<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:60621.wais]
OVERSIGHT OF THE YEAR 2000 PROBLEM AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: HOW
PREPARED IS OUR NATION'S DEFENSE?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 2, 1999
__________
Committee on Government Reform
Serial No. 106-41
Committee on Science
Serial No. 106-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and the
Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
60-621 WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
Carolina DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
LEE TERRY, Nebraska JIM TURNER, Texas
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
GREG WALDEN, Oregon HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California (Independent)
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JIM TURNER, Texas
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GREG WALDEN, Oregon MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
DOUG OSE, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Matt Ryan, Senior Policy Director
Mason Alinger, Clerk
Faith Weiss, Minority Counsel
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., (R-Wisconsin), Chairman
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr., California,
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RMM**
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland RALPH M. HALL, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
DANA ROHRABACHER, California JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOE BARTON, Texas TIM ROEMER, Indiana
KEN CALVERT, California JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
NICK SMITH, Michigan EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan* ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
DAVE WELDON, Florida LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota ZOE LOFGREN, California
THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CHRIS CANNON, Utah SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
KEVIN BRADY, Texas DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan
MERRILL COOK, Utah BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., NICK LAMPSON, Texas
Washington JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma MARK UDALL, Colorado
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin DAVID WU, Oregon
STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
GARY G. MILLER, California MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois VACANCY
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South VACANCY
Carolina
JACK METCALF, Washington
Subcommittee on Technology
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland, Chairwoman
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan**
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota* DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan
THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois MARK UDALL, Colorado
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DAVID WU, Oregon
KEVIN BRADY, Texas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MERRILL COOK, Utah MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin BART GORDON, Tennessee
STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California TIM ROEMER, Indiana
GARY G. MILLER, California
Ex Officio
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr., California+
Wisconsin+
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 2, 1999.................................... 1
Statement of:
Lieberman, Robert J., Assistant Inspector General for
Auditing, Department of Defense; Jack L. Brock, Director,
Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems, U.S.
General Accounting Office; John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Department of Defense, accompanied by Gary A.
Ambrose, Director, Air Force Year 2000; Kevin McHale,
Director, Year 2000 Project Office, Marine Corps; Stephen
I. Johnson, Project Manager, Year 2000 Project Office,
Navy; Miriam F. Browning, Director for Information
Management, Office of the Director for Information Systems,
Army; Robert F. Willard, Deputy Director for Operations for
Current Readiness and Capabilities and Director, Year 2000
Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and R.F. Smith, Vice
Director, NORAD Combat Operations.......................... 7
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Brock, Jack L., Director, Governmentwide and Defense
Information Systems, U.S. General Accounting Office,
prepared statement of...................................... 35
Hamre, John J., Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of
Defense, prepared statement of............................. 65
Lieberman, Robert J., Assistant Inspector General for
Auditing, Department of Defense, prepared statement of..... 11
Ose, Hon. Doug, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, followup questions and responses............ 124
Smith, R.F., Vice Director, NORAD Combat Operations, prepared
statement of............................................... 99
OVERSIGHT OF THE YEAR 2000 PROBLEM AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: HOW
PREPARED IS OUR NATION'S DEFENSE?
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 1999
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information, and
Technology of the Committee on Government
Reform, joint with the Subcommittee on
Technology of the Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Horn
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology) presiding.
Present: Representatives Horn, Morella, Ehlers, Gutknecht,
Biggert, Walden, Ose, Bartlett, Miller, Turner, Maloney, Mink,
Jackson Lee, Udall, Rivers, Stabenow, and Wu.
Staff present from the Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information, and Technology: Russell George, staff
director and chief counsel; Matt Ryan, senior policy director;
Bonnie Heald, director of information/professional staff
member; Mason Alinger, clerk; Faith Weiss, minority counsel,
Committee on Government Reform; and Jean Gosa, minority clerk,
Committee on Government Reform.
Staff present from the Subcommittee on Technology: Richard
Russell, staff director; Benjamin Wu, professional staff
member; Richard Lukas, intern; and Joe Sullivan, clerk.
Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, the joint hearing of the
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and
Technology of the House Government Reform Committee and the
Subcommittee on Technology from the House Science Committee
will come to order.
Only 304 days remain to reassure American citizens that the
Federal Government's computer systems, those that are most
critical to our lives, are year 2000 compliant. Unfortunately,
even today many governmental entities, as well as private
organizations, are only now recognizing the potential severity
of this problem. Some have just begun to fix their systems,
leaving little, if any, time for one of the most important
aspects of this effort, adequate testing. The problem is real.
The deadline is unmovable. The House Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information, and Technology has focused on the
potential problem since April 1996.
The year 2000 computer glitch, often called the
``millennium bug,'' or simply ``Y2K,'' dates back to the 1960's
and 1970's when computers were bulky in size but small in
memory. To conserve limited space or memory, programmers began
designating the year by using two digits rather than four. The
year 1967, for example, appears as ``67.'' The first two digits
are assumed to be ``19.'' Unless corrected, these date-
sensitive computer systems and microchips embedded in countless
mechanical devices may misinterpret the two zeros in 2000 as
1900, or just have sheer confusion with the ``00.'' This
confusion could cause the systems to generate erroneous
information, corrupt other systems or possibly shut down.
Last week the subcommittee issued its seventh report card
which showed considerable improvement throughout the Federal
Government. Still, much work still remains. We will continue to
steadfastly monitor the Federal Government's year 2000
readiness, prodding those departments and agencies that seem to
be lagging behind.
I view our Department of Defense as the Nation's supreme
national insurance policy. I sleep soundly every night, Mr.
Secretary, secure in the belief that our national defense is
the best in the world. However, the Department's biggest battle
currently resides with its own computer systems that are
paramount to its mission. The year 2000 technology challenge
confronts many organizations, but Defense is especially
critical to the Nation.
Given the Department's size and vital mission, today we
will hear the testimony from Department officials about the
status of the Department of Defense's year 2000 readiness.
Since November, and as shown in our most recent report card,
the Defense Department has reported modest improvement in
making its mission-critical systems year 2000 compliant.
In December, the Department reported that 81 percent of its
mission-critical systems were compliant. In February, the
report of the Office of Management and Budget in the Defense
Department reported only that 72 percent of its mission-
critical systems are compliant. This discrepancy shows that
either the Department has taken a huge step backward in its
year 2000 readiness, or the Department is inconsistent in what
systems are critical to its mission.
Either way, I am concerned about this inconsistency. I hope
that we can clear it up this morning, as to what steps the
Department of Defense is taking to solve its year 2000 issues.
The Department of Defense also recently reported that it has
more than 2,300 mission-critical systems. That awesome figure
represents more than one-third of all mission-critical systems
in the Federal Government.
In addition, at last report the Department of Defense still
had to repair, test, and implement an additional 636 mission-
critical systems. My concern is that while the Department has
made good progress, there remains much work to be accomplished
and the timeframe to do so is relatively compressed. January 1,
2000 will not wait for anyone, not even the U.S. Department of
Defense.
This morning we will hear from the Defense Department's
Office of Inspector General, which has gone over 140 reports on
the DOD progress. We will also hear from the General Accounting
Office, which has been doing outstanding work for this
subcommittee on numerous Federal departments. Finally, we will
hear from Dr. John Hamre, distinguished Deputy Secretary of
Defense, who has proved the importance of solid management
leadership in solving the year 2000 challenge. I look forward
to delving into all of these views and these issues this
morning, and I welcome today's witnesses.
This is a joint committee hearing as I said earlier, with
the Science Technology Subcommittee. I will now yield for an
opening statement to the distinguished chairman of that
committee, Mrs. Morella of Maryland.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am
pleased to participate with our subcommittee jointly with you
in the latest installment of our ongoing series of joint
hearings on the impact of the year 2000 computer problem on our
Nation's public and private sectors.
This morning we turn our attention to a topic of very
critical importance to the country, our national security. The
very same doomsayers that initially told us that as the clock
strikes midnight on January 1, 2000, planes will fall out of
the sky, would also have us believe that missiles will be
launched across the globe. We know that is not true.
Just as we have been assured by the Federal Aviation
Administration that the safety of air transportation will not
be compromised, we have already heard from the Department of
Defense that Y2K will not cause our nuclear arsenal to
inadvertently be deployed. What the millennium bug can do
however, is potentially render our defense systems inoperable
so that we would not be able to respond effectively to any
challenges to our country's security.
In this age of weapons of mass destruction delivered by
missiles and by terrorists, to be unprepared is to potentially
jeopardize the safety of our Nation, and by extension, the
world. The United States is a world leader, and we as a Nation
are expected to lead the world. There is no alternative. For
there is no other country capable of organizing against an
Iraqi dictator who wants to get weapons of mass destruction. We
are the one. There is no other country capable of sustaining
freedom against a North Korean dictatorship actively seeking to
get nuclear weapons. We are the one.
We cannot allow Y2K to compromise our Nation's military
preparedness and readiness. We have American men and women who
across the globe are protecting our Nation and the principles
for which this Nation has been founded. For over 200 years, we
have placed these men and women in harm's way to secure the
peace with a covenant that if they provide their courage and
skill, we will provide them with the effective equipment and
support to do their job. We must not let the Y2K bug sever that
covenant.
We must do all the we can to ensure that military hardware
and the three ``C's,'' command, control and communication, are
not endangered as a result of this computer glitch. I am
concerned about the IG and GAO reports that reveal the depths
of the problems at DOD, especially the Inspector General's
recent report about the haphazard Y2K certification of our
nuclear weapons stockpile. Defense is not a sector that can be
taken lightly.
Last year, Congress appropriated $1.1 billion specifically
for the Department's Y2K efforts because we understand the
importance of DOD's mission to our Nation. We will not allow
for our national security to be jeopardized. We in Congress
stand ready to help in any way that we can. It is up to
Secretary Cohen and the President now to work with us to ensure
that we can effectively maintain the peace throughout the world
as we ring in the new millennium.
I look forward to hearing our very distinguished witnesses
today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. I now turn to the ranking
minority member on the committee, Mr. Turner of Texas.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you
and Chairwoman Morella for your leadership in trying to be sure
that all of our Federal agencies are ready for the Y2K
conversion process. It is a very difficult task for both the
public and the private sector and certainly a great challenge
for the Department of Defense.
As we know, the Department of Defense is heavily automated.
It relies on more than 2,000 mission-critical systems. These
systems span diverse operational areas ranging from the
Department of Defense command and control systems, satellite
systems, the global positioning system, all the way to detail
systems relating to inventory, transportation management,
medical equipment and payment and personnel records. Its
weapons, equipment and facilities all contain embedded
microprocessor chips, some of which may have the Y2K date
problems.
As of February 1999, the Department of Defense reports that
it has repaired, validated and implemented 72 percent of its
mission-critical systems. However, that means that 632 mission-
critical systems have not yet been fixed and implemented. As
many as 220 mission-critical systems may miss the federally
imposed deadline of March 31 of this year. The Department of
Defense also has over 2,000 non-mission-critical systems that
still need to be repaired. Clearly, there is much work to be
done.
Last year, the Department of Defense Inspector General
identified serious problems with the accuracy of some of the
Department's reports on the number of Y2K-compliant systems.
Today we will hear that the Department of Defense has improved
its ability to track its Y2K work. But it will be difficult to
know whether the Department has properly classified its systems
as mission-critical or non-mission-critical until it completes
its simulated year 2000 exercises and other planned testing.
The Department of Defense faces a huge challenge in its Y2K
conversion efforts due to a late start, the size of its
systems, and their complexity. Although the pace of repairs and
testing has been improved, the Inspector General cautions that
the number and severity of Y2K problems at the Department of
Defense cannot be quantified until, at least, June of this
year, when additional test results will be available.
What is more, the Inspector General expresses the concern
that the Department's Y2K testing may be rigorous enough to
catch serious problems, given the compressed testing schedule.
Each of us looks forward to your testimony today. We hope to
hear more about the testing process, the operational
evaluations that you have conducted to date and the
Department's assessment of its own condition. I hope the Deputy
Secretary of Defense will also address whether our weapon
systems will be repaired in time.
The good news is that at the highest levels of the
Department there is an increased focus on Y2K. The Department
has seen great improvements in recent months. We appreciate
each of our witnesses being hear today. Again, Mr. Chairman and
Mrs. Morella, thank you for your leadership in this area.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We will now yield for an
opening statement to the vice chairman of the Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information, and Technology and that is
Mrs. Biggert of Illinois.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
excellent work in putting together such a fine schedule of
hearings to highlight our Nation's readiness for the year 2000.
I too am committed to the oversight of our Federal departments
and agencies. I am pleased that so many of our agencies are
making progress in their efforts to become Y2K compliant. I am
also concerned that some of our departments, especially those
with critical missions such as our Nation's defense, have much
work to do before they are ready for the year 2000 date change.
The Department of Defense operates about one-third of our
Federal computer inventory. It has identified some 2,500
mission-critical systems. Yet, only 72 percent of these systems
were Y2K compliant as of February this year. Admittedly, the
Department of Defense faces a heavy burden to ready itself for
the year 2000. Our Nation though is known for its military
strength. Much of this military advantage comes from the United
States' investment in information technology. However, it is
this same technology that must be now updated, tested and
readied for the year 2000 date change.
The Department of Defense, I believe, has made much
progress in its efforts to ensure continued computer capacity
in the new millennium. I am interested to hear today's
testimony discussing the Department's progress on its command
and control systems, satellite technology, global positioning
systems and highly specialized management systems.
I, too, thank today's witnesses for coming to our hearing
today. I look forward to the testimony and the opportunity for
questions.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. I now yield to the
gentlewoman from the Subcommittee on Technology, distinguished
Member from Hawaii, Mrs. Mink.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no prepared
statement. I do want to say that this series of hearings that
you have called, Mr. Chairman, on this very important issue is
certainly keyed into the entire country's concern about whether
this Nation is prepared for the looming coming of the year
2000. Nothing is more important, in my opinion, than hearing
from the Department of Defense and all other agencies and
entities related to our defense, to see where the status of
readiness is with reference to this very important issue. So, I
look forward to the testimony of all our witnesses who are here
and hope that we have made considerable progress on the
questions that have been raised last year and currently by the
GAO. Thank you very much.
Mr. Horn. Now, the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. I do not have a statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. OK. Now we have the gentlewoman from Texas,
Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kindness.
I will only offer my appreciation to all of the chairmen and
ranking members for holding this very vital hearing. Let me
say, Mr. Chairman, I have found out by being in the District
that Y2K now is the topic of discussion. This could not be a
more vital area of oversight for the American people. They are
looking to this Congress for guidance. They certainly are
concerned about issues, not only of national security, which is
the topic of this hearing, but our readiness overall. We have a
responsibility I think, Mr. Chairman, not only to our citizens,
but to the world. I will continue to work with you in oversight
of this issue for our commitment to ensure the safety and
quality of life that Americans have come to understand.
I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that I can submit my entire
statement into the record. I thank you for the time.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. Our next opener is Mr.
Miller of California.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate
your conducting this hearing today on the status of the
Department of Defense's preparedness for facing the technical
challenges associated with the year 2000. Of all the agencies,
DOD's Y2K compliance, to me, is of most great concern. If the
dooms-dayers are right, and I am really praying that they are
wrong about the seriousness of the year 2000 problem, failure
of the DOD to inoculate their systems against the Y2K bug could
pose many major domestic and foreign safety issues.
I am particularly interested in hearing from the witnesses
on whether the DOD will be Y2K compliant and what the agency is
doing to prepare our forces here and overseas against those
individuals or governments who may try to take advantage of
weak times. The questions are: are we prepared to defend
ourselves, our deployed troops and our embassies? Moreover, are
we prepared to assist our allies if they are attacked in the
year 2000? These are important questions whose answers need to
be addressed. Once again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.
Mr. Horn. I thank you very much. Now I yield some time to
the gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms. Stabenow of the Subcommittee
on Technology.
Ms. Stabenow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just also
echo the thanks to both you and our Chairwoman Morella for
holding one more hearing on this critical issue. I have held
two series of meetings in my district in Michigan, one last
year and one this year. I find that the concerns certainly of
my constituents have risen. It is important that we have
accurate information so that people know how to prepare without
overreacting and yet being prudent.
One issue that comes up over and over again is the
Department of Defense, and grave concern about the progress
that we have been making and where we will be. I am very
anxious to hear today, and I know that my constituents are
anxious to hear as well. I appreciate all of you being here.
Mr. Horn. I thank the gentlewoman.
The gentleman from Oregon on our side, Mr. Walden, waives
his opening statement. We now turn to the other gentleman from
Oregon, Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Mr. Horn. All right. Both of you go to the top of the line
in the chairman's view. [Laughter.]
Good freshmen, they are. They are excellent Members.
Now, we finally get down to business. You all know where we
are coming from after our opening statements. So let me note to
you that the tradition of the Government Management,
Information, and Technology Subcommittee is to swear in all
witnesses. So, ladies and gentlemen, if you will stand and
raise your right hands. Yes, and by the way, all the people
behind you will take a microphone so that I don't do this 10
times this morning.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. The clerk will note that all have taken the oath.
We are delighted to have all of you here. Everybody knows this
is the department about which we have the major concern, both
for the good of the world as well as the good of the United
States. So, we are going to start with the first individual
from the Office of Inspector General in the Department of
Defense, Mr. Robert J. Lieberman, who is the Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing for the Department of Defense.
