[DOCID: f:hr454v1.107] From the House Reports Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] Union Calendar No. 269 107th Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 107-454 _______________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE __________ SECOND REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM Volume 1 of 3 together with MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS Chapter 1--``Take Jack's Word'': The Pardons of International Fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green Chapter 2--Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Grants of Executive Clemency <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform May 14, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 78-264 WASHINGTON : 2002 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------ JOHN J. DUNCAN, Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont ------ ------ (Independent) Kevin Binger, Staff Director Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel M. Scott Billingsley, Counsel Pablo E. Carrillo, Counsel Jason A. Foster, Counsel Hilary J. Funk, Counsel Matthew J. Rupp, Counsel Phil Barnett, Minority Chief Counsel Michael Yeager, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel Michael Yang, Minority Counsel ? LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ---------- House of Representatives, Washington, DC, May 14, 2001. Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's second report to the 107th Congress. The committee's report is based on a study conducted by the full committee. Dan Burton, Chairman. DEDICATION ---------- This report is dedicated to the memory of M. Scott Billingsley, counsel for the House Committee on Government Reform from 1999-2001. Scott died unexpectedly on March 25, 2002, at the age of 31. During his time on the Committee staff, Scott was centrally involved in a number of important investigations. Scott made immeasurable contributions to the Committee's work, not only through his critical thinking and excellent writing, but also through his professionalism and cheerful spirit, which made him a pleasure to work with. Scott devoted two years of his short life to the Committee on Government Reform because he wanted to root out waste, fraud, and abuse, and promote integrity in the federal government. Scott's final, and most important work for the Committee was on the investigation of President Clinton's eleventh-hour clemency grants. Scott played a key role investigating the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green and drafted much of the first chapter of this report. Scott's work on the Rich and Green pardons was typical of all of his work for the Committee: excellent, accurate, and thorough. Scott Billingsley certainly has a legacy that goes far beyond his work on this Committee. He has left behind many individuals who will miss him dearly. His memory will be cherished by his parents, sister, fiance, family, and countless others whose lives he touched. However, this report should serve as a small, but lasting, reminder of Scott Billingsley's work and his devotion to the pursuit of truth. C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Volume 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................ 1 INTRODUCTION..................................................... 25 Chapter One--``Take Jack's Word'': The Pardons of International Fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 99 INTRODUCTION..................................................... 105 I. BACKGROUND OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN........................107 A. Rich and Green's Business Activities...................... 107 1. How Rich and Green Became Wealthy..................... 107 2. Marc Rich's History of Illegal and Improper Business Dealings............................................. 108 a. Iran.............................................. 110 b. South Africa...................................... 110 c. The Soviet Union/Russia........................... 111 d. Cuba.............................................. 113 e. Libya............................................. 113 f. Iraq.............................................. 113 g. Angola............................................ 114 h. Romania........................................... 114 i. Serbia............................................ 115 B. The Criminal Charges Against Marc Rich and Pincus Green... 115 1. The Investigation of Rich and Green................... 115 2. The Indictment........................................ 120 3. Rich and Green Flee the Country....................... 121 4. The Corporate Guilty Pleas............................ 122 C. Attempts to Bring Rich and Green to Justice............... 123 1. Attempts to Extradite Rich and Green.................. 123 2. Marc Rich and Pincus Green's Attempts to Renounce Their Citizenship.................................... 123 3. U.S. Attempts to Apprehend Rich and Green............. 125 4. 1992 Congressional Hearings........................... 127 5. Actions Taken by the U.S. Against Rich's Business Interests............................................ 128 a. U.S. Mint Contract Cancellation................... 128 b. Suspension of Rich's Grain Dealings............... 129 c. Cuban Asset Forfeiture............................ 130 II. ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN CASE..........131 A. Attempts to Settle in the 1980s........................... 131 B. Marc Rich's Humanitarian Activities in the 1980s and 1990s 133 C. Rich Hires Jack Quinn..................................... 135 D. Quinn's Fee Arrangements.................................. 137 1. Was Quinn Expecting Payment for His Work on the Pardon?.............................................. 137 2. Has Quinn Received Payments from Marc Rich Since the Pardon Was Granted?.................................. 141 E. Quinn's Attempts to Settle the Case....................... 145 III.THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION..................149 A. Rich Contemplated a Pardon Early in 2000.................. 149 B. The Preparation of the Pardon Petition.................... 154 C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition............ 156 1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed................. 156 a. The Department of Energy Regulations Were Fair.... 156 b. Rich and Green Were Not Singled Out............... 157 c. Rich and Green Did Trade with the Enemy........... 159 d. Rich and Green Did Evade Federal Taxes............ 160 2. The Prosecutors Were Not ``Overzealous''.............. 162 a. The Prosecutors Negotiated with Rich and Green.... 162 b. The Rich Prosecution Was Not Tainted with Media Attention........................................ 164 c. RICO Charges Were Fairly Brought.................. 165 D. The ``Letters of Support'' in the Petition................ 167 1. Rich Paid a Number of Individuals Who Wrote in His Support.............................................. 167 2. Some Who Wrote Letters Were Misled About the Purpose.. 170 3. Many of the Letters Were Misrepresented to the President............................................ 171 IV. LOBBYING FOR THE MARC RICH PARDON...............................173 A. The Marc Rich Lobbying Team............................... 173 1. Denise Rich........................................... 173 a. Denise Rich's Relationship with Marc Rich......... 173 b. Denise Rich's Relationship with President Clinton. 175 c. Denise Rich's Role in the Marc Rich Pardon Effort. 176 d. Denise Rich's Motives............................. 180 2. Beth Dozoretz......................................... 182 a. Beth Dozoretz's Relationship with Bill Clinton.... 182 b. Beth Dozoretz's Involvement in the Marc Rich Pardon Campaign.................................. 184 c. Jack Quinn's Attempt to Keep Information About Dozoretz from the Committee...................... 187 3. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Other Israeli Leaders.............................................. 188 4. Elie Wiesel........................................... 192 5. King Juan Carlos...................................... 195 6. Avner Azulay.......................................... 196 7. Michael Steinhardt.................................... 196 8. Gershon Kekst......................................... 197 9. Robert Fink........................................... 206 10. Kathleen Behan....................................... 206 11. Peter Kadzik......................................... 206 B. Importance of Secrecy to the Marc Rich Team............... 207 C. Jack Quinn and Eric Holder Cut the Justice Department Out of the Process........................................... 208 D. The Filing of the Pardon Petition......................... 214 1. December 11, 2000, Call from Ehud Barak............... 215 2. Quinn Was Likely Legally Prohibited from Lobbying the White House.......................................... 216 E. The Lobbying Effort....................................... 218 1. Quinn's Contacts with Bruce Lindsey in Belfast........ 219 2. Peter Kadzik's Lobbying Contacts with John Podesta.... 220 3. Further Contacts Between Jack Quinn and White House Staff................................................ 223 4. Initial Discussions Between the White House and Justice Department................................... 225 5. January 8, 2001, Call Between President Clinton and Ehud Barak........................................... 226 6. ``The HRC Option''.................................... 227 F. The Final Days of the Marc Rich Lobbying Effort........... 230 1. Communications Between Peter Kadzik and John Podesta.. 230 2. The January 16, 2001, White House Meeting Regarding Rich................................................. 231 3. The Justice Department Receives Jack Quinn's January 10 Letter............................................ 233 4. Final Lobbying Contacts Leading up to January 19, 2001 233 a. Jack Quinn's January 18, 2001, Letter to the President........................................ 235 b. Bruce Lindsey's Contacts with SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt........................................... 236 G. January 19-20, 2001....................................... 238 1. The Call Between Prime Minister Barak and President Clinton.............................................. 238 2. Eric Holder Weighs In................................. 240 3. The January 19 Meeting Between White House Staff and President Clinton.................................... 245 4. The President's Call to Jack Quinn.................... 247 5. The White House Informs the Justice Department of the Decision............................................. 250 H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons................... 254 1. Eric Holder's Congratulatory Remarks.................. 254 2. The Rich Team's Effort to Deal with the Press......... 255 3. President Clinton's Column in The New York Times...... 258 V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN INVESTIGATION.............................................262 A. Marc Rich................................................. 262 B. Pincus Green.............................................. 263 C. Jack Quinn................................................ 263 D. Denise Rich............................................... 264 E. Beth Dozoretz............................................. 264 F. Avner Azulay.............................................. 265 G. Peter Kadzik.............................................. 265 H. Terry McAuliffe........................................... 266 Chapter Two--Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying For Executive Clemency FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 709 INTRODUCTION..................................................... 715 I. ROGER CLINTON'S PATTERN OF TRADING ON HIS BROTHER'S NAME........717 A. Roger Clinton's Foreign Travelers Checks and Other Questionable Sources of Income........................... 719 B. Roger Clinton's Lobbying Regarding Cuban Travel Restrictions............................................. 723 C. The Shakedown of John Katopodis........................... 725 II. THE GAMBINO PAROLE AND PARDON EFFORTS...........................731 A. Rosario Gambino's Involvement with Organized Crime........ 731 B. The U.S. Parole Commission's Handling of Rosario Gambino's Case..................................................... 735 C. Roger Clinton's Involvement with the Gambino Family....... 739 1. Clinton's Contacts with the Parole Commission......... 743 a. Clinton's Initial Approach to the Parole Commission....................................... 743 b. Clinton's Meetings with Parole Commission Staff... 747 i. December 1997 Meeting......................... 747 ii. Spring 1998 Contacts......................... 751 iii. July 1998 Meeting........................... 753 2. The FBI Investigation of Clinton's Contacts with the Parole Commission.................................... 753 a. Clinton's Continued Attempts to Contact the Commission....................................... 755 b. The FBI's Request to Have an Agent Pose Undercover 758 c. The FBI's Recording of Clinton's Conversations with Thomas Kowalski............................. 760 3. Roger Clinton's Apparent Attempt to Involve the White House in the Parole Decision......................... 764 D. Roger Clinton's Financial Relationship with the Gambinos.. 765 E. The FBI's Interview of Roger Clinton...................... 766 1. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding His Brother's Knowledge............................................ 767 2. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding Payment from the Gambinos............................................. 768 3. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch.. 771 F. The Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency for Rosario Gambino.................................................. 773 III.THE LINCECUM PARDON OFFER.......................................777 A. Garland Lincecum's Account................................ 778 1. The Initial $35,000 Payment........................... 778 2. The First Dallas Meeting.............................. 779 3. Lincecum's Attempts to Raise the Remaining Money...... 782 4. Lincecum's Payment of $200,000........................ 785 5. The Division of Lincecum's Money Among Clinton, Locke, and Morton........................................... 786 6. Lincecum's Attempts to Receive the Pardon............. 787 B. Roger Clinton's Reaction to the Allegations............... 790 C. Dickey Morton's and George Locke's Reactions to the Allegations.............................................. 792 D. Analysis.................................................. 795 IV. OTHER PARDON CANDIDATES.........................................799 A. Dan Lasater and George Locke.............................. 799 B. J.T. Lundy................................................ 802 C. Blume Loe................................................. 807 D. Rita Lavelle.............................................. 809 E. John Ballis............................................... 811 F. Stephen Griggs............................................ 815 G. Phillip Young............................................. 819 H. Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan................................... 822 I. Mitchell Wood............................................. 823 J. Mark St. Pe............................................... 825 K. William D. McCord......................................... 826 V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE ROGER CLINTON INVESTIGATION...................................................827 A. Roger Clinton............................................. 827 B. Tommaso Gambino........................................... 828 C. Lisa Gambino.............................................. 828 D. Victor Crawford and Kathy Vieth........................... 828 E. George Locke.............................................. 829 F. Dickey Morton............................................. 829 G. Richard Cayce............................................. 829 H. J.T. Lundy................................................ 829 I. Robert Lundy.............................................. 829 J. Chief Carl Griggs......................................... 830 K. Blume Loe and Cynthia Goosen.............................. 830 L. Bruce Lindsey............................................. 830 M. Meridith Cabe............................................. 830 N. Department of Justice..................................... 831 O. The White House........................................... 831 Volume 2 Chapter Three--Hugh Rodham's Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive Clemency FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 1261 INTRODUCTION..................................................... 1267 I. THE CARLOS VIGNALI COMMUTATION.................................1267 A. The Case Against Carlos Vignali........................... 1267 B. Vignali's Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency............ 1276 1. Initial Efforts to Reduce Vignali's Sentence.......... 1276 a. Contacts with Prosecutors in Minnesota............ 1276 b. Vignali's Appeal.................................. 1277 c. Letters to the White House and Justice Department. 1277 2. Vignali's Clemency Petition........................... 1280 3. Supporters of Vignali's Clemency Petition............. 1283 a. Letters of Support from Prominent California Politicians...................................... 1284 i. Congressman Xavier Becerra.................... 1284 ii. Congressman Esteban Torres................... 1286 iii. State Senator Richard Polanco............... 1286 iv. Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina.. 1287 v. Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez. 1288 vi. Cardinal Roger Mahony........................ 1289 b. Support from Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca.. 1290 i. Sheriff Baca's Relationship with the Vignalis. 1290 ii. Sheriff Baca's Involvement in the Vignali Clemency Effort.............................. 1292 iii. Conclusion.................................. 1293 c. Support from U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas..... 1295 i. Mayorkas' Initial Exposure to the Vignali Matter....................................... 1296 ii. Mayorkas Calls the White House............... 1297 iii. Conclusion.................................. 1299 4. California Law Enforcement and Political Officials Supported Vignali's Clemency Petition Despite Serious Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos Vignali....... 1301 a. There Were Extensive Allegations of Drug Trafficking Against Both Horacio and Carlos Vignali.......................................... 1301 b. The Extensive Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos Vignali Were Never Considered by Sheriff Baca, U.S. Attorney Mayorkas, or the Clinton White House...................................... 1304 C. The White House's Review of the Vignali Clemency Request.. 1307 1. Hugh Rodham's Hiring.................................. 1307 2. Hugh Rodham's Initial Approach to the White House..... 1309 3. The Justice Department's Input on the Vignali Case.... 1311 4. The Final Decision on the Vignali Commutation......... 1314 a. Contacts Between the White House and Interested Parties.......................................... 1314 b. Contacts Between the White House and Hugh Rodham.. 1317 c. Hugh Rodham's Invocation of First Lady Hillary Clinton.......................................... 1318 d. The President's Decision to Grant the Commutation. 1319 5. The White House Has No Justification for the Vignali Commutation.......................................... 1320 D. The Aftermath of the Vignali Commutation.................. 1324 1. The Response of Hugh Rodham........................... 1324 2. The Florida Bar's ``Investigation'' of Hugh Rodham.... 1325 3. The Message Sent by the Vignali Commutation........... 1327 II. THE PARDON OF A. GLENN BRASWELL................................1328 A. Braswell's History of Misconduct.......................... 1329 B. Consideration of the Braswell Pardon by the Clinton White House.................................................... 1332 III.HUGH RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS..........1336 A. Background on Gene and Nora Lum........................... 1336 B. Hugh Rodham Approaches the White House About the Possibility of a Pardon for the Lums..................... 1337 IV. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE HUGH RODHAM INVESTIGATION..................................................1339 A. Hugh Rodham............................................... 1339 B. Horacio and Carlos Vignali................................ 1340 C. James Casso............................................... 1340 D. Glenn Braswell............................................ 1341 E. Kendall Coffey............................................ 1341 F. Gene and Nora Lum......................................... 1341 G. Nicole Lum................................................ 1341 Chapter Four--Tony Rodham's Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive Clemency FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 1589 INTRODUCTION..................................................... 1590 I. EDGAR AND VONNA JO GREGORY.....................................1591 A. Background................................................ 1591 B. Tony Rodham's Relationship with the Gregorys.............. 1592 C. Tony Rodham's Efforts to Help the Gregorys Obtain Pardons. 1595 D. Deliberations by the Administration....................... 1598 E. Conclusion................................................ 1600 II. FERNANDO FUENTES COBA..........................................1602 A. Background on Fernando Fuentes Coba....................... 1602 B. The Pardon Attorney Refuses to Process Fuentes' Clemency Petition................................................. 1604 C. Tony Rodham's Attempt to Become Involved in the Fuentes' Clemency Effort.......................................... 1605 D. Tony Rodham's Representations to Mannerud Were Fraudulent. 1608 Chapter Five--The Grant of Clemency to Drug Money Launderer Harvey Weinig FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE........................................ 1709 I. BACKGROUND.....................................................1712 A. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators............................ 1712 B. The Money Laundering Operation............................ 1713 C. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators Run Afoul of the Colombian Cocaine Cartel........................................... 1714 D. Weinig's Prosecution and Sentencing....................... 1718 II. WEINIG'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY..................1722 A. Weinig Hires Reid Weingarten to Lobby for Clemency........ 1722 B. Weinig's Wife Seeks Support for His Clemency Petition..... 1725 C. Weinig's Wife Obtains Support from Individuals with Ties to the Administration.................................... 1726 III.THE WHITE HOUSE'S REVIEW OF WEINIG'S COMMUTATION REQUEST.......1729 A. The Justice Department's Input in the Weinig Clemency Matter................................................... 1729 1. The U.S. Attorney Strongly Objected to Commuting Weinig's Sentence.................................... 1729 2. The Pardon Attorney Objected to Commuting Weinig's Sentence............................................. 1730 B. The White House's Deliberations........................... 1732 C. The White House Had No Justification for the Weinig Commutation.............................................. 1733 D. Aftermath of the Weinig Commutation....................... 1736 Volume 3 Appendices Appendix I.--Committee correspondence............................ 2079 Appendix II.--Committee subpoenas................................ 2577 Appendix III.--Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardon petition........ 2967 Views Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Patsy T. Mink, Hon. Bernard Sanders, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon. Danny K. Davis, Hon. Thomas H. Allen, Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, and Hon. Diane E. Watson........................... 3292 Additional views of Hon. Dan Burton.............................. 3389 Union Calendar No. 269 107th Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 107-454 ====================================================================== JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE _______ May 14, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed _______ Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the following SECOND REPORT On March 14, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform approved and adopted a report entitled ``Justice Undone: Clemency Decisions in the Clinton White House.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY THE PARDONS OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN Marc Rich and Pincus Green have a history of illegal and corrupt business dealings contrary to the security interests of the United States. <bullet> Rich and Green have had extensive trade with terrorist states and other enemies of the United States. Despite clear legal restrictions on such trade, Rich and Green have engaged in commodities trading with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and other rogue states which have sponsored terrorist acts. By engaging in these activities, Marc Rich and Pincus Green demonstrated contempt for American laws, as well as the well- being of Americans who were harmed or threatened by these states. <bullet> The Central Intelligence Agency provided the following declassified information about Marc Rich to the Committee: If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of inquiries by various foreign government liaison services and domestic government agencies regarding their ongoing investigations of criminal activity. In addition, President Clinton would have received information worthy of his consideration in making his decision on the pardon. This information cannot be declassified. Marc Rich and Pincus Green were guilty of serious crimes and showed contempt for the American justice system. <bullet> Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to obstruct the criminal investigation of them in every way imaginable, including attempting to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the country. Rich and Green's tactics resulted in a record-setting contempt fine against them, totaling $21 million. Despite these tactics, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York was able to indict Marc Rich and Pincus Green on 51 counts of illegal activity, including tax evasion, mail fraud, wire fraud, and racketeering. The evidence against them was overwhelming. <bullet> Because of the strength of the case against them, Marc Rich and Pincus Green fled the country rather than face trial. Rich's own lawyer told him that by fleeing the country, Rich had ``spit on the American flag'' and that ``whatever you get, you deserve.'' For the 17 years leading up to his pardon, Marc Rich was one of America's 10 most wanted international fugitives. Although Jack Quinn, Rich's attorney, argued that Rich did not flee the United States to avoid prosecution, Rich's ex-wife refuted this view, stating that Rich told her that ``I'm having tax problems with the government . . . and I think that we are going to have to leave.'' <bullet> In order to avoid extradition or apprehension by United States law enforcement, Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to renounce their United States citizenship. While this attempt was rejected by the United States, it demonstrated that Rich and Green had no loyalty to the United States and viewed their citizenship as a liability to be discarded at will. Rich and Green's crimes were so serious that for seventeen years, the U.S. government devoted considerable resources to apprehending them and closing down their business activities. <bullet> Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that on a number of occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States Marshals Service attempted to arrest them in various foreign countries. A number of countries from the United Kingdom to Russia attempted to assist the United States in these efforts. The pardons of Rich and Green have sent a message that individuals can go from the FBI's most wanted list to a Presidential pardon if they spend money and have the proper connections. This message undermines U.S. efforts to apprehend fugitives abroad. <bullet> Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that in 1991, the Government Reform Committee, under Democratic leadership, held a number of hearings, and issued two reports about the government's efforts to apprehend Rich and Green. At that time, Democrats and Republicans in Congress took the Bush Administration to task for not being aggressive enough in hunting down Rich and Green, or shutting down their business interests in the U.S. <bullet> While Rich and Green were fugitives from justice, the American government took a number of actions against their interests in the U.S. The federal government seized Rich's assets and shut down his trade in metals and grain with the government. The United States government repeatedly tried to reach a plea agreement with Rich and Green. <bullet> For a number of years after Rich and Green fled the country, the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a plea bargain to settle the case. The government made a number of concessions in an attempt to reach a deal, but all offers were rebuffed by Rich and Green, who would not agree to any deal that resulted in jail time. While lobbying for a pardon, Jack Quinn and Rich's other lawyers claimed that the Justice Department had not even negotiated with Rich, and therefore, that a pardon was justified. Quinn and the other lawyers were misleading the White House when they made these claims. Jack Quinn misled the White House about the Rich case and attempted to mislead the Committee and the public regarding his work for Marc Rich. <bullet> Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn after a recommendation from Eric Holder. After numerous failed attempts to have his case settled, Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn to represent him. Quinn was hired after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked for Marc Rich on the pardon matter, asked Holder for a recommendation of how to settle a criminal matter with the Justice Department. Holder recommended that he hire a Washington lawyer ``who knows the process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' Holder then explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn. While Holder did not know that Kekst was referring to Marc Rich, it suggests that Holder was favorably disposed to Jack Quinn, and would be very receptive to arguments made by Quinn, no matter how baseless they were. <bullet> Marc Rich was going to pay Jack Quinn for his work on the pardon. After the Marc Rich pardon was granted, Jack Quinn claimed that he was not being paid by Rich for his work on the pardon and that he expected no future payment for his work on the pardon. However, the Committee has uncovered evidence that Robert Fink, a lawyer close to Marc Rich, had discussions with Rich and Quinn about paying Quinn for his work on the Rich pardon. Documents which Quinn and Fink withheld from the Committee for over a year, and which were produced only after a federal judge ordered them produced to a grand jury, shed further light on the contemplated payment of Quinn. These documents indicate that Quinn raised the question of his ``status'' with Rich and asked that Rich pay him a $50,000 per month retainer. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn about these documents, but Quinn refused to meet with Committee staff. <bullet> Jack Quinn may have been attempting to receive money from Marc Rich after the pardons were granted. At the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged that ``I will not bill [Rich], and I will not accept any further compensation for work done on the pardon.'' This pledge surprised Rich's lawyer, who expected that Rich would be paying Quinn for his work. Indeed, records just produced to the Committee indicate that Quinn may have been attempting to negotiate some payment from Marc Rich shortly after he pledged that he would not take additional money for his work. A March 5, 2001, e-mail from Quinn to Rich states, ``If you are agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in the next few days a new retainer agreement.'' This e-mail raises the possibility that Quinn has been attempting to obtain payments from Rich, in possible violation of his pledge to the Committee. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn about this matter, but he refused. <bullet> Jack Quinn's work on the Rich pardon was in apparent violation of Executive Order 12834. That executive order was enacted as part of President Clinton's promise to create ``the most ethical administration in history,'' and it prohibited former executive branch employees from lobbying their former executive branch agencies within five years of their departure. Quinn has claimed that his work on the Rich pardon came within an exception for ``communicating . . . with regard to a . . . criminal . . . law enforcement inquiry, investigation or proceeding[.]'' However, this exception was clearly intended to apply to appearances before courts, not lobbying the White House for a pardon. The ``revolving door'' lobbying ban was intended to apply exactly to cases like this, where a former White House Counsel could come back and lobby the President to take an action that had no constitutional limits on it, largely based on the President's personal trust for that former staffer. <bullet> The pardon petition compiled by Jack Quinn and the other Marc Rich lawyers was highly misleading. Most of the arguments used by Jack Quinn to justify the Rich and Green pardons were false and misleading. These arguments could have been completely refuted if anyone in the White House had sought out any of the prosecutors familiar with the Rich case. <bullet> The ``letters of support'' in the pardon petition were used in a misleading manner. Another key element of the Rich pardon petition was a number of letters of support for Rich and Green from prominent Americans and Israelis. Rich and Green used these letters to try to show that their humanitarian activities justified their pardons. However, many of these letters were obtained under false pretenses, and the writers of the letters were not told that they were being used to obtain a Presidential pardon. In addition, a number of individuals who wrote in support of Rich and Green received large amounts of money from them. Marc Rich and Pincus Green used a number of different individuals with close personal relationships with President Clinton and his staff to lobby regarding the pardon. <bullet> The role of Denise Rich. Denise Rich played a key role in obtaining the Rich and Green pardons. Denise Rich had a close relationship with President Clinton, which was based in part on her role as a large-scale contributor to Democratic causes and the Clinton library, and in part on her extensive personal contacts with President Clinton. The $450,000 given by Denise Rich to the Clinton Library was an early and large contribution. Denise Rich used her relationship with President Clinton to lobby for the Marc Rich pardon on a number of occasions. She has refused to cooperate with the Committee, invoking her Fifth Amendment rights rather than answer questions about her role in the pardon. <bullet> The role of Beth Dozoretz. Beth Dozoretz, another close friend of President Clinton, played a key role in obtaining the Rich pardon. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz had a relationship with President Clinton built on personal ties and political fundraising. Dozoretz has raised and contributed millions of dollars for the Democratic party and has pledged to raise an additional million dollars for the Clinton library. Beth Dozoretz also has close relationships with Denise Rich and Jack Quinn. Dozoretz used her close relationship with President Clinton to lobby for the Rich pardon. Because Dozoretz has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the Committee is unable to conclude whether or not Dozoretz made any linkage between contributions to the DNC or the Clinton library and the granting of the Rich pardon. <bullet> The role of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak spoke to President Clinton three times about the Rich pardon. In his public statements about the Rich pardon, President Clinton has pointed to these conversations with Prime Minister Barak as one of the primary reasons he granted the pardon. However an examination of the transcripts of the calls shows that Barak did not make a particularly impassioned plea for Rich. Therefore, it appears that the President may be attempting to use Prime Minister Barak's interest in the Rich matter as a cover for his own motivations for granting the Rich pardon. <bullet> Barak had met with Rich personally and told Clinton that the Rich pardon ``could be important . . . not just financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.'' Barak's statement raises the possibility that either Barak or Clinton acted on the Rich matter because of some promise of future financial return. Eric Holder and Jack Quinn worked together to cut the Justice Department out of the decisionmaking process. Holder's decision to support the pardon had a critical impact. <bullet> Jack Quinn and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder worked together to ensure that the Justice Department, especially the prosecutors of the Southern District of New York, did not have an opportunity to express an opinion on the Rich pardon before it was granted. The evidence amassed by the Committee indicates that Holder advised Quinn to file the Rich pardon petition with the White House, and leave the Justice Department out of the process. One e-mail produced to the Committee suggests that Holder told Quinn to ``go straight to wh'' and that the ``timing is good.'' The evidence also indicates that Holder failed to inform the prosecutors under him that the Rich pardon was under consideration, despite the fact that he was aware of the pardon effort for almost two months before it was granted. <bullet> Eric Holder's support of the Rich pardon played a critical role in the success of the pardon effort. Holder informed the White House that he was ``neutral, leaning towards favorable'' on the Rich pardon, even though he knew that Rich was a fugitive from justice and that Justice Department prosecutors viewed Rich with such contempt that they would no longer meet with his lawyers. Holder has failed to offer any credible justification for his support of the Rich pardon, leading the Committee to believe that Holder had other motivations for his decision, which he has failed to share with the Committee. <bullet> Eric Holder was seeking Jack Quinn's support to be appointed as Attorney General in a potential Gore Administration, and this may have affected Holder's judgment in the Rich matter. On several occasions, Holder sought out Quinn's endorsement to be appointed as Attorney General if Al Gore were to win the November 2000 election. Quinn was a Gore confidant whose endorsement would carry great weight. Holder's initial help to Quinn in the Rich matter predated the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, and accordingly, Holder had some legitimate prospect of being appointed Attorney General when he was helping Quinn keep the Rich matter from the Justice Department's scrutiny. While Holder denies that his desire to be appointed Attorney General had anything to do with his actions in the Rich matter, it provides a much clearer and more believable motivation than any offered by Holder to date. President Clinton made his decision knowing almost nothing about the Rich case, making a number of mistaken assumptions, and reaching false conclusions. <bullet> The White House never consulted with the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York regarding the Rich case. As a result, the White House staff was never able to refute the false and misleading arguments made in the Marc Rich pardon petition. <bullet> Every White House staff member who was working on the Rich pardon opposed it. However, because they failed to do the necessary background research on the Rich case, they were unable to refute the arguments made by Jack Quinn. <bullet> President Clinton was misled by Jack Quinn in their negotiations regarding the Rich pardon. Late in the evening of January 19, 2001, President Clinton and Jack Quinn had a telephone discussion regarding the Rich pardon. During this conversation, Quinn repeated his usual misleading arguments about the Rich case. Quinn also offered to make his clients subject to civil liability for their actions. In furtherance of this offer, Quinn agreed to waive all statute of limitations and other defenses, which Rich and Green would have as a result of their fugitivity. President Clinton has cited this waiver as a key factor in his decision to grant the pardons. However, if President Clinton or his staff had done even cursory legal research, they would have understood that this was a hollow, meaningless deal. First, Quinn agreed to waive defenses that Rich and Green did not have. It is basic legal doctrine that fugitivity tolls the statute of limitations. Second, Rich and Green likely do not face any civil liability for their crimes, since those fines were already paid by their companies. Third, Rich and Green had been willing to pay $100 million to settle their case for years. A fine, even a large one, would have had no impact on Rich and Green, and it would merely stand for the proposition that the U.S. justice system is for sale. <bullet> When the White House did finally provide the names of Marc Rich and Pincus Green for a Justice Department background check in the middle of the night on January 19, 2001, the check turned up new, troubling information which was disregarded by President Clinton. When the White House requested the Justice Department to perform a computer background check on Rich and Green prior to granting the pardons, the check came back with information that they were wanted for ``arms trading.'' This was new information for all of the White House staff, and it raised serious questions among them as to whether the pardons should be granted. However, the only step the White House took to check on this allegation was to call Jack Quinn. Quinn predictably denied that his clients were involved in arms trading. Faced with this conflicting information about Rich and Green, President Clinton instructed his staff to ``take Jack's word'' and issue the pardons. President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting for his decision to issue the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons. <bullet> President Clinton has failed to answer any questions about the Rich and Green pardons. The few statements that he has issued have been misleading, incomplete, and raised more questions than they answered. Given his complete failure to explain the pardons, the Committee is left with serious unanswered questions regarding President Clinton's motives. ROGER CLINTON'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY Roger Clinton engaged in a systematic effort to trade on his brother's name during the Clinton Administration. <bullet> President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to capitalize on their relationship. At the beginning of his second term, President Clinton instructed Roger Clinton to use his connections to the Administration to gain financial advantage. According to the lawyer for former Arkansas State Senator George Locke: ``Roger related that Bill Clinton had instructed him that since this was his last term in office, Roger should find a way to make a living and use his relationship with the President to his advantage.'' By suggesting that Roger Clinton exploit his name, Bill Clinton encouraged the conduct described in this chapter. Roger Clinton apparently took this advice to heart, telling one person from whom he solicited money that he and the President ``had only four years to get things done'' and that they did not care ``about ethics or what appearances were.'' <bullet> Roger Clinton received substantial sums of money from foreign governments solely because he was the President's brother. When the FBI interviewed him, Roger Clinton admitted that since the beginning of the Clinton Administration, he had received substantial sums of money from foreign governments. Clinton told the FBI that ``he knows he receives these invitations [to make paid appearances in foreign countries] strictly because he is the First Brother of the President of the United States.'' Clinton also informed the FBI that in addition to receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars for musical performances from foreign governments, he also received money for President Clinton from foreign governments. Roger Clinton told the FBI that he had to be instructed repeatedly by the President or White House staff that the President was not permitted to receive cash from foreign governments. <bullet> Roger Clinton received at least $335,000 in unexplained travelers checks, many of which were purchased overseas and likely imported illegally. The Committee uncovered at least $335,000 in travelers checks deposited in Roger Clinton's bank account. Most of these travelers checks originated overseas, largely from Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela. The travelers checks were not restrictively endorsed by the purchaser but were instead given to Roger Clinton blank. This method of transferring large sums of money to Roger Clinton appears designed to conceal the fact that the funds originated overseas and probably violated criminal statutes requiring reports of the importation of monetary instruments. Roger Clinton has refused to provide the Committee with any explanation of why he received these funds. These suspicious transactions require a complete and thorough investigation by law enforcement authorities, especially in light of his admissions to the FBI about receiving money from foreign governments. <bullet> Roger Clinton likely violated federal law by failing to register as required under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. One company paid Roger Clinton $30,000 to lobby President Clinton and others to loosen government restrictions on travel to Cuba. Although his activity appears to meet the criteria outlined in the statute for those required to disclose their contacts with covered executive branch officials, Roger Clinton did not register as a lobbyist and did not disclose his paid lobbying contacts with his brother. His failure to register, therefore, needs to be investigated carefully and completely by the Department of Justice. <bullet> Roger Clinton participated in a plot to obtain a $35,000 per month contract in exchange for delivering a cabinet secretary to a speaking event. The FBI briefly investigated Roger Clinton's involvement in a scheme with Arkansas lawyer Larry Wallace to pressure John Katopodis, promoter of an Alabama airport project. Clinton and Wallace attempted to obtain a $35,000 per month contract in exchange for Clinton's promise to ensure that Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater would speak at a conference sponsored by Katopodis' organization of local governments. When Katopodis refused to pay and Slater subsequently refused to acknowledge the invitation, Katopodis suspected that Clinton and Wallace were to blame. Wallace had told him that his project would remain at a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the money.'' Roger Clinton lobbied for the release from prison of Rosario Gambino, a notorious heroin dealer and organized crime figure. <bullet> Rosario Gambino was a major drug trafficker. Rosario Gambino has been convicted in the United States and Italy of heroin trafficking. Before being sentenced to 45 years in federal prison, Gambino associated with known members of organized crime both in Italy and the United States. His associates have described him as a member of the Sicilian Mafia. When his brothers were convicted of racketeering, murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and heroin trafficking in 1994, witnesses described them as ``the main link between Mafia heroin traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.'' <bullet> Roger Clinton received at least $50,000 from the Gambino family, and he expected to receive more if he succeeded in getting Rosario Gambino out of prison. Tommaso ``Tommy'' Gambino, the son of Rosario Gambino, approached Roger Clinton to help win the release of Rosario Gambino from prison. Tommy Gambino promised Roger Clinton a substantial financial reward if he was successful. Even though he never was successful, Tommy Gambino provided Roger Clinton with $50,000, a gold Rolex watch, and an undisclosed amount of ``expense money.'' <bullet> Roger Clinton attempted to use his relationship to the President to influence the decisionmaking of the United States Parole Commission (``USPC''). Roger Clinton lobbied the Parole Commission to grant parole to Gambino. While lobbying Parole Commission staff, Roger Clinton informed them that President Clinton was aware of his efforts on behalf of Rosario Gambino and that the President had suggested that he contact the Parole Commission members directly. Although the Commission staff tried to insulate the Commissioners from undue influence, Roger Clinton clearly attempted to use his relationship to the President to influence the Commission improperly and win Gambino's release. <bullet> The Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission hindered the FBI's investigation. In 1998, the FBI began investigating Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission. However, it met resistance from Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission. Ragghianti, who had participated in meetings with Roger Clinton on the Gambino case, objected to the FBI investigation and successfully halted an FBI plan to have an undercover agent meet with Clinton posing as a Parole Commission staffer. She also attempted to keep the FBI from recording a meeting between Roger Clinton and a Parole Commission staffer. Ragghianti's efforts may have kept the FBI from reaching a full understanding of Roger Clinton's involvement in the Gambino case. <bullet> Roger Clinton lied to FBI agents investigating his contacts with the Parole Commission and his relationship with the Gambino family. When interviewed by the FBI in 1999, Roger Clinton said that he had never represented to anyone at the Parole Commission that the President was aware of his contacts with the Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino. This self- serving claim is contradicted by contemporaneous, written memoranda detailing Clinton's contacts as well as by the vivid and credible recollections of Parole Commission staff. Clinton also lied about the purpose of a $50,000 check from the Gambinos, which he deposited on the day of the FBI's interview. While it is unclear whether he deposited the check before or after the interview, Clinton told the agents that Tommy Gambino had offered to loan him money for a down payment on his house. He repeated this explanation to the media when news of the money became public in 2001. However, after reviewing both Clinton's and Gambino's bank records, the Committee has found no evidence that Clinton used the $50,000 for a down payment or that he ever repaid any of the money. Accordingly, his claim to the FBI that the money was merely a loan is false. During his interview, Clinton also told the FBI agents three separate and contradictory stories in response to questions about his receipt of a Rolex watch from Tommy Gambino before finally producing a Rolex to the agents and claiming he had bought it in Tijuana, Mexico. <bullet> Roger Clinton apparently lobbied the White House to grant a commutation to Rosario Gambino. In the last days of the Clinton Administration--after Roger Clinton had failed to win parole for Rosario Gambino and after he had received a Rolex watch and $50,000 from the Gambino family--the White House received a petition for commutation for Rosario Gambino. Documents indicate that the White House lawyer responsible for clemency matters requested a criminal background check on Gambino, which is normally done when some serious consideration is being given to a grant of clemency. The obvious and logical inference that explains how the Gambino petition garnered that level of attention at the White House is that Roger Clinton was pushing for it. Because key Clinton White House staff have refused to answer questions about this matter, it is unknown whether Roger Clinton hand-delivered the Gambino petition as he did with others or whether he brought it to the attention of the White House some other way. Although the President did not ultimately grant clemency to Gambino, the circumstances surrounding the consideration of his petition are nevertheless suspect. The fact that granting clemency to a mobster and confirmed criminal like Gambino was considered at all is disturbing enough, but the reason it was considered is even more offensive. The Gambino family was apparently able to purchase access to the parole and clemency processes with cash payments and expensive gifts to the brother of the President of the United States. Moreover, despite an FBI investigation of the matter, the Justice Department has, to date, been unwilling or unable to prosecute Clinton for any of his activities. Roger Clinton received a substantial portion of $225,000 that was swindled from the Lincecum family in Clinton's name with the promise of a pardon that never came. <bullet> The Lincecum family paid $225,000 to obtain a pardon for Garland Lincecum. In 1998, Garland Lincecum, a convicted felon, was informed that he could purchase a presidential pardon for $300,000. Lincecum was told that Arkansas businessmen Dickey Morton and George Locke, who had a close relationship with Roger Clinton, could obtain the pardon. Lincecum borrowed $225,000 from his mother and brother and claims that a business associate paid another $70,000 to Morton and Locke for his pardon. The money he borrowed from his family constituted their life savings and means of support in retirement. <bullet> Roger Clinton received at least $43,500 in proceeds from the Lincecums' payments to Morton and Locke. Dickey Morton, George Locke, and Roger Clinton divided the funds among themselves with Roger Clinton receiving a total of $25,500 in checks and $18,000 in cash. The Lincecums paid the checks to a company called CLM, which they were told stands for Clinton, Locke, and Morton. Dickey Morton then disbursed the funds from the company's bank account to Clinton, Locke, and himself. Roger Clinton has falsely denied any relationship with CLM while offering no explanation of why he received this substantial share of an elderly woman's retirement savings through CLM. <bullet> Roger Clinton may have been involved in a scheme to defraud the Lincecums. Garland Lincecum never received a pardon, and there is no evidence that Dickey Morton, George Locke, or Roger Clinton ever submitted Lincecum's name to the Justice Department or White House for consideration for a pardon. Therefore, it appears that the Lincecums were the victims of a scam perpetrated by Morton, Locke, and perhaps Roger Clinton as well. Roger Clinton may have been involved in lobbying for as many as 13 other pardons and commutations. <bullet> Roger Clinton publicly admitted involvement in six clemency efforts, but the evidence connects him to many more. Roger Clinton told the media that he had asked for pardons for approximately six close friends and that he did so because of concern for them and not for any personal gain. For example, Roger Clinton lobbied for pardons for George Locke and Dan Lasater, two associates from Arkansas who were convicted of drug offenses together with Clinton himself in the 1980s. However, the Committee has obtained evidence connecting Clinton to many more pardon seekers. Some of the cases involve people who were not his personal friends and some involve solicitations or offers of money and lucrative business opportunities in exchange for his ability to place a clemency petition in front of the President. <bullet> Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for horse breeder J.T. Lundy in exchange for secretly sharing profits in a lucrative business venture. Lundy promised Clinton a share of a the profits from a Venezuelan coal deal in exchange for Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon for him. Lundy suggested a scheme whereby the payments to Clinton could be concealed by placing his share of the profits in Dan Lasater's name. Lasater, who owned a 20 percent interest in the venture, discussed the possibility of a pardon for Lundy with Roger Clinton. <bullet> Roger Clinton delivered the pardon petition of former Reagan EPA official Rita Lavelle to the White House. According to Lavelle, an intermediary for Roger Clinton asked her for a $30,000 fee for him to hand-carry her petition to the President. Lavelle responded that she could not afford to pay any money, but she said Clinton agreed to deliver the petition anyway. On the last night of the Clinton presidency, Roger Clinton asked Lavelle, ``do you have $100,000 to get this through?'' Being bankrupt, however, Lavelle laughed at the question. She did not pay Clinton any money and did not receive a pardon. <bullet> Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for Houston real estate developer John Ballis, and Ballis' petition was seriously considered at the White House. After being convicted of S&L fraud, Ballis married a former employee of Dan Lasater and friend of Roger Clinton. Through his wife's connection, Ballis sought Roger Clinton's help. Clinton first lobbied for Ballis before the U.S. Parole Commission, sometimes during the same meetings in which he lobbied for mobster Rosario Gambino. Ballis credited Clinton with helping him obtain early release and sought his help in obtaining a presidential pardon to eliminate his parole supervision and restitution payments. While he was not granted any form of clemency, the President reviewed his petition, and a White House lawyer called Ballis' lawyer two nights before inauguration day to ask if Ballis would accept a grant of clemency that left intact his obligation to pay restitution. <bullet> Roger Clinton lobbied his brother to grant clemency to Steven Griggs, the son of the chief of an unrecognized American Indian tribe, who was in prison on drug charges. Like Ballis, Steven Griggs was not a close friend of Roger Clinton's but merely someone who knew someone who knew him. Griggs also did not receive clemency, but Roger Clinton helped ensure that Griggs' petition was brought to the attention of the President even though Griggs had been a fugitive for a year before being sentenced. Griggs argued in his petition that he had received an unusually harsh sentence but failed to mention that he had fled after his conviction. It is not clear what motivated Roger Clinton to assist Griggs, but some evidence suggests that the tribe may have planned to open a casino when and if it were to become recognized by the federal government. <bullet> According to his former lawyer, Arkansas restaurant operator Phillip Young was approached with an offer to obtain a pardon through Roger Clinton for $30,000. While Young denied to Committee staff that he was actually approached by anyone with such a proposal, his denial is not as credible as his former attorney's version of events. Both the White House and the Justice Department hindered the Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton by improperly refusing to produce key documents. <bullet> For months, the Bush White House prevented the National Archives from producing even non-deliberative, clemency-related records from the Clinton administration. The Committee did not learn that President Clinton had been considering a clemency petition from notorious mobster Rosario Gambino until after Archives personnel ``inadvertently'' produced documents that President Bush's Counsel had sought to withhold. The accidental production also included documents relating to three other previously unknown individuals who had sought clemency through Roger Clinton. The Bush Administration did manage to retain four additional deliberative Gambino documents from the files of the Clinton White House, refusing to produce the records even though they were not subject to any executive privilege claim. <bullet> The Ashcroft Justice Department produced certain Gambino-related records, but inexplicably withheld others. After producing sensitive documents such as U.S. Parole Commission files related to Rosario Gambino and a summary of an FBI interview with Roger Clinton, the Justice Department ceased producing additional documents, claiming they were related to an ongoing criminal investigation, even though the Clinton- Gambino matter had reportedly been closed in 2000. HUGH RODHAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIGNALI COMMUTATION Vignali's clemency petition was false and misleading. <bullet> Carlos Vignali lied in his clemency petition. First, he continued to maintain his innocence, despite overwhelming evidence of his involvement in selling a substantial amount of cocaine across state lines and a specific finding by the sentencing judge that he lied at trial about his involvement in a large drug distribution network. Second, Vignali claimed that he was a first-time offender, despite the fact that he had a prior criminal record. By not accepting responsibility for his crime and lying about his background, he should not have been eligible for executive clemency. Vignali's supporters provided letters of support which were false and misleading. <bullet> A key element of the campaign by Carlos Vignali and his father Horacio Vignali, was a series of letters on Carlos' behalf from prominent Los Angeles politicians. A number of these letters contained misleading statements calculated to create the impression that Carlos Vignali was innocent. The officials who submitted letters included Representative Xavier Becerra, Representative Esteban Torres, State Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg, State Assembly member Antonio Villaraigosa, State Senator Richard Polanco, Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina, Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez, and Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles. Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca provided critical support for the Vignali commutation, which was inappropriate, given his position. <bullet> Sheriff Baca had a close relationship with Horacio Vignali which was based on Vignali's political and financial support for Baca. Sheriff Baca has known Horacio Vignali since 1991, and Vignali has been a key political supporter of Baca, giving him at least $11,000 in contributions and raising between $60,000-$70,000 more. <bullet> Sheriff Baca spoke with the White House in support of the Vignali commutation. In January 2001, Baca received a telephone call from Hugh Rodham in which Rodham told Baca that he would get a call from the White House about Horacio Vignali. Shortly thereafter, Baca received a call from White House staff and spoke in support of Horacio Vignali. Based on Baca's statements in this telephone call, White House staff clearly and justifiably concluded that Baca supported the commutation of Carlos Vignali's sentence. <bullet> Sheriff Baca continues to claim, without any basis, that he did not support the Vignali commutation. Rather than express regret for his role in the Vignali commutation, Sheriff Baca maintains that he opposed the Vignali commutation and did nothing that could have been interpreted as support for the commutation. However, Sheriff Baca's supposed opposition to the Vignali commutation does not square with the fact that: (1) he drafted a letter which he believed Horacio Vignali would use in the clemency effort; and (2) when he was asked squarely by the White House if the President should commute Vignali's prison sentence, he stated that it was ``the President's decision to make,'' rather than express his opposition. These facts, and others outlined in this report, indicate that Sheriff Baca wanted to support the Vignali commutation, but was afraid of creating a paper record which would clearly indicate his support. <bullet> Sheriff Baca's efforts on behalf of the Vignalis are even more inappropriate given that there were extensive allegations that Horacio Vignali, Carlos' father, was also involved in illegal drug trafficking. It is inappropriate enough for a senior law enforcement official like Baca to support a grant of clemency for an unrepentant, large-scale drug dealer like Carlos Vignali. However, when coupled with credible allegations indicating that Horacio Vignali was a drug dealer, and in fact was the source of cocaine supply for his son, Baca's support of Horacio and Carlos Vignali is even more inappropriate. U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas provided critical support for the Vignali commutation, which was inappropriate, given his position. <bullet> U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas called the White House in support of the Vignali commutation. Mayorkas, the top federal prosecutor in Los Angeles, was asked by Horacio Vignali to call the White House in support of his son's clemency petition. Mayorkas then called the White House about the Vignali commutation. While Mayorkas does not recall the details of his conversation, he now concedes that his call conveyed support for the Vignali commutation. <bullet> Mayorkas supported the Vignali commutation despite his ignorance of the facts of the case and his knowledge that the prosecutors responsible for the Vignali case opposed clemency. Before he called the White House, Mayorkas had spoken twice with Todd Jones, the U.S. Attorney responsible for the Vignali case. Jones told Mayorkas that Vignali was a ``major player'' in drug trafficking, that he was ``bad news'' and that Mayorkas should not ``go there'' when it came to Vignali. Despite these warnings from a prosecutor who was intimately familiar with the Vignali case, Mayorkas still called the White House in support of the Vignali commutation. <bullet> Mayorkas' support for the Vignali commutation was inappropriate. Mayorkas knew little about the Vignali case. What he did know indicated that Carlos Vignali was an unrepentant large-scale criminal. These facts alone make his support for the commutation, as a senior federal prosecutor, totally inappropriate. There are a number of allegations that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali were involved in illegal drug trafficking. <bullet> There are allegations that, in addition to his son, Horacio Vignali was involved in illegal drug trafficking and that Carlos Vignali was involved in drug trafficking far beyond the conduct which led to his conviction in Minnesota. DEA reports documenting these allegations include the following statements: ``[Horacio Vignali] negotiated with ATF agents to sell a machine gun and stated to them that he had also smuggled heroin into the United States utilizing automobiles.'' ``[Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos Vignali Jr. of Los Angeles . . . Vignali's father Carlos Vignali aka ``pops'' owns a body shop, at 1260 Figueroa and is the source of supply for his son.'' ``Carlos Horatio Vignali's role in [George Torres' drug dealing] organization is relatively unknown at this time. It is believed that Vignali functions as a financial partner in the organization.'' <bullet> These DEA reports are corroborated by law enforcement personnel who indicate that they had received information indicating that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali were involved in large-scale drug trafficking. These charges have never been formally made in court, or substantiated by physical evidence. However, the mere existence of such allegations should have precluded senior law enforcement and political officials from supporting a commutation for Carlos Vignali on the strength of his father's reputation. However, it appears that no one checked with the DEA prior to granting the commutation. Hugh Rodham provided false and misleading information to the White House in support of the Vignali commutation. <bullet> Hugh Rodham was paid $204,200 for his work on the Vignali commutation. It appears that in return for this money, he worked part-time for two months gathering materials in support of Vignali's case and making telephone calls to White House staff. It appears that Rodham's payment in the Vignali matter was contingent upon his success, as he received the $200,000 payment on January 24, 2001, after President Clinton granted clemency to Vignali. <bullet> Rodham repeatedly provided false information during his communications with the White House. First, and most importantly, Rodham told Bruce Lindsey that the trial attorney who prosecuted Vignali supported the commutation. This was completely false. Second, Rodham told Lindsey that Vignali was a first-time offender, when in fact, he had two prior convictions and two other arrests. Rodham also told Lindsey that Vignali ``did not play a major role in the offense,'' when in fact, Vignali was a major source of cocaine for the Minnesota drug-dealing ring at issue in his case. Hugh Rodham told the White House that First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton was aware of his lobbying efforts and that the Vignali commutation was ``very important'' to her. <bullet> Hugh Rodham told White House staff that the Vignali commutation was ``very important to him and the First Lady as well as others.'' This statement is confirmed by the independent recollection of the White House staffer who spoke to Rodham as well as the note which she took contemporaneously. Rodham's statement raises two possibilities: first, that the First Lady was aware of, and approved of, Hugh Rodham's lobbying efforts; or second, that Hugh Rodham was lying to White House staff regarding the First Lady's knowledge of his efforts. The White House sought the opinion of powerful Los Angeles political figures, but failed to consult with the prosecutors or judge who understood the Vignali case. <bullet> White House staff engaged in telephone conversations with a number of outside individuals regarding the Vignali case--Hugh Rodham, Lee Baca, and Alejandro Mayorkas, none of whom knew very much about the Vignali case. It appears that key White House staff gave great weight to the input provided by Rodham, Baca, and Mayorkas, even though they knew little about the case and had mixed motives. <bullet> White House staff failed to reach out to the prosecutors who had convicted Vignali, or the judge who sentenced him. White House staff justified their failure to take this simple action by concluding that they knew that the prosecutors and judge would object, so there was no need to speak to them. However, if the White House had spoken to Todd Jones, Denise Reilly, Andrew Dunne, or Judge David Doty, they would have learned that Carlos Vignali: (1) was not a small- time drug dealer; (2) was unrepentant about his criminal activity; and (3) never cooperated with law enforcement by telling them who supplied him cocaine. The White House ignored the strenuous objections to the Vignali commutation which were lodged by the Pardon Attorney. <bullet> The Pardon Attorney provided the White House with a report that contained his recommendation against granting the Vignali commutation. This report contained a number of powerful arguments against the commutation, which were apparently ignored by the White House. The existence of the Pardon Attorney's report means that the White House cannot claim that it was totally unaware that Vignali's arguments were completely false. The White House knew that the Vignali clemency petition had no merit, yet decided to grant the commutation anyway. President Clinton's decision raises questions about why the Vignali commutation was granted. Rodham has apparently misled the public about returning to the Vignalis those fees he received in connection with the clemency and ignored former President and Senator Clinton's request that he do so. <bullet> On February 21, 2001, at the request of former President Clinton and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rodham promised to return to Horacio Vignali the legal fees he received in connection with the Vignali clemency. But, as of June 2001, Rodham had apparently returned only about $50,000 of the money that Horacio Vignali paid him. Rodham's attorney has confirmed to Committee staff that Rodham has not returned any additional amounts and has no plans to return the remaining $154,000. HUGH RODHAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BRASWELL PARDON Glenn Braswell was under investigation by multiple federal agencies and several state attorneys general when the pardon was granted. <bullet> Over the past two decades, Braswell has created a dietary supplement empire using false advertising to mislead consumers. After serving time in prison for mail fraud and tax evasion in 1983, Braswell has continued to defraud consumers about the benefits of his herbal remedies. In addition to facing numerous lawsuits, Braswell's companies have been investigated by the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and Better Business Bureau. <bullet> Unsurprisingly, Braswell was under another criminal investigation by federal prosecutors for a massive tax evasion and money-laundering scheme when he was pardoned. Braswell's petition bypassed the traditional route through the Justice Department and went directly to the White House. If the FBI had conducted a background investigation instead of the White House, Braswell's petition would have been rejected quickly. Braswell paid Hugh Rodham $230,000 for successfully obtaining the pardon. <bullet> Braswell hired Rodham to support his pardon petition for $230,000. For this price, Rodham claims he forwarded a letter of support for Braswell to the White House Counsel's Office, and he made a follow-up inquiry. According to Rodham, these two actions were the extent of his role in the Braswell pardon. Rodham refunded the $230,000 to Braswell after facing widespread criticism from the media and members of both political parties. HUGH RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS Gene and Nora Lum, prominent Democratic contributors and fundraisers, were convicted of making illegal conduit contributions and tax offenses. <bullet> In 1997, the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000 in illegal conduit contributions to the DNC. They were sentenced to home detention, confinement in a halfway house and a $30,000 fine. In August 1998, Gene Lum pleaded guilty to tax fraud for filing tax returns claiming more than $7.1 million in false deductions and was sentenced to two years imprisonment. The Lums attempted to obtain executive clemency through Hugh Rodham. <bullet> Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House as part of the Lums' efforts but failed to secure them a grant of clemency. In December 2000, Nora Lum called one of her husband's criminal attorneys and asked him to send various documents to Hugh Rodham at the White House. He did so. In early January 2001, Rodham called Gene Lum's attorney again and asked him to resend those documents directly to, among others, Meredith Cabe, an associate White House counsel responsible for clemency matters. Subsequently, Rodham telephoned Cabe and discussed the merits of the Lums' pardon request. Cabe then told White House Counsel Beth Nolan and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey about her discussion with Rodham. Both told Cabe that the Lums were not going to receive clemency. The Lums and Hugh Rodham have refused to cooperate with the Committee's investigation. <bullet> Gene and Nora Lum have refused to cooperate with the Committee's investigation. The Lums' daughter, Nicole (with whom Hugh Rodham apparently had some sort of business relationship), has likewise declined to be interviewed by the Committee. Hugh Rodham has also refused to cooperate with the Committee's request for an interview. Therefore, the Committee is unable to obtain a full understanding of the Lums' efforts to obtain executive clemency and Rodham's role in those efforts. TONY RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY Tony Rodham's Role in the Case of Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory <bullet> Tony Rodham lobbied President Clinton to grant pardons to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory while he was receiving substantial sums of money from the Gregorys. Rodham received $244,769 in salary from the Gregorys over two and a half years and also received another $79,000 in loans from the Gregorys. The Gregorys claim that they paid Rodham this large sum of money for various consulting services that Rodham provided to the Gregorys. However, the Gregorys do not have any documentation reflecting work performed for them by Rodham. <bullet> Given the fact that the Gregorys do not have any documentary evidence reflecting the $244,769 of work performed for them by Rodham, substantial questions are raised as to what Rodham actually did for the Gregorys that was so valuable. The most valuable thing that Rodham did for the Gregorys was to obtain presidential pardons. Therefore, there is a substantial question as to whether the Gregorys paid Rodham for his efforts to obtain presidential pardons for them. <bullet> If Rodham was paid to obtain presidential pardons for the Gregorys, it creates the strong appearance of impropriety. The prospect of financial benefit for Rodham would taint Rodham's actions in lobbying for the pardon. Also, if President Clinton knew about Rodham's financial arrangement, it would taint his actions in granting the pardons. <bullet> Compounding the appearance of impropriety in the Gregory case is the fact that the pardons were opposed by the Justice Department, the prosecutors responsible for the case, and also the Gregorys' sentencing judge. Apparently, the only people in the Clinton Administration who felt that the Gregorys deserved pardons were President Clinton and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, both of whom knew of Tony Rodham's involvement in the matter. Tony Rodham's Role in the Case of Fernando Fuentes Coba <bullet> Tony Rodham offered to help Vivian Mannerud obtain a pardon for her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba, in exchange for $50,000. When Rodham learned in late 2000 that Mannerud was seeking a pardon for her elderly father, he met with Mannerud and told her that he could help obtain the pardon if she paid him a $50,000 consulting fee. Rodham told Mannerud that he had successfully obtained pardons before and showed her the Gregorys' pardon petition to support his claim. <bullet> Rodham attempted to convince Mannerud to hire him by making a number of false representations to her. Rodham told Mannerud that he was close personal friends with the Pardon Attorney, Roger Adams. Rodham also told Mannerud that he would use the $50,000 to hire a law firm to handle her case and that Roger Adams' wife worked at the law firm, which would help her case be treated favorably. All of these representations were completely false and were apparently made to mislead Mannerud as to the purpose of the payment to Rodham. <bullet> Mannerud rejected Rodham's offer. Mannerud was concerned that Rodham could not guarantee that he could obtain a pardon in exchange for the $50,000. She was also concerned about becoming embroiled in a scandal. Therefore, she rejected Rodham's offer. <bullet> After Mannerud rejected Rodham's offer, an associate of Rodham came back to Mannerud with another offer. According to Mannerud, a month after she rejected Tony Rodham's proposal, Marilyn Parker, a mutual friend of Rodham's and Mannerud's who attended the initial meeting between them, came back to Mannerud and told her that Rodham now wanted only $30,000 to help her obtain a pardon for her father. Mannerud was still concerned about the nature of Rodham's proposal and rejected it. <bullet> The actions taken by Rodham and Parker may have been illegal. Rodham, and maybe Parker as well, engaged in an effort to defraud Mannerud. While the effort was unsuccessful, it may have constituted criminal conduct. The Committee recommends that the Justice Department investigate these allegations. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S GRANT OF CLEMENCY TO DRUG MONEY LAUNDERER HARVEY WEINIG Weinig was properly imprisoned for conspiring to launder millions of dollars in drug money and concealing and furthering an extortion-by-kidnapping scheme. <bullet> Weinig, a former Manhattan attorney, conspired to launder about $19 million in drug proceeds through a Swiss bank for the Cali cartel. Members of the money laundering organization, of which Weinig was a part, boasted that they successfully laundered more than $70 million for the cartel. In addition to conducting banking transactions for the organization, Weinig consulted with co-conspirators in furtherance of the organization's activities and stored the drug proceeds in his New York City apartment. <bullet> Weinig and other co-conspirators at his law firm stole from the Cali cartel about $2.5 million they were supposed to have laundered. This theft exposed Weinig's family to a risk of being harmed by those drug dealers. In the course of investigating the organization's money laundering activities, authorities intervened when they learned that the drug dealers sent a hit man to kill one of Weinig's co- conspirators. <bullet> Weinig learned that one of his co-conspirators kidnapped an individual as part of a scheme to extort money from the victim's family. Rather than report the kidnapping, Weinig made his office available as a meeting place where the ransom could be delivered and directed his associates at the firm to execute transfer agreements. Weinig's lawyer, a prominent Washington attorney with close connections to the Clinton Administration, lobbied the White House in support of Weinig's clemency petition. <bullet> Weinig's wife, Alice Morey, retained Reid Weingarten, who was close to the Clinton White House, to lobby for the commutation. In April 2000, Weingarten filed a clemency petition on Weinig's behalf with the Justice Department and the White House. Knowing that the Justice Department would advise the President to reject the Weinig commutation petition, Weingarten lobbied the White House directly, approaching White House Counsel Beth Nolan, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey and Chief of Staff John Podesta. <bullet> Weingarten chose not to familiarize himself with the facts of Weinig's underlying conviction. Accordingly, he was unable to convey to those he lobbied a full, accurate factual basis of the merits of Weinig's petition. Two former Clinton Administration officials, David Dreyer and Harold Ickes, lobbied the White House on Weinig's behalf. <bullet> Alice Morey enlisted the assistance of her cousin, former White House Deputy Communications Director David Dreyer. Dreyer repeatedly raised the Weinig commutation with John Podesta. Ultimately, Podesta recommended that the President grant the Weinig commutation. Dreyer has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights rather than cooperate with the Committee's investigation. <bullet> Morey also obtained support for Weinig's commutation from former Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, whose children attended the same school as did her sons. Ickes discussed the Weinig case with President Clinton twice and recommended the commutation of Weinig's sentence. The Justice Department repeatedly and adamantly recommended against the commutation of Weinig's sentence. <bullet> On several occasions, U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, whose office convicted Weinig, objected to any reduction of Weinig's sentence. Ultimately, in a report to President Clinton, the Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder voiced their strong opposition to a commutation of Weinig's sentence. <bullet> Pardon Attorney Roger Adams submitted a report to the President advising against the Weinig commutation. Adams pointed out that Weinig ``was a well-respected lawyer who used his professional skills to assist in laundering millions of dollars that he knew constituted the proceeds of a huge narcotics trafficking enterprise. He was involved in this activity for an extended period of time, and he admits that he engaged in it purely out of greed.'' Adams also informed the President that Weinig ``aided and abetted the extortion of money from an individual he knew had been kidnapped at the direction of a co-defendant in order to coerce the production of a ransom.'' After an apparently cursory review, the White House set aside the Justice Department's negative recommendation and granted Weinig clemency. <bullet> Support for Weinig's petition from John Podesta and Beth Nolan appears to have been critical. The Associate White House counsels responsible for clemency matters did not support the petition. However, setting aside the negative recommendations of not only the Justice Department but also staff at the White House Counsel's Office, Nolan and Lindsey, who were lobbied by Weingarten, recommended Weinig's clemency to President Clinton. John Podesta, who was lobbied by Weingarten and Dreyer, also recommended to the President that Weinig's sentence be commuted. The White House was unjustified in commuting Weinig's sentence. <bullet> None of the arguments made by Weinig entitle him to executive clemency. In his petition, Weinig stated three main reasons why his sentence should have been commuted: (1) his sentence was disproportionate and excessive; (2) his contributions to society justified his early release from prison; and (3) one of his children was suffering emotional difficulties as a result of his imprisonment and needed him to return home. The first reason is simply not true. Weinig's sentence was comparable to those received by other co- conspirators who were directly responsible for laundering large amounts of drug money and declined to cooperate with authorities. Weinig's sentence was also comparable to those received by co-defendants who participated in the extortion-by- kidnapping scheme, which Weinig concealed and facilitated. The other two reasons fail to distinguish Weinig from the vast number of other similarly situated felons, who were properly sentenced but whose families have suffered because of their imprisonment. President Clinton's commutation of Weinig's sentence has sent out the wrong message about the United States' commitment to fighting drug trafficking. <bullet> President Clinton's decision conveyed an appearance of granting special consideration to wealthy, politically well- connected criminals and their relatives. Pardon Attorney Roger Adams foresaw the message sent by the Weinig commutation, warning President Clinton that ``[t]o commute [Weinig's] prison term to the five years he proposes would denigrate the seriousness of his criminal misconduct, undermine the government's legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty pleas and truthful cooperation from criminal defendants, and could give the appearance of granting special consideration to economically advantaged, white-collar offenders.'' <bullet> The Weinig commutation undermines the nation's efforts to fight the illegal drug trade. Complaints are frequently made that U.S. drug laws punish low-level drug criminals too severely, yet do not punish high-level drug distributors enough. When a large-scale drug money launderer like Harvey Weinig receives executive clemency after serving five years of an eleven-year sentence, it sends the message that the U.S. is not serious about prosecuting the high-level criminals who make the drug trade possible. <bullet> The Weinig commutation has eroded the United States' moral authority to press other countries to fight the drug trade within their own borders. The Weinig commutation could harm the efforts of the U.S. government to extradite drug traffickers and money launderers from Latin America. Newspapers in Latin American countries have accused the U.S. of hypocrisy in the Weinig case. For example, in Colombia's leading daily, former Colombian attorney general Gustavo De Greiff, in an op- ed entitled ``The Morality of the Strongest,'' labeled President Clinton's clemency decision ``monstrous.'' INTRODUCTION A. Why the Committee Investigated These Matters Unlike most other powers granted to the President by the Constitution, the power to grant executive clemency is virtually unchecked. Some have argued that because the power to grant clemency is unlimited, Congress has no oversight role over grants of executive clemency. The opposite is true. Because the President can grant clemency to whomever he wants for whatever reasons, it is critically important that certain grants of clemency be subject to Congressional and public scrutiny. If this scrutiny were not applied to grants of clemency, the power could easily be abused. As James Madison observed: A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ James Madison, The Writings of James Madison 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 9th ed. 1910). While the grants of clemency issued by President Clinton will not, and cannot, be overturned by the Committee's investigation, this report can serve a valuable purpose to inform the public about President Clinton's abuse of power in issuing grants of clemency to so many undeserving individuals. The report can also serve as a reminder to future Presidents not to exercise their pardon power in such a reckless and corrupting fashion. Before President Clinton, when a President made controversial grants of clemency, he often provided a full accounting of his reasons for the decision. For example, when President Ford pardoned former President Nixon in 1974, President Ford made an unprecedented appearance before the House Judiciary Committee to explain his decision.\2\ When President George H.W. Bush pardoned Caspar Weinberger for his involvement in the Iran-Contra matter, he provided a full accounting of his decision in a public statement and released a number of documents dispelling any concerns that President Bush's pardon was meant to cover up his own involvement in the Iran-Contra matter.\3\ President Bush even consulted with prominent Democratic Members of Congress before issuing the Weinberger pardon to see if they would object.\4\ However, President Clinton issued a number of controversial pardons and commutations and failed to ever provide a satisfactory accounting for his decisions. Not only did he avoid consultation with Members of Congress, but President Clinton also avoided consultation with his own Justice Department and other knowledgeable agencies. Moreover, President Clinton has declined to answer any questions about his decisions, choosing instead to make occasional self-serving statements to friendly reporters.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ ``Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related Matters,'' Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (Oct. 17, 1974). \3\ 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992). \4\ According to news reports, House Speaker Tom Foley, Chairman Les Aspin, and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan told President Bush that they would not object to the Weinberger pardon. Senator Moynihan even urged President Bush to grant a pardon to Iran-Contra figure Elliot Abrams, a former Moynihan aide. See Marjorie Williams, Burden of Proof, Wash. Post Mag., Apr. 11, 1993, at 6; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Bush Faces Fallout on Iran-Contra Pardons, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 30, 1992, at 25. \5\ See, e.g., Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- President Clinton's abuse of the clemency power began with the August 11, 1999, grants of clemency to 16 terrorists who were part of the FALN and Macheteros terrorist network. When the Committee and the public understandably raised questions regarding these grants of clemency, President Clinton did nothing to answer those questions. Rather, he invoked executive privilege over 2,800 pages of documents which would have showed why he made his decision.\6\ When President Clinton did attempt to offer an explanation for the FALN clemency, it was factually inaccurate. Indeed, some documents indicated that the President made his decision for political benefit.\7\ For example, one document said that the release of the 16 terrorists would ``have a positive impact among strategic Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. (read, voters).'' Another document stated: ``[t]he Vice President's Puerto Rican position would be helped.'' \8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Log of Documents Subject to Executive Privilege, noted in ``The FALN and Macheteros Clemency: Misleading Explanations, A Reckless Decision, A Dangerous Message,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. 325-68 (Dec. 10, 1999). \7\ See generally ``The FALN and Macheteros Clemency: Misleading Explanations, A Reckless Decision, A Dangerous Message,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. (Dec. 10, 1999). \8\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the final hours of his term, President Clinton issued 141 pardons and 36 commutations.\9\ While other Presidents had issued controversial pardons and commutations, never before had a President made so many grants of clemency with so little justification. To understand the wholesale nature of the President's questionable clemency grants, it is useful to recall that he granted clemency to 13 individuals convicted in connection with independent counsel investigations of the Clinton Administration.\10\ Strong arguments could be made against all of these grants of clemency. The individuals who received these grants of clemency were convicted of serious crimes, and many of them played significant roles in major political scandals. For example, Susan McDougal was convicted of mail fraud, misapplication of funds, and false statements, and then was jailed on contempt of court charges for refusing to tell a grand jury whether President Clinton had testified truthfully at her trial. If Susan McDougal were not a close friend of the President, her pardon would be troubling enough. She was a convicted felon who defrauded a bank and defied the right of a grand jury to receive honest testimony. Considering that McDougal was a close friend of the President, who was jailed for contempt rather than testify against him, there is the indelible appearance that the pardon was a reward for McDougal's silence. Yet the Committee did not investigate the McDougal pardon or any of the other 12 pardons and commutations relating to independent counsel investigations. Neither did the Committee investigate the pardons and commutations granted to former Congressman Mel Reynolds,\11\ William Borders,\12\ or CIA Director John Deutch,\13\ all of which were subject to widespread criticism. Rather, the Committee limited its investigation to pardons and commutations where there was no credible explanation for the grant of clemency, and where there was an appearance of impropriety relating to inappropriate access or corruption. The fact that the Committee did not investigate pardons like Susan McDougal's speaks volumes about both the Committee's exercise of restraint and the severity of the abuses in those cases the Committee did investigate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Department of Justice Document Production DJ/PAO-MR-00009-23 (List of Pardon and Commutation Grants, Jan. 20, 2001) (Exhibit 1). \10\ Individuals convicted in the Whitewater investigation and receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Susan H. McDougal; Robert W. Palmer; Stephen A. Smith; and Christopher V. Wade. Individuals convicted in the investigation of former Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy and receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Richard Douglas; Alvarez Ferrouillet; John Hemmingson; James H. Lake; Brook K. Mitchell, Sr.; and Jack L. Williams. Receiving a commutation for a conviction in the Espy case was Ronald Blackley. Individuals convicted in the Cisneros investigation and receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Henry Cisneros and Linda Jones. In addition, Archibald Schaffer, a key defendant in the Espy investigation, received a pardon shortly before the end of the Clinton Administration, on December 22, 2000. \11\ Reynolds received a commutation for his federal convictions for bank fraud, wire fraud, false statements, and conspiracy to defraud. He also served time in prison for state convictions for sexual misconduct, obstruction of justice, and solicitation of child pornography. He is currently a registered sex offender in the state of Illinois. See Illinois Sex Offender Information (visited Mar. 4, 2002) <http://samnet.isp.state.il.us> (listing Reynolds' registration as a sex offender). \12\ Borders was convicted for participating in a conspiracy to bribe federal judge Alcee Hastings. Borders refused to testify at Hastings' criminal trial or his impeachment hearings, which resulted in Borders' imprisonment for both contempt of court and contempt of Congress. By granting clemency to Borders, President Clinton violated his own standards as drafted by then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn. Quinn wrote that ``offenses involving central involvement in political corruption'' were among those President Clinton would not consider ``under almost any circumstances.'' Arnold & Porter Document Production A0556-57 (Executive Clemency Policy, Jan. 26, 1996) (Exhibit 2). \13\ Deutch was accused of mishandling hundreds of highly classified documents, including information relating to covert actions, storing many on a home computer used to surf ``high risk'' sites on the internet, making the documents easily accessible to a hacker. Jerry Seper, Deutch Planned Guilty Plea Before Clinton Pardoned Him, Wash. Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A3. Less than a day before receiving the pardon, Deutch had signed a plea agreement wherein he admitted a misdemeanor and agreed to pay a $5,000 fine. Vernon Loeb, Senate Committee Questions Clinton's Pardon of Deutch, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2001, at A2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee investigated two types of clemency grants. First was the case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green, which raised substantial questions of direct corruption, primarily whether pardons were issued in exchange for political and other financial contributions. The second group of cases involved indirect corruption, where close relatives of the President-- namely Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham, and Tony Rodham--apparently traded on their relationships with the President to lobby for pardons and commutations. These cases raised serious concerns that Roger Clinton and the Rodhams used their access to the White House to lobby for pardons, in some cases successfully, and received large payments for their lobbying efforts. The Committee had three main purposes in its clemency investigation. First, as discussed above, the Committee sought to let the public know whether President Clinton had abused the clemency power. By subjecting the President's exercise of clemency to public scrutiny, the Committee hopes to make it clear to future Presidents that history will hold them accountable for clemency grants that are abusive. Second, the Committee sought to determine whether there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent individuals with close relationships with the President from trading on their access to win pardons. A number of the most troubling pardons granted by President Clinton were the result of lobbying from former White House staff like Jack Quinn or close relatives like Hugh Rodham. Third, the Committee examined whether there are adequate procedures in the pardon process to protect against abuse by the President. While the Justice Department has regulations governing its handling of applications for clemency, the President is free to ignore those regulations, and President Clinton did ignore them in the last month he was in office. The key lesson to be learned from the facts detailed in this report is that more disclosure is likely to remedy the problems in each of these three areas of concern. Public scrutiny after-the-fact may provide some deterrence, but a more open process before a grant of clemency is likely to be more effective. That is why the Committee moved legislation to require public disclosure of contributions to entities like the Clinton Library, given the potential effect of such contributions on policymaking decisions.\14\ Another example of potential legislation would be a clarification of the definition of ``lobbying'' under the Lobbying Disclosure Act.\15\ It could be amended to explicitly cover those who are paid to contact executive branch officials on behalf of clemency seekers.\16\ If Jack Quinn and Hugh Rodham had been required to disclose their status publicly as paid lobbyists seeking clemency for their clients, then Marc Rich and Carlos Vignali may not have been pardoned. The public outcry could have occurred beforehand and possibly prevented the damage done by these grants of clemency to public confidence in the integrity of government. Even if such a measure would not have prevented these particular grants of clemency, knowing who is paid to lobby for clemency would certainly assist future presidents in making appropriate decisions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ As a result of the Committee's investigation into the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons, the Committee voted out H.R. 577, the Presidential Library Disclosure Act, a bill which ensures that contributions to presidential libraries are publicly disclosed. This bill was approved by the House of Representatives in a 392 to 3 vote on February 5, 2002, and is awaiting action in the Senate. \15\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(a) currently defines a ``lobbying contact'' as: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- G. . any oral or written communication . . . to a covered executve branch official . . . that is made on behalf of a client with regard to-- G(i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of Federal legislation (including legislative proposals); G(ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of a Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other program, policy, or position of the United States Government; G(iii) the administration or execution of a Federal program or policy (including the negotiation, award, or administration of a Federal contract, grant, loan, permit, or license); Gor (iv) the nomination or confirmation of a person for a position subject to confirmation by the Senate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(b)(xii) currently contains an exception for ``a communication that is . . . made to an official in an agency with regard to . . . a judicial proceeding or a criminal or civil law enforcement inquiry, investigation, or proceeding.'' This exception could arguably exclude lobbying for clemency from the statute's disclosure requirements. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 9, 2001) (holding that ``the pardon process was not adversarial'' in the Marc Rich case, that his lawyers were ``acting principally as lobbyists,'' and that they were, therefore, not entitled to withhold certain documents under the attorney-client privilege). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. President Clinton Deviated From All Applicable Standards In his rush to grant pardons and commutations in the waning hours of his presidency, Bill Clinton ignored almost every applicable standard governing the exercise of the clemency power. There were three obvious sources of guidance regarding the exercise of the power. First, the Justice Department had published guidelines regarding its handling of clemency petitions. While these guidelines were not binding upon the President, they should have provided guidance to the Justice Department and the President. At a minimum, they provide a mechanism to provide the President with relevant information. The Justice Department guidelines state first that pardon petitions should not be filed until five years after the petitioner is released from prison, or, if no prison time is served, five years after the date of conviction.\17\ The guidelines also state that commutation petitions should not be filed while there are other forms of judicial or administrative relief, like appeals, still available.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.2 (2002). \18\ 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.3 (2002). