ready. One is
Peach Bottom and the other is Farley. Peach Bottom is currently
going through their final testing. Farley is in an outage now
and they are doing their Y2K remediation and should be done by
December.
Mr. Horn. Where are those plants located?
Mr. Rhodes. Peach Bottom is in Pennsylvania and Farley is
in Alabama. If I can point it out on the large board, you see
Peach Bottom at the top in Pennsylvania and Farley unit No. 2
is down in Alabama.
The next slide shows a typical nuclear power plant. We are
talking about the plant here, as opposed to the reactor,
itself. This is actually a pressurized water reactor, but there
are also boiling water reactors and other kinds of reactors--
light water, heavy water.
The areas that have to be watched under any circumstances,
not just Y2K, are as follows.
The grid itself, which brings in offsite power. In nuclear
terms, a failure here is called a ``LOOP,'' a loss of offsite
power, and is very important because it is the main power
source for the plant to keep their systems running.
Backup diesel generators are important, since if a LOOP
occurs the generators need to kick in to provide backup power
to run the plant. There are typically two diesel generators,
although a few plants have hydroelectric sources for backup.
This gives a higher degree of assurance that if one generator
fails the second one can take over. It is a redundancy in their
diesel systems.
There has been much discussion about the reliability of
these emergency diesel generators. Some claims are that the
generators do not even meet 70 percent reliability, let alone
their design requirement of 97.5 percent; however, according to
a study by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the
generators meet their 97.5 percent requirement, and the lower
reliability ratings are due to anomalous conditions occurring
during routine maintenance--that is, while you have taken the
generator off-line, then you have a power need, and that is why
you are getting these lower reliability percentages. Sometimes
people will come in and say they are only 70 percent
reliability.
Routine maintenance--we have had discussions with both
power plants as well as NRC and NEI. Routine maintenance is not
going to occur on the roll-over date, so our assumption is that
the 97.5 percent reliability will be met by the diesel
generators.
Next in the cycle of importance are the pumps, themselves.
The pumps are a key system, since they make certain that the
water is flowing throughout the plant to keep the reactor
itself cool, as well as the support systems for electricity
generation. You see there are pumps throughout the system.
The reactor itself, of course, is a key system, and its
security systems are key, since that is the site of the fission
reaction that generates the heat. Circulating water that
continuously transfers heat from the core to the steam
generation system cools the reactor core.
Finally, the spent fuel pools need to have a continuous
source of water, since the spent fuel does not cool down
immediately and continues to fission at some low level for a
long time after it has been removed from the reactor, itself.
Again, to reiterate, the next slide shows those plants that
are not yet Y2K ready, and that is as of Friday. NEI reported
that D.C. Cook one and two are now ready, and that Farley and
Peach Bottom--Peach Bottom, as I stated, is currently going
through its testing, and Farley is in an outage and being
renovated.
The next slide shows a simple risk assessment box, four
quadrants that show the relation between probability of failure
and impact of failure. As you can see, the upper right-hand
quadrant is rated as high/high--high probability of failure and
high impact of failure.
If you have devices that are sitting up in the upper right-
hand corner, the objective is to drive those devices down into
the lower left-hand corner into a low probability of failure
and low impact of failure.
You reduce the probability of failure by doing remediation
and replacement of the system, and you reduce the impact by
doing contingency and continuity of operations planning, the
objective being to move those systems into the low/low quadrant
so that there is low impact and low probability of failure.
Any risk assessment and risk management process, not just
Y2K, is going to attempt to drive the risk from high to low,
both in terms of probability and impact. The probability is
reduced, as I said, through remediation and replacement, and
the impact is reduced through contingency and continuity
planning.
Turning to international nuclear power, as you can see from
this chart, if you have very good eyes, the United States leads
the world in nuclear power plants, even though we do not get as
high a percentage of our domestic power from nuclear as other
countries such as France.
The point here is that not just the United States has to be
Y2K ready, the world has to be Y2K ready.
Finally, this slide shows the distribution of nuclear power
plants worldwide. As you can see, some plants are in rather
remote locations, but most are not.
As you are well aware, the former Soviet Union countries
are the most worrisome to nuclear power experts, myself
included.
That concludes my, unfortunately, a little longer than
brief introduction. I would appreciate any questions the
committee has.
Mr. Horn. Actually, we will wait until we complete the
whole panel and then we will start asking questions.
We now have a key witness from the Nuclear Commission, and
that is Mr. Frank Miraglia, Deputy Executive Director for
Reactor Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mr. Miraglia.
STATEMENT OF FRANK MIRAGLIA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
REACTOR PROGRAMS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Miraglia. Thank you, Chairman Horn and members of the
committee. I'm pleased to be here today on behalf of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to report the year 2000 readiness
of the Nation's nuclear power plants.
Based upon our review of the responses from the nuclear
power industry concerning year 2000 readiness, our independent
inspection efforts at all 103 operating plants, and our ongoing
regulatory oversight activities, we have concluded that the
year 2000 problem will not adversely affect the continued safe
operation of the Nation's nuclear power plants.
Starting in December 1996, we engaged our industry
stakeholders on the development of guidance to deal with the
year 2000 problem. The draft guidance was issued for comment.
The GAO reviewed the draft guidance and provided comments.
Their comments were particularly helpful, many of which were
considered in the NRC's endorsement of the final guidance.
These industry guidelines were endorsed and subsequent NRC
audits and inspections of our licensees' programs enabled us to
independently assess the effectiveness of year 2000 readiness
at each nuclear power plant.
Regarding our highest priority, the uninterrupted
performance of plant safety systems, all 103 nuclear power
plants report that their Y2K readiness efforts are complete.
As of October 20th--there will be some difference in
numbers, based upon the dates--99 of these plants also
determined that all of their computer systems that support
plant operations are Y2K ready and that contingency plans were
in place. The remaining four plants have additional work on
non-safety-related systems.
As you heard Mr. Rhodes say, NEI has reported that the
Cooks units are completed. We haven't formally received a
letter, but we understand that is the status of the Cook
stations.
These plants are on target to complete the remaining
modifications in advance of the year 2000 transition period.
Based on our information as of November 1st, only one plant
will have year 2000 readiness work remaining. That station is
Farley Two located in Alabama. That plant entered a shut-down
on October 15th. It will have the modifications installed and
off-line testing completed by mid-November. In order to declare
total readiness, it will be waiting startup, which is projected
for mid-December.
The work remaining involves non-plant support systems and
an outage, as required. These outages are scheduled, the
readiness has been planned, and the work has been successfully
completed on a sister unit.
During late 1998 and early 1999, the NRC conducted audits
of plant-specific Y2K programs and contingency plans at our
licensees' facilities. Based upon these audits, we developed an
inspection protocol in which all 103 reactors with Y2K programs
would be reviewed.
Based on these oversight activities, we have not identified
any issues that would preclude licensees from achieving year
2000 readiness. We will continue to monitor nuclear power plant
readiness as year 2000 approaches.
Concerns have been expressed about the inability or loss of
electrical distribution grid during Y2K critical dates.
According to the North American Electric Reliability Council,
NERC's latest report, more than 99 percent of the Nation's
electricity supply is classified as Y2K ready, or Y2K ready
with limited exceptions.
NERC states that the Y2K transition should have minimal
impact on electrical systems operations in North America and
that widespread, long-term loss of the grid as a result of Y2K-
induced events is not likely.