Mr. Lieberman will make the opening statement.
Obviously, we would like you to summarize it. But, take
your time if you don't want to summarize it. Give us the
important things. A number of Members probably just flew in to
vote today and have not had the chance to see the testimony.
So, lay it all out there.
STATEMENTS OF ROBERT J. LIEBERMAN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR AUDITING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; JACK L. BROCK, DIRECTOR,
GOVERNMENTWIDE AND DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE; JOHN J. HAMRE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY GARY A. AMBROSE,
DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE YEAR 2000; KEVIN MCHALE, DIRECTOR, YEAR
2000 PROJECT OFFICE, MARINE CORPS; STEPHEN I. JOHNSON, PROJECT
MANAGER, YEAR 2000 PROJECT OFFICE, NAVY; MIRIAM F. BROWNING,
DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, ARMY; ROBERT F. WILLARD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
FOR OPERATIONS FOR CURRENT READINESS AND CAPABILITIES AND
DIRECTOR, YEAR 2000 OFFICE, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND R.F.
SMITH, VICE DIRECTOR, NORAD COMBAT OPERATIONS
Mr. Lieberman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chair,
members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the challenge confronting the Department of Defense
because of the so-called ``millennium bug.'' I would like to
save time by verbally highlighting some of the significant
parts of my statement and ask that the remainder be entered
into the record.
Mr. Horn. I might say that every statement that anybody
makes in any hearing is automatically put into the record the
minute we introduce you. It is a unanimous consent motion,
forever.
Mr. Lieberman. Thank you. The task of ensuring that there
is no significant impairment of the Department's ability to
execute its missions is one of the most complex challenges ever
faced by DOD managers. This is primarily because of the sheer
magnitude of the DOD problem. In terms of size, complexity and
diversity, no other public or private sector organization faces
a Y2K problem of such scale.
In addition, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear
that the DOD Y2K conversion challenge has been made more
difficult by a combination of half-a-dozen or so factors
related to DOD management culture. The two most important of
these factors, in my opinion, are first the legacy of very
decentralized information technology resources management,
which led to the runaway proliferation of systems. It has made
it doubly hard to establish a well-synchronized and controlled
DOD-wide Y2K conversion program.
Second, there was an initial tendency, particularly middle-
management level of the Department, to view the millennium bug
as a purely technical problem that could be solved by
information technologists without a need for much involvement
by managers and commanders.
The IG approached the Department's Chief Information
Officer in early 1997 with an offer to help in him achieving
sufficient oversight and management control in those areas
considered to have the most risk. Based on the resulting
informal partnership agreement, we have provided 50 Y2K audit
reports to the Department over the past year-and-a-half. We are
currently working on about the same number of additional
audits. Summaries of a few of these reports are attached to my
written statement.
In addition, we have coordinated Y2K efforts by the
Military Department Audit and Inspection Organizations, which
have issued over 90 reports in accordance with their own Y2K
coverage agreements or tasking within their services. We have
also worked closely with the GAO and exchanged information with
our counterparts in several countries.
I want to stress this morning that generally DOD managers
and commanders have been extremely cooperative and responsive
to audit advice. This includes taking measures to ensure better
accuracy in reporting. Top DOD management's encouragement of
intensive independent auditing of Y2K progress and its
responsiveness to audit results, positive or negative, deserve
note.
Turning to the question of what these audits have shown.
The DOD clearly got off to a slow start. In hindsight, most
managers underestimated both the complexity of the problem and
the commitment of resources and executive managers' time that
would be necessary. As late as last summer, audits were still
indicating a widespread lack of awareness, insufficient Y2K
staffing at all levels of the Department, and only rudimentary
Y2K planning at dozens of crucial organizations, including most
combatant commands, most functional area staffs within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, many support commands and
most installations. Although many DOD organizations were
working hard on the remediation of mission-critical information
systems, a high percentage of remediation plans provided for
completion very late in calendar year 1999 and large scale
system of systems test plans were in vague conceptual form
only. There was even some resistance to the notions of
modifying previously planned exercises to accommodate Y2K
scenarios or of planning for other large scale testing.
The decisive turning point came in early August 1998, when
the Secretary of Defense declared that progress up to that
point had been insufficient. His strong and unambiguous message
that Y2K was a genuine threat to readiness had the intended
effect. The number of mission-critical systems that have been
certified as Y2K compliant now stands at about 72 percent, as
has been mentioned. Somewhat behind plan, but considerably
better than the 24 percent figure from this time last year.
Equally important, efforts have finally accelerated over
the past few months to assess the Y2K readiness of DOD-owned
infrastructure, of the private infrastructure on which the DOD
also depends, of the diverse range of data exchange partners
and of host nations abroad. In addition, one of the largest
testing efforts ever undertaken by the Department has now
started and will continue through calendar year 1999.
With sustained close management attention through 1999, we
in the IG's office are confident that the Department can
achieve its goal of ensuring the continuity of critical
operations and capabilities as the millennium passes. However,
I want to stress that much work remains to be done. No
assessments of overall progress can be entirely credible in the
absence of significant quantities of test results, which will
still not be available for a few more months. It must also be
recognized that the belated start in some areas has caused a
fairly high risk level to persist there.
In our opinion, those areas of continuing concern include,
first, the well over 600 mission-critical systems that remain
Y2K non-compliant. Second, the infrastructure, especially
overseas. Third, supplier readiness. Fourth, untested
contractor off-the-shelf products. Fifth, contingency planning,
particularly at the mission or functional level. Sixth,
mainframe computer platforms and seventh, the greatly
compressed testing schedules.
I would like to close with a few extra words on the testing
challenge. The DOD Y2K conversion effort is unprecedented in
many ways. One is the scope of the critical Y2K testing that
will continue through the end of 1999. We cannot over-emphasize
the need for robust, in-depth testing. The huge number of
systems involved, the risk of incompatible Y2K fixes because of
the number of different firms and individuals involved in
remediating code, the late fielding of many remediated systems,
and the compression of this ambitious testing schedule into
just over a year, pose a formidable testing management
challenge. In our view, effective testing is the most daunting
of the remaining Y2K challenges.
In conclusion, we believe that the DOD is overcoming the
increased risk posed by its belated start in several facets of
the Y2K conversion effort. As the intensive effort continues,
we remain committed to our partnership with the Department on
this difficult matter and will continue striving to provide
DOD, the President's
Council on Y2K Conversion, the Office of Management and Budget,
and Congress with reliable, candid and timely feedback on Y2K
progress.
Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lieberman follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We are going to withhold all
the questions until all the witnesses have testified. Our next
presenter is Mr. Jack L. Brock, the Director of the
Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems for the U.S.
General Accounting Office, the auditing on both finance and
program arm of the Congress and the legislative branch. Thank
you.
Mr. Brock.
Mr. Brock. Thank you, Mr. Horn. Thank you, Mrs. Morella and
members of the two subcommittees. I am pleased to be here
today.
Before I start, I would like to say that we have worked
very closely with the DOD IG during the course of our audits
and they have done commendable work and I think have added an
immense amount of credibility to what the Department is trying
to do to be Y2K ready. I would also like to say that if we had
testified last year, our message would have been far more grim
than it is today. I would like to congratulate the Department
on an incredible amount of progress that has been made over the
past year. A lot of that progress has to do with the very much
increased level in presence of top management within the
Department assuming ownership and control over the problem.
It still faces major issues in being year 2000 ready. I
think this is a situation where the risks are so great and the
need for insurance is so great, it is like going to a party and
you don't want to risk your pants falling. Not only do you want
to wear a belt, but you want to have suspenders on as well.
What we would like to see here are the presence of additional
controls that will allow increased assurance that risk will be
minimized and that business processes and war fighting
processes will work. We are no longer talking about systems,
because the systems have to operate in an environment of
business operations. These operations depend on a variety of
factors, not just a system. I think the Department is moving
into that realm, but we have a few items of advice.
Mr. Lieberman I think correctly described the complex
organization that the Department is. It clearly, of all the
Government agencies and possibly of any entity in the world,
has the most complex set of operations to carry out. Many of
the other hearings that you have had on Y2K have dealt with
agencies that are primarily engaged in transaction processing,
very complex operations that pale in light of the complex
command and control, weapon systems, and other types of systems
that the Department has to field and make sure is ready.
In that backdrop, I would also like to say that the
Department has a history of very poor management over
information technology. In fact, we would argue that some of
its success has been the ability to tap vast sums of money to
overcome problems in development. In fact, these poor controls
in management process have limited the effectiveness of their
Y2K program. I think there are lessons to be learned from this
that we will address later, but this was an initial barrier to
the Department in getting on top of its program.
I also agree with Mr. Lieberman that the program really
began to turn around last summer when both Deputy Secretary
Hamre and Secretary Cohen issued very strong letters to the
Department saying, ``We are running behind. We need to make
fixes. We need to start focusing on our key functional and
operational capabilities to make sure that these functional and
operational capabilities will be able to continue after the
year 2000.''
I would like to highlight a couple of things that the
Department has done in that regard. First of all, it has had a
very high level of involvement in ownership of the problem by
senior management. Second, in turn the Department has now
shifted its focus toward ensuring the continuity of core
business processes and military operations. More specifically,
I would like to identify five areas that the Department has
done.-
First, last summer the Secretary of Defense directed the
commanders-in-chief to plan and execute a series of simulated
year 2000 operational exercises. These exercises are
essentially to determine whether the Department can carry out
critical military tasks with the systems' clocks rolled forward
to the year 2000. These are such things as providing strategic
early warning, deploying and maneuvering forces, and employing
fire power. Thirty-one such evaluations are now scheduled
through the fall of 1999. Second, the Department is requiring
its principal staff assistants, these are the Under Secretaries
and Assistant Secretaries that own the functional areas of the
Department or have responsibility for those, to conduct end-to-
end tests to ensure that the systems that they have
collectively support core business areas and can inter-operate
in a year 2000 environment.-
The Department originally designated five functional areas:
communications, health and medical, intelligence, logistics and
personnel, and has since added weapons and finance to those
functional areas. Third, the military services commanders are
conducting integration testing of their systems. This testing
is intended to build upon completed systems renovation testing
and certification, and ultimately is designed to reduce risk
and ensure the ability to execute critical combat missions in a
year 2000 environment.-
Fourth, Defense directed installation commanders to ensure
that the 600-plus installations scattered all over the world
will be ready to house both the military and civilian work
force, as well as the weaponry and supporting activities that
are necessary for national defense.-
As you can gather from these four things, they are pretty
complex and diverse. Last, the Department has initiated what
they call ``synchronization meetings'' that are chaired by the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs-of-
Staff Year 2000 Task Force leader. These are designed to
improve and facilitate coordination of the activities that cut
across organizational boundaries.-
Because of the complex interrelationships between these
activities, we have recently begun additional audit work, Mr.
Chairman, to look at those relationships and to see how well
they are being carried out. While we don't have a complete
answer on their success or on their progress, we do have a
number of observations that we are prepared to make on those.-
First of all, I would like to say that the initial
operational evaluations carried out by the CINCs have been
successful. The guidance that was provided by the Joint Chiefs-
of-Staff was excellent. It was very much in line with our own
criteria and we found it very useful in conducting our audits.
The exercises that have already been conducted at NORAD and the
Strategic Command have gone pretty well. Last week I had staff
at NORAD and they were looking at NORAD's test of the missile
warning operational evaluation. My team there said that the
test worked. It was primarily to look at processing responses
to airborne threats.
The operational evaluation was very carefully planned. They
followed the test script. The results showed no Y2K failure.
There were a number of relatively minimal system failures that
were not related to Y2K. The staff and personnel at NORAD were
able to take care of these and to successfully move the test
on. As the course of these operational evaluations continue, we
will continue to follow their progress as well.
However, because of the interrelationships of systems all
across the various commands and all across the functional areas
of DOD, many of these planned evaluations will require
extensive support from the functional areas, such as
communications and logistics. For example, when we were talking
to officials at the Strategic Command, who were doing a five-
phase operational evaluation program, they indicated that they
required extensive support from DISA. DISA is the agency within
the Department of Defense that supplies communication and
computing support. They provide support to the Strategic
Command on its communications backbone. The initial phase of
this plan had to be delayed because of one of DISA's programs
not being ready for testing. There are all sorts of
dependencies that exist among these tests that have to be
carefully monitored to make sure that the tests can be
completed.
Finally in this regard, our initial reviews of the plans
for functional areas, these are the health, personnel, finance,
logistics, et cetera, show these plans have mixed results. Our
review has shown mixed results. For example, while each of the
functional plans discusses business functions supporting
systems and testing requirements, many of the plans lack
important details such as a test schedule, complete data for
contingency plans or detailed mapping of systems and support
activities to business functions.
While DOD has correctly shifted its emphasis to continuity
of business processes rather than the status of individual
systems, its controls and reporting mechanisms are still
centered around individual systems. To effectively manage the
program in the future, we believe that managers and executive
decisionmakers need reliable information about the nature and
status of year 2000 conversion efforts from a core business
process. This isn't readily available in DOD.
For example, although the functional areas and commands
have been instructed to develop testing and contingency plans
based on business functions, the overall DOD Y2K management
plan and supporting guidance have not been updated to reflect
reporting and control mechanisms that need to be in place to
reinforce this shift in focus. It is entirely conceivable that
every component, every command and every function is developing
appropriate plans with an appropriate level of control to
ensure that the right thing is being done at the right time.
There is simply not a mechanism to provide assurance. Our
reviews, for example, of the functional plans, suggest an
uneven level of planning and execution across the Department.
We believe that the Department needs greater visibility
into the core business processes throughout the agency.
Specifically, for each core business process identified, the
Department should determine the following. First, the status of
each supporting information system critical to that process,
including its schedule for remediation and testing--this
information is largely being gathered now. Second, the source
and year 2000 status of any suppliers or vendors that are
critical to that process. Third, the status of outside
dependencies that affect readiness. Fourth, interfaces with
other processes and outside organizations. Fifth, the scope and
schedule of end-to-end testing for the process. And sixth, the
scope and schedule for business continuity planning for that
process to continue.
For any of these elements that are behind schedule, Defense
needs to know what steps will be taken to get the schedule back
in line, and what steps will be taken to minimize the risks
that might be associated with delay. Once the assessments are
complete, the Department is going to be in a better position to
take an overall look at their prospective readiness; to
identify gaps or unnecessary overlaps; to reallocate resources,
if necessary, and to develop comprehensive business continuity
plans that cut across organizational lines.
Additionally, the Department needs greater assurance that
the information being provided is consistent, both in terms of
content and accuracy. To this end, the Department needs to
provide standard expectations for both content and reporting
requirements and performance metrics for all of the above
elements, and to establish control mechanisms that ensure
reported information is both complete and accurate.
Finally, just to make a few remarks. I mentioned earlier
that GAO has long had a concern with the Department's
information management. In fact, since 1995, this area has been
on our high risk list. One of the major barriers to effective
information that we have observed within the Department is
their inability to cut across stovepipes and overcome cultural
inertia to change. They have plenty of processes, but no
action.
I think now we are seeing a shift. In the Y2K program, we
have seen a lot of shift in management attention, willingness
to cut across program lines--maybe not as many processes as we
would like--but a real shift. The lessons learned from Y2K can
be transferred to their overall management of information
technology. While this might be an expensive lesson, it will be
an important one, and hopefully worthwhile for the Department.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Horn.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brock follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Brock. The GAO always
gives us a lot of helpful comments. We appreciate it.
We now are going to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr.
John Hamre, who is accompanied by a number of the program
directors. Now I am going to sort of have to juggle things here
to let the Deputy Secretary of Defense get back to work,
because he is going to be back up here this afternoon.
Mr. Hamre. I have another hearing.
Mr. Horn. So, I think I am going to ask one question here,
and then give the statement. Then every Member will have a shot
at you here, so to speak. I would just ask this. You have heard
the IG and you have heard GAO. Do you have any reaction to
their testimony at this point?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, I have a couple of reactions that I think
will come out in the context of the statement that I am going
to give.
Mr. Horn. OK, fine.
Mr. Hamre. By and large, we have had a very open process.
We meet on a monthly basis, and Jack Brock sits through these
endless sessions with me and has been at every single one of
them. I have been grateful to have him there, as has Bob
Lieberman.
Mr. Horn. And he hasn't won the Scowcroft Award by going to
sleep or anything? [Laughter.]
Mr. Hamre. No. He has woken me up a few times, I must say.
I really thought this was going to be a hostile hearing, at
first. You started with an accusation that over at the
Department we had too much bulk and too little memory. I
thought you were talking about me.
Mr. Horn. I was talking about the 1960's computers.
Mr. Hamre. OK. Yes, our computers. I'm afraid I might
qualify as well. [Laughter.]
May I say at the outset, that the most important people--
the Secretary, you are right, was the catalyst that got the
Department focused. But we have four kinds of catalytic
converters here. It is Art Money, who is going to replace me
when I have to get up and leave, and he is our Assistant
Secretary of Command Control Intelligence; Marv Langston, who
is his Deputy, has really been riding shotgun over this, and
his trusty agent, Bill Curtis, has been doing absolutely all of
the legwork for the Secretary. Bob Willard here has been for
the Joint Staff, really pulling the test environment together.
These are the four individuals that I needed to highlight to
you. They have been absolutely instrumental and have done a
terrific job. I will ask Art to step in, very briefly, after I
leave.