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. Attorney's Manual also contains detailed standards applied to clemency petitions by the Pardon Attorney's Office. The Manual lists five standards applicable to the review of pardon petitions: 1. Post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation. An individual's demonstrated ability to lead a responsible and productive life for a significant period after conviction or release from confinement is strong evidence of rehabilitation and worthiness for pardon. * * * 2. Seriousness and relative recentness of the offense. When an offense is very serious (e.g., a violent crime, major drug trafficking, breach of public trust, or white collar crime involving substantial sums of money), a suitable length of time should have elapsed in order to avoid denigrating the seriousness of the offense or undermining the deterrent effect of the conviction. In the case of a prominent individual or notorious crime, the likely effect of a pardon on law enforcement interests or upon the general public should be taken into account. * * * 3. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and atonement. The extent to which a petitioner has accepted responsibility for his or her criminal conduct and made restitution to its victims are important considerations. A petitioner should be genuinely desirous of forgiveness rather than vindication. While the absence of expressions of remorse should not preclude favorable consideration, a petitioner's attempts to minimize or rationalize culpability does not advance the case for pardon. * * * 4. The need for relief. The purpose for which a pardon is sought may influence disposition of the petition. A felony conviction may result in a wide variety of legal disabilities under state or federal law, some of which can provide persuasive grounds for recommending a pardon. * * * 5. Official recommendations and reports. The comments and recommendations of concerned and knowledgeable officials, particularly the United States Attorney whose office prosecuted the case and the sentencing judge, are carefully considered. The likely impact of favorable action in the district or nationally, particularly on current law enforcement priorities, will always be relevant to the President's decision.\19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ U.S. Attorney's Manual 1-2.112. The U.S. Attorney's manual also contains standards for the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- consideration of commutation petitions: Generally, commutation of sentence is an extraordinary remedy that is rarely granted. Appropriate grounds for considering commutation have traditionally included disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical illness or old age, and meritorious service rendered to the government by the petitioner, e.g., cooperation with investigative or prosecutive efforts that has not been adequately rewarded by other official action.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ U.S. Attorney's Manual 1-2.113. A second source of guidance comes from a 1996 memorandum from then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn to Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick and Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate Love. In this memorandum, Quinn issued a number of directives from President Clinton regarding the exercise of his clemency authority. Quinn first stated that the ``President intends to continue to rely greatly on your joint recommendations regarding clemency applications.'' Quinn also stated that President Clinton had identified a number of factors in addition to those listed in the U.S. Attorney's Manual, which he wanted considered as part of the review of clemency petitions: The following circumstances would weigh in favor of granting clemency: 1. Indications that the crime for which clemency is sought was truly abberational, i.e., a lone instance of criminal behavior in an otherwise exemplary life. 2. Cases committed long ago when the individual was very young and which do not involve major crimes. 3. Cases not involving major crimes in which the individual has clearly turned his or her life around by making sustained and significant contributions to the community since being released from prison. By contrast, in certain cases, even extraordinarily exemplary actions post-conviction may not merit the remedy of executive clemency. These cases might include: 1. The commission of major crimes: There are categories of crimes which are so serious that the President will not consider granting a pardon for them under almost any circumstances. Such crimes would include large- scale drug trafficking, sex offenses involving minors, offenses involving central involvement in political corruption, or violent crimes such as murder or rape. 2. An extensive criminal history: Three or more separate convictions should raise a substantial presumption against granting a pardon with respect to any one of them. This presumption would only be overcome by a truly exceptional rehabilitative history involving exemplary service to the individual's community or country.\21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0556-57 (Memorandum from Jack Quinn to Jamie Gorelick (Jan. 26, 1996)) (Exhibit 2). The final source of guidance regarding the exercise of the President's clemency power is, of course, the President's own personal views. In 1996, President Clinton was asked if he was considering a pardon for Susan McDougal and other Whitewater --------------------------------------------------------------------------- defendants. He responded: [M]y position would be that their cases should be handled like others . . . there's a regular process for that, and I have regular meetings on that. And I review those cases as they come up and after there's an evaluation done by the Justice Department, and that's how I think it should be handled.\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 23, 1996). Therefore, the President suggested that the McDougal case, and all others, would be handled according to the ``regular process,'' including screening by the Justice Department. As to the President's claim that he would follow the ``regular process,'' he granted clemency to 30 individuals who had not even filed clemency petitions with the Justice Department,\23\ and some who had not filed any petition at all, not even with the White House.\24\ The President also granted clemency to 14 individuals who had their petitions previously denied and thus were not pending with the Justice Department.\25\ Even more important, in a number of cases, President Clinton dramatically deviated from the ``regular process'' of seeking the Justice Department's input. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ Letter from Sheryl Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 6, 2001) (Exhibit 3). \24\ The Committee has not attempted to discover every single case where clemency was granted without a clemency petition being filed. However, it has been reported that a number of individuals who were convicted in connection with independent counsel investigations, for example, Richard Douglas, Alvarez Ferrouillet, John Hemmingson, James H. Lake, Brook K. Mitchell, Sr., Jack L. Williams, Ronald Blackley, Henry Cisneros, and Linda Jones all received grants of clemency without having filed a petition with either the White House or the Justice Department. See Weston Kosova, Running on Fumes: Pulling All-Nighters, Bill Clinton Spent His Last Days Obsessing Over Details and Pardons, Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 30. \25\ Letter from Sheryl Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 6, 2001) (Exhibit 3). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Many of the President's last-minute grants of clemency violated all of these standards. Marc Rich and Pincus Green, for example, fail all five Justice Department criteria for pardons. They did not demonstrate responsible behavior after their indictment. Rather, by all accounts, they have remained fugitives from justice and continued to engage in business relations with the enemies of the United States. Their offenses were serious and notorious crimes for which, according to the Justice Department, a suitable length of time should pass between conviction and pardon. Yet Rich and Green never even stood trial. Rich and Green did not demonstrate any responsibility, remorse, or atonement for their crimes. Rather, they maintained that they were ``singled out'' and unfairly prosecuted. Rich and Green had no real need for relief. They lived in luxury and apparently sought the pardons only so that they could travel freely around the world, without the fear of being apprehended by the U.S. Marshals Service in countries that were cooperating with U.S. efforts to apprehend them. Finally, there were no official recommendations or reports regarding the Rich and Green pardons, since the White House circumvented the normal pardon review process. If there had been such reports, however, it is safe to assume that the U.S. Attorney's office would have strongly objected to the Rich and Green pardons. The other grants of clemency reviewed in this report also fail to meet the applicable standards. Carlos Vignali satisfies none of the appropriate grounds for commutation identified in Justice Department regulations, as his sentence was not disparate or unfair, and he did not cooperate with law enforcement. As a large-scale drug dealer, Vignali also was not eligible for clemency under the President's own guidelines of 1996. Harvey Weinig similarly failed all relevant standards, having been sentenced fairly and having never cooperated with law enforcement. Weinig, as a large-scale money launderer for the Cali Cartel, also was ineligible for clemency under the President's guidelines. Glenn Braswell clearly failed to meet the standards for a pardon, as he was under active investigation for new criminal acts at the time he received a pardon. Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory similarly fell short of the applicable standard, having committed one of the largest bank frauds in Alabama history. Moreover, prosecutors objected to the Gregory pardons. C. Individuals Close to President Clinton Used Their Influence to Lobby for Undeserved Grants of Clemency One of the most disturbing aspects of the closing month of President Clinton's term in office is that a number of people close to the President used their relationship with him to lobby for clemency grants which ordinarily would not have been considered. While there are certainly individuals who would seek to abuse their access in any administration, never have they been so successful as in the Clinton Administration. Jack Quinn abused his relationship with the President to lobby for the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green. There can be little doubt that these pardons would not have been issued if Jack Quinn had not exploited his position as former White House Counsel. Hugh Rodham successfully lobbied the President for grants of clemency to Carlos Vignali and Glenn Braswell. Tony Rodham successfully lobbied the President to grant pardons to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory. David Dreyer, a former White House staffer, lobbied the President to grant a commutation to his cousin, Cali cartel money launderer Harvey Weinig. It is clear that none of these grants of clemency would have been issued on the merits. Marc Rich and Pincus Green were fugitives from justice, indicted for the largest tax evasion scheme in U.S. history and for selling oil to Iran while Americans were being held hostage. Carlos Vignali was the source of cocaine for a major drug dealing ring. Glenn Braswell was an extremely successful con artist who was actually under criminal investigation at the time he received his pardon from President Clinton. Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory had been convicted for the largest bank fraud in Alabama history. Harvey Weinig laundered millions of dollars for the Cali cartel and participated in a kidnapping, and was only caught when he began to steal money from the Cali cartel. Only by capitalizing on relationships between President Clinton and individuals close to him were these petitioners able to obtain grants of clemency. D. A Number of Potential Violations of Law Have Been Discovered by the Committee In the course of its investigation, the Committee has learned of a number of potential violations of law by Roger Clinton and Tony Rodham. The Committee recommends that the Department of Justice review these matters in conjunction with the ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. The Committee has uncovered a number of potential criminal acts by Roger Clinton. First, Roger Clinton may have imported more than $10,000 in monetary instruments into the United States without properly disclosing it to the Customs Service. Clinton received substantial sums of money originating from overseas between 1998 and 2000. If Clinton imported this money into the United States, then he was required to report it to proper authorities and apparently did not do so. Second, Roger Clinton appears to have violated the Lobbying Disclosure Act. There is evidence that Roger Clinton lobbied the President regarding travel restrictions to Cuba. Clinton did not register as a lobbyist, despite the fact that he was likely required to do so. Third, Clinton lied to FBI agents who interviewed him regarding his lobbying for Rosario Gambino in 1999. When they interviewed Roger Clinton, he claimed that ``he did not represent to anyone on the Parole Commission that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist the Gambino family.'' \26\ However, when Clinton lobbied the U.S. Parole Commission, he had explicitly stated that his brother was ``completely aware'' of his involvement.\27\ Roger Clinton also lied to the FBI about a $50,000 payment from the Gambino family.\28\ Although he deposited the payment the same day as the FBI interview, he did not disclose it to the agents explicitly or truthfully. Rather he claimed that Rosario Gambino's son had offered to loan him money for a down payment on a house.\29\ Despite this claim to the FBI, which Clinton repeated to the media in the summer of 2001, bank records indicate that Clinton neither used the $50,000 for a down payment nor did he ever repay any of the money. During the interview, Clinton also told three separate and contradictory stories when questioned about a Rolex watch he received from the Gambinos.\30\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\ Department of Justice Document Production FBI-RC-00003 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 4). \27\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, U.S. Parole Commission, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit--5); Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, U.S. Parole Commission (July 27, 2001). Roger Clinton made it clear to Parole Commission staff on multiple occasions that President Clinton had specific knowledge that he was contacting the Parole Commission regarding Rosario Gambino. See generally, Chapter Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Executive Clemency, Section II.E.1., ``Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding his Brother's Knowledge.'' \28\ See generally, Chapter Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Executive Clemency, Section II.E.2., ``Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding Payment from the Gambinos.'' \29\ Department of Justice Document Production FBI-RC-00005-06 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 4). \30\ The interviewing FBI agents apparently were not satisfied with Roger Clinton's candor during the interview, as they took the unusual step of explaining to Clinton the penalties for making false statements during the course of the interview. Id. at FBI-RC-00006. See generally, Chapter Two: Roger Clinton's Involvement in Lobbying for Executive Clemency, Section II.E.3., ``Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee has also learned about Tony Rodham's participation in a scheme to defraud Vivian Mannerud in connection with Mannerud's effort to obtain a commutation for her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba. Tony Rodham was introduced to Mannerud by his business partner, Marilyn J. Parker. Together, Rodham and Parker attempted to convince Mannerud to hire Rodham to help her obtain a commutation for her father. In making his pitch to Mannerud, Rodham made a number of false statements to Mannerud, including the assertion that he was friendly with Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, and that he would hire a law firm at which Adams' wife was a partner. Rodham then asked Mannerud to pay him $50,000 to help with the Fernando Fuentes Coba commutation effort. After Mannerud refused, Marilyn Parker called Mannerud to tell her that Rodham now only wanted $30,000 to help with the Fuentes commutation. Mannerud declined both offers for fear of being involved in some improper activity. The activity by Rodham and Parker may amount to a criminal conspiracy to defraud Vivian Mannerud. Whether or not the conduct by Rodham and Parker amounts to criminal activity depends greatly upon the specific evidence that can be gathered by the Justice Department. However, it is clear that this matter deserves thorough investigation by the Department of Justice. E. The Message Sent by President Clinton's Grants of Clemency The way in which a President exercises the clemency power speaks volumes about that President's priorities. The clemency grants reviewed in this report send a clear message, one that does not speak well of President Clinton. While the clemency power is vitally important and should be used by the President, it should not be debased, particularly where large sums of money are flowing to relatives of the President or to foundations in which he has a significant interest. First, President Clinton granted pardons and commutations to individuals who never would have received clemency but for the fact that they hired individuals close to the President to represent them. Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Carlos Vignali, Glenn Braswell, Edgar Gregory, and Vonna Jo Gregory were all extremely wealthy and were able to hire Jack Quinn, Tony Rodham, and Hugh Rodham to lobby the White House and short- circuit the normal clemency review procedures. The average low- income criminal defendant does not have the money necessary to hire a White House insider to lobby for his pardon. At best, he can fill out his clemency application and watch it proceed through the normal Justice Department review process. By listening to the advice of highly-paid White House insiders like Jack Quinn, Hugh Rodham, and Tony Rodham, and by granting clemency to their clients, President Clinton has sent the message that he had two standards of justice--one for the rich, and one for the poor. Representative Elijah Cummings described some of his concerns about this issue at the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing: One of the things that concerns me about [the Rich] pardon is that I think anybody who is sitting in this audience or anybody who is watching this at home, you know, when the little guy, when the Department of Justice comes after the little guy, the guys that I used to represent, they tear their lives apart, I mean rip them apart. They can't afford the Mr. diGenovas, the great lawyers, as he is and others. They do the best they can. They spend all of their money. Their reputations are tarnished. Even if they're found not guilty, friends are brought in, FBI goes into their homes, subpoenas are issued. And when people look at Mr. Rich and others who apparently goes off to another country, they've got the money to do so, and it appears as if they're evading the process. The little guys that I represent and the women, you know, they really have a problem with that, because they sit here and they say, wait a minute, you know, I'm sitting in jail for 20 years. And it does not even compare. I mean, I may have done one-millionth of what was allegedly done here, but I'm sitting in jail. And I didn't have the money to go off somewhere else. I didn't have the money to do that. I didn't have the money to hire the big-time lawyers. So it does concern me. * * * And it's one thing to go to trial. It's one thing to stay here and face the music. It's one thing to be found not guilty. It's a whole other thing, in my opinion, when somebody, because they have the money, can go outside the country and evade the system. I tell you it really concerns me because my constituents have a major problem with that, and I do, too.\31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 164-65 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Elijah Cummings). These concerns are shared by many on the Committee. President Clinton's pardons did not just send the message that he believes in two standards of justice. By pardoning fugitives from justice, President Clinton undermined the efforts of law enforcement officers everywhere. Since 1983, Assistant United States Attorneys and agents of the United States Marshals Service have been trying to apprehend Marc Rich and Pincus Green. They listed Rich as one of the most wanted fugitives in the world. They set up sting operations to arrest Rich overseas. They have submitted arrest requests and extradition requests to a number of foreign countries. President Clinton's pardon of wanted fugitives is a direct slap in the face to the U.S. law enforcement officers who spent almost two decades trying to apprehend Rich. The pardons also could serve to undermine U.S. efforts to extradite fugitives in the future. By commuting the sentences of Carlos Vignali and Harvey Weinig, President Clinton undermined U.S. efforts to fight the flow of illegal drugs into the country. Neither was a minor participant in drug trafficking. Vignali supplied cocaine to the largest drug-dealing ring in Minnesota history. Moreover, he never cooperated with law enforcement and failed to reveal where he obtained his cocaine. Harvey Weinig laundered millions of dollars for the Cali cartel. Without individuals like Harvey Weinig, drug traffickers would not be able to enjoy the proceeds from their drug sales. Despite the seriousness of their crimes, President Clinton commuted the sentences of both Vignali and Weinig. The message of these commutations was loud and clear. Tony Adams, a narcotics detective in Minnesota, spoke eloquently to the meaning of the Vignali commutation. Adams stated that he was stunned to learn of the commutation: ``It's like, basically, you've just been told that this kid, he's untouchable.'' \32\ Adams observed that the Vignali case ``more or less tells us that America's system has been bought if you have money.'' \33\ He also observed that ``politicians always get in front of this camera and say ``We're trying to take dope off the streets. We're trying to put dope dealers in jail.'' Well, you just let one out, a big one.'' \34\ Finally, Adams suggested that ``the politicians in L.A. or Washington, D.C., should finish the nine years that [Vignali] has left on his time, and I'm standing right by that.'' \35\ Adams is certainly not alone in his criticism of the Vignali commutation, but his comments are particularly noteworthy, coming from a detective who investigated the case, and who routinely places his life on the line to protect the public from drug traffickers.\36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American System, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at 10. \33\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television broadcast, Feb. 27, 2001). \34\ Nightline (ABC News television broadcast, Feb. 23, 2001). \35\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television broadcast, Feb. 23, 2001). \36\ While conducting plainclothes surveillance in April 2001, Adams was shot at by a suspect and escaped uninjured. David Chanen, Man Fires at Officer, But Nobody is Hurt, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN), Apr. 20, 2001, at 9B. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Weinig case has sent no less a destructive message to U.S. law enforcement. In fact, the Weinig commutation has created a great deal of consternation in Latin American nations from which the U.S. is attempting to extradite drug kingpins. Many individuals in these nations have argued that they should not extradite their citizens to the U.S. for narcotics offenses because the U.S. clearly is not serious about enforcing its narcotics laws, pointing specifically to the Weinig commutation.\37\ By pardoning a major money launderer for the Cali cartel, President Clinton has made it harder for the U.S. to extradite drug traffickers to the U.S. and harder to fight the war on drugs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ See Colombian General Hits Clinton Commutation, Wash. Times, Mar. 6, 2001, at A13; Russell Crandall, The Americas: In the War on Drugs, Colombians Die, Americans Are Pardoned, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at A15. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- F. Obstacles Faced by the Committee The Committee conducted a thorough investigation, interviewing dozens of witnesses. The majority of parties contacted by the Committee cooperated with the investigation. However, a number of key individuals refused to cooperate, which in turn seriously hampered the Committee's investigation. 1. Witnesses Who Have Not Cooperated with the Investigation The Committee has faced a number of obstacles that have prevented it from discovering the full truth regarding the pardon and commutations which it investigated. The greatest problem faced by the Committee was that a number of key witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment rights or otherwise refused to cooperate with the Committee's investigation. A total of 26 witnesses either invoked their Fifth Amendment rights or refused to be interviewed in the course of the Committee's investigation. Some of these witnesses, like Marc Rich, Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz, and Roger Clinton, were critically important. The impact of the refusal of key witnesses to cooperate is discussed below in the relevant chapters regarding each part of the investigation. Another significant problem the Committee has faced is the refusal of a number of parties to produce records subpoenaed or requested by the Committee. A number of document requests issued by the Committee have not been complied with by their recipients, either because of an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights or an invocation of attorney-client privilege. In some cases, the invocation of privilege has been spurious. For example, Hugh Rodham refused to produce any records regarding the Vignali matter because of the attorney-client privilege. Obviously, Rodham possesses records which are not privileged, which he could provide to the Committee, however, he simply declined to do so.\38\ This refusal adversely impacted the ability of the Committee to develop a full understanding of Rodham's work on the Vignali matter. The specific problems faced by the Committee in each aspect of the pardon investigation are discussed below in the relevant chapters regarding each pardon and commutation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \38\ Such records would include records provided to Rodham by third parties and documents which Rodham provided to third parties. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The White House It is a matter of some concern that the Bush White House and Justice Department failed to cooperate fully with the Committee's investigation. Early in its investigation of the Marc Rich pardon, the Chairman requested that former President Clinton waive any claim of executive privilege he might have over testimony and documents relating to the pardons and commutations he granted.\39\ On February 27, 2001, former President Clinton's attorney, David Kendall, sent the Chairman a letter in which he informed the Committee that ``he will interpose no Executive Privilege objections to the testimony of his former staff concerning these pardons, or to other pardons and commutations he granted.'' \40\ Despite former President Clinton's decision to waive executive privilege, the Committee faced a number of problems receiving records relating to the pardons and commutations, both from the White House and the Justice Department. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to former President William J. Clinton (Feb. 15, 2001) (Exhibit 6). \40\ Letter from David E. Kendall, Counsel for President Clinton, Williams & Connolly, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (Exhibit 7). In addition to waiving any claim of privilege with respect to the testimony of his former staff, President Clinton has not raised executive privilege with respect to any of the records the Committee has requested from the National Archives. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Beginning on January 25, 2001, the Committee issued a series of document requests to the National Archives and Records Administration (``NARA''), seeking records relating to pardons and commutations issued or considered by former President Clinton. Under the Presidential Records Act, once the responsive records were located by NARA staff, they were provided to staff for former President Clinton to be reviewed for executive privilege concerns.\41\ After President Clinton's staff had reviewed them, the records were reviewed by staff for President Bush, who independently has the right to assert executive privilege over the records. The Committee's first requests to NARA for records relating to Marc Rich and Pincus Green were satisfied. However, shortly thereafter, the Committee began to have significant problems receiving the records it had requested from NARA. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2204 (2002). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On March 8, 2001, the Committee issued a request to NARA for records relating to the pardons and commutations of a number of individuals--including Glenn Braswell, Carlos Vignali, Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory, and Eugene and Nora Lum-- as well as records relating to Roger Clinton's involvement in lobbying for pardons. The Committee's request called for the records to be provided to the Committee by March 22, 2001. At some point in April 2001, NARA had gathered all of the responsive documents, and they had been reviewed and cleared by the office of former President Clinton. However, they had not been provided to the Committee because of objections from the Bush White House Counsel's Office.\42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ Notes of Telephone Conversation with Amy Krupsky, Associate General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration (May 1, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee staff spent the next month engaged in fruitless negotiations with the Bush White House regarding the production of the requested records. Staff from the Bush White House explained that they had concerns about producing the requested records, because the records went to the heart of the clemency review process, which was part of a core Presidential power. During these negotiations, Committee staff pointed out that the White House had been delaying the production of a wide variety of records from NARA, including documents sent into the White House from individuals seeking pardons, and that these records could not possibly raise any privilege concerns. The White House agreed to provide these types of non-deliberative records to the Committee.\43\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ The White House did not agree to provide records provided to the White House from third parties until June 6, 2001. It is unclear why these types of records, which were clearly not privileged, were withheld from the Committee for so long. The delay in the production of these records--which did not occur until three months after they were requested--imposed a substantial delay on the Committee's investigation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, the White House was not nearly so accommodating with respect to deliberative documents about the clemency process that were generated inside of the Clinton Administration. White House staff informed the Committee staff that the White House did not plan to assert executive privilege over these records but would simply decline to produce them and hope that the Committee understood the reasons why. Committee staff attempted to explain that a number of these records were critically important to the Committee's investigation. For example, the report prepared by Pardon Attorney Roger Adams regarding the Vignali commutation was central to the Committee's understanding of the Vignali matter. Committee staff also offered to reach a number of compromise accommodations, which would satisfy the Committee's needs to review the Adams memo, while still protecting the White House's interests. All of these offers were rejected. The White House's refusal to reach any accommodation meant that the Committee was unable to obtain a number of key documents regarding pardons and commutations issued by President Clinton. On June 7, 2001, shortly after the Committee's offers to the White House were rejected, the Committee received a production of records from NARA. This production apparently included both deliberative and non-deliberative records responsive to the Committee's March 8, 2001, request. Approximately two weeks later, Committee staff informed the White House that NARA had provided the Committee with a number of records that the White House may have intended to withhold from the Committee. Shortly thereafter, the Committee received a telephone call and then a letter from the NARA General Counsel, Gary Stern, requesting the return of the documents. In his letter, Stern stated that ``some of the records that were provided to the Committee were inadvertently produced. Accordingly, we now request the return of these records, and any copies made thereof.'' \44\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \44\ Letter from Gary Stern, General Counsel, NARA, to Jim Wilson, General Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 21, 2001) (Exhibit 8). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, for several reasons, the Committee decided not to return the records in response to Stern's request. First, the records were responsive to the Committee's request and, therefore, should have been produced in any event. Second, neither President Bush nor President Clinton asserted any privilege over the documents. In the absence of a valid claim of privilege, the Committee has a right to receive documents responsive to its request. Third, even if President Bush or President Clinton had asserted executive privilege, the Committee might have determined to keep certain essential records produced by NARA on June 7, 2001. A number of these records were critical to the Committee's investigation and did not raise legitimate executive privilege concerns. However, since neither the current nor the former President raised any such privilege, the Committee used these documents in its investigation and in this report. The documents that were ``inadvertently'' produced to the Committee were of central importance to the Committee's investigation. The following is a brief description of some of the records included in that production: <bullet> All White House records regarding the Vignali commutation: These records included the report by Pardon Attorney Roger Adams objecting to the Vignali commutation.\45\ This report was of critical importance to the Committee, as it showed the extent to which the Clinton White House was aware of Carlos Vignali's criminal activities. These records also included one White House document indicating that Hugh Rodham had informed the White House staff that the Vignali commutation was ``very important'' to First Lady Hillary Clinton.\46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr., Jan. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 9). \46\ See NARA Document Production (Note from Dawn Woolen, Administrative Assistant, to Bruce Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Staff, the White House) (Exhibit 10). <bullet> Documents that led the Committee to uncover Roger Clinton's efforts to obtain a commutation for organized crime figure Rosario Gambino: Before receiving these records from NARA, the Committee was aware only of a payment of $50,000 from Anna Gambino to Roger Clinton. Only after receiving these documents did the Committee have reason to believe this payment might be related to an effort to free Rosario Gambino from prison.\47\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ Committee staff had been unable to reach Mrs. Gambino or determine the purpose of her payment. The key document in the NARA production was a note apparently drafted by White House staffer Meredith Cabe which referenced the fact that she was requesting an NCIC check on Rosario Gambino. Given the fact that Rosario Gambino was a well-known organized crime figure who was an exceedingly unlikely candidate for a legitimate grant of clemency, the Committee investigated this matter and determined that Anna Gambino was Rosario Gambino's daughter, and that the payment of $50,000 from Anna Gambino to Roger Clinton was part of the Gambinos' efforts to obtain a commutation for Rosario Gambino. <bullet> Documents showing three additional pardons that Roger Clinton attempted to obtain: These documents indicated that representatives of Mark St. Pe and Steven Griggs sent materials requesting pardons to Roger Clinton at the White House, and that these materials were forwarded to the White House Counsel's office. Another document indicating that William McCord had sent a petition was produced in the midst of --------------------------------------------------------------------------- other Roger Clinton-related material. <bullet> Pardon Attorney Roger Adams' report on the commutation of drug money launderer Harvey Weinig: This report demonstrated that the White House was fully aware of the extent of Weinig's criminal activities, including his role in a kidnapping.\48\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \48\ See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) (Exhibit 11). Given the importance of these records to the Committee's investigation, and the absence of any claim of privilege over the documents, the Committee decided to use the records in its investigation and in this report. Given the apparent sensitivity of the records to the White House, the Committee is using only those records which are directly relevant to necessary subject matter covered in this report. The Committee must emphasize that it is disappointed with the way the Administration handled its requests for documents relating to the pardon matter. It is clear that if a large number of documents relating to the pardon had not been ``inadvertently'' produced by NARA personnel on June 7, the Committee would never have received those records. Consequently, Members of Congress, historians, and the public might never have known about many of the significant abuses of public trust detailed in this report. Developments since June 2001 have made it clear that the Administration is engaged in a wide-ranging effort to expand executive privilege beyond its traditional boundaries and reduce Congressional oversight of the White House and Justice Department. It is disappointing that the Bush Administration would attempt to withhold key documents from the Committee in an investigation like this, where the Committee is looking into allegations of malfeasance at the highest levels of government. That the Bush Administration attempted to withhold these records even though former President Clinton approved their release is especially discouraging. 3. The Justice Department The recalcitrance of the Bush Administration in refusing to turn over records in the pardon investigation also extended to the Justice Department. The Justice Department refused to provide a number of records requested by the Committee in the course of its investigation. Most of these documents related to the Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton, specifically relating to Roger Clinton's efforts to obtain a commutation for Rosario Gambino. The Committee requested from the Justice Department all records relating to any consideration of a grant of clemency for Rosario Gambino, as well as all records relating to the Justice Department's investigation of Roger Clinton's efforts to obtain a grant of clemency for Gambino. The Justice Department refused to comply fully with either request. With respect to the Committee's request for records relating to the Justice Department's work on the Gambino commutation request, the Department refused to turn over any records or even specify which records it was withholding. Apparently, the Justice Department based its refusal on privilege concerns, presumably executive privilege, although Justice Department staff did not identify any specific privileges in explaining their decision. With respect to the Committee's request for records relating to the investigation of Roger Clinton's involvement in the Gambino matter, the Justice Department initially provided records but then abruptly stopped doing so. The Justice Department claimed that it was entitled to withhold records because of its ongoing investigation of Roger Clinton. However, the records that the Committee sought related to the Justice Department's investigation of Roger Clinton, which was conducted in 1998 and 1999, and then closed, not its ongoing investigation from the Southern District of New York. The Justice Department's decision to withhold these records significantly hindered the Committee's investigation of the Gambino matter. The withheld documents likely contain the Justice Department's rationale for failing to pursue criminal charges against Roger Clinton, as well as the answers to key factual questions such as whether the FBI was even aware of the $50,000 payment from the Gambinos before the Committee uncovered it in the summer of 2001. Without a complete understanding of facts and reasoning underlying the Justice Department's decision to close the Clinton-Gambino investigation, the Committee is unable to determine whether that decision was made in good faith or may have been tainted by political considerations. [Exhibits referred to follow:] <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> CHAPTER ONE ``TAKE JACK'S WORD'': THE PARDONS OF INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE Marc Rich and Pincus Green have a history of illegal and corrupt business dealings contrary to the security interests of the United States. <bullet> Rich and Green have had extensive trade with terrorist states and other enemies of the United States. Despite clear legal restrictions on such trade, Rich and Green have engaged in commodities trading with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and other rogue states that have sponsored terrorist acts. By engaging in these activities, Marc Rich and Pincus Green demonstrated contempt for American laws, as well as the well- being of Americans who were harmed or threatened by these states. <bullet> The Central Intelligence Agency provided the following declassified information about Marc Rich to the Committee: If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of inquiries by various foreign government liaison services and domestic government agencies regarding their ongoing investigations of criminal activity. In addition, President Clinton would have received information worthy of his consideration in making his decision on the pardon. This information cannot be declassified. Marc Rich and Pincus Green were guilty of serious crimes and showed contempt for the American justice system. <bullet> Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to obstruct the criminal investigation of them in every way imaginable, including attempting to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the country. Rich and Green's tactics resulted in a record-setting contempt fine against them, totaling $21 million. Despite these tactics, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York was able to indict Marc Rich and Pincus Green on 51 counts of illegal activity, including tax evasion, mail fraud, wire fraud, and racketeering. The evidence against them was overwhelming. <bullet> Because of the strength of the case against them, Marc Rich and Pincus Green fled the country rather than face trial. Rich's own lawyer told him that by fleeing the country, Rich had ``spit on the American flag'' and that ``whatever you get, you deserve.'' For the 17 years leading up to his pardon, Marc Rich was one of America's 10 most wanted international fugitives. Although Jack Quinn, Rich's attorney, argued that Rich did not flee the United States to avoid prosecution, Rich's ex-wife refuted this view, stating that Rich told her that ``I'm having tax problems with the government . . . and I think that we are going to have to leave.'' <bullet> In order to avoid extradition or apprehension by United States law enforcement, Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to renounce their United States citizenship. While this attempt was rejected by the United States, it demonstrated that Rich and Green had no loyalty to the United States, and viewed their citizenship as a liability to be discarded at will. Rich and Green's crimes were so serious that for seventeen years, the U.S. government devoted considerable resources to apprehending them and closing down their business activities. <bullet> Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that on a number of occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States Marshals Service attempted to arrest them in various foreign countries. A number of countries from the United Kingdom to Russia attempted to assist the United States in these efforts. The pardons of Rich and Green have sent a message that individuals can go from the FBI's most wanted list to a Presidential pardon if they spend money and have the proper connections. This message undermines U.S. efforts to apprehend fugitives abroad. <bullet> Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that in 1991 the Government Reform Committee, under Democratic leadership, held a number of hearings and issued two reports about the government's efforts to apprehend Rich and Green. At that time, Democrats and Republicans in Congress took the Bush Administration to task for not being aggressive enough in hunting down Rich and Green, or shutting down their business interests in the U.S. <bullet> While Rich and Green were fugitives from justice, the American government took a number of actions against their interests in the U.S. The federal government seized Rich's assets and shut down his trade in metals and grain with the government. The United States government repeatedly tried to reach a plea agreement with Rich and Green. <bullet> For a number of years after Rich and Green fled the country, the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a plea bargain to settle the case. The government made a number of concessions in an attempt to reach a deal, but all offers were rebuffed by Rich and Green, who would not agree to any deal that resulted in jail time. While lobbying for a pardon, Jack Quinn and Rich's other lawyers claimed that the Justice Department had not even negotiated with Rich, and therefore, that a pardon was justified. Quinn and the other lawyers were misleading the White House when they made these claims. Jack Quinn misled the White House about the Rich case and attempted to mislead the Committee and the public regarding his work for Marc Rich. <bullet> Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn after a recommendation from Eric Holder. After numerous failed attempts to have his case settled, Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn to represent him. Quinn was hired after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked for Marc Rich on the pardon matter, asked Holder for a recommendation of how to settle a criminal matter with the Justice Department. Holder recommended that he hire a Washington lawyer ``who knows the process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' Holder then explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn. While Holder did not know that Kekst was referring to Marc Rich, it suggests that Holder was favorably disposed to Jack Quinn, and would be very receptive to arguments made by Quinn, no matter how baseless they were. <bullet> Marc Rich was going to pay Jack Quinn for his work on the pardon. After the Marc Rich pardon was granted, Jack Quinn claimed that he was not being paid by Rich for his work on the pardon, and that he expected no future payment for his work on the pardon. However, the Committee has uncovered evidence that Robert Fink, a lawyer close to Marc Rich, had discussions with Rich and Quinn about paying Quinn for his work on the Rich pardon. Documents which Quinn and Fink withheld from the Committee for over a year, and which were produced only after a federal judge ordered them produced to a grand jury, shed further light on the contemplated payment of Quinn. These documents indicate that Quinn raised the question of his ``status'' with Rich and asked that Rich pay him a $50,000 per month retainer. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn about these documents, but Quinn refused to meet with Committee staff. <bullet> Jack Quinn may have been attempting to receive money from Marc Rich after the pardons were granted. At the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged that ``I will not bill [Rich], and I will not accept any further compensation for work done on the pardon.'' This pledge surprised Rich's lawyer, who expected that Rich would be paying Quinn for his work. Indeed, records just produced to the Committee indicate that Quinn may have been attempting to negotiate some payment from Marc Rich shortly after he pledged that he would not take additional money for his work. A March 5, 2001, e-mail from Quinn to Rich states ``If you are agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in the next few days a new retainer agreement.'' This e-mail raises the possibility that Quinn has been attempting to obtain payments from Rich, in possible violation of his pledge to the Committee. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn about this matter, but he refused. <bullet> Jack Quinn's work on the Rich pardon was in apparent violation of Executive Order 12834. That executive order was enacted as part of President Clinton's promise to create ``the most ethical administration in history,'' and it prohibited former executive branch employees from lobbying their former executive branch agencies within five years of their departure. Quinn has claimed that his work on the Rich pardon came within an exception for ``communicating . . . with regard to a . . . criminal . . . law enforcement inquiry, investigation or proceeding[.]'' However, this exception was clearly intended to apply to appearances before courts, not lobbying the White House for a pardon. The ``revolving door'' lobbying ban was intended to apply exactly to cases like this, where a former White House Counsel could come back and lobby the President to take an action that had no constitutional limits on it, largely based on the President's personal trust for that former staffer. <bullet> The pardon petition compiled by Jack Quinn and the other Marc Rich lawyers was highly misleading. Most of the arguments used by Jack Quinn to justify the Rich and Green pardons were false and misleading. These arguments could have been completely refuted if anyone in the White House had sought out any of the prosecutors familiar with the Rich case. <bullet> The ``letters of support'' in the pardon petition were used in a misleading manner. Another key element of the Rich pardon petition was a number of letters of support for Rich and Green from prominent Americans and Israelis. Rich and Green used these letters to try to show that their humanitarian activities justified their pardons. However, many of these letters were obtained under false pretenses, and the writers of the letters were not told that they were being used to obtain a Presidential pardon. In addition, a number of individuals who wrote in support of Rich and Green received large amounts of money from them. Marc Rich and Pincus Green used a number of different individuals with close personal relationships with President Clinton and his staff to lobby regarding the pardon. <bullet> The role of Denise Rich. Denise Rich played a key role in obtaining the Rich and Green pardons. Denise Rich had a close relationship with President Clinton, which was based in part on her role as a large-scale contributor to Democratic causes and the Clinton library, and in part on her extensive personal contacts with President Clinton. Denise Rich used this relationship with President Clinton to lobby for the Marc Rich pardon on a number of occasions. Denise Rich has refused to cooperate with the Committee, invoking her Fifth Amendment rights rather than answer questions about her role in the pardon. <bullet> The role of Beth Dozoretz. Beth Dozoretz, another close friend of President Clinton, played a key role in obtaining the Rich pardon. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz had a relationship with President Clinton built on personal ties and political fundraising. Dozoretz has raised and contributed millions of dollars for the Democratic party, and has pledged to raise an additional million dollars for the Clinton library. Beth Dozoretz also has close relationships with Denise Rich and Jack Quinn. Dozoretz used her close relationship with President Clinton to lobby for the Rich pardon. Because Dozoretz has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the Committee is unable to conclude whether or not Dozoretz made any linkage between contributions to the DNC or the Clinton library and the granting of the Rich pardon. <bullet> The role of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak spoke to President Clinton three times about the Rich pardon. In his public statements about the Rich pardon, President Clinton has pointed to these conversations with Prime Minister Barak as one of the primary reasons he granted the pardon. However an examination of the transcripts of the calls shows that Barak did not make a particularly impassioned plea for Rich. Therefore, it appears that the President may be attempting to use Prime Minister Barak's interest in the Rich matter as a cover for his own motivations for granting the Rich pardon. <bullet> Barak had met with Rich personally and told Clinton that the Rich pardon ``could be important . . . not just financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.'' Barak's statement raises the possibility that either Barak or Clinton acted on the Rich matter because of some promise of future financial return. Eric Holder and Jack Quinn worked together to cut the Justice Department out of the decisionmaking process. Holder's decision to support the pardon had a critical impact. <bullet> Jack Quinn and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder worked together to ensure that the Justice Department, especially the prosecutors of the Southern District of New York, did not have an opportunity to express an opinion on the Rich pardon before it was granted. The evidence amassed by the Committee indicates that Holder advised Quinn to file the Rich pardon petition with the White House and leave the Justice Department out of the process. One e-mail produced to the Committee suggests that Holder told Quinn to ``go straight to wh,'' and that the ``timing is good.'' The evidence also indicates that Holder failed to inform the prosecutors under him that the Rich pardon was under consideration, despite the fact that he was aware of the pardon effort for almost two months before it was granted. <bullet> Eric Holder's support of the Rich pardon played a critical role in the success of the pardon effort. Holder informed the White House that he was ``neutral, leaning towards favorable'' on the Rich pardon, even though he knew that Rich was a fugitive from justice, and that Justice Department prosecutors viewed Rich with such contempt that they would no longer meet with his lawyers. Holder has failed to offer any credible justification for his support of the Rich pardon, leading the Committee to believe that Holder had other motivations for his decision, which he has failed to share with the Committee. <bullet> Eric Holder was seeking Jack Quinn's support to be appointed as Attorney General in a potential Gore Administration, and this may have affected Holder's judgment in the Rich matter. On several occasions, Holder sought out Quinn's endorsement to be appointed as Attorney General if Al Gore were to win the November 2000 election. Quinn was a Gore confidant whose endorsement would carry great weight. Holder's initial help to Quinn in the Rich matter predated the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, and accordingly, Holder had some legitimate prospect of being appointed Attorney General when he was helping Quinn keep the Rich matter from the Justice Department's scrutiny. While Holder denies that his desire to be appointed Attorney General had anything to do with his actions in the Rich matter, it provides a much clearer and more believable motivation than any offered by Holder to date. President Clinton made his decision knowing almost nothing about the Rich case, making a number of mistaken assumptions and reaching false conclusions. <bullet> The White House never consulted with the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York regarding the Rich case. As a result, the White House staff was never able to refute the false and misleading arguments made in the Marc Rich pardon petition. <bullet> Every White House staff member who was working on the Rich pardon opposed it. However, because they failed to do the necessary background research on the Rich case, they were unable to refute the arguments made by Jack Quinn. <bullet> President Clinton was misled by Jack Quinn in their negotiations regarding the Rich pardon. Late in the evening of January 19, 2001, President Clinton and Jack Quinn had a telephone discussion regarding the Rich pardon. During this conversation, Quinn repeated his usual misleading arguments about the Rich case. Quinn also offered to make his clients subject to civil liability for their actions. In furtherance of this offer, Quinn agreed to waive all statute of limitations and other defenses, which Rich and Green would have as a result of their fugitivity. President Clinton has cited this waiver as a key factor in his decision to grant the pardons. However, if President Clinton or his staff had done even cursory legal research, they would have understood that this was a hollow, meaningless deal. First, Quinn agreed to waive defenses that Rich and Green did not have. It is basic legal doctrine that fugitivity tolls the statute of limitations. Second, Rich and Green likely do not face any civil liability for their crimes, since those fines were already paid by their companies. Third, Rich and Green had been willing to pay $100 million to settle their case for years. A fine, even a large one, would have had no impact on Rich and Green, and it would merely stand for the proposition that the U.S. justice system is for sale. <bullet> When the White House did finally provide the names of Marc Rich and Pincus Green for a Justice Department background check in the middle of the night on January 19, 2001, the check turned up new, troubling information which was disregarded by President Clinton. When the White House requested the Justice Department to perform a computer background check on Rich and Green prior to granting the pardons, the check came back with information that they were wanted for ``arms trading.'' This was new information for all of the White House staff, and it raised serious questions among them as to whether the pardons should be granted. However, the only step the White House took to check on this allegation was to call Jack Quinn. Quinn predictably denied that his clients were involved in arms trading. Faced with this conflicting information about Rich and Green, President Clinton instructed his staff to ``take Jack's word,'' and issue the pardons. President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting for his decision to issue the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons. <bullet> President Clinton has failed to answer any questions about the Rich and Green pardons. The few statements that he has issued have been misleading, incomplete, and raised more questions than they answered. Given his complete failure to explain the pardons, the Committee is left with serious unanswered questions regarding President Clinton's motives. INTRODUCTION The pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green were the most controversial and most outrageous pardons issued by President Clinton, and likely, by any President. Rich and Green were fugitives from justice, and were two of the largest tax cheats in U.S. history. In addition, they had a long and disgraceful record of trading with America's enemies, helping prop up the Ayatollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, and the Russian mafia, among others. This track record has led even Marc Rich's lawyers to call him a ``traitor'' and observe that he has ``spit on the American flag.'' It is beyond any dispute that Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not deserve pardons. Therefore, the inevitable question is why the President granted them. Some believe that the Rich and Green pardons were the product of a pardon process that completely broke down at the end of the Clinton Administration. These individuals would argue that in his rush to create a legacy at the end of his term, President Clinton short- circuited the normal clemency review process, and granted pardons without conducting the due diligence that was required. While this is hardly a charitable view of President Clinton, it is the most innocuous explanation that can be presented for the Rich and Green pardons. There are a number of reasons to believe that the pardons were not just the product of a sloppy process. After all, even though they did not fully understand the scope of Rich and Green's crimes, the President and White House staff grasped the essentials of the Rich case: Rich and Green were massive tax cheats, fugitives from justice, and had traded with the enemy. Yet, they received the pardons despite these damning facts. Therefore, the Committee has looked at the motives of the key players in the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardon effort. The evidence raises many questions regarding the motives of the key players. <bullet> Jack Quinn, for example, used his influence as a former White House Counsel to lobby the President on Rich's behalf. Quinn repeatedly provided misinformation to the White House. At the height of the public's outcry about the Rich case, Quinn claimed that he was representing Rich on a pro bono basis. However, the evidence obtained by the Committee shows that Quinn was attempting to secure a lucrative payment from Rich, and may still be trying to obtain payment from Rich. <bullet> Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder provided critical support for the Rich pardon. While Holder should have ensured that the Justice Department's views were represented in the pardon process, Holder instead advised Jack Quinn on how to cut the Justice Department out of the process. While all of the White House staff was opposing the Rich and Green pardons, Eric Holder provided critical support for it at the eleventh hour. Holder may claim that his actions were the result of misjudgment, but Holder himself admitted that he was seeking Quinn's support to be nominated as Attorney General if Al Gore was elected President. This created a conflict of interest for Holder. <bullet> Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz were both close friends of President Clinton and major contributors to the Democratic Party. In addition, Denise Rich contributed $450,000 to the Clinton Library, and Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton Library. Both lobbied the President on the Rich pardon. Both have also invoked their Fifth Amendment rights rather than testify about their discussions with the President. <bullet> President Clinton is ultimately responsible for the pardons, and must ultimately provide an explanation of why he granted them. He has, however, failed to provide any satisfactory rationale for his actions. He has failed to answer any serious questions, and instead, has offered only one self- serving, factually inaccurate newspaper column to justify the pardons. President Clinton's attempted explanations have raised more questions than answers about his motivations for granting two of the most unjustified pardons in U.S. history. Regardless of the motivations for the Rich and Green pardons, the nation must live with the consequences of them. The pardons have sent two equally destructive messages. First, by granting the pardons, President Clinton undermined the efforts of U.S. law enforcement to apprehend fugitives abroad. By pardoning a man who evaded capture by the U.S. Marshals Service for almost two decades, President Clinton sent the message that indeed, crime can pay, and that it may be worthwhile to remain a fugitive rather than face charges. The pardon also could undermine U.S. efforts to obtain extradition of fugitives from foreign countries. When a man like Rich can go from the Justice Department's most wanted to a free man with a stroke of the pen, it is difficult for the U.S. to credibly demand the extradition of wanted fugitives. Finally, the pardons send the message that President Clinton did believe that different rules applied to wealthy criminals. If he did not have the money to hire Jack Quinn and his White House access, Marc Rich never would have obtained a pardon. The President abused one of his most important powers, meant to free the unjustly convicted or provide forgiveness to those who have served their time and changed their lives. Instead, he offered it up to wealthy fugitives whose money had already enabled them to permanently escape American justice. Few other abuses could so thoroughly undermine public trust in government. I. BACKGROUND OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN A. Rich and Green's Business Activities 1. How Rich and Green Became Wealthy Marc Rich is one of the wealthiest people in the world. His network of business enterprises is estimated to generate upwards of $30 billion annually.\1\ Rich's personal net worth is estimated at between $1.5 and $8 billion.\2\ Along with his business partner Pincus ``Pinky'' Green, Rich has made this fortune principally through the commodities trading business. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Josh Getlin, Clinton Pardons a Billionaire Fugitive, and Questions Abound, L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 2001, at A1. \2\ A. Craig Copetas, Court TV Chat Transcript (visited Mar. 10, 2002) http://www.courttv.com/talk/chat--transcripts/2001/0220rich- copetas.html. It should be noted that estimates of Rich's personal fortune are probably lower than the actual amount because of Rich's history of questionable accounting and tax evasion, including that for which he was indicted in 1983. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rich began his career as a commodities trader in 1954 with the New York office of the trading firm Philipp Brothers.\3\ Rich traded in a wide variety of commodities, including precious metals. Throughout his early career he was highly successful, amassing huge profits for the firm. Over time, Rich also developed a niche within the firm as a crude oil trader. He and Green revolutionized international oil trading by creating the ``spot market,'' which is the practice of purchasing oil from producers and immediately selling it to refineries for a large profit. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion- Dollar Scam 65 (1985). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After more than twenty years of trading for Philipp Brothers, Rich decided that he could make more money on his own. In 1975, while managing Philipp Brothers' Madrid office, Rich called a meeting of the firm's European managers in Zug, Switzerland, during which he demanded an impossibly high bonus.\4\ When, as expected, Rich's boss refused, Rich announced that he was leaving the firm to start his own company. He left with Pincus Green, taking six other top traders from the firm, as well as files of information on Philipp Brothers' clients.\5\ Rich's new firm was a success, and Rich was well on his way to becoming a billionaire. By 1982, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. had become the second largest commodities firm in the world.\6\ However, as Rich's biographer explained, the initial financing for Rich's new company was based largely on ``a promise from Iranian Senator Ali Rezai to help set up a series of no-holds-barred oil deals that would, in part, lead to making Marc Rich the most wanted white-collar fugitive in American history.'' \7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Id. at 96. \5\ Id. at 99. \6\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 98 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). \7\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion- Dollar Scam 99 (1985). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Marc Rich's History of Illegal and Improper Business Dealings Even before he had departed Philipp Brothers, Marc Rich developed a reputation as a shrewd and unethical manipulator. As fellow Phillip Brothers' trader Bill Spier explained, ``What separated our friendship was his belief that you could only make it bigger and better than the next guy by buying people off. Marc was suave and sophisticated and obsessed with power. He was always looking to see who he could buy off.'' \8\ While at Philipp Brothers, Rich also learned to deal with rogue political regimes in order to make a profit. For example, in 1958, Rich was sent to Cuba, and continued to work there after the fall of the Batista regime. As one former associate explained, ``Marc cut his teeth in Havana, and the experience shaped his character because it taught him that being illegal was okay under certain conditions[.]'' \9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Id. at 66. \9\ Id. at 71. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Once he set up his own business enterprise, Rich's questionable practices appear to have expanded. His trading empire was based largely on systematic bribes and kickbacks to corrupt local officials. For example, in 1977, one of Rich's traders claimed to have deposited $125,000 into the Swiss bank account of Reza Fallah, then-head of the Iranian National Oil Company, in exchange for ``services rendered'' in securing a shipment of Iranian oil to Spain.\10\ In 1978, Rich and Green were caught diverting Nigerian oil shipments to South Africa. When the Nigerians threatened to cut off relations with Rich, he paid a $1 million bribe to the Nigerian transport minister to get the contract back.\11\ Rich also reportedly paid former Jamaican President Edward Seaga $45,000 to send the Jamaican track and field team to the 1984 Olympics. In return, Rich signed a ten-year agreement to purchase most of the output of the Jamaican Alcoa plant, which annually produced a significant portion of the world's aluminum.\12\ One former Rich trader explained the standard practices of Rich's companies as follows: ``[t]o go into places like Iran and do honest business is naive. I'd figure 15 percent of your net in payoffs for every deal made.'' \13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Id. at 115. \11\ Id. at 119. \12\ Shawn Tully, Why Marc Rich is Richer Than Ever, Fortune, Aug. 1, 1988, at 74. \13\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion- Dollar Scam 115 (1985). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As is explained in more detail below in the section discussing Rich's legal troubles in the United States, Rich also laundered funds and hid his profits to protect them from the taxing authorities of various countries. For example, Rich routinely used Panamanian shell companies (Sociedades Anonimas) to launder money and to conceal profits from taxing authorities.\14\ As explained by author Craig Copetas: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ Id. at 125. Panamanian corporate law is particularly helpful to a trader whose operations extend outside the Central American nation and into several different countries. A Sociedad Anonima is never required to file financial reports or tax returns and may maintain its books in any manner it desires in any part of the world. This permits a procedure generally known as laundering, and for Marc Rich--an expert at sidestepping the politics of nations by acting as a maverick middleman between producers and consumers--it was quite the bargain at $1,650 plus a $50 annual franchise tax.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Id. Rescor Incorporated, (a company that Rich used in his illegal oil scam that led to his legal troubles in the United States) was one such shell company. At one point, according to a former Rich shareholder, Rich had $800 million in cash concealed in his Panamanian shell companies.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Working with corrupt governments was not Marc Rich's only trademark. Much of Rich's fortune was made dealing with countries that no one else would deal with. Rich shrewdly used his multinational status, and his familiarity with unscrupulous business practices, to profit from embargoes and wars by trading with pariah nations. Rich's pattern of dealing with America's enemies, especially Iran, led even one of Rich's own lawyers to admit that Rich could be considered a traitor to his country: Mr. Waxman. Do you agree with the statement that these gentlemen [Rich and Green] were two traitors to their country? Mr. Libby. I can understand someone using those terms. Mr. Waxman. Do you agree with them? Mr. Libby. Their companies engaged in trades with Iran-- Mr. Waxman. Traitors not traders. Mr. Libby. No, sir, I was trying to finish--during a period when trades [sic] were held, and that was an act you could consider an act of a traitor. Mr. Waxman. That someone could consider, but you do not consider it? Mr. Libby. I could consider it. I do not condone it. I didn't advise it. I do not admire it.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 486 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of I. Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby). The following section describes specific business relationships that Rich maintained with regimes or countries with interests adverse to the United States. U.S. intelligence agencies have considerable information about Marc Rich, none of which was reviewed by the White House prior to the pardons. Unfortunately, most of the information remains classified. The --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CIA, however, did declassify the following statement: If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of inquiries by various foreign government liaison services and domestic government agencies regarding their ongoing investigations of criminal activity. In addition, President Clinton would have received information worthy of his consideration in making his decision on the pardon. This information cannot be declassified. As described below, though, the public record alone should have been enough to eliminate any possibility of pardons for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. a. Iran Marc Rich got his start in the oil trade through business dealings with the Shah of Iran. After the Shah fell from power, many were concerned by Ayatollah Khomeini's violent rise to power. However, Rich saw a new opportunity, and began trading with the Khomeini regime. In the early days of the Iranian revolution, after the new Iranian government seized 51 American hostages, the United States imposed a strict trade embargo on Iran. Nevertheless, Rich directed his staff to meet the new directors of the Iranian state-owned oil company.\18\ Shortly thereafter, Marc Rich and Pincus Green reached a deal to purchase Iranian oil through his Swiss company, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. Reportedly, Rich paid for much of this purchase in small arms, automatic rifles, and hand-held rockets.\19\ One of Rich's colleagues stated that because of this deal ``Rich got more excited than I had ever seen him.'' \20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion- Dollar Scam 131 (1985). \19\ Id. \20\ Id. at 132. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. South Africa Rich's companies also dealt extensively with the South African government throughout the apartheid regime. Notwithstanding the United Nations' ban on oil sales to South Africa, throughout the 1980s Rich's company was one of the three main traders of oil between the Middle East and South Africa.\21\ Where other companies saw legal peril, Marc Rich saw profit, with South African companies willing to pay a premium of $8 per barrel of oil. According to the Dutch-based Shipping Research Bureau, Rich supplied about 6 percent of all oil imports to South Africa between 1979 and 1986, earning upwards of $1 billion from the transactions.\22\ And according to a former Rich shareholder, at the time of their indictment in the United States, Rich and Green were trading Soviet and Iranian oil to the apartheid government in South Africa in exchange for Namibian uranium, which Rich and Green in turn sold back to the Soviet Union.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ Andrew Lycett, Spectrum: Plain Sailing Through the Sanctions Net, Times (London), Sept. 12, 1986. \22\ Shawn Tully, Why Marc Rich is Richer Than Ever, Fortune, Aug. 1, 1988, at 74. \23\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion- Dollar Scam 198 (1985). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At times, Rich's deals with South Africa were so risky and profitable that Rich would scuttle the oil tanker at the conclusion of the deal and fly the crew home. In one deal, a tanker was loaded with oil from the Soviet Union, was diverted from its intended itinerary, covered its name with tarpaulins, communicated only in code, and then delivered its oil in secret to South Africa.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. The Soviet Union/Russia The South African uranium transactions were not the only dealing Rich had with the Soviet Union. In fact, Rich and his companies dealt extensively with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. His oil trading with the Soviet Union provided Moscow with the hard currency needed to purchase grain during the United States' grain embargo.\25\ Rich's dealings with the Soviet Union were so extensive and helpful to the Soviet Union that when he was indicted in the United States in 1983, one Moscow newspaper printed a front page, above-the-fold story defending Marc Rich and attacking the United States.\26\ In fact, the Russian newspaper Izvestia wrote the following in defense of Rich: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ Id. \26\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion- Dollar Scam 196-197 (1985). The United States thinks that all countries, big and small, must subvert their national interests to American measures. . . . Under the pretext of nonpayment of taxes by the Swiss branch of the Marc Rich firm, American authorities have given an ultimatum: either Switzerland changes its internal legislation or its companies will be deprived of admission to American markets. This action by the Reagan Administration is an open threat, an attempt to interfere into the internal affairs of Western European countries through the threat of economic sanctions. The Americans are living under the illusion of a Pax Americana.\27\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ Id. at 197. The fact that one of the leading propaganda organs of the Soviet state would dedicate itself to the defense of a capitalist commodities trader like Marc Rich shows the importance Rich and his company had in providing hard currency to the Soviet regime. Marc Rich's influence has only grown in post-Communist Russia. Rich took advantage of widespread privatization in Russia to acquire large supplies of industrial materials at bargain prices. As explained in The Washington Post, ``[a]fter the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, these relationships helped Rich become for a time the single most important Western trader in Russia.'' \28\ There is also evidence that Rich has developed deep ties with Russian organized crime, a powerful force in post-Communist Russia.\29\ According to press accounts, law enforcement agencies including the FBI and the CIA had information indicating that Rich had financial ties to the Russian mafia.\30\ According to one U.S. intelligence source who spoke to the press, ``Clinton would have found out about the relationships if he had asked either the FBI or CIA, [but] [h]e clearly never bothered to ask.'' \31\ Another source told the press that ``[t]he FBI has tons of material on the Russian mafia and in particular the Rich-mafia connection.'' \32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ Michael Dobbs, Rich Made His Fortune by Breaking the Rules, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1. \29\ Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob has Invaded America 51 (2000) (indicating that Rich had a relationship with Russian gangster Marat Balagula, now serving time in prison for gasoline price fixing). Rich is also suspected to have been involved in metals trading going in and out of the Estonian port of Tallinn, where Russian copper, nickel and cobalt are often exported. Tallinn is notorious for being controlled by the Russian mafia. Rich's company has denied using the port of Tallinn. See Tony Glover, The EU's Baltic Extension, EuroBusiness, May 1, 1994. \30\ Matthew McAllester, Rich's Suspect Ties/Sources: Clinton Could Have Learned Russian Mob Links, Newsday, Mar. 1, 2001, at A5. \31\ Id. \32\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reportedly, Rich has been linked specifically by U.S. law enforcement to Mikhail Chernoy, a former agent for Trans-World Metals. Chernoy is a defendant in a civil case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. He is named as a controller of two Russian aluminum companies by European companies who claim that the defendants used bribery, money-laundering and extortion in order to illegally seize a large aluminum plant in Russia.\33\ Moreover, according to an investigative report commissioned by the World Bank in 1998, Chernoy was arrested by the Swiss police in 1996 during an investigation of Russian gangs.\34\ As the report states, Mikhail's brother Lev ``is believed to be a major Russian mafia figure by most international police and intelligence organizations.'' \35\ The report further states that Marc Rich provided the seed money necessary to start up Trans-World metals.\36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ Id. \34\ Id. \35\ Id. \36\ Id. David Reuben, the Chairman of Trans-World has denied this account. See Letters, Newsday, Mar. 7, 2001, at A39. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rich has also been linked to Grigori Loutchansky, a Georgian-born Israeli citizen who is considered to be a significant player in Russian mob activities. According to press accounts, Loutchansky worked with Rich in the early 1990s selling Russian oil and aluminum from formerly state-run enterprises.\37\ Loutchansky, who was ``accused of drug trafficking and smuggling nuclear weapons,'' \38\ is ``listed in a 1995 State Department `watch list' as a `suspected criminal,' '' \39\ and was involved in the 1996 campaign fundraising scandal. Time magazine has said that Loutchansky is ``considered by many to be the most pernicious unindicted criminal in the world,'' \40\ yet he dined with Clinton at a White House dinner in 1993 and subsequently channeled money into Clinton's campaign.\41\ He was also invited to a fundraising dinner in July 1995 but was unable to attend when his visa was denied and invitation withdrawn.\42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ The U.S. Connection in Caucasus, Intelligence Newsletter, No. 401, Mar. 8, 2001. \38\ Judi Hasson, Panel Offers Evidence of China Link Beijing Bank Wired Funds to L.A. Man Prior to Donation, USA Today, July 11, 1997, at 6A. \39\ Jerry Seper, Ukrainian Gained U.S. Entry Because of Spelling Mismatch, Wash. Times, Dec. 13, 1997, at A4. \40\ Statement by Former CIA Director on Clinton Ties to Loutchansky, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 3, 1996. \41\ Jerry Seper, Soloman Asks Again for Data on Meetings with Russian, Wash. Times, Feb. 11, 1997, at A4. \42\ Lee Davidson, Bennett Zeros in on Demo Donations, Deseret News (Salt Lake City, UT), July 11, 1997, at A1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. Cuba In this hemisphere, Rich continued to conduct business with Communist Cuba, notwithstanding the U.S. embargo. Rich's early dealings with Fidel Castro as a trader for Philipp Brothers apparently paid off decades later when he started his own companies. Marc Rich reportedly assisted Cuban efforts to escalate its nuclear power program in 1991.\43\ Rich negotiated with Castro's son to develop a uranium deposit in Western Cuba.\44\ The highly enriched uranium could be used to fuel Cuba's twin 440-megawatt nuclear power reactors. In addition, U.S. officials were concerned about the weapons potential of the enriched uranium used in the reactor.\45\ Also in 1991, Marc Rich & Co., Ltd. arranged a $3.9 million deal for sugar and oil that were transferred through Cuba.\46\ Ultimately, these transactions violated the Cuban Assets Control regulations, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of Treasury blocked nearly $3 million of funds from Rich's Cuba transactions.\47\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ John J. Fialka and Jose de Cordoba, Cuba Speeds Nuclear Project; Marc Rich Is Said to Assist, Wall St. J. europe, June 4, 1991, at 2. \44\ Id. \45\ See id. \46\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000635 (Note to file C-17306 from the Compliance Programs Division) (Exhibit 1). \47\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000652 (Memorandum from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, to Ronald K. Noble, Under Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Sept. 16, 1994)) (Exhibit 2). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- e. Libya Marc Rich also apparently traded with Libya under Muammar Qaddafi.\48\ Rich's companies purchased oil from Libya beginning in the 1970s.\49\ Yet even after the United States bombed Libya in April of 1986 in response to the terrorist attacks originating in that country, Rich reportedly continued to purchase crude oil from Qaddafi's regime.\50\ Rich continued to do business with Libya even after U.S. oil companies completely withdrew from the country.\51\ Unlike the other American oil companies, Rich ignored the oil embargoes and executive orders of the Reagan Administration designed to punish the terrorist-sponsoring state. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \48\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion- Dollar Scam 118 (1985). \49\ Id. \50\ Strong Tanker Fixtures Seen as Indication of Undiminished Interest in Libyan Oil, Platt's Oilgram News, July 16, 1986, at 1. \51\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- f. Iraq It has also been reported that Marc Rich attempted to violate the UN embargo against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.\52\ Other reports indicate that U.S. officials have been investigating charges that Rich lent money to Saddam Hussein's government in exchange for future deliveries of cheap oil.\53\ In a statement to The Financial Times of London, Marc Rich acknowledged that he had communications with Iraq in September of 1991, but denied that it involved oil trading.\54\ The fact that Rich would admit to having discussions with Saddam Hussein's government just months after the end of the Gulf War is remarkable. Based on his pattern of shrewd, unethical, and illegal business dealings with other rogue regimes, Rich's claim to be interested only in humanitarian aid for Iraq completely lacks credibility. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \52\ See John Hooper, Oil Traders Get Rich in Global Game of Chess, The Guardian (London), Aug. 7, 1990. See also Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104. \53\ Paul Klebnikov, How Rich Got Rich, Forbes, June 22, 1992, at 41. \54\ Ian Rodger, Marc Rich Hopes for Resolution of Tax Case, Financial Times, (London), Mar. 12, 1993, at 26. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- g. Angola In Angola, as in many other countries, Marc Rich and Pincus Green became close to the dictators ruling the country. These relationships gave them exclusive rights to the country's oil. When other Western oil companies wanted Angolan oil, they had to turn to Marc Rich and Pincus Green. This point was made with somewhat comedic effect when, in the late 1970s, a number of western oil executives were called to a meeting with Angola's oil agents. Expecting a group of communist officials, the executives ``were visibly stunned when the communist representative who walked into the conference room turned out to be Pinky Green, greeting Exxon executives with a hearty `How ya doin'?' '' \55\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion- Dollar Scam 115 (1985). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- h. Romania Marc Rich is reported to have traded several commodities, including oil, with the Romanian regime of Nicolae Ceausescu.\56\ At the time, Rich reportedly had his own refineries based in Romania.\57\ Trade unionists in Romania have accused Rich of cashing in on the fortunes that Ceausescu stole from the Romanian people.\58\ It also appears that, based on documents received by the Committee from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Marc Rich was trading grain with the Ceausescu regime in the late 1980s.\59\ As is discussed in detail below, these sales (in addition to sales to countries like China, the Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia) resulted in Rich's companies receiving $95 million from the Department of Agriculture through a program that provided surplus grain to companies selling subsidized grain abroad.\60\ This led to an investigation by then-Congressman, and later Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman. Glickman's investigation would eventually lead the first Bush Administration to direct the Department of Agriculture to bar Rich's companies from receiving any new contracts. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \56\ Romania: Life After Debt, International Trade Finance, May 18, 1989. \57\ Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104. \58\ Id. \59\ See Department of Agriculture Document Production (Minutes of Richo Grain Board Meeting, Jan. 6, 1987); Department of Agriculture Document Production (Listing of E.E.P. Awards Made to Richco Grain, Sept. 27, 1989) (Exhibit 3). \60\ Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Suspends Grain Export Subsidies for Firm Linked to Fugitive Marc Rich, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at sec. 3, p. 19. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- i. Serbia One document from the Office of Foreign Assets Control produced to the Committee by the U.S. Department of Treasury indicates that Rich was also dealing with Serbia in violation of U.S. and international sanctions.\61\ Press accounts indicate that Rich violated the U.N. trade embargo by dealing with Belgrade in a variety of commodities, including copper and oil.\62\ According to an article in The Oil Daily, at the time of the U.N. embargo, Serbia reportedly had a deal in place with Marc Rich to process crude oil in Romania.\63\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \61\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000652 (Memorandum from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, to Ronald K. Noble, Under Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Sept. 16, 1994)) (Exhibit 2). \62\ Michael Dobbs, Rich Made His Fortune by Breaking the Rules, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1. \63\ Roger Benedict, U.N. Oil Cutoff of Serbia Hinges on Russia, China (Security Council Vote), Oil Daily, June 1, 1992, at 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When asked at a Committee hearing about allegations relating to Marc Rich's transactions with rogue states, Rich's lawyer Jack Quinn responded ``I don't know the answer to that.'' \64\ When asked about the White House's knowledge and research of these activities, White House Counsel Beth Nolan told the Committee that she never received an intelligence briefing and never explained Rich's shady dealings to the President.\65\ While it may be understandable that Jack Quinn would not know--or at least not want to know--about Rich's dealings with so many dictatorships and rogue regimes, it is inexcusable that the White House failed to take the time to learn about these disturbing details.\66\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \64\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 111 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \65\ Id. at 374. \66\ The Committee, however, does not take the position that it was ``understandable'' for Quinn not to have known about Rich's dealings with rogue states. While Quinn's actions may be legally permissible, one must think long and hard about the morality of Quinn's actions. Given Rich's status as a fugitive, common sense and due diligence should have led Quinn to inquire further into Rich's past dealings. However, the power of money is often enough to promote willful ignorance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is clear that Rich built his fortune doing business without legal, ethical, or even moral restraints. He regularly dealt with corrupt officials, dictators and rogue regimes. U.S. and international embargoes and sanctions were not barriers to Rich, merely hurdles to be climbed over, under, or around. As is discussed in more detail below, it is shameful and an embarrassment to the United States that the Clinton Administration did not take adequate steps to determine the extent of Marc Rich's illegal and unethical business activities before the President granted his pardon. This failure by the Clinton Administration is especially troubling in light of the fact that Marc Rich built his fortune by trading with so many enemies of the United States. B. The Criminal Charges Against Marc Rich and Pincus Green 1. The Investigation of Rich and Green Marc Rich's illegal business practices in the United States came under the scrutiny of the United States government in the early 1980s. In the fall of 1981, staff from the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice called Assistant U.S. Attorney Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr. of the Southern District of New York (``SDNY'').\67\ They told Weinberg of a lead they had received concerning a crude oil reseller named Marc Rich whose company had an office in New York City.\68\ As Weinberg and his fellow former prosecutor Martin Auerbach explained to the Committee during the first hearing on the Rich pardon, this initial lead on Marc Rich was developed through oil reseller prosecutions in Abilene, Texas.\69\ John Troland and David Ratliff of West Texas Marketing--who had been prosecuted for illegal oil reselling-- provided information about the offshore laundering of funds by Rich.\70\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \67\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 97 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). \68\ Id. \69\ Id. at 97-98. \70\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In December of 1981, when Weinberg flew to Texas to investigate, he obtained a furlough for the principals of West Texas Marketing (``WTM''), who took him to their office.\71\ Upon reviewing their records of WTM's dealings with Marc Rich, Weinberg confirmed that Rich earned $70 million in illegal oil resale profits in 1980 and 1981 and had funneled the money to his Swiss company in order to evade federal income tax and federal energy oil control regulations.\72\ As Weinberg testified to the Committee, it was then apparent to him that he and his office had uncovered ``the biggest tax fraud in history.'' \73\ As he further testified: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \71\ Id. at 98. \72\ Id. \73\ Id. The eventual indictment accused Marc Rich's companies of evading taxes on over $100 million in unreported income. The case against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was very strong. . . . Like any fraud case, the evidence was rife with false documents, inflated invoices, sham transactions and off the books deals. The conspirators kept track of the illegal profits in hand written journals in what was described as the ``pot.'' . . . [T]he evidence included meetings between co- conspirators and Marc Rich regarding the pots and the scheme to funnel the illegal profits out of the country to off-shore accounts.\74\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \74\ Id. at 104. The illegal scheme that Weinberg uncovered stemmed from Marc Rich's evasion of specific Department of Energy (``DOE'') regulations. In September of 1980, pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,\75\ the DOE promulgated regulations establishing the permissible average markup for oil reselling.\76\ The permissible price was different for different regulatory categories of crude oil. The categories contemplated by the regulations included: ``old'' or ``lower tier;'' ``new'' or ``upper tier;'' and ``stripper.'' \77\ Under the regulations, every seller or reseller of domestic crude oil was required to certify to the purchaser the respective amounts and prices of old oil, new oil, and stripper oil contained in the crude oil that was being sold.\78\ The regulations prohibited markups of more than 20 cents per barrel of oil for a reseller such as Marc Rich's company, Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd. (``International'').\79\ International was also required to submit ERA-69 forms to the DOE on a monthly basis that set forth the dollar amount of any permissible average markup overcharges so that they could be immediately refunded to customers.\80\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \75\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 751, et seq. \76\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). \77\ Id. at 6. As the indictment states, ``Crude oil coming from a well at or below a designated 1972 level of production was labelled `old'; `new' oil referred to crude oil discovered since 1973 or oil obtained from existing wells in excess of the 1972 level of production; `stripper' oil referred to crude oil produced from a well whose average daily production was less then [sic] ten barrels.'' \78\ Id. at 7. \79\ Id. at 8-9. \80\ Id. at 9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Beginning in September of 1980, Marc Rich and Pincus Green agreed with the principals of West Texas Marketing that when International was limited to the 20 cents per barrel markup, the huge profits from their crude oil transactions would be retained by WTM rather than being reflected on the books of International.\81\ These profits were referred to as the ``pot.'' \82\ As the indictment against them would allege, to further conceal the scheme, Rich, Green and the principals at WTM conspired to have WTM prepare and mail invoices to International, which falsely indicated that WTM had sold oil barrels to International ``at the high world market price, when in truth and in fact . . . International was paying a far lower price upon WTM's agreement secretly to kickback to [Rich and Green] the huge profits held by WTM for . . . International in the `pot.' '' \83\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \81\ Id. at 10-11. \82\ Id. at 11. \83\ Id. The manipulation of the oil categories by oil resellers such as Marc Rich and his companies was referred to as ``daisy chaining.'' As is explained in the indictment: GDuring the period of price controls, in order to evade the regulations and produce huge profits, controlled oil was on occasion sold through a series of oil resellers known in the crude oil industry as a ``daisy chain.'' The defendant INTERNATIONAL frequently participated as the original reseller of controlled oil into a ``daisy chain.'' The ``daisy chain'' was utilized by the original reseller to make it extremely difficult to trace the movement of controlled barrels and to facilitate alteration of the certifications on controlled barrels into stripper barrels (uncontrolled) which could then be sold at the much higher --------------------------------------------------------------------------- world market price. Id. at 7-8. The profits in these ``pots'' were moved out of the U.S. to foreign bank accounts at the direction of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.\84\ This would occur through sham foreign loss transactions involving Marc Rich + Co., A.G., (``A.G.'').\85\ From October 1980 through May 1981, Rich, Green, and their companies moved more than $23 million in income to offshore accounts from WTM ``pots.'' \86\ These fraudulent transactions were transmitted through telefaxes and wire transfers.\87\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \84\ Id. at 11. \85\ Id. at 11-12. \86\ Id. at 12. \87\ Id. at 12-13. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This scheme by Rich and Green was essentially repeated with another company, Listo Petroleum, for a total of $47 million.\88\ Rich and Green also entered into false deduction transactions with Charter Crude Oil Company, as well as ARCO.\89\ In the case of Charter, at the direction of Marc Rich, International prepared fraudulent invoices purporting that International had purchased foreign crude oil from A.G. at its fair market value and subsequently sold it to a Charter subsidiary at a substantial discount.\90\ As a result, International fraudulently reduced its amount of taxable income by more than $31 million dollars.\91\ In the ARCO case, in the fall of 1980, Rich and Green's company Rescor invoiced their other company, International, for nearly $3 million. The invoice concerned a non-existent contract for the sale of foreign crude oil to Rescor by International. The fraudulent invoice made it appear that International had failed to provide oil to Rescor which subsequently had to purchase a similar quantity of oil from Arco at five dollars per barrel above the original contract price.\92\ As a result, International fraudulently reduced its amount of taxable income for 1980 by nearly $3 million.\93\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \88\ Id. at 13, 15. \89\ Id. at 15-18. \90\ Id. at 16. \91\ Id. \92\ Id. at 17-18. \93\ Id. at 18. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, Weinberg uncovered evidence of Marc Rich and Pincus Green trading with Iran during the American hostage crisis. In 1979 and 1980, President Carter issued several executive orders and the Department of Treasury subsequently promulgated regulations that prohibited any American from trading with Iran without a special license from the Department of Treasury.\94\ The regulations further required all individuals engaging in trade with Iran to keep records to be available for examination by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.\95\ Nevertheless, on April 30, 1980, Marc Rich + Co., A.G. entered into a contract with the National Iranian Oil Company (``NIOC'') for the purchase of crude and fuel oil from May 1, 1980 through September 30, 1980.\96\ As the indictment indicates, from their offices in New York City, Rich and Green in turn sold 6,250,000 barrels of the Iranian oil to an oil company in Bermuda for a total of more than $200 million. In order to conceal this scheme, Rich and Green did not disclose to their banks in the United States that the ultimate beneficiary of the U.S. dollars was the NIOC.\97\ Rich and Green further devised a secret code for their interoffice cable communications to disguise the participation of the Iranian oil company.\98\ The scheme was completed through several wire transactions and transmissions, and ultimately caused United States dollars to be illegally transferred to Iran at the same time that Iran was holding American hostages.\99\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \94\ Id. at 44-45. The executive orders issued pursuant to the International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977 included Executive Orders No. 12,170, 12,205, and 12,211. \95\ Id. at 45. \96\ Id. \97\ Id. at 46. \98\ Id. at 47. \99\ Id. at 47, 49. These charges were brought under 31 CFR Sec. Sec. 535.206(a)(4), 535.208, 535.701, and 50 USC Sec. 1705, and 18 USC Sec. 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In early 1982, the Southern District of New York began subpoenaing millions of documents from oil companies and crude oil resellers in the United States that had done business with Marc Rich.\100\ Prosecutors also served subpoenas on Marc Rich's companies in New York.\101\ The Southern District decided to subpoena Marc Rich + Co. A.G.--even though it was a Swiss company--because there were sufficient contacts through its American subsidiary to give them jurisdiction for enforcing document subpoenas.\102\ Rich, who had retained high-powered attorneys such as Edward Bennett Williams, Peter Fleming, and former federal judge Marvin Frankel, sought to quash the grand jury subpoenas.