Notwithstanding, the NRC has focused its attention on
assuring reliable emergency power would be available to nuclear
power plants. The scope of our licensees' Y2K programs,
including contingency planning, covers the onsite power and
other emergency power systems, such as the electrical diesel
generators.
NRC audits and inspections have verified licensees'
considerations of those systems, and no associated Y2K issues
related to onsite or emergency power systems have been
identified.
Regulatory requirements provide high confidence in diesel
generator operability, availability, and reliability.
Additionally, diesel generator reliability in emergency
situations has been high, as demonstrated during weather-
related power upsets.
We have also focused on spent fuel cooling systems to
assure cooling of spent fuel stored at shut down facilities.
The majority of spent fuel cooling systems are based on analog
controls, and therefore not subject to Y2K problems.
At the shut down facilities, only 14 have spent fuel
remaining onsite. The heat generated by this spent fuel reduces
with time, thus increasing the time available for operators to
take actions to mitigate any off-normal circumstances.
Existing procedures and operator training at these
facilities allow the licensee to deal with normal and off-
normal situations such as loss of offsite power, and the plant
staff would have time to control these functions.
Notwithstanding these preparations, nuclear power plant
licensees have developed contingency plans for each plant to
cope with year 2000 problems.
Based upon our inspections and audits, we have determined
that all power plants have also developed day one strategies as
part of the development of their year 2000 contingency plan.
The NRC has also developed an agency contingency plan to
respond to unforeseen events related to year 2000 problems that
could potentially affect one or more of our licensees. The plan
has been coordinated and communicated with other Federal
agencies, as well as provided to the public for comment.
We conducted a full-scale exercise on October 15th
involving 11 nuclear power plants and three fuel facilities to
further validate the NRC's contingency plan. The exercise was a
success, and we gained valuable insights to further improve our
readiness for the potential year 2000 transition.
The NRC remains committed to keeping our stakeholders and
the general public informed. We have posted our generic
communications, audits, and reports on our external-internal
website for access by members of the public.
In conclusion, we have been active in addressing the year
2000 problem, both internally and with our licensees. We will
continue to work both nationally and internationally to promote
awareness of Y2K problems. Our efforts have established a
framework that appreciably ensures that the Y2K problem will
not have an adverse impact on the ability of the nuclear power
plants to safely operate or safely shut down during the year
2000 transition.
Thank you. That completes my statement.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. That is a very helpful
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miraglia follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Our last panelist is Ralph Beedle, the senior
vice president and chief nuclear officer for the Nuclear Energy
Institute.
Tell us a little bit about the Nuclear Energy Institute. I
assume it is the trade association.
STATEMENT OF RALPH BEEDLE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
Mr. Beedle. Chairman Horn. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify today.
The Nuclear Energy Institute is a member organization
consisting of over 275 companies. Every nuclear operating
utility is a member of the Institute. We establish policy and
set practices for the nuclear industry as a whole.
I applaud the efforts of the joint committees to monitor
the status of year 2000 readiness across the spectrum of
American industry. In the past 2 years, the Nuclear Energy
Institute has developed and implemented a comprehensive year
2000 readiness program. As a result of the tremendous effort of
the thousands of professionals in the industry at our 103
reactors, I am proud to report that the U.S. nuclear power
plants have demonstrated that all safety systems are year 2000
ready.
Since I last spoke to you in May 1998, over 200,000 systems
and equipment have been reviewed for year 2000 readiness, and
as of this morning, the 101, as previously mentioned, are Y2K
ready. The two remaining facilities are in the process of
making modifications during maintenance periods that are
currently in progress.
The industry's nuclear power plants are well prepared for
year 2000 and beyond.
The comprehensive year 2000 program developed by NEI in
1997 looks at all equipment that is important to plant
operations, not just a few critical systems. The program is
embodied in two documents, ``Nuclear Utility Year 2000
Readiness'' and ``Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning.''
We supplemented these with training sessions for our project
managers, conducted workshops to exchange year 2000 related
information, and established an on-line bulletin board to speed
the sharing of the most effective Y2K solutions.
Throughout the process, NEI has carefully monitored and
reported the status of nuclear industry preparation to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as the North American
Electric Reliability Council.
Safety is the nuclear energy industry's top priority, and
with this in mind the first systems to undergo evaluation were
those related to plant safety.
The industry has worked closely with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in an open process that facilitates meaningful
oversight of the industry's program. After careful assessment
and evaluation, industry experts are confident that the nuclear
utilities will continue to produce safe and reliable
electricity without being affected by year 2000 computer
problems.
NEI and our member utilities have worked closely with the
North American Electric Reliability Council. As large-scale
electric generating units, nuclear power plants are an
important element in the overall stability of our Nation's
electric transmission grid. Data reporting, testing, and
exercise participation are all part of the FERC program to
ensure that generation, transmission, and distribution of
electricity will continue to be reliable.
Recognizing the apprehension that many people have
concerning this issue, the nuclear industry has prepared a Y2K
contingency plan. Additional personnel, backup communication
systems, and response strategies have been developed for each
reactor facility. This advanced preparation will reduce the
likelihood that even a minor problem will cause a disruption in
power generation.
Be assured, however, that any problem that could compromise
safety would result in placing the plant in a safe shutdown
condition.
Before I conclude, let me address the subcommittee's
request for information regarding the nuclear industry and the
international year 2000 readiness.
The U.S. Department of State serves as the lead entity in
providing assistance to other nations on Y2K issues in
conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
readiness program developed by NEI that I mentioned earlier is
used as a basis for the IAEA international efforts. I'm certain
that the State Department and the IAEA would be glad to provide
you with additional details on their activities.
In conclusion, the nuclear utilities have reviewed, tested,
and resolved equipment problems and are ready for year 2000.
Consumers can approach the transition of year 2000 with
confidence that the Nation's 103 nuclear plants will provide 20
percent of the electricity in a reliable and safe manner.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. That is a helpful document
you have submitted and I appreciate your summary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beedle follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. We have a number of members here from both the
Science Technology Subcommittee, as well as Government Reform's
Government Management, Information, and Technology
Subcommittee. We will now go into questioning. Everybody on the
panel, including myself, will be limited to 5 minutes until
everybody else gets through. We have about 10 Members present,
so it will take an hour for the questioning.
But let me start out, based on the letter we wrote in
December 1998 to Chairman Jackson when we asked her about the
audit on the year 2000 readiness of all domestic nuclear power
plants and facilities.
We were told that, ``Well, we really don't have to worry
that much. American reactors are different than French
reactors,'' and so forth. And in February 1999, the NRC did
respond finally to our letter and said 42 or 41 percent of the
103 nuclear power plant units were included in the NRC sample
audits of 12 utilities.
What I'd like to know is: how did you develop that sample?
Was that based on different reactors within the universe, or
what?
Mr. Miraglia. Yes, sir. I will be happy to respond to that.
In terms of your letter--we did respond in February--there
were 12 licensees that were examined in terms of the audit, and
they covered 42 units. The units were picked on a number of
criteria--the age of the plant, multiple units, single unit,
different regions of the country, boiling water reactors,
pressurized water reactors. And the 12 utilities did represent
42 plants, which was a unique representative mix of the 103
facilities.