Sir, it is rare that any military organization knows
exactly the time and the place when the enemy will attack.
Indeed, we are largely preparing ourselves, in the strategic
sense, for opponents that we will confront. Rarely do we know
exactly when the enemy will attack and exactly where the enemy
will attack. This is an exception. We know exactly where it is
going to be and we know exactly when it will happen. It isn't a
matter of just computer geeks not keeping our computers
running. It is warriors, like Bob Willard and others, who are
not going to be able to do their job if we are not ready. So,
this is not about management. This is about being able to
protect and defend the United States of America.
I would like to put the bottom line right up front. We will
be able to protect and defend the United States of America on
January 1, 2000, and on the second and on the third and every
day after that. That is not just our computer systems that run
personnel records or accounting. That is our war machines,
those things which will go out if we have to ask them, to take
to combat the enemy. We will be ready. I will go through that
today.
With your permission, sir, I would like to go through a
series of charts just to try to illustrate what it is we are
going to do. Can I get the first chart please?
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. This is where we stand right now and this is the
progress. If it is red, it is what we have reported. If it is
the dash line, it is where we are against our totals. We have
2,300 systems that we need to have fixed if we are going to be
able to carry out our missions. This is across the board. This
is everything from an aircraft carrier and all the systems on
the aircraft carrier, to intelligence systems, to accounting
systems, to finance for payroll, the whole works.
At the end of December we had 1,673 systems. Today, I think
it is 1,730, something like that; 1,722 systems are fixed as of
today, and validated as being fixed.
Mr. Horn. On that point, ``fixed'' and ``validated,'' is
there room for testing here?
Mr. Hamre. Yes, sir. That is all going through with the
systems testing, not the end-to-end operational functional
tests that Jack was talking about. But it is systems testing.
So before they can ever get permission to be put on that column
as being ``filled,'' they have to be fixed, and an independent
source has to validate that it has been fixed.
As you can see, we are stretching out. You will see by the
next chart we will be in 90 percent, 93-94 percent here by the
end of March. We will make 100 percent of our goal by the end
of the year.
Let's go to the next chart, if we could.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. Seventy-three percent of the systems were
totally fixed and fielded. You see these bars here that have
that little shaded area at the top? That is meant to represent
that the system is fixed, but is not completely fielded. So,
Brother Johnson is here with all of the ships out in the Navy.
Not all of the ships may be completely fitted with a fix. But
those that are going to war will be fitted. What you are seeing
here of that differential is the difference between: we know
the software works. We know it works when it is installed, but
it isn't in every single ship, for example. Or it is not every
piece of equipment. As you can see, it narrows down and gets
smaller.
By the end of the year, we will have six systems that are
not going to be year 2000 compliant out of the 2,300. In those
six, the fix is done. It is just a fielding issue. The ship may
not go to sea for another 14 months. So this is just an example
of it's fixed, not fielded. But it doesn't matter. OK?
As you can see, we will by March have 93 percent of the
systems fixed. What I would like to do is to show three
followup charts that illustrate how we are tracking
individually.
Let us go first to the Army.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. First of all, the bar when it is red, it is
still being fixed. When it is green, it is fixed but is still
being fielded. So as you see, the top three systems will all be
fixed. They will be fixed by the summer. It just takes
virtually a day to get it installed. It does not take any time.
For the systems below that, as you can see, there tends be
a longer implementation period. But in each case, we have got
the fix largely in hand and it is just being fielded.
Now these are the 10 most important systems out of the
Army. There are 24 all together that are not fixed right now.
These are the 10 most important. We are tracking every one of
them. We have got witnesses here that know every single fix,
down to where the electrons go. So if you want to ask any
questions about them, we can.
Mr. Horn. I understand from staff that we don't have these
charts.
Mr. Hamre. Be glad to give them to you.
Mr. Horn. I would like them put in the record at each part
of your presentation. I realize your color charts are way ahead
of the congressional and GPO charts. We have a little problem
distinguishing green and red. It is always in versions of
black.
Mr. Hamre. I understand. We will annotate them. Could we go
back to the previous chart? I just wanted to make a point on
something.
Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement you said that we
were reporting 81 percent fixed, but the report that you got
from OMB said that we were only 62 percent fixed, or something
like that. I will tell you what the problem is. It is a useless
reporting requirement that is not doing anyone any good. We
submit these reports. They are a couple of months late by the
time it goes through all the building and writing a thick, darn
report. Our preference would be to have your staff come over
and sit in on our monthly sessions. You can see the data the
day we do it.
Mr. Horn. I think some of them have.
Mr. Hamre. Instead of us generating a report that is 2
months late and does not give you information and just confuses
you, thinking that we are slipping back, I would rather have
you there looking at the stuff we are looking at. It would make
a lot more sense.
Mr. Horn. I will take your invitation up. We have had staff
in your meetings.
Mr. Hamre. Yes, on several of them. We would be glad to
have them attend our monthly meetings. It would be great.
That is where we are today, 81 percent. We will be at 93
percent. We will make 100 percent.
OK, let's go two down to the Navy charts, if we could.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. Same situation, where we are showing you the 10
most important. In this case, as you see, largely it is a
fielding issue. If it is a long, green bar, it is largely a
fielding issue. In very few cases, for example the backup
mission planning system for Navy SpaceCom, is one that is late.
It is a backup system. It is not our primary control system for
our satellites.
OK, next chart. Let's go to the Marine Corps.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. Only three systems. The thin red line. You know
they don't have much, but they are getting it fixed. It is
going to be just fine.
OK, next chart, Air Force.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. Air Force is doing very well. As you can see, it
is largely fielding questions and will easily be done. Mrs.
Morella mentioned GPS, or Mrs. Biggert mentioned GPS. GPS will
be fixed. We have a somewhat additional, different problem.
There is a thing called the ``end of week'' problem that occurs
this fall which we have fixed. The satellites are fixed. The
ground stations are fixed. The Government-licensed receivers
are fixed. But if people have made a non-licensed receiver,
they may have problems. We have been trying to advertise this
because it is an important technical detail associated just
with the GPS system. But we will be ready. Any war machine will
be ready for it. Again, we would be glad to go into any of the
details behind any of these.
Here is where we are with nuclear command and control
systems. As you can see, the green bar is where it is completed
and totally fixed. The yellow is where it is completed and not
completely fielded. As you can see here, by the end of March we
are going to have all but 12 systems completed, some in some
various phase of fielding. This is absolutely everything. This
is from the early warning satellites, to the radars, to the
command and control displays at NORAD here in town, down to the
mission planning systems for the nuclear systems, down to the
stewardship custodial systems that we have for individual
warheads. Everything is being tracked. We will be done and
fully tested by the last quarter of the fiscal year. There is
no risk that the Department of Defense cannot manage and
control its nuclear weapons.
OK, next chart.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. I just would like to take a moment to explain.
There is a proposal that we have made to our counterparts in
Russia. We are not worried about their control over their
nuclear weapons. This is a country and a government that has
emphasized control over everything else. We are absolutely
convinced that there will be positive control over nuclear
assets. We are less optimistic that their early warning systems
will function. We don't think the early warning systems are all
of a sudden going to show satellite tracks of attacking
warheads or anything like that. We don't know how you would go
from a computer glitch to trajectories of an attack profile. We
don't think that will happen.
But it is possible that computer screens could go blank or
could be interrupted. In this world, we are not interested in
having a lot of confusion and doubt. So we have approached our
counterparts in Russia and have invited them to join us in a
center for Y2K strategic stability. We will have an early
warning center. We modeled this after the air traffic control
center that we operated in Berlin for 25 years.
For 25 years, when Berlin was still a divided city, the
United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom jointly
operated an air traffic control center so that there would not
be any confusion in people's minds about aircraft coming in.
Every airplane had to be logged in advance. There were
coordination procedures. We felt that the best thing to do was
to do that together in one room. That is our model for this. We
will be ready this fall. We will be ready in the last quarter.
We have invited our counterparts from Russia to come over and
join us at the center. They will have their own communication
links so they can get back home secure, on their own. They can
look at our machines just in case there is any disruption that
they might have. We think that this is an important
contribution to stability. This is something that we are
pursuing quite aggressively.
Mr. Horn. I would agree with you. Have you had a reception
of this that is positive?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, yes, we have. There has obviously been a
bit of concern by both parties. You know, we are anxious to
have them join us. We have to do it in a way where they cannot
look back up our system and determine what the configuration of
our system is like and any vulnerabilities it might have.
Similarly, they are always apprehensive that this is somehow a
plot, you know. We are going to spy on them or something. So
there is a natural reticence that always comes when we approach
things like this.
We just had a team over, I think it was a week ago. They
had very good discussions. There are going to be followup
discussions, I think, next month. We have been talking with
them more widely about year 2000. Mr. Money can describe that
to you because of our efforts with them. But I think that we
have received a good response. I rather think this is going to
happen. I think it is a confidence-building measure that both
parties understand and think would be important. I might say
that I think we are prepared to offer this to other countries
too, if we feel that we need to provide a reassuring
environment.
Mr. Horn. Well, that was going to be my next question. What
about some of the nuclear countries that are not too
cooperative with us?
Mr. Hamre. I think our view is that this is a stabilizing
contribution that would be useful to others. We of course have
to work this out collaboratively. We are open to discussing
that with people. There are no impediments on our side to
wanting to talk to people about that.
OK, let's go to the next chart.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. I'll break this down. This is just general
timelines. There is no real precision to it. The axis at the
bottom shows you the dates. We started the remediation some
time back. It will continue right up until probably November. I
think some of the last systems do not field until probably
November. There has been contingency planning going on along at
the same time. Every one of these systems has to have a
contingency plan if there is failure. These are the gents at
the table here that are the individuals responsible for
developing those contingency plans, if we have problems.
Operational testing has begun. As a matter of fact, I will
ask Admiral Willard to describe a test that he just observed
out at our Southern Command. I would ask your permission, Mr.
Chairman, for Colonel Smith to give a brief report on the test
we just did at NORAD, both in December and just last week, to
give you a sense of what the operational testing environment is
like.
We have designated the Y2K operations period from I think
it is September 1st through March 31st. There will be a special
command and control, as it were, over our systems for that
period. I will describe the significance of that by going to
the next chart.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. What you see here are test periods. Again, the
axis on the top shows you the months of the year. On the
vertical axis is our various military war fighting command. So,
USACOM is the Atlantic command. There is a Central Command, the
European Command, the Pacific Command, Forces Korea, all of our
CINCs. What the Secretary did was he said, ``This is a war
fighting issue. Are we going to be able to defend the country
or not? I am going to put the CINCs in charge of testing,
because they are going to have to live with the results.'' The
first sense of discipline in the system was to say that we were
not going to take anybody's word except for the guys that are
going to live or die if it does not work.
We put the CINCs in charge of testing. These are the test
windows. We are going to just discuss one of them when I ask
Colonel Smith to do it, down where you see where it says
``NORAD,'' the third up from the bottom. There were some tests
that were done back in December. He has just done some tests in
February and I will ask him to give a brief description. We are
doing literally hundreds of tests. This is the most
sophisticated testing environment that has been established, I
think, in the Department to prove out that this stuff works.
Let me go to the next chart.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. This shows you the testing that is being done in
functional areas, not just the war fighting systems. Now let me
go down in, for example, Finance. I used to be the Comptroller,
so I was concerned about this. An example of what we are doing
in Finance is that we are doing an end-to-end test where the
payroll clerk will leave an earning statement for an individual
and will see that those electrons get over to the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service to authorize payment. That will
go to the Federal Reserve, which will take the electrons and
pass them to the banking system. The banking system will route
them to a correspondent bank, the correspondent bank into the
service member bank. Then we will see if all of the accounts
clear.
That is the kind of end-to-end testing that we are doing,
for example, in the finance world. We are doing that kind of
end-to-end testing in each one of these areas. It is very
extensive testing going on here for the next 4 to 6 months.
Now, generally, you will see blocks. Some of them are
designated as backup blocks in case we uncover some problems.
So far, what you will see is that the testing has gone fairly
well. In other words, the test fixes that we identified when we
did the systems tests and proved in the systems tests have
carried over to the end-to-end tests. That has largely been our
experience.
We have also found that in the systems tests that some of
the commercial products that we have been given that were told
were fixed, really were not fixed. We were able to quickly
identify what the problems were. This kind of a rigorous test
environment is letting us get on top of the problem and be able
to get things turned around very quickly.
Before we go to the next thing, I wonder if I could just
ask Admiral Willard to talk briefly about his experiences he
just had watching the SOUTHCOM test.
Admiral Willard. Good morning, sir. I would like to talk
about a test that was conducted by the Commander in Chief
(CINC) of Southern Command (Southcom) and it had to do with
their mission in performing counternarcotics operations.
Specifically in support of that mission, they were examining
their ability to detect, track, and monitor both aircraft and
vessels on the sea, as well as source-zone targets in the
countries of South America. They examined their abilities to
hand off to their joint counterparts, as well. It was a
collaborative effort between headquarters of SOUTHCOM and the
interagency task forces that exist to support counternarcotics
operations radar site, as well as aircraft and ships at sea
that were participating in the exercise.
In all, they tested over 30 systems, of which 24 in the
architecture included clocks or date functions. They
encountered no hard failures in any of their systems. They
encountered one, what they termed a ``soft failure,'' that was
year 2000 related, having to do with a message handling system
and specifically, an archive function of the message handling
system. Though it did not impact their operations, it was
nonetheless considered a Y2K minor failure. They also uncovered
a couple of other systems failures that were not associated
with the year 2000 but, interestingly, were date functions
within all of the systems, whether they had Y2K related clocks
or not. So they were uncovering a good deal about themselves.
They published some very good lessons learned that we are
sharing with the other commanders in chief, the unified
commanders, who are readying for their own operations
evaluations. Also, in their preliminary report, they reported a
number of ancillary benefits that they have derived from this
entire process: a better understanding of their own
architectures; a better understanding of how they interact with
their supporting agencies; in fact, a better understanding of
their entire mission area. We are finding that we not only
derive benefits in terms of our confidence level and our
ability to deal with the year 2000 issue, but we are deriving a
number of other departmental benefits, as well.
Mr. Horn. Well, I am delighted to hear that because I have
visited the Southern Command about 2 or 3 years ago, and
watched what they have been doing on narcotics. I was very
impressed with the coordination that has finally been occurring
over the last few years among all relevant agencies.
Have we still got so many flights ending up over the waters
of Puerto Rico that we had 3 years ago? It is really
unbelievable.
Admiral Willard. The answer to that is, yes, sir. We are
continuing to be successful.
Mr. Horn. I am impressed by that end-to-end testing. I
think that has been our worry from day one. I agree with you
completely. This ought to be an exercise which cleans up the
management flow-through of decisionmaking and other things. Get
rid of some and keep the others. I hope that exercise has been
just what you say it is in other commands.
Mr. Hamre. Sir, we will give you an example of that just
shortly. If I might go to, I think this is the last chart.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Hamre. I would like to explain something. We are
shifting over our focus. By the way, I agree with what Jack
Brock said to you. We do need to shift our focus from systems
now to functional agencies. I think we are doing that. I will
be glad to sit down with Jack to figure out if there are some
things we need to improve in our process. I think that is the
right focus.
I would like to shift and conclude here by saying if there
are going to be problems, the Department of Defense is going to
get asked to try to help remediate them here in the United
States.
FEMA doesn't have its own helicopters. We have helicopters.
When there is flooding, they ask us to show up and do the
relief activity. If there are hurricanes that come ashore, we
are the ones that set up the tent cities and pump the clean
water and deliver food. So we know we are going to be called to
respond if there are problems in the United States.
We also know that we have to have a process where we do not
respond and put at risk our ability to fight a war if we have
to. So we have developed a system of priorities. The Secretary
has approved this. We can allocate our resources, at least
think about them in a rational manner, when we are responding
to the consequences. Our first priority is to fight and win a
war, if we have to.
First of all, any unit, right now, its day-to-day mission
is to carry out an on-going military operation, to carry out
on-going intelligence operations, to protect and support the
national command authorities, to do those kind of ``survival of
the Nation'' functions. Any unit that is assigned to do that
may not divert its resources to anybody for anything, without
getting the permission of the Secretary of Defense. That is
priority No. 1.
Priority No. 2 is any organization that is an early
deployer for a war, if we have to get involved, and by this we
mean within the first 60 days, we will let that unit commander
help out locally. But they may not consume material, resources,
and supplies that cannot be recovered within 60 days, without
getting the permission of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We
are not going to compromise or sacrifice our ability to get
ready to deploy for a major war if we have to.
After that, all commanders are authorized to make resources
available to help out locally. There is going to have to be
some rationalization process. We think that the next most
important thing is, priority No. 3, supporting our sister
agencies in the Federal Government. We don't want to have a
problem with the Federal penitentiaries. I am not forecasting
there will be, but that is clearly an area where we are going
to be helpful if we are asked to be helpful. We want to help
our brethren in the Customs Service if something comes up in
the FAA.
Let me give an example. We have the ability in the
Department of Defense, of course, to set up our own air traffic
control. When we send a deployment, for example, to Bosnia, we
don't necessarily trust the local air traffic control system.
So we set up our own, complete with air traffic control towers
and radars, approach radars, et cetera. We can do that for
several dozen locations at once. If we have problems here in
the United States, we are prepared to help set up air traffic
control. But we need to know that we are not going to do that
and put at risk our ability to support a war plan. It is that
sort of rationalizing of scarce resources so that we can make
sure we can do it without jeopardizing our primary mission.