\103\ However, United States District Judge Leonard Sand denied the Rich team's motion to quash and ordered A.G. to produce the documents from Switzerland.\104\ The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Sand's decision in May of 1983.\105\ When Marc Rich + Co. A.G. refused to produce the documents, Judge Sand held the company in contempt and ordered a $50,000 per day fine in order to compel production of the documents.\106\ Nevertheless, Rich and his company refused to produce the documents or pay the fine.\107\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \100\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 99 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). \101\ Id. \102\ Id. \103\ Id. \104\ Id. \105\ Id. \106\ Id. at 100. \107\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rich's behavior during the litigation soon became even more confrontational and deceptive. As the Southern District of New York was to learn, on June 29, 1983, Rich quietly sold off his company's only American asset.\108\ Judge Sand called the sale a ``ploy to frustrate the implementation of the court's order,'' and thereby ordered a freeze of A.G.''s assets in the United States.\109\ The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that the sale was a fraud.\110\ As a result of these rulings by the courts, Rich and his lawyers agreed to negotiate a resolution of the contempt issue. A.G. agreed to pay the more than $1 million in contempt fines that had accumulated and to continue paying the contempt fines until all of the documents had been produced from Switzerland.\111\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \108\ Id. \109\ Id. \110\ Id. \111\ Id. at 101. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At first, Rich's company appeared to be complying with the agreement by producing hundreds of thousands of documents from Switzerland. However, on August 9, 1983, four days after the agreement, the Southern District received an anonymous tip that subpoenaed documents were being secreted out of the U.S. by a paralegal of the law firm Milgrim Thomajan & Lee.\112\ In responding to the tip, the Southern District seized two steamer trunks full of subpoenaed documents from a Swiss Air flight.\113\ As a result of this incident, Judge Sand ordered the production of every document of the Marc Rich companies in the world that had been subpoenaed.\114\ Rich and his legal team argued that the Swiss government had already seized all of the remaining documents, thereby rendering compliance with the agreement they had reached impossible.\115\ Judge Sand nevertheless ruled that the contempt fines should continue.\116\ In total, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. paid over $21 million in contempt fines over the course of the litigation.\117\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \112\ Id. When asked about this episode at the Committee's hearing, Jack Quinn testified ``what I have been told is that those documents were going to Switzerland for the purpose of being reviewed for privilege by the lawyers.'' Id. at 113 (testimony of Jack Quinn). In response to this claim, Martin Auerbach testified: ``With respect to the documents that were being slipped out of the country, the suggestion was never that those were being reviewed for attorney-client privilege. It was simply that it would be more convenient for counsel to review them in Switzerland then [sic] to review them in New York. Now, we had tons and tons of documents delivered to us. These two steamer trunks were slipping out. We didn't get a call from them saying, you know, we've got some people over in Zug with nothing better to do than to look at documents; would you mind if we took them over there outside of the jurisdiction at the time when we're in contempt for refusing to produce documents from Switzerland?'' Id. (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). \113\ Id. at 101 (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). \114\ Id. \115\ Id. at 101-02. The Committee does not know Rich's precise role in orchestrating this action by the Swiss government. Rich's power in that country makes it reasonable to assume that he might have played a part in creating the condition that made his representations in the United States possible. The Committee is not aware of the Swiss government penalizing Rich or taking any other action against him. \116\ Id. at 102. \117\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rich's attorneys made a number of attempts to settle the case before an indictment was issued. When Rich hired Edward Bennett Williams to represent him, Williams assured him that he could settle the case if Rich paid a large fine, telling Rich ``I can get rid of it for $30 million.'' \118\ Williams then went to Sandy Weinberg and asked how much the government wanted to settle the case. When Weinberg told Williams he was not interested, Williams asked Weinberg what he had in mind.\119\ Weinberg responded ``J-A-I-L.'' \120\ Later, Williams would offer as much as $100 million to settle the Rich case.\121\ All of these offers were rejected. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \118\ Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett Williams 415 (1991). \119\ Id. at 416. \120\ Id. \121\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 103 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The Indictment In September of 1983, a federal grand jury in New York returned a 51-count indictment against Marc Rich, Pincus Green, and their companies.\122\ The original indictment was restructured into a 65-count indictment in March of 1984.\123\ All of the first 42 counts were charged against Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Clyde Meltzer, A.G., and Marc Rich + Co, International Ltd. The superseding indictment was arranged to include in counts 1 through 23 the scheme to defraud the IRS.\124\ These charges were brought pursuant to 18 USC Sec. 1343, the federal statute prohibiting wire fraud.\125\ These charges related to the fraudulent transactions among WTM, and Marc Rich's companies discussed above. Counts 24 through 38 included the scheme to defraud the Department of Energy, and were brought pursuant to 18 USC Sec. 1341, prohibiting mail fraud.\126\ Count 39 and 40 were racketeering charges brought under the RICO statute, 18 USC Sec. 1962(c).\127\ Counts 41 and 42 included two tax evasion counts for Marc Rich + Co. International's 1980 and 1981 tax returns, covering an amount totaling over $100 million in unreported income which was concealed by the efforts of Rich, Green, Meltzer, and Rich's two companies.\128\ As stated in the indictment, International was able to evade more than $49 million in taxes.\129\ These counts were also brought against Marc Rich and Pincus Green personally. The tax and racketeering counts were approved and authorized by the Department of Justice.\130\ Counts 43 through 57 alleged that Rich defrauded the Department of Treasury for his transactions with the Iranians during the oil embargo and the American hostage crisis. Finally, counts 57 through 65 charged Rich with ``trading with the enemy'' for Rich's secret deals with the Iranians.\131\ In the superseding indictment, these charges were not leveled against the companies. As a letter accompanying the indictment states, ``[t]he primary focus of those counts has always been the activities of the American individuals, Marc Rich and Pincus Green.'' \132\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \122\ Id. \123\ See Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). \124\ Id. at 19-22. \125\ Id. at 22. \126\ Id. at 22-25. \127\ Id. at 33-34. \128\ Id. at 40-42. \129\ Id. \130\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 102-03 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). \131\ U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579). See also 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1705. \132\ Cover letter to superseding indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Rich and Green Flee the Country Even though their companies eventually pled guilty and paid heavy fines, Rich and Green personally refused to face the U.S. justice system. Rich and Green were out of the country when their indictments were handed down. They refused to return to the United States, even after warrants were issued for their arrest. As Weinberg and Auerbach explained to the Committee, ``[b]y the time of the indictment, Marc Rich and Pincus Green had made it clear that they would not return to the United States to face the charges. Apparently, they had quietly left the United States in June 1983 at a time when their lawyers were attempting to negotiate a resolution of the case.'' \133\ Even Rich's own lead attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, was shocked by Rich's conduct: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \133\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 103 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). It should be noted that by this point, Rich and Green had already renounced their U.S. citizenship and become citizens of Spain and perhaps Bolivia. Rich responded to the warrant for his arrest by refusing to return from Switzerland. Williams was standing in the office of Marvin Davis in Los Angeles when he heard the news that his client was on the lam. According to Davis, Williams shouted in the phone, ``You know something, Marc? You spit on the American flag. You spit on the jury system. Whatever you get, you deserve. We could have gotten the minimum. Now you're going to sink.'' \134\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \134\ Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett Williams 417 (1991). Rich denied Davis' account of this conversation, saying, ``There is not a shred of truth in it.'' Despite the outrage of their own lawyers, as well as the prosecutors, Rich and Green never returned to the country to face the charges. They remained fugitives in Switzerland for more than seventeen years until they received their pardons from President Clinton. 4. The Corporate Guilty Pleas Notwithstanding the fact that Rich and Green would not return to face the charges against them, their companies entered plea negotiations with the government. A year after the indictment was handed down, Marc Rich's companies pled guilty to evading $50 million in taxes. In the allocution on October 11, 1984, Peter Fleming, counsel for Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd. stated to the court: Beginning in September 1980 International generated millions of dollars of income from crude oil transactions which International should have disclosed but intentionally did not disclose to the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Energy. * * * In connection with matters within the jurisdiction of agencies of the United States, specifically the Department of Energy and the Internal Revenue Service, International and A.G. knowingly and willfully made those documents and the ERA 69s filed with the Department of Energy which were false in that they failed to disclose material facts regarding the actual income from those crude oil transactions, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001, which is the charging statute of counts 1 through 38. * * * In addition, by knowingly and willfully failing to report at least $50 million of taxable income generated from these transactions for the years 1980 and 1981, International committed income tax evasion for these years in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7201.\135\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \135\ Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. et al. 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5). Counsel for Marc Rich + Co. A.G. then stated to the court, ``[a]s you know, A.G. is charged only in counts 1 through 38 of this information, and A.G. adopts Mr. Fleming's statements in connection with those counts.'' \136\ As part of their guilty plea, A.G. and International (which by then had been renamed ``Clarendon, Ltd.''), also agreed to pay the United States $150 million,\137\ and agreed to waive any right to recover the $21 million in fines they had already paid the government.\138\ The total amount that the companies paid to the government for their crimes was $200 million.\139\ As then-United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani explained in court, this represented the largest amount of money ever recovered by the United States in a criminal tax evasion case.\140\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \136\ Id. at 20. \137\ Id. at 3. \138\ Id. at 4. \139\ Id. \140\ Id. at 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The guilty pleas and fines paid by the companies controlled by Marc Rich and Pincus Green clearly demonstrate the guilt of the two principals. Based on the overwhelming evidence against them, it is no wonder Rich and Green fled the country rather than face trial. The evidence, including the admissions by Marc Rich's companies, also explains why Martin Auerbach of the Southern District of New York could confidently respond to Jack Quinn's criticism at the Committee's hearing, stating, ``Mr. Quinn has suggested to the Committee and to the Nation that we had a legal house of cards. Well, if we did, it was all aces.'' \141\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \141\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 106 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Attempts to Bring Rich and Green to Justice 1. Attempts to Extradite Rich and Green After Rich and Green fled the country in anticipation of their indictment, the Southern District of New York made many attempts to have foreign governments extradite the two fugitives in order to bring them back to the country to stand trial on the numerous charges against them. On July 20, 1984, the United States requested extradition of Rich and Green from Switzerland. That request was rejected by the Swiss government in September of 1984 on the basis that the offenses charged against Rich and Green were ``fiscal violations'' and violations of ``provisions concerning currency, trade policy and economic policy'' \142\ and that the government of Switzerland did not recognize the charges against Rich and Green as extraditable crimes. In June of 1994, the Justice Department attempted to extradite Rich and Green from Israel, but the Israeli government also turned down the request. Israel's Attorney General, Michael Ben-Ya'ir, told the U.S. Government that the extradition treaty between the two governments did not include fiscal offenses.\143\ And even though Rich had become a citizen of Spain, prosecutors could not extradite him from that country because, like Switzerland and Israel, Spain does not extradite its citizens for tax evasion. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \142\ Unofficial translation of a note delivered on September 25, 1984, by the Office for Police Matters to the Embassy of the United States. See ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 3 (May 27, 1992). \143\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct. 1, 1999 (Exhibit 6). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Marc Rich and Pincus Green's Attempts to Renounce Their Citizenship After fleeing the United States, Rich and Green attempted to renounce their U.S. citizenship for the specific purpose of avoiding extradition on the charges against them. According to a U.S. government memorandum from the Embassy in Madrid, Rich expatriated himself on September 3, 1982, prior to his indictment, and became a naturalized Spaniard on February 11, 1983.\144\ As Rich explained in a letter to the U.S. Consul General in Zurich, ``I was naturalized under the laws of Spain, swore an oath of allegiance to the King of Spain, and formally stated that I thereby renounced U.S. nationality.'' \145\ On May 27, 1983, Green, and perhaps Rich, were naturalized as Bolivian citizens according to U.S. State Department cables.\146\ In the case of Green, a letter from the Ministry of the Interior in Bolivia states that ``the privilege of Bolivian nationality has been given to Pincus Green Bergstein, who previously renounced his nationality of origin and complied with the required procedures determined by current legal regulations.'' \147\ According to a letter from the Department of Justice to Congressman Robert Wise in November of 1991, Rich and Green also became citizens of Israel in 1983.\148\ The pardon application submitted to the White House by Jack Quinn also lists Green as a citizen of Switzerland, although it does not list Rich as a Swiss citizen, and it appears that Rich is, in fact, not a Swiss citizen.\149\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \144\ Department of State Document Production (Government Memorandum from U.S. Embassy in Madrid to U.S. Department of State, Aug. 25, 1983) (Exhibit 7). \145\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Marc Rich to Ruth H. Van Heuven, U.S. Consul General, Switzerland (Oct. 27, 1992)) (Exhibit 8). In this and other letters, Rich claims that he became a citizen of Spain in July of 1982, earlier than the date indicated by the U.S. government. Spanish government documents appear to confirm this. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also affirmed a district court ruling that Rich's attempt to renounce his citizenship in Madrid had failed. The Second Circuit held: GThe evidence strongly supports the district court's finding that Rich had no intention whatsoever to relinquish his American citizenship prior to commencement of this action. Despite mouthing words of renunciation before a Spanish official, he refused to acknowledge such renunciation before the United States Consul in Madrid before this action commenced. Instead, he brought a Swiss action as an American national, traveled on his American passport, and publicized himself in a commercial register --------------------------------------------------------------------------- as a United States citizen. Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \146\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from the American Consul to Pincus Green (Dec. 19, 1983)) (Exhibit 9). The State Department apparently believed that Rich and Green entered Bolivia illegally because of the restrictions on their passports, which would have jeopardized their claim of Bolivian citizenship. See U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (Department of State Cable, Oct. 11, 1983) (Exhibit 10). \147\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Dr. Emilio Perez Barrios, Sub-Secretary of Immigration, Bolivian Ministry of Interior, to the American Consul (Sept. 9, 1983)) (Exhibit 11). \148\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/SDNY-MR-00008- 09 (Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Robert E. Wise, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Govt. Information, Justice, and Agriculture, Comm. on Govt. Operations (Nov. 21, 1991)) (Exhibit 12). \149\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green 1, 3 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1983, the State Department informed the Southern District of New York that Rich was seeking to renounce his U.S. citizenship. The American embassy attempted to contact Rich to have him fill out a questionnaire to determine his citizenship, but he never responded.\150\ Rich and Green also never responded to letters from the American Consul in Bern, Switzerland, attempting to determine their citizenship. On September 29, 1993, the U.S. State Department revoked Rich's American passports because of the ``outstanding federal felony warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.'' \151\ The next day, the State Department also revoked Pincus Green's passport.\152\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \150\ Department of State Document Production (Letter from Julian L. Bartley, Consul, Embassy of the United States of America in Madrid, to Marc Rich (Mar. 25, 1983)) (Exhibit 13). \151\ U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (State Department Cable, Sept. 29, 1983) (Exhibit 14). \152\ U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (State Department Cable, Sept. 30, 1983) (Exhibit 15). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The confusion over Marc Rich's citizenship status also became an issue of concern to the U.S. Treasury Department in November of 1991. A letter written by the Office of Foreign Assets Control prompted the State Department to make a determination of Rich's citizenship. In its response of April 14, 1992, the State Department made a final determination that Marc Rich had failed to renounce his citizenship, and was still a U.S. citizen.\153\ The conclusion was based on the fact that the Department never approved Rich's Certificate of Loss of Nationality.\154\ It was also based on the fact that Rich did not demonstrate the requisite intent to lose his U.S. Citizenship--in part because he used his U.S. passport to travel to the United States after he became a Spanish citizen.\155\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \153\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000660-61 (Letter from Carmen A. DiPlacido, Director of the Office of Citizens Consular Services, Department of State, to Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury (Apr. 14, 1992)) (Exhibit 16). \154\ Id. \155\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite the U.S. Government's official finding that Rich is still a U.S. citizen, Rich and his lawyers claim that he is not a U.S. citizen. When he appeared on television after the Rich pardon, Jack Quinn stated ``he is a U.S. citizen.'' \156\ However, when he appeared before the Committee, Quinn stated that he ``misspoke'' when he was on Meet the Press, and took the position that Rich had indeed renounced his citizenship. Sandy Weinberg, testifying with Quinn, observed: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \156\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 2001). I suppose when he [Marc Rich] heard on television from Mr. Quinn that he was a citizen, I'm sure it did concern him whether or not he had a problem over the last 20 years. I suspect that . . . Mr. Quinn got a call the next day saying ``no, I'm not a citizen'' because I believe that there are some very significant tax implications if he's been a citizen all these years.\157\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \157\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 167 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. U.S. Attempts to Apprehend Rich and Green Between 1984 and 1992, the Department of Justice submitted five provisional arrest requests to various countries in an attempt to apprehend Rich and Green.\158\ None of these attempts were successful. As early as October 9, 1985, Rich and Green were listed as wanted international criminals by the U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol.\159\ In 1987, Interpol issued an international ``red notice'' (warrant) that requested the provisional arrest of Rich and Green with the eventual goal of extradition.\160\ On several occasions, the FBI and the U.S. Marshals Service appeared ready to apprehend the two fugitives. One operation set up by the Marshals Service to snare Rich, referred to as ``the Otford Project,'' was nearly successful.\161\ In the fall of 1987, a U.S. Marshal assigned to the project barely missed apprehending Rich in France after he canceled a meeting with an African oil minister.\162\ A few months later, in November of 1987, the U.S. Marshals Service again came close to capturing Rich. They were tipped off by a businessman close to Rich that Rich would be taking a private plane to England for a weekend party. The Marshals set the trap for Rich at the Biggen Hill Airport in Kent. However, thick fog settled in over England, and Rich's plane turned back to Switzerland.\163\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \158\ See ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green,'' Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 10 (May 27, 1992) (quoting Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Robert E. Wise, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Govt. Information, Justice, and Agriculture, Comm. on Govt. Operations (received Oct. 11, 1991)). \159\ Interpol Document Production (Wanted International Criminal Request, Oct. 9, 1985) (Exhibit 17). The document itself lists Rich and Green as wanted for the indictments in the Southern District of New York for wire fraud, mail fraud, income tax evasion, racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, and trading with the enemy. \160\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol International Red Notice, June 4, 1992) (Exhibit 18). \161\ Craig Copetas, The Sovereign Republic of Marc Rich, Regardie's, Feb. 1, 1990, at 46. \162\ Id. \163\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1986, prior to the international arrest warrant being issued, Rich had another brush with the law. Rich had been asked by his wife Denise to visit her in London. After the visit, Rich was at Heathrow airport to catch the return Swissair flight to Zurich. As he approached the gate, Rich apparently noticed that the security staff was conducting a complete search of luggage and identification.\164\ Rather than submit to the search, Rich apparently went to a public telephone and left three checks payable to him for <brit-pound>1.6 million stuck between the pages of a telephone book.\165\ Free of the checks that Rich thought would identify him to the British authorities, Rich then boarded the flight for Zurich.\166\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \164\ Id. \165\ Id. \166\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In September of 1991, the FBI and Interpol attempted to arrest Rich in Finland.\167\ According to a Finnish businessman who helped the FBI with the matter, Rich was tipped off that he would be arrested at the Helsinki airport, and he therefore turned his plane around before landing.\168\ Other failed attempts to arrest Rich are indicated by several documents produced to the Committee. As an Interpol cable indicates, Rich was expected to be in Moscow both in May and September of 1992. Attempts were made at the Justice Department in September of that year to ``insure a provisional arrest warrant is in place should [Rich] appear in Moscow.'' \169\ In March of 1992, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, as well as the Office of International Affairs at the Justice Department, made a request for Interpol to assist in apprehending Rich in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, based on information that he would be meeting with the new republic's prime minister.\170\ In fact, Interpol sent a senior officer directly to Dushanbe carrying the United States' provisional arrest request.\171\ A request for the arrest of Rich was also made in anticipation of his arrival in Czechoslovakia in February of 1992, when Rich was negotiating the purchase of the Slovak Aluminum Company.\172\ Yet another document indicates that provisional arrest warrants were also issued for Marc Rich in France, Portugal, and Norway.\173\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \167\ Interpol Document Production (Letter from Darrell W. Mills, Chief, Interpol-USNCB (1991)) (Exhibit 19). \168\ Telephone Interview with Pertti Ruoho, Finnish Oil Trader (Feb. 22, 2001). See also Letter from Darrell W. Mills, Chief, Interpol-USNCB (1991)) (Exhibit 19). \169\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol-USNCB transmission, Sept. 1, 1992) (Exhibit 20). \170\ Interpol Document Production (Interpol-USNCB transmission, 1992) (Exhibit 21). \171\ Id. \172\ Interpol Document Production (Fax from Donald S. Donovan, Assistant Chief, Interpol-USNCB, to Don Ward, Deputy Chief, U.S. Marshals Service (Feb. 21, 1992)) (Exhibit 22). \173\ Interpol Document Production 000317 (Identifiers on Marc Rich, Nov. 19, 1991) (Exhibit 23). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is difficult to believe that Marc Rich went from being an international fugitive, sought by teams of Marshals across the world, to a free man with the simple stroke of a pen. The effort to apprehend Marc Rich was the subject of intense law enforcement, diplomatic, and Congressional interest. Beyond the obvious negative effects of the Rich pardon, it also had a demoralizing effect on the individuals who tried for so long to track down Rich. In addition, it undermines U.S. authority to apprehend criminal fugitives. When the United States government attempts to apprehend someone by utilizing Interpol and working with law enforcement in foreign countries, it is reasonable to assume that those persons being sought should have to face trial in the United States. By granting pardons to Rich and Green, international law enforcement efforts on behalf of the United States were seriously undermined. 4. 1992 Congressional Hearings The Marc Rich matter and the failure of the government to apprehend him was an issue of great interest to this Committee when it was under a Democratic chairmanship in the early 1990s. In particular, Congressman Robert Wise held three days of hearings on the matter when he served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the Committee on Government Operations.\174\ The hearings, entitled ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' also resulted in two Committee reports. One of those reports, entitled ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green,'' focused on the efforts of the United States to apprehend the two fugitives.\175\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \174\ The Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee held three separate Marc Rich hearings on December 4, 1991, February 18, 1992, and March 5, 1992, entitled ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the Alps.'' \175\ ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. (May 27, 1992). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Congressman Wise and his Subcommittee criticized the Reagan and Bush Administrations for failing to take adequate steps to apprehend Marc Rich. At a hearing on December 4, 1991, Congressman Mike Synar was particularly critical of the Department of Justice for failing to apprehend the fugitives: It is unacceptable that the Justice Department has failed to show up today. It is unacceptable that they have failed to enforce the law in this very important matter, and as the chairman pointed out, in the case of the No. 1 tax abuser in our history. Can there be little wonder, can there be little wonder why Americans have lost confidence with respect to this government's ability to enforce the laws? And can there be little wonder why most Americans believe there are two sets of laws in this country, one for the rich, no pun intended, and one for the rest of us? \176\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \176\ ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' Hearing Before the Govt. Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 7 (Dec. 4, 1991) (statement of the Honorable Mike Synar). The Committee reached similar conclusions in its 1992 reports on the Rich matter, stating, for instance, that the U.S. government ``lacked the political will to effect the return of these fugitives[.]'' \177\ The Subcommittee urged ``that the Department of Justice rejuvenate its efforts to apprehend the fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green and that it become a high profile matter for the U.S. Government.'' The report continued to admonish, stating, ``[t]he continuing failure to return these fugitives to the United States to stand trial before their fellow citizens only furthers the idea `that there are . . . two standards of justice in the United States . . . one for accused criminals without money and there's one for accused criminals with money.' '' \178\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \177\ ``They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 37 (May 27, 1992). \178\ Id. at 34. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The second report by the Subcommittee, ``Coin, Contracting, and Chicanery: Treasury and Justice Departments Fail to Coordinate,'' focused on the failure of the U.S. government to keep Rich from receiving government contracts after he fled the U.S.\179\ The Subcommittee concluded that Rich's Clarendon firm continued to provide the U.S. Mint with metals despite being debarred from government contracting.\180\ The Subcommittee also criticized the Justice and Treasury Departments for failing to take any action against Clarendon for over three years because of a series of missteps and miscommunications.\181\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \179\ ``Coins, Contracting, and Chicanery: Treasury and Justice Departments Fail to Coordinate,'' Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. (May 27, 1992). \180\ Id. at 18. \181\ Id. at 19. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. Actions Taken by the U.S. Against Rich's Business Interests After they fled the country, several federal agencies took actions against Rich and Green's businesses. Notwithstanding their indictment and fugitive status, Rich and Green continued to contract with several agencies within the U.S. government. Companies controlled by Rich and Green held contracts with the U.S. Mint as well as the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These contracts continued for several years until they were eventually reviewed by Congress and relevant agencies. The Department of the Treasury also was forced to block money destined for Rich and Green because of their companies' dealings with Cuba. a. U.S. Mint Contract Cancellation In the wake of Rich's indictment, in 1985, one of his companies, Clarendon, Ltd., was debarred from contracting with the federal government by the Defense Logistics Agency. However, the debarment lasted only three years. Soon after that period, in July of 1988, Clarendon, Ltd. began contracting with the U.S. Mint to supply raw metal for producing coins. From 1989 through 1992, Clarendon won numerous contracts to supply the mint with copper, nickel, and zinc.\182\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \182\ ``The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the Alps,'' Hearing Before the Govt. Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 58 (Dec. 4, 1991) (statement of Kenneth Gubin, Chief Counsel, U.S. Mint). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clarendon was able to secure the metal contracts because, from mid-1988 on, the company was not listed on the GSA's ``Parties Excluded from Procurement Programs'' list. This was possible in part because Marc Rich set up the management of the company so that he was not the majority stockholder. By controlling 49 percent of Clarendon's stock, Rich could claim that he did not have control over the company's business decisions. This move, however, was part of a scheme by Marc Rich in which he purchased back the remaining 51 percent of Clarendon through a wholly owned subsidiary of Marc Rich + Co., A.G.\183\ By the time Clarendon was reaping the benefits of the new contract with the Mint, Marc Rich was in full control of the company. The contracts were reported to be worth up to $45.5 million to Marc Rich's company.\184\ As discussed above, this prompted congressional hearings and a subsequent report. Congressman Robert Wise of West Virginia, who chaired the hearings, stated to the press, ``[e]very time I reach into my pocket for some change, I have to wonder if there's a little bit of Marc Rich in there.'' \185\ This attention by Congress eventually played a part in ending Rich's contracts with the U.S. Mint. In a letter on February 27, 1992, Rich's lawyers announced that, ``Clarendon does not intend to participate in bid or contract opportunities with the Mint in the foreseeable future.'' \186\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \183\ This scheme also led to a civil action against the company. See U.S. v. Clarendon, Ltd. (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1995) (CA 1:95CV00700). The charges were authorized under the signature of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. \184\ Rick Wartzman, Bid to End Pact to Clarendon Comes Amid Disputes Over Marc Rich's Stake, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1992, at B2a. \185\ Id. \186\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from David P. Langlois, Partner, Milgrim Thomajan & Lee, to Kenneth Gubin, Chief Counsel, U.S. Mint (Feb. 27, 1992)) (Exhibit 24). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Suspension of Rich's Grain Dealings Between July of 1986 and September of 1989, one of Marc Rich's companies, Richco Grain Ltd., participated in the Commodity Credit Corporation's Export Enhancement Program. The Department of Agriculture used the program to sell American grain to overseas customers at prices below U.S. market levels. The companies who won the contracts received subsidies from the department in the form of surplus grains. A tally by the Department showed that Richco received $95 million worth of such U.S. grain through the program.\187\ Rich made money through his sales of grain to China, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Saudi Arabia. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \187\ Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Suspends Grain Subsidies for Exporter, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at sec. 3, p. 19. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After prompting from Congressman Dan Glickman and an investigation by the Inspector General, the Department of Agriculture suspended Richco Grain Ltd. from participating in the program. A letter written on September 29, 1989, by the Vice-President of the Commodity Credit Corporation listed Rich and Green's fugitivity and indictment as reasons for the suspension.\188\ Notwithstanding the suspension, Congressman Glickman continued to press the Bush Administration on the matter. On March 4, 1992, Congressman Glickman wrote to President Bush to ask that the Department of Agriculture permanently exclude Rich and Green from participating in the program by debarring them.\189\ The Bush Administration responded by referring Glickman's letter to the Department of Agriculture, requesting that the department ``take action, if warranted, to see that no new contracts are awarded to Richco Grain.'' \190\ It appears that no new contracts were awarded to Marc Rich's company. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \188\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from R.E. Anderson, Jr., Vice President of the Commodity Credit Corporation, Department of Agriculture, to Robert Thomajan, Partner, Milgrim Thomajan & Lee (Sept. 29, 1989)) (Exhibit 25). \189\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Wheat, Soybeans, and Feed Grains, Committee on Agriculture, to President George H.W. Bush (Mar. 4, 1992)) (Exhibit 26). \190\ Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from Allan V. Burman, Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the White House, to Charles R. Hilty, Assistant Secretary for Administration, Department of Agriculture (Apr. 20, 1992)) (Exhibit 27). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is troubling that a member of President Clinton's own cabinet, who, as a Member of Congress was justifiably concerned over Marc Rich's dealings with the Agriculture Department, was apparently not consulted when the White House was considering the pardons. As Secretary of Agriculture, Glickman could have provided insight into the ways in which the fugitive from American justice continued to profit from the very government that had indicted him. c. Cuban Asset Forfeiture Marc Rich has also had Department of Treasury actions taken against his companies because of his disregard for U.S. regulations related to the embargo against Cuba. In late 1991, the Compliance Programs Division of the Office of Foreign Assets Control blocked more than $2.5 million relating to a $3.9 million deal for Cuban sugar brokered by Marc Rich + Co., Ltd. in the United Kingdom.\191\ This transaction had run afoul of the Cuban Assets Control regulations.\192\ As R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control explained to Rich attorney Robert Fink in a December 27, 1995, letter, these regulations prohibit transactions by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction involving any property of Cuba or Cuban nationals.\193\ According to Newcomb, Rich's Cuban sugar deal was clearly contemplated by the regulations and was therefore illegal.\194\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \191\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000022 (Memorandum from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury, to Peter K. Nunez, Assistant Secretary of Enforcement of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury) (Exhibit 28). \192\ Id. See 31 C.F.R. part 515. \193\ Department of Treasury Document Production (Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury, to Robert F. Fink, Partner, Piper and Marbury (Dec. 27, 1995)) (Exhibit 29). \194\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In September of 1994, Marc Rich + Co., A.G. in Switzerland provoked a similar blocking of nearly $1 million in proceeds from an oil deal with Venezuela going through Cuba. Internal notes of the Compliance Programs Division indicate deep concern with attempts by the Venezuelan state-run oil company to have the funds released. As the Compliance Division wrote in its internal notes, the Venezuelan oil company ``also stated that it `believes' that Marc Rich intended to resell the oil to Cuba, but that this particular transfer did not relate to the sale of the oil to Cuba. If it did not relate to Cuba, why did it reference Cuba?'' \195\ Ultimately, in February of 1995, the Department of Treasury unblocked the funds because, as it stated in one document, ``Cuba does not have a direct interest in the blocked transaction, which involves a Venezuelan and a Swiss company[.]'' \196\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \195\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000635 (Note from Compliance Programs Division, Office of Foreign Assets Control) (Exhibit 1). \196\ Department of Treasury Document Production 000636 (License Request by J. Kerrigan, Compliance Programs Division of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury (Jan. 1, 1995)) (Exhibit 30). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It does not appear that the Clinton Administration took into consideration the fact that Marc Rich and Pincus Green profited from the United States while flouting its embargoes. Indeed, a review of Rich and Green's business relationships shows a complete disregard for the welfare of the United States and its citizens. Furthermore, Rich's clever and illegal business schemes meant that U.S. taxpayers' money came out of agencies such as the U.S. Mint and the Department of Agriculture and wound up in the pockets of Rich and Green while they evaded the U.S. legal system, and U.S. income taxation. This is one of the many reasons that Republicans and Democrats alike have been so critical of President Clinton's decision to grant these men a pardon. II. ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN CASE A. Attempts to Settle in the 1980s While living as fugitives in Switzerland, Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to negotiate a settlement with the Southern District of New York. In addition to prominent lawyers such as Edward Bennett Williams, Rich and Green hired other well-known and politically connected lawyers.\197\ In the Spring of 1985, they hired President Richard Nixon's attorney Leonard Garment.\198\ Around this same time, Garment hired Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby to join his firm.\199\ Garment assigned Libby the task of assessing whether or not there were legal defenses to the charges to which Rich and Green's companies had already pled guilty.\200\ As Libby testified at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, he worked with Robert Fink and other attorneys in an attempt to demonstrate that Marc Rich's companies ``had properly reported their tax obligations and energy transactions and that these criminal charges should be reexamined.'' \201\ Libby and the Rich legal team used their analysis in an effort to negotiate a settlement with the Southern District on the outstanding indictment.\202\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \197\ Marc Rich's practice of hiring attorneys who are close to the parties investigating him has continued to this day. In response to this Committee's investigation, Rich and his attorneys have hired an array of prominent Republicans, including the former personal attorneys to Chairman Burton and the Committee's former Chief Investigator. \198\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 438 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Lewis Libby, former counsel for Marc Rich, Dechert Price & Rhoads). \199\ Id. Libby is currently Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney. \200\ Id. \201\ Id. \202\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It should be noted that Lewis Libby's involvement in the Rich matter--like that of Garment and former Reagan Justice Department official William Bradford Reynolds--was limited to settlement negotiations and never included work on the pardon matter. Libby, and to a lesser extent, Garment and Reynolds, have been mentioned by President Clinton and others as prominent Republicans who supported the Rich pardon. This representation is inaccurate, as Libby, Reynolds and Garment worked only on settlement negotiations, and did not work on the pardon. Libby's efforts included an attempt to negotiate a settlement with the Southern District of New York in the late 1980s until he left to work at the Pentagon in the first Bush Administration in 1989.\203\ When he returned to private practice in 1993, Libby again attempted to achieve a settlement for Rich and Green.\204\ This attempt again failed by 1995.\205\ Libby's final involvement in the Rich case was in 1999 and early 2000, when he briefed the newly-hired Jack Quinn on the legal team's previous efforts to reach a settlement with the Southern District and helped prepare yet another request to the Southern District.\206\ Libby was instructed to cease all work on behalf of Rich and Green in the spring of 2000.\207\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \203\ Id. \204\ Id. On this occasion he also worked with Laurence Urgenson of Kirkland & Ellis. \205\ Id. \206\ Id. at 438-39. \207\ Id. at 439. It appears that Rich's lawyers considered approaching Libby to help with the pardon effort, but were concerned that he would refuse them. On December 26, 2000, Robert Fink sent the following e-mail to Jack Quinn and Michael Green: GMarc thought it made sense to call Scooter to see if he could be helpful, knowing he might not be able to be helpful but that he would never do anything that hurt Marc. I agreed and raised it with Mike Green. Mike is concerned that Scooter would want to help but would feel he had to raise the matter with the ethics committee on the transition and it would get caught up there, and we would effectively be bringing it to the attention of a number of --------------------------------------------------------------------------- people who might not be helpful. Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00398 (E-mail from Robert Fink, Partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, to Jack Quinn and Michael Green, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 31). Despite the fact that Rich and Green fled the country as a result of their pending indictment, the Southern District of New York continued to negotiate with lawyers like Fink, Libby and Garment to try to achieve the return of Rich and Green to the United States. In their appeals to President Clinton for a pardon, Rich's lawyers often claimed that the SDNY refused to negotiate with Rich. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite the fact that Rich and Green had fled the country, SDNY prosecutors continued to negotiate with Rich, even offering to reduce the charges against Rich and Green in return for their surrender. For example, in the early 1990s, Otto Obermaier, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, traveled to Switzerland to meet with Rich and Green. This was a highly unusual step for a United States Attorney to make. In fact, Eric Holder testified at a Committee hearing that he could think of no other instance in which a U.S. Attorney had traveled to a foreign country to negotiate with an indicted fugitive.\208\ Despite this accommodation, Rich and Green failed to reach an agreement with the Southern District to return to the United States to stand trial. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \208\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 268-69 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The SDNY also offered a number of other accommodations if Rich would return to the U.S. to face the charges. For example, prosecutors offered to agree in advance on bail, so that Rich would not have to be incarcerated pending trial.\209\ They also offered to have a full meeting with Rich's attorneys, and conduct a complete review of the charges against Rich.\210\ Most importantly, they offered to drop the RICO charges against Rich and Green.\211\ Marc Rich's own lawyer, Robert Fink, confirmed that prosecutors offered to drop the RICO charge as a result of negotiations.\212\ Fink wrote about these negotiations in an e-mail he sent to Avner Azulay on February 10, 2000, stating ``I was told at one point that they would drop the RICO charge if we wanted if Marc came in.'' \213\ Fink confirmed the substance of this e-mail at the Committee's hearing: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \209\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32). \210\ Id. \211\ Id. \212\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 469 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). \213\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32). Mr. LaTourette. Looking at [the February 10, 2000, e- mail], or your recollection from the representation of Marc Rich, is it accurate that at one point you were told that the prosecuting authorities would drop the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RICO charge if Marc Rich returned to this country? Mr. Fink. That was something that was discussed with me in at least one meeting I had with the prosecutors.\214\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \214\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 469 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). Given the fact that the SDNY had offered to drop the RICO charges if Rich and Green returned to the U.S., it is interesting that Quinn continued to cite the RICO charges as one reason the pardon was necessary. Throughout the pardon petition, his contacts with White House officials, and even his attempts to justify the pardon after the fact, Quinn cited the RICO charges as a reason Rich and Green fled the country rather than face trial. However, the SDNY's offer makes it clear that Quinn's RICO argument, like most of his other arguments, was false and misleading. Finally, in addition to the offer to drop the RICO charges, prosecutors also offered another accommodation to Rich and Green. The SDNY indicated it would agree to bail so that Rich and Green would not have to be incarcerated while they stood trial. The only condition of this offer was that they give up their passports.\215\ Even after the offers to drop RICO and allow bail was presented to them, the two men still chose to remain fugitives and refused to face the American judicial system. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \215\ Id. at 470. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Marc Rich's Humanitarian Activities in the 1980s and 1990s After he fled the United States, Marc Rich began to contribute large sums of money to various humanitarian activities, mainly in Israel and to Jewish communities in Europe and the United States. Marc Rich's contributions, beyond achieving their humanitarian purposes, also served a useful purpose of making Rich a well-known and respected figure in Israeli and Jewish political circles. These contacts would prove useful both in Rich's unsuccessful attempt to settle his indictment and in his successful campaign to win a pardon. Rich also used his wealth to cultivate political contacts. In 1985, after an Egyptian policeman shot and killed a number of Israeli tourists at Ras Burka, Rich contributed $400,000 to a compensation fund which was established for the victims.\216\ More recently, in 1995, Rich began to make offers of providing substantial sums of money to help the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.\217\ According to internal Marc Rich legal documents, Rich offered to help fund the economic development of Palestinian territories as part of the peace process.\218\ As part of his offer, Rich apparently told Israeli officials that his ability to help was limited by his outstanding U.S. indictment. Receptive Israeli officials then went to U.S. officials to see what could be done to settle Rich's case. According to an account of the negotiations prepared by Rich's lawyers, the Israeli government approached the Justice Department to discuss the Rich case.\219\ Mark Richard, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, informed the Israelis that while the Justice Department could not act directly on the Israeli request, the Justice Department would ``give serious consideration to a statement by the State Department or the White House that the United States had an interest in allowing Israel to obtain the active participation of Rich in a Middle East Initiative.'' \220\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \216\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green 8 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III); Leonard Garment, Crazy Rhythm 375 (1997). \217\ Id. at 9; Jack Quinn Document Production (Background Memorandum to the Marc Rich Case, Dec. 1997) at 5 (Exhibit 33). \218\ Id. \219\ Id. \220\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Following Mark Richard's suggestion, the Israeli Foreign Ministry took the Rich case to the State Department. In July 1995, Uri Savir, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, presented Ambassador Dennis Ross with a briefing paper on the Rich case.\221\ Several months later, Ross informed Savir that the Rich case was a ``hot potato'' and should not be pursued.\222\ Despite Ross' rebuff, then-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres instructed the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Itamar Rabinovich, to press the Rich matter with the State Department.\223\ Peres himself also raised the Rich case with Ross and the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk.\224\ While Ross did not respond to Peres, Indyk suggested that the Rich case could be discussed at greater length by Israeli officials and the State Department.\225\ Ambassador Rabinovich and his staff met with a State Department official in October 1995 and discussed the Rich case.\226\ In follow-up meetings with the State Department, Israeli officials learned that they were not likely to win support from the State Department for settling the Rich case.\227\ According to the Israeli officials, State Department officials were concerned about allegations that the Administration was interfering with law enforcement for political purposes, and the potential embarrassment that would follow if the public learned of a deal with Marc Rich.\228\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \221\ Id. at 5-6. \222\ Id. at 6. \223\ Id. Itamar Rabinovich, now President of Tel Aviv University, wrote a letter of support for the Rich pardon to President Clinton. \224\ Id. \225\ Id. \226\ Id. \227\ Id. \228\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to the internal account prepared by the Marc Rich lawyers, Shimon Peres continued his efforts on behalf of Marc Rich even after Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated and Peres became Prime Minister.\229\ However, by 1996, as Israeli elections approached, Peres' priorities shifted, and Israeli contacts with the U.S. government on the Rich matter subsided until the pardon effort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \229\ Id. at 7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Other than the initial response from Mark Richard, it appears that Justice Department and State Department officials were unified in their resistance to Israeli efforts to have the Rich case settled. The resistance of these government officials should be contrasted with the receptivity displayed by President Clinton and Deputy Attorney General Holder for the much more drastic step of pardoning Rich. Also noteworthy is the fact that this brief effort in 1995 appears to be the only time that Marc Rich's name came up in the context of the Middle East peace talks. To the extent that Rich's name came up, it appears to have been a minor matter that never had any impact on the Middle East peace talks. Dennis Ross, the Clinton Administration's Middle East envoy, has stated that Marc Rich ``was not a factor in the Middle East talks.'' \230\ The fact that Marc Rich was never a factor in the peace talks, either in 1995 or in 2000, suggests that President Clinton's key justification for the pardon--that it was important to Israel-- is an after-the-fact excuse that the President has put forward to cover up other motivations for the pardon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \230\ James Risen and Alison Leigh Cowan, U.S. Diplomats Turned Aside Israeli Push on Rich's Behalf, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2001, at A1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Rich Hires Jack Quinn After several years of failed negotiations with the Southern District of New York, Marc Rich and his team tried another approach to resolve his case. Instead of dealing only with the federal prosecutors from New York, Rich began a process of going directly to the Justice Department in Washington. Beginning sometime in 1997, Michael Steinhardt, a prominent hedge-fund investor and friend of Rich, recommended that Rich hire public relations consultant Gershon Kekst to help with his case.\231\ Although Kekst was at first reluctant to get involved, he eventually began working with Rich to help resolve his legal troubles in the United States.\232\ It was through Kekst's efforts that Jack Quinn was hired to work on the Marc Rich case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \231\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001). \232\ As discussed in Section IV(A)(9) of the report, Kekst tried to disavow his role in helping Marc Rich with negotiations and the pardon effort. It appears, however, that Kekst was deeply involved in the pardon effort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Kekst explained that in late 1998, he attended a dinner celebrating the merger of Daimler Benz and Chrysler.\233\ At the dinner, he was seated next to an individual he did not know, who explained that he worked at ``Main Justice.'' \234\ It turned out that this individual was Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder.\235\ Kekst asked this stranger to whom U.S. Attorneys are accountable.\236\ Holder explained that they answer to Main Justice.\237\ Kekst had Marc Rich in mind, but did not mention Rich's name at the time.\238\ Kekst then asked Holder what someone should do if ``they were improperly indicted by an overzealous prosecutor.'' \239\ Holder told Kekst that a person in that situation should try to work it out and resolve it.\240\ Holder further stated that, ``lawyers know there is a path back to DOJ, to me.'' \241\ Holder told Kekst that such a person should ``hire a lawyer who knows the process, he comes to me, and we work it out.'' \242\ Kekst asked who such a lawyer would be, and Holder pointed to an individual sitting at a nearby table and said, ``there's Jack Quinn. He's a perfect example.'' \243\ According to Kekst, Quinn was in attendance, but he did not discuss Marc Rich or Eric Holder with Quinn at that dinner.\244\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \233\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). To the best of Kekst's recollection, the Daimler Chrysler dinner took place in November of 1998. \234\ Id. \235\ Id. \236\ Id. \237\ Id. \238\ Id. \239\ Id. \240\ Id. \241\ Id. \242\ Id. \243\ Id. \244\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shortly after the Daimler Chrysler dinner, Kekst began to explore this new strategy. First, he worked to gather names of lawyers in addition to Jack Quinn who might be able to help Marc Rich.\245\ By the time he met with Michael Steinhardt and Robert Fink to discuss the Rich case several weeks later, Kekst recommended that Rich hire a senior Washington lawyer who could intercede with the Justice Department in Washington.\246\ Kekst then provided the names of three such lawyers who might be able to help: Warren Christopher, Judah Best, and Jack Quinn.\247\ Kekst called each of the three to introduce them to Fink.\248\ According to Kekst, Warren Christopher said that taking the job would be inappropriate since he had just come out of government.\249\ Fink interviewed Best but did not like him enough to hire him for the job. Rich, Fink, and Kekst eventually settled on Jack Quinn. As Quinn explained to The New York Times, he traveled to Switzerland, studied the issues, and met with Marc Rich ``not for hours, but for days.'' \250\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \245\ Id. \246\ Id. \247\ Id. \248\ Id. At the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, Fink testified that he asked Kekst to ``recommend someone who [he] called the white- haired man.'' Fink testified that this expression referred to ``someone who understood the entire political process.'' ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 471 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). \249\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \250\ Alison Leigh Cowan and Raymond Bonner, Lawyer Tells of His Pursuit of Pardon for His Client, and Conversation With Clinton, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A21. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jack Quinn began working for Marc Rich in the spring of 1999.\251\ According to Quinn, he was hired at first, ``not to go to the White House, but to work with Main Justice and the Southern District of New York.'' \252\ It is noteworthy that Eric Holder's recommendation to Gershon Kekst was the impetus for Marc Rich's hiring of Jack Quinn. Quinn had a warm relationship with Holder--Holder even solicited Quinn for support to have Holder nominated as Attorney General. This warm relationship appears to have had a significant role in Holder's support for the Rich pardon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \251\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 216 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \252\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Quinn's Fee Arrangements Jack Quinn was a partner with the law firm of Arnold & Porter when he began working for Marc Rich. Quinn also worked on the Rich matter with Kathleen Behan, another Arnold & Porter partner. As Behan explained to Committee staff, although they were not officially retained by Marc Rich until July of 1999, from February until July, Quinn and Behan were ``engaged in a series of familiarization and preparatory efforts'' to learn about the case ``in preparation for possible retention on the matter.'' \253\ Quinn and Behan were officially retained after they met with Marc Rich in Zug, Switzerland, in May of 1999 to discuss the representation.\254\ As the engagement letter explains, Quinn and Behan were hired for a minimum rate of $55,000 per month for six months, totaling $330,000, with an option to reconsider if their billable hours were to ``substantially exceed'' $55,000 per month.\255\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \253\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001). \254\ Id. \255\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0507-10 (Letter from Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Marc Rich (July 21, 1999)) (Exhibit 34). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Was Quinn Expecting Payment for His Work on the Pardon? In November 1999, just several months after he was hired by Rich, Quinn left Arnold & Porter to form the lobbying firm of Quinn and Gillespie.\256\ While Quinn brought Rich as a client to the new firm, he did not sign a new retainer with Rich. Quinn continued to work for Rich at Quinn and Gillespie, both on negotiations with the Justice Department, and on lobbying for the pardon. However, Quinn has taken the incredible position that he did not expect to be paid for any of his work on the Rich case after he left Arnold & Porter. In the first days of the uproar regarding the pardon, Quinn told The New York Times, ``I have no understanding with Marc Rich about future payments. If Marc Rich sent me a box of Godiva chocolates tomorrow, it would be more than he is obligated to do.'' \257\ He expanded on this position at a Committee hearing: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \256\ According to one magazine article about his departure from Arnold & Porter, Quinn brought $4.5 million in business to Arnold & Porter. The article continued: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- GBut that's small potatoes to what he can make on his own, because now Quinn is not constrained by the hourly rate structure and will take equity stakes in start-up companies in exchange for his services. That will give him the possibility of making millions on one client when it goes public. Arnold & Porter, like almost all corporate firms, does not allow equity participation with clients. Kim Eisler, Old Political Opponents Join Forces for Lucrative Lobbying, Washingtonian, Feb. 2000, at 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \257\ Raymond Bonner and Alison Leigh Cowan, Notes Show Justice Official Knew of Pardon Application, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at A14. Mr. Burton. You left [Arnold & Porter], and I guess the contract stayed with them; is that right? What happened? They went on just to a fee-for-service with --------------------------------------------------------------------------- that law firm? Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. Mr. Burton. And you have said that you didn't receive any fees from Mr. Rich. You said something about a box of chocolates. It was all going to be voluntary if you got that. That just seems very unusual to me. Don't most attorneys have some kind of a contractual agreement when they leave a law firm with a new client? Mr. Quinn. Yeah. Let me try to explain this to you. The fees you just reported were received by Arnold and Porter. And, of course, as a partner, and because I had a contractual relationship with a firm, I benefited to some extent from those fees. To another extent, the fees went to other partners of the firm. After leaving Arnold and Porter, I did consider and discuss with Mr. Fink whether we should have a new arrangement. I came to the conclusion that, particularly because of the fact that we were unsuccessful in achieving a resolution of this at the Southern District, and because I didn't think, frankly, there would be that much more additional time in it, and because I believed that the earlier payments had been fair and reasonable, that I would see this through to the end simply on the basis of the fees we had been paid earlier. Mr. Burton. So you received nothing further from Mr. Rich? Mr. Quinn. I have not received any further fees from him on this pardon matter. Mr. Burton. Have you received any fees from him for anything? Mr. Quinn. No, sir. Mr. Burton. You've received no fees from Marc Rich or his--how about any of his companies or friends or associates? Mr. Quinn. No, sir. Mr. Burton. All that was received was from the--to the law firm that you previously worked with? Mr. Quinn. Right. * * * Mr. Burton. Do you have any kind of understanding where he is going to give you a lump sum of money or funds down the road for the services you've rendered? Mr. Quinn. No sir[.] \258\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \258\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 242 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). It is impossible to believe that Jack Quinn did his work on the Rich pardon out of the goodness of his heart, on a pro bono basis. Quinn apparently spent hundreds of hours \259\ on the Rich matter, calling and e-mailing his colleagues on the Rich legal team in the middle of the night, on vacation, on Christmas Day, and New Year's Eve.\260\ While Quinn's dedication to his client was admirable, it suggests that Quinn anticipated some satisfaction beyond seeing Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardoned. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \259\ In media accounts Quinn claimed that he spent 60-100 hours on the Rich pardon. These claims simply are not credible. Kitty Behan, who was considerably less involved in the Rich pardon than Quinn spent 126 hours on the Rich pardon. Arnold & Porter Document Production A0513-15, A1128 (Arnold & Porter billing records for Marc Rich (Jan. 16, 2001 and Feb. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 35). It is likely that Quinn was underestimating his hours to the media to try to support his claims that he was not expecting to be paid. \260\ See Arnold & Porter Document Production A0844 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 25, 2000)); Arnold & Porter Document Production A0850 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 27, 2000)); Arnold & Porter Document Production A0861 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)); Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00091 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, and Marc Rich (Dec. 28, 2000)); Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to the common sense rejection of Quinn proceeding on a pro bono basis, e-mails between Jack Quinn, Robert Fink, and Marc Rich indicate that Rich was specifically contemplating entering into a large-dollar retainer agreement with Quinn after Quinn left Arnold & Porter. These documents were withheld from the Committee for over a year on the basis of a claim of attorney-client privilege which was rejected by federal Judge Denny Chin. Once provided to the Committee, the documents seriously undermined Quinn's claims that he never expected any payment from Rich. On February 3, 2000, the day after the Southern District of New York rejected Quinn's request for a meeting to discuss the Rich case, Quinn asked Fink about his status with Marc Rich, asking ``not that I'm concerned, but did marc decide to renew the retainer? I've not heard anything.'' \261\ Two weeks later, Fink addressed Quinn's status in an e-mail to Marc Rich, suggesting that Quinn could still be useful, despite his failure to date: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \261\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02847 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Feb. 3, 2000)) (Exhibit 37). Separately, I have been thinking about your reaction to Jack. When we meet [sic], he felt (and made it clear that he believed this, but was not sure) that he could convince Eric that it made sense to listen to the professors and that he could convince Eric to encourage Mary Jo to do the same. In this he was correct. Moreover, in the preparation process, it became clear that Jack was not just a pretty face but had thoughtful ideas and questions and was not simply relying on his past contacts to make this happen. So, I would not give up on him, at least not yet, as he is still a knowledgeable guy who has a clear understanding of relationships and what may be doable. While we may get more than that, we should not have enlarged expectations.\262\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \262\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00720-21 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 38). On February 29, 2000, Fink sent another message to Rich suggesting that he enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn while their negotiations with the Justice Department were still --------------------------------------------------------------------------- pending: All in all, while he has been very busy and sometime hard to get to, he has not separated himself from the matter and has fully participated. He has not pushed me for the retainer, though, and realizes that he does not have an agreement with you. I think it makes sense to compensate him for what he has done and may continue to do. Just give it some more thought and we can come back to it soon. We can wait, if you want, to see what Eric says, although it may pay to respond now, before Eric response [sic] to the last message from Jack, so it does not look like you were only willing to pay because of a positive response, as that was not the agreement. Even if we stop everything we are doing, and decide not to investigate the pardon, etc., at this time, we should fold this down in a friendly way.\263\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \263\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39). After the effort to settle the criminal case with the Justice Department failed, Fink continued to recommend that Rich enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn, who was continuing to raise the issue. On June 6, 2000, Fink sent the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- following e-mail to Rich: Jack raised the question of his status. I told him that I felt that you would feel that he had been compensated for the past, even though the retainer had run out before he stopped work, but that you would not want or expect him to work without compensation going forward-- indeed, you appreciated that it was important to compensate people who asked you to perform for you; although I thought you would not want to get involved in another one of those six month retainers. Jack said he did not want to make a proposal that you might find objectionable, but felt some clear arrangement for the future was appropriate. I told him I hoped to see you soon, and that I would raise it with you when I see you and come back with a suggestion. He was happy with that and we agreed to catch up with each other on this issue in the beginning of July.\264\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \264\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00731 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (June 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 40). At the beginning of July 2000, Fink e-mailed the figures for a --------------------------------------------------------------------------- proposed retainer agreement to Marc Rich: Here is my proposal on Jack Quinn, consistent with your advice to me. Jack originally proposed a $50,000 per month retainer and additional hourly charges for Kitty Behan. We settled at $55,000 per month, including Kitty, which was a better deal because at her hourly rate her billings would have averaged over $10,000 per month. Moreover, we continued to consult with Jack (and Kitty) after the retainer period had ended so that the average blended rate for Jack was well below $45,000. (OK, enough with making you feel better.) At the moment the issue raised by you and Michael is how to keep Jack on a ``retainer'' so that he is available for questions that might arise and, more importantly, available in the Fall, if we want him to be. Since the Fall is not far away, and you will know whether you want him to gear up again within four months or so, I suggest that we offer Jack $10,000 per month as a retainer to keep his eyes, ears and brain open to events and thoughts that may be helpful, with the understanding that if a decision is made to proceed that we will renegotiate the monthly retainer to reflect the changed circumstances. This arrangement could start mid-July or August 1st. He has not pushed me for this and, indeed, we are the ones who raised the idea of keeping him on a retainer. Still, if we do go back to Jack and offer a package, we should not schedule it to begin weeks after the proposal. So, if I were to call him next week, I would want to suggest a July 15th start date.\265\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \265\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00732 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (July 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 41). Despite the clear and detailed indications that Rich and Quinn were negotiating a lucrative retainer agreement, Quinn testified that he never received any money from Marc Rich between the time that he left Arnold & Porter and the time that the pardon was granted. The Committee requested interviews with Jack Quinn and Robert Fink so that they could provide further explanation regarding these e-mails. Both refused to participate in an interview. 2. Has Quinn Received Payments from Marc Rich Since the Pardon Was Granted? Because he spent so much time and effort on the Marc Rich pardon effort, and was successful, many believe that Quinn may have expected some large payment from Rich after the pardon was granted. Quinn has always denied these allegations. However, among the documents withheld by Quinn, and which were forced out by the decision of Judge Denny Chin in December 2001, were documents which undermined Quinn's denials. Shortly after the pardon was granted, Quinn was asked by a reporter if he received a fee for his work on the Rich matter. Rather than just saying ``no,'' it appears that Quinn did not know what to say. On January 23, Quinn told Gershon Kekst that ``Debra [sic] Orin wants to know if I received a fee. My instinct is to either not respond or say that I have never, in 25 yrs, thought it propoer [sic] to discuss a client fee arrangement or even if there was one. What say you?'' \266\ Kekst suggested a response that ``[t]he privacy of my personal and professional relationships is inviolate and so I would not, as a lifelong practice, discuss such a question. Suffice to say that in this case my motivation was quite simple: an injustice needed to be corrected and I determined to do what I could to help accomplish that.'' \267\ Quinn then fueled further speculation about his fee arrangement when he told the press that he was handling the Rich pardon as a ``personal matter,'' indicating he would not share the profits with his partners at Quinn & Gillespie.\268\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \266\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02973 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 42). \267\ Id. \268\ Alison Leigh Cowan and Raymond Bonner, Lawyer Tells of His Pursuit of Pardon for His Client, and Conversation With Clinton, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2001, at A21. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E-mails between Marc Rich and Jack Quinn after January 20, 2001, suggest that Rich was seeking some way to show his thanks to Quinn, perhaps alluding to a payment to Quinn. On January 23, 2001, Rich told Quinn that ``As time goes by it's sinking in more and more and I once again want to thank you for all you've done. I still want to thank you personally and properly on a separate occasion when we meet.'' \269\ After Quinn's appearance before the Committee, and on a number of television programs, Rich e-mailed Quinn to congratulate him.\270\ Quinn responded with his own thanks, and an assurance that he would continue to fight to point out the flaws in Rich's indictment.\271\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \269\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02924 (E-mail from Marc Rich to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 43). \270\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02916 (E-mail from Marc Rich to Jack Quinn (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 44). \271\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02930 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Marc Rich (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 45). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The most conclusive piece of evidence that Quinn fully intended to be paid by Marc Rich for his work on the pardon came from Rich lawyer Robert Fink at the Committee's March 1 hearing. Fink confirmed that Rich fully intended to pay Quinn for his work. Fink's testimony also strongly suggests that Quinn was lying when he stated that he had no expectation of being paid for his work on the pardon: Counsel. When Mr. Quinn began pursuing the pardon, the prospect of a pardon, did you anticipate compensating him for that work? Mr. Fink. I anticipated that he would be compensated for that work by Mr. Rich. Counsel. And if you could, tell us what you were thinking. Mr. Fink. Actually, I--I don't know that I was thinking anything other than he was entitled to some fair fee, the exact parameters of which I did not have in mind. I believe I told Mr. Quinn when we started to discuss the pardon that we would find a fair fee arrangement for him consistent with whatever his fee arrangements were. I did not know how he was handling his fee arrangements. Counsel. Did you discuss with Mr. Rich compensating Mr. Quinn? Mr. Fink. Could you excuse me just one moment? Counsel. Certainly. [Mr. Fink confers with counsel.] Mr. Fink. The answer is yes, I did. I communicated thoughts I had to Mr. Rich, with which he did not disagree. Counsel. And what did you communicate to him? Mr. Fink. I actually communicated to him what I told to Mr. Quinn. Counsel. And what was that? Mr. Fink. That we would come to a fair fee arrangement that was consistent with his normal fee arrangements. Counsel. So you had communicated to Mr. Quinn that you would come to an arrangement with him to compensate him? Mr. Fink. Yes. Counsel. And when was that? Mr. Fink. The precise date I do not know, but it was most likely early November 2000. Counsel. And when did you stop thinking that was going to be the case? Mr. Fink. I stopped thinking that was going to be the case during the first hearings of this committee. Counsel. When I was asking Mr. Quinn about his compensation? Mr. Fink. I believe you were the questioner. Counsel. I'm not quite sure where to go after that. But you had not had a conversation with Mr. Quinn during which you had discussed the prospect of him not being compensated up until at least the time of our last hearing; is that correct? Mr. Fink. It was always my contemplation, I mean, not that I reflected on this frequently, but if you had stopped me at any point in time and said would you expect that Mr. Quinn would be compensated for this work, I would have thought that he would be.\272\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \272\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 505-06 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). Fink's testimony, in addition to the circumstantial evidence, establishes that Quinn expected to receive payment for his work on the Rich pardon. It is likely that Quinn attempted to mislead the public and the Committee on this point to try to improve the public perception of his actions in this case. That is, if Quinn could say he did all of his work on the Rich pardon out of his belief in the merits, rather than his belief in a large payday, it would show the strength of the Rich case. Knowing now that Quinn did do his work on the Rich pardon with an expectation of payment, the question is--how large of a payment would Quinn receive? Fink loosely characterized it as ``consistent with his normal fee arrangements.'' However, given the enormous sums at Rich's disposal, and the vast amounts Rich had spent, unsuccessfully, to resolve his case, it is not unreasonable that Rich would pay Quinn a large sum of money. However, at the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged not to accept any future payment on the Rich case: Counsel. Mr. Quinn, the Chair asked you some questions about compensation. Apart from your attorney's fees, will you accept any money from Mr. Rich in the future? Mr. Quinn. Well, look, I don't think it would be fair to ask me to commit never to accept moneys from him. As I've said to you, if I do work that justifies my billing him for it, I will do so. I expect to be reimbursed for the expenses I'm put to in connection with this. Those are the only moneys I anticipate receiving from him. Counsel. But as far as your work done in pursuit of obtaining a pardon for him, you do not anticipate him-- you're not going to ask him to pay you any money? Mr. Quinn. That's correct. Counsel. You're not going to accept any money if he did offer it to you; is that correct? Mr. Quinn. I only anticipate receiving from him moneys in connection with work I may do. Counsel. My question was, will you accept any money if he offers it to you for the work you did in obtaining the pardon? Mr. Quinn. I have no idea what he might offer. It's a hypothetical question. I don't think I should be required to say-- Counsel. It's not a hypothetical question. It's a very clear question. If Mr. Rich offers to pay you money in the future for work you did in pursuit of obtaining his pardon, will you accept it or will you not accept it? Mr. Quinn. I will not bill him, and I will not accept any further compensation for work done on the pardon.\273\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \273\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 266 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). However, in February 2002, as a result of Judge Chin's decision in the Southern District of New York, the Committee received a number of documents which had been earlier withheld from the Committee on the basis of attorney-client privilege. One of the e-mails provided to the Committee indicated that on March 5, 2001, after the Committee's second and final hearing on the Marc Rich pardon, Quinn asked Rich to enter into a new retainer agreement to pay Quinn. Quinn's e-mail reads as --------------------------------------------------------------------------- follows: Greetings. Quite a month we have had! If you are agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in the next few days a new retainer agreement. I cannot, under the D.C. Bar rules continue to work without a written agreement, and I have been crafting one which I will forward shortly. I hope that, in recent days, the public has begun to see your pardon in a different light. I particularly thought that our hearing last Thursday brought to the fore aspects not previously appreciated. About all this I hope we shall speak soon. Best to you.\274\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \274\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02916 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Marc Rich (Mar. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 44). Rich responded to Quinn by telling him: ``[w]ith reference to your email of March 5, please go ahead and send me the new retainer agreement.'' \275\ Neither Quinn nor Robert Fink provided the Committee with a copy of any retainer agreement, or any further e-mails regarding payments from Rich to Quinn after March 5, 2001. However, the March 5 e-mail raises the possibility that Quinn is receiving payment from Rich, despite his express promise to the contrary at the Committee's February 8 hearing. The Committee requested an interview with both Quinn and Fink to provide further explanation for these e-mail messages, but both declined to participate. While Quinn has refused to provide an explanation to the Committee, his spokesman has told the press that Quinn has signed a new retainer with Rich to ``cover new legal matters.'' \276\ The Committee will continue to investigate this matter to determine the nature of Quinn's work for Rich and the amounts that Quinn is being paid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \275\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02974 (E-mail from Marc Rich to Jack Quinn (Mar. 6, 2001)) (Exhibit 46). \276\ Michael Isikoff, Secret E-Mail, Newsweek, Mar. 10, 2002. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. Quinn's Attempts to Settle the Case In October 1999, Quinn followed the advice offered by Eric Holder to Gershon Kekst and approached Main Justice in an effort to settle the Rich case. He started by drafting a presentation for the Justice Department. Quinn also hired Neal Katyal, a lawyer who interned for Quinn when he was Counsel to Vice President Gore.\277\ Katyal had also worked as National Security Advisor to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. According to Katyal, he was hired more as a consultant than as a lawyer.\278\ Katyal characterized the presentation he helped prepare as more marketing than legal.\279\ Katyal helped draft documents that were presented to Eric Holder. He denied contacting Holder directly, or using his access to Holder to benefit the Rich lawyers. However, he did acknowledge that on several occasions Jack Quinn told him, ``you know, I want to talk to Eric about this.'' \280\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \277\ Telephone Interview with Neal Katyal, Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 26, 2001). \278\ Id. \279\ Id. \280\ Id. Katyal further explained that Quinn already had an independent relationship with Holder and would not have needed Katyal's assistance in setting up any meetings between them. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quinn had a number of contacts with Holder about settling the Rich case. It appears that Quinn's main request to Holder was that he intercede with the Southern District of New York and have the Southern District's prosecutors meet with the members of the Marc Rich legal team. On October 22, 1999, Quinn met with Holder for the first time regarding the Rich case. Quinn reviewed a number of points about the Rich case with Holder, and asked that Holder intervene with the Southern District of New York, to encourage the Southern District to meet with Marc Rich's lawyers and reach a settlement of the criminal case.\281\ On November 8, 1999, Holder called Quinn and told him that he and other senior staff at the Justice Department believed that the refusal of the Southern District to meet with Rich's lawyers was ``ridiculous.'' \282\ Holder recommended that Quinn send a letter requesting a meeting to U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, with copies to Holder and Assistant Attorneys General James Robinson and Loretta Collins Argrett.\283\ Holder told Quinn that once he got the letter, he would call White and suggest that she should meet with Quinn.\284\ Holder also told Quinn that he was assigning one of his top deputies, David Margolis, to look at the Rich matter.\285\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \281\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 47). \282\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn (Nov. 8, 1999)) (Exhibit 48). \283\ Id. \284\ Id. \285\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After Holder spoke with Mary Jo White about a meeting with Quinn and members of the Rich legal team, Quinn made a direct appeal to Mary Jo White, writing her on December 1, 1999: We would like to begin by asking that you or your representative, along with representatives of the Tax and Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice, meet with Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg, and members of our legal team, to personally evaluate their conclusions. We urge this approach because the tax allegations underlie so much of the indictment, and because the merits of our tax position can be quickly evaluated. We believe that such a meeting will advance a resolution of this matter. We further believe that we can persuade you that neither the law nor the policies of the Department of Justice support the RICO charges and that, in this regard, too, the indictment as currently drafted should not stand.\286\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \286\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Dec. 1, 1999)) (Exhibit 49). On January 18, 2000, Quinn spoke to Holder to see how Mary Jo White had received his letter. Holder told Quinn that he had spoken to White, and that she was reviewing the matter personally. Holder told Quinn that he would ``do what he can,'' \287\ and also provided encouragement to Quinn, telling him that White ``didn't sound like her guard was up.'' \288\ On February 2, 2000, the Southern District responded to Quinn and Behan's letter by turning down their request to meet in order to modify the indictment.\289\ As Mary Jo White further explained in her letter to Quinn, ``I have communicated with representatives of the Deputy Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and with the Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division. They all concur that this is a matter within the discretion of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.'' \290\ White's letter was a complete rejection of the overtures made by Quinn and Holder, and was a significant setback for the Marc Rich legal team. Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Avner Azulay explaining that ``[w]e received a negative response to our overture from [Deputy U.S. Attorney] Shira[h Neiman]. She said her office will not negotiate while Marc is away, and that the DoJ agrees. JQ was surprised and disappointed that the DoJ had agreed even though he had not heard from Eric.'' \291\ Azulay responded that ``I am not exactly surprised. I foresaw this answer from the moment I read JQ's ltr. I hate to say that `I told you so.' I was surprised by JQ's optimistic report.'' \292\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \287\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 50). \288\ Id. \289\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51). \290\ Id. \291\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 32). \292\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After this rejection, Quinn turned his efforts to Eric Holder, asking him to review the Rich case, despite White's refusal to do so. Robert Fink laid out Quinn's proposed plan of action in a February 17, 2000, e-mail to Marc Rich: [Jack] agrees (subject to further discussion) with trying to have Eric help us meet with the tax lawyers in Main Justice (and maybe the head of the criminal division) to see if the professors can convince the chief government tax lawyers that this was a bad tax case. He also agrees that such a conclusion would be useful for many purposes including going back to the SDNY. Similarly, he agrees we should make something of the fact that the office was dealing with fugitives (who surrendered this week) in connection with the Russian money laundering case, while insisting that they can't deal with fugitives. Still, he wants to give Eric a short list of what is wrong with the indictment as he agreed to do that. He feels we can do both.\293\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \293\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00701 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 52). On February 28, 2000, Quinn sent Holder a short memorandum entitled ``Why DOJ Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment.'' \294\ In this memorandum, Quinn stated that ``[t]he refusal of the SDNY to participate in a discussion of the Marc Rich case is sorely disappointing. That office (and DOJ) should not sit on a defective indictment.'' \295\ Quinn then explained why he believed that the RICO, mail fraud, wire fraud, tax evasion, and energy charges against Rich were faulty.\296\ Quinn also claimed that the SDNY had recently negotiated with fugitive Russian money launderers, despite their policy against negotiating with fugitives. Quinn also stated that ``[t]he DOJ website lists Marc Rich on its International Fugitive page. This involves USG resources and is a potential embarrassment for DOJ.'' \297\ Quinn did not provide any explanation, though, of why listing Rich as a fugitive would be an embarrassment for DOJ, given the fact that the Justice Department had been trying to extradite or apprehend him for almost 20 years. Holder apparently reviewed Quinn's arguments, but failed to help Quinn. Quinn spoke to Holder on March 14, 2000, and reported back to Fink, Behan, and Kekst: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \294\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum entitled ``Why DOJ Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment'' (Feb. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 53). \295\ Id. \296\ Id. \297\ Id. [W]e spoke briefly today. it started out badly--``we've gone as far as we can go, can't figure out a way around Shira[h Neiman], etc.''--but I pushed back hard on the russian money laundering culprits and the uneven treatment of marc. he wants to talk further about that with his people, said he'd call me back tomorrow. it's time to move on the GOI [Government of Israel] front.\298\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \298\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Mar. 14, 2000)) (Exhibit 54). Quinn's suggestion to ``move on the GOI front'' was rebuffed by Avner Azulay, who stated that ``there is no way the MOJ [Israeli Minister of Justice] is going to initiate a call to EH--a minister calling a second level bureaucrat who has proved to be a weak link.'' Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00728 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 55). Holder did speak to Quinn almost a month later, on March 25, 2000, and told him that ``we're all sympathetic'' and that the ``equities [are] on your side.'' \299\ However, Holder apparently informed Quinn that he could not force a meeting on the Rich case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \299\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 56). In this conversation, Holder also answered Quinn's arguments regarding the SDNY's negotiations with the fugitive Russian money launderers, pointing out that they, unlike Rich, agreed to cooperate with the government. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Jack Quinn confirmed that Holder was sympathetic to his cause: I certainly formed the impression that there was, as one of my notes reflect, a view among some senior people in Main Justice that the equities were on our side in some senses. Again, I'm not trying to overstate this. I'm not trying to say that I believed that senior people at Main Justice thought the indictment was meritless, but I did absolutely believe that Main Justice thought that the Southern District was being unreasonable in being unwilling to talk to us. I thought that there was a more sympathetic audience at Main Justice.\300\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \300\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 230 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). However, Eric Holder attempted to qualify his support of Jack --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quinn's arguments: With regard to question of equities and whether or not we thought the Southern District was being unreasonable, I think Mr. Quinn was just a little confused. What we were talking about there was them being unreasonable and not having the meeting. The equities were on their side, as Mr. Quinn's side, with regard to the meeting. No one at Main Justice thought that, with regard to the substance, the equities were on Mr. Quinn's side.\301\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \301\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 231 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). Even assuming, though, that Holder's support was limited to his request for a meeting with Mary Jo White, it is still unclear why he thought the ``equities were on Quinn's side,'' even with respect to a meeting. The SDNY had a number of meetings and negotiations with Rich's attorneys, both before and after Rich's flight from the U.S. The SDNY had made a number of reasonable offers to settle the case, and U.S. Attorney Otto Obermaier and one of his senior aides even met with Rich in Switzerland. Rich's lawyers, however, took an inflexible position that they would not agree to any plea that required jail time. Given this position, the SDNY decided further negotiations would not be productive. For Holder to characterize the SDNY's position as ``ridiculous,'' suggests that Eric Holder supported Quinn's efforts to settle the Rich case from the beginning. III. THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION A. Rich Contemplated a Pardon Early in 2000 Jack Quinn and others on the Marc Rich legal team have maintained that they did not decide to seek pardons for Rich and Green until October 2000.\302\ However, there is extensive evidence that Marc Rich and his lawyers were contemplating a pardon as early as February 2000, while they were still attempting to settle Rich's criminal case with the Southern District of New York. It appears that Rich and his legal team viewed the Presidential pardon effort as a fall-back in case they were unable to settle the criminal case. Moreover, it appears that although they were considering petitioning for a pardon as early as February 2000, Rich and his legal team waited until November 2000 to submit their petition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \302\ See, e.g., ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As discussed previously, on February 2, 2000, Mary Jo White, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, rejected Jack Quinn's offer to meet regarding the Marc Rich case. After White's rejection, Jack Quinn turned again to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, and asked him to intervene and force a reconsideration of the Marc Rich indictment. By late March 2000, it became clear to Quinn that Holder was sympathetic to Quinn's requests, but would not force the Southern District to meet with Quinn. However, during the time that Quinn was discussing his request for a meeting with Eric Holder, the Marc Rich legal team was already considering a Presidential pardon. A privilege log submitted to the Committee by Arnold & Porter suggests that attorneys working for Marc Rich had been researching Presidential pardons as early as March 1999.\303\ It appears, though that serious consideration of a pardon began in February 2000, while Quinn was still attempting to settle the criminal case through Eric Holder. February 9, 2000, Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, which referred to the pardon effort cryptically as the ``second option:'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \303\ Arnold & Porter Document Production (Privilege Log, Mar. 27, 2001) (Exhibit 57). The privilege log notes that a memorandum regarding the pardon power was prepared on March 12, 1999, and withheld from the Committee on the basis of the attorney work product privilege. I briefed Marc and he is awaiting word on your call. (I have also sent Avner a briefed [sic] email letting him know of the current status.) I also told Marc that I would discuss with you and Kitty your views on the second option (whether there is any reason to consider it, or whether what happened here made it so unlikely that you did not think it worthwhile, as I told him that you would not work on it unless you thought there was some possibility of success). He was curious as to your thinking. I told him I would also check on your thinking on what Avner was doing. but let's see what Eric says.\304\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \304\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00695 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 9, 2000)) (Exhibit 58). On February 14, 2000, Fink had a telephone discussion with Quinn regarding the efforts to settle Rich's criminal case in New York. Quinn apparently mentioned the possibility of seeking a Presidential pardon, as Fink's notes of the call state in part, ``Pardon--mid to late Nov.'' \305\ Two weeks later, Robert Fink sent another e-mail to Marc Rich explaining Quinn's role in the negotiations with the Justice Department, and his potential role in seeking a Presidential pardon. Fink concluded his e-mail to Rich by suggesting that Rich enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn before they heard back from Eric Holder: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \305\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 01202-03 (Notes of Robert Fink, Feb. 14, 2000) (Exhibit 59). I think it makes sense to compensate him for what he has done and may continue to do. Just give it some more thought and we can come back to it soon. We can wait, if you want, to see what Eric says, although it may pay to respond now, before Eric response [sic] to the last message from Jack, so it does not look like you were only willing to pay because of a positive response, as that was not the agreement. Even if we stop everything we are doing, and decide not to investigate the pardon, etc., at this time, we should fold this down in a friendly way.