In addition, we did six audits of the contingency plans at
six licensees other than the 12, and that covered another 18
units. These were detailed audits where we used as the basis of
the review the guidelines Mr. Beedle reviewed with you. Those
guidelines were endorsed by the NRC as being appropriate
guidelines to follow for Y2K remediation and assessment, as
well as contingency planning.
Based upon those reviews, sir, we did develop an inspection
protocol and came up with an inspection protocol that was
completed by our inspectors at each of the 103 facilities,
based upon the insights of those audits.
Through subsequent conversations and discussions, we did
exactly what you originally had asked us in terms of where we
stand today.
Mr. Horn. Well, can you say that the 103 are Y2K compliant?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the safety systems, they were
reported as Y2K ready on July 1st, and we have confirmed that
by independent inspections and followup inspections. As I have
indicated in my testimony, right now, as officially reported by
us, there are four that we consider to have some additional
work in non-safety systems. Three of those are expected to be
completed by the end of the month, and that one unit, Farley 2,
would be Y2K ready by December.
Mr. Horn. In terms of the use of computers in relation to
the reactors, what do we know and what did the inspectors find
out? Did they try a pilot where they advanced the date to
January 1, 2000? And, if so, what happened?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the inspection guidelines that
were endorsed, there were a number of aspects of that plan in
terms of how to assess the impact of potential computer
problems and how to remediate and how to test. The testing
could be roll-back, as you suggest, or roll-forward, as well as
working with vendors to modify the programming within the
systems.
An important point that should be made is that there are
not many digital control systems within the nuclear power
plants' safety systems, so the scope of those kinds of
activities is reduced.
Mr. Horn. What do you know about the nuclear plants abroad?
Is there a relationship between your commission in terms of
loaning expertise on this? And what is your feeling as to what
is happening there?
Mr. Miraglia. We have worked through the International
Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the Nuclear Energy Agency,
which is part of OECD, the European economic community, and
have provided what we have done in this country, in terms of
the guidance. And, as Mr. Beedle has indicated, that guidance
has been utilized by a number of foreign countries to review
and remediate their facilities.
As Mr. Rhodes has indicated, there have been concerns
expressed relative to the Russian facilities. We don't have
direct involvement and other than providing information and
sharing what we have done here and what our regulatory
processes are.
Mr. Horn. My understanding on the Russian facilities is
that one is very close to Alaska, in terms of at least the
islands and reaching out to the Bering Strait. Is that a
problem at all? Do we know anything from the Russians on that?
Mr. Miraglia. I couldn't address that question.
Mr. Horn. OK. Let me ask--because I have got about 40
seconds left--GAO, did you look at the sample? Did you have any
concern about the sample they took and the way they did it?
Mr. Willemssen. The concerns that we would have had, Mr.
Chairman, were really parallel to the ones that you pointed out
in your letter. Subsequent to the letter, as NRC has pointed
out, there were additional evaluations done. As we mention in
our testimony, a 452-question check list was administered to
all plants.
In addition, we are aware that many of the plants did have
independent verification and validation efforts performed;
however, we are not clear on the exact nature of those IV&V
efforts. One of the suggestions that we have for NRC is to be
clear and precise on what was done and how consistent it was
across plants so that, if there is additional IV&V needed at
plants, there is still a couple months to do that.
Mr. Horn. My time is up, so I'm going to yield 5 minutes to
Mr. Kanjorski, acting for the minority.
Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just in regard to the Peach Bottom plant in Pennsylvania,
by the end of November you anticipate they will be in
compliance, or the end of October?
Mr. Miraglia. The end of October, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. Is there any reason why they are running
late compared to the other 100?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of some of the remediation that has
to be done, it requires an outage. Nuclear power plant outages
are traditionally spring and fall. They completed the outage,
the spring outage, on one unit and made the remediations. They
are just in their fall outage, and the remediation is underway
and expected to be completed by the end of the month, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. The entities that have the spent fuel, are
there any that are at total capacity? And, if you can tell me,
what type of manual backup is there if the computer system
fails to keep the spent fuel secure.
Mr. Miraglia. As I indicated in my oral and in my written
testimony, most of the systems at these facilities are analog
and do not have much digital and computer controls. The 14
decommissioned facilities that one is talking about, the fuel
has been in the pool for in excess of 2 years, and therefore
the decay heat is significantly reduced. This would allow
operators a significant amount of time, on the order of hours,
to restore and to make up water and to replenish water, and
that could be easily done manually.
In addition, they do have emergency supplies that they can
line up, as well.
Mr. Kanjorski. It seems to me that, when you look at the
number of plants in the world, the United States has about a
third of the nuclear plants, and we could rest assured they are
in pretty good shape. The other two-thirds, do you all have
opinions as to what status they are? And is there a possibility
that they could go to a critical point and, if so, cause a
disaster such as we recently almost had in Japan, or something
that you really have a reaction?
Mr. Miraglia. That would be purely conjecture on my part,
but my view would be that the concern, as Mr. Rhodes indicated,
is directed at perhaps some of the facilities in the former
Soviet Union, and that the concern there is perhaps not just
directed at the plants as much as perhaps the reliability of
the grids in those countries.
Mr. Kanjorski. Backup systems for power?
Mr. Miraglia. Maintaining power to the plant to assure safe
operation, and I think there's little known. And I think,
because of what is known in terms of real facts makes it
difficult for one to make conjectures in that regard.
Mr. Kanjorski. If there were failures in some of these
other countries, particularly in the former Soviet Union, do we
have a national policy or international policy of forming a
response team to get in there before something would become
critical, or are we just waiting under normal processes, if a
disaster occurred, to then put together a response?
Mr. Miraglia. I believe there is activity underway in terms
of perhaps Department of Energy providing more assistance, but
that is all I could say. I think the government is trying to
provide assistance to these facilities.
Mr. Kanjorski. But that is assistance now in helping them
get to compliance. I'm talking about if something happens after
January 1st and we say a week period of time or 2-week period
of time. Do we have something that we can lend the best
expertise and a response team very quickly to get into those
areas?
Mr. Miraglia. A very good example of that, sir, would be
the events that did occur in Russia in 1986, and that the
Federal Government does have a response plan and we would be
prepared to interact, and that would involve a large number of
agencies, of which NRC is just a part of what that response
would be.
Mr. Kanjorski. I notice on the list here plants, Korea. Is
that South Korea, or North Korea, too?
Mr. Miraglia. Most of the plants are in South Korea in
terms of power plants.
Mr. Kanjorski. But there are some power plants in North
Korea?
Mr. Miraglia. You are stretching my knowledge now. I
believe there are some smaller reactors within North Korea.
Mr. Kanjorski. The whole panel, if you can, more on the
international problems, the other 66 percent, what do you think
the degree of reliability is at this point? Is it that there
are no problems out there that could be serious for other
countries or for the world, as a whole, for something critical?
Mr. Rhodes. In terms of the former Soviet Union, leveraging
off of what the NRC has said, again, the concern--for example,
let's take South Korea. Well, South Korea's reactors are CANDU
reactors. They are Canadian light-water reactors, so the design
is understood. When I was in Ottawa, Canada, in February at the
International Nuclear Power Preparedness Conference, the
Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board was there. They did meet
with the South Koreans and they are helping them.
We had the developers from Czechoslovakia, who built most
of the Russian reactors, who were there. They have a few
reactors themselves, and there was a good exchange.
The concern that we had at that time, which stands today,
is that the Russian nuclear power plant industry is still in
what we would all describe as the ``awareness phase.''