That is the purpose of this process.
Mr. Horn. Has the FAA Administrator or the Secretary of
Transportation asked for help?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, no, they haven't. Everything we hear, and
again I am taking my knowledge from talking in detail with John
Koskinen, and John sits in with our monthly sessions, that we
think they are going to be OK. There could be some problems
with regional airports, more at the local level. We don't know
that yet. I know that that is very much what they are turning
their focus to.
Again, we are saying that we have assets. We will support.
We will provide the supporting activity for the rest of the
Government. We are first going to have a process to make sure
that we can afford to do that from our primary war fighting
mission.
Mr. Horn. Well after this hearing is over, I am going to
phone up and see why they aren't calling you, because they
should.
Mr. Hamre. Well, sir, I think our preference would be is
that we do this together through the process John Koskinen has
set up for the Federal Government, rather than them just call
us directly. Of course they can call and we would be glad to
respond. We would like to have it in a coordinated manner
through John. John is doing a terrific job. We think that
mechanism could work and could work fairly well.
OK, I think that here is where we are. We will be ready on
January 1st. As I said, there are only six systems, and they
are not crucial for going to war because the systems are not
going to be going to war. Our war fighters are responsible for
testing. So if there is a problem with the guys that are going
into combat, they have a responsibility for telling us we have
a problem. There are contingency plans in place for every one
of these systems.
Infidelity. This was one of those issues we worked earlier
in the year. I know the fidelity was less than it should have
been earlier. I think it has improved. I will have to rely on
some continuing input from the IG and GAO to help us identify
that. We are very open to doing it. The nuclear command and
control system is fixed, or is going to be fixed. It is going
to be very scrupulously and rigorously tested. We are prepared
to support domestic activity and overseas activity, if
necessary. We are going to have to do that in a very
disciplined way. We have got lots of assets, but we don't have
anything close enough to cover it if it is a very, very
widespread problem.
Now, sir, with your permission I would like to ask Colonel
Smith to give you a summary of the testing that we did, one of
those little boxes. This was the little box that we did out at
NORAD. It was really the first, lead sophisticated testing. If
I could indulge the committee to take this briefing right now.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamre follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Please, come to the table and take whichever one
of these sad microphones you can put your fingers on.
Colonel Smith. Will that be sufficient?
Mr. Horn. That is fine. Just speak into the mic.
Colonel Smith. Mr. Chairman, Madam, for the next 5 minutes
I would like to give you some understanding of what your North
American Aerospace Defense Command has been doing for the last
4 or 5 months in the skirmish in the operational evaluation of
the Y2K problem.
I am going to show you a number of fairly technical charts.
Your staff will have those charts. I trust you understand my
intention is not to confound the committee and not to impress,
but rather to express the level of detail with which we have
examined the problem, and the amount of rigor that has been
applied to testing them in the operational environment.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. As you heard described, there are four parts
to the DOD Y2K plan. Each of the 11 combined and unified
Commanders-in-Chief have been tapped with the responsibility of
taking the work that has been done by the system program
offices doing individual technical testing and the services and
agencies and functional deputies doing various portions of
their string and functional area tests and apply that system's
approach to the actual mission environment.
In other words, take a sensor to shooter string of
operational systems; apply an exercise scenario over the top of
that; operate the systems in the Y2K environment and ensure
that we can conduct the mission.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. These are the two critical missions that
North American Aerospace Defense Command has and General Myers
is responsible to you and to the American people for aerospace
warning and aerospace control. Integrated tactical warning and
attack assessment is the warning of ballistic missile attacks,
nuclear attacks, atmospheric and space attacks. The control
part is the air sovereignty and air defense part. The portion
of this chart shown in red is the portion that we addressed in
our December operational evaluation. The remainder was
addressed in the last 2 weeks during our February operational
evaluation, otherwise known as Amalgam Virgo 99-2.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. This is obviously a chart to choke a horse.
Again, the purpose of this chart is not to address in detail
each of the systems involved, but to express the level of
detail we went to to ensure that we understood the complete
missile warning mission architecture: every box, every
connecting communication system that is involved in that
architecture.
From that architecture we carved out the minimum number of
systems, from sensor to shooter, if you will, required to
execute each of the two missions I showed you on the previous
chart.
Next, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. What that looks like in an operational sense
is that the global missile warning system, for example, to
include the radar sensor systems shown in yellow; the infrared
satellite detection systems and their sensor processor systems,
shown in blue; the correlation centers where all of the radar
and infrared information is brought together and correlated
shown in pink, principally Cheyenne Mountain; and in green, the
forward users or shooters, in this case the principals being
the National Military Command Center, the National Defense
Headquarters in Ottawa and CINCSTRAT's headquarters in Omaha.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. This is what I call a blue box chart, if you
will. It is the thin line that we carve out of that, that is,
the minimum number of systems. This is what we looked at in
December. We looked at a representative sample of each of those
three kinds of radars that I showed you and the infrared
processing system. We processed it through the two correlation
centers. In this case, principally the alternate missile
warning center at Offutt and forward to STRATCOM headquarters
to the National Military Command Center. In participation with
the Nuclear Command Control and Communications process, we also
forwarded that information to site R to make sure one, that we
had a good proof of process for operational evaluations; and
two, that we could take a look at some of our systems. Each of
the blue blocks that you see here represents a system that has
a clock in it, whether it be a distribution or a process
system, or a SECURECOM interface or some kind of a display.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. What we found from that December operational
evaluation were no failures. Not only did we have good
performance in the real-world environment, which suggested to
us that, whatever happens, our real-world system is going to
operate properly for us. Our final report was posted on January
5th, 1999, and that can be made available.
Next chart.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. Having established a good proof of process
for operational evaluations and an understanding of our
systems, we went forward this last 2 weeks in our second
operational evaluation looking at all of that space and missile
warning architecture, as well as the air warning and control
architecture. We ran runs prior to clock rollovers, across the
clock rollover, and after the clock rollover for each of the
four critical dates, the so-called 9/9/99 date, dated September
9th, the December 31st rollover, and the two leap years,
February 28th and 29th.
We looked at a representative sample again at the IR
missile sites and space sites. In the air side, we looked at
like and simulated tracks to make sure that we had good
redundant data, and we looked again at the same environment
there looking at critical sites.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. This is a missile warning thin line. In
addition to what we did in December, we picked up that last
ballistic missile early warning radar system that we had not
looked at. In addition, we looked at several elements of the
survivable endurable nuclear command and control system to
include the mobile ground stations and the mobile consolidated
command centers. We also brought forward the national defense
headquarters in the Canadian NORAD Region, along with the
Fylingdales radar station in the United Kingdom.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. The space warnings thin line is very much
similar to that with the exception of the radar that we added
at Eglin Air Force Base.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. Looking at that air warning system, the
second week, we took of the over 100 radars that ring the North
American continent for aerospace early warning, we took five
representative samples of the five key types of radars that
constitute that entire system.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. What those look like when you apply them to
that thin line environment, is the radar processors that we
looked at through the radar display systems and processing
systems at each of the regions, CONUS, Canada, and Alaska,
through Cheyenne Mountain again, a slightly different display
system, but essentially the same processing through to those
same forward users or shooters at the National Command Center,
STRATCOM, and the NDHQ in Canada.
Next chart, please.
[Chart shown.]
Colonel Smith. The summary, then, is that the first
exercise of Vigilant Virgo 99-1 went without a hitch. We had
high confidence based on nominal performance after that
evaluation. We just completed our second evaluation of the
entire mission string that we require. Our quick look is that
there were no hard failures for our NORAD system. And, I will
tell you that we were running some non-mission-critical systems
in the background to take advantage of the architecture that we
put together, and in one of those systems, we had a situation
similar to what Admiral Willard described with a message
handling piece, but the system program office that is
responsible for that tells us that it will be 60 days or less
before we have that one fixed. And in any case, it is not a
mission-critical system. So, we were successful in finding some
problems and in time to have them fixed.
The last message that I would give you here is a continuity
of operations bullet. My point there is that, having completed
our operational evaluations, we at NORAD do not consider
ourselves finished. We are responsible now to put together a
real-world operations plan so that we can deal with the actual
dates as they occur, so that we work with our local community
to make sure that we have prioritization and sharing of
resources to deal with unexpected consequences, that we have
the right people in the right place to deal with the systems,
and that we are prepared to distribute messages throughout the
system to validate the performance immediately after each
rollover. So that we don't have to wait until a real-world
event occurs to find out whether it is actually working or not.
So, we are going to apply very rigorous process to that
operational planning, so that we are prepared to deal not only
with what we have discovered in our test, but what happens in
the real world. The bottom line is the Commander-in-Chief,
NORAD General Myers, is going to be able to provide that
warning and control, just as Dr. Hamre has described, on
January 1st and every day thereafter.
Subject to your questions, that concludes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Well, let just sum it up. You have had extensive
testing and interactions in a real-world environment for most
of your systems in NORAD, and you only have very few left to
go. And as I have looked at the basic Y2K mission-critical
system, we are talking about the Army, at 10 out of 24, OK;
USN, 10 out of 55; USAF, 10 out of 14, and then the nuclear
side, of the 275, most will be completed by the end of March,
except for 12 different systems, as I heard the testimony. So,
how much is really left here after the President's date of
March 31st?
Colonel Smith. As far as our mission-critical systems----
Mr. Horn. Yes.
Colonel Smith [continuing]. For NORAD? All of the mission-
critical systems for NORAD, those that are supplied to us by
the Army, Navy, Air Force, are compliant. We have some non-
mission-critical systems of which only one will extend, as far
as I understand it, past the 31 March deadline.
Mr. Horn. OK, they are compliant and that is after the
testing in a regular real-world interaction going on around it?
Colonel Smith. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Hamre. Mr. Chairman, if I might just wrap up just to
say that I think Admiral Willard said something very important
to me while we were listening to R.F., and that was, we are
glad that we saw a couple of failures, because if they just
came back and said everything worked fine, we would think our
testing wasn't good. So we look on failures not as a sign that
we have got problems, but, frankly, that the test environment
is working. And I think that it is very important.
Sir, that really wraps up what we wanted to say to you. Of
course, I got all the smart guys here to answer the real hard
questions.
Mr. Horn. Since you are going to succeeded by Assistant
Secretary Money, is part of the problem why the Pentagon was
delayed, the fact that General Paige retired as Assistant
Secretary, then his Deputy Assistant Secretary retired, then
two Directors under them retired, so, I taketh you have had a
tough time filling that area.
Mr. Hamre. Well, sir, I think that in fairness, it is half
right and half wrong. What is right about it, is that you are
absolutely right. Art Money has made all the difference in the
world to get in there. And we went for a period of time of 8
months without having somebody in the job. So, that was a huge
change. I remember attending my first Y2K session back about 4
years ago when I was a Comptroller, and it was very hard to get
people to feel that this was something other than just a
computer geek problem. You know, this was largely viewed as
just a technical problem. And it really took until last summer,
when we said, and this isn't about computers; this is about
fighting and winning wars; this is about people; this is about
leadership. And it was bringing them onboard, and fortunately,
what Art was able to do was to bring a discipline process that
he and Marv and Bill had worked out, so that we really could
take advantage of that energy that the Secretary put into the
system.
It is working. I think we are going to be OK. I don't want
to give you the impression that we won't have some surprises,
but we are going to be able to take care of this country.
Mr. Horn. Let me ask you one last question for me, and I
will yield to my colleagues. The microchip situation, not just
the critical mission bit. How many? You have probably got a
billion or so----
Mr. Hamre. Yes, lots of them.
Mr. Horn [continuing]. Somewhere throughout the Department
of Defense. What are we doing on that?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, some others here know. I think the answer
is we have done some testing already. We found that the problem
isn't nearly bigger than we thought it was, and who----
Admiral Willard. I can cover it in general. Sir, the
process of checking microprocessors is part of our remediation
series of events. It is actually handled in the management
plan. And these systems that you are seeing tested here are not
strictly date functions that are associated with software, but,
indeed, date functions associated with microprocessors as well.
And you are right, there are a great many of them in our
systems. But, once again, as we took the systems through
testing and through remediation, in addition to our software
requirements, microprocessors were part of that entire checks-
and-balances issue.
Mr. Horn. I yield 5 minutes to Mrs. Morella, the co-
chairman of the task force.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you very much. I thank you for your
testimony and the charts, and I think the testimony has been
somewhat comforting.
I have a number of concerns. One was the personality; you
have tried to address that. Computer chips was another one. I
am concerned about the contractors that you deal with, knowing
that you deal with so many of them. How are you going to handle
making sure that not only they say they are compliant, but that
they have been adequately tested? I don't know whether you have
a special department or group that are looking at that, or
whether each of the compartments is looking at its own, in
terms of its contractors, and have you found them reticent to
respond to your inquiry in terms of validating or assuring that
they are compliant?
Mr. Hamre. Mrs. Morella, of course, we have so many
contractors.
Mrs. Morella. Yes.
Mr. Hamre. I mean, several hundred thousands of contractors
that we work with, and, of course, all the utilities all around
the country, et cetera. So, it is not a process that we can run
centrally. This is one where we have to give individual
organizations responsibility to check with who they work with
most and that sort of thing. And everybody has been given that
job.
And our answer is that, for example, if we have a
contractor we are not sure if they are going to be able to
provide spare parts, you know, in a Y2K environment, let's not
go out and stockpile a bunch of spare parts. Let's find a
contractor who is. You know, let's find somebody. Let's use the
power of the marketplace here to get people to fix their
systems.
Now, we have found it difficult for companies to give us
unequivocal answers about where they will be. And it is partly
this fear of lawsuits, you know, that has frozen up so many
people here with year 2000. This is a big problem. This is a
problem that, frankly, rests--there is only one place in the
world that you can settle it; that is here in Congress, and
that is to reconcile the relative priorities of the legal due
process rights that belong with both aggrieved parties and
claimants and defenders versus the problem we are having
getting unequivocal answers to questions.
We are doing our best to work around that, but, frankly,
the environment people that are in there are never going to
give you 100 percent guarantees. I can understand that because
of the environment we have. So, we work other ways of trying to
get a handle on, are they going to be ready; aren't they? We
ask to see, well, tell us about your testing plan. Tell us
about how you are going through your internal procedures to
confirm you will be compliant. You can get a pretty good sense
pretty quick. I mean, if they get kind of a blank bovine and
stare, you know that we are in trouble.
Mrs. Morella. I hope so, because I still find that daunting
and rather frightening. Are you also indicating that you feel
some kind of liability legislation is appropriate? I mean, you
know we have legislation that is saying that it is not a waiver
of immunity; it does not offer the immunity, not a waiver of
liability, but it looks at frivolous lawsuits, talks about
alternative dispute resolution, and has a series of other
components that might well reduce that chilling effect. Do you
have a feeling about it?
Mr. Hamre. Madam Chairwoman, I really have to defer to John
Koskinen, to speak on behalf of the administration, I think,
for that, rather than I don't--the Department of Defense
wouldn't have views independent of what the administration
would have, and I really need to have him answer that question.
Mrs. Morella. I understand the situation, and I guess I was
just kind of thinking personally.
Mr. Hamre. And we would like to work together with you to
get that, yes.
Mrs. Morella. My other concern, and I would certainly
invite, if time allows, our Inspector General and GAO
representative to comment on--I am very concerned about other
countries; you mentioned Russia; you mentioned trying to
assuage their concerns and to help them, and I assume this is
Kazahkstan and all of the other Republics, too, of the former
Soviet Union. But, I also traveled in Asia and even to Tokyo,
to Japan, and of course, Indonesia and Korea, and they are just
so far behind in terms of remedying of being compliant with
Y2K. I don't even think they understand all the ramifications
of it.
My concern is, of course, obviously, the interoperability,
the fact that we have bases on so many of those places, too.
Are we placing our own people in jeopardy about the world?
Would you like to comment further on that?
Mr. Hamre. I will try to be very brief. We are not worried
about our war-fighting systems, because, frankly, they are kind
of designed to operate independently, wherever they are. But we
are worried about, you know, the living conditions and the
support functions that go on that we have overseas. We are
apprehensive about where things stand in Korea and Japan, not
that they don't have very talented people to fix things; they
do, enormously capable people. But, you know, they have had
their hands full with some serious economic problems for the
last year and a half and they probably haven't been spending as
much attention to this as have we. So, we are nervous about it.
We have asked our Commander-in-Chief for United States Forces
in Korea to work with the Koreans, and I believe that we really
do have a good dialog now established with the Koreans about
it.
We are particularly worried about things like electrical
power, things of that nature, telecommunications. Probably our
biggest concern, if we have it overseas, is with nuclear power
reactors in the old Soviet Union. We don't know that there are
very good safety backup arrangements for them. That makes us
worried. You know, we are nervous about that. Again, it is not
so much that it affects our ability to operate our military
ability, but I think in a broader sense, I think Americans
should worry about that.
Why don't I see if our colleagues here have some followup
notes.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you.
Mr. Brock. I think that is a very important area, Mrs.
Morella. The potential for Y2K disruptions in other countries I
believe is much greater than it is in the United States. I
think that Deputy Secretary Hamre is correct when he states
that it might not have an immediate impact on our forces, but
it, obviously, has an impact on economic relationships, on
trade relationships, on our ability to get goods and services
into the United States, and on our ability to have effective
harmonious relationships with other countries that might be
having disruptions caused by large-scale failures. The problem
is, it is unlike the Department of Defense where we are able to
go in and identify the issues and come up before you and
discuss them; we don't have that same level of visibility
within the international arena.