\306\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \306\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39). On March 18, 2000, Avner Azulay sent Fink an e-mail which again alluded to the possibility of seeking a pardon in November 2000. More importantly, this e-mail also raised the possibility of capitalizing on Denise Rich's relationship with --------------------------------------------------------------------------- President Clinton: I had a long talk with JQ and Michael. I explained why there is no way the MOJ [Israeli Minister of Justice] is going to initiate a call to E[ric] H[older]--a minister calling a second level bureaucrat who has proved to be a weak link. We are reverting to the idea discussed with Abe--which is to send D[enise] R[ich] on a ``personal'' mission to N01. with a well prepared script. IF it works we didin't [sic] lose the present opportunity--until nov--which shall not repat [sic] itself. If it doesn't--then probably Gershon's course of acion [sic] shall be the one left option [sic] to start all over again.\307\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \307\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00729 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 60). At the March 1, 2001, hearing on the Rich pardon, Jack Quinn and Robert Fink were asked to explain their understanding of this communication. Fink stated that he understood ``N01'' to mean President Clinton.\308\ However, neither of the two attorneys could provide a definitive answer as to whether Denise Rich actually undertook the `` `personal' mission'' to the President contemplated in the e-mail. For example, Quinn provided the following response: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \308\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 515 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). Now, I'm telling you, I did not speak to the President in the year 2000 about the Marc Rich matter. I was not a recipient of this [e-mail]. I have no reason to believe that anyone asked Denise Rich to speak to him about this matter, and I have no reason to believe that she did so. But my firsthand knowledge of this is limited to the facts I'm able to testify to.\309\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \309\ Id. at 396 (testimony of Jack Quinn). When asked what Denise Rich's involvement was around this time, Robert Fink provided an even more lawyerly response: ``I have an imperfect memory, so I'll be careful. I believe as I sit here that there was no involvement by Denise Rich in Mr. Rich's problems during that period of time. I have absolutely no recollection that she became involved in any way.'' \310\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \310\ Id. at 515 (testimony of Robert Fink). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Furthermore, neither attorney could give a definitive answer as to whether this ``well prepared script'' for Denise Rich related to the pardon, or to negotiations with the Department of Justice. During questioning about the March 18, 2000, e-mail, Quinn testified that it was possible that ``every one of us involved in this thought out loud with each other, is there any way to persuade the President to tell Justice, to tell the southern district to do something.'' \311\ Quinn continued, however, stating, ``It's also entirely possible that Mr. Azulay, others, myself included, were involved in a conversation where someone said you know we are going to try to pardon one of these days.'' \312\ Robert Fink's testimony, while also not definitive, suggests that the script related to negotiations with the Department of Justice. When asked about the last sentence of Azulay's e-mail that discusses reverting to ``Gershon's course of action'' if Denise Rich's script were to fail, Fink stated, ``I suspect that he's talking about an application for a pardon here.'' \313\ Assuming Fink's supposition is correct, then the script for Denise would have related to Department of Justice negotiations.\314\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \311\ Id. at 396 (testimony of Jack Quinn). \312\ Id. \313\ Id. at 516 (testimony of Robert Fink). \314\ This also tends to suggest that while the attorneys were not working on a pardon effort in March of 2000, the idea had already been discussed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In June 2000, Robert Fink had further communications with Marc Rich indicating that they were intentionally waiting until after the November 2000 election to petition for a Presidential pardon: Jack Quinn and I traded calls until today. He is well and doing well. He has not forgotten you or what we set out to do, but has pretty much concluded that there is nothing to do until we get closer to (or even passed) [sic] the election, or as he put it, the closing days of the current administration.\315\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \315\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00731 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (June 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 40). In July 2000, Fink again e-mailed Rich suggesting that Rich sign a retainer agreement with Quinn so that he would be --------------------------------------------------------------------------- available to work in the Fall of 2000: At the moment the issue raised by you and Michael is how to keep Jack on a ``retainer'' so that he is available for questions that might arise and, more importantly, available in the Fall, if we want him to be. Since the Fall is not far away, and you will know whether you want him to gear up again within four months or so, I suggest that we offer Jack $10,000 per month as a retainer to keep his eyes, ears and brain open to events and thoughts that may be helpful, with the understanding that if a decision is made to proceed that we will renegotiate the monthly retainer to reflect the changed circumstances.\316\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \316\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00732 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (July 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 41). This documentary evidence is supported by the information provided by two witnesses who indicate that they were aware of pardon discussions well before the Fall of 2000. Abraham Foxman, the National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, informed the Committee that he recommended that Rich seek a Presidential pardon as early as February 2000. Foxman first met Marc Rich fifteen years ago through mutual friend Max Maxin who was President of B'nai B'rith.\317\ According to Foxman, Maxin asked Foxman to meet with Rich ``because Rich felt that there may have been anti-Semitism involved in his prosecution.'' \318\ According to Foxman, he met Rich in Europe sometime in late 1998 or early 1999.\319\ Foxman told Rich at that meeting that he did not see any evidence to support a charge of anti- Semitism.\320\ Later, in February of 2000, Foxman was contacted by Zvi Rafiah, who was then congressional liaison for the Israeli Embassy in Washington.\321\ Rafiah suggested that Foxman go to Paris to meet with Avner Azulay, the former Mossad agent who managed Marc Rich's philanthropic organizations.\322\ At that meeting in Paris, Foxman allegedly told Azulay that if the attorneys for Rich continued to be unsuccessful in their negotiations with the prosecutors in New York, a pardon might be a ``long-shot'' possibility to consider.\323\ Foxman told Azulay that, to the best of his knowledge, Denise Rich ``hated Marc Rich's guts,'' but that if someone could convince her to speak to the President, ``then you have the beginning of a pardon situation.'' \324\ Foxman later learned that, ``as it turns out, that is what happened.'' \325\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \317\ Interview with Abraham Foxman, National Director, Anti- Defamation League (Mar. 19, 2001). \318\ Id. Marc Rich has charged on a number of occasions that he was singled out for prosecution because he was Jewish. There is no support for Mr. Rich's assertion. Mr. Rich's decision to play the race card emphasizes the extent to which he has failed to accept responsibility for his crimes. Rather than recognizing the extent of his criminal acts, of which violation of Department of Energy regulations and the Tax Code were among the least, Rich has made baseless accusations against federal prosecutors. \319\ Id. \320\ Id. \321\ Id. According to Foxman, Rafiah is now a lobbyist for ``commercial interests.'' Id. Lobbying registration materials from the FEC indicate that Rafiah's main client is Elisra Electronic Systems Ltd., a company that develops and manufactures electronic warfare systems. Lobbying Registration of Zvi Rafiah (visited Feb. 16, 2001) <http://www.tray.com/cgi-win/bna--mach.exe> (Exhibit 61). \322\ Id. \323\ Id. \324\ Id. \325\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Publicist Gershon Kekst claims that he mentioned the possibility of a Presidential pardon to Rich's lawyers as early as 1999. Kekst had been hired by Rich to assist with strategy and public relations relating to his criminal case.\326\ In 1999, the same time period in which Kekst was looking for a Washington lawyer to represent Rich, Kekst was giving general thought to the Rich case, including his basic conclusion that a public relations campaign could not help Rich. Seeking to conduct a ``sanity check'' on his conclusion, Kekst turned to former Attorney General William P. Barr, the Senior Vice President and General Counsel for Verizon Communications. Kekst met Barr through public relations work he did for Verizon Communications.\327\ Kekst claimed that he was unaware at that time that Barr had been U.S. Attorney General.\328\ However, Kekst was impressed with Barr's legal acumen, and thought that he could offer some insight into the Rich case. Kekst called Barr, and asked him whether he thought that a public relations campaign would be useful in trying to resolve the Rich case.\329\ Kekst claims that Barr told him that a public relations campaign was the worst thing he could do. According to Kekst, Barr told Kekst that, assuming the Rich case was a bad case, the most that Rich could do was wait until the end of the Administration and seek a pardon from President Clinton.\330\ Kekst stated that before Barr's suggestion, he had never heard any discussion of Rich seeking a Presidential pardon. Kekst also believes that Barr told him that even if the case against Rich was not justified, as long as Mary Jo White was U.S. Attorney and Rudolph Giuliani was Mayor, there was nothing to be done.\331\ The latter point appears to have been the main thing taken away from the conversation by Kekst and those on the Rich team who he informed about the conversation with Barr. In December 2000, Robert Fink e-mailed Jack Quinn and reminded him that Kekst had spoken to Barr in 1999, and that Barr believed ``it paid to wait for the new administration and the retiring of several of the then-current players.'' \332\ Fink then suggested that they ask Barr to assist with the pardon effort, but apparently, Quinn and Fink decided not to include a prominent Republican in their efforts.\333\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \326\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \327\ Id. \328\ Id. \329\ Id. \330\ Id. \331\ Id. \332\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00073 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 62). \333\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For his part, Barr recalls that he told Kekst that political pressure would be a ``waste of time.'' \334\ Barr explained to Kekst that the Justice Department supported the Southern District of New York prosecutors because it was a matter of significant principle for the Department.\335\ He also told Kekst that it was inconceivable that any relief was possible as long as Rich remained a fugitive.\336\ In short, Barr believed that the White House would never do anything for Rich unless Rich were willing to surrender himself and accept responsibility for what he had done.\337\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \334\ Telephone interview with William P. Barr (Mar. 10, 2002). \335\ Id. \336\ Id. \337\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the days immediately following the Rich pardon, Jack Quinn and the other lawyers for Marc Rich emphasized that they did not decide to seek a pardon for Rich until October 2000. What they did not make clear, however, was that they were actively considering a pardon much earlier. They decided to wait until the closing days of the Clinton Administration to apply for the pardon. While the reasons for the delay are not clear, there are two likely reasons: first, by waiting until December to apply, opponents of the pardon would have a limited amount of time to learn of and resist the pardon effort; second, the Clinton White House would have limited time to conduct a detailed review of the petition and learn of its numerous flaws. B. The Preparation of the Pardon Petition The centerpiece of Marc Rich's effort to obtain a Presidential pardon was the pardon petition, which was put together by the Marc Rich legal team in October and November 2000. The main attorneys involved in preparing the pardon petition were Jack Quinn; Kathleen Behan; Robert Fink; Christopher Man, an associate at Arnold & Porter; Michael Hepworth, Of Counsel at Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe; and G. Michael Green of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky. These lawyers spent dozens, if not hundreds, of hours compiling the petition. The resulting document, which had a number of misrepresentations and factual inaccuracies, was a surprisingly poor effort, considering the amount of time and money that went into it. The argument section of the petition, the only portion that was actually drafted anew in October and November 2000, totaled 31 double-spaced pages. The first 20 of those pages were dedicated to biographical sketches of Rich and Green. These pages attempted to cast Rich and Green in a favorable, even likable light. These statements seem almost laughable given what the world knows now about Marc Rich and Pincus Green: Mr. Rich and Mr. Green have lived exemplary, indeed, remarkable lives. Although they have suffered terrible hardships as the result of their exile from the United States, they have continued to work productively and contribute to society.\338\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \338\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 4 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). Although it is true that the work of Rich and Green assisted the governments of countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya, it is difficult to argue that they contributed to the United States once they fled their country and attempted to renounce their citizenship. Included in the attempt to make Marc Rich seem like the victim was a reference to the tragic death of his daughter Gabrielle while Marc Rich was a fugitive from justice: ``Because Gabrielle lived and died in the United States, Mr. Rich felt the extra weight of being unable to personally visit with her during her final months.'' \339\ This claim, which was repeated by Denise Rich in her appeals to the President, made it sound as if the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York denied Rich the opportunity to visit with his dying daughter. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rich knew that if he returned he would receive bail, and that he would not be incarcerated unless convicted of the crimes he had been accused of committing. He was prevented from returning to visit his dying daughter only if he refused to face the U.S. justice system. Rich's desire to both have his cake and eat it too, makes it difficult to generate any sympathy for him in this matter. In fact, the only possible conclusion is that Marc Rich placed his own needs over those of his daughter. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \339\ Id. at 7 n.1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The petition also made it sound as if Rich was providing the world with an economic benefit through his dealings: In building this business, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green made substantial contributions to the world economy by increasing competition--and even breaking cartels--in the physical commodities industries.\340\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \340\ Id. at 6. Of course, the petition did not mention that Marc Rich's business was built by supporting corrupt and dictatorial regimes across the world, ranging from Communist Cuba to apartheid South Africa. Nor did the petition mention that Rich's deals with third world countries meant that Rich himself gained monopolies over commodities that often paid developing nations less than fair-market prices for their commodities. Nor did the petition point out that Rich provided opportunities to those regimes the United States was actively attempting to penalize, including Iran during the period when 54 Americans were held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The petition also made the claim that Rich and Green's lives were exemplary, setting aside the 65-count indictment: Other than the allegations for which clemency is sought, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green never have been charged with a crime. Indeed, Mr. Rich's and Mr. Green's lives both before and after the accusations have been ones of hard-working, resourceful businessmen who have become remarkably successful and have devoted much time and money to philanthropy and statesmanship.\341\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \341\ Id. at 20. Again, the pardon petition made no mention of other less-than- savory aspects of Marc Rich's business dealings, for which he was never prosecuted, but which remain of questionable legality and morality, including supporting the Khomeini regime while it held U.S. hostages, selling weapons and missile parts to Khomeini, and trying to do business with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. The petition then takes six pages to argue that the indictment of Rich and Green was flawed and unfair, and the appropriate subject of a Presidential pardon. As described below, these arguments were largely a rehash of the same arguments that Rich and his lawyers had been making since the indictment was handed down. The final four pages of the petition were used to explain that it was permissible for the President to issue a pardon before a conviction. Also attached to the petition were the ``letters of support,'' as well as other attachments, including the tax analysis by Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman, as well as other varied materials related to negotiations with the Southern District of New York and the President's pardon power in general. C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition The pardon petition crafted by Jack Quinn and the other attorneys on the Rich legal team is filled with numerous misleading and disingenuous legal arguments. Many commentators have stated that Quinn was merely being a good lawyer providing zealous representation to Marc Rich. However, many of the points made by Quinn and others go beyond zealous representation to the point of deception. Quinn had a responsibility to be honest in the pardon petition, and he failed. Normally, such dishonesty would not have a tremendous effect, but when it was combined with the total failure of the Clinton White House to examine the Rich case, the result was disastrous. 1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed The first charge leveled by Quinn and the Rich legal team is that Rich and Green and their companies, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. (``A.G.'') and Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd. (``International''), were subjected to an ``unprecedented criminal investigation'' and ``a unique indictment based on now-discarded and rejected theories.'' \342\ Notwithstanding the fact that this is an argument made by almost all individuals and companies accused of white collar crime, this claim is especially specious here. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \342\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- a. The Department of Energy Regulations Were Fair In his pardon petition, Rich claimed to have been the victim of overly complex and unfair Department of Energy regulations. One element of this line of defense is that the regulations governing the conduct for which Rich and Green were indicted were too confusing. According to the pardon petition, the Department of Energy regulations limiting prices in oil reselling were ``extremely complicated,'' and were therefore rescinded in January 1981 because they were ``unworkable.'' \343\ Such an argument is completely disingenuous. Rich and Green were able to understand the regulations well enough to exploit them for millions of dollars in profit. Regardless of whether they outlived their usefulness, they were deemed appropriate at the time when the United States was seriously concerned about fuel shortages. More important, they were the law at that time, and Rich and Green therefore had a duty to play by the rules or face the consequences. Indeed, other companies were able to obey the law and were not subject to prosecution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \343\ Id. at 21. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quinn also argued that the Department of Energy indicated that Rich and his company ``properly . . . accounted for the transactions.'' \344\ This argument is irrelevant because Rich's accounting was not the central issue. Rather, Rich's companies falsified reports in order to hide profits over the legal limits in violation of law. Marc Rich's own companies admitted as much when they pled guilty and paid $200 million in taxes, penalties, and interest. As the lawyers for Rich's companies stated in federal court: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \344\ Id. at 27. Beginning in September 1980 International generated millions of dollars of income from crude oil transactions which International should have disclosed but intentionally did not disclose to the Internal --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Revenue Service and the Department of Energy. * * * In connection with matters within the jurisdiction of agencies of the United States, specifically the Department of Energy and the Internal Revenue Service, International and A.G. knowingly and wilfully made those documents and the ERA 69s filed with the Department of Energy which were false in that they failed to disclose material facts regarding the actual income from those crude oil transactions[.] \345\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \345\ Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. et al. 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5). This language from the allocution clearly demonstrates not only that the Department of Energy in no way exonerated Rich and Green's activities, but also that Rich and Green and their companies clearly understood the nature of the supposedly complicated regulations well enough to violate them ``knowingly and wilfully.'' Their arrangement with West Texas Marketing was clearly intended to contravene the regulations and perpetrate tax fraud against the United States. b. Rich and Green Were Not Singled Out Another element of Quinn's attack on the indictment is that Rich and Green were unfairly singled out because ``others engaging in similar activity'' were pursued only in civil regulatory actions.\346\ This argument is simply false, and a minimally competent lawyer would have known that it was false. Even Rich's own lawyers had earlier determined this in their research, which was also in Jack Quinn's possession. According to a 1988 memo drafted by Rich's lawyers, there were 48 criminal cases nationwide brought against crude oil resellers.\347\ In 14 cases, the defendants spent some time in prison.\348\ Texas resellers John Troland and David Ratliff of West Texas Marketing were prosecuted for ``daisy chain'' oil transactions and for falsely classifying different types of crude oil to skirt DOE regulations. It was while serving 10 months in prison that they first alerted prosecutors to the activities of Rich and Green. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \346\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). \347\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers to Scooter Libby 1 n.1 (June 10, 1988)) (Exhibit 63). \348\ Id. at 1-2 n.2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rich's lawyers have also argued that, unlike Rich and Green, the few violators who were pursued criminally were involved in ``daisy chaining'' or miscertification (falsely labeling controlled oil as uncontrolled oil).\349\ However, Rich and Green were not alone in facing criminal penalties even though they were not accused of miscertification. Oscar Wyatt, David Chalmers, and Sam Wilson, Jr. pled guilty to a willful violation of the price control enforcement provision that involved no accusation of miscertification.\350\ These cases are consistent with the relevant statute, which distinguishes between civil and criminal violations on the basis of whether the conduct was willful--not whether it involved miscertification.\351\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \349\ Quinn made this argument before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 78 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \350\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers to Scooter Libby 2-3 n.4 (June 10, 1988)) (Exhibit 63). \351\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 754 (1982 ed.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- More important, Rich and Green were also involved in illegal conduct that was unique in the context of the commodity they were trading. In September 1980, DOE clarified its oil reseller regulations to make it plain that resellers were not permitted to profit more than $0.20 per barrel.\352\ Rich and Green made profits far in excess of that limitation but created fraudulent invoices and filed false reports to hide about $100 million in illegal profits from both the DOE and the IRS. In other words, Rich and Green were engaged in classic criminal financial fraud. The grand jury in New York had ample evidence from documents and witnesses that Rich and Green were willfully violating the price controls and, as discussed above, their companies later pled guilty to doing so.\353\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \352\ U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984)(S 83 Cr. 579). \353\ Telephone Interview with Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Feb. 7, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quinn further tried to advance the argument that Rich and Green's entire case was sui generis by stating in the petition that similarly situated individuals and corporations such as ARCO were never criminally charged.\354\ However, ARCO was not a similarly situated corporation because it was never involved in attempting to hide illegal profits as was Rich's company. In fact, in looking at the more analogous case of the corporations (West Texas Marketing and Listo Petroleum) that helped Rich hide illegal profits, the executives of those companies were prosecuted. Two executives from West Texas Marketing served 10 months in prison and one from Listo pled guilty to felony charges of making false statements and was sentenced to five years probation and fined $5,000.\355\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \354\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 26 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). \355\ See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Grand Jury Probing Shift of Oil Profits, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1982, at A1. See also Rich Associate Gets Probation, Associated Press, Dec. 17, 1984. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Beyond being completely false, the argument that Marc Rich was ``singled out'' for prosecution also draws upon the preposterous claims, made by Marc Rich himself, that the prosecution was the result of anti-Semitism.\356\ In an interview with the Israeli Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Rich stated, ``I'm convinced that the fact that I was a foreigner and a relative newcomer on the oil-trading market and Jewish influenced the manner in which my case was handled.'' \357\ Rich has never provided any support for this outlandish claim. Rich's clumsy attempt to play the race card was rejected even by associates like Abraham Foxman, who found no evidence to support it. Rich's attorneys did not make any overt reference to anti-Semitism in the pardon petition, but did repeatedly claim that Marc Rich had been ``singled out'' by prosecutors, never explaining why they believed that to be the case. Furthermore, Quinn's own notes make it appear possible that he raised the specter of anti-Semitism in his last-minute appeal to the President on January 19, 2001.\358\ It is unfortunate that the President found Rich's arguments believable--when in fact, they were completely inaccurate--a fact the President could have discovered with minimal due diligence. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \356\ While these arguments were not made explicitly in the pardon petition, Rich made them in the media, and Jack Quinn may have made them to President Clinton. See Section IV(G)(4). \357\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct. 1, 1999 (Exhibit 6). \358\ For a detailed discussion, see Section IV(G)(4) below. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. Rich and Green Did Trade with the Enemy The pardon petition claims that ``the Iranian [trading with the enemy] counts were added to the indictment to incite public opinion against the defendants.'' \359\ The petition further claims that ``[t]he prosecutors quietly dropped the Iranian claims against the companies, but never dealt with the claims against the individuals.'' \360\ By making this claim, Rich suggested that the charges had no merit. In fact, the charges appear to have been accurate, and were only dropped from the indictment for technical reasons. The trading with the enemy charges against the Marc Rich companies were dropped because Clyde Meltzer--the Listo petroleum executive who, unlike Rich and Green, did not flee the United States--was not involved in trading with Iran. Since Rich and Green fled and were unavailable for trial, the only charges of conspiracy against the remaining defendants were unrelated to Iran. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \359\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). \360\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The charges against Rich and Green personally for trading with Iran during the hostage crisis were never dropped or dismissed. They remained in effect at the time of the pardon.\361\ Indeed, there is voluminous evidence that Rich and Green traded with Iran, in addition to a number of other prominent enemies of the United States. While a foreign company may have been allowed to trade with Iran, Rich and Green were American citizens and it was illegal for them to engage in trade with Iran regardless of whether they did so on foreign soil or through the use of a foreign corporation. In fact, the evidence showed that Rich and Green negotiated the deals from the Manhattan offices of Marc Rich International, an American firm.\362\ It was the height of irresponsibility for Marc Rich and his lawyers to suggest that prosecutors charged Rich with trading with the enemy only to ``incite public opinion'' against Rich when Rich was, in fact, trading with Iran. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \361\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 110 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). \362\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jack Quinn, who signed the pardon petition, admitted in the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing that Rich had indeed traded with Iran: Mr. Shays. Did Mr. Rich trade with Iran when U.S. hostages were being held captive? Mr. Quinn. I do not know the precise answer to that question. It is my belief that he traded with Iran. I can't tell you right now when that occurred. Mr. Shays. Should it make any difference to you if it did? Mr. Quinn. Again, I approached this as a lawyer concerned with the indictment that was before me and whether or not it should stand. I was not here to be a character witness. I was here to take on four points-- Mr. Shays. It didn't make any difference to you. Should it have made a difference to the President of the United States? Mr. Quinn. It is something he well may have taken into consideration, certainly.\363\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \363\ Id. at 111. While Quinn admitted that he knew that Rich did indeed trade with Iran, he failed to address how he could state in the pardon petition that ``the prosecutors quietly dropped the Iranian charges against the companies, but never dealt with the claims against the individuals.'' Quinn likely failed to address this statement because he knew the implication that the charges were ``quietly'' dropped for lack of evidence is misleading. d. Rich and Green Did Evade Federal Taxes Quinn and the Rich legal team also attacked the core tax evasion counts in the indictment against Rich and Green. As they argued in the petition, ``The tax treatment of the transactions in the indictment, however, is governed by a U.S.- Swiss tax treaty, which was ignored by the prosecution. . . . The transactions in issue were consistently reported in accordance with the tax treaty.'' \364\ In making these arguments, Rich's lawyers relied on what they called the ``independent'' analyses of law professors Bernard Wolfman and Martin Ginsburg.\365\ However, the language from the pardon application is misleading in its use of the word ``independent.'' First of all, the professors were paid handsomely by Marc Rich for their work on his behalf. Professor Ginsburg, husband of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, was paid $66,199 for his work on the Rich case.\366\ Professor Wolfman was paid $30,754 for his analysis.\367\ Wolfman was hired as a consultant by one of Rich's firms, and was paid between $250 and $300 per hour.\368\ Hence, the analysis was not ``independent'' of Marc Rich. Second, the professors did not come to the same conclusion ``independently'' of each other, but rather worked jointly. Third, they emphasized that their analysis made ``no independent verification of the facts,'' and that they were merely ``accepting the statements thereof made to us by'' Marc Rich's attorneys.\369\ As Rich prosecutor Martin Auerbach stated: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \364\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 23 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). \365\ Id. \366\ Letter from Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 64). Ginsburg is also of Counsel at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. Of the $66,199 received by his firm on the Rich matter, $43,980 reflected work by Ginsburg personally. The remainder reflects work by other attorneys assisting Ginsburg. Ginsburg billed his time at rates of $300 to $400 per hour. Id. \367\ Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 65). \368\ Id. \369\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Gerard E. Lynch, Criminal Division Chief of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Dec. 7, 1990)) (Exhibit 66). The transmittal letter that came with that analysis says it all and betrays the problem, the fundamental flaw in the pardon application as it was applied to Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, and that is a complete absence of a knowledge of the facts, the true facts of this case, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- the facts that led the companies to plead guilty. When that analysis was sent 10 years ago, the professors who wrote it said, . . . quote, making no independent verification of the facts but accepting the statements thereof made to us by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's lawyers. And that is the problem. The President relied on the facts as described to him by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's lawyers, making no independent investigation.\370\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \370\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 106 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). In the end the analysis by the two professors cannot, and does not, attempt to explain the necessity for double accounting, phony invoices, and false reports to the Department of Energy. Nor do the professors discuss the double accounting, phony invoices, and false reports employed by Rich and Green to hide their illegal profits. The only rational explanation for the artifices employed by Rich is that he was fraudulently attempting to hide profits from the DOE and the IRS. In the final analysis, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman sold their names to the highest bidder, thereby turning their backs on the accounting and legal considerations that were necessary for a meaningful professional opinion. Quinn further attempted to justify the granting of a pardon by explaining that Rich's companies reached a settlement with the government and ``paid a total of approximately 200 million dollars in back taxes, interest, fines and foregone tax deductions, an amount far in excess of any taxes, penalties or interest which might have been assessed in a civil tax proceeding.'' \371\ Far from being a reason to grant a pardon, this fact only proves the point that Rich and Green fled from justice because they were caught red-handed and most likely would have gone to prison if they stood trial in the United States. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. and Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd. each pled guilty to making false statements and evading about $48 million in taxes because the strength of the case against them was overwhelming.\372\ Rich's companies pled guilty to a criminal scheme to conceal ``in excess of $100 million in taxable income . . . most of which income was illegally generated through the defendants' violations of federal energy laws and regulations.'' \373\ Rich's companies further admitted that they had engaged in this criminal scheme ``together with Marc Rich, Pincus Green . . . and others . . . unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly[.]'' \374\ That Rich's companies paid these moneys and made these admissions of guilt squarely contradicts Quinn's claim that the indictment was without merit. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \371\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 24-25 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). \372\ The case against Rich and Green individually was just as strong as the case against the companies. As noted above, Edward Bennett Williams offered to have Rich pay $100 million to settle the charges against him individually. Prosecutor Sandy Weinberg told Williams that the government would not reach any settlement that did not result in jail time for Rich. See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the House Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 176 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). See also Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett Williams 415-16 (1991). \373\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. at 3-4 (Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). See Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G., Marc Rich Int'l, Ltd. et al. at 11 (Oct. 11, 1984) (SS 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5). \374\ Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. at 3 (Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). See Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G., Marc Rich Int'l, Ltd. et al. at 11 (Oct. 11, 1984) (SS 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The Prosecutors Were Not ``Overzealous'' A second theme in the pardon application is that the investigation and indictment of Rich and Green was flawed because the prosecutors were overzealous and overly ambitious. Quinn attacked not only Weinberg and Auerbach on this basis, but also Rudolph Giuliani who was at the time the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. As with the claims of the flawed indictment, however, these claims were also misleading. a. The Prosecutors Negotiated with Rich and Green The pardon petition claims that the federal prosecutors refused to negotiate with Rich and Green. Quinn repeated this claim before the Committee, as well as in the press. However, as is discussed in detail above, Rich and Green were fugitives. The Southern District of New York had (and continues to have) a longstanding policy of not negotiating with fugitives from justice. As was explained by the SDNY in its February 2, 2000, letter to Quinn, negotiating with fugitives ``would give defendants an incentive to flee,'' providing them ``the inappropriate leverage and luxury of remaining absent unless and until the Government agrees to their terms.'' \375\ The particular history of the office's dealings with Rich counseled against negotiations. As is discussed in detail above, Rich had a history of acting in bad faith during the grand jury investigation. From refusal to obey grand jury subpoenas to attempting to fly two steamer trunks full of subpoenaed documents to Switzerland, Rich showed that he was not the type of defendant with whom to negotiate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \375\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yet even with such outrageous conduct, the Southern District of New York made many good faith efforts to reach an accommodation with Rich. During the investigation of Rich and his companies, prosecutors undertook numerous negotiations with Rich's lawyers, which resulted in the guilty pleas by Rich's companies. Even after Rich fled the country, prosecutors attempted to negotiate terms for Rich's return. In the early 1990s, U.S. Attorney Otto Obermaier and a top prosecutor in his office took the extraordinary step of flying to Switzerland and meeting with Marc Rich in an attempt to negotiate a resolution to the case. Moreover, the Southern District made numerous accommodations for Rich, including offering to drop the RICO charges as well as allowing him and Green to stand trial without spending any time in jail prior to trial. Despite these efforts, Rich and Green refused to return to the United States to stand trial. Rather, they would only return as part of a settlement that guaranteed they would not serve jail time unless convicted. It is therefore misleading for Quinn to simply state that the Southern District of New York ``takes the position that it will not even discuss the matter while Mr. Rich and Mr. Green continue to live outside of the United States.'' \376\ By itself, this statement fails to account for the numerous good faith efforts of the prosecutors in spite of their well-founded reluctance to negotiate with fugitives. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \376\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 25 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quinn also argued in the petition that the Southern District had ``negotiated with numerous other absent defendants over the years, and the Department of Justice has no such policy against such negotiations.'' \377\ However, as the Southern District noted in its February 2, 2000, letter to Quinn, Department of Justice policy places the decision to negotiate with a fugitive within the discretion of the office responsible for the prosecution.\378\ The Southern District of New York was well within the reasonable exercise of its discretion to require Rich to return to the United States before engaging in further negotiation, especially given Marc Rich's history of bad faith behavior and brazen legal tactics. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \377\ Id. \378\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, Quinn argued that the Southern District refused to negotiate with his legal team by failing to agree to a meeting between Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg and tax experts in the Department of Justice.\379\ This, too, is misleading. As the Southern District explained in the February 2, 2000, letter to Quinn, ``in 1987, an Assistant in this Office met with Mr. Rich's counsel and listened to the same presentation by Professor Martin D. Ginsburg referenced in your letter regarding the merits of the tax charges.'' \380\ Prosecutors had rejected the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis because it was based on an inaccurate and incomplete representation of the facts of this case. Its legal conclusions were, therefore, irrelevant. For the Southern District to meet with the professors again would have been redundant and fruitless. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \379\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 26 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). \380\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. The Rich Prosecution Was Not Tainted with Media Attention Quinn and the Rich legal team further tried to discredit the prosecution by claiming that United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani was unfairly bringing the glare of the media to the case. According to the pardon petition, Giuliani ``aggressively'' pursued Rich and Green in court as well as in the press: ``Not only did Mr. Giuliani and other prosecutors from his office speak frequently to the media in off and on record conversations, the office held formal press conferences where purported `evidence' against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was showcased to the press.'' \381\ Responding to this charge, Mayor Giuliani said on Meet the Press, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \381\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 23 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). First of all, the indictment was actually just about put together before I even became United States Attorney. It's been pursued by at least three Democratic appointees, who were United States attorney and the Justice Department, that had him number six on the fugitive list, was President Clinton's Democratic Justice Department. And the United States attorney of the Southern District in New York, an appointee of President Clinton, is as outraged as I am by the pardon that was given here. . . . You've been covering me a long time, right, running for office? Did you ever hear me mention Marc Rich? So this was hardly used by me in any way in any of my political campaigns. . . . And the fact that he was a fugitive--it was not something [about which I would] say, ``Gee, look what a good job I did as United States attorney.'' So that's kind of a silly thing to [s]ay.\382\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \382\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 2001). Rudolph Giuliani was one of dozens of prosecutors, Republican and Democrat, who worked on the Rich case. Robert Litt and Gerald Lynch were prominent Democrats who were also involved in the case. It would be strange for Quinn also to accuse them of overcharging. Litt was one of Attorney General Janet Reno's closest advisors, and Lynch, currently a professor at Columbia University Law School, was appointed to the federal bench by President Clinton. The two main prosecutors who brought the Rich case, Morris Weinberg and Martin Auerbach, were Democrats as well. The attempt to cast the Rich indictment as the result of partisan prosecutorial overreaching by Rudolph Giuliani is simply one more fabrication by Marc Rich's legal team. This argument had no basis in reality, and likely was invented to appeal to President Clinton's partisan instincts, as well as his dislike for aggressive prosecutors. As many have observed, by the end of his term, President Clinton was very sensitive to issues of prosecutorial overreaching, as a result of his perceptions of the Independent Counsel investigations.\383\ Quinn exploited these sentiments masterfully by fabricating claims regarding prosecutorial conduct in the Rich case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \383\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 341 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Henry Waxman). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. RICO Charges Were Fairly Brought The pardon application also accuses the federal prosecutors of unfairly bringing a racketeering charge against Rich and Green. According to Quinn, RICO was misused because the underlying allegation involved tax fraud.\384\ The petition points to a Department of Justice policy that was adopted in 1989, stating that, ``[f]ollowing the indictment, the United States government recognized the misuse of RICO in tax fraud cases and issued guidance in the United States Attorney's Manual explicitly stating that tax offenses are not predicates for RICO offenses.'' \385\ Jack Quinn suggested at the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing that the decision to bring RICO charges against Marc Rich and Pincus Green was the key factor that led to their flight from the United States: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \384\ Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). \385\ Id. It's the position of my client that he remained outside the United States because what Mr. Weinberg earlier described to you as, in essence, a simple tax evasion case was also made into a RICO case. And he may choose to say it was only one count in the indictment, but it was the sledgehammer that brought about the current impasse.\386\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \386\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 161 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). Quinn's argument is flawed for a number of reasons. First, at the time of the indictment, there was no policy against bringing RICO charges predicated on tax offenses. To the contrary, the RICO charges were brought consistent with Justice Department policy and the RICO charges were reviewed and approved by the RICO section of the Department of Justice--as were the tax charges by the tax section.\387\ As prosecutor Sandy Weinberg observed: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \387\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 187 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). If you're away for 20 years and you're fortunate enough to be able to persuade two foreign States not to extradite you, the gloss of time is always going to change the interpretation of the law. You can look at indictments that were brought in 1980, and if you examine them in 2000, the gloss of time is--you're going to find that the courts interpret the laws --------------------------------------------------------------------------- different in 2000 than they did in 1980. But you've got to look at the guts of what the case was about and these people. And when you look at the guts of what the case was about and the people, it doesn't make any difference whether or not we would bring a RICO charge today. It is whether or not we would bring a criminal charge today and whether or not it is acceptable to be pardoning folks who have done things like renouncing their citizenship, becoming fugitives, not coming back and making these arguments that they say are so clear. I mean it--was it justified? And you can't come in and say, well, 20 years have passed and, you know, the courts now interpret or the Justice Department interprets the RICO statute differently.\388\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \388\ Id. at 156. Along similar lines, even former Clinton White House Counsel --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Abner Mikva has stated: Clearly, a defendant would rather negotiate the unfairness of RICO charges from a comfortable abode in Switzerland than from a hardback chair in the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan. This is especially true when defendants have been trying, unsuccessfully, to make the same ``unfair'' point about RICO for the last 30 years.\389\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \389\ Coming in from the Cold, The Recorder, Mar. 28, 2001, at 5. Second, Quinn's argument also fails to address the non-tax RICO predicates in the case or the fact that there are money laundering statutes available today that were not available in --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1980. As prosecutor Martin Auerbach observed: I'm afraid that the argument with respect to the change in RICO policy is as disingenuous as I find the argument with respect to fugitivity. While it is true that the Justice Department changed its view with respect to tax counts as a predicate for RICO, it has not changed its view with respect to mail and wire fraud as a predicate to RICO. And as Mr. Quinn knows, as the indictment reflects, there are both mail and wire fraud counts which are predicates for RICO. So I believe that the Justice Department might well approve this indictment today. And I, in fact, believe that, were they to review this indictment today, and of course they did review it before it was brought, there would be money laundering charges in this case.\390\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \390\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 156 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). Therefore, it is likely that if he was charged today, Rich would be facing stiffer, not lighter penalties. Third, and most importantly, Quinn conveniently ignored the fact that the prosecutors tried to reach an accommodation with the two fugitives by offering to drop the RICO charges. As Robert Fink himself testified to the Committee, he was in discussions with prosecutors during which they offered to drop the RICO charges if Rich and Green would simply stand trial in the United States.\391\ These discussions are reflected in a February 10, 2000, e-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay: ``[a]t those times the office [Southern District of New York] offered to do a variety of things, none of which are necessarily still on the table. First, I was told at one point that they would drop the RICO charge if we wanted if Marc came in.'' \392\ Given the willingness of the SDNY to drop the RICO charges, Quinn's claim that the RICO charge was ``the sledgehammer that brought about the current impasse,'' is completely inaccurate and misleading. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \391\ Id. at 469 (testimony of Robert Fink). \392\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It appears that even Jack Quinn realized that the arguments in the petition were deeply flawed. On December 29, 2000, he sent the following e-mail to Kathleen Behan: What do you think our chances really are for Marc? the hardest question, i think, is ``if you're right about the weakness of the govts case, why not go to ct and win?'' the answr, i guess is that we couldn't have gotten a fair trial, but that was 18 years ago. couldn't he get one now? isn't that the way this shd go? these are tough questions, but I guess we have decent answers.\393\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \393\ Arnold & Porter Document Production KB00037 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Dec. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 67). It is unclear what ``decent answers'' Quinn had to that argument or to any of the multiple arguments against the Rich pardon. D. The ``Letters of Support'' in the Petition The legal arguments contained in the petition are not the only problematic section of the Rich and Green pardon petition. The ``letters of support'' in the petition also raise several troubling issues. Most of the letters were collected by Avner Azulay.\394\ Those letters were a crucial part of the pardon petition, as they helped create the impression that Marc Rich was a humanitarian who had made a minor mistake but who had a positive impact on countless lives. The significance and import of the letters presented to President Clinton was compromised by several factors, including: (1) many of those who wrote the letters in support of the pardon were either themselves, or their organizations, given money by Rich; (2) many who wrote the letters were misled about the purpose of the letter; and (3) their letters were misrepresented to the President. Given these facts, the letters of support in the Rich pardon petition represent just one more dishonest ploy in Marc Rich's overall scheme to obtain a pardon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \394\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Rich Paid a Number of Individuals Who Wrote in His Support The letter written by Abraham Foxman is one of the most prominently displayed letters in the petition. As National Director of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), his support of clemency for Marc Rich was of obvious importance to the application. However, the ADL received $100,000 from Marc Rich shortly after Foxman became involved in the pardon effort.\395\ In fact, this money was received a few weeks after Foxman flew to Paris to meet with Rich aide Avner Azulay.\396\ Moreover, Rich has given the ADL a total of $250,000 since he fled the country in 1983.\397\ Foxman has publicly denied that Rich's contributions to the ADL had anything to do with his help in the pardon effort. He stated to a group of reporters, ``I really find offensive the idea that Abe Foxman was bought for a check for $100,000. If he gave me nothing--or he gave me $10 million--I would have made the same decision, for which I now say I made a mistake.'' \398\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \395\ Michael Isikoff, ``I Made a Mistake''; The ADL's Abe Foxman Admits the Jewish Organization Received a $100,000 Grant from Marc Rich but Maintains He Wasn't ``Bought,'' Newsweek, Mar. 23, 2001, at 2001 WL 24138340. \396\ Id. \397\ Id. \398\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notwithstanding Foxman's denial of a quid pro quo, the payment to the ADL raises the general question of Marc Rich's tactics in drumming up support for his pardon application. The ADL was not the only organization to which Marc Rich paid money or attempted to pay money. In another instance, Marc Rich attempted to secure the assistance of the American Jewish Congress (AJC) with the promise of a large contribution. A week after Foxman's admission, Phil Baum, executive director of the AJC revealed that his organization had been approached by a representative of Marc Rich who told them, ``that if we were to speak favorably of Mr. Rich, we would be the beneficiary of a gift.'' \399\ Baum denied that there was any direct quid pro quo.\400\ However, Baum went on to state that, ``there was an understanding communicated to us[.]'' Baum further stated, ``It was not a contract. But these things are communicated in more subtle ways. We had reason to hope or expect that if we did this thing, we could probably be the recipient of Mr. Rich's generous recognition of our importance.'' \401\ The AJC ultimately turned down Rich's request.\402\ Committee staff attempted to contact Baum to corroborate this account and learn other details of the offer from the Rich team. Unfortunately, Baum failed to cooperate with the Committee's investigation, refusing on three separate occasions to return phone calls from Committee staff. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \399\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jewish Group Says Rich Reps Sought Pardon Help for Money, Associated Press State and Local Wire, Mar. 28, 2001. See also Brian Blomquist, Rich Tried to Tempt Jewish Group, N.Y. Post, Mar. 29, 2001, at 14. \400\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jewish Group Says Rich Reps Sought Pardon Help for Money, Associated Press State and Local Wire, Mar. 28, 2001. \401\ Id. \402\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Another example of Rich's efforts includes Birthright Israel, an organization that pays for young American Jews to travel to Israel. Marc Rich has pledged $5 million to Birthright Israel.\403\ The organization was founded by Michael Steinhardt, a longtime friend of Rich's who was heavily involved in the pardon effort. Steinhardt wrote a letter that was included in the petition. In addition, Birthright Israel's current North American Chairperson, Marlene Post, also wrote a letter supporting Rich's request for clemency.\404\ This letter was prominently displayed in the petition. As with the public statements of the ADL and the AJC, a spokesman for Birthright Israel denied any quid pro quo relating to the $5 million pledge to the organization and the organization's support for the Rich pardon.\405\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \403\ Beth J. Harpaz, Jews Divided Over Rich Pardon, Associated Press, Mar. 29, 2001, at 2001 WL 17989287. \404\ Letter from Marlene E. Post, North American Chairperson, Birthright Israel, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000) (Exhibit 68). The original letter was part of Rich and Green's pardon petition. \405\ Brian Blomquist, Rich Tried to Tempt Jewish Group, N.Y. Post, Mar. 29, 2001, at 14. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yet another person with a connection to Birthright Israel also wrote a letter on behalf of Marc Rich. Rabbi Irving Greenberg, Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Council, wrote a letter on Holocaust Museum Council letterhead in favor of clemency for Rich. Rabbi Greenberg is also President of the Jewish Life Network, an organization that is a partner with Birthright Israel.\406\ However, when Committee staff asked Greenberg's lawyer about press accounts of Rich's contributions, he stated that Rich had never given any contributions to any organization or entity controlled or operated by Greenberg.\407\ Greenberg's letter and Rich's contributions to Birthright Israel caused seventeen former and current members of the Holocaust Museum Council to send a letter demanding Greenberg's resignation.\408\ Rabbi Greenberg apologized for his letter on behalf of Rich, and ultimately, the Council voted to keep him as Chairman.\409\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \406\ Jacqueline Trescott, Holocaust Council Head Urged to Resign, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 2001, at C9. \407\ Telephone Interview with Andrew Levander, Partner, Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman (representing Rabbi Greenberg) (May 2, 2001). \408\ Jacqueline Trescott, Holocaust Council Head Urged to Resign, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 2001, at C9. Kitty Dukakis also signed the letter. \409\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There are other cases of Rich contributing or attempting to contribute to individuals (and their organizations) who wrote letters on his behalf. One prominent example is Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert, who wrote a letter to President Clinton on November 27, 2000, that was included in the petition. According to The New York Times, Rich contributed $25,000 to Olmert's first mayoral campaign in 1993.\410\ The Committee has not been able to determine whether Rich made financial contributions to other foreign political officials who supported his pardon. However, the Marc Rich team was clearly concerned about inquiries along these lines. Shortly after the pardon was granted, Avner Azulay sent an e-mail to others on the Rich team stating that: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \410\ William A. Orme, Jr., Marc Rich Aided Israeli Official, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A21. Pse [sic] keep barak [sic] out of the media. We have enough names on the list other than his. Important to keep all politicians out of the story. Pse [sic] share with me the inclusion of any one on the list. This is election time here and has a potential of blowup. A newsweek reporter here has already asked if there were any political contributions.\411\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \411\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69). Some of the other letter writers have also mentioned Rich's generosity and philanthropy as the reason for agreeing to write their letters. For example, several of the letter writers in Switzerland have ties to the Doron Foundation, an organization of Rich's that gives awards of $63,000 to Swiss groups and individuals.\412\ Zurich Mayor Josef Estermann was among that group.\413\ Estermann did not return calls from Committee staff. He has, however, spoken on the matter in his home country, saying, ``I think every person has a right to a pardon.'' \414\ To this, one Swiss paper responded, ``Yes, but does this right have to be one you can buy?'' \415\ Others with connections to the Doron Foundation who wrote letters on Rich's behalf include: Pierre de Weck, of UBS Bank; Michael de Picciotto, a director of Union Bancaire Privee in Geneva; Kurt R. Bollinger, of the Swiss Air Rescue Foundation; and Professor Verena Meyer of Zurich University. Michael de Picciotto spoke with Committee staff over the phone. When asked if Marc Rich or any of his associates had ever given anything of value to him or his company in exchange for his letter, de Picciotto responded, ``an important man like Mr. Rich does not need to do anything like this.'' \416\ The others with connections to the Doron Foundation failed to return Committee calls. Kurt Bollinger, whose rescue service received an award from Rich's foundation in 1992 failed to return the Committee's calls.\417\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \412\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11. The Doron Foundation has now been folded into the Marc Rich Foundation. \413\ Id. \414\ Id. \415\ Id. \416\ Telephone Interview with Michael D. de Picciotto, Managing Director, Union Bancaire Privee, Geneva, Switzerland (Apr. 26, 2001). \417\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee staff contacted or attempted to contact almost all of those whose letters were included in the section of the pardon petition entitled, ``Letters Addressed to the Honorable President William J. Clinton Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich.'' While the Committee does not have sufficient evidence to conclude that all of the letters were written on a quid pro quo basis, it cannot completely rule out the possibility. This is largely because a number of the letter writers and intended letter writers failed to cooperate with the Committee by not returning phone calls. Nevertheless, there does appear to be a pattern of receiving contributions or pledges from Marc Rich among many of those who wrote letters. The fact that a number of the most prominent letters of support for the Rich pardon were tainted with allegations of linkage to large financial contributions diminishes Rich's claims to have been a great humanitarian. Rather, it appears that many of Rich's humanitarian activities were just one part of a lengthy strategy to escape criminal prosecution in the U.S. 2. Some Who Wrote Letters Were Misled About the Purpose The significance and import of several of the letters is further weakened by the lack of candor of the Rich team in soliciting them. Rich's own lawyer, Robert Fink, admitted that during the solicitation of the letters, ``[n]ot everyone was necessarily told it was going to be for a pardon.'' \418\ Professor Verena Meyer, who serves on the board of the Doron Foundation, stated that she did not know that her letter would be included in a pardon petition.\419\ She thought the letters were ``routine'' and ``assume[d] other members of the foundation also wrote letters.'' \420\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \418\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15. \419\ Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11. \420\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Several others who wrote letters on behalf of Rich felt even more deceived. Professor Jonathan Halevy, CEO of the Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Jerusalem, wrote a letter on November 30, 2000, acknowledging contributions from Marc Rich's Doron Foundation. Halevy was contacted by Avner Azulay and asked to write a letter acknowledging the contribution.\421\ According to Halevy, Azulay told him that the letter would be used in a ``book in honor of Mr. Rich and the foundation.'' \422\ When interviewed about his letter being used in Rich's pardon application, Halevy stated, ``I'm obliged, if I got a donation from someone, to confirm that I got it in writing. But I think it would be very fair to tell me this was the purpose.'' \423\ Anthony J. Cernera, President of Sacred Heart University, in Fairfield, Connecticut, was similarly misled about his letter. Cernera wrote Rich to ``express my deepest appreciation for your on-going support for our program of Christian-Jewish understanding.'' \424\ When the director of public relations for the University discovered that Cernera's letter was included in the pardon petition, he was astonished, responding, ``Wow. So these letters were used as part of the petition for his pardon?'' \425\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \421\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15. \422\ Id. \423\ Id. \424\ Letter from Anthony J. Cernera, President, Sacred Heart University, to Marc Rich (Nov. 27, 2000) (Exhibit 70). \425\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15. In fact, when reached by The New York Times, only one of six letter writers were aware that their letters would be used as part of a pardon effort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The fact that Avner Azulay and others on the Marc Rich team misled individuals to obtain letters of support from them suggests a level of dishonesty that calls into question all representations made by the Rich pardon team. It also suggests that a number of people affiliated with Marc Rich, many of whom received his money, would not have written in his support if they had known that their letter was being used to get a pardon. 3. Many of the Letters were Misrepresented to the President Finally, the letters included in the pardon petition are further compromised by the way in which they were presented to President Clinton. The second section of the petition containing these letters was divided into two parts, one entitled ``Letters Addressed to the Honorable President William J. Clinton Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich,'' and another entitled ``Letters Expressing Support for the Pardon of Marc Rich.'' Both of these titles are misleading. All of the twenty-one letters in the first part of this section were addressed to President Clinton. However, several of these letters made no mention of Marc Rich's request for a pardon or executive clemency. Among the letters that included no reference to the pardon issue were those written by Nobel Laureate Camilio Jose Cela, Chief Rabbi of France; Rene-Samuel Sirat, President of the Jewish Community of Madrid; Issac Querub Caro; and President of the Association of Spanish Business Enterprises Fernando Fernandez Tapias. These letters all refer to Rich's philanthropic contributions over the years. But none of them makes any reference to the pardon. It is therefore misleading for such letters to be included under the cover page indicating that all of the writers are expressing their support for a pardon. The cover page for the second part of this section of the petition is even more problematic. There are fifty-two letters included under the title ``Letters Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich.'' Not one of these letters makes any mention of the pardon effort. Almost all of these letters were addressed to Marc Rich or Avner Azulay, thanking them for the generosity of Marc Rich and his foundations. Furthermore, based on the fact that most of these letters were written in late November and early December of 2000, it is clear that they were solicited by the Rich team for use in the pardon. However, as discussed above, their use in the pardon application came as a surprise to many of the letter writers. It stands to reason, therefore, that most of the writers were not informed of the purpose of the letters, let alone that they would be sent to President Clinton in such a misleading format. There is also disturbing evidence that a more accurate title for these letters was considered, but not used, in the application. Among the materials produced for the Committee was an earlier draft of the same document, containing the same list of names, but with a different header reading ``List of Letters of Support for Marc Rich and Foundation.'' \426\ The existence of this more accurate title makes it much less likely that the use of the inaccurate and misleading title was a mere oversight by the Rich team. Lawyers billing many hundreds of dollars an hour certainly should not make such errors, and circumstantial evidence makes it appear that they were simply trying to mislead. Given the rejection of an accurate title, and the fact that it was replaced with an inaccurate title, there can be no other reasonable conclusion. Moreover, when the Committee confronted Jack Quinn about the misleading cover page that was included in the pardon petition, he stated: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \426\ Compare Jack Quinn Document Production (Document entitled ``List of Letters of Support for Marc Rich and Foundation'') (Exhibit 71), with Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Document entitled ``Letters Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich'' (Dec. 11, 2000) (Exhibit 72). I don't know who made that change. And I accept responsibility for anything filed in my name. I will tell you that, for the most part, I was not involved in the effort to gather these letters. I became aware after the petition had been filed that some of these letters were simply sought as testimonials to his charitable activities and that some of the people from whom they were sought were not told in advance that these letters were going to be used from a pardon application. I very much regret that. And to the extent that, as a result, any of that was misunderstood or was misleading, I certainly apologize for it.\427\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \427\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 172 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). The deceptive tactics used by the Rich team in securing and presenting so many of the letters sent to President Clinton in the pardon application are disturbing. The Committee is also troubled by the fact that the Clinton Administration failed to take the time to review these letters and the misleading way in which they were presented. However, in the context of the rush to grant last-minute pardons, and all of the unfortunate decisions made during the pardon process, the dishonest use of these letters is not surprising. The misleading presentation of the letters is consistent with the misleading legal arguments that form the basis of the Rich and Green pardon petition. IV. LOBBYING FOR THE MARC RICH PARDON A. The Marc Rich Lobbying Team Marc Rich employed much more than Jack Quinn and a deceptive petition to obtain his Presidential pardon. Just as important to the pardon effort was a carefully orchestrated lobbying campaign that used a number of individuals with unique access to the Clinton White House. Rich employed private attorneys with personal relationships with White House staff, personal friends of the President, and foreign leaders to press his case with the White House. The key players in the lobbying effort included Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, as well as other Israeli leaders, King Juan Carlos of Spain, Michael Steinhardt, Peter Kadzik, and a number of other individuals, all working for the same goal, the pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green. 1. Denise Rich Denise Rich was in many ways the key figure in the effort to obtain a pardon for Marc Rich. She enjoyed a close relationship with President Clinton, which gave the Rich team the access they needed to make their case directly to the President. She used this access as much as she could, sending two letters to the President, and making her case to him personally on at least three occasions. Denise Rich's involvement in the pardon effort has raised three serious questions: (1) why did Denise Rich agree to help Marc Rich; (2) what were the nature of her communications with President Clinton; and (3) did she in any way connect the pardon of Marc Rich to contributions she had made or would make to the DNC or Clinton Library? The Committee has not been able to find definitive answers to these critical questions, largely because Denise Rich has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination rather than cooperate with the Committee. To attempt to understand Denise Rich's role in helping to obtain Marc Rich's pardon, the Committee has considered documents about the pardon effort, testimony provided by other individuals, and even Denise Rich's self-serving media appearances. a. Denise Rich's Relationship with Marc Rich Denise Rich was wealthy before she married Marc Rich. She was the daughter of Emil Eisenberg, who founded Desco Incorporated, one of the largest shoe manufacturers in the United States. In 1966, at the age of 22, Denise married Marc Rich, whom she had met six months earlier. Denise Rich was married to Marc Rich for the next 25 years, having three children. In 1983, when Marc Rich was indicted and fled the country, Denise and her children left the United States with Marc Rich. Despite the fact that she accompanied her husband into exile, and remained with him there for the next eight years, Denise Rich claims to have been ignorant of the reasons for Rich's indictment and flight: Question. In 1980, were you aware that your husband was reportedly trading with Iran after we had an embargo because of the hostages? Denise Rich. I really didn't know much about that at all because I was so involved in my life. It's not like he would come home and he would say, ``Hey, I'm trading with the enemy.'' We didn't talk about it. * * * Question. How did you find out [about the indictment] and what was your reaction? Denise Rich. All I really knew was that he spoke to me and he said that ``I'm having tax problems with the government. And--and I think that we are going to have to leave.'' And my response was, ``I am his wife. These are my children. I'm not going to split up the family.'' And, so, I did what I think any wife would do. I left the country. Question. Did you understand that by fleeing to Switzerland and refusing to return to this country, that your husband was considered one of the 10 most wanted fugitives in America? Denise Rich. That had nothing to do with me because I was . . . Question. Yes. It's your husband, Denise. It's the father of your children. Denise Rich. Yes, he's the father of my children . . . Question. He's a fugitive. Denise Rich. . . . and he was my husband, but as far as I knew, it was a tax situation. So I really never understood anything else. And I really didn't--that's all that I knew.\428\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \428\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001). While living in exile, Denise began her musical career, becoming a successful songwriter. In approximately 1990, Denise discovered that Marc Rich had taken up with a younger woman, model Gisela Rossi. In 1991, Denise divorced Marc Rich. In the ensuing legal battle, she received a substantial sum of money, which has never been disclosed by Marc Rich, Denise Rich, or their representatives, but is believed to be in the vicinity of $500 million.\429\ As a result of the divorce, Denise and Marc Rich were reportedly on very poor terms, rarely speaking. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \429\ Some estimates list the amount as high as $900 million. See Debunking the Buzz Over Denise, N.Y. Post, Feb. 1, 2001, at 10. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1996, however, the Richs' daughter Gabrielle died of AML leukemia. Denise Rich has often pointed to Gabrielle's death as an important factor in her change of heart regarding her ex- husband. First, she has claimed that Marc Rich was ``cruelly denied the opportunity'' \430\ to return to the U.S. to visit her. She has also claimed that the death of Gabrielle caused her to forgive her ex-husband for his transgressions: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \430\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Denise Rich to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 73). Question. Here is what a lot of people don't understand. How do you go from almost hating your husband at the time of the divorce to writing a letter pleading for his clemency and his pardon? What changed --------------------------------------------------------------------------- in your mind? Denise Rich. My daughter died. And when you've lost a child, there's nothing more you can say. There are no more questions. When you've lost a child, everything changes, and I felt--I felt in my heart forgiveness.\431\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \431\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001). This explanation, however, fails to address one fundamental issue: should Marc Rich have decided to spend time with his daughter, he could easily have done so. Rather, he placed his legal jeopardy ahead of his concerns for his family and elected to refrain from visiting her. Years later, it appears that he and his ex-wife would cynically use the death of his daughter to gain sympathy for his earlier transgressions. b. Denise Rich's Relationship with President Clinton After her divorce from Marc Rich, Denise Rich returned to New York, where she purchased what is reportedly the largest penthouse on Fifth Avenue, a 28-room triplex filled with works of art by Picasso, Miro, Dali, Calder, Warhol, and Chagall, as well as a staff of 20 to serve her needs, including two cooks, a stylist, and a ``personal healer.'' \432\ Shortly after arriving in New York, Denise Rich sought to establish herself as a leading figure in New York social circles. Geraldo Rivera, a close friend of Denise Rich, observed that ``[t]he people who think she wants to be a kind of Pamela Harriman person are not off the mark. . . . She wanted a salon, she wanted a Gertrude Stein, Paris kind of scene, she wanted to watch the parade of contemporary popular cultural life march through her living room.'' \433\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \432\ Lloyd Grove, The Reliable Source, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 2001, at C3. \433\ Elisabeth Bumiller, Tossed Into a Tempest Over a Pardon; Friends See Naivete, Critics a Payoff in a Clinton Fund-Raiser's Acts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at B1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- An important part of becoming a ``kind of Pamela Harriman'' was to get involved in political fundraising. Denise Rich began making large political contributions and holding lavish fundraisers shortly after her return to the United States. Denise Rich and her daughters gave over $1.1 million to federal political causes between 1993 and 2000, all but $5,000 of that to Democrats. Denise Rich's political contributions increased as the end of the Clinton Administration neared, with over $625,000 of her contributions coming between 1998 and 2000. While she was giving and raising vast amounts of money for the Democratic Party, Denise Rich developed a close relationship with President Clinton: When I met him there was so much charisma, and I saw a lot of idealism, and eventually I had a very special relationship with the former President and the former First Lady because they were so compassionate to me when I lost my daughter. And it--and it was as if he understood and . . . could put himself in my shoes.\434\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \434\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001). This special personal relationship was also manifested in Denise Rich's political fundraising, where she became one of the Democratic Party's largest and most reliable fundraisers. In fact, Denise Rich held the fundraiser that was President Clinton's first public appearance after the publication of the Independent Counsel's referral in 1998. It raised nearly $3 million.\435\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \435\ Elisabeth Bumiller, Tossed Into a Tempest Over a Pardon; Friends See Naivete, Critics a Payoff in a Clinton Fund-Raiser's Acts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at B1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Denise Rich's special relationship with President Clinton was also manifested in her large contributions to the William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation, the charitable foundation responsible for building the Clinton Library. Between 1998 and 2000, Denise Rich gave $450,000 to the Clinton Library.\436\ Among these contributions was a $250,000 gift in July 1998, which was one of the earliest large contributions to the Library, made during one of the darkest times in the Clinton presidency.\437\ Because she and her friend Beth Dozoretz have used the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering the Committee's questions, little is known about Denise Rich's motivations for contributing to the Clinton Library. However, one document suggests that Denise Rich was seeking ``help'' from Dozoretz. On a note accompanying her $100,000 library contribution, Denise Rich wrote, ``Dear Beth, Thanks for your help, Lots of love, Denise.'' \438\ However, since both Rich and Dozoretz have refused to testify on grounds that their testimony would incriminate them, the Committee has not been able to develop an understanding of this note. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \436\ See William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0002 (Check from Denise Rich to the Clinton Library for $250,000 (July 15, 1998)); William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0008 (Check from Denise Rich to the Clinton Library for $100,000 (Aug. 7, 1999)); William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0031 (Check from Denise Rich to the Clinton Library for $100,000 (May 11, 2000)) (Exhibit 74). \437\ Id. \438\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0037 (Note from Denise Rich to Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee) (Exhibit 75). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As Denise Rich helped President Clinton with his charity, he helped Denise Rich with hers. In 1998 and 2000, President Clinton attended fundraising galas for the G&P Charitable Foundation, which Denise Rich established to raise funds for cancer research. c. Denise Rich's Role in the Marc Rich Pardon Effort Little is known about when Denise Rich decided to assist the Marc Rich pardon effort, or who asked her to help.\439\ Avner Azulay has stated that he personally convinced her to write in support of the pardon, telling her that ``everyone in the world is supporting this and you can't just stand aside, it's embarrassing.'' \440\ The first documentary evidence of her support for the effort to resolve Marc Rich's criminal case appears in the March 2000 e-mail discussing sending her on a ``personal mission'' to President Clinton.\441\ The first specific references to her role in the late 2000 pardon effort come in November 2000, in a meeting agenda prepared by attorney Robert Fink. The agenda for that meeting, which included Jack Quinn, includes an item ``Maximizing use of D.R. and her friends.'' \442\ It appears that the first conversation between Denise Rich and the pardon team took place on December 4, 2000, when she spoke to Robert Fink.\443\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \439\ There are reports that Denise Rich may have also assisted the effort to obtain a pardon for ex-boyfriend Niels Lauersen, a prominent New York gynecologist who was convicted of fraudulent billing practices. According to one account, though, Rich was approached to help with Lauersen's pardon effort, and was willing to help, until she was ``reminded that she might be spreading herself thin.'' See James Barron with Alison Cowan and Shaila Dewan, A Second Pardon Front, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2001, at B2. \440\ Rich's Israeli Aide: The Pardon Surprised Us. So Did the Furor, Forward, (Feb. 23, 2001), at 1. \441\ There is some circumstantial evidence of reconciliation between Denise Rich and Marc Rich somewhat earlier, at least in November 1999, when Denise Rich and her daughter Danielle traveled to Israel to attend the dedication of the Gabrielle Rich wing of the Tel Aviv Museum of Art, which was funded by Marc Rich. A photograph of that event shows Denise and Danielle Rich posing with one of Marc Rich's closest aides, Avner Azulay. \442\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0567-69 (Agenda of Nov. 21, 2000, Meeting) (Exhibit 76). \443\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00021 (Billing Records for Marc Rich, Dec. 19, 2000) (Exhibit 77). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Rich legal team did maximize use of Denise Rich. They started with a December 6, 2000, letter from Denise Rich to the President. This letter was in many ways, the centerpiece of the pardon petition. While it appears to have been a heartfelt plea, in reality, it was drafted by Marc Rich's lawyers. The letter combines inaccurate charges about the indictment with emotional pleas about Rich's ``exile:'' I support his application with all my heart. The pain and suffering caused by that unjust indictment battered more than my husband--it struck his daughters and me. We have lived with it for so many years. We live with it now. There is no reason why it should have gone on so long. Exile for seventeen years is enough. So much of what has been said about Marc as a result of the indictment and exile is just plain wrong, yet it has continued to damage Marc and his family. * * * My husband and I could not return to the United Sates [sic] because, while the charges were untrue, no one would listen--all the prosecutors appeared to think about was the prospect of imprisoning Marc for the rest of his life. With a life sentence at stake, and press and media fueled by the U.S. Attorney, we felt he had no choice but to remain out of the country. Let no one think exile for life is a light burden. The world we cared about was cut off from us. When our daughter was dying from leukemia, Marc was cruelly denied the opportunity to see her by the prosecutors. What was this exile for? The charges all relate to old energy regulations, where all of the other people and companies involved in the same kinds of transactions were never charged with a crime. Only my husband was treated differently.\444\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \444\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Denise Rich to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 73). This letter was placed prominently at the front of the stack of testimonials in the Marc Rich pardon petition, and it was quoted extensively in the petition itself. Of course, the arguments in the letter were completely inaccurate. After including the letter in the pardon petition, Denise Rich took a number of other actions to lobby for the pardon. Another letter from her to President Clinton was prepared by Marc Rich's lawyers on December 20, 2000. This letter was discussed among the Marc Rich legal team, with Robert Fink suggesting the following text: ``Because I could not bear it were I to learn that you did not see my letter and at least understand my special person[al] reasons for being a supporter of a pardon, I am sending you an additional copy, and an additional request that you wisely use your power to pardon Marc.'' \445\ Jack Quinn thought that this language was ``perfect,'' \446\ and suggested that Denise Rich should ``hand it to him [the President] in [a] sealed envelope and mention that she is aware I intend to discuss the matter with him personally. She shd simply ask him to read it later and let him know how strongly we feel that we have the merits on our side.'' \447\ After Marc Rich's lawyers had finalized the text of the letter, it was presented to Denise Rich for her signature. Denise Rich did see the President on December 20, 2000, at a White House Christmas party. According to one witness at the party, Rich wrested the President away from Barbra Streisand to press her case about the pardon.\448\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \445\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00068 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 78). \446\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00069 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 79). \447\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00397 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 80). \448\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Documents Show a Complex Campaign to Win a Pardon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2001, at A11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Little is known about how many other contacts Denise Rich might have had with President Clinton during the final month of the Clinton Administration. There is evidence that she had at least one, and maybe more, telephone calls with the President about the pardon. E-mails between Jack Quinn and Robert Fink on January 16, 2001, indicate that they wanted Denise Rich to make ``another call,'' indicating there had been other calls before this one. First, Quinn wrote that: I am advised that it would be useful if she [Denise] made another call to P. I am in a fannie mae bd mtg, but would like to set this in motion asap. Message shd be simple: ``I'm not calling to argue the merits. Jack has done that, and we believe a pardon is defensible and justified. I'm calling to impress upon you that MR and our whole family has paid a dear price over 18 yrs for a prosecution that shd never have been brought and that singled out MR while letting the oil companies he dealt with go scot free. Please know how important this is to me personally.'' can you or avner call her this morning? \449\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \449\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00167 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 16, 2000)) (Exhibit 81). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fink responded: I called at 10:30 AM and she is still asleep (she was at her Dad's yesterday and it was a very full day) but I left a message that I had to talk to her before a noon meeting. I expect I will hear from her and I will give her the message.\450\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \450\ Id. In the absence of cooperation from Denise Rich, however, it is impossible to know exactly how many contacts Rich had with President Clinton, and what those contacts were about. An e- mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink's assistant shortly after the pardon raises interesting questions. This document was withheld from the Committee for over a year, and was produced only after a decision from a federal district court judge requiring it to be turned over to a grand jury. Quinn wrote the following in response to an e-mail titled ``One of the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reporters' Requests:'' Shd def confirm it didn't. Is this the moment to say that he asked DR for pol support? Or might DR have said something stupid like that when they spoke. God knows, I hope not.\451\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \451\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02958 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Rosemary Micciulli, Quinn Gillespie & Associates (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 82). The Committee requested an interview with Jack Quinn after it received this e-mail, but he refused. Without further illumination from Quinn, this e-mail's meaning is not clear. One interpretation suggests that a reporter may have called asking whether the President asked Denise Rich for ``political support,'' perhaps in the context of their discussions about the Rich pardon. It also suggests that Quinn was fearful that Denise Rich might have said something like this to the press. Quinn's question ``is this the moment to say that he asked DR for pol support,'' raises a real question as to whether President Clinton asked Denise Rich for ``political support'' in the midst of their discussions about the Rich pardon. While Quinn has refused to answer questions from the Committee about this e-mail, his spokesman has informed the press that the ``he'' in the e-mail refers to former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, not President Clinton.\452\ While Quinn's explanation is possible, it is troubling that Quinn has refused to provide this explanation to the Committee himself. Absent further information from Quinn, Denise Rich, or President Clinton, the Committee can only speculate as to the meaning of this e-mail. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \452\ Michael Isikoff, Secret E-Mail, Newsweek (Mar. 10, 2002). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is clear that Denise Rich had frequent opportunities to press the pardon case with President Clinton. Rich was scheduled to visit the White House 19 times during the Clinton presidency, with six of those visits scheduled between May 2000 and January 2001.\453\ In addition, Rich also called the White House on several occasions near the end of the Clinton Administration.\454\ However, without cooperation from Denise Rich or President Clinton, the Committee is unable to know what was discussed during those telephone calls or how many of those scheduled White House visits actually occurred. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \453\ National Archives and Records Administration Document Production (WAVES records (1994-2000)). \454\ See, e.g., Verizon Document Production (Telephone calls from Denise Rich to the White House (Dec. 9, 1999)); Qwest Document Production (Telephone call from Denise Rich to the White House (Feb. 16, 2000)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. Denise Rich's Motives Denise Rich's involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort raises a number of serious questions: (1) why did Denise Rich agree to help Marc Rich; (2) did Denise Rich's extremely large political contributions play any role in the President's decision to grant the pardon of Marc Rich; (3) were additional large contributions envisioned or hoped for; (4) what did the President and Denise Rich discuss; and (5) was Denise Rich making her political contributions with her own money? Due to Denise Rich's decision to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the Committee is not able to answer any of these questions definitively. However, there are a number of factors suggesting that Denise Rich's involvement in the Marc Rich pardon case is far more complicated than she has suggested. First, Denise Rich's explanation for why she helped Marc Rich obtain the pardon does not withstand full scrutiny. Denise Rich has stated that she helped him because, after her daughter died, she forgave Marc Rich for his transgressions. She also claimed that she helped get the pardon so that her daughters could be with their father again. However, the Committee is unaware of Rich returning to the United States since he has obtained the pardon. Moreover, during Marc Rich's self-imposed ``exile,'' his daughters were free to visit him in Europe and Israel, as they often did. Since Denise Rich's explanations do not fully explain her involvement, it is fair to consider other possible motivations. One comes from the fact that Rich promised to give $1 million a year to the G&P Charitable Foundation, at the precise time that he was trying to get Denise Rich to help with the pardon effort.\455\ This sum would have represented a major influx of cash for the G&P Foundation, which raised $2.4 million in 1998 and only $978,000 in 1999.\456\ Second, the Committee has attempted to examine whether Denise Rich and her daughters continue to receive financial support from Marc Rich, or would receive enhanced financial support in the future, other factors which could have influenced their decision to support his pardon. While Denise Rich's bank records do not indicate any influx of money from Marc Rich, at least one document received by the Committee suggests that Rich might have established a Swiss bank account for his daughter Ilona. In a December 4, 2000, letter from Robert Fink to Ilona Rich, Fink wrote ``here are some banking papers to set up the account with UBS for you that need your signature. Please execute where indicated and also return these to me so I can send them back to Switzerland.'' \457\ While this reference is certainly capable of multiple interpretations, it at least raises the possibility that Marc Rich was providing untraceable funds to his family through Swiss bank accounts. This could provide another explanation for their support for the pardon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \455\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Rich Pardon Reportedly Followed Pledge to Charity of Former Wife, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2001, at A1. $500,000 of this sum would have been given by Marc Rich and the other $500,000 would have been given by Pincus Green. \456\ See Department of the Treasury Form 990-PF, G&P Charitable Foundation, 1998; Department of Treasury Form 990-PF, G&P Charitable Foundation, 1999 (Exhibit 83). A copy of G&P's tax return for the year 2000 was unavailable because the Foundation may have received a filing deadline extension. \457\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00259 (Letter from Robert Fink to Ilona Rich (Dec. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 84). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Similarly, the Committee is unable to reach any firm conclusions regarding the nature of Denise Rich's communications with the President, and specifically whether Denise Rich's political contributions and contributions to the Clinton Library played any role in the pardon. Absent true cooperation from Denise Rich or President Clinton, there is no way of knowing what they discussed, or what they were thinking about the Marc Rich pardon. However, there are a number of pieces of circumstantial evidence that raise the indelible appearance of impropriety in this case, which Denise Rich and President Clinton have done nothing to refute. First, Denise Rich made $1.1 million in political contributions to Democrats, including the Clintons, and the contributions increased dramatically toward the end of the Clinton Administration. Denise Rich also made $450,000 in contributions to the Clinton Library, including one of the earliest large contributions to the Library. Although this sum has been downplayed, it was in fact an appreciable percentage of cash actually advanced to the Library. Given the difficulties generally experienced raising money after a President leaves office, the individuals who are prepared to give large sums--particularly after there are no more elections to finance--assume a particular importance. Second, Denise Rich used the relationship she had with the President, which was built in large part of political contributions, to lobby the President to grant the pardon. Third, Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz, the two people who were privy to the reasons for Denise Rich's political contributions and her discussions with the President regarding the pardon, were so concerned about their potential criminal exposure that they invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. Were there a benign explanation to the events prior to the pardon, there is little conceivable reason to have invoked the Fifth Amendment. Fourth, the President, Denise Rich, and Beth Dozoretz have offered the weakest of justifications for their actions in the Marc Rich pardon matter. Given these facts, there is an unmistakable appearance of impropriety. The Committee had the opportunity to grant Denise Rich immunity against prosecution so that it could receive compelled testimony from her, but decided not to proceed with a grant of immunity for several reasons. First, there was no evidence that Denise Rich intended to cooperate with the Committee. After the Committee received notice that the Justice Department had no objection to a grant of immunity, Committee staff contacted counsel for Mrs. Rich, to determine whether they would offer the Committee a proffer before the immunity vote. By receiving a proffer, the Committee hoped to receive an understanding of what Mrs. Rich would testify to if she received immunity. Counsel for Mrs. Rich were unwilling to provide a proffer. By refusing to provide a proffer, counsel for Mrs. Rich made it clear that they had no intent of cooperating with the Committee's investigation, and would make obtaining information from Denise Rich as difficult as possible. Another factor that played a role in the Committee's decision not to grant immunity to Denise Rich were Mrs. Rich's own public statements about her role in the investigation. When Mrs. Rich appeared on the television program 20/20, to the extent she made any statements addressing her role in the pardon, her statements were difficult to believe. This appearance raised real questions as to whether Denise Rich intended to provide honest and complete testimony to the Committee, even if she were immunized. 