When you are talking about a graphite-moderated light water
reactor of the Chernobyl type--it is called an RBMK--the
concern again is not so much with the reactor itself as it is
with the instability of the grid, the instability of diesel
backup, and the fact that you are talking about a country that
has a struggling economy.
There are always anecdotal stories about people selling the
diesel fuel as currency. I mean, you are moving into a barter
environment. That is the concern. It is a concern that Lawrence
Gershwin of the intelligence community voiced several times now
over the last year, in that it is not with the reactor itself
so much as it is with the stability of the grid.
The United States is providing actual technical support,
but we can't solve every problem for all the reactors in the
former Soviet Union because we don't have the resources to do
that unless we draw resources away from solving our own
problem.
That is the concern that I and other people who are
tracking international nuclear power have. It is no so much our
domestic it is not ourselves or Canada or Great Britain or even
France as much as it is the former Soviet Union. And it is not
so much the reactor as it is the stability of the grid.
Mr. Horn. The time is up. We will now start on Ph.D. row to
my left here. Mr. Ehlers is a physicist. We will go to Mr.
Bartlett. With two degrees, you are Dr. Dr. Bartlett, I guess.
Go ahead, Roscoe.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Are the nuclear reactors isolated from the grid, so if the
grid fails there is not a problem with the functioning of the
reactors?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the design of our reactors, sir,
we are concerned about the grid in two ways. First is the
impact of the grid on the plant, itself. Second is the loss of
the plant being a large power supply and what effect that may
have on the grid.
The plant can be isolated from the grid and operate on
emergency diesel in isolation from the grid, but in that
condition the plant is in a shut-down mode and maintaining
itself in a safe shut-down condition.
Mr. Bartlett. I have a lot more confidence in the integrity
of the nuclear power plants in Y2K than I do in the continuity
of the grid.
Are plants prepared, if the grid goes down, to immediately
isolate themselves so that there is no fall-back problem?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of even prior to the grid--the
concern about Y2K, the loss of offsite power is a design basis
event that the plants are evaluated and can cope with in terms
of its design, and so the answer to that question would be yes,
sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Let me ask a policy question. I suspect that
our nuclear reactors are going to behave flawlessly in Y2K. I
do not have that same degree of confidence for the grid and the
other power plants. Will this give us an opportunity to help
educate the American people as to the safety of the nuclear
power generation so that we might be able to expand that
contribution to our electricity production in the future?
Mr. Miraglia. That would be conjecture on my part, sir,
but, since you have asked for a personal view, I would give it.
I think, as indicated here, 20 percent of our electrical supply
is nuclear. The expectation is that the grids will remain whole
and that the nuclear power plants would safely go through that
transition.
As to whether that would be renewed interest in nuclear
power I think that would remain to be seen.
Mr. Bartlett. I would like us to be prepared to exploit
what I think is going to be a meaningful opportunity here.
We have 2 percent of the known reserves of oil. We use 25
percent of the world's oil. That is a prescription for disaster
and an obvious indication that we ought to be looking for
alternative ways of producing our energy, and nuclear is
certainly one of those.
The big impediment to using more nuclear power has been one
of education and the perception by the public that somehow this
is not safe, although I think it has been the safest type of
power generation that we have had.
I hope that the Administration and others are looking for
the opportunity of educating the American people so that they
will be more comfortable with nuclear power. They are not now
accepting of nuclear power. If we don't do something, the 20
percent electricity we are now producing by nuclear power will
shrink to zero. All the while, we are using up even more of the
small amount of oil that we have remaining.
As I said, although we have only 2 percent of the known
reserves, we use 25 percent of the world's energy.
Certainly, of all the countries in the world, we ought to
be looking more aggressively at nuclear power, and we are
actually turning away from it. As far as I know, no new plants
are going to be licensed.
I just hope that we will exploit the opportunity I'm quite
sure we are going to have in Y2K for educating the American
people as to the safety, the reliability of nuclear power
plants so that we can hopefully move forward on that front.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
We will now ask Mr. Baird from Washington, 5 minutes on
questioning.
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have just two fairly brief questions.
First of all, we focused a lot on power generation. What
about the waste storage programs around the country? What
reviews have been put in place for that?
Mr. Miraglia. Most of the spent fuel, sir, is at the
operating reactors, and it is either stored in spent fuel
pools, and those systems were examined in the context of 103
operating reactors.
As indicated, there are 14 facilities that are being
decommissioned and no longer generating power, but they are
maintaining the fuel in water pools. There are five facilities
that have fuel either shipped offsite or in dry cask storage,
which is a passive type system.
Those systems and those facilities are being--maintaining
cooling is the primary objective. The plant procedures are such
that the operators are trained in taking appropriate response
to those events. As I have indicated, most of the fuel in the
pool is 2 years old or closer to 3 years old, and so the heat
load is fairly low and there is significant time for the plants
to deal with any contingency that might arise with respect to
Y2K.
As I indicated, most of the systems are analog and not Y2K
prone, in many cases.
Mr. Baird. In one of the testimonies it discussed a Y2K
exercise, in which NRC conducted a table top exercise with
Baltimore Gas and Electric. It sounds, from reading this, like
it went pretty well and that people are well prepared.
Was it your impression that people were well prepared
because they knew they would be part of this exercise, or if we
were to, say, randomly drop in tomorrow at some community that
is near a nuclear reactor and say, ``What would happen? Would
they be as well prepared?''
Mr. Miraglia. I think, in context, the regulatory structure
that exists and has existed prior to the Y2K issue always had
emergency preparedness as a key centerpiece in defense and
depth concept; therefore, there are emergency plans. We work
with FEMA, our sister Federal agency. FEMA coordinates the
offsite response to State and locals are prepared to respond to
events at the nuclear facilities.
We work with the utilities to assure that their emergency
response plans are coordinated with the State and local
officials.
So that infrastructure existed. The existing table top
brought the local facilities and local counties in and around
Calvert Cliffs together, along with the utility, as well as
State, FEMA, and us, and walked through scenarios to say, ``If
this happens, how are we going to augment communications? How
are we going to communicate?'' That was the kind of exercise
that was conducted in terms of the table top, which was July,
and that went very well.
There were lessons learned, in that communications need to
be compatible so one needs to talk to one another and say,
``What are your plans,`` and that activity was ongoing.
In addition, we did a drill on October 15th where we
exercised our contingency plan and dealt with 11 nuclear power
plants and three fuel facilities. Some of those facilities were
exercising their contingency plans with the State and locals at
that time, as well.
Mr. Baird. From listening to that, though, I'm hearing
about 12 plants where some sort of exercise has been done. To
what extent has this been recreated across the broad spectrum?
The nightmare scenario, of course, and not to be alarmist,
of course, is an accident at a plant and simultaneously the
grid goes down, communication is disrupted, transportation is
disrupted, other problems. I mean, I'm not an alarmist with
that, but it is worth saying. To what extent have other
communities around nuclear plants within this country taken a
very serious look at, if that scenario were to play out with
the disruption of communication, power, transportation, et
cetera, how would they cope with it? To what extent have they
done that?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the guidelines, the guidelines
addresses those types of issues. Many of the utilities
participated in the September 9, 1999, drill that was conducted
with NERC in terms of exercising their plans, as well. So there
were those kinds of exercises, as well, across the country, not
only at the nuclear power plants, but most generating stations.