Mrs. Morella. Mr. Lieberman.
Mr. Lieberman. Within the last few weeks, I have had people
doing extensive work in Korea and in the Middle Eastern
countries, where we have forces stationed, and we have also
done some work in Europe. I would concur that most countries in
the world, other than most of the European countries,
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, are well behind us. We need
to do a lot more communicating with them than has been done in
the past.
We have found basically a lot of situations where they are
waiting for U.S. officials to come talk to them and we have not
done that yet. So, the auditors have been trying to close those
communication gaps.
Actually, I think the level of awareness is going up very
steeply in all of those countries, for a variety of reasons.
There was a World Bank report in January which shook up lots of
countries when the World Bank reported that they were not doing
well in Y2K. In the Republic of Korea's case, they didn't
answer the mail from the World Bank, so they got a blank on the
chart which showed whether or not you were doing anything, and
they are very upset, because they do have an active program
now.
We are dependent on these foreign countries for everything
from air traffic control in Kuwait and using Kuwaiti hospitals
to Republic of Korea railroads, power, water, all kinds of
things. So, this is a critical concern. And it is one of those
areas that, as I mentioned in my statement, still has to be
worked very intensively as the year goes on. You probably
couldn't have done that much 6 months ago because the countries
simply weren't ready to talk, but I think now they are.
And all of those that are members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, which include Japan,
Korea, and most of the European countries where we have bases,
are pushing forward much more vigorously with this now than
they were before the turn of the year.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you. I know my time has expired.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
Mrs. Morella. China is another country, too, that, you
know, enormous proportions. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes requesting to
Mr. Turner of Texas, the ranking member of the subcommittee.
Mr. Hamre. If you will indulge me, sir, Mr. Money, who
knows everything, anyway, I am going to ask him to sit in my
place.
Mr. Horn. Well, can you indulge me for 30 seconds?
Mr. Hamre. Oh, yes, sir, of course; you are the chairman.
Mr. Horn. And I will tell you this: You will know with your
experience on the Hill, but occasionally, a Member will throw
in something when they have got the big man in front of them.
So, this is a big man question that has come over from the
Pentagon. ``For as long as anybody can remember, we Pentagon
employees have been walking from the parking lot to the
building, no matter how far from the building we have had to
walk. Reason: it is against regulations to use government
vehicles for employment commuting purposes, which is what a
shuttle would be. Now, we find out the Defense Supply Center in
Columbus, Ohio, operates a parking lot shuttle in a parking lot
much smaller than the Pentagon's. As justification, they site
DOD Regulation 4500.36-R. If that regulation can justify
shuttle service for DOD employees in Columbus, Ohio, then why
can't it justify the same service right here at the Pentagon.''
I merely bring this up because they might be working on the
Y2K problem--[laughter]--and if you would not mind, Mr.
Secretary----
Mr. Hamre. I will look into it.
Mr. Horn [continuing]. Making sure there is an answer on
disparity of treatment with this Department.
Mr. Hamre. I absolutely will look into it. It is in our
interest to get the workers there earlier. So, I will find out
what is going on.
Mr. Horn. OK. Thank you very much. [Laughter.]
Mr. Money, then, will replace you.
And, Mr. Money, tell us how long it took to, one, to get
your appointment up there, and, two, to get confirmed?
Mr. Money. It is not even up there yet. [Laughter.]
Mr. Horn. Because we have all been wondering, you know,
where are you? And, I take it, it took rather lengthy or what?
Mr. Money. No, sir. I am still the senior civilian
official.
Mr. Horn. I see. OK. So, you haven't been confirmed yet?
Mr. Money. I was confirmed about 3-plus years ago as the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research, Development,
and Acquisition. Dr. Hamre asked me to come down about a year
ago to take on this job. So, pending, if I am nominated and if
I am confirmed, then I would be the Assistant Secretary, but
today I am the senior civilian official of the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Horn. This is the Assistant Secretary C3 plus
intelligence?
Mr. Money. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. Yes, we are glad to have you onboard.
Mr. Money. My pleasure.
Mr. Horn. And Mr. Turner now has the floor.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Money, after listening to Dr. Hamre, I think we
all are very much reassured that the Department of Defense has
gotten this house in order, and obviously, you are due much of
the credit for that. And I think we heard some very interesting
proposals that you are planning to implement, one of which I
found very interesting, and that is the idea that you are going
to invite the Russian military to come look over the shoulders
of those who man our nuclear weapon systems on January 1. I
wondered if that had ever been done before. This seems like
certainly a groundbreaking event?
Mr. Money. Not in the nuclear area, to my knowledge, Mr.
Turner. The State Department is actually working that. We came
up with the idea several months ago, but it is being worked
through the State Department. As it was alluded to earlier;
there have been several groups going back and forth to Russia
discussing this. Also, I believe there is some discussion about
bringing in anti-nuclear power, so that in fact they can, in
fact, see that, through our early warning systems, if anything
else is going on, to assure them that if there are screens that
go blank or all light up, whatever may be a problem out of Y2K,
that there is an independent or yet another source of
information to preclude any inadvertent reactions.
I might, if I could, just add onto a previous question that
the IG responded to. Mr. Curtis, back here, he has been
overseas a lot. We have had several workshops with various
countries. In particular, what comes to mind are several NATO
allies. We have also gone into Australia, Canada, into Russia,
more recently. So, we have had an outreach program from the
DOD. But the overall outreach program, and in fact it was being
handled under the coordination with the Y2K coordinator, John
Koskinen, but of note, he has had a meeting, I want to say,
maybe 6 weeks ago, 2 months ago, up at the United Nations,
where there were over 100 countries present, where the problem
was talked about, awareness was heightened, as a beginning to
get other countries in the world more aware, if not, into
remediation.
So, there has been a fair amount of outreach, albeit, there
always could be more. But the State Department is also looking
into that. But, when it comes to Y2K, we look to John Koskinen
as being the defining authority on all those activities.
Mr. Turner. What kind of potential problems do we face with
our NATO allies where we have joint operations, say Bosnia?
What kind of potential problem do we have, and have we done
anything to try to remedy that?
Mr. Money. Absolutely. We have the Supreme Allied
Commander, General Wes Clark. He is also CINC for European
command. So, he has those two hats. He stands up in front of
the Secretary and the Deputy on certifying that the United
States Forces in Europe are ready, but, also, we have looked at
him and tried to help in the NATO area.
Frankly, I have some concerns in NATO. Some of the
countries are going after the Y2K problem with a vengeance;
others are less so. The U.K., Netherlands, France, are very
much up on Y2K. Germany is maybe a little bit behind, and then
some of the other countries are quite a ways behind. In
particular, operations into Bosnia today rely on circuits that
are not Y2K compliant. We are trying to get them to be Y2K
compliant by the end of the year, but there are some worries
about that. We also have backups, though, from a U.S.
standpoint, that would help.
So, I can't give you a blanket guarantee that all the
communications and command and control of the NATO are up and
compliant to date because they are not. But there is effort
being made against those areas, albeit I think it is a little
late and maybe too short, not enough being done.
Mr. Turner. So, the reports that we have been given today
really are directed our own systems, and really do not
represent an assessment of what kind of problems we might have
when we are doing a joint operation with NATO?
Mr. Money. You are absolutely right. What we are talking
about is what the DOD can do for operations when there is a
coalition or an allied operation; these folks will also look at
that. So, let me just give Admiral Willard here a chance, but,
also, the people here from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps.
Admiral Willard. I would say this: Very recently, the Y2K
Task Force lead for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[NATO] visited us in the Pentagon, in fact, visited with me for
some time just to compare notes in terms of the approaches to
our respective problems. He is from the United Kingdom and was
assigned the responsibility to oversee their remediation
process and evaluation process. And, as Mr. Money points out,
they are not as far along as this Department is right now, but
are enthusiastic, and they understand the process. If not in
remediation of actual systems, then in building the necessary
contingency plans to be able to work around them. Also, we have
an ongoing dialog between our European command and NATO, and
NATO has an infrastructure that is, in fact, in place to
address the problem.
Mr. Money. Admiral Johnson, you want to talk about the
Navy, and in particular, Mr. Turner's question?
Admiral Johnson. We started last year recognizing that we
had to deploy ships year 2000 compliant at least 6 months ahead
of time because of the length of our cycle. The first year 2000
compliant battle group is the Constellation. We just finished
the year 2000 joint systems integration test. Well, actually we
haven't finished it. It is ongoing right now. But, New Year's
Day 2000 was at 1600 local in the SOCAL operating areas on
Saturday. I was there. The clocks rolled over and flight
operations and the man overboard drill and everything else just
continued, and they held a New Year's Eve party on board.
The HMCS Regina, a Canadian ship, is deploying with that
battle group. She has been involved in our testing and
planning. Much of our C3 interoperability with our allies in
the battle group environment are the results of FMS sales. Our
FMS offices have contacted our allies, have informed them which
ones of our sales are year 2000 compliant, which ones aren't,
and what the fixes are. We are providing that information to
our allies so that they can implement those changes. Regina is
an example where we had the Canadians involved in our testing
because they are going to deploy with us, and have gotten her
capability tested in a year 2000 environment.
Mr. Horn. General Ambrose.
General Ambrose From the Air Force perspective, we are
absolutely sure that our systems and our people will be ready
to go on January 1, 2000. For foreign systems on the FMS side
of things, we do a very good job of telling foreign countries
to whom we export technology, what the status of that equipment
is. And we know what the status of it is on the day that we
transfer it to that foreign country. Now, quite honestly, if
that country chooses to modify the equipment somehow or add a
third country's technology to it, then we no longer know the
status of it.
For that reason, interoperability has become an important
issue to us. And what we have done, is engaged our major
commands, most of whom are components to a commander-in-chief
somewhere in the world, and asked them to engage those
commanders-in-chief, because the approach that you take to
interoperability will be different in every theater because of
the mix of countries you have there, because of the Y2K status
of those countries, and there is certainly no uniformity in
that anywhere across the globe.
So, the right answer to this, I believe, is the approach we
have taken, and that is, to have the war-fighters engage our
coalition partners and allies and to work out those
interoperability issues with them in theater for the situation
they encounter.
Mr. Horn. The answer to Mr. Turner's question?
Ms. Browning. Good morning, Mr. Horn. First, let me tell
you that, as of right now, about 95 percent of the Army war-
fighting systems are compliant, and the rest of our systems, as
has been talked earlier, will be compliant toward the end of
the year, between now and then.
Concerning the issue of interoperability, right now we are
in the process of going through all our war-fighting divisions.
Our 10 divisions are 4 corps, and we are testing all of the
systems. Probably the biggest issue we have, as has been
indicated by my colleagues, is the foreign military. We are
working with our Army Materiel Command. We are working with our
partners both in Korea and Europe to make sure that as we do
the test not only in our corps and divisions, but also with
unified commanders, that the equipment we are using in the
coalition warfare, that information is knowledgeable to these
folks, they are looking at our implementation of that, and if
they have a system they need to adapt, that we provide them all
the information in doing that. So, we guarantee when the United
States, when the Army weapons are given to those other
countries, we give them the status of the Y2K compliancy of
those weapon systems.
Mr. Horn. Colonel McHale.
Colonel McHale. Thank you, sir. The Marine Corps presently
has fixed 84 percent of our mission-critical systems, and we
are on track to finish the remainder prior to September of this
year. The way the Marine Corps is configured, we are more
expeditionary and less dependent upon overseas bases, so we
don't have the problems that the Army and the Air Force would
have. We just completed an operational evaluation that we
conducted in Norway, which was not intended to be an
interoperability exercise with the Norwegians, but they
observed our exercises, and we traded information with them
about the status of where they were, and came away quite
confident that they were taking similar measures, although they
are not on the same time line that we are. We demonstrated some
interoperability with them in Y2K systems, although it was not
part of a detailed technical plan, and again, came away with
the idea that they were on track and performing very similar
measures that we were.
Mr. Horn. Good. I thank the gentleman for that question,
and now yield the 5-minutes to the vice chairman of the
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and
Technology, Mrs. Biggert, of Illinois.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rear Admiral Willard, I had the opportunity 2 weeks ago to
be at the Southern Command on my way on counternarcotics,
visiting six countries in Central and South America, and was
very impressed with what was happening down there. You
mentioned that the Y2K problem was not jeopardizing their
mission down there, that they were able to do both at once. I
wondered if, since it seems to have been a lot of progress made
down there and doing the end-to-end testing, if they are
providing help to other areas, if they are sending anybody
there to work on this problem or are all these commands doing
it separately?
Admiral Willard. In the case of Southern Command, the
entire area of responsibility for that CINC, the commands, both
interagency and within Southern Command proper, are all
participating in this event. That said, there is ongoing dialog
with some of our host nations to involve them in our year 2000
assessments, and it has met with limited success. I would say
that the true successes have been with our Uniformed Services
in the operating area, as well as the Coast Guard and the other
agencies down there that we are coordinating with. But, as is
the case in Europe and as is the case in Asia, we find it
challenging in the Southern Command to ascertain the exact
status of infrastructures in and around our forces that are
operating there, and we continue to strive to do that.
Mrs. Biggert. I guess then my next question, is there a
coordination between the different commands, like in Europe? Is
there anybody that is in charge of overseeing all of those
areas and making sure where there are successes in the testing
of one area that that is forwarded to the other areas and to
see if there is any difference?
Admiral Willard. As you know, geographically, our world is
divided among our uniformed commanders in chiefs, and they are,
in fact, responsible for the conduct of the operations
evaluations that you have seen illustrated this morning. They
all have a reporting requirement not only insofar as their
operations evaluations are concerned, but also as an ongoing
assessment of the status of their forces within those regions
of the world. So they are maintaining visibility on both the
success of their operations evaluations as well as the forces
that are in country by the various Services.
And I would say too that the Uniformed Services
individually maintain a great deal of visibility on their
foreign base and facilities structures overseas and are
continuously reporting their status as the year 2000 is
concerned.
Mrs. Biggert. I guess what I am asking is, at what point is
there coordination between all the services? At what level is
there someone who is coordinating all of the services?
Admiral Willard. That is Mr. Money.
Mrs. Biggert. Mr. Money would probably know.
Admiral Willard. It is also the Joint Staff to some extent.
So, though we focus primarily on the unified commands, the real
focal point of effort, the real coordinating effort within the
Pentagon is the conduct of the synchronization meetings that
were described earlier where the uniformed services are
represented. We in the Joint Staff represent our commanders-in-
chief, and all of the agencies are responsible for their
functional areas, and their tasks are also represented there,
and we discuss at that level all of our interactions.
Mr. Money. Ma'am, if I could just add to that--this admiral
here is the joint staff representative that also pulls all of
that together. And he and my deputy, Marv Langston, meet weekly
now on these harmonizing meetings, if you will, to sort those
things out.
I also want to just mention, not one CINC stands alone.
There is supporting CINCs like transportation or space command,
or whatever; that information is also being brought to those
CINCs. By law, we have two tests for everything we are doing,
and you can see there is 27, going to 31 tests; there is 30
CINCs, so there is a lot of duplication of support functions
that are also being tested. So, they are not totally standalone
per se.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you.
I guess then, Mr. Brock, you talked about the management
function and how there needs to be improvement with that. Is
this the area that you are talking about?
Mr. Brock. Yes, ma'am, exactly. The example you saw earlier
regarding the NORAD operational evaluation, was an example of a
timely controlled test, well-defined test parameters, a well-
defined test script; a test script was followed, and things
worked. When things didn't work, there was a way of going
around it, and people were able to track it. That, we have been
finding, is fairly typical of what we are seeing in the
operational evaluations.
However, on the functional evaluations, and when we review
the plans of the functional evaluations--these are things like
logistics, health, personnel, accounting, processes that the
Department depends on on a day-to-day basis to support
everything--and when we review their plans, we don't find that
same level. I mean, we see a lack of test schedules, a lack of
identification of specific goals and objectives, and it is more
difficult to track what is going on there.
I think the synchronization meetings that Mr. Money was
talking about go a long ways toward resolving some of these
differences, and we attend those synchronization meetings. But,
to some degree, they are just reports of individual components
and they are not funneled in such a way that all the
information comes in in the same format or the same form that
is easy for the top managers to make decisions about, and to
determine what is going wrong and what is going right. So, this
is the area that we are recommending that they need to improve,
the type of management information coming in, so that there can
be better oversight over these processes.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. If I might just interject a minute, to clarify
that answer--you make a very good point, Mr. Brock. I would
like to ask Mr. Money and yourself if you have seen not only a
report that comes in on a regular cycle to the responsible
manager--I would be curious, Mr. Money, in answer to Mr.
Brock's answer to Mrs. Biggert--to what degree do you have them
on, say, weekly reports, every other week, or monthly reports?
What is our timetable there to get a sense of urgency
throughout the whole establishment?
Mr. Money. Let's see, at the Department level, we meet
monthly, reviewing what has transpired according to a plan from
the previous month. Each of these functional people or PSA's,
Principal Staff Authorities, over whatever these functional
areas are, are meeting more often with whatever is going on in
their particular area.
I don't dispute or find any deviation from what Jack is
talking about. Those plans aren't as rigorous and robust as
we'd like them. We will continue to work with those folks. But
I would say, this is now getting daily attention at some level.