2. Beth Dozoretz Together with Denise Rich and Jack Quinn, Beth Dozoretz served a key role in lobbying for the pardon of Marc Rich. Like Denise Rich, Dozoretz enjoyed a close personal relationship with President Clinton that was a mixture of friendship and extremely significant political fundraising. Like Denise Rich, Dozoretz took advantage of this close relationship to press President Clinton about the Rich pardon. Also, much like her friend Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights rather than testify before the Committee. a. Beth Dozoretz's Relationship with Bill Clinton In 1992, Beth Dozoretz attended the Democratic Convention in New York City at the urging of her husband, Ron Dozoretz. Until that point, Dozoretz had never been significantly involved in political events of any type. But at the Democratic convention, Dozoretz had an epiphany of sorts, as Hillary Clinton passed by: On her way to the podium she had to walk by where I was sitting. . . . She was looking around, smiling, and I flattered myself to think that our eyes met. And I blurted something out like, ``I just think you're fabulous!'' And I felt like she looked at me and said, ``Thank you!'' with her big, beautiful smile.\458\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \458\ Lloyd Grove, The A-List's No. 1 Political Partiers; How Beth and Ron Dozoretz Made Washington Their Very Own, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 1999, at C1. Beginning with the 1992 convention, Beth Dozoretz began to be deeply involved in Democratic politics. She and her husband moved to Washington from Norfolk, Virginia, in 1993. First at an apartment in Georgetown and then at an estate in Northwest Washington, the Dozoretzes began to host high-profile fundraising events. Through these events, the Dozoretzes had frequent contact with the Clintons, and struck up a warm relationship with both the President and First Lady. During the course of the Clinton presidency, the Dozoretzes were close to the Clintons, vacationing with them, and playing golf with them.\459\ Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz remained close to the President throughout the Monica Lewinsky scandal. In November 1998, the Dozoretzes asked the President to serve as godfather to their infant daughter.\460\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \459\ Id. The Dozoretzes had their critics, some of whom suggested that their friendship with the Clintons was the result of a deliberate plan: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- GStarting from the very beginning, they were having dinners and soirees at their apartment in Washington Harbour. . . . The whole program was geared to rising to the top. She had a staff from the very first day. I mean, how many housewives have staffs? She played golf with the president, and she took golf lessons so she could play with him. Her husband obviously is very, very wealthy, and this is something they set out to accomplish. And obviously they have. Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \460\ Id. President Clinton agreed, and he and Hillary Clinton attended a high-profile christening at the Dozoretz estate. The star- studded attendance list for the event also included Jack Quinn. Annie Groer and Ann Gerhart, The Reliable Source, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1998, at C3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to the close personal relationship she maintained with President Clinton, Beth Dozoretz also developed a fundraising relationship with the President. In 1994, Dozoretz served as co-Chairman of the DNC's large contributor program. By 1999, Dozoretz had raised $5 million for various Democratic causes.\461\ As a result, in early 1999 Dozoretz was appointed, with the President's personal blessing, as Finance Chairman of the DNC, the chief fundraiser for the Democratic Party. Dozoretz resigned her post in September 1999, to allow new DNC Chairman Ed Rendell to appoint his own Finance Chairman. However, even after she left her position as Finance Chairman, Dozoretz continued to raise funds for the Democratic Party, and maintain a warm relationship with President Clinton. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \461\ It was through her fundraising work for the DNC that Beth Dozoretz became enmeshed in her first White House scandal. In September 1997, Dozoretz testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding a controversial White House fundraising coffee attended by John Huang and Pauline Kanchanalak. Two witnesses at the coffee testified that Huang made an illegal appeal for political contributions at the White House coffee. Dozoretz, who was also attending the coffee with a prospective donor, denied that Huang made the remarks. See ``Investigation into Fundraising Activities During the 1996 Elections,'' Hearings Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Special Investigations Comm., 105th Cong. (Sept. 16, 1997). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to raising funds for the DNC, Beth Dozoretz raised money for President Clinton's personal causes. For example, she raised money for the President's legal defense fund. She also raised money for the Clinton Library. Dozoretz solicited Denise Rich for her first contribution to the Clinton Library, a $250,000 contribution made in July 1998.\462\ Apparently, Rich gave the check to Dozoretz, who sent it on to the lawyers for the Library.\463\ In connection with this, or one of Denise Rich's other contributions to the Clinton Library, Rich drafted a note to Dozoretz reading ``Dear Beth, Thanks for your help, Lots of love, Denise.'' \464\ Apparently, Denise Rich was a person specifically targeted by Dozoretz to solicit for the Clinton Library. Dozoretz gave Peter O'Keefe, the chief fundraiser for the Clinton Library, a list of individuals Dozoretz intended to solicit, and Denise Rich was listed on this document.\465\ In addition to the substantial sums she raised from Denise Rich, on May 23, 2000, Beth Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton Library.\466\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \462\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0002 (Check from Denise Rich to the William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Library for $250,000 (July 15, 1998)) (Exhibit 74). \463\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0004 (Letter from Janine Werkman, Chief of Staff for Beth Dozoretz, to Nicole Seligman (July 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 85). \464\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0037 (Note from Denise Rich to Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee) (Exhibit 75). \465\ William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0048 (List of Potential Contributors to William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation) (Exhibit 86); Interview with Peter O'Keefe, Fundraiser, William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation (Apr. 12, 2001). \466\ This information was provided to the Committee in a briefing by David Kendall and Nicole Seligman, counsel for the Clinton Foundation. See also William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0024 (Letter from Skip Rutherford, President, William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation, to Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee (Jan. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 87). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Beth Dozoretz's Involvement in the Marc Rich Pardon Campaign Around Thanksgiving of 2000, Jack Quinn informed Beth Dozoretz that he would be filing a pardon petition on behalf of Marc Rich. Quinn was close friends with Dozoretz, and also knew that she was close to Denise Rich. Quinn testified that he ``encouraged her to help me be sure that the President himself was aware of the fact that the application had been filed with the White House Counsel's office.'' \467\ According to Quinn, Dozoretz did talk to the President, who told her that Quinn should make his case to Bruce Lindsey and the other staff in the White House Counsel's office.\468\ Quinn described his motivation for involving Dozoretz at the Committee's March 1 hearing: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \467\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 69 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \468\ Id. I did so because she was a friend of mine, because she had a relationship with Denise Rich, she was in much more frequent communication with the President than I was. I was motivated by two things principally; one, I was hopeful that she could let the President know that I had or was going to file this so that he would be aware it was there; and two, she was another person who I hoped might be in a position to give me the kind of information that I have, as a lawyer, thought would be useful to me to pursue their efforts on behalf of my client vigorously. Now, I want to also tell you have [sic] that in that conversation I had with her again around Thanksgiving time, I cautioned her that it would be very important to make sure that no such conversation was ever connected in any way with any kind of fundraising activity. She reacted to that by kind of looking at me like how could I even suggest that. She said to me, of course I would never do that to him.\469\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \469\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 410-11 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). It is apparent that Quinn turned to Dozoretz because of her access to and influence with the President. Precisely how Dozoretz used these skills is a mystery, because of Dozoretz's invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights.\470\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \470\ Irving Sandorf, a former colleague of Dozoretz's from the clothing industry, noted that ``She has a way of getting into you a little bit. She knows how to manipulate people. I don't know if you'd call them `people skills.' It's more like `I'll use you, you use me' skills.'' See Lloyd Grove, The A-List's No. 1 Political Partiers; How Beth and Ron Dozoretz Made Washington Their Very Own, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 1999, at C1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the course of the next two months, Beth Dozoretz and Jack Quinn were in frequent contact about the Marc Rich pardon effort.\471\ Jack Quinn estimated that they spoke between five and ten times about the Marc Rich pardon effort. The real question is, of course, how many times Beth Dozoretz spoke to the President about the Marc Rich pardon, and what they spoke about. Because of the Fifth Amendment claims of Dozoretz and Denise Rich, the Committee knows little about these communications. However, the e-mail discussions of the Marc Rich legal team offer some insight into the matter. On January 10, 2001, Avner Azulay e-mailed Jack Quinn with the following message: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \471\ Beth Dozoretz left telephone messages for Jack Quinn on: December 8, 2000; January 2, 2001, with the question, ``[A]ny news on the matter?''; January 8, 2001; an undated message between January 8 and January 18, 2001; January 18, 2001; and January 19, 2001, leaving her contact information for the rest of that day. Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Messages from Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 88). 2. D[enise] R[ich] called from aspen. Her friend B--who is with her--got a call today from potus--who said he was impressed by J[ack] Q[uinn]'s last letter and that he wants to do it and is doing all possible to turn around the WH counsels. D[enise] R[ich] thinks he sounded very positive but ``that we have to keep praying.'' There shall be no decision this wknd and the other candidate Milik [sic] is not getting it.\472\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \472\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89). When questioned about this e-mail, Quinn confirmed that the ``B'' referred to by Azulay was indeed Beth Dozoretz.\473\ However, Quinn could do little to explain the message, including why the President would by trying to convince the staff of the need for the pardon, rather than vice-versa. Robert Fink responded to this message with an e-mail stating, ``I said it before, and I say it again, `nice letter.' Keep on praying, and, oh, a few phone calls won't hurt.'' \474\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \473\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 246-48 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \474\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dozoretz remained deeply involved in the Marc Rich pardon effort through the granting of the pardon. Three e-mail messages to Jack Quinn make it appear that Dozoretz was urgently trying to reach Quinn on January 17, 2001. At 12:13 p.m., Quinn's assistant informed him that ``Beth Dozoretz wants you to call her on her cell if you get a chance.'' \475\ At 1:38 p.m., Quinn's assistant told him that ``Beth is very eager to talk to you. She called again and knows that you are at the WH.'' \476\ A mere 24 minutes later, Quinn's assistant sent Quinn an e-mail regarding ``BETH'' stating ``[v]ery sorry to bother you with this but she is insistent. Please call her--she says that it is URGENT.'' \477\ On January 19, 2001, Dozoretz traveled to Beverly Hills, California, with her husband.\478\ That day, she called Jack Quinn to let him know her contact information, both in her private jet, and at the Peninsula Hotel, where she would be staying.\479\ At 10:48 p.m., Quinn called Dozoretz at the Peninsula Hotel.\480\ Presumably, Quinn informed Dozoretz that he believed Marc Rich was going to receive a pardon. Shortly after that call, Dozoretz called the White House and spoke to President Clinton.\481\ According to one press report, Dozoretz thanked President Clinton, but he was so busy that he did not initially understand why Dozoretz was thanking him.\482\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \475\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03027 (E-mail from April Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 90). \476\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03028 (E-mail from April Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 91). \477\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03029 (E-mail from April Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 92). \478\ WAVES records from the White House indicate that both Dozoretz and Denise Rich visited the White House on January 19, 2001. However, it appears that these records are spurious. White House WAVES records usually show a scheduled time of entry for any scheduled visit to the White House. However, only if a visitor actually shows up at the White House is an actual time of entry entered into the WAVES system. In this case, the WAVES records show actual times of entry for Rich and Dozoretz. The United States Secret Service, has explained, however, that a large group of individuals were scheduled to visit the White House at one time for a party. Rather than hold up the group of individuals who were actually there, the Secret Service waved through the entire group. Therefore, the WAVES system shows erroneously that everyone who was scheduled for that event actually showed up. Hotel records as well as several eyewitnesses confirm the fact that Dozoretz was in transit and in California on January 19. The fact that the United States Secret Service had no idea of who was actually admitted to the White House is obviously troubling. \479\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 88). \480\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Quinn Gillespie telephone bill, Feb. 9, 2001) (Exhibit 93). \481\ Peninsula Hotel Document Production (Dozoretz Invoice from Peninsula Hotel, Jan. 21, 2001) (Exhibit 94). \482\ Corky Siemaszko, Dem Aide Had Early Word of Pardons, N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 26, 2001, at 6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After the pardon was granted, Dozoretz continued her contacts with Jack Quinn. Between January 23, 2001, and February 5, 2001, Dozoretz called Quinn at least nine times, leaving messages of support such as (1) ``NY Times was great today!'' \483\ (2) ``You are getting a reputation as the smartest lawyer in America;'' \484\ (3) ``Hearing lots of good things about you especially hearing that you are brilliant;'' \485\ and (4) ``Just had important conversation she would like to share with you.'' \486\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \483\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 25, 2001)) (Exhibit 95). \484\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 29, 2001)) (Exhibit 96). \485\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 31, 2001)) (Exhibit 97). \486\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Feb. 1, 2001)) (Exhibit 98). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Beth Dozoretz's efforts to help get Marc Rich's pardon cast yet additional doubt on the motives of President Clinton. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz was a close personal friend of President Clinton. Also like Denise Rich, and a number of the President's other close friends, her friendship was closely intertwined with her fundraising relationship for the President and Democratic Party. Dozoretz's involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort has the indelible appearance of impropriety. Whether or not criminal acts were involved is unknown, and can only be discovered with facts not available to the Committee--namely the truthful testimony of Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz. However, the appearance of impropriety is substantial: <bullet> Beth Dozoretz was herself a major fundraiser for the DNC as well as President Clinton's personal causes, including his legal defense fund and library. In addition, she was the primary solicitor for Denise Rich's contributions to the Clinton Library. Therefore, at a minimum, Beth Dozoretz's endorsement of a pardon carried particular weight with the President. <bullet> The one communication between Dozoretz and President Clinton of which the Committee is aware raises serious questions. According to the e-mail describing the call, President Clinton told Dozoretz that he was ``doing all possible to turn around the WH counsels.'' This upside-down construction suggests that the President had made up his mind to grant the pardon, but was hoping to convince the staff so as to improve appearances. <bullet> No acceptable explanation has been made to the Committee of why Beth Dozoretz agreed to become involved in the pardon effort. Obviously, Dozoretz is friendly with both Denise Rich and Jack Quinn. It is possible that she agreed to help Rich and Quinn as part of this friendship.\487\ However, given the substantial effort that Dozoretz made, and the excitement that she showed at the President's decision to grant the pardon, the possibility that Dozoretz had some other motivation should be considered. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \487\ Of course, there are questions regarding why Denise Rich and Jack Quinn were making such great efforts to obtain the pardon. As described above, Rich has never adequately explained her motivations, leading to speculation that her motivation may have been financial, not personal. Jack Quinn's explanations have been even more suspect, as he has maintained that he was not expecting any payment for his work on the Marc Rich pardon effort. As described above, this suggestion is contradicted by common sense, as well as by Marc Rich's primary U.S. lawyer, Robert Fink. Fink confirms that Quinn's motivation was likely financial, as he was going to receive handsome financial compensation for his efforts. Because Quinn and Rich have offered weak reasons for their involvement in the Rich pardon effort, the motivations of individuals with even less at stake, like Beth Dozoretz, must be subjected to even greater scrutiny. <bullet> Rather than cooperate with the Committee's investigators, Dozoretz invoked her Fifth Amendment right --------------------------------------------------------------------------- against self-incrimination. However, absent cooperation from Ms. Dozoretz, the Committee is unable to answer these questions. c. Jack Quinn's Attempt to Keep Information About Dozoretz from the Committee It should be noted that Jack Quinn apparently tried to keep the Committee from learning the true nature of Beth Dozoretz's role in the pardon effort. When Quinn was asked about the January 10, 2001, e-mail at the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, the Committee did not have any information regarding the role of Dozoretz in the pardon effort. When he was asked about the e-mail, Quinn did acknowledge that it referred to Beth Dozoretz, but he was then quite reticent about explaining Dozoretz's role: Mr. Barr. Why would the President be sharing this information with the finance chair of the DNC? What do they have to do with it? Mr. Quinn. I was on the receiving end of this e-mail, and I don't know the answer to that. I was aware of this e-mail. Mr. Barr. Work with me, speculate a little bit, why would the DNC finance chair be involved here? Mr. Quinn. Well, I believe--my impression was that Denise and Beth were--have been friends, and that, in fact, they grew-- Mr. Barr. I suspect so. Mr. Quinn. That they grew up in the same town in Massachusetts up north. * * * Mr. Quinn. But let me be clear, I don't know that he [the President] called her about this. * * * Mr. Barr. Clearly it was about this. Mr. Quinn. I believe that--my impression was that in the course of the conversation they were having she asked him what is happening with these two pardon applications, and apparently was with Denise Rich at the time, which may have motivated her to ask the President in the course of the conversation, but I was not of the impression, I want to be careful to say this accurately, that the call was placed for the purpose of discussing the pardons.\488\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \488\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 248 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Bob Barr and testimony of Jack Quinn). Quinn's initial testimony on this point was misleading. When Representative Barr asked why the President would be calling Beth Dozoretz about the Rich pardon, Quinn answered ``I don't know the answer to that.'' When Representative Barr asked Quinn to speculate about why Dozoretz was involved in this matter, the best Quinn could offer was that Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz were friends, and had grown up in the same town in Massachusetts. Quinn neglected to mention the more salient point that he had personally asked Dozoretz to become involved in the pardon effort. Therefore, he knew specifically why she was discussing the Rich pardon with the President. However, at no time during the Committee's February 8 hearing did Quinn disclose the fact that he had specifically asked Dozoretz to become involved in the pardon effort, because of her close relationship with President Clinton. If the House Government Reform Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee had not held follow-up hearings on this matter, it is likely that Quinn never would have told the truth about Dozoretz's involvement. The fact that Quinn tried to conceal this information only adds to the appearance that Dozoretz's role in the pardon was improper. 3. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Other Israeli Leaders Key players in the lineup of individuals assisting the Marc Rich pardon effort were Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and a number of other current and former Israeli officials who weighed in with the Clinton Administration. President Clinton has made much of the influence of Prime Minister Barak's appeal in his decision making. This claim can be debated. However, it cannot be debated that the Marc Rich team made a substantial effort to get these Israeli officials involved. However, much like some of the key American players, it is difficult to gauge whether these officials were involved because they believed in the Rich pardon, or because they received financial support from Marc Rich. After he fled the United States in 1983, Marc Rich began to make large financial contributions to various charities in Israel, as well as Jewish charities in Europe and the United States. Marc Rich also made political contributions to Israeli political candidates. However, since Israeli law does not require the public disclosure of these contributions, the Committee is not able to determine to whom Rich has contributed. Communications among the Marc Rich legal team make it clear that they were able to call upon a number of prominent Israelis to weigh in on Rich's behalf with President Clinton. Marc Rich's pardon petition included a number of letters of support from prominent Israelis, including: Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Public Security; Itamar Rabinovich, the former Israeli Ambassador to the United States; Yaakov Neeman, the former Minister of Finance and former Minister of Justice; Ehud Olmert, the Mayor of Jerusalem; Isaac Herzog, the Israeli Government Secretary; and Shabtai Shavit, the former Director of the Mossad.\489\ A number of these officials received some sort of financial contributions from Marc Rich. Olmert received a $25,000 political contribution from Rich in 1993.\490\ A community development organization called Yedid, which was linked to Shlomo Ben-Ami, received $100,000 from Rich.\491\ Herzog's wife worked for the Rich Foundation.\492\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \489\ See Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). \490\ Michael Dobbs, Pardon Smoothed Ties to Israel; Barak, Others Aided Rich's Campaign, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 2001, at A1. \491\ Id. \492\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- More important than the letters of support, though, were telephone calls to President Clinton from some of these Israeli leaders. Most importantly, Marc Rich's supporters were able to have Prime Minister Ehud Barak raise the Marc Rich pardon with President Clinton. Prime Minister Barak described the approach to him by Avner Azulay as follows: Few months ago [sic] I was approached by the chairman of the Rich Foundation in Israel. The chairman, Mr. Azoulay is a man I know [sic] for many years, who had contributed a lot to the security of the State of Israel. The Rich Foundation is well known and highly appreciated in Israel for its philanthropic activities in the fields of healthcare, education and culture. Mr. Azoulay asked me to raise Mr. Rich case with President Clinton. I raised the subject with President Clinton several times (probably three) in the course of routine telephone conversations during the last two or three months of his presidency and made a personal recommendation to him to consider the case.\493\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \493\ Letter from Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 13, 2001) (Exhibit 99). Avner Azulay's efforts to enlist Israeli officials in the pardon effort were helped dramatically when, in early January 2001, Marc Rich himself flew to Israel to attend a convention for Birthright Israel, a recipient of Rich's largesse. While Rich was in Israel, he took the opportunity to meet senior Israeli political officials as well as Jewish-American leaders. During this trip to Israel, Rich met personally with Prime Minister Barak, and shortly after that meeting, Barak raised the Rich pardon with President Clinton a second time. Azulay referred to Rich's scheduled meetings in a January 4, 2001, e- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- mail to the Rich legal team: As I have already mentioned--during this wknd [sic] M[arc] R[ich] is scheduled to meet the P[rime] M[inister], F[oreign] M[inister] & SH[imon] P[eres]--as well as a main vector to E[lie] W[iesel]. If possible it would be very useful to ask the W[hite] H[ouse] to hold the final decision (unless it is positive!)--until the above have the opportunity to make/repeat their personal appeals.\494\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \494\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0865 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 4, 2001)) (Exhibit 100). It also appears that the Rich team attempted to have other Israeli officials call the President or his staff. Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres called President Clinton about the Marc Rich matter on December 11, 2000,\495\ the day that the Rich petition was filed, and the same day that Prime Minister Barak spoke to the President. On December 19, 2000, Avner Azulay suggested that he ask Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg to call the President on Marc Rich's behalf.\496\ It is unclear whether Burg actually spoke with President Clinton. Burg apparently did write a letter to President Clinton on January 9, 2001, advocating Rich's pardon.\497\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \495\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0842 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 25, 2000)) (Exhibit 101). \496\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00071 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 102). \497\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00163-64 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 103). While Burg's letter did expressly advocate Rich's pardon, it was criticized by Gershon Kekst and Bob Fink. Kekst asked Quinn and Fink ``is this a helpful letter?'' Id. Fink responded, ``I think Potus will realize that it is intended to be helpful. Frankly, I am a little surprised Avner let it go in this form, as we pulled one like it from the original petition. Maybe he did not see it until after it had gone. I see no reason to rain on anyone's parade.'' Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Azulay also asked Israel Singer, Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress, and Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, to raise the Marc Rich matter with the President: Israel Singer & Edgar Bronfman (CEO & President of the World Jewish Congress) are scheduled to meet potus on Sunday evening in NY (the Israel Policy Forum--not adequate for a private talk) and on Wednesday for a private seance at the WH. In anticipation of Abraham Burg's meeting, I contacted Singer through Rabbi Rizkin. Burg will give his support only if he knows that Singer and Bronfman will . . [sic] I don't know but suspect that this has to do with JPoll. Now Singer wants to be sure that the MRPG petition is on the agenda of potus. I suggest you contact Israel Singer the soonest possible--either to brief him and answer his questions or arrange for a mtg with him before he meets potus.\498\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \498\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0866 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 104). In his desperation to find prominent Israeli supporters for the Marc Rich petition, Jack Quinn even suggested that the deceased widow of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Leah, call President Clinton. Robert Fink made this request to Avner Azulay in an e-mail: ``Oh one more thing. Jack asks if you could get Leah Rabin to call the President; Jack said he was a real big supporter of her husband.'' \499\ Azulay responded the following day: ``Bob, having Leah Rabin call is not a bad idea. The problem is how do we contact her? She died last November--on the 5th anniversary of her husband's murder.'' \500\ In the end, the Rich team settled for the Rabins' daughter, who met with Avner Azulay on January 10, 2001, and informed him that she would call President Clinton on Rich's behalf.\501\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \499\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00091 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Dec. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). \500\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00094 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 105). \501\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- One of the tactics used by Azulay to enlist Israeli leaders was to link the Rich pardon to the Jonathan Pollard matter. The Pollard pardon had long been a priority for a number of Israeli officials, and Azulay attempted to use the Pollard matter to Rich's advantage: I can also cfm [sic] the info on J[onathan] P[ollard]. It seems that the topic was discussed in telecons with potus--within the framework of the peace agreement. JP's freedom is considered as a public-political ``sweet pill'' which shall help swallow (or divert public attention from) the more sour pills in the agreement with arafat [sic]. I am sure potus is aware that JP is going to be big trouble with the entire intelligence community and MR could go along with it ``less unnoticed''. On the other hand if he says no to JP--one more reason to say yes to MR.\502\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \502\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0865 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 4, 2001)) (Exhibit 100). Jack Quinn made the same linkage between Rich and Pollard in his appeals to the White House: ``Lastly, I told her [Beth Nolan] that, if they pardon JP, then pardoning MR is easy, but that, if they do not pardon JP, then they should pardon MR. In the last connection, she affirmed that they have heard from people in or connected to the GOI [Government of Israel].'' \503\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \503\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00111 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 106). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is difficult to gauge whether the efforts of the Marc Rich team to link their fate to that of Jonathan Pollard helped their cause. Jonathan Pollard certainly feels that the Rich pardon was granted at his expense. Pollard made the following statement after the Rich pardon: I've become disillusioned. This is the hardest thing for me. . . . But what has shaken me to my very bones is to finally realize, after 16 years, that I made a mistake. For 16 years I have been desperately waving the Israeli flag, crying out for help to the Israeli political establishment. But since the Marc Rich campaign, I realize that I made a mistake. All those years I should have waved something else to get their attention. I should have waved a dollar bill in front of them and convinced them that I had a lot of money. That is the depths to which we have sunk as a nation, that an agent has to bribe his own government to rescue him. That is how low we have sunk. Esther and I are pinching pennies in order to stay alive. Israel has never assisted us. But this Marc Rich fellow, with all of his millions, he's the one that everyone in Israel is breaking their backs for. * * * Barak, the politicians, and all those who were involved, were corrupted and debased by Marc Rich's money. Every one of them was corrupted at some level or another. The corruption and the repulsiveness that characterized the Rich pardon campaign is appalling.\504\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \504\ Eran Tiffenbraun and Mody Kreitman, Expose: Using Pollard to Get Rich, Yediot Achronot, Feb. 25, 2001 (Exhibit 107). While Pollard clearly did not deserve a pardon of his own, his comments about the Rich pardon may be accurate. 4. Elie Wiesel The Rich team also attempted to recruit prominent Holocaust survivor and author Elie Wiesel to their cause. As a prominent spokesman for Jewish causes and a close friend to President Clinton, Wiesel was a logical candidate for the Rich team to turn to. It appears that Gershon Kekst initially identified Wiesel as a potential supporter of the Rich pardon. After a meeting with Kekst, Avner Azulay informed Behan, Fink, and Marc Rich that Kekst ``proposed Elie Wiesel as the ``moral authority'' to present the plea. We discussed some ideas how to reach him--and that I shall do in the next few days.'' \505\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \505\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0542 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 108). When asked about this document, Kekst said, ``I would not have proposed Elie Wiesel as a moral authority to anyone on any subject.'' Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). Kekst said that he was asked, but refused, to request Wiesel's help. As discussed below, Kekst has repeatedly denied that he made suggestions and recommendations even when they are corroborated by contemporaneous e-mails. Kekst's denials are not credible, and appear to be part of an effort to understate his role in the Marc Rich pardon effort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It appears that Azulay followed Kekst's recommendation, and attempted to enlist Wiesel. In an e-mail of November 29, 2000, Azulay suggested that the Rich team might be obtaining a letter of support from Wiesel: ``We shall have a few days to get additional letters in New York (Elie Wiesel, Abe Foxman and others). I assume by now you are getting letters from Switzerland and Spain.'' \506\ When he was interviewed over the telephone by Committee staff, Wiesel confirmed that he was asked by Avner Azulay to write a letter on behalf of Rich. At a November or December 2000 meeting at Wiesel's home in New York City, Azulay showed Wiesel other letters written on behalf of Marc Rich.\507\ According to Wiesel, although he told Azulay that he was impressed by the list of names, he said he could not write such a letter for someone he did not know.\508\ Wiesel told Committee staff that he also told Azulay that he did not believe Rich could legally receive a pardon without standing trial.\509\ According to Wiesel, even though Azulay assured him that Rich could receive a pardon, Wiesel told Azulay that he could not write the letter because he had already written a letter requesting a commutation of Jonathan Pollard's sentence. Wiesel felt that he could not make another request.\510\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \506\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00066 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink and Marc Rich (Nov. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 109). \507\ Telephone Interview with Elie Wiesel (Apr. 2, 2001). Yossi Ciecanover, a banker and former high official in Israel, and Danny Karavan, who lived in both Paris and Israel, arranged this meeting. Wiesel indicated that he was under the impression that Gershon Kekst asked Yossi Ciecanover to contact Wiesel on behalf of Azulay. \508\ Id. \509\ Id. \510\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to Wiesel, Avner Azulay called him several days later to see if he had changed his mind.\511\ Wiesel told him that he had not.\512\ While this seemingly would have been the end of Wiesel's involvement in the Rich pardon campaign, there is evidence that it was not. Several e-mails indicate that Wiesel may have lobbied the White House. On December 21, 2000, Jack Quinn wrote to Robert Fink and Azulay, responding to Azulay's question about ``having another VIP place an additional call'' to President Clinton.\513\ As Quinn wrote, ``I think another call is fine, but it needs to come from someone who can get POTUS personally on the line. Did Elie Wiesel call?'' \514\ Azulay responded to Quinn's inquiry by e- mailing, ``I don't know positively if he talked directly to potus and if he did what was his reaction. All he told me was that `he was at the WH the day potus traveled but he couldn't give me any reaction.' '' \515\ Azulay then spoke with Wiesel again, and on December 25, 2000, Azulay responded to Quinn in an e-mail with the subject line ``elie wiesel,'' stating: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \511\ Id. \512\ Id. \513\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0831 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 21, 2000)) (Exhibit 110). \514\ Id. \515\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0836 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 22, 2000)) (Exhibit 111). I talked to him today. He says that he brought up the topic at the WH on Monday Dec 12th, he refused to disclose who he met. He was told of the difficulties lying ahead in dealing with it (he would explain it only in a face to face meeting) and hopes that they can be surmounted[.] \516\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \516\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0845 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 25, 2000)) (Exhibit 112). On December 27, 2000, Azulay told Quinn, Kekst, Behan, Fink, and Marc Rich that he was looking for some way to have Wiesel express his opinion on the Rich pardon in a clear way to the President: ``Elie Wiesel--I am still checking if there is a way to get from him a straight forward support statement-- direct call to potus.'' \517\ Azulay followed up with another e-mail on December 31, 2000, stating that: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \517\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0851 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 113). I was informed today that EW visited the WH last Dec 12th. He didn't meet or speak directly with potus. EW had a scheduled mtg [sic] with the ``person responsible for the pardons.'' His original goal was to discuss Pollard--and at the same time raised a question about the MRPG case. He was told that the MRPG case can't be defined as humanitarian because there was no trial, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- conviction or punishment to deal with[.] I understand--although he didn't disclose it that he talked with a lawyer, the WH counsel. Perhaps BL. This is not new to you. What the lawyers think or thought at the time. However, I think it worthwhile mentioning that EW's mtg [sic] was held in the morniing [sic] hours of Monday, Dec 12th--before xx [sic] before the formal petition was delivered in the afternoon hours. I hope that the lawyers have a different view of the case by now? It is clear that EW is reluctant to make a direct appeal to potus--with the uncertainty that he is doing something that doesn't stand a chance. Therefore, it seems plausible that if someone he respects will convince him that he is doing the right thing it might still be possible.\518\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \518\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0854 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 114). Despite the assurances that Wiesel had raised the Rich pardon with White House staff, Azulay apparently continued his efforts to have Wiesel raise it directly with the President. On January 2, 2001, he e-mailed Fink, Quinn, and Behan to tell them that Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg was going to try to recruit Wiesel to help with the Rich case.\519\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \519\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00104 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 115). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Other than the information that Azulay was able to get from Wiesel, Gershon Kekst also told the rest of the Rich team that Wiesel had weighed in with the White House on the Rich pardon. In a January 9, 2001, e-mail, Kekst wrote that ``[b]y the way, please tell marc [sic] that I am `assured' the call has been made by elie [sic].'' \520\ Robert Fink responded that he would ``tell Marc about Elie.'' \521\ When he was interviewed by Committee staff, Kekst explained that he discussed Wiesel's involvement in the Rich pardon effort with Yossi Ciecanover, a former senior Israeli government official.\522\ Ciecanover told Kekst that he had been asked by Azulay to ask Wiesel to express support for the Rich pardon.\523\ Ciecanover said that Wiesel either ``would call'' or ``did call'' the President.\524\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \520\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116). \521\ Id. \522\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \523\ Id. \524\ Id. Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel also suggested that he heard that Wiesel raised the Rich matter with President Clinton. However, after making this initial assertion, Angel backtracked, and said that he was not certain if he recalled hearing this before the pardons were granted, or from media accounts after the fact. Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Elie Wiesel has denied any involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort, calling such allegations ``pure fantasy.'' \525\ Wiesel acknowledged that he did visit the White House in December 2000 and January 2001.\526\ However, Wiesel denied that he raised any Marc Rich pardon issues with anyone at the White House on either of those visits.\527\ He also denied that he ever raised any pardon issues with anyone at the White House in any other form, other than writing a letter on Jonathan Pollard's behalf to the President.\528\ Given the lack of any first-hand evidence that Wiesel did actually lobby the President on behalf of Marc Rich, the e-mails of Kekst and Azulay most likely overstated involvement of Wiesel in the Rich pardon effort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \525\ Telephone Interview with Elie Wiesel (Apr. 2, 2001). \526\ Id. \527\ Id. \528\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. King Juan Carlos King Juan Carlos apparently made two contacts with the White House over the Rich pardon. The first contact was a direct one, when the King called President Clinton personally regarding the Rich pardon. On January 13, 2001, Avner Azulay sent an e-mail to the Rich legal team indicating that ``we have a CFM [confirmation] that the king of spain [sic] talked to potus. He reports a positive conversation. No concrete sayings [sic].'' \529\ It is unclear why the King took this action on Rich's behalf. It is possible that the King was motivated by Rich's support of Madrid's Jewish community, but he has not offered any explanation for his actions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \529\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0881 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 117). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Also in this same time frame, John Podesta heard of King Juan Carlos' interest in the Rich pardon. Podesta received a telephone call from former Congressman John Brademas, President Emeritus of New York University, who is a friend of King Juan Carlos.\530\ The King had informed Brademas that he had recently met with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, who had raised the Marc Rich pardon with the King. The King in turn called Brademas to see if Brademas could make the King's interest in the pardon known to the White House. Podesta told Brademas that ``while it was the President's decision, the White House Counsel's Office and I were firmly opposed and I did not believe that the pardon would be granted.'' \531\ While Podesta apparently braced the King for the worst, the King's interest in the Rich matter was made known to the President, as well as Marc Rich's supporters, who have often mentioned his support for the pardon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \530\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 320 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). \531\ Id. at 317. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Avner Azulay Avner Azulay is a former high-ranking Mossad agent. He founded his own security consulting company after leaving the Mossad in the early 1990s.\532\ Marc Rich retained his services and placed him as the head of the Marc Rich Foundation and the Doron Foundation, based in Jerusalem.\533\ These Foundations handle all of Rich's philanthropic interests (they were recently merged and are now referred to only as the Marc Rich Foundation). These foundations also paid significant amounts of money to many organizations and persons who wrote letters on behalf of Marc Rich that were included in the pardon petition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \532\ Bo'az Ga'on, Rich as Korach, Ma'ariv Weekend Magazine, Oct. 1, 1999 (Exhibit 6). \533\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Azulay was a central figure in the pardon effort. His name appears on a large number of the e-mails produced to the Committee that were sent among the Rich pardon team. Azulay played a key role in securing many of the letters included in the petition. He traveled throughout Israel, Europe, and the United States soliciting the letters for the pardon. Azulay also solicited many Jewish leaders for their support of Rich. In this effort, Azulay contacted Abraham Foxman, Elie Wiesel, and Rabbi Irving Greenberg, among others. As would be revealed after the pardon was granted, however, not everyone who was approached by Azulay was told that their letter would be used in the pardon effort. The Committee first sought Avner Azulay's cooperation in its investigation in a March 8, 2001, letter asking him to participate in an interview with Committee staff.\534\ Azulay refused to meet with staff, citing health reasons.\535\ Committee staff followed up with a number of telephone calls to Azulay's counsel to try to secure an interview, but he made it clear that Azulay would not participate in an interview, due to health concerns and concerns regarding the ongoing criminal investigation by the Southern District of New York. As a close advisor to Marc Rich and a key participant in the pardon effort, Azulay has a great deal of valuable information that he has decided to withhold from the Committee. His lack of cooperation appears to be part of a concerted effort by Marc Rich and his closest advisers to keep critical information about the pardon effort from the American people. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \534\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Mar. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 118). \535\ Letter from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001) (Exhibit 119). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. Michael Steinhardt Michael Steinhardt is a prominent hedge fund investor who has also been involved in Democratic politics, having served as the Chair of the Democratic Leadership Council and the Progressive Policy Institute. He first met President Clinton while serving in the former position. Steinhardt mentioned this fact in his December 7, 2000, letter to President Clinton that was included in the pardon application.\536\ Steinhardt also wrote a follow-up letter to President Clinton on Marc Rich's behalf on January 16, 2001.\537\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \536\ Letter from Michael Steinhardt to President William J, Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000) (Exhibit 120). As Steinhardt mentioned in the letter to President Clinton, ``I think you may remember me as one of your earliest national supporters.'' Steinhardt went on in the letter to explain his decision to step away from the DLC in 1995 ``when ideas and human judgments seemingly led in different directions[.]'' \537\ Letter from Michael Steinhardt to President William J. Clinton (Jan. 16, 2001) (Exhibit 121). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steinhardt has been an acquaintance of Marc Rich since the 1970s, and a close friend since 1996. Both Marc Rich and Denise Rich's father, Emil Eisenberg, had invested in Steinhardt's fund.\538\ In 1997, Steinhardt made his first recommendation to Rich, which was to hire public relations specialist Gershon Kekst to help him with his case.\539\ Over the course of the last few years, Steinhardt had numerous meetings and discussions with Rich, Azulay, Kekst, Jack Quinn, and Robert Fink concerning the legal negotiations and the pardon effort. Throughout that time, Steinhardt advised Rich on his efforts to settle his criminal case. In the fall of 2000, when the efforts to settle the case reached a dead-end, Steinhardt claims that he conceived of the pardon option and recommended that Rich seek a presidential pardon.\540\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \538\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001). \539\ Id. \540\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steinhardt was also involved in the effort to solicit Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, to assist in the Rich lobbying effort. Around the same time that he faxed his follow-up letter to President Clinton, Steinhardt attempted to contact Bronfman in Washington, D.C. In a January 16, 2001, e-mail to Jack Quinn and copied to Robert Fink and Marc Rich, Avner Azulay wrote, ``Michael faxed the letter to potus as requested. Edgar B. is in DC. Michael is trying to contact him to enlist his support.'' \541\ When asked about this e-mail by Committee staff, Steinhardt confirmed that he had tried to contact Bronfman to enlist his support in the pardon effort.\542\ However, Steinhardt explained that he did not contact Bronfman in time for him to help.\543\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \541\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00171 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 122). \542\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001). \543\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. Gershon Kekst Gershon Kekst is a prominent public relations specialist who heads his own firm, Kekst and Company, which focuses on corporate communications. Kekst was hired by Marc Rich to assist with strategy and public relations relating to his criminal case.\544\ Michael Steinhardt told Committee staff that he first recommended Kekst to Marc Rich sometime in 1997.\545\ Kekst recalled this meeting, explaining to Committee staff that he met Steinhardt and two of Marc Rich's lawyers, including Robert Fink, at Steinhardt's office.\546\ According to Kekst, he told the lawyers that he would probably not get involved because he did not believe a public relations campaign would be helpful for Rich.\547\ Rich's lawyers implored Kekst to study the Rich case and to meet personally with Rich to discuss working for him.\548\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \544\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \545\ Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001). \546\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \547\ Id. \548\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A few months later, Kekst met with Marc Rich in Switzerland.\549\ According to Kekst, Rich told him that unless Kekst could guarantee that getting publicity would help resolve Rich's problems, Rich did not want to go through with it.\550\ Kekst said he left the meeting with the understanding that he would do no work on the Rich case.\551\ When back in the United States, he again met with Fink and Steinhardt.\552\ According to Kekst, he told them that they should either let Marc Rich live in peace or get a lawyer in Washington who worked with DOJ to work on the case.\553\ As is discussed in a previous section, it was Kekst who recommended Jack Quinn to the Rich team in late 1998.\554\ Nevertheless, Kekst claims that he never worked on the Rich case and ``turned down'' work on the case.\555\ In 1997 and 1998, Rich paid Kekst $75,000 for the time he spent reviewing the case and traveling to Switzerland. However, Kekst did not receive any payments from Rich after 1998 despite the fact that he devoted considerable time to the Rich case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \549\ Id. \550\ Id. \551\ Id. \552\ Id. \553\ Id. \554\ Id. \555\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite his claim that he repeatedly rebuffed the Rich team's attempts to recruit him throughout the late 1990s, there is evidence that Kekst was working with the team at least as early as 1999. In responding to an October 13, 1999, e-mail from Robert Fink concerning press articles written about Rich, Kekst wrote, ``I did not like it because we had agreed that no publcity [sic] best serves us for the time being. If someone wanted to change that position, I would have liked to have known so I could argue a bit.'' \556\ It is telling that at this point in 1999, Kekst was referring to ``us'' when responding to Marc Rich's lawyer. It is also telling that in a fax sent the previous day from Azulay to Fink, Azulay suggests conferring with Kekst to get his opinion on the articles.\557\ This evidence strongly indicates that Kekst was already part of the Rich team in 1999. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \556\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00642-43 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst & Co., to Robert Fink (Oct. 13, 1999)) (Exhibit 123). \557\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00839 (Fax from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Oct. 12, 1999)) (Exhibit 124). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to several e-mails produced to the Committee, Kekst continued to be included in the strategy and planning of the Rich team in 2000. In late January of 2000, Fink e-mailed Marc Rich to inform him that Fink and Quinn would be meeting with Kekst to discuss their negotiations with the Southern District of New York.\558\ Furthermore, in a February 10, 2000, e-mail, Avner Azulay described Kekst's active role in strategy sessions involving the Southern District. Discussing the rejection letter sent by Mary Jo White's deputy Shirah Neiman, Azulay wrote, ``I note that Shirah's ltr is dated feb [sic] 2. This means that she had already issued the ltr when you JQ GK [sic] were discussing what to do and how to approach her.'' \559\ After the rejection letter from the SDNY, Kekst continued to consult on the next steps the Rich team should take. As Robert Fink explained to Marc Rich on February 17, 2000, ``I have only recently spoken to Jack, Gershon and Kitty on this issue and all agree that we should try to approach the DoJ tax lawyers even without the SDNY if necessary.'' \560\ On February 29, 2000, Fink sent Marc Rich an e-mail noting that: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \558\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A1011-12 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich et. al. (Jan. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 125). \559\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00698 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 126). \560\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00701 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 52). Gershon has not billed for months. He has spoken to me many time[s] and Avner at least one and meet [sic] with me and Jack at least three times (Jack speaks to him more) in the last two months and I know he speaks to Michael from time to time. He even did a draft outline of what he thought our response should be to the Southern District, which he, frankly, thought required a response. No doubt he has some billable work for which we have not been billed. He knows that you do not want him to work for free, but has not billed or has just delayed it.\561\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \561\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39). As these e-mails demonstrate, Kekst was obviously much more involved in the pre-pardon efforts than he was willing to reveal to the Committee. Kekst's claim not to be involved in the Rich pardon campaign is also strongly contradicted by the documentary evidence received by the Committee. As early as March of 2000, Kekst was mentioned by the Rich team in their strategic planning. A March 18, 2000, e-mail from Avner Azulay to Robert Fink discussing Denise Rich's ``personal mission'' states, ``IF it works we didin't [sic] lose the present opportunity--until nov--which shall not repat [sic] itself. If it doesn't--then probably Gershon's course of acion [sic] shall be the one left option to start all over again.'' \562\ When asked about this e-mail, Kekst told Committee staff that he has no understanding of what this e-mail means.\563\ He said his entire awareness of Denise Rich comes from watching C-SPAN.\564\ Kekst further stated that he did not think he knew Denise Rich was involved.\565\ He said he has never met Denise Rich and does not recall speaking to Azulay around March 2000, the time of this e-mail.\566\ Kekst's lack of memory on this message is brought into question by the testimony of Jack Quinn and Robert Fink. When asked about the March 18, 2000, e-mail, Quinn testified, ``It's also entirely possible that Mr. Azulay, others, myself included, were involved in a conversation where someone said you know we are going to try to pardon one of these days.'' \567\ Perhaps most significantly, when Fink was asked about this e-mail, he testified that he believed that ``Gershon's course of action'' referred to the idea of a pardon application.\568\ This raises the distinct possibility that not only was Kekst heavily involved in the pardon effort, but more importantly that the idea to seek a pardon was his own. This may explain why Kekst was not forthcoming when he was interviewed by Committee staff. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \562\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00729 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 60). \563\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \564\ Id. \565\ Id. \566\ Id. \567\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 396 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \568\ Id. at 516 (testimony of Robert Fink). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Kekst again became heavily involved with the Rich team when the pardon effort began in earnest. In November of 2000, Robert Fink asked Kekst to meet with Avner Azulay.\569\ This meeting took place on November 15, 2000.\570\ According to Kekst, he told Fink that he had no interest in mounting a public relations campaign and that it would only hurt Rich.\571\ Nevertheless, Kekst met with Azulay. Azulay told Kekst about the plans for a pardon petition and the need to get letters of support.\572\ Azulay asked for Kekst's help but, according to Kekst, he told Azulay ``no.'' \573\ Kekst told Committee staff that he knew before his conversation with Azulay that Rich was seeking a pardon.\574\ From time to time Kekst received e-mail asking if he had changed his mind. According to Kekst, he either clicked the delete button or would send a short negative answer.\575\ Kekst asked the Rich team to let him know if Jack Quinn changed his mind about a public relations campaign.\576\ Kekst thought that if Quinn thought a public relations campaign was warranted, then he would reconsider.\577\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \569\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \570\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0541 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 127). \571\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \572\ Id. \573\ Id. \574\ Id. \575\ Id. \576\ Id. \577\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Kekst's claim that he refused to help Azulay is undermined by a November 15, 2000, e-mail from Avner Azulay to Kathleen Behan, Robert Fink, and Marc Rich, the subject line of which reads, ``meeting with gershon kekst[.]'' The e-mail begins with the statement ``GK supports the idea of presenting the request for a P[ardon].'' The e-mail also goes on to state the following: Although chances are not high, no damage could result thereof if plea is rejected. It could also generate a positive effect on the DOJ even if case is not resolved. -Media & public criticism can be countered by the fact that for years DOJ and SD stonewalled and were never open to find a solution that the interested parties offered. The most recent rejection of JQ's proposal for a review can be used as an example. -GK proposed Elie Wiesel as the ``moral authority'' to present the plea. We discussed some ideas how to reach him--and that I shall do in the next few days. -I gave GK a copy of my updated long list of potential supporters (Bob--pse [sic] fax a copy to KittY [sic]), and reported on my contacts with DR's friend. I expect to recieve [sic] a priority list from these to work on. -GK pointed out that Prof. Itamar Rabiinovitch [sic] is an important supporter because he is highly respected in the US and could help with additional names in the US--which are lacking in my list. -The time-table [sic] for implementing this project with a dead line should be decided upon with JQ. -I also raised the idea that ``a task force'' under his guidance and strategy should be established to make sure we make good use of the time and means available. I understood from GK that he shall undertake this project. -GK is meeting Bob on Thursday, shall contact JQ and decide on how to proceed.\578\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \578\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0552-53 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 128). This e-mail was followed up by Azulay in an e-mail which reads, ``-GK thinks it is better to present the plea in 2 consecutive steps (MR first and PG later). It might be easier to obtain positive results, if any, for one single. If it succeeds then the second shall be easier to obtain.'' \579\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \579\ Id. at A0552. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These e-mails indicate that Kekst was heavily involved in the pardon process. From holding meetings with the Rich team, to going over lists of potential supporters, to recommending Elie Wiesel to lobby the President, Kekst had a hand in many aspects of the campaign. When asked about this first e-mail, however, Kekst told Committee staff that the e-mail does not accurately reflect what he said at the meeting.\580\ Kekst stated that he does not believe he advocated seeking a pardon or taking any particular option.\581\ He said he did not know how criticism could be countered, and that is why he did not agree to assist in the first place.\582\ He also stated, ``To think you could counter the record, which was pretty awful, is outrageous to me. I would not have proposed Elie Wiesel as a moral authority to anyone on any subject.'' \583\ However, e- mails sent by Robert Fink strongly contradict Kekst's claim concerning Wiesel. On November 17, 2000, Fink wrote to Azulay and Behan that ``Gershon made it clear that he thinks his proposed moral authority, EW, is the most important person by far.'' \584\ On January 5, 2001, Fink sent Quinn an e-mail stating that ``Gershon continues to believe, indeed, he is very consistent, that Elie Weisel [sic] is the key. I will email Avner and ask where he is on that.'' \585\ The Committee is troubled by Kekst's apparent dishonesty regarding his suggested use of Elie Wiesel in the pardon process. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \580\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \581\ Id. \582\ Id. \583\ Id. \584\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0564 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Nov. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 129). \585\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00403 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 130). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee staff also asked Kekst about numerous other e- mails also detailing his involvement in the Rich case. In one of the e-mails, Kekst personally responds to the Rich team about a meeting agenda from November 21, 2000, concerning the pardon petition and lobbying campaign. One of the bullets from the meeting agenda mentions ``Maximizing use of Gershon.'' \586\ In response to the meeting agenda, Kekst wrote the following, in all capital letters, to Robert Fink: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \586\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0567-0569 (Agenda of Nov. 21, 2000, Meeting) (Exhibit 76). ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT THE CASE MUST BE MADE (FOLLOWING THE GUIDELINES MEMO) IN THE CORE DOCUMENT. AS THERE IS NO MARGIN FOR ERROR OR OMISSION, I MUST LEAVE THE DRAFTING TO THE EXPERTS (YOU, KITTY AND JACK). I WOULD WANT A SHOT AT IT, THOUGH, BECAUSE ONCE THAT DOCUMENT HAS PASSED THAT TEST, IT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT FROM A PUBLIC AND PERSUASION TEST, AS WELL. SECOND, THE SUPPORT-SPONSORSHIP OF AN ELIE WIESEL IS CRUCIAL: AVNER SAID HE WOULD WORK ON THAT. A [sic] AND THE LIST OF SUPPORTERS MUST NOT BE ALL RECIPIENTS OF PHILANTHROPY, JEWS AND ISRAELIS: IT MUST INCLUDE POLITICAL AND BUSINESS LEADERS FROM AROUND THE WORKLD [sic], INCLUDING THE U.S.A. I BELIEVE AVNER SAID HE WOULD START ON THAT. (AS TO HOW TO USE GERSHON BEST . . . . . GEE, LET ME KNOIW [sic] WHEN YOU DECIDE !) BY THE WAY, I WILL ONLY HAVE ABOUT AN HOUR (PERHAPS A FEW MINUTES LESS) BECAUSE I AM TO CATCH A PLANE THAT AFTERNOON.\587\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \587\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0570 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Nov. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 131). When asked about the meeting and this e-mail, Kekst told Committee staff that he was unaware of any meeting being planned.\588\ Committee staff then asked him about the specifics of his response. Kekst stated that he wrote this e- mail as an ``angry e-mail,'' suggesting that he did not want to be involved.\589\ Asked why he said he wanted ``a shot at [the pardon petition] though because once the document has passed that test, it should be looked at from a public and persuasion test as well,'' Kekst said ``I don't know.'' \590\ Later, Kekst claimed that he was concerned because Azulay went so far in enlisting Jewish organizations that it would have a negative ``boomerang'' effect on the Jewish people.\591\ So, Kekst said he may have offered to review the petition as ``one last shot to keep them from doing that.'' \592\ Kekst stated that his offer to review the pardon petition was limited solely to this aspect.\593\ Kekst claimed that when he stated, ``it should be looked at from a public and persuasion test as well,'' he was referring to trying to limit any anti-Semitic backlash.\594\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \588\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \589\ Id. \590\ Id. \591\ Id. \592\ Id. \593\ Id. \594\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The explanation by Kekst that he was only reluctantly involved, and only offered advice because of fear of an anti- Semitic backlash is belied by the fact that the Rich team included him in numerous conference calls, and continued to include him in their e-mail loop. Moreover, Kekst continued to respond to some of the messages. For example, before the pardon application was submitted, Robert Fink forwarded Kekst a copy of Avner Azulay's work on the letters concerning Rich's philanthropic activity that would be included in the application.\595\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \595\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0001 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Nov. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 132). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On December 26, 2000, Kekst responded to a Robert Fink e- mail, which discussed contacting Hillary Rodham Clinton for her support and having Denise Rich call the White House, by registering his agreement with Fink's recommendation.\596\ The following day, Kekst responded to an e-mail from Robert Fink, reminding him of his position on submitting two separate pardon applications for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Kekst responded, ``As you will recall, I always thought it best to de-link the two. But . . . .'' \597\ Finally, on December 27, 2000, Kekst responded to an e-mail from Fink concerning Senator Charles Schumer, stating, ``Can quinn tell us who is close enough to lean on schumer?? I am certainly willing to call him, but have no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us quickly who the top contributors are . . . . . . maybe Bernard Schwartz??'' \598\ As this series of e-mails makes clear, Kekst was far from a passive bystander who was simply worried about anti-Semitism. He was actively making suggestions about tactics--including the use of prominent political contributors to enlist the help of elected officials in the pardon effort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \596\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00076 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 133). \597\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00081 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 134). \598\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00083 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 135). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the last few weeks of the Clinton Presidency, Kekst continued to advise the Rich team. When asked on January 9, 2001, by Robert Fink about a potential press story on Rudy Giuliani's treatment of Marc Rich, Kekst responded: Unless jack quinn changes his views about the risk- reward ratio for publicity, I vote against it. The herald tribune, in any event, is not the place for us to be. The publicity I was referring to relates to the repair of marc's name assuming we fail, not to help make it happen (unless jack says it would). By the way, please tell marc that I am ``assured'' the call has been made by elie.\599\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \599\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116). Two days later, Fink wrote to Marc Rich, stating, ``Meanwhile I spoke to Gershon yesterday, and he said he would call first thing this morning to specifically ask that EW call Potus and no one else.'' \600\ That same day, January 11, 2001, Kekst received a copy of a letter from the Speaker of the Israeli Knesset concerning Marc Rich. Kekst questioned its effectiveness in asking Quinn and Fink, ``[I]s this a helpful letter?'' \601\ On January 16, 2001, Robert Fink e-mailed Marc Rich about Kekst's views on the pardon effort: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \600\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00165 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 136). \601\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00163-64 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 103). Gershon just called and said he is convinced this is still possible and that this is a critical week, and suggests you call Jack directly and encourage him to keep plugging away, and thanking him for what he has done. Gershon is also convinced that the no publicity route was correct.\602\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \602\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMRW 00168 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 137). Even after the pardon was granted, Kekst continued to receive and respond to e-mails from the Rich team. In a January 23, 2001, e-mail that Kekst sent to Quinn and Fink, he stated ``I spoke with marc. He asked the question and I told him that he should not speak with any reporters anywhere, , , , , , , [sic] if after his first trip to America and that `trauma' passes, he may be able to make `courtesy calls' in Europe.'' \603\ By dealing directly with Marc Rich concerning press inquiries, Kekst was clearly actively involved in the pardon process until the end. When asked about this e-mail, Kekst said that he spoke with Marc Rich twice after the pardon.\604\ The first, he claimed, was to say congratulations.\605\ The second was to say that he should do nothing at all about the public relations strategy.\606\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \603\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Jack Quinn and Robert Fink (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 138). \604\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \605\ Id. \606\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A series of e-mails from January 22 and January 24, 2001, suggests, however, that Kekst was actively consulting with the Rich team on post-pardon public relations strategy. On January 22, Kekst made suggestions for a post-pardon letter from Marc Rich to President Clinton. He wrote, ``I think he needs to make reference to the fact that the president's opinion and action were based on his having been willing to take the time and give consideration to the best professional analysius [sic] of the matter which made clear the need to `do justice' at this point.'' \607\ That same day, Avner Azulay wrote to Quinn, Fink, Behan, Green, Kekst, and Rich, stating, ``I thought we agreed that all inquiries, interviews should be channeled to gershon. Why is BF giving interviews? He shouldn't be dealing with this aspect.'' \608\ Furthermore, in a discussion about an op-ed piece being solicited by the Rich team, a statement to Robert Fink reads, ``It is Gershon's view that the New York Times is the first choice for placement. He suggests that Jack resubmit this version for the Time's consideration.'' \609\ In another e-mail of January 24, 2001, Fink asked a question about a New York Times reporter. In response, Kekst wrote, ``I believe the paper is being dealt with . . . . and has been[.]'' \610\ Asked about this e-mail by Committee staff, Kekst said he was ignoring Azulay and did not want to talk to him.\611\ Kekst said he believed Azulay had the ``insane idea'' that the Times reporter could help turn the public relations campaign around.\612\ Nevertheless, Kekst continued to advise the Rich team and deal with members of the press. On January 25, 2001, when it was clear that the press was turning negative on the Rich pardon, Kekst issued a warning to Azulay, Fink and Quinn. He stated: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \607\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 139). \608\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69). \609\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Roanne Kulakoff to Robert Fink (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 140). \610\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 141). \611\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \612\ Id. The reporter at the ny times is Allison cowan working with Johnny apple. A senior, well-experienced team. They have met with jack and I believe you should run this past him. Unless there is strong evidence, they are not likely to fabricate a story. Is there any trace of evidence?? lenzner told me that forbes believes milkin [sic] should have been pardoned and he wanted to do a piece contrasting the two and showing that if mike did'nt [sic] deserve one certainly m.,r. [sic] didn't either. Talk with fink about him. PLEASE be careful about letting so many people talk with reporters. . . . . .all that is being accomplished is that, however ``well-intentioned'' they stir the story and keep it cooking!! We are a stage [sic] now at which the story is being kept alive be [sic] wannabe heroes.\613\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \613\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 25, 2001)) (Exhibit 142). Kekst's claim not to be actively involved in the pardon effort is simply not believable. It is troubling that, despite all of the evidence to the contrary, Kekst told the Committee that he ``did not work on the Marc Rich case.'' \614\ It would make no sense for Azulay or others on the Rich team to waste time e-mailing each other about suggestions that were not made or offers to help that were fabricated. If Kekst were not involved, the Rich team would have been engaged in a fruitless effort to include him in their deliberations. Kekst made far too many suggestions to the Rich team throughout the pardon campaign for him to credibly assert that he was not involved. Kekst even admitted to Committee staff that he billed Marc Rich between $80,000 and $90,000--a large fee for someone who was not involved in the process.\615\ It stands to reason that a person such as Kekst who needs to preserve his public image for his own livelihood as a public relations consultant would try to distance himself from the Marc Rich affair. Unfortunately, Kekst did so at the expense of providing the Committee with candid information. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \614\ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). \615\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. Robert Fink Robert Fink has worked as an attorney for Marc Rich for two decades, beginning in 1980.\616\ At that time, Fink was with the law firm of Milgrim Thomajan and Lee. Fink's former law firm was responsible for what the Southern District of New York referred to as the ``steamer trunk affair,'' in which subpoenaed documents from Marc Rich's company were taken out of the country on a plane to Switzerland.\617\ Fink continued to represent Rich when he moved to his new law firm, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe. Fink was involved throughout the 1980s and 1990s with the failed efforts to reach an acceptable arrangement with the SDNY. It was Fink to whom the SDNY communicated the offer to drop the RICO charge in the indictment if Rich and Green would return to the United States to face trial.\618\ Fink continued to work on the matter when Jack Quinn and Kitty Behan were retained by Rich. He was one of the most active and important members of the Rich pardon effort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \616\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 467 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). \617\ See Section I(B)(1) above. \618\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production 00697 (E- mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. Kathleen Behan Kathleen Behan is a partner at the law firm Arnold & Porter. Jack Quinn recruited her to the Marc Rich case when he was also at the firm. Behan was one of the three most active lawyers in the pardon process, along with Quinn and Fink. Behan met Marc Rich in 1999 when she and Quinn flew to Switzerland to discuss their representation of Rich. Like Quinn, Behan was retained in July of 1999 to work for Marc Rich for a fee of at least $330,000 that included $55,000 per month for the first six months.\619\ Behan was interviewed by Committee staff on February 27, 2001. Behan asserted attorney-client privilege or work product privilege in response to the majority of questions relating to her work on the pardon.\620\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \619\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0507-10 (Letter from Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Marc Rich (July 21, 1999)) (Exhibit 34). \620\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11. Peter Kadzik Peter Kadzik is a partner at Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky LLP. According to Jack Quinn, Kadzik was hired at the suggestion of Michael Green, a fellow partner of Kadzik's, because he was ``trusted by [White House Chief of Staff John] Podesta,'' and was considered to be a ``useful person to convey [Marc Rich's] arguments to Mr. Podesta.'' \621\ Kadzik's effort on behalf of the Rich team included seven contacts with the White House Chief of Staff or his assistants between December 12, 2000, and the end of the Clinton Administration.\622\ He also called the White House four out of the final five days of the Administration to see what progress had been made on the Rich pardon.\623\ Based on the testimony of Podesta before the Committee, it does not appear that Kadzik's efforts were successful, as Podesta remained opposed to the Marc Rich pardon until the end. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \621\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 432 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \622\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0064-65 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). \623\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Importance of Secrecy to the Marc Rich Team During the lobbying campaign for the pardon, the Rich team was keenly aware that public knowledge of their efforts would hamper their ability to secure a pardon. The most logical reason for their concern was knowledge that sunshine regarding the Rich pardon application would severely curtail their ability to misrepresent facts about the history of Rich's legal troubles. Perhaps more importantly, public attention probably would have resulted in the Administration consulting with the Central Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency. Such consultation would certainly have had a negative impact on the Rich pardon petition. Rich's legal team was determined to keep their efforts secret from the outset. An agenda for one of the first meetings regarding the Rich pardon effort lists as a discussion item ``A need for secrecy and possibility/likelihood of potential leaks. (Kitty says people are watching this closely.)'' \624\ Robert Fink defended this approach, testifying that ``Marc Rich has been victimized by the press and publicity and that if the press learned about this that victimization would continue.'' \625\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \624\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0569 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Nov. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 76). Fink sent the agenda for the November 21, 2000, meeting as an e-mail attachment. \625\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 476 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On January 9, 2001, Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Gershon Kekst and Jack Quinn in which he discussed a negative story that was being written about New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.\626\ Fink mentioned that the story ``led to a discussion [with Marc Rich] on whether we seek any publicity about the pardon application[.]'' \627\ As Fink continued, ``I explained that we did not want publicity now. He [Marc Rich] understands that is our view. I look forward to hearing from you.'' \628\ Jack Quinn responded to Fink's e-mail the same day stating, ``[I] think we've benefitted from being under the press radar. [P]odesta said as much.'' \629\ Gershon Kekst also responded to Fink's message, stating, ``Unless jack quinn [sic] changes his views about the risk-reward ratio for publicity, I vote against it.'' \630\ To this, Fink responded, ``I agree with your views on publicity[.]'' \631\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \626\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00158 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 144). \627\ Id. \628\ Id. \629\ Id. \630\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116). \631\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The fears over the disclosure of the pardon effort concerned the Rich team up until the very end of the Clinton Administration. On January 19, 2001, Robert Fink e-mailed Avner Azulay, Mike Green, and Kitty Behan, and informed them that the head of the SEC knew about the pardon efforts.\632\ As Fink stated in the message, ``[w]e agree that is not good and that maybe the SDNY knows too, but we have no information on it.'' \633\ In other words, the Rich team recognized that knowledge of their efforts could produce an outcry, especially if government officials who knew the details of the criminal case became aware of the possibility of a pardon for Rich and Green. Jack Quinn acknowledged as much at the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \632\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00180 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 145). \633\ Id. Mr. LaTourette. [I]s there any plain reading of that e- mail on January 19, 2001, other than you all were afraid if the Southern District of New York caught wind of what you were up to, the egg was going to hit the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- fan? Mr. Quinn. My preference was that the White House counsel contact Main Justice and that, based on the course of dealings we had earlier, that they would make a recommendation that would be helpful to us. I certainly knew that if Main Justice deferred to the prosecutors in New York, they were likely to have a negative recommendation. But I thought that, based on our earlier dealings, they had enough information.\634\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \634\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 230-31 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Steven LaTourette and testimony of Jack Quinn). Not only did Quinn and the Rich team recognize the public relations problem posed by the Rich pardon campaign, but, according to one e-mail, the White House Chief of Staff recognized this potential problem as well.\635\ As it turned out, the eventual pardon of Marc Rich by President Clinton produced exactly the public outrage that the Rich team sought to avoid by keeping their lobbying campaign secret. However, by the time this wide-ranging public outrage was realized, Marc Rich already had his presidential pardon secured. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \635\ For his part, Podesta stated that he did not recall telling Kadzik that Rich had benefited from being ``under the press radar.'' See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 432 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Jack Quinn and Eric Holder Cut the Justice Department Out of the Process By late November 2000, the Marc Rich pardon petition had been prepared and was ready to be filed with the White House. Rather than go immediately to the White House, Jack Quinn first turned to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. Holder had worked with Quinn during the previous year to try to force the Southern District of New York to sit down and meet with Quinn about settling the charges against Rich. During that process, Holder became more familiar with the Marc Rich case, to the extent he was aware of the charges against Rich, and the fact that Rich was a fugitive from justice. Despite these facts, Holder had a basically sympathetic view of the Rich case. Holder believed that the prosecutors in New York should meet with Quinn, despite the fact that Rich was a fugitive and that prosecutors from the SDNY had already had a number of unproductive negotiations with Rich's lawyers. In fact, Holder told Quinn the refusal of the prosecutors to meet was ``ridiculous,'' \636\ that ``we're all sympathetic,'' and the ``equities [are] on your side.'' \637\ By taking this position with Quinn, Holder had already sent the message to Quinn that he had a favorable view of the Marc Rich case, despite the firmly entrenched position that his own agency had taken for the preceding seventeen years. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \636\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn, Nov. 8, 1999) (Exhibit 48). See also ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \637\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 56). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As Marc Rich's lawyers prepared to file the pardon petition, Eric Holder provided pivotal assistance to their effort. Holder encouraged Jack Quinn to seek the pardon and helped Quinn cut the Justice Department out of the process of reviewing Rich's pardon petition. Ordinarily, the Justice Department has a key role in reviewing pardon petitions and providing a recommendation to the President as to whether each petition should be granted. However, Eric Holder abdicated his responsibilities as the Deputy Attorney General and took actions that ensured the Justice Department would have no meaningful input on the Rich and Green pardons. This was the first of two actions taken by Holder at the Justice Department's expense. After first succeeding in keeping the career prosecutors at the Justice Department from having any input in the Rich pardon, Holder informed the White House on the last day of the Clinton Administration that he was ``neutral, leaning towards favorable'' on the Rich and Green pardons.\638\ Together, these actions had a dramatic impact on ensuring that the pardons were ultimately granted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \638\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 198 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Knowing that Holder was favorably disposed to the Marc Rich case, Quinn approached Holder and confided in him that he was going to file the pardon petition with the White House. On November 21, 2000, Holder, Quinn, and representatives from the U.S. Marshals Service met regarding a matter for another client of Quinn's. After this meeting was over, Quinn took Holder aside and informed him that he would be filing a pardon petition on behalf of Marc Rich directly with the White House. Quinn then stated that ``I hoped I could encourage the White House to seek his views and he said I should do so.'' \639\ Quinn then asked Holder if Quinn should send a letter to the White House encouraging the White House Counsel to seek Holder's views. Holder told Quinn ``no, just have him [sic] call me.'' \640\ It is also likely that at the November 21, 2000, meeting, Quinn and Holder discussed whether Holder wanted to receive a copy of the pardon petition. When a senior Justice Department official informed The Washington Post that Holder left the November 21 meeting expecting to receive a copy of the pardon petition from Quinn, Quinn told the newspaper that: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \639\ Id. at 44 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \640\ Id. at 158. I am astounded that he now takes that position. . . . I am astounded because I specifically had a conversation [in November] with him [Holder] about the fact that I was going to submit it to the White House and I asked him if he needed it in writing and he said he did not.\641\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \641\ James V. Grimaldi and Robert O'Harrow Jr., Recollections at Odds on Pardon, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 2001, at E1. While Quinn did not repeat this charge at the Committee's hearings, his statement to the newspaper makes it fairly clear that he offered to provide Holder with a copy of the pardon petition, and that Holder decided he did not want one. This appears to be in keeping with Holder's apparent disinterest in learning about the details of Marc Rich's legal troubles. In the normal course of events, one would expect Holder to have welcomed input from professional staff with experience in the pardon process. For some unknown reason, however, he eschewed such expertise. For his part, Holder has testified that he does not recall any discussion of Marc Rich with Jack Quinn on November 21, 2000: Mr. Quinn has recently stated after the meeting he told me he was going to file a pardon request on behalf of Mr. Rich at the White House. I have no memory of that conversation but do not question Mr. Quinn's assertion. His comment would have been a fairly unremarkable one, given my belief that any pardon petition filed with the White House ultimately would be sent to the Justice Department for review and consideration.\642\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \642\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 193 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- * * * What I assumed was going to happen in late November of 2000 was that after the petition had been filed, that the White House would be reaching out to the Justice Department, and that we would have an opportunity at that point to share with them as we do in pardon--that we generally do in pardon requests, after all of the vetting had been done, the opinion of the Justice Department.\643\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \643\ Id. at 212. Holder's defense is difficult to believe. First, his characterization of Quinn's comments as ``unremarkable'' is inconsistent with everything about the Rich case. Marc Rich was one of the most wanted fugitives in the United States, and the largest tax cheat in the country's history at the time of his indictment. Holder knew that his fugitive status meant that federal prosecutors wouldn't even meet with Rich's lawyers. Yet, when Jack Quinn informed him that he was seeking a presidential pardon, outside of the normal pardon process, Holder claims that he did not take note of it and could not even remember it two months later. Equally as unbelievable is Holder's claim that he did not want a copy of the pardon petition because he was confident that the White House would send the Justice Department a copy of the petition and seek out the Department's opinion. The fact that Quinn was going directly to the White House indicated that Quinn was trying to avoid the normal Justice Department procedure by which pardon petitions were reviewed. It also indicated that no serious vetting would be done on the Rich petition. For his part, Jack Quinn claimed that he was not trying to keep any information from the Justice Department, but rather was filing his petition with the White House merely to expedite consideration of the pardon. Quinn claimed that he believed that the White House would provide the Justice Department with a copy of the pardon petition, and therefore, that he had no malign intent in failing to provide Holder with a copy of the petition in November, or at any point during the application process: Counsel. Why did you not send Mr. Holder the pardon application? Mr. Quinn. I believed that a good deal of the material included in the pardon application consisted, at least in their central parts, of the materials that I had provided to him in October 1999 when he asked Mr. Margolis to take a look at this matter. But you're correct. I did not at that time send him a copy of the full pardon petition. Counsel. The question was, why did you not do that? Is it because you thought he had all of the material from over a year previous? Mr. Quinn. Well, I thought he was sufficiently familiar with the underlying case that, when he was asked, he would be in a position to advise the White House. * * * Counsel. But you had not provided the extent of your ultimate argument to the President, so you didn't feel that he needed to see that? Mr. Quinn. Well, again, I think, in fairness, you have to say, if you look at the material I provided to him earlier about the flaws in the indictment, you will see that it was the same argument made in the pardon petition. Counsel. Because you're proud of your work, and you believe in your work, you want to provide it to people. It's not a matter of how much it costs, because that's not the issue. You would like to provide it to people so they can see the extent of what you are representing in whatever material you're pursuing. And, generally, it seems when you don't provide material to people it's because you don't want them to review it or you don't want them to poke holes in it or perhaps find a flaw. I mean, the courts require briefs. You have to provide them so they can see your legal reasoning. In this case, were you concerned that if you provided Mr. Holder your application that Mr. Holder might send it on to somebody who might actually read it and look at it? Mr. Quinn. Absolutely not. Again, I had provided these arguments to him at an earlier point. Counsel. You haven't provided all of the arguments, all the letters and all the other things in the tabs. You couldn't have provided them previously. Mr. Quinn. Fair enough. The other point I was going to make is, as I said earlier, I encouraged the White House Counsel's Office to reach out to him, and there's no reason in the world why they couldn't have shared a copy of the pardon petition when they did so. Counsel. I understand, but I've not yet heard of a lawyer who has decided to take a weak argument and leave it on the table when he's strengthened his argument. . . . . [I]t's hard for us to understand, even if it was the 11th hour, why you simply wouldn't put it in an envelope, messenger it over, let Mr. Holder take a look at it, take it home, spend a couple of hours. He could think to himself, maybe we want to talk to security people; maybe we want to send it over to the FBI. It's just--we still don't understand. I guess what you said is you provided material the previous year, and that was enough for Mr. Holder. Mr. Quinn. Well, look, you can disagree with me on this. I was not--I didn't make that decision in an effort to hide the pardon petition from anybody. I encouraged the White House to reach out to the Justice Department and seek their views. That's my testimony.\644\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \644\ Id. at 267-68 (testimony of Jack Quinn). Quinn's testimony is not convincing. As the questioning at the hearing demonstrated, Quinn simply did not have any reasonable justification for failing to send Holder a copy of the pardon petition. Perhaps most important, Quinn knew that if the petition were provided to Holder, Holder would likely forward it to the staff of the Pardon Attorney. Even more likely, the correspondence would be copied to the Pardon Attorney as a matter of routine. These lawyers would review the case, which would have likely involved contacts with the attorneys at the Southern District of New York, FBI, CIA, and NSA. If that had happened, Quinn's arguments would have been revealed as fraudulent, and this might have proven fatal to the pardon effort. Quinn's claim that he had provided Holder with everything he needed to know in 1999 simply is not true. In early 2000, Quinn provided Holder with a two-page set of talking points that addressed solely why the Justice Department should review the Rich indictment.\645\ It did not even begin to address the issues raised in the 31-page pardon petition. Quinn could have no reason for wanting to keep the pardon petition from Holder other than his desire to keep Rich's quest for a pardon as confidential as possible. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \645\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum entitled ``Why DOJ Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment,'' Feb. 28, 2000) (Exhibit 53). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The key point that must be taken away from November 21, 2000, discussion between Holder and Quinn is that it took both of them to keep the Rich pardon petition from the Justice Department. It cannot be disputed that Holder should have recognized the significance of the fact that Quinn was applying for a pardon for Rich, and should have asked for a copy of the pardon petition to be forwarded to the Justice Department. Holder has not provided any coherent explanation of why he failed to do so. Similarly, Quinn should have provided a copy of the pardon petition to Holder. Quinn has claimed that he had nothing to hide, and frequently asked the White House to include the Justice Department in the pardon process. Quinn's claims are misleading. Quinn clearly tried to keep his pardon petition from the Justice Department, apparently out of the fear that it could fall into the wrong hands, namely the prosecutors in New York, or anyone else who had knowledge of Rich's illegal activities or his subsequent actions in support of countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya. The final question then is whether Holder's failure to obtain the Rich petition and involve the Justice Department in the pardon process was the result of incompetence or a deliberate decision to assist Jack Quinn. At the Committee's hearing, Holder suggested that it was the result of poor judgment, initially not recognizing the seriousness of the Rich case, and then, by the time that he recognized that the pardon was being considered, being distracted by other matters.\646\ However, it is difficult to believe that Holder's judgment would be so monumentally poor that he could not understand how he was being manipulated by Jack Quinn. Rather, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that Eric Holder was deliberately assisting Quinn with the Rich petition, and deliberately cut the rest of the Justice Department out of the process to help Quinn obtain the pardon for Marc Rich. This conclusion is supported by the following e-mail, which was sent by Quinn to Kitty Behan, Gershon Kekst, and Robert Fink on November 18, 2000, three days before Quinn's meeting with Holder on November 21: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \646\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 193-95 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject: eric spoke to him last evening. he says go straight to wh. also says timing is good. we shd get in soon. will elab when we speak.