In terms of our own contingency plans, we are going to have
a resident or inspector stationed at the facility during the
rollover in the transition. They will be familiar with the
contingency plans at the licensees' facilities. They will be
equipped. We have provided to each site, each inspector that is
going to be at the facility, with satellite communications, so
there is guaranteed communications between the facilities and
our operations offices here in headquarters, as well as our
regions.
Mr. Baird. One last question. My understanding is that the
French have distributed iodine to their residents as just a
precautionary note, not in relation to Y2K. They did this some
time back. Is there any thought about doing that?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the use of potassium iodine for
occupational workers, that is a part of most emergency response
plans. The issue is a more widespread distribution of KI, and
that policy matter is under review.
Mr. Baird. It seems like it might be a fairly prudent
prophylactic just in case, you know. To have it around anyway
might be useful, but certainly in the off chance there would be
a Y2K problem.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
We now yield 5 minutes to the vice chairman of the
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and
Technology, the gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Biggert.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Miraglia, in the international activities, you
mentioned the Y2K early warning system, and I understand that
that will allow the U.S. nuclear power operators to monitor the
status of the foreign nuclear power plants similar to their
own, and that would give us about 12 to 15 hours that this will
be ahead so that our plants will know if something is
happening. But is there a similar system that would allow the
U.S. nuclear plants, kind of looking across the United States,
where there will be some in the west coast that will be
following on later? Is there a plan in each of the plants in
the different time zones to be able to know immediately if
there is a problem?
Mr. Miraglia. Yes. The ``YEWS'' system, the Y2K early
warning system, is an Internet-based system. We have worked
through NEA in trying to get foreign governments to subscribe
to that system. At this time, there are about 25 countries that
will be providing information. That information will be
provided on a read-only basis to all of the nuclear power
plants. We have indicated how they could subscribe and have
access.
That information would also be shared with the Information
Coordinating Committee of the President's Y2K Council to share
that information throughout the community.
It is approximately a 17-hour head start if you go all the
way to Australia and New Zealand and come across.
Mrs. Biggert. Then each one will have a contingency plan
that will be based on--let's say, the communication, as Mr.
Baird mentioned, would shut down. Is there a contingency plan
that they would still be able to know?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the ``YEWS'' system, that is a
source of information to say what is happening elsewhere and
can we glean some knowledge so we would be better prepared.
The contingency plans for the individual facilities are in
place, and it would perhaps better prepare them to manifest for
some potential impact. It should be within the context of the
existing plans already, ma'am.
Mrs. Biggert. And you said that all of the 103 domestic
plants are Y2K compliant. How was the verification of that
compliance done?
Mr. Miraglia. We said Y2K ready. There is a slight
difference between compliance and ready.
In terms of the 103, we looked at the guidance documents
that we endorsed, and in the context of those guidance
documents and the audits that we did, we did focus inspections
on the elements of that guidance.
GAO has indicated that it was a 450 question checklist, but
in order to complete those lists you went and looked at
individual, specific attributes of the guidance.
For example, five to six software systems and modifications
were examined. Were they independently verified? Was there a
peer review or was their quality assurance done on those
aspects? And so those questions led to specific focused
activities by the inspectors to look at the various elements
and were they complying with the guidance that we developed and
endorsed. That would give us the confidence to say that
appropriate assessments had been made, appropriate remediation
had been done, appropriate testing and contingency planning had
been completed.
Mrs. Biggert. Then was there a certification that they were
compliant?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of our inspection activities, we
would indicate in our inspection reports that were docketed for
each of the facilities that we have completed those inspections
and have concluded that they implemented the guidance and the
guidance documents that would give us confidence in saying
there is reasonable assurance of Y2K readiness of those
facilities.
Mrs. Biggert. So are there remaining risks to our domestic
nuclear facilities?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of absolute guarantees, they are
very difficult. There are many computer systems, many embedded
chips. The systems that we used and the guidance that we
provided we believe provided a framework to appropriately
assess, remediate, test, and have contingency planning, and we
believe that we have a basis for reasonable assurance.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
We now move to--well, I see there is a pass down there, so
we will begin the round again.
Mr. Beedle, when I was at the beginning of the first
question, I think you had something you wanted to add to it.
This is your chance.
Mr. Beedle. You had asked a question, Mr. Chairman,
concerning audits of the plants, and I wanted to point out that
each one of these utilities has had at least three audits of
one variety or another, consisting of self audits by their own
QA organizations, which are rather extensive, audits of one
utility against another one, and then third party audits, where
we bring in contractors. That gives us a great deal of
confidence that the effort on the part of the utilities has
been detailed and thorough in their examination of the Y2K
issues.
Mr. Horn. When the Federal Government and the executive
branch looked at the September 9, 1999, bit, there didn't seem
to be much of a problem. Was there any problem in any of the
nuclear reactors on that?
Mr. Miraglia. Nothing was reported that was related to any
Y2K event at any nuclear facilities, sir.
Mr. Horn. There are about 300 foreign nuclear power
facilities, and often the so-called ``facilities'' and their
safety standards don't meet the U.S. standard. Getting back to
where are we in some of the international bit, what is your
feeling on that? Have you been called upon for technical
expertise by the International Atomic Energy Commission?
Mr. Miraglia. Yes. We have provided, in terms of
participating in workshops, we have participated in workshops
on the guidance that was developed here. That was shared.
As NEI has indicated in their testimony here today, sir,
that guidance has been used by a number of foreign countries to
examine the Y2K issues.
We have participated in discussing Y2K contingency
planning. I'm scheduled to participate in an IAEA workshop next
week in Vienna to discuss what we have done relative to the
contingency planning here in the United States, so there has
been that type of activity.
In addition, we have worked through the Nuclear Energy
Agency in developing the Y2K early warning system, and that has
been another vehicle for us to indicate interest in activities
that we have been engaged in.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Rhodes, we have read articles, we have heard
people say that nuclear weapons have no Y2K problem; that is,
that the weapons, themselves, have no dates or clocks, and
therefore there really wouldn't, in relation to time. Is that
really true?
Mr. Rhodes. Yes, it is. We performed an audit of the
nuclear weapons stockpile. I led the team. GAO went out from
one of our sister divisions that handles the stockpile
stewardship issues, and we did a complete design review of the
nuclear weapons, themselves, what's called the ``physics
package,'' the actual weapon, and in the process walked through
every electronic component, every design. I even did code walk-
throughs.
In terms of time and a nuclear weapon, you are talking
about a stop watch. Even those weapons that have chips in them,
the chips don't have time. They get time from an external
oscillating crystal, and that is just giving them a time
interval. It is just a vibration, and they get an electrical
impulse out of that vibration.
So all they are doing is counting up time. And, while they
are counting up time, certain events are taking place.
So, I give you my professional opinion, and we have issued
a letter stating that we have found that the U.S. domestic--
well, the entire nuclear stockpile for the United States is not
a Y2K issue.
They operate on what is called ``fiducial time.''
Mr. Horn. Well, without objection, we will put the letter
and any summary you have of the review in the record at this
point.
Mr. Rhodes. I will make certain it gets to you.
Mr. Horn. I assume it isn't classified?
Mr. Rhodes. No. There were many classified discussions, but
it is an unclassified, public document.
Mr. Horn. Last month, Congress set up the National Nuclear
Security Administration, which is being formed to run the
Nation's nuclear weapons laboratories. In your opinion, GAO's,
how should this organization work with the Department of Energy
to manage our nuclear weapons, assets, and security measures?