It rolls up, and we will have a roughly a 2-hour session with
the Deputy Secretary once a month. Your staff, other
committee's staff from Congress are invited and attend, as well
as the IG, GAO, and John Koskinen has been very good at
attending every one of those as well. So, it depends on what
level you are on. There are various daily to monthly attention
being given.
I want to just foot-stomp, if I might, what Dr. Hamre said;
some of the reporting, though, is obviously late, but also, it
is burdensome. Let me give you an example. Every time you put
out a report card for us, and when we were still at the ``F''
or the ``D-minus'' level, my office, frankly, it would be the
Secretary of Defense, or, frankly, the President, would get
letters from the general public. Those would then go to the
Secretary of Defense and eventually get to my office. We have
10 people, or thereabouts, continuously responding to the
private citizen. I would rather have those 10 people off
working on Y2K compliance versus answering mail, where our
policy is we will answer every piece of mail. So, that is part
of the additional duties, if you will, that maybe aren't quite
as productive as we would like, but we will do that.
Mr. Horn. Well, if you are successful in getting all the
mail answered, we would like you to come over and spend a few
weeks on Capital Hill. They keep telling us why they can't get
it answered.
I now yield to the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
I would like to ask the IG, your office has completed 50
reports on the Y2K efforts in DOD. You have already completed
50 reports, and I am told that you have an additional 50
reports in progress. Is that true?
Mr. Lieberman. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, then it is obviously, I would say, the
highest priority of your office. I would like to know, has the
Department of Defense responded adequately to your concerns and
the problems that you have raised?
Mr. Lieberman. Yes. I think it is fair to say that we
probably never have had as much responsiveness from the most
senior levels of the Department to any given body of audit work
than we have had to these Y2K audits.
References have been made to some of the positive outcomes
or silver linings in the cloud from Y2K--I think one of the
lessons learned is that a lot of managers in the Department
have learned how to use their internal auditors constructively,
and to unleash us instead of trying to keep us out of areas. I
would say, with very few exceptions, that there are mechanisms
to work those exceptions, management has normally taken
corrective action even before we formally report.
Mrs. Maloney. As recently as last September, you found that
9 of the 16 weapon systems contracts that you reviewed, that
they did not contain the required language for Y2K 2000
compliance. And this seems like a widespread problem due to
DOD's decentralization of contracts and procurements in weapons
systems. Do DOD contracts now contain a standard Y2K compliance
assurance clause?
Mr. Lieberman. They are supposed to. We are still finding
isolated instances where they don't, but I would say the
problem basically is as close to being solved as it is going to
be. We will still look for that in every single audit that we
do, but I think the Department has come a long way. Initially,
auditors were finding this non-compliance quite frequently, but
now it has become an isolated exception.
Mrs. Maloney. The DOD report to OMB, no longer contains
information on the status of the intelligence community. And
again, I would like to ask the IG, the current status of the
intelligence computer system and whether there is a concern
within the intelligence community. And I would also like to add
that possibly we shouldn't be asking detailed questions about
the intelligence community in public hearings. If you would be
more comfortable, I have a series of questions in writing I
could give to you on the intelligence community.
Mr. Lieberman. That would be fine. And Mr. Money runs the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence), so he can weigh-in also.
Mr. Horn. And if you can't respond here, we will have Mrs.
Maloney's questions go over to you, and at this point in the
record, without objection, the answers and questions will be
put in.
Mr. Money. Yes, sir, but I can give you an answer here. All
those numbers included every critical system that DOD needs to
conduct any operations, including intelligence systems. The
data base issue was dropped out, meaning it is handled at a
classified data base because we were concerned about how much
information was present in that data base. So, it is still
being reported as handled in a classified manner.
Mrs. Maloney. But I tell you, the report that you put up
there, it was quite comprehensive, and it had many tests taking
place at the same time.
Mr. Money. Yes, ma'am. And those included the intelligence
system that whatever that test needed.
Mrs. Maloney. Right. OK, I will still put my questions in
though.
Mr. Money. And we will be glad to answer.
Mrs. Maloney. On the weapons systems, again, I would like
to go back to the IG. How safe are we that we won't have some
weapon that goes off? And we have got some serious weapons now.
I understand that most of our nuclear weapons have a manual
process that is required to launch them. They have to be
manually activated, but that we have other serious weapons that
aren't manually operated, that are computer operated. And how
safe are we? What is the status of these weapons systems? Is it
correct to say that they will fail safe, that they will not
accidently misfire? Have you been reviewing all of these and
making sure there won't be a problem?
Mr. Lieberman. We have only looked at a small sampling of
weapon systems, I would say probably about 20. In none of those
cases were there any dangers of that type. Statistically, the
Department is reporting that about 90 percent of the weapon
systems are compliant at this point. There are 40 some that
still need to be worked through as the year progresses. But I
would have to defer to my colleagues here to the left to talk
to those systems that the IG hasn't looked at.
Mr. Money. Let me answer one question and then pass it
down, because this is not only a joint staff answer, but each
service.
But just go back a few weeks. We had missiles about to be
in the air, and we had positive recall in a command-and-control
sense. They may be an automated sense, but initially they are
started, and there is a person in the loop. Some of that
requires Presidential authority and release; others require
CINC. So, it is not just that things are all totally automatic;
there is something that starts it, and there is a human in that
loop. But each of these people can answer that as well.
Admiral Willard. With regard to weapons, I would just
remind everyone that it is a special functional area. It
receives very particular oversight by Mr. Money. As well, we
have a system where each of our mission-critical systems and
the weapons that fall into that category have been or are being
remediated and checked Y2K compliant. Overarching that is the
systems integration testing by the Services and they are
testing all of their weapons systems, and above that, are the
CINC operational evaluations that are testing from sensor to
shooter. So, these mission-critical systems are receiving not
only the attention that they need to make them compliant in the
first place, but are undergoing rigorous integration and
warfighting testing, as well, in several ways. I would defer to
the Services to speak to their individual weapons systems, but
you can be assured that the weapons systems are getting all the
attention they deserve.
Admiral Johnson. I want to emphasize that we have tried not
to put any new processes in place to try and resolve this
problem. We have used existing processes that have been proven
over the years--our weapons systems safety processes, our
safety of flight, our submarine safety programs, and the like.
We know how to do systems integration and systems engineering.
We have added Y2K aspects onto those, but our weapons systems
are safe.
General Ambrose. And I will add to what Admiral Johnson
said that safety is an important part of our business, day in
and day out. You can't use something to defend the Nation if
you are destroying it yourself. So, we are very, very careful.
Y2K is just one more thing we are very careful about.
Now, when it comes to testing, we test our systems when we
are in the process of certifying them. But when we go into
these operational evaluations, we will only test Y2K compliant
systems. So, we won't be testing systems that we are not yet
sure are absolutely safe. In addition, I am not personally
aware of very many weapons that have date-sensitive functions
in them. That doesn't mean there aren't any, but I am just not
aware of very many.
Finally, in our testing to date, the Air Force has not
encountered a catastrophic failure of any sort involving any
weapons. So, our weapons are all safe.
Ms. Browning. The Army is in very good shape on its weapons
systems. About 95 percent are already Y2K compliant. You need
to know, too, that the Army has no nuclear weapons. That is
just a fact. The Army started testing of its weapons systems
and its divisional units back in the fall. Let me just give you
a brief snapshot of some of those tests and what we found.
We did a lot of tests, as you know, at White Sands Missile
Range. We did live fire tests. We tested our helicopters, our
infrastructure, our command-and-control pieces. We found very
few Y2K errors. The one or two we did find, they were easily
fixable and we moved on.
We have also tested our first deployable forces of the 18
Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg. We did a number of communications
tests back in the fall. They are part of our testing of our
divisions and our corps units. Again, we found very few, if
any, Y2K problems. We tested the 3rd Corps Field Artillery at
Fort Sill, OK--that is an ongoing test--and the 10th Mountain
Division in Fort Drum, NY, which will be deployed to Bosnia
shortly. They have requested a full Y2K test.
I would also echo what General Ambrose has said. Many of
our weapons systems do not process dates, so you can rest more
comfortably with that. But the ones that do, we have tested
them and we are very confident that they will work.
Colonel McHale. The Marine Corps is a shopper, not a
developer, of weapons systems; 49 percent of our weapons
systems are developed by the other services. The Army is the
primary developer of our ground combat systems, and the Navy is
the developer of our aviation systems. And we are tracking with
them very closely on the status of their systems, and we take
their compliant reports and ensure that the equipment is in
fact certified, that we are using them and that we have
incorporated them into our operational evaluations.
We have conducted two operational evaluations to date, one
in December, and one just last month in Norway, that I
mentioned earlier, and have found no failures in any of the
systems that we are operating.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. And I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Ose,
the gentleman from California.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to also share with
you that I was with Mrs. Biggert when we visited South Comm,
and thereafter on Chairman Mica's reprise of the Bataan death
march for the rest of the trip. I am still tired.
I had a couple of questions, and I want to ask them in the
context of, are there things that Congress needs to provide to
make this happen, so that, come December 31, we have got it
solved, this Y2K problem solved? If I understood the testimony
today, the battle groups that we have out on deployment
operating independently of any host-nation by virtue of being
on international waters, they are OK. Am I correct on that? Go
ahead.
Admiral Johnson. We never operate independently. We are
always in a combined environment of Naval forces or a joint
environment, because we are always communicating with our Air
Force, Marine Corps, Army counterparts, as we do our operations
and supply maritime support from the sea. To that respect, we
do rely upon the shore infrastructure; we do rely upon the
space infrastructure. In the Constellation battle group test,
we actually carved out a separate communications node so that
we could use our Reachback Comms in the year 2000 testing
environment this last weekend and ongoing today.
So, to the extent that our forces are off the coast, and
they are using their own capabilities for surface surveillance,
undersea surveillance, air surveillance, and mission
performance, yes, they are independent. Like every force in a
coalition or joint environment, we are dependent upon the shore
infrastructure and the other capabilities that might come to
bear from either host nations or our joint commanders. And we
are testing those in our operational evaluations.
Mr. Ose. Does our dependence on those joint operations
impact us to the degree that we are not capable? I thought I
heard the testimony today that said we are OK irrespective of
those joint interactions.
Admiral Willard. There are a couple of things to consider.
The battle groups themselves are being tested as an entity in
the----
Mr. Ose. That is the question that I am trying to get to.
Admiral Willard. The answer is, yes, very rigorously. In
fact, there is a sequence of five battle groups that will be
tested, and the testing is very rigorous and extends throughout
the battle group to ensure its Y2K compliance as an entity. In
addition, the component Services are all captured in both their
individual integration testing and unified command operations
evaluations. So, those important interfaces between Services
and between headquarters in the individual components' Services
are all part of this examination.
Mr. Money. The comments you have may be related to--I don't
know if I made it or Dr. Hamre--when we are in garrison, if you
will, in foreign countries, we are dependent on local power,
and so forth. When we go to the field, we are self-sufficient.
Mr. Ose. It was Dr. Hamre----
Mr. Money. Yes.
Mr. Ose [continuing]. But I am most concerned about the
deployed battle groups, not the ones that are in drydock, and
not the ones spinning up for the next mission.
Admiral Willard. Sir, and again, I should defer to Admiral
Johnson, but the entire Navy approach currently is to ensure
that the integral battle group, to include the amphibious ready
group component, is Y2K compliant as a whole, and they are
actually being sequenced through their testing in accordance
with their deployment dates, to ensure that we don't push a
battle group across the millennium that has not been fully
integration tested and captured in our operations evaluation
process that is not Y2K compliant.
Admiral Johnson. Today, the Peleliu and the Constellation
battle group are operating off the coast of southern
California, and all the clocks on those ships read, now it is
January 2, 2000.
Mr. Ose. To reference the test they are doing.
Admiral Johnson [continuing]. And they are flying sorties.
They are conducting practice bombing runs. They are doing AAW.
They are doing man overboard drills, everything that they would
normally do as part of their battle group qualifications,
because PAC Fleet is a force provider to the joint commanders,
responsible that those forces, when provided, will be fully
certified to do their war-fighting mission in a year 2000
environment.
Mr. Ose. We have battle groups that are nuclear; we have
battle groups that are non-nuclear. Are the battle groups that
are nuclear, have the core reactors been tested?
Admiral Johnson. The Naval reactors, I won't speak for
Admiral Bowman, except to say that the nuclear propulsion
plants are year 2000 compliant.
Mr. Ose. Right. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to get to all
of my questions, but I do appreciate your patience. That gets
me to my second question.
On these operational evaluations for calendar year 1999,
you have the various command locations, and this is somewhat
frightening and I am actually understanding what the acronyms
mean. Some of them have primary; some of them have backup. The
one that does not have a backup is the transportation command
down at the bottom. Does that affect our logistics ability and
what are we doing about that?
Admiral Willard. In fact, Transportation Command--this may
be a slight error. Every unified command operations evaluation
must be backed up. So I would ask you to allow us to correct
that slide and provide you the dates of their backup period. In
fact, it was our requirement that, as they scheduled their
operations evaluations, that they carve out an adequate period
of time to handle further remediation and retesting, if
required. So, it is mandatory that they have that available.
Mr. Money. That is exactly right. That period from,
roughly, July 1st, through the end of the September, in fact,
is being viewed as, if we don't, if something goes haywire the
first time or two, then there is where it will be tested yet
again. So, I think the chart is wrong here.
Mr. Ose. All right, thank you. I have two more questions.
My time is going to expire, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Horn. No, it hasn't.
Mr. Ose [continuing]. So I will get to one.
Mr. Horn. It hasn't expired, and my rule is, if you can get
the question out, they can take a half hour to answer it.
Mr. Ose. Holy smokes. Hold on. Fasten your seatbelts.
[Laughter.]
Two questions. The first is having to do with the
communication facilities for our forward-deployed units. I see
we have on that same page a primary system, but no back up. And
my second question is, with respect to Russia, I know that we
talked about the command control systems that are in place
there, but with respect to their perceived lack of civilian
control in that country and the third-party organizations that
might operate, they are dependent on computers. Does Y2K cause
a problem in terms of, if you will, proliferation of nuclear
weapons or development of nuclear weapons within countries that
are now nuclear capable but who lack civilian control? That is
two completely unrelated questions. I appreciate the chairman's
dispensation on the communication.
Admiral Willard. Sir, I can handle the communication
question that you asked. The functional areas are being handled
a little bit differently than the unified command operations
evaluations. These functional end-to-end tasks, their detailed
planning and the tests are being executed by the agencies
responsible for our DOD-wide or, in some cases, national
networks. They don't fall under the same categorization as the
commander in chief OPEVALs (Operational Evaluations). And as
such, they are being handled differently.
You don't see backup periods against all of them because
they are fairly extensive tests that occur within the timeframe
that you see, but in some cases stop and go leverage off of
CINC OPEVALs on occasion, even venture into the public domain.
And we have collaborative efforts ongoing, for example, in
the public phone network, to check public switches with them.
It is being spearheaded by Mr. Money and his agencies, but,
again, it is being handled a little bit differently, and you
don't see necessarily a backup date in there, but in fact there
is adequate time to remediate and retest.
Mr. Ose. Do we end up with a dual or a backup system, a
backup communication system for forward-deploying units?
Admiral Willard. We have numerous redundancies in our
communication systems and command and control systems, for that
matter, for deployments.
Mr. Ose. That are Y2K compliant?
Admiral Willard. Absolutely.
Mr. Ose. All right.
Mr. Horn. You want to ask a question?
Mr. Money. I was just going to add, by law, we have two
tests for every one of these. So the charts are not showing you
backup, but we will guarantee you there will be two tests for
every one of these systems as it goes through, whether it is an
OPEVAL or a functional end-to-end test, or, in some cases, it
is duplicated.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I will
yield back, if I could submit in writing my other question for
response.
Mr. Horn. Without objection, the questions and answers will
be put in at this part of the record.
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Mr. Horn. Did any other service want to comment on this? If
not, I now yield time to the gentleman from Minnesota who is
the vice chairman of the Science Technology Subcommittee, Mr.
Gutknecht?
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think at this
point most of the important questions have been asked. But I do
want to come back to a very important point, and in fact, if
Mr. Ose would like, I would probably have time to yield to him,
but I more or less want to make a statement here.
I really do believe that our own Defense Department is
doing an excellent job, and I think you are all to be commended
for the seriousness that you take relative to this problem. I
think the concern that you have heard echoed in different ways
is, what can we do to affect both our allies and those who may
not be particular friendly toward us? There is a growing body
of countries out there, friendly and unfriendly alike, who are
working around the clock to develop intercontinental ballistic
missiles, or at least different venues to deliver weapons to
other places around the world. And my real fear, and I think
the fear of Members of Congress, and I think I speak on behalf
of the American people, I think the biggest concern about this
is we really don't have a contingency plan in place if
something should go wrong.
And part of the reason I have been a supporter through the
years of development and deployment of a strategic defense
program is, I think, highlighted by this circumstance. I mean,
we are not just talking about Russia here; we are talking about
Red China; we are talking about North Korea; we are talking
about potentially countries in the Middle East. There is a
growing list of potential problems out there whose technology
is not necessarily what the United States is.
And so, while I applaud what you folks are doing to solve
these problems relative to the United States, I really do think
that we need to do more on an international basis, either
through the United Nations, through our own State Department,
whatever we can do to make certain that we avoid the
potentiality of a problem on December 31st or January 1st,
whichever way you look at it, so that we don't have a problem
with an inadvertent launch or some other mistake that may
happen as a result of this particular computer glitch.