\647\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \647\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0565 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 146). Assuming the ``eric'' referenced is Eric Holder, this e-mail contradicts the heart of Holder's defense. Holder claims that he was not focused on the Rich pardon until late in the process, at first on January 6, when he spoke to Beth Nolan, and then, not really until January 19, when he announced his position of ``neutral, leaning towards favorable.'' He claims that he does not even recall the November 21, 2000, meeting, because it was an unremarkable request. And he claims that he did not ask for a copy of the petition because he thought he would get everything in due course from the White House. However, this e-mail indicates that Holder suggested that Quinn file the petition directly with the White House and circumvent the Justice Department. It also suggests that Holder had reason to know that the request was remarkable, as he suggested to Quinn that he circumvent the Justice Department. Finally, it indicates that Holder was a willing participant in the plan to keep the Justice Department from knowing about and opposing the Marc Rich pardon. The final question is why Eric Holder would do such a thing. As discussed below, Holder had been asking Quinn for his help in being appointed Attorney General in a Gore Administration. At the time when Holder made the decision to assist Quinn, there was still a realistic possibility of Vice President Gore winning the election. As an influential friend of Vice President Gore, Jack Quinn would be in a key position to assist Holder's chances of becoming Attorney General. While this may not have been Holder's sole motivation in aiding Quinn, it was likely a powerful motivation for Holder.\648\ Regardless of Holder's motivations, his actions were unconscionable. One of Holder's primary duties in the pardon process was to make sure that the views of the Justice Department were adequately represented in the pardon process. In addition, as a Justice Department employee, he was bound by federal regulations that required the Justice Department to review pardon petitions before they were presented to the White House. Finally, as a simple matter of prudence, Holder should have ensured that he knew something about the pardon before he took action that substantially assisted the chances that the pardon would be issued. By helping Quinn circumvent the Justice Department, Holder ensured that his own prosecutors would not be able to express their opinion about the Rich case. In so doing, Holder disserved his own Department, as well as the statutes he was sworn to uphold. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \648\ In evaluating Holder's motivations, one should keep in mind that the only reason Jack Quinn was hired by Marc Rich was because of Eric Holder's initial recommendation to Gershon Kekst. Holder's suggestion to Kekst that he hire a lawyer like Quinn, who could come to him and solve the problem, was a self-fulfilling prophecy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. The Filing of the Pardon Petition On December 11, 2001, Jack Quinn called White House Counsel Beth Nolan to inform her that he would be submitting a pardon application to the White House that day.\649\ Quinn personally delivered the application to the White House later that day.\650\ Accompanying the application was a letter from Quinn to President Clinton, briefly explaining Rich's arguments.\651\ In that letter, Quinn provided a brief summary of his arguments, claiming that a ``grave injustice'' had been done, that Rich and Green's attempts at settlement had been rebuffed, and that the charges against Rich and Green were unjustified. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \649\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 431 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). By contrast, Kathleen Behan, who was present when Quinn called Nolan, told Committee Staff that she did not recall Quinn saying he was sending over a pardon application. Behan stated, ``It sounded like he didn't need to explain to her what it was. It was very cordial conversation.'' Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001). \650\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 11, 2000)) (Exhibit 147). \651\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The filing of the pardon petition triggered a small wave of phone calls and other attempts to lobby the President and top White House officials on the Rich pardon. These contacts ranged from calls from Prime Minister Ehud Barak to personal communications between Jack Quinn and his former White House colleagues. 1. December 11, 2000, Call from Ehud Barak On December 11, 2000, the same day that the pardon application was delivered to the White House, the Rich pardon became a topic of discussion between President Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. One can only speculate as to whether this was orchestrated or an extraordinary coincidence. Barak's involvement in the lobbying campaign was secured by Avner Azulay of the Rich Foundation. On May 13, 2001, Barak responded to a March 8, 2001, inquiry by the Committee concerning his involvement in the Rich pardon. As he stated in his letter: Few months ago [sic] I was approached by the chairman of the Rich Foundation in Israel. The chairman, Mr. Azoulay [sic] is a man I know [sic] for many years, who had contributed a lot to the security of the State of Israel for its philanthropic activities in the fields of healthcare, education and culture. Mr. Azoulay [sic] asked me to raise Mr. Rich case with President Clinton. I raised the subject with President Clinton several times (probably three) in the course of routine telephone conversations during the last two or three months of his presidency and made a personal recommendation to him to consider the case.\652\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \652\ Letter from Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 13, 2001) (Exhibit 99). The first of these three telephone conversations between Barak and Clinton concerning clemency for Marc Rich took place on December 11, 2000. The notes of the conversation taken by National Security Council staff indicate Prime Minister Barak raised the matter towards the end of the nineteen-minute --------------------------------------------------------------------------- conversation: Barak. Okay, thank you. One last remark. There is an American Jewish businessman living in Switzerland and making a lot of philanthropic contributions to Israeli institutions and activities like education, and he is a man called Mark [sic] Rich. He violated certain rules of the game in the United States and is living abroad. I just wanted to let you know that here he is highly appreciated for his support of so many philanthropic institutions and funds, and that if I can, I would like to make my recommendation to consider his case. Clinton. I am going to take all of them up at the same time. I know about that case because I know his ex- wife. She wants to help him, too. If your ex-wife wants to help you, that's good. Barak. Oh. I know his new wife only, an Italian woman, very young. Okay. So, Mr. President, thank you very much. We will be in touch.\653\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \653\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel (Dec. 11, 2000) (Exhibit 148). As this exchange indicates, President Clinton may have already heard of the Marc Rich matter because of some contact with Denise Rich. It is unclear, however, when this contact occurred or in what context it occurred. It is also possible that President Clinton discussed with Denise Rich her ex- husband's pardon over the phone. Phone records reflect a number of telephone calls between Rich and the White House.\654\ It may also be that the President discussed the Marc Rich matter with Beth Dozoretz, who visited the White House on numerous occasions and placed numerous phone calls prior to Barak's first phone call. In any event, it is clear from the transcript of this conversation that President Clinton was already aware of the Marc Rich pardon effort when he first spoke with Prime Minister Barak. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \654\ See, e.g., Verizon Document Production (Telephone calls from Denise Rich to the White House, Dec. 9, 1999); Qwest Document Production (Telephone call from Denise Rich to the White House, Feb. 16, 2000). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There were additional lobbying contacts made with the White House on the Marc Rich matter on December 11. That same day, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres contacted President Clinton about the Marc Rich case. Presumably, this call, like the call from Prime Minister Barak, was initiated by Avner Azulay. Also on December 11, 2000, President Clinton attempted to call Beth Dozoretz. \655\ It is unclear, from available documentary evidence, whether Dozoretz successfully spoke with the President, or what they spoke about. However, it is clear that Dozoretz and President Clinton discussed Marc Rich at some point in the days around when the petition was filed. In this conversation, President Clinton told Dozoretz that Quinn should make his case to the White House Counsel's Office. Finally, as discussed above, on December 12, 2000, Elie Wiesel visited the White House and may have raised the Rich pardon with a member of the White House staff. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \655\ NARA Document Production (White House record of attempted call between Dozoretz and President Clinton). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Quinn Was Likely Legally Prohibited from Lobbying the White House When Jack Quinn filed the Marc Rich pardon petition with the White House and contacted White House staff regarding the pardon, he violated Executive Order 12834. On January 20, 1993, the first day of the new administration, President Clinton signed into law Executive Order 12834.\656\ The order prohibited persons who had worked for the administration from lobbying the administration for a five-year period.\657\ In fact, Jack Quinn had a hand in writing this regulation. Quinn had left the White House in February of 1997, and was therefore under the prohibition when he submitted the pardon petition. Beth Nolan testified that when Quinn brought the pardon application to the White House, she raised the issue of his eligibility to represent someone before the White House.\658\ According to Nolan, Quinn responded to her concerns by telling her that he ``had obtained a legal opinion that it was permissible for him to represent someone in a pardon application.'' \659\ Kathleen Behan also told Committee staff that Quinn told Nolan he could act ``pursuant to the exception for representations like this.'' \660\ In fact, Quinn does not appear to have obtained a ``legal opinion.'' Rather, it appears that he exchanged brief e-mails with Kathleen Behan. Behan's entire ``legal opinion'' appears to be a two-sentence e-mail titled ``Re: exec order 12834.'' Behan stated, ``Certainly the plain language you have cited would not preclude your participation. I'd be happy to look at the whole order.'' \661\ Nolan also testified that she ``asked one of [her] associate counsels to look at the question independently and got the answer back that Quinn's work did meet the exception.'' \662\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \656\ Exec. Order No. 12,834; 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993) (Exhibit 149). \657\ Id. \658\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 324 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). \659\ Id. \660\ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001). \661\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Jack Quinn (Dec. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 150). \662\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 324 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Executive Order 12834 prohibits lobbying of the executive branch agency for which the person was employed for a five-year period. The exception to this rule referred to by Quinn reads as follows: [T]he term ``lobby'' does not include: . . . (2) communicating or appearing with regard to a Judicial proceeding, or a criminal or civil law enforcement inquiry, investigation or proceeding (but not with regard to an administrative proceeding) or with regard to an administrative proceeding to the extent that such communications or appearances are made after the commencement of and in connection with the conduct or disposition of a Judicial proceeding[.] \663\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \663\ Exec. Order No. 12,834; 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993) (Exhibit 149). Quinn testified to the Committee that he believed he was within this exception when he lobbied the White House on behalf of Marc Rich. In response to a question from Congressman LaTourette, Quinn stated, ``there was, as you've heard, an indictment pending in the Southern District of New York, so there was a judicial proceeding that had been commenced.'' \664\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \664\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 153 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In contradiction of Quinn, ethics expert Stephen Gillers of New York University law school says that Quinn has twisted this exception beyond its original intent. Gillers explains that the provision, known as the ``judicial exception,'' is boilerplate for government ethics regulations and laws. It is meant for former government employees who are advocates in court, acting as attorneys in the traditional sense. According to Gillers: The problem with Quinn's efforts to use that loophole is that the president, in exercising his pardon power, is not performing in a judicial capacity . . . . He is performing in an executive capacity. And the pardon function does not enjoy any of the safeguards that led to the creation of the judicial exception. There is no judge, there is no adversary process necessary and there is no sunshine. . . . I don't think any reasonable interpretation of the language, in light of the history of this exception, can support his claim[.] \665\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \665\ James V. Grimaldi, In Rich Pardon Case, Did Quinn Violate the Ethics Rule He Wrote?, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2001, at E4. Quinn's claim that he was appearing with regard to a ``judicial proceeding'' is not credible. Quinn was appearing to obtain a pardon, which is not a judicial power, but rather, is an executive power. If Quinn had been lobbying the President to intervene and force the Justice Department to drop criminal charges against Rich, his argument might be more sound. Quinn's claim was also severely undercut by a ruling in Federal Court that he and his colleagues were acting principally as lobbyists in the Rich case, rather than as attorneys.\666\ As Judge Chin held in that decision: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \666\ In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. M11-189 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Although Quinn may be an excellent attorney, he was preceded by series of excellent attorneys; clearly, he was not hired for his ability to formulate better legal arguments or write better briefs. To the extent it contained legal arguments at all, the [pardon] Petition made the same arguments that Rich and his prior attorneys had been presenting, unsuccessfully, to the Southern District for almost 17 years. Rather, Quinn was hired because he was ``Washington wise'' and understood ``the entire political process.'' He was hired because he could telephone the White House and engage in a 20-minute conversation with the President. He was hired because he could write the President a ``personal note'' that said ``I believe in this cause with all my heart,'' and he would know that the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- President would read the note and give it weight. * * * The public relations consultants and media experts here were not helping the lawyers prepare for litigation. It was the other way around, as the lawyers were being used principally to put legal trappings on what was essentially a lobbying and political effort.\667\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \667\ Id. at 41-42. It should also be noted that Quinn's position is diametrically opposed to Hugh Rodham's view of his work lobbying for pardons. Rodham received two large contingency fees for his work in lobbying for a pardon for Glenn Braswell and a commutation for Carlos Vignali. Florida bar rules prohibit lawyers from receiving contingency fees in criminal matters. When questioned about this matter, Rodham took the position that his contingency fees were permissible, because his appearance before the White House was a lobbying matter, not a criminal matter. E. The Lobbying Effort After the initial filing of the pardon petition, the Marc Rich legal team began a coordinated campaign to lobby the White House on the Rich and Green pardons. These contacts ranged from telephone calls from Jack Quinn to Beth Nolan, to personal appeals made by Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz to the President, to calls from other lawyers to staff they knew at the White House. The apparent goal of this campaign was to raise the Rich pardon as frequently as possible and keep it as prominent as possible in the White House, without letting anyone outside of the White House know of the effort. 1. Quinn's Contacts with Bruce Lindsey in Belfast Immediately after submitting the pardon application, Jack Quinn began to personally lobby the White House on behalf of Marc Rich. On December 13, 2000, Jack Quinn traveled to Belfast, Northern Ireland, with President Clinton's delegation for the peace talks. During this trip, Quinn took the opportunity to raise the Marc Rich pardon with Bruce Lindsey, who was also on the trip. But the first reaction by the Deputy White House Counsel was not positive: ``Mr. Quinn asked me if I had gotten his packet of material on Mr. Rich and Mr. Green. I told him I had. He asked me what I thought. I told him I thought they were fugitives.'' \668\ Apparently, Quinn disputed Lindsey's assertion, but it is not clear what else they discussed about the Rich matter during the Belfast trip. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \668\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 323 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When Quinn returned to the United States, he sent a brief letter to Lindsey to try to address Lindsey's concerns. In his letter, Quinn summarized some of the same arguments made in the pardon petition: You expressed a concern that they [Rich and Green] are fugitives; and I told you they are not. Here is why: Rich and Green were in fact residing in Switzerland when they were indicted in September 1983. They (understandably in my mind) chose not to return to the US for a trial in light of all that had happened to them; particularly the enormous and overwhelmingly adverse and prejudicial publicity generated, I am sure, by then U.S. Attorney Giuliani. Their failure to return to New York was not a crime and no one has ever accused them of a crime for failing to come to the US for a trial. . . . Our review of the law in the area (18 USC 1073) similarly confirms to us that their conduct is not proscribed by federal law.\669\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \669\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 151). Quinn's claims were absurd, and it appears that the White House staff recognized that they were absurd. As described further below, Rich and Green were fugitives, both in the practical and the legal sense. Practically, they fled the country when they believed that their indictment was imminent, and never returned, because they knew they would be arrested. The federal government considered them fugitives, listing Rich as one of its ten most wanted international fugitives, attempting to extradite Rich and Green, and mounting complicated operations to apprehend them abroad. In the legal sense, Rich and Green clearly violated the federal statute outlawing fugitivity, which prohibits ``travel[ing] in . . . foreign commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution.'' \670\ The fact that Rich and Green were never charged with violating this statute has more to do with the fact that they were already facing dozens of felony counts, rather than any lack of evidence. It appears that Quinn's facile arguments had little impact on Lindsey as he, and every other lawyer at the White House who considered the Marc Rich matter, continued to believe that Rich was a fugitive.\671\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \670\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073 (2000). This section states: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- GWhoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent either (1) to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of the place from which he flees, for a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime, punishable by death or which is a felony under the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees, or (2) to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceedings in such place in which the commission of an offense punishable by death or which is a felony under the laws of such place, is charged, or (3) to avoid service of, or contempt proceedings for alleged disobedience of, lawful process requiring attendance and the giving of testimony or the production of documentary evidence before an agency of a State empowered by the law of such State to conduct investigations of alleged criminal activities, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. For the purposes of clause (3) of this paragraph, the term ``State'' includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. Violations of this section may be prosecuted only in the Federal judicial district in which the original crime was alleged to have been committed, or in which the person was held in custody or confinement, or in which an avoidance of service of process or a contempt referred to in clause (3) of the first paragraph of this section is alleged to have been committed, and only upon formal approval in writing by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General of the United States, which function of approving prosecutions may not be delegated. (Emphases added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \671\ Moreover, it appears that Quinn's own associates believed that Rich was a fugitive. Shortly after the pardon was granted, Jeff Connaughton, one of Quinn's partners, sent him an e-mail explaining that Quinn had to make the case that ``President Clinton was right to pardon Rich despite the fact that he's a fugitive.'' Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03088 (E-mail from Jeff Connaughton, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 27, 2001)) (Exhibit 152). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- More important, should there have been any doubt about the matter, Quinn had Denise Rich to tell him what really happened. As she succinctly explained to the American people on April 27, 2001: Question. How did you find out [about the indictment] and what was your reaction? Denise Rich. All I really knew was that he spoke to me and he said that ``I'm having tax problems with the government. And--and I think that we are going to have to leave.'' And my response was, ``I am his wife. These are my children. I'm not going to split up the family.'' And, so, I did what I think any wife would do. I left the country.\672\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \672\ 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001). There can be no clearer ``cause and effect'' explanation of what happened than this, and it is hard to argue that Denise Rich failed to understand, at the time, why she and her children fled from the United States. In short, Quinn's after- the-fact rationalization is nothing more than pure dishonesty. 2. Peter Kadzik's Lobbying Contacts with John Podesta Peter Kadzik is a partner at the law firm Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky LLP, the same firm as long-time Rich lawyers Michael Green and I. Lewis Libby. Kadzik was recruited into Marc Rich's lobbying campaign because he was a long-time friend of White House Chief of Staff John Podesta, dating back to law school. Kadzik had also represented Podesta in connection with Congressional and independent counsel investigations.\673\ Over the course of his lobbying efforts for Marc Rich, Peter Kadzik had seven contacts with either Podesta or administrative staff at the White House. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \673\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 445-46 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On December 12, 2000, Peter Kadzik had his first telephone conversation with John Podesta relating to the Marc Rich pardon application.\674\ In his opening testimony before the Committee, Podesta explained his initial contact with Kadzik: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \674\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). My first recollection of this matter is that some time in mid-December 2000 I returned a call from Mr. Peter Kadzik who has been a friend of mine since we attended law school together in the mid-1970's. I remember that Mr. Kadzik told me that his firm represented Mr. Rich and Mr. Green in connection with a criminal case and that Jack Quinn was seeking a Presidential pardon from --------------------------------------------------------------------------- them. At that point, I was unfamiliar with the Rich/Green case. Mr. Kadzik asked me who would be reviewing pardon matters at the White House. I recalled that I told him that the White House Counsel's office was reviewing pardon applications.\675\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \675\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). A few days after this initial contact, on December 15, 2000, Kadzik sent Podesta a copy of Jack Quinn's cover letter to the pardon application, which provided a summary of Marc Rich's case.\676\ Podesta testified that he forwarded this on to the White House Counsel's Office.\677\ Kadzik next contacted Podesta on January 2, 2001.\678\ According to Podesta, Kadzik ``asked, in light of the pardons that Mr. Clinton had issued around Christmas, whether any more pardons were likely to be considered.'' \679\ Podesta told Kadzik that President Clinton ``was considering additional pardons and commutations, but it was unlikely that one would be granted under the circumstances he had briefly described unless the counsel's office, having reviewed the case on the merits, believed that some real injustice had been done.'' \680\ Apparently, Kadzik also informed his partner Michael Green that the Rich case was pending, and would be considered within the next week, but that they needed a supporter in the Counsel's Office. As Fink explained to Jack Quinn: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \676\ Id. See also Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0005 (Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, to John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House (Dec. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 153). \677\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). \678\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). \679\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). \680\ Id. Mike spoke with his partner [Kadzik] today who spoke to Podesta who said, in effect, that we are still in the running but we are fourth and long. It seems that there are many requests and only the ones being pushed by Beth or Bruce are being followed, so we have to get one of them strongly behind this. They have to become advocates.\681\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \681\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0370 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn and Michael Green, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 154). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fink sent a similar message to Avner Azulay: I learned from Mike Green today that our case is still pending and is part of a large group that may be considered at the end of the week. But his friend [Kadzik] told him that we need a rabbi among the people in the counsel's office (it seems that Mike's friend [Kadzik] believes we do not have one yet), so I have written Jack to ask him to follow up with the two people there (Beth and Bruce), both of whom received our papers, both of whom he knows well and both of whom he has already discussed this matter [sic].\682\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \682\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00108 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 155). Fink's use of the term ``rabbi'' caused some confusion for Azulay, who responded ``I don't understand the comment about the rabbi. Our book is full of rabbis. Could you get more specific?'' Id. Fink then responded, ``Yes, by rabbi I meant someone inside who is in favor of the pardon and working for it to be granted. Sorry about the lack of clarity, it is just common usage here.'' Id. On January 6, 2001, Kadzik met with Podesta in the White House.\683\ At this meeting, Podesta conveyed the collective view of the White House Counsel's Office on the potential pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \683\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). See also Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059-0069 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). I told him that I, along with the entire White House staff counsel, opposed it and that I did not think it would be granted. At that point, I believed that the pardons would not be granted in light of the uniform staff recommendation to the contrary and that little more needed to be done on the matter.\684\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \684\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). Notwithstanding Podesta's negative views, and the discouraging news on the White House's consideration of the Rich pardon, Kadzik placed one more call to Podesta on January 16, 2001.\685\ According to Podesta, Kadzik told him that ``he had been informed that the President had reviewed the submissions Mr. Quinn had sent in and was impressed with them and was once again considering the pardon.'' \686\ Podesta told Kadzik that he still opposed the pardon and did not believe it would be granted.\687\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \685\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059-0069 (Billing records from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). \686\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). \687\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Taking John Podesta's testimony at face value, it does not appear that the Rich team's Kadzik approach was successful. Podesta, like Bruce Lindsey and the other key staff, appears to have been steadfastly against the pardon. However, as is discussed in more detail below, notwithstanding their strong opposition, White House staff did not give their best efforts to dissuade President Clinton from granting the Rich and Green pardons. 3. Further Contacts Between Jack Quinn and White House Staff After Peter Kadzik spoke to John Podesta, and learned that Rich needed a ``rabbi'' among the White House staff to press the case for a pardon, Robert Fink decided that they needed to press their case as strongly as possible at both the staff level and with the President.\688\ Fink then apparently asked Jack Quinn to make another call to the White House.\689\ Quinn agreed to make the call,\690\ and spoke to Beth Nolan on January 3, 2001.\691\ He reported back to Fink, Marc Rich, Avner Azulay, and Behan later on January 3: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \688\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00106-07 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 156). \689\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00108 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 155). \690\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00109 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 157). \691\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0864 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 158). I just got off the phone with Beth Nolan, the White House Counsel. She told me that her office will do the next ``reassessment'' of our and other applications on Friday [January 5]. I impressed upon her that our case is ``sui generis'' only in that M[arc] R[ich] was indicted but did not stand trial and then elaborated at some length on the circumstances of MR's decision not to return--the facts that Rudy was new, was trying to make a reputation, overcharged in the most gross way (and in ways that would not stand today--RICO, mail/ wire fraud, etc.) and that MR, seeing the mountain of adverse publicity generated by the US Atty's ofc and the disproportionate charges, made the choice anyone would make, i.e., not to return. She responded that this is still a tough case--that the perception will nevertheless be that MR is in some ``sense'' a fugitive. I explained why he is not. I told her that I want an opportunity to know, before a final decision, if there are things we have not said or done that should be said or done. She promised me that opportunity. I asked if she would see us to review the matter in person and she said she would if there was reason to think, after her reassessment, that that would be fruitful. I told her, finallt [sic], that I intend to have one more conversation with POTUS before this is finalized in order to make the case to him, focusing in particular on his appreciation of what an overly-zealous prosecutor can do to make a fair trial, in court or in the court of public opinion, impossible. Lastly, I told her that, if they pardon J[onathan] P[ollard], then pardoning MR is easy, but that, if they do not pardon JP, then they should pardon MR. In the last connection, she affirmed that they have heard from people in or connected to the G[overnment] O[f] I[srael].\692\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \692\ Id. After this call, Jack Quinn also tried to bring another former White House staffer into the Marc Rich pardon effort. Cheryl Mills was the former Deputy Counsel to the President, and was now an executive at Oxygen Media in New York. However, Mills was still influential in the Clinton White House, and Quinn brought his arguments to her. At some point before January 5, 2001, Quinn apparently called Mills and discussed the Rich pardon with her. Then, on January 5, 2001, Mills was in the White House for a party for former White House Counsels.\693\ On January 5, Quinn sent a new letter to the President outlining his key arguments on the Rich pardon.\694\ He sent copies of this letter to Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and Mills.\695\ Quinn explained that he sent the material to Mills because she was: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \693\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001). \694\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 159). \695\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00153 (E-mail from April Moore, Secretary to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Robert Fink and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 160). A person who, after some 7 years at the White House, was enormously well regarded and trusted, well might at some point be consulted on this. I had raised with her the fact that I was pursuing the pardon as I did with others from time to time to just bounce ideas off. But also I was hopeful, knowing of her relationship with Ms. Nolan and Mr. Lindsey and the President, that as any good lawyer would, that as this thing progressed, if it were progressing, that I would get some sense of how people were reacting to different arguments in order that I might be in a position to know better what concerns the folks advising the President might have so that I might address those concerns.\696\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \696\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 331 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). Then, at the party for former White House Counsels later that day, where the former counsels, including Abner Mikva, Lloyd Cutler, and Bernard Nussbaum were filming a video for President Clinton, Quinn raised the Rich pardon with Nolan again. At that time, Mills told Quinn to ``stop pestering'' Nolan about the Rich pardon.\697\ While Mills had received information about the pardon from Quinn, she was not familiar enough with the issue to discuss the merits with Quinn.\698\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \697\ Id. at 333. \698\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While Quinn apparently did not make much progress with Mills at the January 5 party, he did lay important groundwork for the last day of the Clinton Administration, when Cheryl Mills would be the most supportive voice for the Rich pardon among White House staff. 4. Initial Discussions Between the White House and Justice Department When he met with Eric Holder on November 21, 2000, Jack Quinn had told Holder that he was going to urge the White House to contact him about the Rich pardon. At the time, Holder had indicated that he looked forward to contact from the White House. True to his word, Quinn did suggest that the White House contact Holder. Quinn recognized that what Holder said to the White House would be crucial to whether or not Rich received a pardon. In an e-mail on Christmas 2000, Quinn told his colleagues that ``[t]he greatest danger lies with the lawyers. I have worked them hard and I am hopeful that E. Holder will be helpful to us. But we can expect some outreach to NY.'' \699\ Apparently, Quinn underestimated just how helpful Holder would be, keeping the Rich pardon completely to himself, and keeping his prosecutors in New York from even knowing about the effort to pardon Rich, much less asking for their opinion. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \699\ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0844 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 25, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the first week of January, Beth Nolan met with Holder, and asked for his opinion regarding a number of clemency matters. During this conversation, Nolan brought up Marc Rich's name. Holder told Nolan that he was neutral.\700\ Later, at the Committee's February 8 hearing, Holder explained that when he used the term ``neutral,'' he was trying to convey that he ``didn't have the basis to form an opinion.'' \701\ However, it is unclear why, if he was trying to tell Nolan that he did not know enough about the Rich case to have an opinion, Holder simply did not say that. In addition, it is strange that Holder would start out with a position of ``neutral'' on the Rich case, knowing what he did, namely, that Rich was a fugitive from justice, that his had been one of the largest tax cases in history, and that the prosecutors in New York would not even meet with his lawyers. However, late on January 19, 2001, Holder would revise his opinion of the Rich pardon from ``neutral'' to ``neutral, leaning towards favorable,'' on the basis of a third-hand account of Prime Minister Barak's call to President Clinton. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \700\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 205 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). See also id. at 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). \701\ Id. at 205 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Holder's default position of neutrality on the Marc Rich case is especially peculiar in light of express Justice Department policy regarding grants of clemency to fugitives. In the case of Fernando Fuentes Coba, Pardon Attorney Roger Adams rejected Fuentes' petition for clemency because Fuentes was a fugitive from the United States. Adams stated that: Mr. [Fuentes] Coba is ineligible to apply for a presidential pardon. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.2 . . . ``[n]o petition for pardon should be filed until the expiration of a waiting period of at least five years after the date of the release of the petitioner from confinement . . . .'' Because Mr. Coba has served none of his prison sentence, he fails to meet this most basic eligibility requirement for pardon consideration. Moreover, the Department of Justice has consistently declined to accept pardon petitions from individuals, such as Mr. Coba, who are fugitives, since the pardon process assumes the Government's ability to implement either of the President's possible decisions regarding a petition--that is, a denial of clemency as well as a grant of clemency. Put another way, it is not reasonable to allow a person to ask that the President grant him a pardon which, if granted, would have the effect of eliminating the term of imprisonment to which he has been sentenced, while at the same time insulating himself from having to serve the sentence if the pardon is denied.\702\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \702\ Vivian Mannerud Document Production (Letter from Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, to Lonnie Anne Pera, Counsel to Vivian Mannerud, Zuckert Scoutt & Rasenberger (Nov. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 161). The same principles should have applied to the Marc Rich pardon. The fact that Eric Holder disregarded this policy, as well as every other warning sign about the Rich case, raises further questions about his motivations in the Rich case. 5. January 8, 2001, Call Between President Clinton and Ehud Barak The second week in January started with another call from Prime Minister Barak on the Rich pardon. Towards the end of the eighteen-minute call on January 8, 2001, Barak mentioned the Marc Rich pardon for a second time. It appears that this second conversation was prompted by a meeting between Marc Rich and Prime Minister Barak. A January 12, 2001, e-mail from Avner Azulay to Jack Quinn, Marc Rich, Robert Fink, and Kathleen Behan included the subject line ``telecons to potus.'' \703\ As Azulay wrote, ``Following mr's mtg with the pm--the latter called potus this week. Potus said he is very much aware of the case, ``that he is looking into it and that he saw 2 fat books which were prepared by these people.'' Potus sounded positive but maede [sic] no concrete promise.'' \704\ Azulay's summary closely tracks the discussion between the President and the Prime Minister as recorded by the National Security Council staff: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \703\ Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00166 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 12, 2001)) (Exhibit 162). \704\ Id. Prime Minister Barak. Let me tell you last but not least two names I want to mention. [Redacted] The --------------------------------------------------------------------------- second is Mark [sic], the Jewish American. President Clinton. I know quite a few things about that. I just got a long memo and am working on it. It's best that we not say much about that. Prime Minister Barak. Okay. I understand. I'm not mentioning it in any place. President Clinton. I understand. Prime Minister Barak. I believe it could be important [gap] not just financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case. President Clinton. It is a bizarre case, and I am working on it. Prime Minister Barak. Okay. I really appreciate it.\705\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \705\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel (Jan. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 148). Two facts about this telephone conversation stand out. First, it appears that President Clinton told Prime Minister Barak to ``not say much'' about the Rich matter. It is difficult to know exactly what the President meant by this comment, but one interpretation is that President Clinton did not want to discuss the Rich matter with Barak when there were a number of staff on the line taking notes about the conversation. Perhaps most important, if he was leaning towards pardoning Rich, he probably understood that if this became known, the public outcry would have made the pardon politically untenable. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any other reason why President Clinton would tell Prime Minister Barak to ``not say much'' about Rich. Another critical element of the telephone call is Barak's statement that ``I believe it could be important [gap] not just financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one case.'' Read literally, Barak's statement suggests that the Rich pardon had future financial implications for Barak, and perhaps President Clinton as well. It is also possible, though, that Prime Minister Barak was referring to Rich's past financial assistance to Israel. While the Committee does not have enough information to confirm that Barak or Clinton took action on behalf of Rich in exchange for future payment, Barak's comments raise this possibility. 6. ``The HRC Option'' The Marc Rich legal team used a number of approaches to influence President Clinton and his staff. One approach that was considered was for then-First Lady Hillary Clinton to become involved. There is now, however, a uniform denial that she ever participated in the Marc Rich pardon process. Beginning in late December, the lawyers representing Rich had a number of discussions in which they debated the merit of asking Hillary Clinton for help with the Rich pardon. Apparently the first discussions regarding Mrs. Clinton started around December 26, 2000, when Robert Fink sent the following e-mail to Quinn, with copies to Marc Rich, Kitty Behan, and Avner Azulay: ``Kitty and I think the best person to call Hilary [sic] (if it makes sense to call her at all) may well be Denise. She is in Aspen; let me know if you need the number.'' \706\ Later that day, Fink e-mailed the same group again: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \706\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00072 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 163). Of all the options we discussed, the only one that seems to have real potential for making a difference is the HRC option and even that has peril if not handled correctly. I assume, and am emphasizing that this is an assumption, that we want Avner to speak to Abe [Foxman] about the support this will get in NY to see if Abe could make the necessary representation to HRC.\707\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \707\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00075 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 164). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The following day, December 27, 2000, Avner Azulay weighed in: I have been advised that HRC shall feel more at ease if she is joined by her elder senator of NY who also represents the jewish [sic] population. The private request from DR shall not be sufficient. It seems that this shall be a prerequisite from her formal position [sic].\708\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \708\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00080 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 165). Robert Fink passed this recommendation on to Gershon Kekst, who had been advising the Rich team with media relations. Kekst seemed to be taken with the idea, and recommended asking --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Senator Schumer's campaign contributors to ``lean'' on him: Good point. Can [Q]uinn tell us who is close enough to lean on [S]chumer?? I am certainly willing to call him, but have no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us quickly who the top contributors are . . . . . . maybe Bernard Schwartz?? \709\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \709\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00083 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 135). Jack Quinn apparently signed onto the concept of involving the First Lady in the Rich pardon effort. On December 28, 2000, Robert Fink apparently contacted Quinn about the proposal, and --------------------------------------------------------------------------- sent the following confirming e-mail to Quinn: I understand I am to call DR and ask her to call HRC, but I wanted to talk to you first to make sure that makes sense and to determine what you thought DR should be saying, not just what she should be asking.\710\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \710\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00401 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 166). It appears that Robert Fink discussed the ``HRC option'' with Denise Rich, and that Denise Rich did not react well to the idea. He sent the following e-mail to Azulay and Marc Rich on --------------------------------------------------------------------------- December 28, describing his conversation with Denise Rich: I spoke to DR who was adamantly against the proposal. She is convinced it would be viewed badly by the recipient. Nothing good will come of the overture even with a good word from anyone in NY. She said she is convinced of this and so is her friend who has advised DR not to discuss it in front of HRC. I spoke to MR both before the call and in the middle of this email and he now agrees we should do nothing on this topic.\711\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \711\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00087 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, and Marc Rich (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 167). From this e-mail, it appears that the proposal to lobby Hillary Clinton was presented to Denise Rich, who in turn discussed it with Beth Dozoretz. Dozoretz advised Rich not to lobby Hillary Clinton on the pardon, and Denise Rich rejected the plan. In turn, Marc Rich decided not to press the matter any further. However, Jack Quinn and Robert Fink still saw merit in the ``HRC option,'' and continued to pursue it. Quinn told Fink that he thought ``the friend [Dozoretz] is naive to think this will not be discussed in front of her [Hillary Clinton].'' \712\ Fink replied that ``I cannot help but think they are right. She has something to lose and little to gain and may not want anything which will affect her new position.'' \713\ Quinn also stated, ``I continue to think it most likely HRC would be at least informed before anything positive happens, given the possibility of a Giuliani/NY press reaction.'' \714\ Fink then replied to Quinn's suggestion: ``I will call Avner to see what he thinks. . . . DR was very sure speaking to HRC was a mistake and told me that Beth worned [sic] her not to raise the issue while HRC was in ear shot. Still want to contact HRC?'' \715\ Quinn replied: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \712\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). \713\ Id. \714\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00089 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 168). \715\ Id. [I]t's a tough call, no doubt. [I] just think HE will know the calculation you mention and therefore she will become aware it is pending. If this is right, do we want her to hear about it first in that way or from someone (assuming we have someone) who can put it to her in the context we need? \716\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \716\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00097-98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). By January 2, 2001, Fink was apparently convinced, and --------------------------------------------------------------------------- suggested to Quinn that he call Hillary Clinton: Frankly, I think you are the best person at this point. You signed the petition and the letter and know the case better than anyone else who could call. DR is out and probably could only make a personal appeal. You know of Abe Foxman and of the Israeli connection and of all the giving and the Brooklyn connection (Pinky). So my vote is that you call her.\717\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \717\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00102 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 169). But, it appears that by later on January 2 and on January 3, Marc Rich and Avner Azulay had decided against an approach to Hillary Clinton. First, around January 2, Marc Rich apparently spoke to Denise Rich. Azulay reported that ``her impression-- from Beth is that HRC shall try to be protective of her husband and stay out of potential trouble.'' The following day, January 3, Azulay e-mailed Quinn, Fink, Behan and Rich, and stated --------------------------------------------------------------------------- that: Looking from the sideline and hearing all this--I would like to forward the idea that perhaps we should just leave HRC alone. By initiating a call to her we are ``saying in a way that there is a problem here . . .'', and in the process we might create a problem out of speculations on her reaction. I don't think we have any positive knowledge that she is for or against, only assumptions. Potus should deal with this himself--and if it does then intervene with all the arguments etc.\718\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \718\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00109 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 157). Apparently, Azulay's suggestion settled the matter, as there was no more discussion of the ``HRC option.'' At the Committee's February 8 hearing, Jack Quinn testified that ``I'm confident that I never communicated with the First Lady about this, and I don't believe that anyone else did.'' \719\ In addition, the Committee has received no documents suggesting that the First Lady was actually contacted by anyone connected to Marc Rich or that the First Lady offered any opinion on the Marc Rich pardon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \719\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 257 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- F. The Final Days of the Marc Rich Lobbying Effort 1. Communications Between Peter Kadzik and John Podesta As the end of the Clinton presidency approached, the Marc Rich legal team increased the intensity of its lobbying efforts. Peter Kadzik called the White House four out of the final five days of the Administration to see what progress had been made on the Rich pardon. On January 16, 2001, he spoke to his friend and sometime client, White House Chief of Staff John Podesta. Kadzik asked Podesta what the status of the Rich pardon was, and what recommendation the White House staff would make. After a conversation with Podesta, Kadzik relayed the results of that conversation to his partner at Dickstein Shapiro, Michael Green. The two calls took Kadzik a total of thirty minutes.\720\ According to an e-mail sent by Robert Fink to the rest of the Rich legal team: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \720\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0064 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). [Kadzik partner] Mike Green called after speaking with Peter [Kadzik] who spoke with Podesta: it seems that while the staff are not supportive they are not in a veto mode, and that your efforts with POTUS are being felt. It sounds like you are making headway and should keep at it as long as you can. We are definitely still in the game.\721\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \721\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00169 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 170). The e-mail message indicates that Podesta informed Kadzik that he and the other key White House staff did not support the Rich pardon, but at the same time, appeared to give Kadzik some encouragement, indicating that the President still might decide to grant the Rich pardon. However, when questioned about these discussions at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, both Podesta and Kadzik disowned the contents of the e-mail message. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Podesta described the conversation with Kadzik as follows: He told me he had been informed that the President had reviewed the submissions Mr. Quinn had sent in and was impressed with them and was once again considering the pardon. I told him I was strongly opposed to the pardons and that I did not believe they would be granted.\722\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \722\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). Kadzik likewise indicated that the e-mail describing his --------------------------------------------------------------------------- conversation with Podesta was inaccurate: Mr. LaTourette. [T]his e-mail in particular states that Mike Green spoke with Peter, who I assume is you, who spoke with Podesta; and that Podesta told Peter that while the staff are not supportive they are not in the veto mode. First of all, did Mr. Podesta communicate that to you on January 16th? Mr. Kadzik. No. . . . Again, he told me he was opposed to it, that the staff was opposed to it, but no final decision had been made and again the decision was the President's.\723\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \723\ Id. at 464-66 (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky). It is difficult to square the recollections of John Podesta and Peter Kadzik with the contents of the Robert Fink e-mail message. The e-mail message is consistent with the portrait of the White House painted by a number of other contemporaneous e- mail messages--namely that the White House staff opposed the Rich pardon, but was not fully engaged on the issue, and that the President was open to it. This is the message that the Marc Rich legal team was getting from its contacts with the White House, despite the after-the-fact characterizations from Podesta and Kadzik. 2. The January 16, 2001, White House Meeting Regarding Rich White House staff had a number of contacts with Jack Quinn and other lawyers representing Marc Rich regarding the Rich pardon in December 2000 and January 2001. Similarly, the President had contacts with individuals advocating on Rich's behalf during those two months. However, the first time that the President sat down with his staff to discuss the Rich pardon was January 16, 2001, just four days before the end of his Administration. The purpose of the January 16 meeting was for the President to discuss other clemency matters with White House staff. According to John Podesta, who was present at the meeting, President Clinton then initiated discussion of Marc Rich: [T]he President brought up the Rich case and told us that he thought Mr. Quinn had made some meritorious points in his submission. He clearly had digested the legal arguments presented by Mr. Quinn since he made a point of noting the Justice Department had abandoned the legal theory underlying the RICO count and mentioned the Ginsburg/Wolfman tax analyses. The staff informed the President that it was our view that the pardon should not be granted.\724\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \724\ Id. at 317 (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). Podesta interpreted the President's reaction to the views of the White House staff as meaning that ``he accepted our judgment and I didn't think this was a particularly active matter.'' \725\ Beth Nolan, who also attended the January 16 meeting, also remembered a fairly brief discussion: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \725\ Id. at 325. I don't recall that it was an extensive discussion. However, we were going through a number of pardon applications, and my memory is that it was a fairly brief discussion in which he heard from all of us our opposition. I didn't think it was going anywhere. . . . I did not believe that the pardon was going anywhere. He was familiar with it. He was sympathetic with it. And he was familiar with the issues, but I did not have the sense . . . at that meeting or until the 19th that he really was inclined to grant the pardon.\726\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \726\ Id. at 324-25 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). While Beth Nolan interpreted the President's comments as meaning that the Rich pardon was not ``going anywhere,'' Bruce Lindsey did not reach the same conclusion, informing the Committee, ``I clearly left the meeting understanding that no decision had been made. I don't know if I knew what was in his mind.'' \727\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \727\ Id. at 325 (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The account of the January 16, 2001, meeting appears to be an attempt by senior White House staff to explain why they were caught so unprepared when the President decided to grant the Marc Rich pardon three days later. As became clear on that day, White House staff knew little about the Rich case, and had not made any attempt to gather the necessary information. The ignorance of the senior White House staff meant that they were unable to provide any clear refutation of the arguments made by the Rich legal team. As explained by Beth Nolan, John Podesta, and to a lesser extent, Bruce Lindsey, they were caught unprepared because they simply did not believe that the President was going forward with the Rich pardon, based on the opposition that they expressed at the January 16 meeting. This argument explains why White House staff, while claiming to be opposed to the Rich pardon, did so little to actually keep it from being granted. However, the defense of the White House staff does not seem to comport fully with reality. While the President listened to the White House staff as they objected to the Rich pardon, he apparently did not say anything to indicate that he actually agreed with White House staff. Rather, he clearly expressed that he was sympathetic to the Rich pardon. If the White House staff were serious about opposing the Rich pardon, they would have done more than simply express their opposition to the pardon. They would have taken the time period between January 16 and January 20 to gather information about the Rich case, and present it to the President as reasons why he should not grant the pardon. Unfortunately, White House staff never took any such steps. 3. The Justice Department Receives Jack Quinn's January 10 Letter On January 17, 2001, the letter that Jack Quinn sent to Eric Holder on January 10, 2001, finally arrived at the Justice Department. Quinn had intended to have the letter delivered to Holder by messenger, but due to a secretarial error, the letter was sent to 901 E Street, in Washington, rather than the main Justice Department headquarters building, where Holder maintained his office.\728\ The January 10 letter from Quinn to Holder represented the only documentary information the Justice Department ever received regarding the Rich pardon. The cover letter from Quinn to Holder stated ``I hope you can say you agree with this letter. Your saying positive things, I'm told, would make this happen.'' Attached to the letter was a copy of Quinn's January 5 letter to President Clinton, which summarized the arguments made by Quinn in the Rich pardon petition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \728\ The Justice Department's Civil Division maintained offices at 901 E Street. While it is not clear why Quinn sent the letter to 901 E Street, the most obvious explanation is that Quinn's secretary had sent materials to the Justice Department Civil Division offices at 901 E Street in the past, and mistakenly assumed that Deputy Attorney General Holder had an office at 901 E Street as well. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Between January 10 and January 17, this letter made its way from the Justice Department offices at 901 E Street to the Justice Department Executive Secretariat, which is in charge of managing the paper flow at Justice Department headquarters. Despite the fact that the letter was addressed to the Deputy Attorney General, because it obviously related to pardon matters, the letter was directed to Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney. The Office of Pardon Attorney received the letter during the afternoon of January 18, and Adams saw it in his inbox on the morning of Friday, January 19.\729\ Adams drafted a short response to the Quinn letter, stating that neither Marc Rich nor Pincus Green had filed a pardon petition with the Justice Department, and advising Quinn that petition forms were available upon request from his office. Adams decided not to send the letter out, and instead hold it until the following Monday. Adams explained that he did not send the letter out because he recognized Jack Quinn's name, and knew that Quinn had substantial influence as a former White House Counsel, and acknowledged that he could not be certain of what was going on at the White House. Rather than send out what amounted to a rejection letter for a person who might yet receive a pardon later that day, Adams decided to hold the letter until after President Clinton left office, when he could be certain that Rich was not going to receive a pardon. As it turned out, Adams' fears were realized, and he never did mail the rejection letter. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \729\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 24 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Final Lobbying Contacts Leading up to January 19, 2001 As the Clinton Administration entered its final days, the Rich team increased its efforts. It was well known that the President was considering granting a large batch of pardons as one of his final acts as President. In fact, during his final visit to Arkansas as President on January 17, 2001, the President acknowledged this, asking reporters, ``You got anybody you want to pardon? Everybody in America either wants somebody pardoned or a national monument.'' \730\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \730\ Andrew Goldstein, Countdown to a Pardon, Time, Feb. 26, 2001, at 27. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Rich team increased the intensity of its lobbying campaign in the final days. First, Jack Quinn faxed a memo to Beth Nolan that purported to provide additional evidence that Rich had been singled out for prosecution. In a note at the top of the memo, Quinn wrote: ``This is FYI further to the point that no one else was prosecuted.'' \731\ In fact, the memo stands for the opposite point. The memo, which was drafted by a lawyer on the Rich legal team in 1988, provided a review of enforcement actions against individuals who had violated energy regulations. The memo concluded that ``[w]e have uncovered no case in which a jail sentence has been imposed for a willful violation of the PAM regulations, the conduct for which M[arc] R[ich] and P[incus] G[reen] have been indicted.'' \732\ Ironically, this memo, which was intended to provide support for the Rich case, actually weakens it. A close reading of the memo indicates that the Rich lawyers located 48 criminal cases brought for violations of the energy regulations, 14 of which resulted in jail time.\733\ The Rich legal team distinguished those cases on the thinnest of technical grounds, since those convictions were for ``miscertification'' of oil, not a violation of the permissible markup regulations. However, it is most likely that the memo had no impact on the White House's consideration of the Rich pardon, either pro or con, since the White House staff took little time to read the Rich pardon petition, much less extraneous information pertaining to the case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \731\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers to Scooter Libby (June 10, 1988) (Exhibit 63). \732\ Id. \733\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attorney Peter Kadzik called the White House on each of the last three days of the Clinton Administration, seeking information about the status of the Rich pardon. On January 18, January 19, and January 20, Kadzik called staff in John Podesta's office to see if the President had made any decisions on pardons. After the calls on the 19th and 20th, he relayed what he had learned to his partner Michael Green, who was also working on the Rich pardon.\734\ Kadzik characterized these calls as ministerial in nature--simply trying to determine whether any pardons had been granted, and if so, whether a list of pardons was available--as opposed to his earlier direct contacts with his client John Podesta.\735\ Nevertheless, Kadzik billed Marc Rich an hour for his work on January 18, half an hour for his work on January 19, and half an hour for his work on January 20.\736\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \734\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0065 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). \735\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 466 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky). \736\ Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0065 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). The billing entry on January 18 consists of two items, the call to the White House and a redacted entry. The entries on January 19 and January 20 each consist of two items, calls to the White House and Michael Green. Based on his descriptions of the calls to the White House, those calls should not have taken more then 6 minutes each, the minimum amount of time that could be billed at Dickstein Shapiro. While it is possible that Kadzik spent 54 minutes on other Marc Rich business on January 18, and 24 minutes speaking to Michael Green on January 19 and 20, the length of the periods of time billed during these days casts doubt either on Kadzik's description of the calls to the White House or the accuracy of his billing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- a. Jack Quinn's January 18, 2001, Letter to the President Also on January 18, 2001, Jack Quinn submitted a letter to the President ``to clarify several points with regard to the petition'' and to ``propose a solution to any concerns . . . regarding the setting of an unwise precedent involving individuals living outside the jurisdiction of our American country.'' \737\ In this letter, Quinn again attempted to refute the argument that Rich was a fugitive. To support his position, Quinn made three arguments, all of them spurious. First, Quinn claimed that ``much of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's professional lives have been spent abroad. . . . Thus, while they did not return to the United States following the issuance of the indictment, there is no question that this did not constitute a significant change in their international living circumstances.'' \738\ Second, Quinn claimed that Rich and Green ``violated no laws in not returning to the United States, and no violation of law with regard to their purported ``fugitivity'' ever has been alleged.'' \739\ Third, Quinn pointed out that Rich and Green ``have lived not as fugitives, but their residences and places of business always have been available to and known to the United States.'' \740\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \737\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton (Jan. 18, 2001)) (Exhibit 171). \738\ Id. \739\ Id. \740\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quinn's first point, that Rich and Green spent a great deal of time outside of the country prior to their indictment, was completely irrelevant. It is undisputed that Rich and Green refused to return after their indictment. Legally and practically, the fact that Rich and Green had houses in Switzerland prior to that indictment was meaningless. They fled to those homes in anticipation of the indictment and to avoid its consequences. That they managed to escape before rather than after the indictment is irrelevant.\741\ Quinn's second assertion, that Rich and Green had not violated the law by remaining outside of the United States, was completely wrong. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073, which outlaws fugitivity, states that: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \741\ U.S. v. Lupino, 171 F. Supp 648 (D.C. Minn. 1958). Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution . . . under the laws of the place from which he flees, for a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime . . . which is a felony under the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.\742\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \742\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073. This statute clearly proscribes the behavior of Marc Rich and Pincus Green, namely, traveling in foreign commerce to avoid prosecution for a felony. The fact that Rich and Green were never charged with violation of this statute has more to do with the fact that they were already facing numerous felony charges than any innocence on their part.\743\ Quinn's final point, rather than dispelling the argument that Rich and Green were fugitives, only shows the contempt with which they treated American laws. The fact that Rich and Green both lived in palatial estates in Switzerland, at addresses known to American authorities, did not mean that they were not fugitives. Swiss authorities refused to extradite Rich and Green, and they were therefore able to live their lives in comfort, rather than in hiding. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \743\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 123 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former assistant U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to the facile and irrelevant arguments regarding his clients' status as fugitives, Quinn also made an offer to President Clinton in the January 18 letter. Quinn stated that ``[m]y clients have authorized me to make it clear that they have always sought to negotiate a civil resolution with the government, and would willingly accept a disposition that would subject them to civil proceedings with the Department of Energy (or other appropriate agencies).'' \744\ While this offer might have appeared dramatic to President Clinton, someone with any understanding of the Rich case would have recognized that Rich and Green were not offering anything that they had not offered on any number of previous occasions. Throughout the Rich investigation, Rich's lawyers had offered to pay many millions of dollars to settle the case, as long as Rich was not required to serve jail time. This offer was repeatedly rejected by prosecutors, who recognized that Rich's crimes were of such a scale that jail time was amply justified. In addition, someone with knowledge of the Rich case would have recognized another serious flaw with Quinn's January 18 offer. All civil liability for Rich and Green was extinguished with the guilty pleas of the Rich companies, and that the only penalties available against Rich in 2001 were criminal.\745\ Thus, Rich's offer--to be subject to civil penalties that could not be applied against him--was an empty offer. However, this letter, and the empty offer in it, had an impact at the White House, as would be demonstrated the following day. It does not appear that Quinn had any misgivings about what was really at issue--Rich wanted to buy his way out of his legal predicament, and if this was not an option, he would not only eschew the United States, but also work against vital U.S. interests. It is an interesting commentary on Quinn that he appears to agree with the thesis that rich people should be able to pay money to avoid prison. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \744\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton (Jan. 18, 2001)) (Exhibit 171). \745\ At the Committee's hearing, Mr. Auerbach stated, ``The civil liabilities in this case were fully extinguished in 1984 when Marc Rich and Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co. International Limited paid $150 million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were corporate civil liabilities.'' ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 108 (Feb. 8, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Bruce Lindsey's Contacts with SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt In this same time period, Clinton aide Bruce Lindsey made an apparent effort to gather information to use in opposition to the Rich pardon. On the morning of January 17 or 18, Lindsey called Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC.\746\ Lindsey asked Levitt what he knew about Pinky Green.\747\ Levitt told Lindsey that he had never heard the name.\748\ Lindsey then told Levitt that Green was Marc Rich's business partner.\749\ Levitt told Lindsey that he would find out what he could about the matter. Levitt consulted with his staff, who informed him that the SEC had no information about Rich and Green, because theirs had been an IRS and Commodities and Futures Trading Commission matter, not an SEC matter.\750\ Levitt then left a message for Lindsey indicating that he was getting back to him about the Marc Rich matter. Lindsey called back that afternoon, and Levitt told Lindsey that the Rich matter was not in the SEC's jurisdiction. However, Levitt then added that he believed that pardons of Rich and Green would be a ``real bad idea.'' \751\ Lindsey agreed that Rich and Green were ``fugitives'' who had ``never set foot in the country'' and that this ``is not what pardons are intended for.'' \752\ Based on his contacts with Lindsey, Levitt assumed that Lindsey was personally opposed to the pardons of Rich and Green, and that he was looking for further justification or reinforcement for his position.\753\ Levitt also assumed that the pardons would not be granted, given Lindsey's great influence in the White House.\754\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \746\ Telephone Interview with Arthur Levitt (Feb. 20, 2001). \747\ Id. \748\ Id. \749\ Id. \750\ Id. \751\ Id. \752\ Id. \753\ Id. \754\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shortly after the call between Lindsey and Levitt, the Marc Rich team found out about the call. In the afternoon of January 19, Robert Fink e-mailed Avner Azulay, Mike Green, and Kitty Behan, and informed them that: I just spoke to Jack [Quinn]. He has not heard from the President, but agreed to call him as soon as he gets to a hard line phone (he was in the car). He said that the SEC knows of the request and for some reason opposed it. But not like they opposed Milken. He does not know how they learned of it. (He found out when the head of the SEC gave one of his partners a hard time about Marc yesterday.). We agree that is not good and that maybe the SDNY knows too, but we have no information on it. No other pardons have been announced yet, as far as we know. Bob \755\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \755\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production 00180 (E- mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 145). The Fink e-mail again confirms that the Rich team was counting on secrecy to achieve its objective. Fink's message shows the concern with which the Rich team reacted any time that any government agency outside of the White House received word of the effort to obtain the pardon. When questioned about this matter at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, Fink stated that he was concerned not that certain government agencies would learn of the pardon effort, but that he was concerned that the press would learn of it, and that the press' reaction ``would not be helpful for a thoughtful review of the pardon application.'' \756\ However, Fink's assertion is not plausible. Fink's contemporaneous e-mail specifically identifies the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York, not the public or the press, as a subject of concern. Fink's e-mail, along with other evidence, shows that Rich's lawyers were trying to keep the pardon effort from the prosecutors in New York, the people who knew the most about the Rich case and could do the most to thwart the pardon effort. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \756\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 509 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lindsey's interaction with Arthur Levitt on the Rich and Green pardons represents the only time that White House staff reached out to anyone other than Rich's lawyers and Eric Holder to gather information about the Rich case. It was a half- hearted effort, as the SEC was not involved in the Rich case, and had no information to offer. Lindsey's effort at outreach therefore demonstrated two important facts. First, it shows that Lindsey had little understanding of the Rich case, as he did not even know where to turn to get information about Rich. If Lindsey had turned to the Southern District of New York, rather than the SEC, he would have obtained voluminous information that refuted Quinn's arguments. Second, the Lindsey effort shows that there was a genuine rift between President Clinton and his closest advisor on this issue--to the extent that Lindsey even felt the need to gather outside information to bolster his case. G. January 19-20, 2001 The final full day of the Clinton Presidency was obviously a busy one. Early in the day, President Clinton reached an agreement with the Office of Independent Counsel whereby the President admitted that ``I acknowledge having knowingly violated Judge Wright's discovery orders in my deposition in [the Jones] case. I tried to walk a line between acting lawfully and testifying falsely but I now recognize that I did not fully accomplish this goal and that certain of my responses to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false.'' \757\ After making these admissions, which the President reportedly considered difficult to make, the President began final consideration of a number of grants of clemency.\758\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \757\ Neil A. Lewis, Transition in Washington: The President; Exiting Job, Clinton Accepts Immunity Deal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2001, at A1. \758\ Many, including Representative Waxman, have speculated that President Clinton was especially sensitive to ``overzealous prosecutors'' after making these admissions regarding his testimony in the Jones case. ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 341 (Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Henry Waxman). It is very possible that the President was motivated to issue a number of controversial grants of clemency in Independent Counsel cases as a result of his feelings about the Whitewater-Lewinsky investigation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. The Call Between Prime Minister Barak and President Clinton Also on the final day of his presidency, President Clinton made a number of farewell telephone calls to world leaders. Among these was a call to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Between 2:47 and 3:09 p.m., Clinton and Barak spoke.\759\ During that conversation, it appears that President Clinton brought up that Marc Rich matter: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \759\ Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel (Jan. 19, 2001) (Exhibit 148). President Clinton. [Redacted] I'm trying to do something on clemency for Rich, but it is very --------------------------------------------------------------------------- difficult. Prime Minister Barak. Might it move forward? President Clinton. I'm working on that but I'm not sure. I'm glad you asked me about that. When I finish these calls, I will go back into the meeting on that but I'm glad you raised it. Here's the only problem with Rich; there's almost no precedent in American history. There's nothing illegal about it but there's no precedent. He was overseas when he was indicted and never came home. The question is not whether he should get it or not but whether he should get it without coming back here. That's the dilemma I'm working through. I'm working on it. Prime Minister Barak. Okay.\760\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \760\ Id. There are two important aspects of this call. First, the transcript does not make it appear that Prime Minister Barak was tenaciously lobbying for the Rich pardon. The only comments he made at this critical juncture were ``Might it move forward?'' and ``Okay.'' Neither can be seen as a forceful request. In fact, the transcript raises the possibility that Prime Minister Barak, not President Clinton, brought up the Marc Rich pardon during the telephone call. Second, not in this call, or in any other call, did Prime Minister Barak claim that the Rich pardon would have any foreign policy benefits. These facts undermine the suggestions made by the President and his supporters which place great importance on the January 19 call by Prime Minister Barak. For example, in the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing, John Podesta stated that ``[w]hile the bulk of that [January 19] call concerned the situation in the Middle East, Prime Minister Barak raised the Rich matter at the end and asked the President once again to consider the Rich pardon.'' \761\ Bruce Lindsey testified that ``[i]n our meeting when he [the President] said Barak had raised it in his conversation that day he indicated that was, I think, the third time it had been raised by Mr. Barak.'' \762\ If the notes of the call prepared by the White House are correct, it appears that the President, not Prime Minister Barak, raised the question of the Marc Rich pardon during the January 19 telephone call. James Carville, a longtime defender of President Clinton, appeared on Meet the Press and stated that ``Prime Minister Barak made enormous concessions to try to get a peace agreement. It was very important to him. And on the last day, he called and said `look, I really would like for you to do this,' and the President did it.'' Again, Carville's description of the January 19 call was completely inaccurate and was either purposefully misleading or the result of false information provided to him by President Clinton or the President's staff. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \761\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). \762\ Id. at 431 (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Most importantly, both on January 19, and during the controversy about the Rich pardon that followed, President Clinton repeatedly suggested that the calls from Prime Minister Barak ``profoundly'' influenced his decision making.\763\ This claim was echoed by John Podesta at the Committee's March 1 hearing: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \763\ Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001). I do know that Mr. Barak--as Mr. Lindsey said and raised a couple of times--that was, as you properly point out, was an emotional time. The peace process obviously wasn't coming to fruition. He had enormous respect for Mr. Barak. I think Mr. Barak had asked him for several things, if you will, that were intended to show support for the State of Israel, not so much for Mr. Barak but for the State of Israel, including, for example, the pardon of Jonathan Pollard.\764\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \764\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 376 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). There is nothing in any of the discussions between Clinton and Barak, especially the January 19 discussion, that supports President Clinton's conclusion that the Rich pardon was especially important to Prime Minister Barak so that Barak's calls should have had a ``profound'' influence on the President. The actual transcripts of the calls suggest that, at least on January 19, the Rich pardon seemed to have a more prominent place in President Clinton's mind than in Prime Minister Barak's mind. 2. Eric Holder Weighs In At about 6:30 in the evening on January 19, 2001, Jack Quinn called the office of Eric Holder. Quinn said that the Rich pardon was receiving serious consideration at the White House and that the White House would be calling Holder for his opinion before any decision was made.\765\ Holder told Quinn that while he ``had no strong opposition based on [Quinn's] recitation of the facts, law enforcement in New York would strongly oppose it.'' \766\ Quinn's notes of the conversation with Holder indicate that Holder told Quinn that he had ``no personal prob[lem]'' with the Rich pardon, and that his personal feeling was that he was ``not strongly against'' it, but that the prosecutors in the Southern District would ``howl.'' \767\ It also appears that Quinn informed Holder that Prime Minister Barak had expressed support for the Rich pardon.\768\ Holder was told that Barak ``had weighed in strongly on behalf of the pardon request,'' and this assertion ``really struck'' Holder.\769\ It appears that Quinn learned of Barak's call to President Clinton from sources in Israel, likely Avner Azulay, rather than the White House.\770\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \765\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Jack Quinn). \766\ Id. at 194 (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). \767\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 172). \768\ In his hearing testimony, Holder stated that he did not recall whether he learned of Barak's support through Quinn or Nolan. However, Beth Nolan made it clear that Holder stated that he had heard that Barak was interested in the pardon, and explained that this new information moved his position from ``neutral'' to ``neutral leaning toward or neutral leaning favorable.'' See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). Given Nolan's seemingly clear recollection that Holder already knew about Barak's support when she spoke to him on January 19, it is fair to conclude that it was Quinn, rather than Nolan, who told Holder about the Barak call. \769\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). \770\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 348 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Earlier that afternoon, Cheryl Mills arrived in Washington from New York to visit the Clinton White House one last time. Mills spent some of the afternoon in the West Wing office of White House Counsel Beth Nolan. While Mills was in Nolan's office, Jack Quinn called for Nolan. Nolan told Mills that she was busy and couldn't take the call, and asked Mills to take it instead. Mills picked up the line, and spoke with Quinn. Quinn told Mills that he had recently spoken with Eric Holder, and that Holder informed him that his position on the Rich pardon was ``neutral, leaning favorable.'' Mills passed this information on to Nolan. Nolan understood Mills to say that Quinn had told her that Holder ``favored the pardon.'' \771\ Mills was surprised that Holder had taken such a positive position on the Rich pardon, as she believed him generally to be ``conservative'' with respect to pardons, and believed that under Holder the Justice Department ``had not fulfilled its pardon function.'' \772\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \771\ Id. at 354 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). \772\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate White House Counsel, in New York, NY (Mar. 19, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After Mills told Nolan that Quinn said that Holder ``favored the pardon,'' Nolan decided to call Holder herself to see if this was true. She called Holder at about 6:40 p.m.,\773\ and described her conversation with Holder as follows: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \773\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/ODAG-MR-00040 (Telephone log of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Jan. 22, 2001) (Exhibit 173). I had talked with him the first week in January about it, and I did not have the impression that he was in favor of it, so that's what I said. I said, I'm hearing you're in favor of it. I didn't think you were in favor --------------------------------------------------------------------------- of it. He said that he was neutral, which I think is the language he had used earlier in January about it. He-- and I said, well, I'm a little confused because I'm hearing that you're not just neutral. And he said that he, if--he had heard that Mr. Barak was interested, that if that were the case, while he couldn't judge the foreign policy arguments, he would find that very persuasive and that--and I finally said, well, are you? I still don't understand what neutral means here. And he described it as neutral leaning toward or neutral leaning favorable.\774\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \774\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). The position that Holder took in support of the Rich pardon took many by surprise. Obviously, Beth Nolan was surprised at Holder's position, especially when he had been neutral with respect to the pardon just two weeks earlier. Cheryl Mills was surprised, given what she considered Holder's ``conservative'' perspective on pardons. Other White House staff were surprised as well. After her call with Holder, Beth Nolan informed Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel that Holder was in favor of the Rich pardon. Angel, like the rest of the staff, opposed the pardon and exclaimed, ``Why the f**k would he say that?'' \775\ Nolan responded by shrugging her shoulders.\776\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \775\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). \776\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eric Holder's support for the Rich pardon would have a significant impact in the President's deliberations later that evening. Coming from the nation's second-ranking law enforcement official, Holder's support could easily counterbalance the objections to the Rich pardon made by White House staff. Holder's support also had the illusory effect of giving the Justice Department's blessing to the Rich pardon, when in reality, not a single individual at the Justice Department other than Eric Holder knew that the Rich pardon was even being considered. No information about the Rich pardon had been shared with the Justice Department through official channels. Indeed, Holder had a central responsibility for ensuring that no one else at the Justice Department knew that the pardon was even under consideration. Moreover, despite the fact that he had been on notice that Rich was seeking a pardon since November 2000, and that the White House was actively considering it in early January 2001, Holder made no attempt to contact prosecutors in the Southern District of New York to get their opinion regarding the case. One of the most serious questions before the Committee is why Holder decided to support the Rich pardon, given the paucity of information that Holder had about the matter. Holder had never seen any documents regarding the Rich pardon, and his sum total of knowledge about the Rich case came from a page of talking points provided to him by Jack Quinn in 2000, before the pardon effort had even begun. Holder offered a number of excuses for his decisionmaking, many of them conflicting, none of them convincing. First, Holder claimed that he was really neutral, not in favor of, the Rich pardon: Neutral meaning I don't have a basis to form an opinion consistent with what I told him before. . . . I was neutral because I didn't have a basis to make a determination. I have not seen anything on the pardon. I'm now saying that I'm neutral consistent with what I said before, leaning toward it if there were a foreign policy benefit. I could not make the determination if there were foreign policy benefit[s].\777\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \777\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 201 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). Holder's claims of ``neutrality'' are completely implausible. First, everyone who had contact with Holder on this matter took Holder's words as being in support of the Rich pardon. Second, Holder had to have known that when he was asked for his opinion regarding a prosecution which had been brought by his agency, if he said that he was ``neutral, leaning towards favorable,'' it was tantamount to supporting the pardon. Representative Barr pointed this fact out to Holder in --------------------------------------------------------------------------- the Committee's February 8 hearing: Mr. Barr. [I]n one conversation, you were swayed from let's give you the benefit of the doubt that you didn't know anything about the case and it was unremarkable to you, to understanding that it was important enough for a foreign leader to become personally involved in, and just based on that information alone . . . not having heard anything back from your prosecutors who identified this case as one of the most significant in white collar crime history, you all of a sudden become leaning toward favorably simply because some foreign leader, for whatever reason, [says] that he wants us to act favorably on this pardon? Mr. Holder. What I said was that I was neutral leaning toward. Neutral, meaning consistent with what I said before, which was I don't have a basis to one way or the other-- Mr. Barr. Is that your presumption as the second top official at Justice, that if somebody comes in and asks you about a pardon that you don't know anything about, that your position is immediately neutral and therefore their job is to move you toward favorable? I mean, wouldn't your position as a prosecutor be you stand by your prosecutors and your initial position when you don't know about a case is to oppose it? Mr. Holder. No. Without a basis to know whether--how the decision should go, I think it would be incumbent upon-- Mr. Barr. Don't you presume that your prosecutors have prepared good cases, and therefore you would operate from the presumption as their superior at the Department of Justice that you were going to stand by them and not take a neutral position? \778\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \778\ Id. at 209-10 (statement of the Honorable Bob Barr and testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). What Holder could not see, or would not admit to, even after it was made clear by Representative Barr, was that when he refused to support the work of the prosecutors in his own office, it amounted to one of the largest expressions of support for the Rich pardon that any independent party could muster. Holder also attempted to argue that he was presumptively neutral on the Rich case because Rich was a fugitive, and Holder had supported a pardon for another fugitive several years earlier. I did not reflexively oppose it [the Rich pardon] because I had previously supported a successful pardon request for a fugitive, Preston King, who, in the context of a selective service case, had been discriminated against in the 1950's because of the color of his skin.\779\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \779\ Id. at 194 (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). Holder's argument amounts to a claim that since he once supported a pardon for a fugitive, he had to support all future pardon requests by fugitives. Holder's bizarre argument actually treats fugitivity as a bonus in the consideration of a pardon, rather than a criminal act. Mere incompetence cannot account for Eric Holder's decisionmaking in the Marc Rich case. Holder knew about Jack Quinn's efforts to obtain a pardon for Rich as early as November 2000, yet he never mentioned the effort to prosecutors in New York or the Pardon Attorney. Holder kept this information from them, even though he knew that they would vehemently oppose any effort to pardon Rich. Perhaps more important, he never made an effort to educate himself about the facts of the case. These efforts to keep prosecutors from finding out what was happening, in conjunction with Holder's complete inability to explain or defend his decisionmaking, make the concerns regarding Eric Holder's motivations even more serious. During the Committee's February 8 hearing, at least one potential motivation for Holder was revealed. Holder asked Jack Quinn for his support to have Holder nominated as Attorney General in a future Gore Administration.\780\ Quinn recalled such a discussion, but claimed that it was in the fall, prior to the election, and prior to the filing of the Rich pardon petition.\781\ However, Holder allowed that there might have been more than one discussion with Quinn regarding his appointment as Attorney General.\782\ When asked about this matter, Holder angrily denied that his efforts to be appointed as Attorney General, and his solicitation of Quinn's support, had any effect on his decisionmaking: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \780\ Id. at 202. \781\ Id. (testimony of Jack Quinn). \782\ Id. (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). My actions in this matter were in no way affected by my desire to become Attorney General of the United States, any desires I had to influence or seek to curry favor with anybody. I did what I did in this case based only on the facts that were before me, the law as I understood it and consistent with my duties as Deputy Attorney General, nothing more than that.\783\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \783\ Id. at 203. Holder's impassioned defense would be more believable if Holder's decisionmaking could be justified based on the facts that were in front of him. However, given his complete inability to justify his decision to keep the Rich matter from the rest of the Justice Department and his position in favor of the Rich pardon when he knew next to nothing about the case, the Committee must question Holder's motivations. 3. The January 19 Meeting Between White House Staff and President Clinton After hearing from Deputy Attorney General Holder, Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, John Podesta, Meredith Cabe, Eric Angel, and Cheryl Mills all went to an Oval Office meeting with President Clinton to discuss the President's last grants of clemency.\784\ This meeting took place at approximately 7:00 p.m. The presence of Cheryl Mills, who at this time was not a government employee, and had not been for over a year, has raised two serious concerns. First, Mills might have been exposed to information, that as a private citizen, she was not legally entitled to review. Certainly, if minimal due diligence regarding the Rich pardon had been performed, Mills would have been exposed to a considerable amount of highly classified information. Furthermore, even NCIC information on Rich and Green would have been inappropriate to disseminate to a private citizen like Mills. Second, at the time, Mills was a trustee of the Clinton Library. As a trustee, Mills was responsible for supervising the effort to construct the Library. However, Mills claimed that she was unaware both of general fundraising efforts, and of Denise Rich's large contributions to the Library. The White House staff present at the meeting explained that Mills was invited to the meeting because of her substantial knowledge regarding the various independent counsel investigations of the Clinton Administration.\785\ The bulk of this meeting concerned pardons relating to various investigations by independent counsels, and Mills was asked for her opinion on whether various individuals involved in these investigations should receive pardons.\786\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \784\ Id. at 428 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House); Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). \785\ During her tenure as Associate White House Counsel and then Deputy White House Counsel, Mills was one of the primary lawyers handling scandal-related matters at the Clinton White House. \786\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001); See also ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 328 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After a lengthy discussion regarding the Independent Counsel-related pardons, the President raised the issue of Marc Rich. President Clinton said that he had received a message from Jack Quinn,\787\ and that he had also received a call from Prime Minister Barak. Bruce Lindsey clearly recalled that the President stated that ``Prime Minister Barak had spoken to him that afternoon and had asked him again--I don't believe it was the first time that the Prime Minister had raised the Marc Rich pardon--had asked him again to consider it.'' \788\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \787\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). Quinn's phone records indicate that he called the President at 12:29 p.m. on January 19 for a duration of two minutes. Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone bill of Jack Quinn, Feb. 9, 2001) (Exhibit 174). It appears that Quinn did not actually speak to the President, but rather left a message, which was returned in the evening. \788\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 347 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House). See also id. at 328. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Before the President raised the Marc Rich matter, everyone on the White House staff thought it was a dead letter, and had not prepared for the issue to be brought up at the January 19 meeting.\789\ Nevertheless, once the President raised the matter, Nolan, Lindsey, Cabe, and Angel all expressed their opposition to the Rich pardon.\790\ Those present recall Lindsey giving a strong statement of opposition, focusing on the fact that Rich and Pincus Green were fugitives from justice who had never faced the charges against them.\791\ The basic thrust of all of the arguments offered by the staff focused on the fact that Rich and Green were fugitives. When asked about the strength of the arguments made by Rich and Green, Meredith Cabe stated that if their arguments were strong, Rich and Green could obviously finance an excellent defense, and they should make those arguments in court.\792\ During this discussion, Beth Nolan also expressed her opposition to the pardon. However, she also informed the President that Eric Holder was ``leaning toward'' the granting of the pardon. A number of individuals involved in the decisionmaking process have identified Holder's position as being a significant factor in the President's decisionmaking.