Has GAO done any work in that area?
Mr. Rhodes. We haven't done any formal work on it, but we
have worked on discussions about security at the Department of
Energy, and one of the points, key points, I would want to make
about the oversight that is being brought to the Department of
Energy is--and being someone who has come out of the weapons
complex, it is very hard for the complex itself to assess its
own risk, and what it considers to be valuable may be different
than what the Department of Energy considers valuable may be
different than what nationally is of value.
If the external structure that is being applied to the
Department of Energy can assess the value of the assets
regarding the nuclear weapons, that would be of great value.
That would be of great importance to the agency. And that would
be one of the key--I think one of the key tasks at hand is to
make certain that everyone understands the export value of
super computer equipment, the domestic development of certain
materials, et cetera, and how they should be handled and
safeguarded.
Mr. Horn. Well, continuing the second round, I will yield
to Mr. Kanjorski, the ranking member.
Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Kanjorski. Since all four of you gentlemen are experts,
and since obviously the American people may be seeing this
testimony, I would sort of like each one of you to render your
expert opinion based on reasonable certainty of your various
disciplines as to what your professional opinion is as to the
safety of the nuclear industry--and stockpile system is
included, just so that you get a shotgun starting off, Mr.
Willemssen.
Mr. Willemssen. Well, as mentioned earlier by the NRC,
there is no way we can give an absolute guarantee, but I think,
through the efforts of NRC and the licensees, they have
significantly reduced the remaining risk that is there.
We have some additional steps that we think the NRC can
take to further reduce that risk to even a more microscopic
level along the lines of what we have talked about today, for
example, additional information on independent verification and
validation. We'd also like to see some additional evidence of
detailed day one planning at each of the nuclear plants--that
is, the series of steps that they plan to take at the end of
December and early January in the unlikely event that there are
problems.
Mr. Rhodes. Let me expand on one point that Mr. Willemssen
touched on.
If you take an existing nuclear reactor and you look at a
pump and you are basing your risk assessment and the emergency
procedures based on the mean time between failure and the mean
time to repair of an individual pump, you are taking a very
large sample of equipment and you are trying to figure this
probabilistic curve, and you say this individual pump failing
has a probability of some value, some very small point. That is
a probability based on standard manufacturing requirements.
The point that I would make in amplifying Mr. Willemssen's
point about day one planning is that you go to any nuclear
power plant and there are literally rooms filled with operating
procedures. The people are well trained. You cannot become a
senior reactor operator without tremendous training, tremendous
background, recertification.
However, if that operator is operating according to normal
emergency procedures where the probability of something going
wrong may change because of an instability in communications or
a perceived instability in the grid, then the point that Mr.
Willemssen is making about that detailed day one planning, it
is day one planning in light of the probability of a Y2K
failure. It is not day one planning in light of the mean time
between failure of a normal pump or the mean time between
failure of a diesel generator or the mean time between failure
of the grid.
Now you have a very focused event, you have a very focused
bit of data that you are supposed to capture, and that is the
basis for our recommendation about formal day one planning.
But I do concur that there is an extraordinarily low risk
associated with nuclear power failure right now.
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the completeness of what we have
done, if you look at the existing regulatory structure and what
we have done to address the Y2K problem--and by the ``we,'' I
mean the efforts of the industry and the agency, itself--I
think we have reasonable assurance of continued safe operation
of the facilities through the transition.
With respect to the points and suggestions made by GAO, I
think, in terms of the independent verification and validation
efforts, I believe, if one looks at the guidelines, the audits
that we have completed, and the inspections, I think we have,
in looking at that entire framework, addressed some of those
suggestions.
With respect to the contingency plan, as Mr. Rhodes picked
out, the uniqueness about the Y2K issue is that it is an event
whose date is set. We know it is going to happen.
In terms of the contingency planning guidance that we have
provided and endorsed via the industry guidelines, it does
address the topics and the issues that are outlined in GAO's
letter of October 13th to the Federal agencies with respect to
staffing, with respect to consumables, with respect to having
additional contractor help, and security and those kinds of
aspects are built into the guidelines for the contingency
planning.
I think, in terms of what we have in place and what has
been developed, it addresses those issues such that it
complements and supplements the normal processes and
procedures.
As Mr. Rhodes has said, the remediation and assessment
addresses our attempt to try to keep the frequencies of failure
to what is normally perceived by addressing the Y2K issue, and
also designating specific contingency planning to assure that
there is additional help and support during the transition.
So, with respect to the suggestions, we believe that we
have encompassed most of those.
In your question, sir, you also asked for an opinion
relative to the weapons stockpile, and I just want to say that
I am not expert in that area and I would not offer an opinion.
Mr. Beedle. With regard to the operation of these plants,
we daily train, daily operate and maintain these plants. Yes,
equipment fails on occasion. The operators are prepared to deal
with that.
We don't see that the Y2K is going the present any
different situation for the operator than they would on a
normal operating day, but we recognize the vulnerability of the
Y2K, and, as a result of that, we have tested, as I indicated,
some 200,000 pieces of equipment and systems in these plants.
We have had to remediate about 10,000 throughout the industry.
So we are talking about roughly 100 pieces of equipment or
systems in each one of these plants that has been remediated,
and they range from things of valve controllers, where we have
embedded systems, to data collection and monitoring systems on
these plants.
There are relatively few systems in these plants that are
actually controlled by computers. They are all controlled by
individuals, human beings that are at the control switches. For
the most part, these systems monitor and provide indication of
plant performance, rather than actual control of the equipment.
We have tested and verified that these systems will be
ready for Y2K. We don't see that the vulnerability and risk to
the plant is significantly different than the normal routine
operational capabilities that we have with these plants today.
I, like Mr. Miraglia, really don't have any opinion with
regard to the weapons programs.
Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
I now yield to the chairman of the House Science Technology
Subcommittee of House Science, the gentlewoman from Maryland,
who is co-chairman of the select task force of her committee
and my committee.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. You take as much time as you would like.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you.
I apologize to this expert panel for not being here
earlier, but I was involved with a great technology and
education event in Montgomery County, MD, which is where NRC is
located, Mr. Miraglia, as you know, in that beautiful White
Flint Building.
I do appreciate the testimony that has been given. I also
appreciate the fact that I understand, Mr. Miraglia, that you
commented on the fact that, of 103 operating nuclear plants,
all but seven, I think, are Y2K compatible.
Mr. Miraglia. That was updated during the testimony. There
are four remaining.
Mrs. Morella. Only four remaining?
Mr. Miraglia. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Morella. Maybe by the end of our hearing it will be
down to one.
But I do appreciate the fact that this has been done. I'm
certainly very laudatory about those efforts.
I guess the line of questioning that I would have would
deal with how does your contingency plan at NRC differ from
other contingency plans you might have. How does it differ from
your usual emergency situation? I mean, do you have more safety
people? How do you link up with coordinating with command
control? Tell me what the difference is.
Am I explaining that clearly enough?
Mr. Miraglia. I believe I understand your question, Madam
Chairman.
Mrs. Morella. What new elements do you need and do you
have?
Mr. Miraglia. As I indicated earlier, there is an existing
regulatory infrastructure for emergency response for off-normal
circumstances.
Mrs. Morella. Right.
Mr. Miraglia. As a result of Y2K, we have developed
guidelines for the industry to develop additional contingency
planning. That would supplement those kinds of activities.