And I don't know if you really want to respond to that or
not, but I think it is something, Mr. Chairman and Madam
Chairman, that we need to continue to pursue and put pressure
on our government officials, as well as officials from around
the country because this is a very serious potential problem.
Mr. Money. Yes, sir, we do have a couple of comments, if we
might, Admiral Willard, and then I will add something.
Admiral Willard. I would just, sir, point out that only the
United States and Russia have extremely robust strategic early
warning systems that could be subject to the year 2000 failure.
In fact, though proliferation is all of our concern. The only
countries that you mentioned have somewhat limited early
warning capacity. So, from the standpoint of the initiative
that was mentioned earlier between the United States and
Russia, it is focused on the partners that have the worldwide
early warning capability to begin with that could ever be prone
to failure.
Mr. Ose. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Money. And if I just might add, you asked, and I failed
to answer your previous question about, or whoever brought up
about what can you all do. I encourage you in any interactions
you will have with your counterparts, for example, in the Duma
and other bodies that you may have some interaction with, to
encourage them to get on with the Y2K remediation, and in the
particular case, for the Duma support of this stability center.
We testified in front of Senator Bennett just the other
day, I believe the Senate, and maybe you all would like to join
in, is thinking about going over and having a conversation at
the right time with folks in the Duma, for example. My request
is if that in fact occurs. I would also recommend or ask you
for your support to stopping in locations where we have troops
stationed--Germany, South Korea, Southwest Asia--to encourage
the local governments there to help make sure that our
interdependency on whatever power water, telephones, and so
forth, when we are in garrison and those countries, is in fact
up to snuff, so that will alleviate some of demands on us. So,
I would ask for that kind of consideration.
Mr. Gutknecht. Mr. Chairman, I yield----
Mr. Horn. I think that is a very good suggestion, and I can
assure you a number of us will be doing that.
Mr. Gutknecht. Mr. Chairman, I will yield the balance of my
time to Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. If I could followup on one thing--the early
warnings systems joint effort with the Russians, is there any
number of hotspots around this world or countries who might not
have an early warning system, but might be receptive to the
idea of having access to, at that point and time, where the
technological failure is greatest, might welcome the chance to
sit at this same table with direct communications to their
CINCs, or what have you? I wonder, in particular, about you
notwithstanding the recent comradery about India, Pakistan, for
instance?
Mr. Money. Yes, sir. In fact, that is being suggested. The
State Department, in fact, is working that. I could conceive
this not just being there only for the Y2K period, but being
there in a permanent sense. So, as countries develop nuclear
weapons, they have some idea what their neighbor may or may not
be doing that would, I think, add to the stability of that.
So, my recommendation, but it is a State Department action,
is any country that has nuclear weapons ought to be invited to
be there just to see what else is going on, so they have some
assurance that they are not under attack or whatever suspicion
they might have. So, I agree wholeheartedly with you, it ought
to be broaden.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, I would welcome the chance to sign a
letter of your aghast futilage to that effect, and I yield back
the rest of my time.
Mr. Horn. I think it is a good suggestion. Mrs. Morella and
I would be glad to join you in that with maybe all of our
colleagues to get the message across. We do have relations, of
course, with the European community. We have discussed this
with them when Mr. Gilman led the delegation over there. But,
we also have a concern about the lackadaisicalness of some of
the countries on the domestic side where they just sort of say,
well, you know, if it happens, it happens. I mean, they are
still in a state of denial in a few industrial countries, and
in the developing countries, they simply don't have the money
or the technology know-how to get at the problem on even the
domestic side. So, I think we all face that problem.
Does the gentleman from Texas have any other questions he
would like to ask?
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, maybe just a couple. And, I
certainly want to commend our witnesses today for the testimony
because I think it has been very reassuring to us. And, I think
anyone who listens objectively to what has been said here
should rest easier about the status of the Department of
Defense and Y2K compliance.
I wanted to ask Mr. Money, just could you give us an
estimate as to how much it will cost the Department of Defense
by the time we get through to comply with Y2K?
Mr. Money. Yes, sir, and this is an estimate. There is not
a lot of high precision behind this. But the current estimate,
the latest to the OMB is we are somewhere around $3 billion.
Mr. Turner. $3 billion?
Mr. Money. $3 billion.
Mr. Turner. It always amazes me, and of course, we have had
many of these hearings with Federal agencies, but the price tag
that we have had to incur and pay to be sure we are Y2K
compliant has been enormous. It makes you realize that, no
matter how sophisticated we have become as a society, we are
really not too smart after all. [Laughter.]
Mr. Money. Whoever is here 1,000 years from now, I hope
they are not having the same problem.
Mr. Turner. Right. One of the things that Mrs. Maloney
asked you about earlier was what kind of--I believed she asked
the Inspector General--what kind of contractual language do we
have to protect the Department and the Government against Y2K
problems? Have you, in all of your efforts to remediate, and
after you will spend $3 billion to correct this problem, has
any of the responsibility ever been shouldered by any of our
outside contractors or suppliers of the various systems and
computers that we utilize in the Department of Defense?
Mr. Money. Oh, yes, sir. Let me start with the answer on
the contracts. As Bob mentioned, roughly a year--maybe it has
even been longer than that, language was to be put into every
new contract--whatever that contract was to deliver to the DOD,
would be Y2K compliant. We chose not to go back and notate all
the previous contracts. We said we would start from that point
on.
Contractors, again, vary in degrees just like countries or
maybe departments and governments, that some are taking it more
seriously than others. But when systems are being delivered
today, they are being tested. They are tested at--the
contractors will test them. If they fall into a mission-
critical system, some do, but not many, what we call mission-
critical is what we will go to war with today or conduct any
operation, whatever is called upon us. So that is pretty much
equipment that is already in the inventory. So, all that is
being done. Some contractors are taking us on with a vengeance,
some with more diligence than others, but I would say, by and
large, the private industry, and so forth, have come onboard
with what is needed.
I do worry about the 15th-tier supplier. We have talked
with primes and second-tier and third-tier, but you get down to
several tiers now. So I just picked the 15th-tier that supplies
something. We fully expect, because we have gone through just-
in-time inventories, regardless of who you are, in the
government or contractor sub-tier, and so forth, that some
missing some deadline there, rolling effect could, in fact,
happen, and to me that is probably the biggest danger that we
will be facing, and that is totally unpredictable. We can't. So
we just have to wait for that to occur, and then we will react
to it.
I can't overemphasize, though, that your Department of
Defense can meet any operational problem that comes along,
whether that is humanitarian operations in Africa or whatever
may be called upon, or in Southwest Asia or Kosovo, wherever we
may be in armed conflict. We have the wherewithal to conduct
those operations, and if one of these systems does fail, we
have contingency plans, and we are exercising those to back
fill, so we can continue to operate in any of these calendar
disruption periods.
Mr. Turner. I guess I might ask--this is my last question.
Is there any area of lingering concern that you have based on
all your oversight of this process of remediation in the area,
lingering concern, anything that still keeps you awake at night
that you might want to share with the committee, so we will be
thorough, to have examined every area of potential problem?
Mr. Money. Well, you just said it. There is no way, time,
money, that we can examine every possibility. We talk about
mission-critical systems, and then the thread through as you
tie one to another to another. We are not testing all the
infinite combinations of those threads. We are testing the
threads that the CINCs are most likely need to use.
Consequently, there are things that we are not testing, and
that does worry me, but we are doing the best we can with the
resources. Frankly, the biggest resource we are lacking now is
time to pull all of this off. I am confident; I, frankly, do
sleep at night. It may not be as long as I like.
Nevertheless, Dr. Hamre mentioned my name a couple of
times. Frankly, these people down on the table here and the
services are the ones, and many, many, many people that aren't
here today--essentially, the Department of Defense has really
taken this on. I admit there are some people maybe that don't
have quite the awareness, but I believe everybody in the
Department today at least knows what Y2K means and how that
might impact them.
The other part of this is--Bob Lieberman mentioned this--we
have learned how to use the auditors. We view these folks as
additional, independent, clearly independent, but additional
people on the team to say what we are doing right or wrong
because they view things from a different prospective. So, it
has really been a total effort, including the GAO. That may not
be often you hear that over here from a DOD person, but it is
true. We have opened the door to everything we do, to whomever
wants to come in, and consequently, because we do appreciate
the perspective from people when they see things from another
viewpoint. So, I hope my, Dr. Hamre, our mission today was--we
are not arrogant; I don't mean it that way at all, but we are
confident that we can ride through any calendar disruption and
conduct any operation the Nation may call upon us.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. I just want to clarify one point in the answer.
We have heard so often that there is a danger of polluting our
fixed computers that are Y2K compliant. Is there any danger
that the non-critical mission plans and systems in the
Department of Defense would interact with the critical mission
systems which are compliant, and is that a problem?
Admiral Willard. Sir, it is a good question. Frankly, the
non-mission-critical systems are undergoing the same rigorous
testing and remediation processes that our critical mission
systems did, and as well, they are part of the architectures
that we are testing in our operations evaluation process. So,
first of all, they are being remediated. Second, they are being
captured in these large-scale integration tests that we are
doing.
I think, to answer Mr. Turner's question in the glass half
full sense, when you consider the relative successes that we
are seeing through the small number of operations evaluations
that we have completed thus far, I think our level of
confidence is rising that this rigorous process that we apply
to each individual system is a good one, and that together the
systems will test satisfactorily. That should give us a good
deal of confidence, even of the systems that are outside the
bounds of these critical thin lines and architectures that the
commanders in chief, for example, are testing.
Mr. Horn. So, you have analyzed those systems that are just
regular business systems, or whatever; they can't get into your
other systems that are compliant with the year 2000?
Admiral Johnson. If I could, sir--in the Constellation
Battle Group systems integration tests that we are doing right
now, we identified approximately 30 mission support systems
that we thought were necessary for the functionality of that
battle group, and included them in our testing. What we are
finding is that we have good program managers. We told them
what to do; they went out and did it, and they defined their
interfaces; they tested those interfaces, and then as we put
those systems together, in fact, they are performing the way we
expect. We are finding that the kinds of problems we have found
in the last week on CONNIE, a display on a COTS system,
actually, that was certified to us by a supplier, read 1900
instead of 2000. It still worked, just had a display error.
Those are the kinds of things that we are finding.
We are finding the systems operate. We may have a display
functionality wrong or a day functionality wrong, but in terms
of actually supporting the war-fighter, the systems work.
Mr. Horn. Any of the other services want to comment on
this, the separation of non-critical mission systems that are
not compliant or have not even been looked at because you are
focusing correctly on the mission-critical systems? The Air
Force?
General Ambrose. Well, although the Air Force tracks a
little over 400 mission-critical systems, we are looking at
about 3,400 total systems. And, although all of them aren't as
far along as the mission-critical systems, all of them will be
Y2K compliant by January 1, 2000. So, we are confident that
those systems won't corrupt the mission-critical systems.
Mr. Horn. The Army, Ms. Browning.
Ms. Browning. The Army tracks approximately 700 mission-
essential systems, and we are tracking them quite closely. One
of the things that we are doing both for our mission-critical
and non-mission-critical, when we test them, we have to test
all the interfaces, so if a mission-critical system interfaces
with a non-mission-critical system, that is part of the test.
So your concern about its corrupting one another, we have
already accounted for that. And our main concern is the
operational function that it is supporting, regardless of
whether the system is mission-critical or not.
The test we did at White Sands, the test we have done at
Fort Bragg and at Fort Sill, include both mission-critical and
non-mission-critical in the threads that we are testing. In
fact, our non-mission-critical systems, if you will, are
probably ahead of our mission-critical systems in compliancy
because they are, frankly, less complex and have less
interfaces. So, we are very confident of those. But right now,
we see no potential for corruption since our testing rules
require that all the interfaces be done during the test.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. Colonel McHale, the Marines?
Colonel McHale. As I mentioned earlier, the majority of our
systems are operated and maintained by the other services, and
we are confident that they are tracking the right thing and we
are tracking them as they track those systems.
Mr. Horn. So, you see no danger of pollution out of your
other systems that are not critical?
Colonel McHale. And in the definition of mission-critical
that was taken into account when we defined the system as
mission-critical, and as Ms. Browning said, the interfaces are
being tested in all the operational evaluation scenarios.
Mr. Horn. We thank you. And now I yield to the gentlewoman,
the co-chairman of the Working Group Task Force, whatever we
are called now, Mrs. Morella.
Mrs. Morella. Well, it is ongoing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you all for your testimony, and the fact
that it reflects to us a commitment, and a commitment is what
is really necessary, I think, in compliance with this
incredible challenge.
I go back to what Mr. Lieberman said in his testimony and
orally, that the most daunting aspect of Y2K is testing. And, I
think we have heard that in different ramifications
throughout--the idea of, is it the right testing? Are we
circumventing doing it the right way in order to save time and
to save money, inadvertently sometimes, the whole magnitude of
testing? I am just wondering if you have any comments on it?
I would like to also mention an article that came out in
DOD Computing. It refers to an IG report that is entitled,
``Management of the Defense Special Weapons Agency Year 2000
Program,'' and the IG audit has found that the weapons agency
didn't complete independent testing of three mission-critical
systems before classifying them as ready. The articles goes on
about the agency tested one mission-critical system, the
Nuclear Management Information System, and two have 10 non-
mission-critical systems, but the IG said the agency classified
all 13 as 2000 ready. And it goes on in that vein. This
indicates something about the problem with testing, and I would
like to hear comments from you about how do we attack this
problem? What are we doing? Do you agree that this is an
enormous challenge? Maybe, should I start with you Mr.
Lieberman, the IG?
Mr. Lieberman. Fine. That audit report was issued the day
before Thanksgiving, so it was November, and it reflected the
situation in that particular agency as of a few weeks before
that. Those particular systems, by the way, are back on track.
The last two of them will be----
Mrs. Morella. Mr. Inspector General, this actually had been
published, though, on January 25th.
Mr. Lieberman. The press article, yes. All of the systems
discussed in the audit report will be implemented by the end of
this month, as a matter of fact. However, we had a lot of
problems initially with the managers of systems prematurely
certifying that they had fixed and validated the fix on their
systems. I think that the problem is behind us. The Department
went back and looked at all the systems that we had not late
last year, and quite a few were moved backward in terms of the
reporting. That is, they were decertified. One of the reasons
why the percentage of completed systems had apparently dropped,
and I would say that was to the good, because it was a more
accurate representation of where we really were. We are now
past the point where, for most systems, we are talking about
individual system level testing and certification anymore. Now
we are talking about group tests, end-to-end tests, or system-
of-systems tests.
Once again, I think you are absolutely right, we have to
fight against any tendency to replace numbers of tests for
rigor of testing, and there is a difference there. We have to
do something to make sure that all these tests have the proper
technical support while they are being run. An awful lot of
things are happening at the same. The crunch is going to come,
particularly, in the May, June, July timeframe, when the
functional end-to-end tests kick in. Right now, we are just
doing a few of these operational evaluations, so there is still
a limited demand for technical expertise. But it is going to be
tough to support all these tests adequately at the same time.
And the last thing I would say is that those commands that
were most ready to do good testing went first. So, we would
agree, NORAD did a fine job. Generally, the Space Command and
the Strategic Command are way ahead of the other unified
commands. So, they went first, did a good job, as would be
expected, and had good results.
There are other commands that have different kinds of
challenges, and I think the overseas commands, the big
combatant commands, particularly, the Pacific Command, European
Command, Central Command, are going to have a much more
difficult time, for no other reason than they have real-world
operational considerations that are going to distract them
constantly. So, that still remains a big challenge. I am happy
with my characterization of it as the most daunting challenge.
Mrs. Morella. Let's take note of that. Would anyone else
like to comment on it? All right, Mr. Brock and then Secretary
Money.
Mr. Brock. Yes, I think there is another issue. Testing is
going to be daunting, and Mr. Lieberman is right that the two
initial CINCs that did the testing had somewhat of an advantage
over some of the others because they also controlled more of
their own systems they used. And so, they didn't have as many
interfaces or dependencies on systems outside their control.
But, nevertheless, we did find the guidance for those processes
to be very rigorous. And I want to repeat that, that we were
very pleased with the guidance.
Other tests that are coming out, as I have also mentioned
in my statement, for some of the functional areas have not been
defined yet. And that is our concern. These tests probably
aren't as rigorous or require the same level of rigor found in
operational tests, but by the fact that they aren't defined and
some of them aren't scheduled, makes us wonder when they will
be squeezed in.
Second, there is a whole issue which we really haven't
addressed today, and that is the need to develop contingency
plans or business continuity plans. The vast number of mission
threads or thin lines or business processes that we have been
talking about today, for the most part, still need to be
developed, and also need to be tested. And so, the Department
has a fair amount of work to do in a relatively short period of
time.
Mrs. Morella. Try to follow that Secretary Money.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Money. She has asked my questions, so take
your time.
Mr. Money. Back to the article. The article suggested that
there was a fraudulent entry, and so forth. When that was
published, the Deputy Secretary and myself, we called every
service, every Defense agency, into the room and the high-level
people in each of those services, like the vice chiefs and/or
agencies attested to that their reporting, in fact, is accurate
and not fraudulent. There was a misinterpretation, by the way,
in the test plan. We requested that there be an independent
signoff, not just the program manager or whoever was on the
particular program. I believe we are past that. By no means do
I want to minimize the testing that we performed.