\793\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \789\ Id. at 344-45 (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). \790\ Id. at 110. See also Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). John Podesta was present for the portion of the meeting where the independent counsel pardons were discussed, but left the meeting prior to the discussion of Marc Rich to tape a television appearance. \791\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). \792\ Id. \793\ See ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 367 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As the White House staff argued against the Rich pardon, Cheryl Mills questioned their knowledge of the case. Mills pointed out that the White House Counsel's Office staff was not responding to the substantive issues raised in the Marc Rich petition. Mills specifically pointed out that Bruce Lindsey was not the best person to give an opinion on the Rich case since he had not even read the petition.\794\ It appears that no one among the six individuals discussing the Rich pardon had even read through the 31-page petition. At this point, Mills outlined what she did know about the case, based on her review of materials provided to her by Jack Quinn. The President then asked her what she thought about the arguments made by Quinn about Rich's fugitive status in his January 18 letter. Mills stated that she did not find Quinn's arguments persuasive.\795\ She did say that the President should look at the selective prosecution argument which had been raised by Rich. According to Beth Nolan, Mills said that the White House should be looking at the selective prosecution argument ``seriously.'' \796\ But then Mills told them ``you know me, I don't care about rich white guys,'' and then argued that American blacks were selectively prosecuted every day.\797\ Of the individuals present at the meeting, only Mills made any statements that can be construed as anything other than negative about the Rich petition. The President indicated he was interested in the matter, but did not make any clear statements that he was going to issue the Rich pardon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \794\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001). \795\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). \796\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 346 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). \797\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After this discussion, the President indicated that he had to return Quinn's call. He did not indicate whether he had made up his mind on the Rich pardon. It was clear, though, that the President still had a strong interest in the matter. 4. The President's Call to Jack Quinn The President then tracked down Jack Quinn, who was having dinner at the home of a friend. Clinton spoke to Quinn about the Rich case. According to Quinn, this conversation lasted approximately twenty minutes. Before the call, Robert Fink e- mailed Quinn the following suggestion: ``I would say, Do it for me. I know it is deserved.'' \798\ Also providing a suggestion as to the topics discussed between Quinn and President Clinton is a list of bullet points apparently prepared by Quinn for the call: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \798\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00406 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 175). <bullet> unusual <bullet> but not unworthy <bullet> never was a case <bullet> tax RICO fraud <bullet> stayed away--publicity <bullet> CTS/RUDY SAY OVERREACHED <bullet> will submit to some civil processes in ARCO <bullet> others similarly sit. <bullet> controversial/defensible <bullet> humanitarian record since that time <bullet> Ken Starr <bullet> Ira[n]-Contra <bullet> inequity <bullet> bias--rich Jew <bullet> Israel \799\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \799\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 176). As has been discussed throughout this report, most of Quinn's apparent arguments were completely false, ranging from the assertion that there ``never was a case,'' to the claim that other similarly situated defendants were subject to civil penalties, to the preposterous claim that Rich was targeted because he was Jewish. According to Quinn, ``President Clinton had obviously read and studied the pardon petition. He grasped the essence of my argument about this case being one that should have been handled civilly, not criminally, and he discussed with me whether the passage of time would permit statute of limitations defenses in such a civil proceeding.'' \800\ After President Clinton expressed this opinion, Quinn told the President that he ``would happily give him a letter waiving those defenses, and he insisted that I provided one to him within an hour.'' \801\ Quinn has testified that his discussion with the President was limited to the law and the facts of the Rich case, and at no time touched upon the financial contributions of Denise Rich. After getting off the phone with the President, Quinn drafted a short letter making the necessary waiver. The letter reads as follows: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \800\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 70 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). \801\ Id. I am writing to confirm that my clients, Marc Rich and Pincus Green, waive any and all defenses which could be raised to the lawful imposition of civil fines or penalties in connection with the actions and transactions alleged in the indictment against them pending in the Southern District of New York. Specifically they will not raise the statute of limitations or any other defenses which arose as a result of their absense [sic].\802\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \802\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 177). This letter was then faxed to the White House, where it was apparently provided to the President and the relevant White House staff. It was after the telephone call with Jack Quinn that President Clinton apparently decided to grant the pardons to Marc Rich and Pincus Green. The President himself has pointed to this agreement as a significant concession that he was able to obtain from Jack Quinn and Marc Rich.\803\ That the assurances given by Jack Quinn had any impact on President Clinton's decisionmaking is deeply troubling. The promise made by Quinn was an empty promise for at least three reasons. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \803\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2001 (Exhibit 178). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- First, Quinn agreed to waive a defense that Marc Rich and Pincus Green could not use in any event. Due to their absence from the United States, Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not have a statute of limitations defense to waive. The statute of limitations provision of the Petroleum Overcharge Distribution and Restitution Act of 1986 \804\ would apply to any civil enforcement action imposing civil penalties on Marc Rich and Pincus Green for violations of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 \805\ and the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.\806\ The limitations provision provides that a civil enforcement action cannot be commenced after the later of September 30, 1988, or six years after the date of the violation.\807\ It appears that this provision would provide a defense for Marc Rich and Pincus Green; however, immediately following the limitations provision are exceptions tolling the limitations period. The first exception provides: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \804\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. Sec. 4501-4507 (2001). \805\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. Sec. 751-760(h) (2001), omitted pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 760(g). \806\ 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1904 (1976) omitted, pursuant to Pub.L. 91- 151, Title II, Sec. 211. \807\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4504(a)(1). (1) In computing the periods established in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1) of this --------------------------------------------------------------------------- section, there shall be excluded any period-- (A) during which any person who is or may become the subject of a civil enforcement action is outside the United States, has absconded or concealed himself, or is not subject to legal process.\808\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \808\ 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4504(b)(1)(A). Therefore, according to the plain meaning of the statute, the time Marc Rich and Pincus Green were outside the United States tolled the statute of limitations. Furthermore, a look at the legislative history of this provision shows that Congress intended this result. Congress enacted the limitations provision with the intent that all alleged violations of the law would be pursued expeditiously but it did not intend for those who violated the laws to escape prosecution.\809\ It is evident from the plain meaning of the statute, as well as the legislative history, that Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not have a statute of limitations defense to raise, but that, in fact, their absence tolled the limitations period. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \809\ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1012, at 234 (1986). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Second, it appears almost certain that Rich does not have any civil liability relating to the charges against him in 1983. Martin Auerbach, one of the main prosecutors responsible for investigating Rich, opined that ``[t]he civil liabilities in this case were fully extinguished in 1984 when Marc Rich and Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co. International Limited paid $150 million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were corporate civil liabilities.'' \810\ When asked about Rich's promise to pay civil liabilities, Sandy Weinberg stated, ``What civil penalties? The civil penalties already have been extracted, $200 million worth. They were corporate liabilities and were already handled through plea agreements. This is about as big an empty promise as can be made.'' \811\ Rich's own lawyers agree with the assessment of the prosecutors. Michael Green, one of the main lawyers representing Rich, stated that ``[w]e think he [Marc Rich] owes no civil liabilities.'' \812\ Perhaps the most telling sign is that over a year after the Rich pardon, the Department of Energy has taken no action to collect civil penalties from Rich.\813\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \810\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 108 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Martin Auerbach, former assistant U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). \811\ Jerry Seper, Pardoned Financier Gives ``Empty Promise,'' Ex- Prosecutor Says, Wash. Times, Jan. 30, 2001, at A1. \812\ Raymond Bonner and Alison Leigh Cowan, Notes Show Justice Official Knew of Pardon Application, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at A14. \813\ Department of Energy staff have informed the Committee that they are still reviewing the Rich case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Third, to the extent that civil penalties were available, Marc Rich had been willing to pay as much as $100 million to settle the case against him, going back to the early 1980s. What Rich had feared though, and was not willing to accept, was any time in jail. Rather than representing a concession, the agreement between the President and Quinn represented exactly what Rich had been demanding all along. It cannot be disputed that the deal the President reached with Jack Quinn on January 19, 2001, was a hollow, meaningless deal. The only remaining question is whether the President's mistake was the result of ignorance, part of his complete failure to conduct any research about the Marc Rich case, or whether the President knew it was an empty agreement and made it solely to provide window dressing for his decision. Since this question goes to the heart of whether or not President Clinton's decision was corrupt, it is difficult for the Committee to reach a conclusion on this question, absent additional information from individuals who have refused to cooperate with the Committee's investigation. However, it is difficult to understand why President Clinton would enter into these kinds of negotiations with Jack Quinn, reach this kind of agreement, and then use the agreement as a justification for granting the pardon without even checking with someone who understood the case to see if the agreement had substance. President Clinton knew that his staff had not even read Quinn's submissions to the White House, much less spoken to parties outside the White House about the Rich matter. Therefore, President Clinton, if he was attempting to reach a reasonable decision in the Rich matter, should have understood the need to turn to someone who understood the case to assist him in the matter. That he did not seek such advice raises further questions about his decisionmaking, and about his motive for issuing the Rich and Green pardons. 5. The White House Informs the Justice Department of the Decision President Clinton apparently made the decision to pardon Rich and Green in the evening of January 19, 2001. After the President made the decision, Bruce Lindsey and Beth Nolan were informed of the decision. Nolan then asked Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe to inform the Justice Department, and have the Justice Department perform a National Crime Information Center (``NCIC'') check on Rich and Green. It was standard procedure for the Justice Department to perform this kind of check on an individual before they received a pardon, even under the dramatically truncated background checks employed by the Clinton Administration in January 2001. The purpose of the NCIC check was to ensure that the individual receiving the pardon did not have any outstanding warrants or criminal charges. Shortly after midnight on January 20, 2001, less than twelve hours before the end of the Clinton Administration, Cabe telephoned Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney, and informed him that she would be faxing over a list of additional individuals to whom President Clinton was considering granting pardons.\814\ When the list arrived, Adams saw the names of Marc Rich and Pincus Green on the list. This was the first time that Adams had heard of Rich or Green being considered for pardons. Adams saw that the faxed list did not contain any identifying information for Rich or Green, so he called Cabe to ask for additional information.\815\ Cabe provided Adams with dates of birth and social security numbers for Rich and Green. Cabe then informed Adams that she expected that there would be little information on them, because they had been ``living abroad'' for several years.\816\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \814\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 22-23 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice). \815\ Id. at 23. \816\ Id.; Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While the FBI conducted the NCIC check on Rich and Green, the White House Counsel's Office faxed further information on Rich, consisting of several pages from Quinn's pardon petition, to the Pardon Attorney's Office.\817\ Based on his review of these pages, Roger Adams understood the full magnitude of the Rich and Green case for the first time. He saw that they had been indicted 17 years earlier in New York, and had remained fugitives since then. A member of Adams' staff then began to conduct internet research on Rich and Green.\818\ While Adams's staff was attempting to gather information about Rich and Green, the FBI faxed the results of the NCIC check to Adams. The NCIC check revealed that Rich and Green were fugitives wanted for mail and wire fraud, arms trading, and tax evasion.\819\ Adams drafted a summary of the charges against Rich and Green, and faxed the summary to the White House shortly before 1:00 a.m. on January 20.\820\ At this point, Adams was obviously concerned about the effort to pardon Rich and Green, and called his superior at the Justice Department, Deputy Attorney General Holder, at home.\821\ Adams informed Holder that President Clinton was considering granting pardons to Rich and Green. Holder then informed Adams that he was aware of the pending clemency requests from Rich and Green.\822\ According to Holder, when he received this call from Roger Adams, it was the first time that he actually thought that the Rich pardon was likely to be granted.\823\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \817\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice). \818\ Id. \819\ Id.; Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001). \820\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice). \821\ Id. \822\ Id. \823\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After his brief conversation with Holder, Adams received another call from the White House Counsel's office, which by this time had received Adams' summary of the charges against Rich and Green. During this conversation, Adams told Meredith Cabe that in addition to the charges against Rich, there was a customs alert posted for Rich and Green and that he believed this was significant. Apparently not trusting Adams' summary, Cabe asked Adams to fax over the original printout from the NCIC check that was performed by the FBI. Adams faxed the printout over, as well as the articles that his staff had been able to locate through their Internet searches.\824\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \824\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23-24 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- What had caused such concern at the White House was the reference in the NCIC check to ``arms trading.'' No one at the White House had ever heard that Rich or Green had been involved in arms trading. Cabe and Eric Angel took the information about arms trading to Beth Nolan. Nolan and Cheryl Mills were in Nolan's office. Bruce Lindsey had apparently left the White House for the evening. Cabe gave Nolan and Mills the information, which had been provided to her by the Pardon Attorney's office. Nolan compared the information in the NCIC printout to the Rich and Green indictment, attempting to discern whether they had been charged with arms trading in 1983, or whether this was new information. Cabe, Angel, Mills, and Nolan were unable to come to any definitive answer as to whether the information about arms trading was already known, or whether this was new information which would complicate the effort to issue a pardon. At the time, they speculated that either this was a new charge for which Rich and Green were wanted, unrelated to their 1983 indictment, or this was the way that the NCIC database referred to the Trading with the Enemy count which was part of their indictment.\825\ In short, however, they did not have an understanding of what the ``arms trading'' reference meant. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \825\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 374-75 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The meaning of the ``arms trading'' reference in the NCIC is not entirely clear, since none of the charges in Rich and Green's 1983 indictment related to arms trading. The NCIC printout itself, however, does not support the speculation by the White House staff that the ``arms trading'' reference was just another term for trading with the enemy. The printouts for Marc Rich from the NCIC database show separate entries for ``trading with the enemy'' and ``arms trading,'' suggesting that they are separate offenses.\826\ Given the fact that on its face the NCIC printout raises serious questions about Rich being wanted for arms trading, President Clinton clearly should have made a serious inquiry to determine what the arms trading entry meant before granting the Marc Rich pardon.\827\ Instead, he did not make a single inquiry of law enforcement. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \826\ Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/SDNY-MR-00021- 23 (NCIC Printouts for Pincus Green and Marc Rich (Mar. 3, 1992, and Mar. 18, 1994)) (Exhibit 179). \827\ The Committee is not aware of any criminal charges that have been lodged against Rich or Green for illegal arms trading. There are numerous reports, however, that Marc Rich is involved in trafficking weapons, included sophisticated missile guidance systems. This arms dealing activity may or may not be legal. See, e.g., A. Craig Copetas, Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-Dollar Scam 131 (1985) (indicating that Rich paid for Iranian oil with small arms, automatic rifles, and hand-held rockets); Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), Playboy, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104 (indicating that Rich bought gas- fired gyroscopes from North Korea and sold them to Iran). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- To try to figure out a response to this new piece of information, Nolan, Mills, Cabe, and Angel called Bruce Lindsey. Lindsey did not have any insight regarding the arms trading information, but reiterated his opposition to the Rich pardon, and stated that the arms trading information was yet another reason not to issue the pardon.\828\ Nolan then called Jack Quinn. Quinn expressed irritation to be receiving a call at 2:00 a.m.\829\ Quinn also was not immediately responsive to the concerns Nolan was raising.\830\ Quinn told Nolan that he ``would have known if [Rich] had been charged with that.'' Apparently Nolan, and Cheryl Mills as well, did not consider that a satisfactory answer, and pressed Quinn for more information. Mills told Quinn that ``you've got to work with us here.'' \831\ At that point, Quinn told Nolan and the others that he would check back on this issue and call them back.\832\ Shortly thereafter, Quinn called back and forcefully told Nolan and the others that he had no knowledge about any arms trading charges against Rich.\833\ He told them to look at the indictment against Rich, and that the indictment ``was the only thing out there.'' \834\ Quinn's answer was obviously non- responsive but no one appears to have taken any steps to obtain a responsive answer. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \828\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). \829\ Id. \830\ Id. \831\ Id. \832\ Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 19, 2001); Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). \833\ Id. \834\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At the Committee's March 1 hearing, Nolan was asked why she did not take any further steps to determine exactly what charges were outstanding against Marc Rich. Nolan's answer was less than satisfactory: Mr. Burton. An intelligence agency tells you that there was arms trading, a violation of law, and all these other things had taken place which had not just been revealed or checked; and you take the man's word or the President takes his word on the pardon of one of the most wanted fugitives in the world who renounced his citizenship and all the other things we talked about. You took his word when Mr. Quinn was representing him. And Mr. Quinn said in previous testimony the last time he was here, my job wasn't to tell all the facts that were against the pardon. My job was to point out all the reasons why there should be a pardon. You know as an attorney that's what you do. You try to make the best case for your client. Why in the world would you go to Mr. Quinn when there was a question of illegal activity and say, hey, what about this? You know darn well he's going to say, oh, that's nothing. That was just a minor thing. That was probably not arms trading. It was oil trading or something else. Why would you take his word for it and why would the President take his word for it and then go ahead and grant the pardon? I just don't understand it. It eludes me. Would you explain that to me? * * * Ms. Nolan. This was 2:30 a.m. My eyes were officially stuck together by then. I had my contact lenses in since 7 or 6 the morning before. I had been going on a couple hours of sleep most nights that week, as had the President; and I think frankly, as Mr. Podesta said, because this came up so late we did not do the kind of checks that we would have if we would have had the time. . . . As Mr. Lindsey indicated, he had indeed indicated that, understand Mr. Quinn is not your advisor, he is an advocate. But I do think that the President viewed Mr. Quinn as somebody who he truly did trust to give him correct information; and as far as we know that information was correct, not incorrect. * * * Mr. Burton. I'm running out of time here. Was Mr. Quinn at the White House? Ms. Nolan. No. Mr. Burton. So you had the ability with your eyes stuck together to get ahold of Mr. Quinn, but you didn't try to contact the Justice Department to ask them about it because it was 2:30 a.m.? And you can get a hold of the man who is an advocate for pardoning one of the most wanted fugitives in the world, but you don't call the Justice Department or the intelligence agency at 2:30 a.m.? I don't understand that.\835\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \835\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 379 (Mar. 1, 2001). After the final conversation with Quinn, at 2:30 a.m., Nolan called President Clinton. Nolan told the President that they had performed an NCIC check, which showed that Rich was a wanted fugitive, and also revealed new information suggesting that Rich was wanted for arms trading. Nolan then told the President that the White House did not have any information showing that the NCIC information was inaccurate, other than --------------------------------------------------------------------------- what Quinn had told them: I said all we have is Jack Quinn's word that the arms trading is not, in fact, an issue for Mr. Rich. * * * [T]hat's when I said, you know, what we have is Jack Quinn's word; that's all we have at this hour. And he said, take Mr. Quinn's word, or take Jack's word.\836\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \836\ Id. at 378, 429 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). With that sentence--``take Jack's word''--President Clinton decided to grant the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Nolan informed Cheryl Mills and Meredith Cabe, both of whom were in her office, of the decision, and then went home for the evening. The actual master warrant granting pardons to Marc Rich, Pincus Green, and 139 others was prepared at the Justice Department, and then delivered to the White House on the morning of January 20. The warrants were then signed by President Clinton. H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons 1. Eric Holder's Congratulatory Remarks The first reaction of the Marc Rich legal team to the pardons was one of happiness and self-congratulation. By Monday, January 22, they had turned to more practical concerns, like having the travel restrictions and arrest warrants for Rich and Green lifted. Jack Quinn spoke with Eric Holder, who was now Acting Attorney General. Quinn asked Holder what steps needed to be taken to ensure that Rich and Green were not arrested when they traveled. Holder told Quinn he needed to have detainers removed from computers, as well as inform Interpol of the pardon.\837\ Apparently, Holder thought that the Southern District of New York might resist the pardon, and refuse to dismiss the indictment. In that case, Holder counseled Quinn, Rich and Green to move to dismiss the indictment in court.\838\ According to Jack Quinn, who took notes of the conversation, Holder said that Quinn ``did a very good job.'' \839\ Holder also gave Quinn advice on how to handle the burgeoning media requests regarding the pardon effort, telling Quinn that he should ``make public [their] commitment to waive defenses to civil penalties at [DOE] and tthe [sic] support of [B]arak.'' \840\ Also in this same conversation, Holder asked Quinn to consider hiring two of his former aides at the Justice Department.\841\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \841\ Id. Holder sent the resumes of the two aides, former Associate Deputy Attorney General Bernard J. Delia and former Associate Deputy Attorney General Nicholas M. Gess, later that day. Jack Quinn Document Production (Fax from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn (dated Dec. 1, 2000, date stamped by fax machine Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 182). In addition, at least one of these aides, Nick Gess, called Quinn as early as January 2, 2001, presumably seeking a job. The telephone message reads, ``Calling at Holder's suggestion.'' See Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Nick Gess, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 183). \837\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). \838\ See Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 180); Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 181). \839\ Id. \840\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 180). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Holder has offered evolving accounts of his congratulatory remarks to Jack Quinn. At first, Holder's supporters informed the press that his comments to Quinn were ``sarcastic, not congratulatory.'' \842\ Then, when questioned about this matter at the Committee's hearing, Holder denied making the comments at all.\843\ Given the fact that Quinn took notes and sent an e-mail contemporaneously with the conversation with Holder, and that Holder has offered conflicting accounts of the conversation, it appears that Holder has not offered an honest explanation, and that he did indeed make the congratulatory comments to Quinn. Such comments support the Committee's conclusion that Eric Holder was sympathetic to the Marc Rich pardon or was willing, through his own inaction, to see the pardon granted so as not to interfere with his other interests. It is also worth noting that Holder, who had himself sought Quinn's support for his appointment as Attorney General if Vice President Gore won the presidency, continued to seek Quinn's support for finding employment for his underlings, even after the Rich pardon had been granted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \842\ Lucy Howard, Susannah Meadows, Bret Begun and Katherine Stroup, Periscope, Newsweek, Feb. 12, 2001, at 6. \843\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 215 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The Rich Team's Effort to Deal with the Press After Holder's congratulations, things began to go downhill for the Marc Rich team. By the end of the day on Monday, January 22, it became clear that the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green were going to be a major news story. E-mails between Rich's representatives showed that they were having some difficulty dealing with this unforeseen consequence of the pardons. Rich lawyer Robert Fink began by asking how he should deal with press calls: I have been asked who lobbied the President in behalf of Marc (and Pinky) and said it may be private and therefore did not immediately respond. May I? Who should I say? I have told everyone that Denise was in favor of the resolution of this case and was in favor of the pardon.\844\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \844\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69). Rich's representative in Israel, Avner Azulay, was concerned --------------------------------------------------------------------------- about the publicity: Pse [sic] keep barak [sic] out of the media. We have enough names on the list other than his. Important to keep all politicians out of the story. Pse [sic] share with me the inclusion of any one on the list. This is election time here and has a potential of blowup. A newsweek reporter here has already asked if there were any political contributions. Other than that I thought we agreed that all inquiries, interviews should be channeled to [G]ershon. Why is B[ob] F[ink] giving interviews? He shouldn't be dealing with this aspect.\845\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \845\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jack Quinn also made a case for further disclosure: I have this very great concern: we are withholding our very good and compelling petition from the press only to protect the tax professors who don't want to be too far out front. The tail is wagging the dog. I think it is critical that one of us sit down with some journalist and share the petition. I hope I'm not over- reacting, but thins [sic] is my best judgment. I'd do it with the NY Times. In the next hour or so. Is that possible? \846\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \846\ Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00195 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 184). Avner Azulay agreed with the need to make the tax professors' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- opinion public: You are right. Why do we have to worry so much about the professors. They did a job and there is nothing wrong in giving expert onions [sic]. A lot know about it, including the doj and sdny. It is part of the petition. Why hide it? \847\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \847\ Id. The e-mails indicate that Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman expressed some hesitancy to have their work for Marc Rich publicly disclosed. When asked if Professor Ginsburg was hesitant to be linked to the Rich case because it might harm the reputation of his wife, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Quinn said Professor Ginsburg's, and Professor Wolfman's concerns were limited to a fear of being ``besieged with media requests.'' \848\ It appears that the professors' concerns were more serious than fear of dealing with a barrage of press calls, and it stands to reason that they were concerned about having their reputations tarnished by having the public know of their lucrative work for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \848\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 180 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While they were deciding how to deal with the public, the Marc Rich team was also receiving communications from former President Clinton. On January 23, Anne McGuire, an associate at Quinn Gillespie, e-mailed Jack Quinn to let him know that she had heard from Clinton Library fundraiser Peter O'Keefe: Just got a weird call from Peter O'Keefe--was up in Chappaqua for the last few days--he asked me to check with you on whether or not you were going to go out and start defending vigorously--said ``we wanted to find out.'' I am assuming he meant Terry [McAuliffe]--but I did not go into it on the cell phone.\849\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \849\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Anne McGuire, Associate, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 185). Shortly after her conversation with O'Keefe, McGuire spoke to Terry McAuliffe and asked Quinn to ``[c]all me as soon as you can.'' Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Anne McGuire, Associate, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 186). The timing of McAuliffe's call suggests that it was related to Quinn's response to the Rich matter. However, since McAuliffee has refused to participate in an interview with Committee staff, the Committee cannot know definitively what McAuliffe's call was about. It appears that Quinn spoke to former President Clinton on January 23 and 24, about how to handle the Rich issue in the press. On January 23, Quinn e-mailed Avner Azulay and pointed out that Clinton ``himself is saying in his frustration about the press coverage that good people like the PM [Barak] supported this.'' \850\ The following day, Quinn e-mailed the Marc Rich team and said that he ``spoke to BC. [He] thinks we shd offer op-ed to daily news. [C]an anyone help?'' \851\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \850\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 187). \851\ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 188). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On January 26, 2001, Quinn did write an op-ed piece, which was published by The Washington Post. The article was little more than a rehash of the same inaccurate arguments that Quinn made to the White House when he was seeking the pardon. Quinn's main claims were that: (1) companies which committed acts similar to those of Rich and Green were not prosecuted for their actions; (2) the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York refused to negotiate with Rich and Green; and (3) Quinn did not violate the Executive Order banning lobbying by officials who had left the White House in the previous five years. As explained earlier in this report, all of these arguments were misleading. Internal e-mails among the team defending Jack Quinn indicate that they were particularly concerned about Quinn's exposure for his possible role in ``coordinating'' political activities and the effort to obtain the Rich pardon. These e- mails also indicate that Quinn was eager to place the blame for the Rich pardon onto others. The day after the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn associate Peter Mirijanian sent the following e-mail to Quinn and a number of his associates: Where Jack remains exposed is in defending the optics of the emails, contributions and the DNC piece (Beth Dzoretz [sic]). We need to anticipate the worst in this regard--i.e. Fink refuses to testify, Denise is granted immunity and Beth is brought before the committee. Since Jack has been out front and center on this the impression will stick that, yes, he knew of these activities and gave them his tacit approval. Just like with Holder, if these other parties don't come forward and instead duck their responsibility on these matters, we'll have to do it for them. (Does that sound too ``Sopranos-like''?) \852\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \852\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02943 (E-mail from Peter Mirijanian, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Scott Hynes, Quinn Gillespie & Associates et al. (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 189). On February 10, 2001, Mirijanian advised Quinn against --------------------------------------------------------------------------- appearing on Meet the Press because of similar concerns: My concern jack is that russert is going to get into a series of questions involving denise's political activities and you will be the de facto defender of what she did. That will only result in more press inquiries about your ``coordinating'' role--something we want to avoid.\853\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \853\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02946 (E-mail from Peter Mirijanian, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Feb. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 190). These e-mails suggest that Quinn and his defenders felt that they were vulnerable to questions about Quinn's coordination of the political activities of Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz and the effort to obtain Marc Rich's pardon. The e-mails raise the possibility that Denise Rich and Dozoretz might have had valuable information regarding these activities which they did not share with the Committee, due to the invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights. 3. President Clinton's Column in The New York Times For the first month of public outcry about the Marc Rich pardon, President Clinton was largely silent. He made a few scattered comments about the matter, most notably a telephone call to Geraldo Rivera. Through the call to Rivera, the public learned that the President felt ``blindsided by this. I have no infrastructure to deal with this, no press person. I just wanted to go out there and do what past presidents have done, but the Republicans had other ideas for me.'' \854\ President Clinton also suggested that the outcry over Marc Rich was hypocritical, because Republicans had worked on the Rich case: ``It's terrible! I mean, he had three big-time Republican lawyers, including Dick Cheney's chief of staff. Marc Rich himself is a Republican.'' \855\ President Clinton also told Rivera about the influence that Israeli support for Rich had played: ``Now, I'll tell you what did influence me. Israel did influence me profoundly.'' \856\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \854\ Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001). \855\ Id. \856\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On Sunday, February 18, former President Clinton attempted a fuller defense by publishing a column in The New York Times. Unfortunately for the President, his attempt at defense only made matters worse. The column largely parroted the arguments made by Jack Quinn and the other Marc Rich lawyers. Therefore, it was rife with false and misleading statements. The following is a summary of the arguments made by the President, and the problems with each argument: <bullet> ``I understood that the other oil companies that had structured transactions like those on which Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were indicted were instead sued civilly by the government.'' \857\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \857\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178). LAs explained earlier in this report, there were 48 criminal prosecutions for violations of oil price control regulations by crude oil resellers, and 14 of those individuals served time in prison. In fact, John Troland and David Ratliff, resellers of oil who played a small part in Marc Rich's plan to avoid U.S. oil regulations and tax laws, served 10 months in prison, and provided vital evidence against Marc Rich and --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pincus Green. <bullet> ``I was informed that, in 1985, in a related case against a trading partner of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, the Energy Department, which was responsible for enforcing the governing law, found that the manner in which the Rich/Green companies had accounted for these transactions was proper.'' \858\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \858\ Id. LThe so-called DOE finding was completely irrelevant to the criminal charges against Rich and Green. Despite the finding about accounting methods in a related case, the Department of Energy never disputed that Rich's companies falsified reports to hide illegal profits and then failed to pay taxes on those illegal profits. Furthermore, the former President neglected to mention that he made no effort, and he was aware that his staff made no effort, to check with Justice Department or --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Energy Department experts regarding this matter. <bullet> ``[T]wo highly regarded tax experts, Bernard Wolfman . . . and Martin Ginsburg . . . reviewed the transactions in question and concluded that the companies `were correct in their U.S. income tax treatment of all the items in question[.]' '' \859\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \859\ Id. LThe tax analysis that was performed by Ginsburg and Wolfman was performed only with facts provided to the professors by the Marc Rich legal team.\860\ The professors did not gather facts independently, and therefore based their analysis on an incorrect set of assumptions. In addition, the President failed to disclose in his column that Marc Rich paid Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman over $96,000 for their work on the Rich case.\861\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \860\ Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Gerard E. Lynch, Criminal Division Chief of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Dec. 7, 1990)) (Exhibit 66). \861\ See Letter from Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 64); Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 65). <bullet> ``[I]n order to settle the government's case against them, the two men's companies had paid approximately $200 million in fines, penalties and taxes, most of which might not even have been warranted under the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis that the companies had followed the law and correctly reported their income.'' \862\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \862\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178). LRather than being an argument in support of the pardon, the fact of the corporate guilty plea and the massive fines shows that the case against Rich and Green was overwhelming. As prosecutor Sandy Weinberg observed, ``if the case is so weak, I mean what in the world were those lawyers [for Rich's companies] thinking at that time . . . . They would have never pled guilty, they would have never paid those fines. Whatever the reason for the pardon, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, whatever the reason, surely the reason was not the merits of the case.'' \863\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \863\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 91 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former assistant U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). <bullet> ``[T]he Justice Department in 1989 rejected the use of racketeering statutes in tax cases like this one[.]'' \864\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \864\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178). LThe fact that the Justice Department stopped using the tax charges as predicate offenses for bringing RICO charges is irrelevant to the Rich pardon. While the Justice Department did stop using tax charges in this way, it continues to allow mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses, and therefore, RICO charges could still be brought against Rich and Green under current legal theories. In addition, money laundering statutes were not in place in 1983, and Rich could have been charged under these statutes if he were charged today. Finally, to look at the evolution of the law over the seventeen years that Marc Rich was a fugitive from justice, and argue that those changes merit a pardon for Rich is to reward Rich for his flight from the country. Indeed, sophisticated practitioners of money laundering--which is one of the things that Rich and Green were doing--would be in a far worse position if --------------------------------------------------------------------------- indicted today. <bullet> ``It was my understanding that Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder's position on the pardon application was `neutral, leaning for.' '' \865\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \865\ Id. LAs explained throughout this report, Holder's position on the pardon is more of an indictment of Holder's judgment and reasoning than it is a justification for the pardon. Holder served the Justice Department and President poorly by failing to gather any facts about the Rich case before reaching his decision about the pardon. He also created the indelible impression that he did not have a pure motive in supporting Rich's request while he was soliciting Jack Quinn's support for appointment as Attorney General. This point is also an indictment of Jack Quinn, who worked very hard to keep the Rich pardon matter away from anyone who would be able to refute his --------------------------------------------------------------------------- spurious arguments. <bullet> ``[T]he case for the pardons was reviewed and advocated not only by my former White House counsel Jack Quinn but also by three distinguished Republican attorneys: Leonard Garment, a former Nixon White House official; William Bradford Reynolds, a former high- ranking official in the Reagan Justice Department; and Lewis Libby, now Vice President Cheney's chief of staff.'' \866\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \866\ Id. LThis was President Clinton's most misleading assertion. When President Clinton initially drafted this statement, it said that ``the applications were viewed and advocated'' not only by my former White House counsel Jack Quinn but also by three distinguished Republicans[.]'' \867\ After some initial copies of the newspaper were printed, the former President's spokesmen called The New York Times and asked that the word ``applications'' be replaced with ``the case for the pardons.'' \868\ The pardon applications were never reviewed by Garment, Reynolds, or Libby, so the initial form of the statement was blatantly untrue.\869\ However, even the improved statement was misleading. Garment, Reynolds and Libby had worked with Rich in the 1980s and early 1990s to try to reach a resolution of the charges against Rich in New York. The arguments made by Garment, Reynolds and Libby focused on the claim that the SDNY was criminalizing what should have been a civil tax case. They did not make, compile, or in any other way lay the groundwork for, or make a case for a Presidential pardon. When former President Clinton stated that they ``reviewed and advocated'' ``the case for the pardons,'' he suggested that they were somehow involved in arguing that Rich and Green should receive pardons. This was completely untrue. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \867\ Editors' Note, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2001, at A15. \868\ Id. \869\ Id. <bullet> ``[F]inally, and importantly, many present and former high-ranking Israeli officials of both major political parties and leaders of Jewish communities in America and Europe urged the pardon of Mr. Rich because of his contributions and services to Israeli charitable causes, to the Mossad's efforts to rescue and evacuate Jews from hostile countries, and to the peace process through sponsorship of education and health programs in Gaza and the West Bank.'' \870\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \870\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec. 4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178). LThis argument would have been more sound if President Clinton had been President of Israel, rather than President of the United States. Indeed, President Clinton received more pressure from the Israeli government, Israelis, and Israeli sympathizers for a pardon for Jonathan Pollard than for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Presumably, President Clinton was representing U.S. interests when he declined to pardon Pollard. While it would certainly not have been inappropriate to take many concerns into consideration, one would have expected President Clinton to continue to put U.S. interests above all others when considering --------------------------------------------------------------------------- the Rich and Green pardons. LThere were a number of other problems with President Clinton's reliance on statements of support from Israeli and Jewish officials. First, as discussed throughout this report, it appears that Marc Rich carefully cultivated support by making large financial contributions to political candidates and charitable groups, in some cases making his financial support contingent on their support for his pardon. In other cases, individuals voicing support for Rich were misled, and had no idea that their support would be used to obtain a pardon. Finally, as explained previously, it appears that the President has grossly exaggerated the extent to which Prime Minister Barak pressed him to issue the Rich pardon. President Clinton even misinformed his staff on January 19 that Prime Minister Barak had raised the Marc Rich issue, when in reality, it was President Clinton who raised the Rich pardon with Barak. Given the fact that every reason that the President offered for the Rich pardon was either misleading or inaccurate, the President's column added to the public furor over the pardons. Given the President's inability to provide any factually accurate or convincing justification for the Rich pardon, the public, and the Committee, are left wondering what the President's true motivations were.\871\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \871\ In a televised interview, Roger Clinton made the following statement about the Marc Rich pardon: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- GWell, it was surprising, I can't--but I'm not saying it was wrong. I have talked to my brother about it, not in detail, but he has explained to me the reasons, the nonpersonal reasons--because I don't need to know the personal ones--but he has explained to me how he was right in doing it, and he thought that he was right, specially based on all the people that had written him about it. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 21, 2001). Roger Clinton's reference to the ``personal reasons'' for President Clinton's action is noteworthy. While Roger Clinton has limited credibility, as the President's brother, he would have reason to know whether President Clinton had hidden motives for issuing the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons. However, it is unclear, what, if any, ``personal reasons'' the President had for issuing the pardons. V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN INVESTIGATION The Committee's investigation of the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green was hampered by a number of Fifth Amendment claims and other refusals to cooperate with the Committee. A. Marc Rich On February 15, 2001, Chairman Burton directed a letter to Marc Rich, asking him to testify before the Committee and waive attorney-client privilege with respect to documents relating to his efforts to obtain a pardon. On February 27, 2001, Laurence Urgenson, counsel for Mr. Rich, informed the Committee that because of the various criminal investigations into Mr. Rich's activities, Rich would not waive his attorney-client privilege, or appear before the Committee.\872\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \872\ Letter from Laurence A. Urgenson, Counsel for Marc Rich, Kirkland & Ellis, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Pincus Green On August 27, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Pincus Green, requesting that he participate in an interview with Committee staff.\873\ Green never responded to this request. Given that Green apparently still lives outside of the United States, the Committee has not been able to serve him with a subpoena requiring the production of documents or testimony. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \873\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Pincus Green (Aug. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Jack Quinn Jack Quinn cooperated with the initial phase of the Committee's investigation, testifying at both the February 8, 2001, and March 1, 2001, hearings. Quinn also produced a number of documents to the Committee regarding his work for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. However, Quinn also withheld hundreds of pages from the Committee, claiming that they were covered by the attorney-client privilege. Quinn and three other law firms which had represented Marc Rich also made similar arguments to try to withhold the documents from the grand jury investigating the Rich and Green pardons. In December 2001, Federal District Court Judge Denny Chin overruled the claims of privilege by Quinn and the other lawyers, and directed them to produce the subpoenaed records to the grand jury. On December 17, 2001, Chairman Burton requested that Quinn and three other law firms representing Rich to produce to the Committee any documents they produced to the grand jury in response to Judge Chin's ruling. On February 7, 2002, Quinn produced hundreds of pages of documents to the Committee which he had withheld for over a year. The documents were highly significant, and raised serious questions about Quinn's work on the Rich case, including whether Quinn was going to receive money from Rich, contrary to assurances given by Quinn at the Committee's February 8, 2001, hearing. On February 19, 2002, Chairman Burton asked Quinn to participate in a voluntary interview with Committee staff regarding the documents he had turned over. On March 5, 2002, Quinn's counsel Victoria Toensing informed Committee staff that Quinn would not participate in an interview with Committee staff. It is disturbing that Quinn withheld documents from the Committee for over a year, and then refused to answer questions about those documents when they were finally turned over to the Committee. Quinn's refusal to answer questions about these documents creates an impression that Quinn is still attempting to conceal relevant information from the Committee about his work on the Marc Rich case. In an attempt to obtain further information from Quinn, the Committee issued a document subpoena to him on March 6, 2002. D. Denise Rich On February 5, 2001, Chairman Burton submitted a list of written questions to Denise Rich regarding her efforts to win a pardon for her ex-husband.\874\ Chairman Burton sent this letter in an attempt to obtain information from Mrs. Rich without calling her to testify at a public hearing. On February 7, 2001, Committee staff met with Carol Elder Bruce, counsel for Denise Rich. Bruce informed Committee staff that Rich would be invoking her Fifth Amendment rights rather than answer the questions posed to her by the Chairman. Bruce also informed the Committee staff that Rich was ``privy to a number of private conversations that might be of interest'' to the Committee.\875\ She further informed the Committee that Rich had given a large amount of money with respect to the Clintons, including an ``enormous sum'' of money to the Clinton Library.\876\ However, Bruce denied that Rich had any intent to bribe President Clinton. Later that day, Bruce sent a letter to Chairman Burton in which she confirmed that ``Ms. Rich is asserting her privilege under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution not to be a witness against herself and, accordingly, will not be answering any questions of the Chairman or the Committee.'' \877\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \875\ Notes of meeting with Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe Patton Armstrong & Teasdale (Feb. 7, 2001). \874\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe Patton Armstrong & Teasdale (Feb. 5, 2001) (within Appendix I). \876\ Id. \877\ Letter from Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe Patton Armstrong & Teasdale, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 7, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. Beth Dozoretz After the Committee learned of Beth Dozoretz's involvement in the Rich pardon matter at its February 8, 2001, hearing, Committee staff attempted to interview Dozoretz. She refused to answer calls from Committee staff, and accordingly, on February 16, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Dozoretz requesting her to participate in an interview.\878\ On February 20, 2001, Tom Green, counsel for Dozoretz, called Committee staff and stated that Dozoretz declined to be interviewed. Accordingly, on February 23, 2001, Chairman Burton issued a subpoena to Dozoretz requiring her to testify before a hearing of the Committee on March 1, 2001. On February 26, 2001, Mr. Green wrote to the Chairman to inform him that Dozoretz ``has elected to invoke her constitutional privilege not to testify.'' \879\ When Chairman Burton informed Green that he intended to call Dozoretz to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights publicly,\880\ Green sent a letter requesting that Dozoretz be excused from her appearance.\881\ However, the Chairman required Dozoretz to testify for two main reasons: first, a letter from counsel stating that a client will invoke the Fifth Amendment if called is not a satisfactory invocation of the Fifth Amendment; and second, the Committee could not be certain that Dozoretz would actually take the Fifth if called to testify, and accordingly had a responsibility to call her to determine whether or not she would actually invoke her Fifth Amendment rights. On March 1, 2001, Dozoretz appeared before the Committee and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights rather than testify about her role in the Rich and Green pardons. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \878\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Beth Dozoretz, former Finance Chair, Democratic National Committee (Feb. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I). \879\ Letter from Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, Sidley & Austin, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I). \880\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, Sidley & Austin (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I). \881\ Letter from Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, Sidley & Austin, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- F. Avner Azulay Avner Azulay was a key participant in the effort of Marc Rich and Pincus Green to obtain a pardon. Since Azulay resides outside of the United States, the Committee was not able to compel Azulay's testimony. However, on March 8, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Azulay requesting that he participate in an interview with Committee staff.\882\ On March 15, 2001, Azulay responded by referring the Committee to his lawyer in New York, Robert Morvillo.\883\ Committee staff then had a number of communications with Morvillo attempting to arrange an interview of Azulay. The Committee was initially informed that Azulay was undergoing medical treatment, and was unable to participate in an interview. However, over the course of the negotiations with Morvillo, it became clear that Azulay had no intention of cooperating with the committee. In a final discussion on February 28, 2002, Morvillo confirmed that Azulay would not participate in an interview with Committee staff. Given his key role in enlisting support for the Rich and Green pardons among Israeli leaders, Azulay's refusal to cooperate with the Committee's investigation has had a significant negative impact. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \882\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Mar. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 118). \883\ Letter from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001) (Exhibit 119). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- G. Peter Kadzik The Committee only learned of Peter Kadzik's role in lobbying for the Rich and Green pardons after receiving records from his law firm, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, which reflected Kadzik's work on the matter. On Friday, February 23, 2001, Committee staff left a message with Kadzik's attorney informing him that Kadzik would be called to testify at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing. On Monday, February 26, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Kadzik formally notifying him that he would be called to testify.\884\ At 7:40 p.m. on February 27, 2001, only 36 hours before the March 1 hearing, and without so much as a telephone call from Kadzik or his attorneys to Committee staff, Kadzik sent a response to the Chairman, declining to testify because he was to be in California for a meeting.\885\ Upon receiving this information, Chairman Burton issued a subpoena for Kadzik's attendance at the hearing.\886\ Despite the fact that Committee staff informed Kadzik's attorneys that the Chairman would subpoena Kadzik to attend the hearing, Kadzik boarded a plane for California on the morning of February 28, 2001. Accordingly, the Committee provided the subpoena to the U.S. Marshals Service for service upon Kadzik. When Kadzik exited his plane in San Francisco, he was served by a U.S. Marshal. He then boarded the next plane for Washington, and arrived in time to testify at the Committee's March 1, 2001, hearing. While the Committee was able to serve Kadzik and receive testimony from him, his attempts to avoid compulsory process were unseemly. Kadzik declined to testify voluntarily. Then, when he was informed that the Committee would issue a subpoena to compel his attendance at the hearing, he left Washington, mistakenly assuming that the Committee would not be able to serve him. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \884\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I). \885\ Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). \886\ Subpoena from House Comm. on Govt. Reform to Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix II). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H. Terry McAuliffe In a letter dated February 16, 2001, Chairman Burton requested Terry McAuliffe to participate in an interview with Committee staff regarding the Rich and Green pardons, specifically regarding Denise Rich's contributions to the Clinton Library.\887\ Shortly thereafter, Richard Ben-Veniste, McAuliffe's attorney, contacted Committee staff to state that he wanted to wait until the Committee reached an accommodation with the Clinton Library regarding access to the Library's information, before he decided whether to make McAuliffe available. On March 22, 2001, Chairman Burton informed Ben- Veniste that after obtaining information from the Clinton Library, he still wanted McAuliffe to participate in an interview with Committee staff.\888\ On March 23, 2001, Ben- Veniste responded to state that he wanted more information regarding what the Committee sought from McAuliffe.\889\ The Committee's Chief Counsel provided this information in a letter dated March 30, 2001.\890\ Nevertheless, on April 11, 2001, Ben-Veniste sent a reply stating that ``it does not appear that a personal interview with the staff is warranted at this time. Mr. McAuliffe wishes you to know that his obligations as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee to help elect a Democratic majority to the House and Senate are fully occupying his time at the present.'' \891\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \887\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges (Feb. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I). \888\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges (Mar. 22, 2001) (within Appendix I). \889\ Letter from Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 23, 2001) (within Appendix I). \890\ Letter from James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges (Mar. 30, 2001) (within Appendix I). \891\ Letter from Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 11, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Exhibits referred to follow:] <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> CHAPTER TWO ROGER CLINTON'S INVOLVEMENT IN LOBBYING FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE Roger Clinton engaged in a systematic effort to trade on his brother's name during the Clinton Administration. <bullet> President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to capitalize on their relationship. At the beginning of his second term, President Clinton instructed Roger Clinton to use his connections to the Administration to gain financial advantage. According to the lawyer for former Arkansas State Senator George Locke: ``Roger related that Bill Clinton had instructed him that since this was his last term in office, Roger should find a way to make a living and use his relationship with the President to his advantage.'' By suggesting that Roger Clinton exploit his name, Bill Clinton encouraged the conduct described in this chapter. Roger Clinton apparently took this advice to heart, telling one person from whom he solicited money that he and the President ``had only four years to get things done'' and that they did not care ``about ethics or what appearances were.'' <bullet> Roger Clinton received substantial sums of money from foreign governments solely because he was the President's brother. When the FBI interviewed him, Roger Clinton admitted that since the beginning of the Clinton Administration, he had received substantial sums of money from foreign governments. Clinton told the FBI that ``he knows he receives these invitations [to make paid appearances in foreign countries] strictly because he is the First Brother of the President of the United States.'' Clinton also informed the FBI that in addition to receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars for musical performances from foreign governments, he also received money for President Clinton from foreign governments. Roger Clinton told the FBI that he had to be instructed repeatedly by the President or White House staff that the President was not permitted to receive cash from foreign governments. <bullet> Roger Clinton received at least $335,000 in unexplained travelers checks, many of which were purchased overseas and likely imported illegally. The Committee uncovered at least $335,000 in travelers checks deposited in Roger Clinton's bank account. Most of these travelers checks originated overseas, largely from Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela. The travelers checks were not restrictively endorsed by the purchaser but were instead given to Roger Clinton blank. This method of transferring large sums of money to Roger Clinton appears designed to conceal the fact that the funds originated overseas and probably violated criminal statutes requiring reports of the importation of monetary instruments. Roger Clinton has refused to provide the Committee with any explanation of why he received these funds. These suspicious transactions require a complete and thorough investigation by law enforcement authorities, especially in light of his admissions to the FBI about receiving money from foreign governments. <bullet> Roger Clinton likely violated federal law by failing to register as required under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. One company paid Roger Clinton $30,000 to lobby President Clinton and others to loosen government restrictions on travel to Cuba. Although his activity appears to meet the criteria outlined in the statute for those required to disclose their contacts with covered executive branch officials, Roger Clinton did not register as a lobbyist and did not disclose his paid lobbying contacts with his brother. His failure to register, therefore, needs to be investigated carefully and completely by the Department of Justice. <bullet> Roger Clinton participated in a plot to obtain a $35,000 per month contract in exchange for delivering a cabinet secretary to a speaking event. The FBI briefly investigated Roger Clinton's involvement in a scheme with Arkansas lawyer Larry Wallace to pressure John Katopodis, promoter of an Alabama airport project. Clinton and Wallace attempted to obtain a $35,000 per month contract in exchange for Clinton's promise to ensure that Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater would speak at a conference sponsored by Katopodis' organization of local governments. When Katopodis refused to pay and Slater subsequently refused to acknowledge the invitation, Katopodis suspected that Clinton and Wallace were to blame. Wallace had told him that his project would remain at a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the money.'' Roger Clinton lobbied for the release from prison of Rosario Gambino, a notorious heroin dealer and organized crime figure. <bullet> Rosario Gambino was a major drug trafficker. Rosario Gambino has been convicted in the United States and Italy of heroin trafficking. Before being sentenced to 45 years in federal prison, Gambino associated with known members of organized crime both in Italy and the United States. His associates have described him as a member of the Sicilian Mafia. When his brothers were convicted of racketeering, murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and heroin trafficking in 1994, witnesses described them as ``the main link between Mafia heroin traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.'' <bullet> Roger Clinton received at least $50,000 from the Gambino family, and he expected to receive more if he succeeded in getting Rosario Gambino out of prison. Tommaso ``Tommy'' Gambino, the son of Rosario Gambino, approached Roger Clinton to help win the release of Rosario Gambino from prison. Tommy Gambino promised Roger Clinton a substantial financial reward if he was successful. Even though he never was successful, Tommy Gambino provided Roger Clinton with $50,000, a gold Rolex watch, and an undisclosed amount of ``expense money.'' <bullet> Roger Clinton attempted to use his relationship to the President to influence the decisionmaking of the United States Parole Commission (``USPC''). Roger Clinton lobbied the Parole Commission to grant parole to Gambino. While lobbying Parole Commission staff, Roger Clinton informed them that President Clinton was aware of his efforts on behalf of Rosario Gambino and that the President had suggested that he contact the Parole Commission members directly. Although the Commission staff tried to insulate the Commissioners from undue influence, Roger Clinton clearly attempted to use his relationship to the President to influence the Commission improperly and win Gambino's release. <bullet> The Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission hindered the FBI's investigation. In 1998, the FBI began investigating Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission. However, it met resistance from Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission. Ragghianti, who had participated in meetings with Roger Clinton on the Gambino case, objected to the FBI investigation and successfully halted an FBI plan to have an undercover agent meet with Clinton posing as a Parole Commission staffer. She also attempted to keep the FBI from recording a meeting between Roger Clinton and a Parole Commission staffer. Ragghianti's efforts may have kept the FBI from reaching a full understanding of Roger Clinton's involvement in the Gambino case. <bullet> Roger Clinton lied to FBI agents investigating his contacts with the Parole Commission and his relationship with the Gambino family. When interviewed by the FBI in 1999, Roger Clinton said that he had never represented to anyone at the Parole Commission that the President was aware of his contacts with the Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino. This self- serving claim is contradicted by contemporaneous, written memoranda detailing Clinton's contacts as well as by the vivid and credible recollections of Parole Commission staff. Clinton also lied about the purpose of a $50,000 check from the Gambinos, which he deposited on the day of the FBI's interview. While it is unclear whether he deposited the check before or after the interview, Clinton told the agents that Tommy Gambino had offered to loan him money for a down payment on his house. He repeated this explanation to the media when news of the money became public in 2001. However, after reviewing both Clinton's and Gambino's bank records, the Committee has found no evidence that Clinton used the $50,000 for a down payment or that he ever repaid any of the money. Accordingly, his claim to the FBI that the money was merely a loan is false. During his interview, Clinton also told the FBI agents three separate and contradictory stories in response to questions about his receipt of a Rolex watch from Tommy Gambino before finally producing a Rolex to the agents and claiming he had bought it in Tijuana, Mexico. <bullet> Roger Clinton apparently lobbied the White House to grant a commutation to Rosario Gambino. In the last days of the Clinton Administration--after Roger Clinton had failed to win parole for Rosario Gambino and after he had received a Rolex watch and $50,000 from the Gambino family--the White House received a petition for commutation for Rosario Gambino. Documents indicate that the White House lawyer responsible for clemency matters requested a criminal background check on Gambino, which is normally done when some serious consideration is being given to a grant of clemency. The obvious and logical inference that explains how the Gambino petition garnered that level of attention at the White House is that Roger Clinton was pushing for it. Because key Clinton White House staff have refused to answer questions about this matter, it is unknown whether Roger Clinton hand-delivered the Gambino petition as he did with others or whether he brought it to the attention of the White House some other way. Although the President did not ultimately grant clemency to Gambino, the circumstances surrounding the consideration of his petition are nevertheless suspect. The fact that granting clemency to a mobster and confirmed criminal like Gambino was considered at all is disturbing enough, but the reason it was considered is even more offensive. The Gambino family was apparently able to purchase access to the both the parole and clemency processes with cash payments and expensive gifts to the brother of the President of the United States. Moreover, despite an FBI investigation of the matter, the Justice Department has, to date, been unwilling or unable to prosecute Clinton for any of his activities. Roger Clinton received a substantial portion of $225,000 that was swindled from the Lincecum family in Clinton's name with the promise of pardon that never came. <bullet> The Lincecum family paid $225,000 to obtain a pardon for Garland Lincecum. In 1998, Garland Lincecum, a convicted felon, was informed that he could purchase a presidential pardon for $300,000. Lincecum was told that Arkansas businessmen Dickey Morton and George Locke, who had a close relationship with Roger Clinton, could obtain the pardon. Lincecum borrowed $225,000 from his mother and brother and claims that a business associate paid another $70,000 to Morton and Locke for his pardon. The money he borrowed from his family constituted their life savings and means of support in retirement. <bullet> Roger Clinton received at least $43,500 in proceeds from the Lincecums' payments to Morton and Locke. Dickey Morton, George Locke, and Roger Clinton divided the funds among themselves with Roger Clinton receiving a total of $25,500 in checks and $18,000 in cash. The Lincecums paid the checks to a company called CLM, which they were told stands for Clinton, Locke, and Morton. Dickey Morton then disbursed the funds from the company's bank account to Clinton, Locke, and himself. Roger Clinton has falsely denied any relationship with CLM while offering no explanation of why he received this substantial share of an elderly woman's retirement savings through CLM. <bullet> Roger Clinton may have been involved in a scheme to defraud the Lincecums. Garland Lincecum never received a pardon, and there is no evidence that Dickey Morton, George Locke, or Roger Clinton ever submitted Lincecum's name to the Justice Department or White House for consideration for a pardon. Therefore, it appears that the Lincecums were the victims of a scam perpetrated by Morton, Locke, and perhaps Roger Clinton as well. Roger Clinton may have been involved in lobbying for as many as 13 other pardons and commutations. <bullet> Roger Clinton publicly admitted involvement in six clemency efforts, but the evidence connects him to many more. Roger Clinton told the media that he had asked for pardons for approximately six close friends and that he did so because of concern for them and not for any personal gain. For example, Roger Clinton lobbied for pardons for George Locke and Dan Lasater, two associates from Arkansas who were convicted of drug offenses together with Clinton himself in the 1980s. However, the Committee has obtained evidence connecting Clinton to many more pardon seekers. Some of the cases involve people who were not his personal friends and some involve solicitations or offers of money and lucrative business opportunities in exchange for his ability to place a clemency petition in front of the President. <bullet> Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for horse breeder J.T. Lundy in exchange for secretly sharing profits in a lucrative business venture. Lundy promised Clinton a share of the profits from a Venezuelan coal deal in exchange for Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon for him. Lundy suggested a scheme whereby the payments to Clinton could be concealed by placing his share of the profits in Dan Lasater's name. Lasater, who owned a 20 percent interest in the venture, discussed the possibility of a pardon for Lundy with Roger Clinton. <bullet> Roger Clinton delivered the pardon petition of former Reagan EPA official Rita Lavelle to the White House. According to Lavelle, an intermediary for Roger Clinton asked her for a $30,000 fee for him to hand-carry her petition to the President. Lavelle responded that she could not afford to pay any money, but she said Clinton agreed to deliver the petition anyway. On the last night of the Clinton presidency, Roger Clinton asked Lavelle ``do you have $100,000 to get this through?'' Being bankrupt, however, Lavelle laughed at the question. She did not pay Clinton any money and did not receive a pardon. <bullet> Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for Houston real estate developer John Ballis, and Ballis' petition was seriously considered at the White House. After being convicted of S&L fraud, Ballis married a former employee of Dan Lasater and friend of Roger Clinton. Through his wife's connection, Ballis sought Roger Clinton's help. Clinton first lobbied for Ballis before the U.S. Parole Commission, sometimes during the same meetings in which he lobbied for mobster Rosario Gambino. Ballis credited Clinton with helping him obtain early release and sought his help in obtaining a presidential pardon to eliminate his parole supervision and restitution payments. While he was not granted any form of clemency, the President reviewed his petition, and a White House lawyer called Ballis' lawyer two nights before inauguration day to ask if Ballis would accept a grant of clemency that left intact his obligation to pay restitution. <bullet> Roger Clinton lobbied his brother to grant clemency to Steven Griggs, the son of the chief of an unrecognized American Indian tribe, who was in prison on drug charges. Like Ballis, Steven Griggs was not a close friend of Roger Clinton's but merely someone who knew someone who knew him. Griggs also did not receive clemency, but Roger Clinton helped ensure that Griggs' petition was brought to the attention of the President even though Griggs had been a fugitive for a year before being sentenced. Griggs argued in his petition that he had received an unusually harsh sentence but failed to mention that he had fled after his conviction. It is not clear what motivated Roger Clinton to assist Griggs, but some evidence suggests that the tribe may have planned to open a casino when and if it were to become recognized by the federal government. <bullet> According to his former lawyer, Arkansas restaurant operator Phillip Young was approached with an offer to obtain a pardon through Roger Clinton for $30,000. While Young denied to Committee staff that he was actually approached by anyone with such a proposal, his denial is not as credible as his former attorney's version of events. Both the White House and the Justice Department hindered the Committee's investigation of Roger Clinton by improperly refusing to produce key documents. <bullet> For months, the Bush White House prevented the National Archives from producing even non-deliberative, clemency-related records from the Clinton administration. The Committee did not learn that President Clinton had been considering a clemency petition from notorious mobster Rosario Gambino until after Archives personnel ``inadvertently'' produced documents that President Bush's Counsel had sought to withhold. The accidental production also included documents relating to three other previously unknown individuals who had sought clemency through Roger Clinton. The Bush Administration did manage to retain four additional deliberative Gambino documents from the files of the Clinton White House, refusing to produce the records even though they were not subject to any executive privilege claim. <bullet> The Ashcroft Justice Department produced certain Gambino-related records, but inexplicably withheld others. After producing sensitive documents such as U.S. Parole Commission files related to Rosario Gambino and a summary of an FBI interview with Roger Clinton, the Justice Department ceased producing additional documents, claiming they were related to an ongoing criminal investigation, even though the Clinton- Gambino matter had reportedly been closed in 2000. INTRODUCTION Unlike other presidential relatives discussed in this report, Roger Clinton was fairly unsuccessful in actually obtaining clemency for anyone but himself. Nevertheless, the Committee investigated his activities because the substantial number of credible allegations of influence peddling demanded further scrutiny. Even though Roger Clinton was unable to deliver actual grants of clemency, he was able to deliver the time and attention of the President and his senior staff. Roger Clinton's ability to circumvent the normal process was worth a great deal of money to those hoping for clemency, and he exploited it for his personal gain. The damage done by this exploitation is even worse in light of evidence suggesting that President Clinton was aware of and even encouraged it. While investigating these matters, the Committee also discovered several potential violations of law and suspicious transactions, some of which are not directly related to clemency requests. However, these non-clemency matters are detailed briefly in this chapter because they provide evidence of a pattern of behavior by Roger Clinton that is instructive when considering the evidence in the clemency-related matters. For a variety of reasons, including his 1985 conviction for cocaine distribution, Roger Clinton was generally mocked and regarded with derision during President Clinton's two terms in office. When Roger Clinton's involvement in lobbying for presidential pardons came to light, it was often treated with humor in the press and was fodder for late-night talk show monologues. However, as the Committee investigated these allegations, it became clear that Clinton was involved in serious and reckless misconduct constituting a systematic effort to cash in on his fame as the President's brother. Roger Clinton's efforts to use his status as the President's brother to try to win clemency for an organized crime figure represents one of the darkest examples of influence peddling ever reviewed by the Committee. His other seamy business dealings, along with his frequent acceptance of large cash payments from foreign governments, only compounds the disturbing appearance that access to the President was up for sale. That the President could have been completely unaware of these sordid dealings is implausible at best. Yet, too often, public disclosure of this type of behavior has prompted laughter rather than stern rebukes. To dismiss Roger Clinton's activities as merely the comical bumbling of Bill Clinton's less-gifted half-brother, however, runs the risk of seriously undermining public confidence in the integrity of government. At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, Clinton attempted to obtain grants of clemency for a number of individuals, many of whom he barely knew. While he appears to have been motivated by friendship in some instances, many of the others appear to be motivated by the promise of financial reward. The Committee has collected evidence indicating that Roger Clinton was connected to pardon or commutation requests for at least 15 different individuals, excluding himself: John Ballis, Rosario Gambino, Steven Griggs, Dan Lasater, Rita Lavelle, Garland Lincecum, George Locke, Blume Loe, J.T. Lundy, Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan, Jim McClain, William McCord, Mark St. Pe, Mitchell Wood, and Phillip Young. For his part, Roger Clinton has admitted only to leaving a list of six pardon requests at the White House for his brother's consideration.\1\ The Committee has been unable to obtain a copy of the list \2\ or confirm which names were on the list.\3\ Whether Roger Clinton provided President Clinton with a list of six names is largely irrelevant, however, as the Committee has compiled evidence clearly demonstrating that of the 15 cases with some connection to Roger Clinton, he actually pressed for grants of clemency for at least eight individuals.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Roger Clinton Says He Promised Pardons, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 2001, at A1. \2\ In attempting to obtain a copy of the list from the files of the former Administration, the Committee requested from the National Archives, ``All records relating to any requests for clemency made by Hugh Rodham or Roger Clinton on behalf of any individual.'' Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States, National Archives and Records Administration (Mar. 8, 2001) (within Appendix I). On March 14, 2001, the Committee also issued a subpoena to Roger Clinton seeking, inter alia, ``all records relating to any efforts made by you, or on your behalf, to assist in the obtaining of any grant of executive clemency'' (within Appendix II). \3\ The Committee sent Roger Clinton a letter requesting answers to a number of questions, including, ``Please list all individuals on whose behalf you ever requested executive clemency.'' Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Roger C. Clinton (June 25, 2001) (within Appendix I). The reply from his lawyer refused to answer any of the questions, stating, ``Like anyone who values his own privacy and who respects the privacy of those close to him, Mr. Clinton will not submit willingly to a general warrant.'' Letter from Bart H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). \4\ The eight individuals are Rosario Gambino, Steven Griggs, Dan Lasater, Rita Lavelle, George Locke, Joseph McKernan, William McCord, and Mark St. Pe. Their cases are discussed in more detail below. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although Roger Clinton failed to obtain the grants of clemency for which lobbied, he did receive clemency for his own cocaine conviction. While the Committee did not investigate it directly, President Clinton's grant of clemency to his brother now appears to be one of his most egregious last-minute pardons. Roger Clinton was involved in potentially illegal conduct and was under active investigation by the FBI at the time that he received his pardon. The fact that he was involved in the type of conduct described in this report should have disqualified him from receiving clemency. Moreover, the media widely reported in August 2001 that Roger Clinton had entered rehabilitation for chronic cocaine abuse.\5\ Obviously, if Roger Clinton was engaged in illegal cocaine use in January 2001, it would indicate that he was neither rehabilitated nor remorseful for his cocaine distribution crimes, making him an unsuitable candidate for a presidential pardon under President Clinton's own guidelines. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ See, e.g., Lloyd Grove, The Reliable Source: First Paula Poundstone, then Ben Affleck, now Roger Clinton, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 2001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The focus of this chapter, though, is Roger Clinton's involvement in lobbying for others in their attempts to obtain executive clemency. The sheer number of people who attempted to purchase or were solicited to purchase a pardon through Roger Clinton gives credence to allegations that he was engaged in a systematic effort to capitalize on his relationship to the President of the United States. Moreover, the Committee's investigation has revealed that his attempts to sell his access to the President were not confined to clemency-related matters. Indeed, Roger Clinton repeatedly treated his relationship to President Clinton as a commodity to be sold to the highest bidder. This disturbing pattern of behavior began shortly after Bill Clinton became President and apparently continued until Bill Clinton's last day in office. Roger Clinton's behavior was unseemly at best, but it is even more troubling is that the President himself appears to have instigated and encouraged this behavior. I. ROGER CLINTON'S PATTERN OF TRADING ON HIS BROTHER'S NAME When the FBI interviewed Roger Clinton in conjunction with its investigation of his relationship with the Gambino family, Clinton made a number of startling admissions. He admitted that since early in President Clinton's term, foreign governments had paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars. Clinton claimed that these payments were for musical performances but acknowledged that he knew he was receiving the money only because he was the President's brother. Roger Clinton also admitted that foreign governments had given him gifts for President Clinton and that he had kept some of those gifts for his own use. He informed the FBI that early in President Clinton's term, he received cash payments from foreign governments, which he was to give to the President. White House staff had to instruct him that the President could not accept cash payments from foreign countries. Some of Clinton's conduct is explained in his interview with FBI investigators: [Roger Clinton] has made a number of business trips to foreign countries over the last few years. Clinton stated that he is a musician and plays with a six piece band. He has received invitations from Presidents and other foreign government leaders from between 10-12 different countries. Clinton advised he knows he receives these invitations strictly because he is the First Brother of the President of the United States. Clinton advised that the President is aware of the invitations, in general, but may not know each time he takes a trip. Clinton stated that when he received an invitation to visit a country he is offered money by the country to make the trip. He stated that he would not accept the invitation unless he could earn the money. He insists on performing with his band while visiting the country. He is a musician and wants to be recognized for his music. Clinton stated he receives a minimum of $25,000 per performance when he travels. He may play a few nights during a given trip. He likes to perform for children during these trips and attempts to make those arrangements. Clinton stated he has traveled to South Korea approximately six times. He has gone as the personal guest of President Kim Dae Jong (phonetic). He has been paid as much as $200,000 for performing on a trip. He has also traveled to Japan, Argentina, and 8 to 10 other countries. Clinton stated that the country extending the invitation usually pays for him and his six piece band to fly to the country and perform. The host country usually pays all their expenses and provides a Presidential security detail while they are there. Clinton stated he has received payment for these performances in a number of ways. He has received payment by check in United States dollars, cash in United States dollars and also in the currency of the host country. Clinton stated in some instances the foreign government even provides extra funds to cover the costs of taxes that would be assessed against the money. Clinton advised he did not want to provide specific details on what exactly he is paid for his performances because that is ``personal.'' Clinton stated that when he receives an invitation to a country he always calls the National Security Council to get the clearance to make the trip. He stated that they usually say no at the very beginning, then he talks them into agreeing to let him make the trip. Clinton stated that he always provides the Security Council with an itinerary whenever he makes one of these trips. * * * Clinton advised that while he visits foreign countries as their guest he is often presented with all kinds of gifts. Examples he gave were vases, sheep skin rugs and many more he could not remember. He also received gifts for the President which he has sometimes kept. Clinton advised that in his earliest trips, at the beginning of the Presidents [sic] term, he would be offered money for the President from some of the foreign government officials he was visiting. He stated years ago he did not know he could not accept money for the President. Clinton stated he was told by either the President or his staff that he could not bring money back from a foreign country for the President. He advised he was told on a couple of occasions to send the money back because the President was not allowed to accept money from a foreign country. Clinton was asked if he reported the money he earned on his foreign country visits as income on his United States tax returns. He stated that yes he reported the income. He was asked if he claimed the expenses on his tax returns as well. Clinton stated that he only claimed the expenses that he actually paid for on his tax returns. Clinton further advised that years ago he had some tax problems. At one point he owed between $40,000 to $60,000 dollars [sic] in taxes. He made arrangements with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to pay of [sic] the tax debt, and does not want to have any more problems.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000007-8 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). Roger Clinton's statements to the FBI make it clear that from the earliest days of his brother's presidency, he used his fame and proximity to power to make as much money as possible. Over the next eight years, Roger Clinton accepted hundreds of thousands of dollars from foreign governments in exchange for ``musical performances.'' Clearly, the payments made to Clinton far exceeded the actual value of his performances. Presumably, the foreign governments paying Roger Clinton were attempting to curry favor with the Clinton Administration by paying large sums of money to the President's brother. Whether these governments found increased favor or access with the Clinton Administration is unknown. However, this pattern of conduct clearly establishes that Roger Clinton was attempting to use his position and access to cash in, without regard to whether his actions were legally or ethically questionable. Although Roger Clinton used his name to make money early in the Clinton Administration, he apparently believed the potential to exploit his relationship to the President was greater than he had previously realized. Roger Clinton's longtime friend and fellow convicted cocaine felon George Locke told the Committee through his lawyer about a conversation in which Roger Clinton described his determination to profit more effectively from his status as brother of the President: On the night of the reelection of Bill Clinton as president, a special party was held at the Excelsior Hotel for VIP guests. Roger Clinton invited George Locke to the party. During the course of the evening, Roger had a conversation with George Locke. Roger Clinton advised that during his brother's first term in office, (although he had been invited to numerous social gatherings as a result of being the president's brother) Roger Clinton had never ``capitalized'' on his relationship to the president. Further, Roger related that Bill Clinton had instructed him that since this was his last term in office, Roger should find a way to make a living and use his relationship with the President to his advantage. Bill Clinton had stressed to Roger that whatever business endeavors Roger was involved in, they must be legitimate concerns and not to find himself involved in any illegal activity.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). It appears that Roger Clinton took at least part of Bill Clinton's advice to heart. During the last term of the Clinton presidency, Roger Clinton was involved in a number of efforts to use his brother's name to make large amounts of money. However, despite his brother's advice to engage only in legitimate and legal business, Roger Clinton's activities may have violated the law and clearly raise substantial ethical questions. A. Roger Clinton's Foreign Travelers Checks and Other Questionable Sources of Income A review of Roger Clinton's bank records shows that he received money from a wide variety of sources, ranging from small amounts for television and film appearances to large amounts for lobbying his brother. However, one of the greatest influxes of money to Roger Clinton during the Clinton Administration came in the form of at least $335,000 in overseas travelers checks. These transactions present a number of troubling issues. Nevertheless, Roger Clinton has provided no explanation of why he received these travelers checks. <bullet> First, almost all of these travelers checks were purchased by third parties overseas, largely in Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela. Why Roger Clinton received these substantial sums of money from overseas is unknown. <bullet> Second, the travelers checks were provided to Roger Clinton blank. Clinton signed and countersigned all of the checks, despite the fact that he did not purchase the checks. Usually, the individual who purchases travelers checks signs them when they are purchased, so that they cannot be stolen or used by an unauthorized individual. The fact that the buyer did not sign them and gave them to Clinton blank suggests that the funds were intentionally provided to Clinton in a manner calculated to conceal their origin. <bullet> Third, the travelers checks were purchased overseas and then imported into the United States. If a total of $10,000 or more was imported at any one time, then the importation should have been declared on customs forms. However, Roger Clinton did not file any such forms with the Customs Service.\8\ If Roger Clinton imported these travelers checks into the United States from overseas without filing the required forms with the Customs Service, then he committed a serious crime.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ The Committee sought any records indicating, inter alia, that Roger Clinton filed forms declaring the importation of more than $10,000 into the United States. Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to James F. Sloan, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Director, Department of Treasury (June 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). The one document produced in response to this request appears to be unrelated to the travelers checks deposited into Roger Clinton's bank account. Letter from Albert R. Zarate, Senior Counsel, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 8, 2001) (within Appendix I). \9\ 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5316 imposes an obligation on anyone who ``transports . . . monetary instruments of more than $10,000'' into the United States or who ``receives monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one time transported into the United States'' to file a report of the importation. Failure to file such a report can result in both civil penalties under 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5321 and criminal penalties under Sec. 5322. Monetary instruments subject to the reporting requirement include travelers checks in any form, whether restrictively endorsed or not. U.S. v. Larson, 110 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1997). The following is an accounting of the travelers checks received by Roger Clinton, indicating the country of origin of the checks and the name of the purchaser. Although the Committee has been able to obtain the name of the individual purchasing the travelers checks, it has been unable to obtain further information regarding the purpose of the checks. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date Deposited Type of Check Origin Purchaser Name Amount ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- November 30, 1998 American Express Unknown Chen Jianxing $1,000 December 1, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $15,000 December 8, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $23,000 December 15, 1998 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $90,000 December 15, 1998 Unknown Unknown Unknown $29,000 December 15, 1998 Visa-Sumitomo Taiwan Lin Mei Guang $4,000 December 15, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $2,000 July 12, 1999 American Express Unknown Unknown $20,000 July 12, 1999 Citicorp South Korea Sook-Eun Jang \10\ $5,000 November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $3,000 November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $10,000 November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $5,000 November 30, 1999 Visa Taiwan Unknown $1,000 November 30, 1999 Visa Taiwan Xu Jingsheng $3,000 November 30, 1999 Citicorp Venezuela Pedro Jose Garboza $38,000 Matos November 30, 1999 Unknown Unknown Unknown $40,000 February 22, 2000 American Express Taiwan Qu Guang Yin $7,000 March 24, 2000 Citicorp Venezuela Pedro Jose Garboza $3,000 Matos April 5, 2000 American Express Taiwan Mou Chuanxue $4,000 April 17,2000 American Express Taiwan Qu Guang Yin $13,000 April 17, 2000 American Express Unknown Suk Eun Chang $5,000 May 15, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $5,000 July 13, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $1,000 July 27, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $2,000 July 31, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $4,000 August 2, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $1,000 August 11, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $1,000 ------------ Total: $335,000 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Roger Clinton therefore deposited in his bank accounts at least $335,000 in travelers checks, most or all of which originated overseas. It is possible that Clinton was provided with even more funds in travelers checks, which were not deposited in his bank accounts but were spent instead. Roger Clinton has refused to answer any questions about the travelers checks, including why they were paid to him, who paid them to him, or whether he paid appropriate taxes on them.