In addition, our agency has augmented our own contingency
plans and developed a Y2K contingency plan and provided that
for comment, and we have coordinated with our other Federal
agencies to indicate how we are going to operate during the
transition period.
We will have inspectors at each of the 103 reactors during
the transition. We are developing procedures and processes for
them to look for, things to look for.
We have equipped each of those inspectors with satellite
communications to maintain communications with our response
center, which is located in White Flint. In addition, we have
response centers at all four regional offices.
We will have additional staff at our response center in
Washington. We would have a staff of 40 folks during the
transition. We will have a smaller team manning the response
center, about six on New Year's Eve, to start looking at the
reports from across the international community and to monitor
the transition within the facilities.
Each of our regional offices will have a team--regional
administrators, senior managers, as well as a support team in
each of our regional offices.
We have also planned, in the unlikely event if we lose
communications with the headquarters response center, that that
could be turned over to our region four office, which is in
Arlington, TX. It is in a different time zone, it is on a
different grid.
And we have exercised that contingency plan this past
October and it was a very successful drill, notwithstanding we
have learned some things to improve our ability during the
transition.
So we are going to have additional staff and folks at the
facilities, as well as our response centers.
Mrs. Morella. Is it important to let the community around
these 103 operating nuclear plants know of the fact that you
are prepared, and just to kind of assuage any concerns they may
have? In other words, do you have any kind of a public
relations outreach plan?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the agency itself, through the
Y2K President's Council we have participated, there have been
the community outreach issues. Our sister agency, FEMA, has had
regional meetings in and around certain of the nuclear power
plants that the NRC has participated in. As discussed earlier
here today, Madam Chairwoman, we did a table top exercise with
the Baltimore Gas and Electric utility with their local
representatives and implementers of the emergency plan, as well
as the State.
We have encouraged the industry, through NEI, to inform the
local community in what its state of readiness is, not only at
the nuclear power plant but to also assure themselves that the
telecommunications and electrical supply and the reliability of
that in the vicinity is known to them as well as to the local
community.
Mrs. Morella. And, finally--because my time is expiring--
what plans do you have for alternative energy if there are
difficulties, breakdowns with the nuclear power? Isn't it 20
percent of our energy emanates--electrical energy emanates from
nuclear power?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the issue of reliability and the
independent nature of our regulatory, statutory framework, our
goal is to maintain the plants in a safe condition.
Notwithstanding that, the Y2K issue does present a unique
challenge to us. It is also important to maintain the
facilities such that it doesn't adversely impact the grid.
The plants are designed to tolerate a loss of offsite
power. There are emergency diesels onsite. Those are under
normal maintenance and surveillance programs, they are tested.
As part of the contingency planning, there will be no
surveillance tests during the transition period. Fuel tanks
would be topped off and things of that nature would occur.
So, in terms of maintaining a power supply available at the
facility to maintain itself in safe shutdown, it will be done.
Without the grid, the plant cannot generate power to the
grid, so the objective is to keep the plants in safe shutdown.
Mrs. Morella. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me just one
final question for the group?
Mr. Horn. Certainly. You may have all the time you wish.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you.
Let me ask our GAO people, Mr. Willemssen and Mr. Rhodes,
do you feel pretty good that they are following your suggested
actions? Would you have any final comments to make? I mean,
should we feel comfortable that everything is proceeding as it
should with the countdown of so few days?
Mr. Rhodes. The point that I would make, as I mentioned
earlier about the--you design emergency procedures in a nuclear
power plant based on probability, and there are some very, very
fine probabilistic analysts that work at all of the nuclear
power plants.
But the probability today of the grid going down or the
probability today of communications failing is different than
when we hit the roll-over.
Our concern and our suggestion is based on, one, the
independent validation and verification that, as Mr. Miraglia
has pointed out, there has been either a peer review, a quality
assurance analysis, or an independent validation and
verification done at all the plants.
The point we would make is that NRC should take steps to
make certain that a peer review, a quality assurance, and an
IV&V are all equivalent.
Second point is that that gives you the basis for
understanding what the probability of failure is going to be.
If the probability of failure is actually going to be unique at
that time, you need to extract from these huge, huge volumes of
operating procedures and emergency procedures the exact set of
steps that you think you are going to probably need to take for
day one.
Now, that would affect, as you pointed out, staffing,
consumables, et cetera. That would be the single point that we
would make is that, until we know that the peer review, the
quality assurance, and the independent validation and
verification are equivalent and complete, and that, as a result
of those analyses, someone didn't decide that they needed to
have independent testing of a device, or something like that,
then saying that this room full of emergency procedures is
going to cover all contingencies is probably true, but making
certain that you are ready for the most probable failures is
where our suggestion comes in.
Mrs. Morella. Did you agree, Mr. Willemssen?
Mr. Willemssen. Yes. I totally concur with Mr. Rhodes'
comments.
Mrs. Morella. And, Mr. Miraglia, you do too?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of what I indicated, Madam
Chairwoman, previously, is that in the content and scope and
the concepts being offered, we agree. And I think our view is
the steps and the framework that we have in place has addressed
the issues raised by GAO.
Notwithstanding that, we appreciate the views that are
expressed and we will look at those suggestions to determine if
additional things need to be considered.
I think, in terms of the IV&V and the day one planning,
when one looks at where we are and what we have done, I think
we have essentially complied with the suggestions.
I think, in terms of what GAO may be indicating during
their review, they were perhaps able to ascertain exactly what
we had completed.
Mrs. Morella. Would you like to add anything, Mr. Beedle?
Mr. Beedle. Yes, I would, Chairwoman.
In developing this contingency plan that we provided to the
utilities for implementation at each of the facilities, we have
consideration for increased staffing, increased allocation of
consumables in the event that you had some transportation
problems. We wanted to make sure that you had adequate supplies
and stocks.
We think that we have addressed each of the issues that the
GAO has pointed out, and, in fact, we have had the GAO review
this document and provided valuable input in the construction
of this plan.
So everything that Mr. Rhodes is talking about is certainly
valid, and, as Mr. Miraglia indicates, the NRC and I would add
that the utilities, the licensees, are prepared to deal with
those.
A failure at the plant is a failure that results in action
by people, and we have people trained and prepared to deal with
these issues.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panelists.
Mr. Horn. Without objection, that document will be put in
the record at this point.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Also in the record will be the letter of February
25, 1999, to Chairman Jackson, and the response that was the
response from there and our letter from December 17, 1998
earlier when it was mentioned in the record. Without objection,
it will be there.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. I now yield to the ex-ranking member, Mrs.
Maloney, if she has any questions.
Mrs. Maloney. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. OK. Do we have any from the vice chairman of the
Government Management, Information, and Technology
Subcommittee?
[No response.]
Mr. Horn. How about Dr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Since most embedded chips will not know what time zone they
are in, if they were to fail, when should we expect them to
fail?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the guidance, sir, we recognized
that some of them may be on Greenwich Mean Time, so, in terms
of the contingency planning, it is to look for failures across
that spectrum. And, in terms of the assessment and the
remediation, that was recognized, as well. It depends on the
embedded chip and the functions that it performs.
Mr. Bartlett. Greenwich Mean Time midnight would be when
here?
Mr. Rhodes. 7 p.m. Eastern time.