I see a very important date, somewhere around the end of
March, March 31st, because we will have had the operational
test, at least one series of those. We will learn a lot from
that. I don't expect that every one of these will fly through
with no hiccups and no problems. In fact, we will focus on some
where those may be.
Let me use an example of a few months ago; we had a test
down at White Sands Missile Range, an end-to-end, and it
flunked; it failed miserably. Went back and fixed the systems,
had another one, roughly, I think it was about 3 months later--
this is about 3 months ago--and it flew. We were even doing
telemedicine to some remote village. So, we will go through
that.
Relative to the functional testing, those were addressed
later. A lot of the non-mission-critical area falls into there.
But there are, to varying degrees, contingency plans. Let me
give you an example.
When Dr. Hamre talked about the DFAS going through the fed,
going to various banks, when that is exercised, if we see any
problem with that, we will then go back and buy check stocks so
we can issue checks the old way versus electronic funds
transfer. Frankly, I am holding onto that. That is $4 million I
would rather spend somewhere else. We will make that decision
roughly the end of June. That is time enough to get the checks
in place, and so forth. So, we are working through those. By no
means do I want to sit here and claim that we have this
whipped, that we have thought of every aspect.
One of you asked me earlier, what do I worry about? It is
what we haven't thought of. You don't know what you don't know,
what is going to come back and bite us in that way. But through
the various tests and the extensiveness that we are trying to
address those, we hope to uncover, discover, if you will, what
is out there that we need to fix.
Mr. Horn. Any other questions on that or other people?
Mrs. Morella. I think Admiral Willard wanted to comment on
that.
Admiral Willard. Mrs. Morella, I would comment that, with
regard to magnitude of testing, that there was a methodology
applied to determining what would be tested, for example, in
the operational evaluations. And that methodology dealt with
determining the missions of each of our unified commanders and
the tasks that supported those missions and picking the most
critical tasks. There is no shortcut being applied to the
architecture that supports that task. So, it wasn't arbitrary.
On the contrary, it was very methodical.
With regard to the points that Mr. Lieberman made on the
paucity of technical expertise, that is a challenge that we
continually face. By and large, when we have date functions in
systems, we require the systems expert from the program manager
of that system to be present to assist us in rolling clocks
forward and rolling clocks back and restoring systems to 1999.
It is a challenge associated with all of our evaluations, and
we are spreading that expertise thin, as you can imagine. The
ratio of technical expertise to systems with clocks averages
about 0.75 to 1. I mean, we need nearly as many technical
experts as we have systems with clocks as we step through these
functional end-to-end tests and operations evaluations. So,
scheduling those individuals is crucial.
On the point that was made regarding the fact that the
CINCs that are farthest along are conducting their operations
and evaluations earliest is true. And we are doing that because
our data base captures the lessons learned and results of those
evaluations, and in turn, they are spread about the other
CINCs. So, those CINCs that are challenged the most, that are
overseas, that are busy in other areas of the world, or that
have chosen the most difficult tasks to OPEVAL, have the
benefit of these earlier evaluations, successes and failures to
draw on. So, we are sharing lessons learned across them all,
and we hope that by the time we get to the most difficult and
most challenged unified commands, that they would have absorbed
a great many of the lessons from the earlier evaluations. So
that too, I think, is being done very methodically.
And then my last point would be this: Again, back to the
magnitude of testing, I think as the Services comment, you will
find that the rigor with which they are testing is generally
through very time-tested methodologies to test their various
systems. They are not inventing a lot of new things. In the
case of CINC OPEVALs and picking architectures according to
task, that was relatively new to us. But many of the
integration tests are leveraging off of very rigorous
integration tests that we have performed on our weapons
systems, and other systems for many, many years with success.
Admiral Johnson. I would like to quickly address a couple
of things, sir. One of them is the concern about shortchanging
testing. A huge quantity of testing is completed by the program
managers in their validations. That is complete for about 91
percent of the Navy systems right now. And now we are in the
fielding business. What our experience in operational
evaluations has found is that the testing was rigorous because
we aren't finding problems in our operational validations.
The operational testing is being run by operational
commanders. They are defining the scope of testing, and they
are calling upon the SYSCOM commanders and other technical
experts to provide the support they need in order to satisfy
them that the systems that are being deployed, in our deployed
units, are in fact, going to work and provide them the
capability they need.
Another comment, and I am shifting to a separate subject,
and that is on the area of contingency planning. We think we
are very, very far along in the area of contingency planning.
We have worked with our operational commands and our shore
establishments to develop a contingency planning guide which we
published last November. Our operators already have casualty
procedures and operating procedures in place to deal with
system failures. They do that on a daily basis. We have backup
and redundant systems.
And what we are doing is exercising those capabilities they
already have and their operational capabilities to shift to
backup systems or backup methods in the event of a system
failure, and we are exercising those procedures in our
operational evaluations. We already have disaster preparedness
plans at our bases. We are looking at those in terms of year
2000, and making sure that those disaster preparedness plans
reflect the year 2000 aspect of it, and will be ready to be
implemented, if necessary. So we think the contingency planning
aspect of that is much farther along than a lot of people
think. And we are exercising all of those contingency plans and
continuity operational plans in our operational evaluations.
Mr. Horn. Admiral, as you have mentioned, contingency
plans, and before General Ambrose does, I am reminded with Mr.
Money's comment, they are going to go back to just writing out
checks. There is even an earlier contingency plan the Navy
practiced, which was just pay it out in cash and sign for it,
which was what the Senate did when I came there in the 1960's.
They had some Navy officer, who is now comptroller of the
Senate, to just passing it out in cash. And I remember one
basic commander, General Ambrose, who paid the whole base in $2
bills. And believe me, community relations went up with the Air
Force when they saw thousands of $2 bills out there.
But go ahead.
General Ambrose. Until about 4 months ago, I was the
Commander of Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, NE, and
fortunately, we have had such a tremendous relationship with
downtown, I didn't need to do the $2 bill thing, but it will be
a good hip pocket thing to hold.
I would just like to point out, just a couple of days ago,
our auditors presented a report to me on a phase validation we
asked them to do. Basically, we asked them to go back and take
a look at a sample of the systems that we have certified,
across all criticalities, not just mission-critical, and take a
look at the process, and the exit criteria for going through
each step of the process, and make sure we did that right. And
they went out and looked at 267 systems, most of which were
chosen at random, and they reported no testing discrepancies of
any kind, and in fact, only a couple of minor discrepancies of
any kind, not a statistically significant number.
In terms of OPEVALs, and especially the end-to-end tests,
we are spending a lot of time right now making sure that when
we test, the quantity and the quality are both what they should
be, and that we are testing the right processes and the right
systems. And realistically, you can't test every possible way
that you will use even your mission-critical systems. So, what
you must do is ask how do we use these in the preponderance of
our operations and that is what we will test.
Now, we are ready for the unexpected things that occur,
because we have told our program managers and, more
importantly, we have told our commanders that you need to take
a look at all that you do from the standpoint of what is it
that you can't stand to shut down, and then have another way to
do that thing. And that is how, I think, the entire Department
is approaching Y2K. So, if the computers work, and we think
they will, great. If they don't work, we will continue to do
business because we have another way to do it.
Mrs. Morella. If I just might mention one thing--with our
very distinguished military here, and Inspector General, and
GAO representative, I am reminded--I have mentioned this once
before at a hearing--of Admiral Grace Hopper. Remember the
first woman admiral? She is the one who devised COBOL. Don't
you wonder what she is thinking now, from where she is up with
St. Peter as she looks down on the need for people who are
skilled in using COBOL and in remedying this problem that she
was a little part of?
And I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Ms. Browning.
Ms. Browning. Mrs. Morella, I would like to answer two of
your questions, one, whether we are testing the right stuff----
Mrs. Morella. Thank you.
Ms. Browning [continuing]. And two, about the veracity of
our certification? And by the way, I am sure Grace Hopper is
laughing in her grave; I would think that.
What I would like to give you--I don't know if you want to
enter this into the record, but as to whether we are testing
the right stuff, the Army looked at its major battlefield
functional areas, how it does business. We have over 100, what
we call, mission threads. We have boiled that down to 24
critical mission threads. This was done not by the techs; this
was done by the war fighters. So, these are the threads; these
24 critical ones are the ones that we are testing. And we are
testing them at the division, at the corps; they are being
tested in the OPEVALs, in the end-to-end tests.
We are also, in terms of testing the right stuff, the
minimum we are doing are four critical dates. And that is true
across the Defense Department. The September 9, 1999 date, the
crossover, the midnight crossover on December 31, and there are
two midnight crossovers on the leap year. Those are the
minimum. Some tests, especially if they are complicated
business systems, are testing more. But we are testing those.
In addition, we have a lot of management controls on the test.
The Army has been using for over a year and a half the Army
Audit Agency. There are internal management consultants to Y2K
from my office. They have been doing very good work for us.
They are out there asking the questions on the contract
compliance, on the interface agreements, et cetera, and we
constantly get reports and updates from them. In addition, for
our testing, we are going to use our operational tests and
evaluation command, to sit with us, the technical folks, the
functional folks, to do that.
Mr. Horn. Without objection, that exhibit is put in the
record at this point.
Ms. Browning. Thank you. Also, for all of our contingency
plans that we have for mission-critical systems, they not only
have to have a technical piece, but also a functional piece.
So, we are looking at that.
Your second question on the veracity of the certification,
and this is for the certification of our individual systems,
for all mission-critical systems in the Army, we require either
a senior executive service or a flag officer signature on that.
And we require it in two channels, both the technical or the
material developer channel, as well as the functional channel.
We also, again, have those management controls. We have
sent some of those back from our front offices because they
haven't looked at everything. We also have the AAA working with
us on that.
One final thing, if you ask how I don't sleep at night
because of Y2K, I would say the thing that probably bothers me
the most is the outside dependencies. I am very confident in
the Defense Department, not only in the Army, but the rest of
the components. It is the outside dependencies, whether they be
our suppliers, whether they be foreign countries, and the more
that we can do nationally to get that message out and to
educate people, I think the more we minimize risks come this
December.
Mr. Horn. Well, I take it you are looking at electricity,
food supply----
Ms. Browning. Yes.
Mr. Horn [continuing]. Water, et cetera. I mean, we might
face a Berlin airlift, I think, in some of these bases, but I
would think it depends on how distant they are from the main
source of supplies.
Ms. Browning. And how robust the infrastructure is around
them.
Mr. Horn. Right. And that should be a worry, just in
general.
Ms. Browning. Right.
Mr. Horn. So is the Army asking those questions on the
contingency plan? Because as I get the reports from the
Department, and all departments, all 24 of them, we hardly see
any movement in facing up to a contingency plan. Now, maybe
they are just optimistic and say, well, gee, we will finish by
March 31st and we will get the testing done and all of that.
Very few contingency plans. The one that you see in the
domestic departments, perhaps the Department of Defense, is we
will use the United States Postal Service. And the other day,
we had the Postal Service in, and we said, ``What is your
contingency plan?'' I didn't snidely say, ``Is it a mailbox?''
I just let that pass. But, that is one of the problems on, say,
getting checks out and everything else to one's employees,
which have mortgages to pay and all the rest of it. So, that is
a worry, and yet, I don't see much movement on the contingency
plan in its reporting.
Colonel McHale, what about the Marine situation?
Colonel McHale. Certainly. Ms. Browning mentioned the Army
developed the critical mission threads. Coincidentally, at the
same time, at a parallel independent path, the Marine Corps
arrived at the same conclusion in evaluating and constructing
our OPEVALs much the same way the Army did. When I heard about
the Army system, I immediately suspected that we had taken a
wrong turn some place because we were doing the same thing, but
it verified that we were doing the right thing.
On contingency plans, the Marine Corps requires contingency
plans for all our mission-critical and all our mission support
systems because of that interdependency of the two systems. And
we found that, in doing that, that causes us to be more
rigorous about the way we were evaluating our plans. You are
concerned about not having contingency plans, I believe, as the
Department of Defense goes through this process of conducting
the operational evaluations, conducting tabletop seminars, that
that will cause us to focus again away from the system-by-
system evaluation and to focus on the larger functional, and,
in our case, the Marine Corps-wide plan of how we are going to
operate on day one, how we are going to operate on January 1st,
and those contingency plans will evolve as we get away from the
system-by-system analysis.
One comment about the operational evaluations that we are
conducting: I am amazed that it turns out that every Marine
Corps general officer was born in Missouri and they don't want
to take anybody's word for anything. So as we have developed
our operational evaluation plan, we have said, these are the
systems that you have to test in a minimum configuration. And
we have found in all the operational evaluations that we have
conducted or are planning to conduct that they are additional
systems, that our Army systems or Air Force systems, that they
want to be able to have--if I can use the term ``warm and
fuzzy'' feeling about--and the Commandant has charged them at
the time of this operational evaluation cycle, which will
complete for us at the end of July, that each one of them needs
to come back to the Commandant and say, ``I can do my
mission.'' And he is not really going to be concerned about,
well, it was an Air Force or it was a Navy system that failed.
A marine commander has to be able to do his mission
regardless of what systems he has to bring to bear, and that is
what he is evaluating. So, it far exceeds whatever the
congressional requirements are for systems that are only Marine
Corps owned and operated.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Ose, any further questions? Mrs. Morella, any
further questions? Mr. Turner, any further?
Mr. Turner. No, thank you.
Mr. Horn. I have one last question, and that is on the
nuclear supply, and this is really directed at Mr. Money and
Admiral Willard.
In terms of your weapons support and the use of the nuclear
suppliers in the United States, has the Department of Defense
asked these questions of its supplier or have they left it
generally to the Department of Energy as the cabinet department
supplier, if you will? Because some people are worried about
some of our reactors and are there microprocessors in there
that lead in one condition or the other by--let's take it, we
are in Illinois. Most of their electrical power is generated by
nuclear reactors. If we have blackouts, which haven't had
anything to do with nuclear reactors at this point--and
sometimes we don't have the slightest idea what contributed to
that blackout in either the San Francisco situation, the New
York situation; that was a decade ago. I am just curious, if we
are looking at suppliers, it seems to me the Defense Department
has a role in there, and are they worried or not?
Mr. Money. Yes, sir. If we start with the weapons versus
the reactors generating power----
Mr. Horn. Right.
Mr. Money [continuing]. DOE has that responsibility. DOD
overlooks that CINCSTRAT in particular.
Anything you want to add?
Admiral Willard. Yes, sir. There is a simple answer: By and
large, the facilities that are owned by the Department of
Energy [DOE] are being overseen by DOE, and the interfaces to
those facilities are being checked by the Department of Energy.
In those areas where an interface exists between our strategic
commands and those vendors, then Strategic Command is
maintaining visibility. I think Admiral Mies would assure you
of that.
Mr. Money. When it gets to reactors, then that is a power
generation and that will be a DOE reporting up through John
Koskinen.
Mr. Horn. OK. We thank you. We will be pursuing that in a
couple of months, and obviously, we have got a major concern on
the nuclear reaction in terms of supply for civilians, as well
as military indirectly, in some cases.
Let me just thank the people--and then I will have a few
remarks here--thank the people that helped prepare this
hearing: J. Russell George is in the door down there, staff
director and chief counsel for the Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information, and Technology; Matt Ryan, senior
policy director, right behind me here for that subcommittee;
Bonnie Heald, director of information and professional staff
member; and Mason Alinger, the clerk for the subcommittee;
Richard Lucas, our faithful intern; and for the Technology
Subcommittee, Richard Russell is back of Mrs. Morella, staff
director; Ben Wu, professional staff; and Joe Sullivan, the
clerk.
And for the minority we have Faith Weiss, the counsel, and
Jean Gosa, the clerk.
And for our faithful court reporter, it is Leslie Preer.
I think you have all given some very compelling testimony
this morning, and it, obviously, pleases all of us that both
the Inspector General of Defense and the GAO are working
together, and everybody in all the services seem to be working
together. So, I commend you for that.
Let's face it, the safety of our country and other
countries depend on the Department of Defense's mission-
critical services, and we have been concerned, obviously, that
the Defense Department seems to be behind schedule, but it
could be that you are in the Preakness or something and you are
waiting for the last few laps. I don't know. I have sometimes
said, with the administration, when it took a long time to get
them organized, that it was like the ``Perils of Pauline.'' You
know, she is strapped over the railroad, you think she is a
goner, next Saturday, she is doing great. [Laughter.]
And that is when movies were 10 or 15 cents.
I appreciate Secretary Cohen and Deputy Secretary Hamre,
and now, hopefully, Assistant Secretary-to-be Money, for the
leadership they are providing. I think that has absolutely been
essential in solving some of these problems.
But we remain concerned about the preparedness and
potential vulnerability of foreign military bases, and we are
delighted with the initiative the Secretary took in relation to
the Russians. I happen to feel very strongly that, if we don't
win the Russians in with us as part of the western democracy
down the line, we would have made the biggest mistake we could
make in diplomacy in the last part of this century. So, I am
glad those relations were started when General Powell was
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; I am glad they are going
on.
And I thank all of you for testimony. It is good to know
that progress has been made within the executive branch. I
think we still see a lot that has to be done, and some of it
relates to the national defense, and hopefully, with all of
your hard work, we will get that job done. And we thank you for
coming.
With that, this meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]