Mr. Bartlett. 7 p.m. So if embedded chips are going to
cause problems, we could expect that to perhaps start happening
about 7 p.m.?
Mr. Miraglia. And, as I indicated, we are manning our
response centers, sir, at 6 p.m.
Mr. Bartlett. You are an hour ahead of the curve?
Mr. Miraglia. Hopefully, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Hopefully. Let me ask, are there, to your
knowledge, any countries with nuclear power plants who have not
been cooperating so that we do not know the status of their
readiness?
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of what I understand the primary
assessor of the international Y2K readiness is the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and they have been
conducting assessments at the various countries. I am not aware
of any such issues, but that is the extent of my knowledge.
Mr. Bartlett. As far as the panel knows, all countries with
nuclear power generating facilities have been inspected and are
cooperating?
Mr. Rhodes. I cannot say that they have been inspected. I
can say they are providing information. The information,
however, is self-reported and some of the official positions
that are given, as we were discussing earlier about the former
Soviet Union, are not very encouraging.
Mr. Miraglia. I would offer the same answer, sir. I know
the IAEA has gone to a number of the countries to make
assessments and suggestions and the like, and the President's
Y2K Council has been very active through the U.N. and
encouraged information sharing and providing information flow
and that kind of thing, but as to whether each plant has been
inspected or not, I can't answer that question, either.
Mr. Bartlett. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. On that question, a few weeks ago we had a
hearing here that related to the International Civil Aviation
Organization that is a similar organization to the nuclear one
in Europe, and there were about 35 countries that hadn't
released the information.
Well, our hearing got them to release them, so that was
Friday, and Monday morning we had them.
But the question would be to the Nuclear Commission, the
U.S. version, which you represent: do you have access to the
documents they would have filed with the international agency?
And I think some of you were dubious if they have filed.
Granted, it is self-reported, but so are what the executive
branch here that we look at every quarter. That is all self-
reported, and the only time we will know if those data were
proper and reliable will be on January 1, 2000, wherever the
time zone is.
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of our agency and access, as I said,
we have been cooperating and we do get reports via the IAEA.
We are an independent regulatory agency, and perhaps the
Department of Energy would have even more direct access, but we
do get reports on the assessments being done by IAEA and have a
general knowledge and awareness of the kinds of discussions and
findings that they have.
Mr. Horn. One of our worries is, with the power needs, we
look at Japan. We are worried about that. We look at Italy. We
are worried about that. We know there are some central European
and eastern European countries that haven't really taken the
energy and the focus that you have had in this country. That is
what worries us.
Is that a correct worry?
Mr. Miraglia. I think your representation reflects the
degree of knowledge that we have, as well, sir, as the concerns
overseas.
Mr. Horn. Well, let me ask you gentlemen if there are any
questions you would make or any points you would make that we
didn't get out of you in the question period.
Mr. Beedle.
Mr. Beedle. I'd like to make a comment concerning Mr.
Bartlett's question, ``Does this offer an opportunity to
underscore the value of nuclear in this Nation's energy mix?''
This Y2K situation is rather interesting. About 2 years ago
the focus was on, ``Let's shut all these plants down because we
are not sure they are going to be safe.'' Now the emphasis is,
``Keep them running, because we need the energy.''
So I would say to Mr. Bartlett we do have an opportunity to
underscore the value that these nuclear plants provide to this
Nation of ours. They do present 20 percent of the electric
generation, it is clean, it is reliable, and I think we are
well prepared to deal with Y2K.
Mr. Horn. OK. It looks like there are no more questions.
Mr. Miraglia. Might I comment on the last comment, sir, in
terms of the posture of the NRC with respect to that? The NRC
was created back in 1975 from the perspective of being an
independent regulator, and, as such, we are not a promoter of
the use of nuclear energy, so to take an active role in the
promotion, sir, that is not a particular statutory mandate we
have. That rests more with the executive branch and the
Department of Energy.
Notwithstanding that, our job is to assure that if nuclear
power is used in this country, it is used safely, and that is
our goal and our mission, and that we should also not be an
impediment.
The former chairman and present commissioners have
indicated that we should have the right kind of regulation for
each of the activities that we regulate.
Our posture and goal is to make our regulatory process an
efficient one, and, in terms of public outreach, we have an
obligation in establishing public confidence in that we are
doing our job of protecting and providing reasonable assurance
for the public health and safety, and so in that sense we have
that type of obligation, and we recognize it, sir.
Mr. Horn. Well, on that point, the two reactors you
mentioned at the beginning of your testimony I take it will
conform with your safety standards on this subject.
Mr. Miraglia. In terms of the two remaining ones?
Mr. Horn. Right.
Mr. Miraglia. Yes, sir. We will followup.
Mr. Horn. In other words, you are telling us you don't have
to worry about 103, they are all going to be OK.
Mr. Miraglia. That is a reasonable assurance of that
expectation, sir.
Mr. Horn. OK. Good.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to ask about, speaking of
international, my understanding is that there is going to be a
command center right in Washington, DC, that is going to be
monitoring what happens in New Zealand. Are you all going to be
connected to that? Maybe GAO would know the total structure of
it.
Mr. Willemssen. I can comment on the Information
Coordination Center from a more broad perspective.
FEMA will be a key part of the Information Coordination
Center that, and through its regional offices will be gathering
information on what is happening in States and localities, and
that information will flow up to the ICC.
In addition, each of the major Federal agencies will have
their own command/coordination center and report into the ICC.
I anticipate that NRC will have a similar mechanism. We
have briefly looked at the NRC's day one plan and note that
they have begun efforts to do that internally, and I have heard
in the testimony today additional planned efforts from an
oversight and an external perspective.
I look forward to the detail in their plans on how exactly
that will be carried out.
Mr. Miraglia. If I may add to that, Madam Chairwoman, in
terms of our contingency plan, it does include an element of
participation in the coordinating center.
In part of the contingency plan that we exercised on
October 15th, we simulated our ICC cell. I, personally, will be
at the ICC during the turn-over, with some additional staff,
having communications to our central response center.
As Mr. Willemssen has indicated, it is to be a central flow
of information.
In addition, the Y2K early warning system data is being
provided to the ICC, as well, so we will have an involvement.
And, as Mr. Willemssen has said, the existing Federal
response plan, overall response plan, is FEMA, and all of that
is coordinated with many, many sister Federal agencies.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Well, thank all of you, because I think this has
reassured a lot of us. We had been very worried when you hadn't
been looking at all of the reactors, and now you have taken
that view, and I'm very impressed with the testimony we have
received today and I thank all four of you for giving us that
information. That is most helpful.
Let me thank the majority and minority staff that prepared
this hearing. J. Russell George is back there in the corner,
staff director and chief counsel; to my immediate left, your
right, Matt Ryan, senior policy director on Government
Management, Information, and Technology, prepared the hearing;
Bonnie Heald, our communications director and professional
staff member against the wall there; Chip Ahlswede, our clerk;
and P.J. Caceres, a faithful intern; and Deborah Oppenheim, the
other faithful intern. And from the Technology Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Science, Jeff Grove, staff director; and
Ben Wu, professional staff member; Joe Sullivan, staff
assistant. And from the minority staff, Trey Henderson,
minority counsel, and Jean Gosa, staff assistant. And from the
Technology Subcommittee, Michael Quear, professional staff
member; and Mary Ralston, staff assistant. And our court
reporter is Ruth Griffin.
So thank you all, and with that we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:59 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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