\11\ Given the large amount of money involved and the attempt to conceal its source, these circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that multiple laws may have been violated, including those relating to declaring monetary instruments imported into the United States and reporting the income for tax purposes. Accordingly, the Committee believes this matter should be investigated further by the Department of Justice, which would have the ability to review Roger Clinton's tax records and could potentially obtain sworn testimony from him. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ This individual is likely the same person identified as ``Suk Eun Chang'' who purchased $5,000 in travelers checks deposited by Roger Clinton on April 17, 2000. See also n.19 and accompanying text. \11\ See Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Roger Clinton (June 25, 2001) (within Appendix I); Letter from Bart H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to the $335,000 in travelers checks, Roger Clinton has also received funds from a number of other suspicious sources, raising questions about the legality of his activities: <bullet> Cash: Roger Clinton deposited into his bank accounts $85,000 in cash between February 1998 and February 2001. Clinton claimed to the FBI that he received this cash while traveling to foreign countries ostensibly for the purpose of performing with his six-piece band. Like the transactions involving blank travelers checks, these large cash transactions give rise to reasonable suspicions that the purpose of the payments was not legitimate. In addition, the $85,000 figure represents only the money that Clinton deposited into his account. It seems likely that Clinton received more money and spent it, rather than depositing it. However, as Clinton has refused to answer any questions from the Committee, it is impossible to know exactly how much cash he received, from whom, and for what purpose. <bullet> Seaway II Florida and Tony Rodham: Seaway II Florida is a company controlled by Florida businessman Gene Prescott.\12\ Prescott owns the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables, Florida, as well as a number of other properties. Prescott also has a close relationship with Hillary Clinton's brother Tony Rodham and has an interest in Rodham's consulting business, Tony Rodham and Associates. Between January and November 1998, Seaway II Florida issued three checks to Roger Clinton totaling $20,000. According to the lawyer for Seaway II Florida, Roger Clinton was paid this money for referring business to Tony Rodham, although neither the attorney nor Prescott could recall the specific referral.\13\ In addition, it appears that Tony Rodham attempted to pay Roger Clinton $25,000 personally, in April 1998, but that the check was returned for insufficient funds.\14\ Due to the refusal of Rodham and Clinton to cooperate with the Committee, the purpose of the attempted $25,000 payment is not clear. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ See Telephone Interview with Gene Prescott, Owner, Biltmore Hotel (June 5, 2001). \13\ Telephone Interview with Daniel Ponce, Counsel for Gene Prescott (June 29, 2001). \14\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 2). <bullet> Edvard Akopyan: Edvard Akopyan is a Glendale, California, resident who paid $61,100 to Roger Clinton between August and December 1999. Akopyan claims that he paid the money to Clinton because he was acting as a middleman in scheduling Clinton's appearance at a musical concert in Kazakhstan.\15\ Akopyan stated that Clinton made one appearance in Kazakhstan in the summer of 1999 and a second in January 2000.\16\ Akopyan stated that the individual in Kazakhstan who provided the funds to him for Clinton's payment was named Darkhan Berdaleav.\17\ Akopyan also stated that Roger Clinton informed him that he checked with the State Department before he traveled to Kazakhstan to perform.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Telephone Interview with Edvard Akopyan (June 5, 2001). \16\ Id. \17\ Id. \18\ Id. <bullet> Suk Eun Chang: In December 1999, Suk Eun Chang provided Roger Clinton with a cashier's check for $70,000.\19\ The source of the cashier's check was apparently $193,000 deposited by Chang into a bank in Los Angeles.\20\ Chang also provided $10,000 in travelers checks to Clinton. However, the Committee has been unable to locate Chang to ask him about the source of this cash or the purpose of the payment to Clinton. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 3). \20\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 4). These questionable sources of income, together with the travelers checks received by Roger Clinton, should be the subject of further investigation by the Department of Justice. At a minimum, the government should satisfy itself that the requisite taxes have been paid. B. Roger Clinton's Lobbying Regarding Cuban Travel Restrictions In the course of reviewing Roger Clinton's bank records, the Committee learned that during 2000, Roger Clinton was paid to lobby President Clinton regarding the restrictions on travel to Cuba. Roger Clinton's receipt of substantial sums of money to lobby his brother raises serious ethical and legal questions given Clinton's failure to register as a lobbyist as required by federal law. This arrangement also served as a precedent for Roger Clinton's acceptance of money to lobby his brother for grants of clemency at the end of President Clinton's term. In June 2000, a Los Angeles-based company called Cuba Travel Services (``CTS'') hired Roger Clinton. Michael Zuccato, President of CTS, is a personal friend of Roger Clinton's.\21\ According to Zuccato, Roger Clinton was hired to help CTS lift restrictions on travel to Cuba.\22\ CTS specialized in arranging charter flights from Los Angeles to Cuba and would substantially benefit from a loosening of legal restrictions on such travel. A CTS affiliate, J. Perez Associates, and Roger Clinton's company, Odgie Music, signed a consulting agreement in which CTS retained Roger Clinton to ``provide counsel, advice and to promote [CTS] to entities necessary to conduct its import and export business.'' \23\ CTS agreed to pay Clinton $5,000 per month for these services.\24\ Over the next four months, CTS and J. Perez Associates paid Roger Clinton a total of $30,000.\25\ According to Zuccato, Roger Clinton was paid during this period to present information to ``his brother and other people.'' \26\ Indeed, one invoice from Odgie Music to J. Perez and Associates charges $5,000 for a trip made by Roger Clinton to Washington, D.C.\27\ Although Zuccato denied that Roger Clinton's contacts with ``his brother and other people'' constituted ``lobbying,'' \28\ there is no other accurate description for what Roger Clinton did. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (``the Act'') defines the term ``lobbying contact'' as: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato, President, Cuba Travel Services (June 5, 2001). \22\ Id. \23\ Cuba Travel Services Document Production (Consulting Agreement) (Exhibit 5). \24\ Id. \25\ Bank of America Document Production (Checks from CTS and J. Perez Associates) (Exhibit 6). \26\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato (June 5, 2001). \27\ Cuba Travel Services Document Production (Invoice from Odgie Music) (Exhibit 7). \28\ Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato, President, Cuba Travel Services (June 5, 2001). [A]ny oral or written communication . . . to a covered executive branch official . . . that is made on behalf of a client with regard to--(i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of Federal legislation (including legislative proposals) [or] (ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of a Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other program, policy, or position of the United States Government[.] \29\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(8)(a). A ``covered executive branch official'' includes the President. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(3)(a). Any contact Roger Clinton had with the President about easing restrictions on travel to Cuba would certainly constitute a communication with regard to a modification of a policy or position of the United States. If Roger Clinton's lobbying activities \30\ for Cuba Travel Services constituted more than 20 percent of the total work he did for the company, then he would be ``a lobbyist'' under the provisions of the Act.\31\ As a lobbyist who earned more than $5,500 in a six-month period from a single client, Roger Clinton would have an obligation to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives.\32\ A search of those filings indicates that he did not do so.\33\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ The term ``lobbying activity'' is broadly defined as ``lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.'' 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(7). \31\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(10). \32\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1603(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(a)(3)(A)(1); 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1603(a)(3)(b). \33\ See Office of Public Records, United States Senate, ``Lobby Filing Disclosure Program,'' <http://sopr.senate.gov/> (U.S. Lobby Report Images for 2000). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Because Roger Clinton declined to be interviewed by the Committee, the precise content of his discussions with President Clinton is unknown.\34\ However, it is clear that he was paid $30,000 to lobby the President to loosen travel restrictions to Cuba and that he told his clients that he had, in fact, contacted his brother on their behalf. These circumstances warrant further investigation by law enforcement authorities to determine whether Roger Clinton violated federal law by failing to register as a lobbyist.\35\ Apart from his failure to register, Roger Clinton's activity in this case was likely legal. However, whether such activities should be legal is another question. Even when properly disclosed, which these contacts were not, paid lobbying of the President by close relatives is likely to decrease public confidence in the integrity of government. As a matter of prudence, the President should not have agreed to be lobbied by family members who received payment. President Clinton implicitly admitted this principle when he asked his brother-in-law Hugh Rodham to return money paid to lobby for the pardons of Carlos Vignali and Glenn Braswell. The day after learning of the payments, President Clinton issued a statement: ``Neither Hillary nor I had any knowledge of such payments. We are deeply disturbed by these reports and have insisted that Hugh return any moneys received.'' \36\ The payments to Roger Clinton to lobby his brother on travel restrictions to Cuba should be equally disturbing for exactly the same reasons. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\ A statement in the summary of the FBI's interview with Roger Clinton suggests that at some point, Roger discussed the Cuban trade embargo with President Clinton: G[Roger] Clinton recalled a conversation, the date or approximate time of which he could not recall, he had with his brother, Bill Clinton, who told him the [Cuban] cigar embargo would not be lifted while he was still President. President Clinton allegedly said ``The embargo will be eased for food and medicine because that is the direction the world is going, but not for cigars, not during your --------------------------------------------------------------------------- life time [sic].'' DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000004 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ The penalty for such a violation is a fine of up to $50,000. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1606. \36\ John Solomon, Clinton Kin Returns Pardon Fee, Associated Press, Feb. 21, 2001. See generally Chapter Three, ``Hugh Rodham's Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive Clemency,'' Section I.D.1., ``The Response from Hugh Rodham.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. The Shakedown of John Katopodis The Committee investigated another episode in which Roger Clinton tried to exploit his Administration contacts to enrich himself. Roger Clinton and a business associate, Larry Wallace, pressured the president of an association of local governments in Alabama, John Katopodis, to hire Clinton for his ability to contact Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater and others in the Clinton Administration. As described below, Wallace and Clinton apparently engaged in strong-arm tactics to try to force Clinton's hiring. In early 1996, John Katopodis, a Harvard-educated Fulbright Scholar,\37\ was advocating the construction of a new international airport for Alabama.\38\ Katopodis served as Executive Director of the Council of Cooperating Governments, an association of city and county governments dedicated to improving transportation in the Southeast.\39\ As part of its efforts to publicize the airport project, the Council was seeking a prominent guest speaker for its 1996 symposium.\40\ Local and state political figures, as well as federal agency representatives, were planning to attend the symposium,\41\ and Katopodis sought the Secretary of Transportation as the ideal guest speaker.\42\ Yet, attracting the Secretary of Transportation proved to be no easy task. While discussing the airport project with his colleague Dr. Frank Stuart, Katopodis was advised that Arkansas attorney Larry Wallace could be instrumental in arranging for the Secretary's visit.\43\ Katopodis eventually received an unsolicited telephone call from Wallace.\44\ Mr. Wallace, a self-proclaimed power broker from Little Rock, Arkansas, was well connected to the Clinton Administration.\45\ One of these connections included the White House Chief of Staff at the time, Mack McLarty, Wallace's former law partner.\46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis, Executive Director, Council of Cooperating Governments (Sept. 5, 2001). \38\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \39\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000166 (Council of Cooperating Governments Brochure) (Exhibit 9) \40\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \41\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000091 (Symposium Schedule, June 27, 1997) (Exhibit 11). \42\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \43\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \44\ Id. \45\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000011 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \46\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000024 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Katopodis explained that he wanted Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena to speak at a symposium on Alabama's aviation future.\47\ Wallace agreed to use his influence to help Katopodis draw the Secretary to the conference.\48\ Wallace informed Katopodis that Rodney Slater would replace Pena once President Clinton was reelected.\49\ Wallace contacted Katopodis at least eight times in late September and early October of 1996.\50\ He advised Katopodis to talk to Wallace's ``friend at the White House,'' \51\ Bob Nash, the Director of Presidential Personnel.\52\ All White House liaisons reported directly to Nash, and Wallace promised that the transportation liaison would have an answer for Katopodis soon.\53\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). \48\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000147 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Sept. 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 12). \49\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). \50\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000147 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Sept. 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 12); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000200-01 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 13); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000191 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 2, 1996)) (Exhibit 14); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000162 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 9, 1996)) (Exhibit 15); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000146 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 11, 1996)) (Exhibit 16); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000169 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 12, 1996)) (Exhibit 17); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000159 (Telephone message from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 14, 1996)) (Exhibit 18); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000168 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 15, 1996)) (Exhibit 19). \51\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000146 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 11, 1996)) (Exhibit 16). \52\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000200-01 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 13). \53\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000162 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 9, 1996)) (Exhibit 15). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On November 5, 1996, Katopodis attended an election night party hosted by Wallace in Little Rock. At the election night party--the same party where Roger Clinton informed George Locke that President Clinton had advised him to make the most of his last four years in office \54\--Wallace introduced Katopodis to individuals Wallace described as ``financial heavy hitters'' and ``friends of Bill.'' \55\ Among these individuals was a former state senator whom Wallace introduced as ``Roger Clinton's mentor and closest associate,'' \56\ likely George Locke.\57\ Roger Clinton had apparently enlisted Locke's assistance because Locke lobbied for Roger's employment during the election night party.\58\ Locke was not the only one trying to find Roger Clinton gainful employment. After the party, Wallace and Katopodis continued to discuss the airport issue.\59\ During one of these conversations, Wallace told Katopodis that his close personal friend, President Clinton, was concerned about his ``baby brother's'' lack of employment and income.\60\ According to Wallace, the President tasked him with finding some type of job for Roger.\61\ Wallace wanted to follow the President's directive and asked Katopodis if they could meet in Washington to discuss a possible contract for Roger.\62\ To lure him to the nation's capital, Wallace even offered Katopodis the opportunity to spend a night in the Lincoln Bedroom of the White House.\63\ Katopodis declined the invitation.\64\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ See n.7 and accompanying text. \55\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \56\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). \57\ See Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Partner, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). \58\ See Telephone Interview with Larry Wallace (Aug. 27, 2001). \59\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \60\ See id.; DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \61\ Id. \62\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \63\ See id. Wallace extended this invitation before the Lincoln Bedroom scandal became public. \64\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Katopodis wanted to define and formalize Clinton's responsibilities before signing a contract for his services.\65\ Katopodis also wanted to ensure that Clinton's responsibilities passed ethical and legal standards of conduct and could not be construed as influence peddling.\66\ In fact, Katopodis offered to hire Wallace, instead of Clinton, to avoid these concerns.\67\ Wallace stated that he could not guarantee the Secretary's appearance and would not be acting as an attorney, but he did offer Clinton's access ``thrown in as a bonus.'' \68\ Katopodis rejected this proposal because he wanted to hire Wallace only in his capacity as an attorney.\69\ In future conversations, Wallace returned the focus of contract discussions to finding Roger employment as the President directed.\70\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \65\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000022. \66\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). \67\ See id. \68\ Id. \69\ Id. \70\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When Katopodis asked Wallace to place a figure on Roger Clinton's services, Wallace suggested that $30,000-$35,000 per month would be sufficient.\71\ Katopodis asserted that the Council of Cooperating Governments could not possibly afford to pay Clinton such an inordinate amount.\72\ Moreover, Katopodis was understandably suspicious of this proposal because he had never spoken with Roger Clinton \73\ and was beginning to doubt whether Wallace was actually as ``connected'' to the Clinton Administration as he claimed.\74\ These doubts were dispelled, however, when Roger Clinton personally telephoned Katopodis.\75\ During the call, Clinton and Katopodis discussed the $35,000 per month contract.\76\ In return for such a large fee, Clinton offered to ``open a lot of doors'' for the Council.\77\ The President's brother gave Katopodis his pager number and his telephone and fax numbers in Farmer's Branch, Texas.\78\ Clinton was aware of contract details that Wallace and Katopodis had discussed, which convinced Katopodis of Wallace's close relationship with Clinton.\79\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \71\ See id.; Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). In this interview, Katopodis stated that Wallace proposed a contract for Roger at $30,000 per month. See id. When the FBI interviewed Katopodis in May 1997, soon after these events occurred, he stated that Wallace proposed a contract for Roger at $35,000 per month. See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \72\ See id. \73\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). \74\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \75\ See id.; Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). \76\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \77\ See Bob Johnson, Former Birmingham Official Says FBI Probed Clinton's Half-Brother Over Job Query, Associated Press, Feb. 22, 2001. \78\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000035 (Roger Clinton Contact Information) (Exhibit 20). Roger Clinton was likely visiting his wife's family who live in Farmer's Branch, Texas. \79\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000022 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Following their introductory conversation, Katopodis and Clinton discussed a possible business relationship on several occasions.\80\ Katopodis maintained that having the Secretary of Transportation as a guest speaker was not worth hiring Clinton for $35,000 per month.\81\ As Katopodis later told Newsweek, the $35,000-per-month contract was ``a pretty big consulting fee for someone who plays in a rock band.'' \82\ Katopodis asked Clinton to create a list of tasks with a reasonable amount of money assigned to each task before the Council could make a financial commitment.\83\ The potential conflict of interest between having the President's brother lobby the Secretary of Transportation for the Council concerned Katopodis.\84\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \80\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000023. \81\ See id. \82\ Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, His Brother's Keeper, Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 33. \83\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \84\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Another concern disturbing Katopodis was the relationship between Wallace and Clinton.\85\ Clinton clarified Wallace's role by declaring that Wallace had no influence that did not ``drive directly through me.'' \86\ Clinton continued that he was tired of doing favors without being recognized or compensated.\87\ Clinton then asked Katopodis to meet him in Redondo Beach, California, because Clinton wanted to avoid further discussions over the telephone.\88\ The conversation concluded with Clinton saying that he and his brother had ``only four years to get things done'' and did not care about ``ethics or what appearances were.'' \89\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \85\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000021 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \86\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \87\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \88\ See id. \89\ Id. Katopodis recorded some of his telephone conversations with Roger Clinton once the situation became ``stickier.'' Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). Due to the passage of several years, Katopodis cannot locate these tapes and believes that they may have been turned over to the FBI. If the FBI has possession of these tapes, they should have been provided to the Committee based on the Committee's request to the FBI for ``[a]ll records relating to any criminal investigation relating to the relationship between Roger Clinton, Arkansas lawyer Larry Wallace, and Birmingham, Alabama, businessman John Katopodis.'' Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to the Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 14, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A few minutes after this telephone call, Wallace contacted Katopodis and expressed frustration over the difficulty in formalizing a contract between Clinton and the Council.\90\ Wallace reiterated his demand for a one-month's payment to Clinton and informed Katopodis that the airport project would remain at a standstill until Katopodis ``showed him the money.'' \91\ After Wallace's not-so-veiled threat to block Katopodis' efforts with Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater, Katopodis made no progress on attracting the Secretary to the aviation seminar as Wallace promised. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \90\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000012 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \91\ See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While negotiating with Wallace and Clinton, Katopodis concurrently continued his individual efforts to have Secretary Slater speak at the seminar.\92\ In a December 19, 1996, letter, Katopodis congratulated Slater on his selection as Secretary, explained the purpose of the symposium, and invited him to give the keynote address.\93\ The Secretary responded one month later to Katopodis' congratulatory wishes without mentioning the conference.\94\ On February 24, 1997, Katopodis sent a fax to the Secretary's office reminding them of the invitation and requesting an answer.\95\ Katopodis then called the Secretary's office several times to determine whether an answer was forthcoming.\96\ The Secretary refused to give Katopodis an answer--not even a ``no''--for nearly four months,\97\ so he tried a different strategy by establishing a deadline for the Secretary's response in a letter dated April 11, 1997.\98\ The deadline passed without a word from the Secretary. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \92\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000013. \93\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000076 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Rodney Slater, Federal Highway Administrator, Department of Transportation (Dec. 19, 1996)) (Exhibit 21). \94\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000041 (Letter from Rodney Slater, Federal Highway Administrator, Department of Transportation, to John Katopodis (Jan. 22, 1997)) (Exhibit 22). \95\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000104 (Fax from John Katopodis, to Peg Weathers, Deputy Scheduler for Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (Feb. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 23). \96\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000089 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Eddie Carazo, Scheduling Assistant for Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (Apr. 11, 1997)) (Exhibit 24). \97\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \98\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000089 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Eddie Carazo, Scheduling Assistant for Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (Apr. 11, 1997)) (Exhibit 24). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Upon hearing that the Secretary was considering a separate speaking engagement in Birmingham, Katopodis faxed another letter on April 28, 1997, requesting to be included on the Secretary's schedule.\99\ The Council again received no response. On May 7, 1997, Katopodis called Slater's scheduler, Vonnie Robinson, and expressed his suspicion that Clinton and Wallace had urged the Secretary's office not to respond while contract discussions were ongoing.\100\ Robinson told Katopodis that this was not the case but did acknowledge knowing who Roger Clinton and Wallace were.\101\ After speaking with Robinson, Katopodis received a brusque telephone call later that day from Catherine Grunden, Secretary Slater's Director of Scheduling and Advance.\102\ Grunden immediately launched into a monologue stating that the Secretary's office disclaimed any connection with Roger Clinton or Larry Wallace.\103\ If Katopodis still was not satisfied, Grunden advised him to turn over any allegations of wrongdoing to the proper authorities.\104\ Katopodis indicated his understanding and hung up.\105\ Following this unsolicited telephone call, Katopodis faxed Robinson a letter on May 8, 1997, in which he wrote: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \99\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000090 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Vonnie Robinson, Scheduler for Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (Apr. 28, 1997)) (Exhibit 25). \100\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \101\ Id. \102\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \103\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000023 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \104\ Id. at FBI-RC-0000024. \105\ Id. I can't begin to tell you how disgusted I am with this whole matter. If it is the normal policy of your office to not respond to written requests from established organizations, then perhaps I am wrong in my assumptions about the lack of response being tied to an attempt at extortion.\106\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \106\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000088 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Vonnie Robinson, Scheduler for Secretary Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (May 8, 1997)) (Exhibit 26). Grunden's was not the only odd telephone call Katopodis received while trying to schedule Secretary Slater's appearance. On April 16, 1997, Katopodis reached out to his local Congressman, Representative Earl Hilliard, to ask for his advice and assistance in solving this problem.\107\ On May 14, 1997, less than one week after Katopodis' letter to Robinson, Congressman Hilliard's staff member cryptically told Katopodis that the Congressman had received a call ``from the highest level'' concerning this matter.\108\ The staff member told Katopodis that he had ``been bad again'' and that he should stop incriminating Roger Clinton and Larry Wallace.\109\ This conversation, in addition to Grunden's telephone call and the Secretary's absolute lack of response, reinforced Katopodis' conclusion that Clinton and Wallace were obstructing any progress on the airport project. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \107\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8); DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000101 (Fax from John Katopodis, to Ken Mullinax, Staff Assistant, Office of the Honorable Earl Hilliard (Apr. 16, 1997)) (Exhibit 27). \108\ See DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \109\ See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On May 16, 1997, the Federal Bureau of Investigation contacted Katopodis regarding this matter.\110\ Agents from the FBI asked Katopodis to wear a wire in a meeting with Wallace or Clinton.\111\ Katopodis declined to wear a wire because he had friends in both political parties and feared a political backlash if he fully pursued an investigation.\112\ Nevertheless, Katopodis participated in one face-to-face meeting and two full telephone interviews with the FBI,\113\ and provided FBI agents with all of his documents regarding Wallace and Clinton.\114\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \110\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000020 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \111\ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001). \112\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-0000013 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). \113\ See id. at FBI-RC-0000011-13; DOJ Document Production FBI-RC- 0000020-24 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). \114\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Referring to the FBI's handling of this information as an ``investigation'' may be a misnomer. Notwithstanding the facts that Katopodis submitted to multiple interviews, possessed incriminating recordings of conversations with Roger Clinton, and provided hundreds of pages of documentation supporting his allegations, the Committee has been unable to obtain any evidence that the FBI ever interviewed Larry Wallace or Roger Clinton regarding this incident. Katopodis described the FBI as not ``follow[ing] up with any sort of intensity.'' \115\ Without aggressive pursuit by the FBI, the investigation effectively died.\116\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \115\ Id. \116\ See Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, His Brother's Keeper, Newsweek, Feb. 26, 2001, at 33. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The airport project met a similar fate. Katopodis severed his ties with Clinton and Wallace in Spring 1997,\117\ but he continued as director for the Council of Cooperating Governments. Support for the airport and its promotional symposium lost all momentum because of the delay in receiving a response from the Secretary. In fact, the Secretary never responded to Katopodis' series of invitations or pleas for an answer. Larry Wallace and Roger Clinton apparently ensured that no answer would be forthcoming as long as Katopodis was unwilling to pay their price. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \117\ See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Roger Clinton's dealings with John Katopodis served as a harbinger of things to come in 1998-2001. Clinton would use his status as the President's brother to obtain even larger payments, lobbying for parole and pardons of convicted criminals, including a member of the Gambino crime family. Moreover, Roger Clinton's lobbying efforts in these other areas would show no more subtlety than did his crude dealings with Katopodis. II. THE GAMBINO PAROLE AND PARDON EFFORTS While Roger Clinton lobbied for executive clemency for a number of unsavory and undeserving individuals, none was as unsavory as Rosario Gambino. Gambino was a major organized crime figure serving a 45-year prison sentence for heroin trafficking. It is difficult to believe that anyone, much less the brother of the President, would lobby for parole or clemency for an individual like Gambino. Indeed, Roger Clinton's involvement in this matter can be explained only by the fact that he received $50,000 from the Gambinos and was promised even more money. A. Rosario Gambino's Involvement with Organized Crime At 20 years of age in 1962, Rosario ``Sal'' Gambino was arrested on immigration charges and deported to Italy.\118\ At some point, however, this son of a Sicilian butcher \119\ returned to the United States and, between the ages of 27 and 38, was arrested three times on charges ranging from possession of a dangerous weapon to assault and extortion.\120\ Then in 1980, he was arrested for conspiracy to import heroin after police in Milan, Italy, confiscated 91 pounds of heroin valued at $60 million destined for the United States.\121\ Although acquitted in the United States, Gambino was tried in absentia (with representation by counsel) in Italy, convicted, and sentenced to 20 years in prison.\122\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \118\ USPC Document Production 00067 (Pre-sentence Report, U.S. v. Gambino (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1984)) (Exhibit 28). \119\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0096 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 29). \120\ USPC Document Production 00067 (Pre-sentence Report, U.S. v. Gambino (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1984)) (Exhibit 28). \121\ Id. \122\ Id. at 00068. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Without being extradited to serve any time in Italy, Gambino was arrested yet again in the United States in March 1984 and was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin, use of a communication facility to distribute heroin, and possession with intent to distribute heroin.\123\ Following his conviction in October 1984, Gambino was sentenced to 45 years in prison, which he has been serving since December 6, 1984.\124\ Throughout his incarceration, Gambino has failed to take responsibility for his crimes, has maintained his innocence, and has vigorously pursued every possible avenue of appeal including arguments that he was entrapped, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and that he was the victim of racial discrimination. Yet, his conviction, sentence, and denials of parole have withstood every legal challenge. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \123\ Id. at 00038. \124\ USPC Document Production 00075 (Progress Report, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Jan. 4, 2001) (Exhibit 30). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In January 1984, two of Gambino's relatives and co- conspirators, Anthony Spatola and Antonio Gambino, were seeking to sell heroin. Unknown to them, the prospective buyer was an undercover FBI agent. In intercepted phone conversations, Anthony Spatola and Antonio Gambino discussed Rosario Gambino and the heroin deal in code.\125\ They referred to the heroin as a ``car'' and to Rosario as the ``short guy.'' \126\ The intercepts made it plain that Rosario Gambino was in a leadership role in the conspiracy. The first transaction was completed in a room at Caesar's Boardwalk Regency Hotel in Atlantic City.\127\ A call was placed from the room to Rosario Gambino's residence and immediately after leaving the hotel, the co-conspirators drove to his residence to pay him his proceeds from the deal.\128\ The undercover agent continued to communicate with Antonio Gambino in an attempt to negotiate a second transaction.\129\ The FBI intercepted several additional phone calls related to a second sale of heroin to the undercover agent and involving Rosario Gambino or referring to him in code, such as ``Saruzzo'' and ``the short one.'' \130\ The undercover agent eventually completed a second purchase of a half-kilogram of heroin for $120,000.\131\ When Rosario Gambino was arrested in March 1984, a search of his master bedroom uncovered two of the $100 bills the agent had used to purchase the heroin.\132\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \125\ U.S. v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 942 (1986). \126\ Id. \127\ Id. \128\ Id. \129\ Id. \130\ Id. \131\ Id. \132\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Throughout his attempts to obtain parole, Rosario Gambino has claimed that authorities treated him unfairly merely because of his infamous name. In his initial parole hearing, Gambino denied his guilt and implied that he was a victim of either mistaken identity or prejudice: Hearing Officer. Now, what the government writes is that you were involved in a large-scale heroin distribution ring. You've told me that you didn't have anything to do with this whatsoever. What do you think caused the jury to believe that you were involved with the other guys. What do you think would cause the jury to convict you? Gambino. Because number one is my name. Because see, they [built] this name like [a] big building[.] I'm not, I'm not the name they're looking for. Hearing Officer. Who they [sic] looking for? Gambino. I don't know. They looking [sic] for some big name.\133\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \133\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0057-58 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31). Prosecutors have maintained that Rosario Gambino is a relative of the 1950s-era ``boss of bosses,'' Carlo Gambino, the man for whom the Gambino crime family is named. Reports by special organized crime task forces in two states, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, linked Rosario Gambino to the Gambino crime family,\134\ and regulators banned him from Atlantic City casinos.\135\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \134\ Pennsylvania Crime Commission, A Decade of Organized Crime 70-72 (1980), New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, Twelfth Annual Report 15 (1980). \135\ Division of Gaming Enforcement, New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, ``Exclusion List,'' <http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ge/ exclude2.htm> (exclusion ordered Oct. 30, 1987). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rosario Gambino's representatives, however, have argued that he is not related to members of the Gambino crime family and that claims to the contrary were unsubstantiated. However, the transcript of one of Rosario Gambino's parole hearings seems to indicate that Rosario Gambino himself believes his grandfather may have been related to the 1950s mob boss: Hearing Officer. Is there any family connection between those people--between he and Carlo Gambino? Lawyer. There is none. Hearing Officer. I just want it for the record. Lawyer. The report tries to make an unsubstantiated allegation of some tie on Mr. Gambino's part to-- Gambino. Excuse me, there was a my grandfather, grandfather relative--I don't know. Maybe, I don't know.\136\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \136\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0092 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 29). At another hearing, Gambino made separate statement, which could be construed as a denial of a relationship to Carlo Gambino: GHearing Officer. Let's put the cards on the table. GGambino. Go ahead. GHearing Officer. Carlo Gambino. What relationship are you to Carlo Gambino? GGambino. No relationship. No because I refuse him to be my cousin or something like that. Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0057-58 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31). Regardless of whether or how closely Gambino is related to the notorious family whose name he shares, members of his immediate family have admitted to being involved in organized criminal activity. Rosario's brothers, Giovanni ``John'' Gambino and Giuseppe ``Joe'' Gambino pled guilty in January 1994 to charges of racketeering, murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and heroin trafficking.\137\ Witnesses had testified in court that John and Joe Gambino were the ``main link between Mafia heroin traffickers in Sicily and the American Mafia.'' \138\ The media also described John Gambino as a ``capo'' in John Gotti's organization, the Gambino crime family.\139\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \137\ Selwyn Raab, Two Admit Importing Heroin for Mafia Crime Family, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1994. \138\ Id. \139\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Not only were Rosario Gambino's brothers known associates of Gambino crime family members, but Rosario himself was as well. He was a close friend with Philadelphia mob boss Angelo Bruno, and police surveillance revealed that Bruno often met New York underboss Paul Castellano at the Valentino's supper club,\140\ which was owned by Rosario Gambino.\141\ Castellano later became boss of the Gambino crime family, until John Gotti had him assassinated and became boss in December 1985.\142\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \140\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, has Local Roots, Philadelphia City Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001. \141\ USPC Document Production 00499 (Pre-hearing Assessment, Feb. 3, 1994) (Exhibit 32). \142\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to his ties to the U.S. Mafia, Rosario Gambino is also alleged to be an associate of well-known members of the Sicilian Mafia: When Tommaso Buscetta, a Sicilian Mafia boss from Palermo, needed to hide his ex-wife and daughter in America, Rosario Gambino took the women in. A few years later, Buscetta fled a violent mob war in Sicily and settled in Brooklyn, where he often hung out with the Gambino brothers as well as Carlo Gambino.\143\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \143\ Id. A letter to the Parole Commission advocating Gambino's release also confirms Rosario Gambino's association with Buscetta. The letter refers to statements by Buscetta that he knew Gambino and his brothers but claimed that they were not a part of organized crime.\144\ Parole Commission documents and news reports also refer to Rosario Gambino's role in the phony kidnapping of Michele Sindona, an international banker and money launderer for the Sicilian Mafia.\145\ After being indicted in both the U.S. and Italy in 1979 for bank fraud involving more than $400 million,\146\ Sindona disappeared and friends claimed he had been kidnapped.\147\ During the sham kidnapping, Sindona flew to Sicily accompanied by Rosario Gambino's brother, Giovanni, and when he returned to the U.S., Rosario Gambino met him at JFK airport.\148\ Giovanni Gambino and Michele Sindona were arrested in Italy for aggravated extortion in connection with this incident.\149\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \144\ USPC Document Production 00758 (Letter from Edward S. Panzer, to Hearing Examiner (Sept. 25, 1995)) (Exhibit 33). \145\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001. \146\ USPC Document Production 00925 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Dec. 30. 1997)) (Exhibit 34). \147\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001. \148\ Id. \149\ Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Moreover, a 1995 report issued by the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation refers to evidence that Rosario Gambino was not merely a relative and associate of members of the Mafia. The report details the testimony of Philip Leonetti, whom it describes as ``a former, high-ranking La Cosa Nostra member'' and the ``underboss and confidant to his uncle Nicodemo Scarfo, the boss of the Southeastern Pennsylvania- South Jersey Family of La Cosa Nostra, commonly referred to as the Scarfo Family.'' \150\ The report also makes a distinction between being a member of La Cosa Nostra (the American Mafia) and being a member of the Sicilian Mafia: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \150\ New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, Organized Crime in Bars, Part II 1 (1995). Leonetti learned from Scarfo that John Gambino was a La Cosa Nostra member in the Gambino Family. Gambino and Leonetti were later introduced to each other as ``amico nostra'' by Nicholas ``Nick'' Russo at a sit-down at an Atlantic City restaurant in approximately 1983. Russo was a member of the Gambino Family who lived in the Trenton, N.J., area. The words ``amico nostra'' mean ``friend of ours.'' If a La Cosa Nostra member introduces two people as ``amico nostra,'' it lets each know that the other is a La Cosa Nostra member. The words are only used when introducing La Cosa Nostra members to each other. [Rosario ``Sal''] Gambino --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [however,] was a member of the Sicilian Mafia. Scarfo told Leonetti that sometime in the 1970s, he was introduced to Sal Gambino as ``amico nostra'' by [Philadelphia crime boss] Angelo Bruno. Because of the way that Bruno introduced Sal Gambino to Scarfo, Scarfo and Leonetti always thought that he was a member of La Cosa Nostra. It wasn't until January or February of 1986, when Scarfo and Leonetti first met John Gotti after he became the boss of the Gambino Family, that they found out that Sal Gambino wasn't a member of La Cosa Nostra. Gotti informed Scarfo and Leonetti that Gambino was a member of the Sicilian Mafia, not La Cosa Nostra.\151\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \151\ Id. Italian authorities also allege that Rosario Gambino and his brothers were members of the Sicilian Mafia, so-called ``men of honor,'' at the time he entered the United States.\152\ Given all these circumstances, prosecutors' allegations against Gambino seem well founded. Rosario Gambino appears to be more than merely associated with mobsters; the evidence suggests that he is himself a ``made man.'' As one New Jersey investigator put it, ``[t]o call Rosario Gambino a mob associate is like saying John Gotti was just a street corner thug. Rosario and his brothers were some of the most important Sicilian Mafiosi to ever operate in this country.'' \153\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \152\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001. Moreover, the body of an execution-style murder victim was found in the trunk of a car belonging to Erasmo Gambino, a cousin, co-conspirator, and fellow leader with Rosario Gambino in the heroin distribution ring that led to his incarceration. The body was that of Pietro Inzerillo, Gambino's cousin and partner in his pizzeria business. While Erasmo Gambino was never implicated in the murder and a court found that it could not be considered as a factor in denying Erasmo's parole request, it is nevertheless worth noting as an example of the kind of activity surrounding Rosario Gambino and his associates. See Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 162 (1998). \153\ Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton's Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, Philadelphia City Paper, Sept. 6-13, 2001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. The U.S. Parole Commission's Handling of Rosario Gambino's Case At Rosario Gambino's initial parole hearing in February 1995, the hearing officer recommended a release date of July 15, 1996.\154\ As Hearing Examiner Harry Dwyer explained at the time, however, this was merely a recommendation subject to review by the U.S. Parole Commission: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \154\ USPC Document Production 00486 (Initial Hearing Summary, Feb. 16, 1995) (Exhibit 35). I'm going to take it to 148 months, recommend that you get a date of July 15[.] You've been in custody since March 16 of '84. Twelve years and four months, 148 months, that would be--July 15. I'm going to tell you, I do not believe it's going to come back any less than that. It could come back more. They could disagree with me and push you way down the road. So don't pack your bags.\155\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \155\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0068 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31). Although Dwyer set a presumptive parole date, he noted that --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gambino had not taken full responsibility for his crimes: After careful consideration of subject's statements and information contained in the pre-sentence report this examiner believes that there is more credible evidence that subject did in fact engage in the activities as described in the pre-sentence report and that subject's statements [of denial] are self-serving. Thus, this examiner has concluded by the preponderance of evidence that subject did in fact engage in a Category eight offense behavior regarding the extremely large scale heroin distribution.\156\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \156\ USPC Document Production 00486 (Initial Hearing Summary, Feb. 16, 1995) (Exhibit 35). No other examiner or commissioner ever concurred with Dwyer's initial recommendation of a July 1996 release date, and even Dwyer himself later repudiated it.\157\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \157\ USPC Document Production 00551 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal Summary) (Exhibit 36). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After Acting Regional Commissioner Jasper Clay reviewed the decision in March 1995, he referred it to the National Commissioners for original jurisdiction consideration and voted to require that Gambino serve out his entire sentence. Clay's decision memorandum cited as factors in his decision both Gambino's connections to organized crime and the leadership role he played in the heroin conspiracy that landed him in jail: Although he was not convicted of racketeering or continuing criminal enterprise, the New Jersey and Pennsylvania crime commission reports indicate that Mr. Gambino is a soldier and descendant in the Organized Crime Family of the late mob boss, Carlo Gambino. The PSI further indicates that he, along with his brother, Giuseppe, owned and operated pizza parlors in New York, Pennsylvania and Southern New Jersey to facilitate a continuing criminal enterprise[.] The current conviction surrounds Mr. Gambino's heroin distribution activities between October 1983 and March 1984. The PSI indicates that our subject was the most culpable, holding a high managerial role in this scheme which centered around six individuals, all of whom were related. Mr. Gambino had the authority to determine who would be actively involved in the heroin negotiations and transactions and how the profits would be divided among the participants. Specifically, he was involved in the arrangements to deliver \1/2\ kilogram of heroin to undercover agents on two occasions. Also, 3 kilograms and later 2 kilograms of heroin were made available during negotiations and subject and his co-conspirators offered guarantees to supply 10 kilograms of heroin per month to the agents.\158\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \158\ USPC Document Production 00490 (Memorandum from Jasper R. Clay, Acting Regional Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Mar. 13, 1995)) (Exhibit 37). In April 1995, the full Commission agreed with Clay and rejected Dwyer's initial recommendation, voting to continue Gambino's case until a 15-year reconsideration hearing in March 2010.\159\ Gambino appealed the decision, arguing the Commission did not have enough evidence of his reputed membership in organized crime to legitimately consider it as a factor in denying his parole. Ultimately, the Commission based its final decision on Gambino's actual conduct rather than on his associations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \159\ USPC Document Production 00480 (Continuation Order) (Exhibit 38). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is not necessary for one to be a member of the specific group known as La Cosa Nostra or the Sicilian Mafia to be an organized crime figure of the type for whom early release would be inappropriate. Rather, it is enough that one demonstrate certain characteristics of a lifetime, career criminal who has the inclination and capacity to run a large-scale criminal enterprise upon release. Apart from his relatives, associations, and Sicilian Mafia membership, Rosario Gambino has himself engaged in behavior that invites scrutiny from those charged with combating organized crime--behavior that led to his conviction and incarceration. In denying his parole, officials at the U.S. Parole Commission relied on Gambino's own activities and leadership in the heroin trafficking scheme for which he was convicted, noting that he exhibited the characteristics of an organized crime boss: It would appear that Rosario Gambino certainly has more extensive ties to organized criminals than his own circle of codefendants, but his status as a member of ``organized crime'' is not sufficiently clear to support a finding by the Parole Commission. . . . [However,] the Commission was persuaded that Rosario Gambino was, within his own circle, a traditional organized crime boss who operated through a reputation for violence, through evident corruption of local police, and through subordinates with close family ties of loyalty. . . . Gambino certainly has the background and behavioral characteristics of the career organized criminal, and it is reasonable to suppose that he knows no other way to succeed in life than through his ``family business.'' His connections within the world of organized crime would probably still be extensive upon release, and Gambino shows nothing in his makeup that would distinguish him from the familiar type of Mafioso who is not deterred even by long imprisonment from continuing the only career he knows. In particular, as long as Gambino continues to file appeals in which he denies his leadership role, and portrays himself as a simple first offender, it will be difficult for the Commission to find any basis for deciding that Gambino has the capacity to shake off his past, and discover a law-abiding way to make living.\160\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \160\ USPC Document Production 00702-03 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal Summary) (Exhibit 39). There is no shortage of evidence to support the assertion that Gambino exhibited the characteristics of an organized crime boss by operating through a reputation for violence and corruption of local police. When he was arrested, Gambino was in possession of police surveillance documents relating to his own case, which the Commission considered to be significant circumstantial evidence that Gambino had a ``a sophisticated ability to penetrate police operations.'' \161\ Furthermore, an investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms in 1980 produced evidence implicating Rosario Gambino in two arsons: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \161\ Id. at 00701-02. [The arsons] appear related to efforts by Rosario and his brother, Guiseppe Gambino, to take over a pizza franchise in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Rosario and his brother were observed at the scene of a pizza restaurant following the arson and shortly thereafter, the manager received a call and [was] told to close the store and return to New York. Two days later, the manager's automobile was destroyed by a firebomb. Two days later, the manager received a telephone call and [was] threatened with death.\162\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \162\ USPC Document Production 00887 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Dec. 30, 1997)) (Exhibit 40). The Commission also relied on evidence that his subordinate co- conspirators deliberately promoted Rosario Gambino's reputation for violence to undercover police agents during the commission of the crimes for which he was convicted.\163\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \163\ USPC Document Production 00702 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal Summary) (Exhibit 39)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although Rosario Gambino's lawyers argued in court that denial of his parole was motivated by prejudice based on his national origin, that claim was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The statement that allegedly indicated the bias was, ``Gambino appears to come from an immigrant background in which family connections are simply exploited (as in the current offense) to get around the law.'' \164\ However, the court ruled that, ``[Gambino's] contention is devoid of merit. . . . The reference to Gambino's `immigrant background' in a Commission memorandum is insufficient to establish a due process violation. In sum, the Commission's final decision was not tainted by ethnic bias.'' \165\ The court also rejected Gambino's argument that his due process rights were violated when his offense severity rating was set higher than that of his co-defendants: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \164\ Id. \165\ Gambino v. United States Parole Comm'n, 216 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2000). Differences between Gambino's offense severity rating and his codefendants' were justifiable in light of their differing roles in the heroin distribution conspiracy. Holding Gambino accountable for an amount of heroin greater than what was actually sold to government agents was supported by evidence establishing his ability and willingness to provide greater amounts.\166\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \166\ Id. Despite Gambino's claims to be a victim of prejudice because of his last name, the evidence is clear that he was indeed involved in organized criminal activity, and it is certainly reasonable to conclude that he was at least an associate, if not an outright member, of the Mafia. All of which made the denial of his request for early release the only conscientious, responsible course of action the U.S. Parole Commission could have taken. C. Roger Clinton's Involvement in the Gambino Parole Effort Tommaso ``Tommy'' Gambino is the 27-year old son of Rosario Gambino and a personal friend of Roger Clinton.\167\ That the President's brother lobbied for the release of Rosario Gambino is troubling enough, but that he came to do so through a personal relationship with Tommy Gambino is positively alarming. According to Los Angeles law enforcement and press accounts, Tommy Gambino is not only the son of a mobster, he is a reputed underboss in the Los Angeles Mafia currently under investigation for his own criminal activity.\168\ While Tommy Gambino purportedly runs a company called Progressive Telecom that places pay phones in bars, restaurants, and other businesses, his standard of living appears to be well beyond his visible means of support.\169\ Like his father, Tommy Gambino associates closely with known mobsters; his partner in the pay phone business is Dominick ``Donnie Shacks'' Montemarano.\170\ Montemarano was convicted in 1987 on racketeering, bribery, and extortion charges.\171\ The indictment described Montemarano as a captain in ``the Colombo organized-crime family of La Cosa Nostra.'' \172\ He served 11 years of an 18-year sentence for his role in the scheme to obtain cash payments from New York City concrete companies in exchange for major construction projects.\173\ In addition to Tommy Gambino's business partnership with a known mobster, law enforcement also suspected that he was involved in the distribution of the drug Ecstasy.\174\ In October 2001, the investigation of a lab capable of producing up to 1.5 million tablets of Ecstasy per month was linked to Tommy Gambino: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \167\ Tommy Gambino, a resident of Los Angeles, should not be confused with the legendary Carlo Gambino's son, Thomas, a 72 year-old resident of New York. Through his lawyer, Michael Rosen, Thomas Gambino was quick to make this clear in the days following the public revelations of Roger Clinton's efforts on behalf of Tommy and Rosario. Rosen said, ``my client had nothing to do with the low-rent, trailer- park trash politicians who infested our country for the past eight years.'' Al Guart, Wiseguy Fires at ``Trashy'' Clintons, N.Y. Post, July 1, 2001. \168\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001) (identity withheld due to the sensitive nature of the detective's work). Tommy Gambino ``is considered by Southern California organized crime investigators to be a rising star in the Los Angeles underworld.'' John L. Smith, Las Vegas Review Journal, June 29, 2001. ``[T]he police and FBI . . . suspect young Gambino is a rising underboss in the Los Angeles La Cosa Nostra scene.'' John L. Smith, Pardons Scandal Could Mean Congressional Heat for Gambino, Las Vegas Review Journal, July 5, 2001. See also John L. Smith, Will the Last Guy Left in L.A. Mob Please Turn Out the Lights? Las Vegas Review Journal, Nov. 16, 1997 (indicating that Tommy Gambino was ``sent West by father Rosario Gambino''). \169\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001). \170\ Id. \171\ Arnold H. Lubasch, 2 Convicted of Racketeering in Mafia Construction Case, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987. \172\ Id. \173\ Alan Abrahamson, UCLA is Cleared after FBI Probe, L.A. Times, Mar. 12, 1999. Following his release, Montemarano was the subject of an FBI investigation of point shaving by UCLA football players. Id. \174\ Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los Angeles Police Department (June 28, 2001). Federal agents raided the lab Oct. 17 in an industrial park. During the yearlong investigation, authorities say they taped phone conversations between Derek Galanis [one of the defendants accused of building the lab] and Tommy Gambino, the son of a convicted drug trafficker. Federal authorities contend his father, Rosario Gambino, is an associate of the New York-based Gambino crime family.\175\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \175\ Marisa Taylor, Feds Link Ecstasy Case, Organized Crime; Escondido Wiretapping also Points to Trafficking in Kosovo, San Diego Union-Tribune, Oct. 25, 2001. While Tommy Gambino was not among the 24 defendants charged, prosecutors said that ``members of the drug ring were attempting to seek financing for the Ecstasy lab from the Gambino family.'' \176\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \176\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- All these circumstances make Tommy Gambino's friendship with the brother of the President of the United States unseemly, to say the least. That friendship began when the manager for 70s pop star Gino Vanelli introduced Roger Clinton to Tommy Gambino sometime in the mid-1990s at a club in Beverly Hills.\177\ The purpose of the introduction was so that Tommy could request Roger's help in obtaining his father's release from prison.\178\ When FBI agents interviewed him regarding the Gambino case, Roger described how he was introduced to the matter: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \177\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). \178\ Id. The two most common questions he gets asked regularly are, ``What is it like to be the President's brother? and Can you help me get someone out of jail?'' Clinton stated after talking to Tommy Gambino he knew the reason for the introduction was to see if he could help Tommy Gambino get his father released from prison.\179\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \179\ Id. Despite the fact that Clinton was accustomed to requests to help get convicts out of prison, he became particularly enamored with the Gambino family. Clinton described to the FBI why he enthusiastically joined in the effort to secure Rosario --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gambino's release: Clinton advised that after he began to spend time with Tommy Gambino, he learned about the family and the efforts that they have made to get Tommy's father, Rosario, released from prison. They have hired very qualified attorneys and been through the appeal process. Clinton stated that he identified with Tommy Gambino on a number of levels and because of this, he became passionate about trying to help him get his father released. Clinton stated that since Rosario Gambino has been in prison, Tommy has had to grow up without a father. Clinton advised that he, too, had grown up without a father, and sympathized with that position. Tommy Gambino has a close knit Italian family. Clinton stated that when he grew up in Arkansas he and his brother grew up close to an unnamed tight knit Italian family. He further stated that he has is [sic] own prison experience which has given him an insight to the prison system. Through his experience of being incarcerated, he claimed to have learned that things are not always as they appear or as they are reported. Clinton advised that Tommy Gambino provided him with all the case files related to his father's case. He has spent hours reviewing all the files. Clinton stated that after his full review of the case, he does not believe that Rosario Gambino is being treated fairly. Rosario Gambino has served three years longer than the maximum guidelines for his offenses. He has been given release dates on two occasions and they have both been denied. The same person, whose name he declined to provide, has denied the release, and provided different reasons each time. Clinton further advised that he believes Tommy Gambino's father may be treated differently than other people strictly because of this name. Clinton advised that he too has experienced that problem. He stated that the name can be both a positive or negative depending on the circumstances.\180\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \180\ Id. at FBI-RC-00002. When the Committee subpoenaed Clinton for all of his materials relating to Gambino, he provided approximately 130 pages of documents, many of which were apparently provided to him by Tommy Gambino. Most of these documents were transcripts and forms related to Rosario Gambino's parole. After he conducted his ``full review'' of the Gambino case files, Roger Clinton decided to assist Gambino with his effort to obtain parole. Clinton described his decision to help Gambino to the FBI when they interviewed him in September 1999: He [Clinton] told Tommy Gambino that he would not agree to help the family unless they provided him with all the information related to the case. Clinton told Tommy Gambino that he did not want any information withheld that might effect his decision to help the family. Gambino told Clinton if there is any information withheld from you, it was also being withheld from him (Tommy Gambino). Clinton stated he really felt for the family and grew passionate about trying to help them. He further advised that he told Tommy Gambino that by his providing assistance and making contact with the U.S. Parole Commission to seek assistance with this case, it could actually work against him. Clinton stated his name will not necessarily be an advantage when it comes to fighting this matter. Gambino was willing to take the risk and have Clinton attempt to help.\181\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \181\ Id. Given the assurances by Tommy Gambino to Roger Clinton--and by Clinton to the FBI--that Clinton had been provided with all of the relevant background information about Rosario Gambino, it is fair to conclude that Clinton was aware of the extent and seriousness of Rosario Gambino's criminal activity and mob ties, including: (1) Rosario Gambino's conviction for dealing heroin; (2) his Italian conviction for conspiracy to distribute $60 million of heroin; (3) his role in extortion and arson in southern New Jersey; and (4) his involvement in a phony kidnapping to keep a Mafia money launderer from U.S. authorities.\182\ Despite his knowledge of some or all of these issues, Roger Clinton decided that he should lend his support to getting Rosario Gambino out of prison. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \182\ See n.145 and accompanying text. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- By Roger Clinton's own admission, he was frequently asked to help get people out of prison. Accordingly, it should be asked why he would decide to assist someone who was a member of organized crime, whose involvement in large-scale heroin dealing was beyond dispute, and who was reputed to be involved in a series of serious and violent crimes? If his motives were pure, then surely Roger could have chosen a more deserving case to champion from among all those who approached him for help. Despite Roger Clinton's efforts to convince the FBI that he assisted Gambino because he believed in the merits of his cause, and because he had known a close-knit Italian family growing up in Arkansas, the primary motivation for Roger Clinton was clearly money. Clinton confirmed this fact during his FBI interview: Clinton was asked if he was ever given anything of value for his assistance in this matter. He advised he had not received anything for this assistance. Clinton stated that Tommy Gambino said if he (Clinton) could help get his father out of prison, ``we will take care of you.'' Clinton said that he knows what that means. He stated ``I'm not stupid, I understand what the big picture is.'' He again stated that no specific compensation was discussed if he were to be successful in obtaining Rosario Gambino's release. Clinton advised it was his understanding if he were successful, he would be financially compensated. Clinton is not sure however, if he will be able to help Tommy Gambino and his family.\183\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \183\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00004 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). Clinton admitted that the ``big picture'' included the expectation that the Gambinos would pay him for his work. What he did not admit, however, was that the Gambinos actually did pay him significant amounts of money. As discussed below, Tommy Gambino paid at least $50,000 to Roger Clinton during the time that Clinton was trying to obtain parole or executive clemency for Rosario Gambino. Clinton was also provided with an unspecified amount of ``expense money,'' as well as a gold Rolex, while he was working on the Gambino matter. This payment, and the promise of additional payments, likely had a great deal to do with Roger Clinton's willingness to disregard the clear evidence that Rosario Gambino was a career criminal and use his influence with the Clinton Administration to help get Gambino out of prison. Once Roger Clinton decided to help Gambino, the real question was whether his status as the President's brother would help convince the Parole Commission to release Gambino or whether the Parole Commission would resent Clinton's attempts to lobby them. In fact, some members and staff on the Parole Commission attempted to assist Clinton, while others resisted his attempts to win the release of a major criminal. 1. Clinton's Contacts with the Parole Commission a. Clinton's Initial Approach to the Parole Commission Roger Clinton's lobbying on behalf of Rosario Gambino began in earnest in January 1996. He first contacted the U.S. Parole Commission's regional office in Kansas City, which had been the source of the recommendation to deny early release.\184\ Apparently, Clinton spoke with Parole Commissioner Carol P. Getty and voiced his support for the parole of Rosario Gambino. Clinton also apparently told Getty that he planned on visiting her office in Kansas City on January 17 or 18, 1996, and asked if he could meet with her or her staff, and Getty agreed to a meeting between Clinton and her staff.\185\ During this conversation, Clinton also mentioned that he was aware that the Kansas City Regional Office of the Parole Commission, of which Getty was the head, was scheduled to be closed.\186\ Getty was concerned that Roger Clinton had this information, as it apparently made it appear that Roger Clinton was aware of some of the inner workings of the Parole Commission.\187\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \184\ USPC Document Production 00898 (Memorandum from Michael J. Gaines, Commissioner, to Sharon Gervasoni, Designated Agency Ethics Officer (Jan. 30, 1996)) (Exhibit 41). \185\ Id. \186\ Id. \187\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After Clinton had spoken to Getty, on January 16, 1996, Getty called Parole Commission headquarters in Maryland and spoke to Commissioner Michael J. Gaines regarding the Clinton call.\188\ Getty related to Gaines the fact that Clinton had called about the Gambino case. Getty told Gaines that she had scheduled a meeting between Clinton and her staff to discuss the case. Getty also told Gaines that she was concerned that Clinton was aware of the planned closure of her regional Kansas City Parole Commission office and asked Gaines if he had spoken to Clinton about the closure.\189\ Gaines said he had not, to his knowledge, ever spoken with Roger Clinton.\190\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \188\ Id. \189\ Id. \190\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Following his conversation with Getty, Gaines notified the White House Counsel's Office of Roger Clinton's attempt to contact a Commission member about a pending case.\191\ The Commission's General Counsel, Michael A. Stover said that he had suggested to Gaines that he call the White House to ``warn them about Roger Clinton.'' \192\ When interviewed by Committee staff, Gaines said his decision to contact the White House was ``a spur of the moment decision'' because of the appearance of impropriety.\193\ He contacted someone in the Counsel's office that he had known from Arkansas, Trey Schroeder. Gaines said he wanted to ensure that someone at the White House was aware that Roger Clinton had contacted the regional office about an inmate's case.\194\ Gaines told Schroeder that he did not intend to speak to Clinton, and Schroeder replied, ``okay, thanks,'' and that was the end of the conversation.\195\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \191\ Id. \192\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \193\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). \194\ Id. \195\ Id. When asked about Gaines' contact with the White House, Chief of Staff Marie Ragghianti stated that Gaines told her about his conversation with someone at the White House. According to Gaines, when he told White House staff about Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission, the staffer replied ``for God's sake, you can handle that one.'' Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On January 17, 1996, Commissioner Getty again contacted Commissioner Gaines to inform him that Roger Clinton had contacted Rosario Gambino's hearing examiner, Sam Robertson.\196\ Clinton told Robertson he would not come to the Kansas City office as he had planned, but instead would contact the Parole Commission's main offices in Maryland.\197\ On January 30, 1996, he did so, leaving a message with a secretary for Commissioner Gaines.\198\ The message slip read, ``Roger Clinton, very important . . . ASAP, re: brother recommended meeting.'' \199\ Because Commissioner Gaines knew from Commissioner Getty that Roger Clinton was planning to contact him about the Gambino case and because he knew that any such contact would be improper, he consulted the General Counsel Michael Stover.\200\ Stover volunteered to contact Roger Clinton on behalf of Gaines to shield him from an inappropriate contact and to advise Clinton that such a contact would be inappropriate.\201\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \196\ USPC Document Production 00898 (Memorandum from Michael J. Gaines, Commissioner, to Sharon Gervasoni, Designated Agency Ethics Officer (Jan. 30, 1996)) (Exhibit 41). \197\ Id. \198\ USPC Document Production 00896 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). \199\ Id; Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001) (indicating that the message slip was attached to the last page of his January 31, 1996, memo to file at 00896). \200\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). \201\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With the Parole Commission's Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Officer (``DAEO'') Sharon Gervasoni present, Stover returned Roger Clinton's phone call, describing it in detail in a memo dated the following day.\202\ According to Stover's memo, Roger Clinton immediately invoked his brother, President Clinton, saying not only that the President was aware of what Roger was doing but also that he was assisting Roger with strategy on the best way to achieve his objectives: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \202\ Id. [Roger Clinton] began the conversation by informing me that his brother ``[]is completely aware of my involvement.'' Roger Clinton stated that his brother had recommended to him that he not meet with Commissioner Getty . . . because Commissioner Getty's Kansas City Regional Office was about to be closed. Roger Clinton informed me that his brother suggested that he contact Commissioner Gaines instead. (I knew about the previous contact with Commissioner Getty's office, and that Roger Clinton is apparently a friend of Rosario Gambino's son Thomas, who also lives in California.) \203\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \203\ Id. The parenthetical comment inserted by Stover makes clear that he understood the context of the conversation related specifically to the case of inmate Rosario Gambino. This is important because when he was interviewed by the FBI regarding his efforts in the Gambino matter, Roger Clinton told the FBI that ``he did not represent to anyone on the Parole Commission that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist the Gambino family or that the President was supporting his effort to assist in getting Rosario Gambino released from prison.'' \204\ In light of Stover's memo (as well as subsequent contacts with Case Operations Manager Tom Kowalski),\205\ Roger Clinton's statement to the FBI appears to be false. If Roger Clinton believed that his brother's involvement would be illegal or improper and might spark another scandal, then he would have had a powerful motivation to lie to the FBI. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \204\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). \205\ Kowalski recalled that on several occasions, Clinton made it clear that his brother knew of his involvement in the Gambino matter. Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Stover's record of the January 30, 1996, conversation with Clinton indicates that Stover clearly explained to Clinton the applicable law and proper procedures for lobbying for parole: I informed Roger Clinton that . . . the Privacy Act of 1974 prohibited Commissioners and staff of the U.S. Parole Commission from discussing any case with a member of the public without a signed waiver from the inmate in question. . . . I further informed Roger Clinton that Commissioner Gaines could not meet with him because, even if Roger Clinton were an authorized representative of the inmate, he would have to appear before the hearing examiners at a regularly-scheduled parole hearing. . . . I explained the Commission's procedures whereby hearing examiners make recommended decisions after hearing presentations on the record, and that Commissioners vote and make their decisions without meeting with prisoners' representatives. I explained that, in this respect, the Commission operates like a court of law.\206\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \206\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). According to Stover's memo, Roger Clinton reacted to Stover's explanation by once again invoking the President's authority in --------------------------------------------------------------------------- suggesting he meet with Commissioner Gaines: Roger Clinton evinced his strong disappointment upon learning that he could not meet with Commissioner Gaines about this case. . . . I informed him that such a meeting would not have been appropriate. Roger Clinton then asked me how it could be that the President would be misinformed as to the law, and emphasized that the President had suggested that he should meet with Commissioner Gaines, ``. . . a friend of ours from Arkansas.'' Roger Clinton professed his bewilderment as to how the President would not be knowledgeable as to the law with regard to the propriety of this suggested meeting. He stated that he would have to inform his brother that his brother had been wrong. I replied that it would be an honor for me to be advising the President of the United States, directly or indirectly, as to the law. Roger Clinton again stated that he would have to report this information to his brother, who would be ``glad to know'' what I had said. During this colloquy, however, Roger Clinton's voice rose, and betrayed the fact that he was upset with what I was saying.\207\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \207\ Id. at 00895. Stover and Gervasoni clearly believed that Clinton's call was --------------------------------------------------------------------------- an attempt to exercise political influence: Deputy DAEO and I are disturbed at the tactic employed by Roger Clinton of repeatedly invoking his brother as having allegedly recommended that he meet with Commissioner Gaines[.] The U.S. Parole Commission must not permit itself to be subjected to improper attempts to exercise political influence over its procedures. (Roger Clinton did not address himself to the merits of the case itself.) . . . My preference is for the Commission to vote a decision based only on the facts of the Gambino case, and without reference to this episode. Finally, I have discussed the situation with Commissioner Gaines, who agrees that the Commission should be shielded, if at all possible, from the unwelcome intrusion of a man who would appear to have nothing to contribute to the Commission's deliberations in the Gambino case but a crude (and I hope unauthorized) effort to exercise political influence. When interviewed by Committee staff, Stover reiterated his strong disapproval of Roger Clinton's attempts to contact Commission members and Commission staff, saying he ``was concerned that Roger had no business contacting the Commission'' and that his goal in advising Gaines on how to proceed was to keep Clinton ``as far away as possible from the Commission.'' \208\ Stover emphasized that he took two steps in response to Clinton's contact: (1) he suggested that Gaines call the White House ``to warn them about Roger Clinton;'' and (2) he called the Deputy Attorney General's office and spoke to Roger Adams about the matter.\209\ Stover explained that ``an alarm bell goes off when the half-brother of the President is helping an organized crime figure.'' \210\ He believes that Adams discussed the matter with Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick.\211\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \208\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \209\ At this time, Adams was an Associate Deputy Attorney General, and was Stover's primary contact at Main Justice. He later became U.S. Pardon Attorney. Id. \210\ Id. \211\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Clinton's Meetings with Parole Commission Staff From February 1996 to November 1997, there was a pause in Roger Clinton's approaches to the Parole Commission. After Roger Clinton had his hostile telephone discussion with Michael Stover in January 1996, he did not approach the Parole Commission again until December 1997. Due to Roger Clinton's refusal to discuss the Gambino matter with Committee staff, little is known about the reasons for the nearly two-year hiatus.\212\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \212\ In the middle of this lull in activity, Rosario Gambino signed a letter apparently intended for President Clinton seeking his assistance. A copy of the letter was produced to the Committee by Roger Clinton. The salutation of the January 9, 1997, letter is curiously blank, but the rest reads in relevant part: GI am writing this letter to you as my last hope to get justice. I feel that the system has been turned inside out in my case, and I now seek your help in the hope that you can right the wrong that is being done to me. What I am asking for is that my punishment be based on the crime that --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I did, and not on my name. GThe reason I am asking for your help is because my son knows your brother, and my son has told me that your brother is a good and honorable man; I know such traits run in families, and I have heard that you are also such a man. Because of the trust and respect that my son has for your family, he suggested that I write this letter to you to explain my situation in more detail. So please let me take a few lines to explain my case. Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0046 (Letter from Rosario Gambino (Jan. 9, 1997)) (Exhibit 43). The letter continues to explain the detailed procedural history of the case and makes false statements in the process. For example, Gambino claimed that after his December 1995 parole hearing, the examiner ``made a finding that I was not connected to `Organized Crime.' '' Id. at RCC0047. In truth, the examiner merely found that there was insufficient evidence for the Commission to conclude, for the purpose of a parole decision, that Gambino was a member of La Cosa Nostra. This finding of insufficient evidence in a particular proceeding is far different from the blanket exoneration Gambino claimed he received. i. December 1997 Meeting In December 1997, Chairman Michael Gaines informed his Chief of Staff, Marie Ragghianti, that Roger Clinton had contacted him. Ragghianti had come to the Commission as its first politically appointed staffer \213\ around August 1997.\214\ According to Ragghianti, Gaines called her into his office and said, ``I have a problem. I hope you can handle it for me.'' \215\ He explained to her that Roger Clinton was trying to meet with him but that he did not think it would be appropriate to do so.\216\ Gaines also informed Ragghianti that Clinton had tried to contact him about the same matter almost two years earlier, in January 1996. Gaines asked Ragghianti to meet with Clinton and treat him the way she would ``anyone else.'' \217\ According to Ragghianti, Gaines' instructions to her about meeting with Roger Clinton were ``as scrupulous as you could want.'' \218\ She said that Gaines told her to be courteous because Roger was the President's brother, but to tell him that if Gaines spoke to him, Gaines would have to recuse himself.\219\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \213\ Before her appointment, only the Commissioners were politically appointed. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \214\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). As head of the Tennessee Parole Board in the 1970s, Ragghianti had been responsible for initiating a federal investigation of Governor Ray Blanton, who was later convicted on other charges, and his staff for soliciting money in exchange for clemency. Her story was told in a book by Peter Maas and in a motion picture. Id. \215\ Id. \216\ Id. \217\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). \218\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \219\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It was Ragghianti's understanding that Gaines believed it would be inappropriate for him to meet Clinton and that he wanted her to shield him from the inappropriate approach being made by Clinton.\220\ When asked by Committee staff why he referred the Clinton matter to Ragghianti rather than, as before, to General Counsel Stover, Gaines said that in 1996 he had not been the Chairman of the Commission and Marie Ragghianti did not yet work for the Commission.\221\ In 1997, he had become the Chairman, and as such, Chief of Staff Marie Ragghianti answered directly to him. Therefore, he subsequently asked her to handle such matters.\222\ Gaines was aware that the January 1996 telephone conversation between Clinton and Stover did take place, as he requested that Stover make the contact. However, he claims that he was not aware until well after the call of what Clinton and Stover discussed or that the call was quite hostile, likely because Stover was attempting to shield him from knowledge that could arguably require his recusal from the Gambino case.\223\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \220\ Id. \221\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). \222\ Id. \223\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After her meeting with Chairman Gaines, Ragghianti called Roger Clinton and scheduled a meeting with him for December 23, 1997.\224\ Before the meeting occurred, General Counsel Michael Stover learned that it had been scheduled from Tom Kowalski, the Director of Case Operations at the Parole Commission.\225\ Ragghianti had asked Kowalski to join her in the meeting with Clinton.\226\ Stover said he was not pleased upon learning that the meeting was scheduled and that he called Chairman Gaines to see if he knew the meeting was going to occur.\227\ Stover reiterated his advice to Gaines that ``as a matter of prudence that it was not a good idea to meet with a man who had previously attempted to use political influence in an improper way.'' \228\ According to Stover, Gaines responded ``in a peremptory tone that this discussion was over'' and that he believed that Roger Clinton deserved to be treated with the same courtesy as any other member of the public.\229\ Wanting to do everything possible to discourage the meeting without being insubordinate, Stover made a copy of his January 1996 memo that described his conversation with Roger Clinton and gave it to Ragghianti.\230\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \224\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \225\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \226\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \227\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \228\ Id. \229\ Id. When interviewed by Committee staff, Gaines stated that he did not recall Stover advising against having the meeting with Clinton, or of any effort by Stover to prevent the meeting. Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). \230\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). Ragghianti, however, denies that she received a copy of the memo before her meeting and denies having read it until being shown a copy by Committee staff during her interview. She said she would have remembered the memo because it ``slams the Chairman.'' Ragghianti said she could not have forgotten ``this `friend of ours' business'' and that the memo was, ``pure Michael [Stover].'' Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While Gaines asked Ragghianti to extend only common courtesy to Clinton and treat him like any other member of the public, it is clear that from the outset, Ragghianti treated Roger Clinton like a celebrity and gave him access that she never would have afforded a member of the general public. She gave Roger Clinton her home telephone number even before she met with him, and he placed at least four calls to that home number.\231\ Ragghianti's warm approach to Roger Clinton continued at the December 23, 1997, meeting. Clinton, Ragghianti, and Kowalski attended the meeting.\232\ Ragghianti said the meeting was cordial and that Clinton was personable and bright.\233\ Ragghianti said that Roger Clinton was ``not the yokel he is painted to be'' and ``was downright engaging.'' \234\ After the meeting, Ragghianti marveled at Roger's charisma, telling Tom Kowalski, ``this isn't even the President. Imagine what the President is like.'' \235\ Ragghianti explained that she had ``connected'' with Roger Clinton because her mother had died a few years earlier and that Roger Clinton's mother had also died recently.\236\ Ragghianti took Clinton to Tom Kowalski's office, where Clinton began referring to papers regarding specific cases he wanted to discuss.\237\ In addition to the Gambino case, Clinton also wanted to discuss the cases of two other prisoners. For one, John Ballis,\238\ he was seeking to obtain a furlough, and for the other, whose name Ragghianti could not recall, he was seeking a pardon.\239\ Tom Kowalski explained that for a furlough, Roger needed to speak to the warden of the prison in which Ballis was incarcerated and for a pardon, he needed to contact the Pardon Attorney's office.\240\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \231\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Jan 1, 1998, at 12-13; Mar. 1, 1998, at 16; Aug. 1, 1998). Ragghianti claims that she gave her home telephone number to Clinton because it was difficult to get in touch with him, given the time differential between the east coast and west coast. \232\ USPC Document Production 00889 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44). \233\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \234\ Id. \235\ Id. \236\ Id. \237\ Id. \238\ See generally Section IV.E., ``John Ballis.'' \239\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \240\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After the first two issues, Clinton turned to the Gambino matter. In describing the denial of Gambino's parole to Committee staff, Ragghianti claimed that the Commission had ``thrown the book'' at Gambino and that ``intelligent people would be able to say that a case could be made for less time.'' \241\ She said Clinton delivered a ``heartfelt narrative'' about how he had been in prison and knew what it was like.\242\ The following day, Kowalski prepared a memo summarizing Roger's appeal on behalf of Gambino, whom Kowalski described as a ``notorious organized crime figure:'' \243\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \241\ Id. \242\ Id. \243\ USPC Document Production 00890 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44). [Roger Clinton] basically believes that the Commission has been much too harsh in this case and that Rosario Gambino is not an organized crime boss as the Commission has considered him to be. If anything, he believes that he is only on the fringes of organized crime and he is being discriminated against because his name happens to be ``Gambino.'' He used the Original Jurisdiction Appeal Summary by Michael Stover as his primary source of information. He specifically named Michael Stover as being discriminatory in his description of the prisoner and was particularly incensed by the statement in the summary which states, ``Gambino appears to come from an immigrant background in which family connections are simply exploited (as in the current offense) to get around the law.'' In discussing this case, he was actually quite animated and argued rather emotionally about how the Commission --------------------------------------------------------------------------- is being too harsh with the prisoner. Ms. Ragghianti and I merely listened throughout the session since we did not have file [sic] nor did Mr. Clinton have a signed release from the subject. He was advised that the case would be reviewed and no further promises were given.\244\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \244\ Id. Marie Ragghianti also drafted a memo regarding the same meeting, and rather than being critical of Clinton's approach, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ragghianti appeared sympathetic: Regarding Rosario Gambino, who apparently has been denied parole by this Commission, Mr. Clinton asked for any possible reconsideration of the matter. He pointed out that Gambino has served nearly 15 years, has at least 2 potential job opportunities, and also the support of a loving son, Tommy (Mr. Clinton's friend), and his wife and other children. We explained to him that the Commission takes a hard line in matters perceived as related to organized crime. Tom did offer to review the history of the case and write a summary (which will be sent to me). At that time, with the approval of the Commission or its legal department, I will notify Mr. Clinton of Tom's summary, as (or if) appropriate.\245\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \245\ A handwritten note at this place on the memo dated September 17, 1998, nine months after the memo was initially prepared, reads ``I never discussed Tom's summary at any time with Mr. Clinton (nor did he ask me to).'' USPC Document Production 00891 (Memorandum from Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Dec. 23, 1997)) (Exhibit 45). Even if Ragghianti did not share the summary with Clinton, it is troubling that she considered doing so, as it would have been a violation of Commission rules. Mr. Clinton was articulate. His questions and comments were thoughtful and appropriate, which is to say that he in no way came across as wishing to capitalize on his name. Instead, he apologized for taking our time. He appeared to be a genuinely caring person, not only for the 3 individuals he was seeking advice for, but in general.\246\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \246\ Id. While Ragghianti took the position that Clinton did not appear to be capitalizing on his name, Tom Kowalski disagreed, noting that Clinton ``mentioned his brother'' at virtually every meeting and made it clear that he was operating ``with his brother's knowledge.'' \247\ Kowalski said Clinton frequently made references to his plans to be in Washington and to stay at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, saying, ``he threw it in your face that he was staying at the White House.'' \248\ Kowalski said that from the first meeting, Clinton made it clear that his brother knew of his involvement.\249\ Specifically, Kowalski said his impression was the President knew that Roger was contacting the Parole Commission about the Gambino case.\250\ Kowalski's memory on this point was vivid. He explicitly recalled his reaction, ``I thought to myself, `Lord, Lord, Oh Lord, why would the President want to get involved in the case of this guy?' '' \251\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \247\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). \248\ Id. \249\ Id. \250\ Id. \251\ Id. Kowalski's recollections raise serious questions about Roger Clinton's veracity when he was interviewed by the FBI. See also n.205 and accompanying text. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ragghianti told Committee staff that she and Kowalski instructed Clinton that in the future, ``the best way of doing this'' would be to address his concerns to the Commission in writing rather than through further meetings, although this admonition was not recorded in either of the contemporaneous memos.\252\ Ragghianti thought that following her initial contact, Clinton would not return seeking further meetings.\253\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \252\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \253\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After the December 1997 meeting, Ragghianti also asked Kowalski to review the Gambino file. In case Ragghianti had any doubts about the lack of merit in Clinton's argument, Kowalski's December 30, 1997, memo summarizing the Gambino case should have dispelled them. Kowalski found, in part, that: (1) Gambino participated in a conspiracy which promised the delivery of 10 kilograms of heroin per month; (2) ``Rosario Gambino's criminal activities also extend to arson and extortion;'' (3) Gambino participated in harboring Michele Sindona while he was a fugitive; and (4) ``[t]he Sentencing Memorandum and documents in the file clearly depict the subject as an individual deeply involved in organized criminal activity.'' \254\ Given these findings, it is disturbing that Ragghianti continued to meet with Clinton and discuss the Gambino case with him. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \254\ USPC Document Production 00925-26 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Dec. 30. 1997)) (Exhibit 34). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii. Spring 1998 Contacts Roger Clinton continued to remain in contact with Ragghianti and Kowalski after the December 1997 meeting, making telephone calls to both of them regarding the Gambino case. Kowalski recalls that Gambino was scheduled for a parole review hearing and that Clinton called because he was concerned that Gambino had been moved from a prison in California to one in Arizona, which was further from Gambino's family.\255\ Clinton asked Kowalski to find out why Gambino was moved.\256\ Kowalski looked into the matter and discovered that Gambino was moved because he had been ``muscling,'' or intimidating, other inmates at the prison.\257\ Kowalski did not pass this information on to Clinton, but it did confirm his feelings regarding Rosario Gambino.\258\ Clinton apparently prepared talking points for himself in anticipation of these telephone calls. One set of notes, in Clinton's handwriting, reads as follows and provides a further suggestion as to the nature of Clinton's calls to Kowalski: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \255\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). \256\ Id. \257\ Id. \258\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Questions for Tom Kowalski: 1) Possibility of re-transfer back to Terminal Island. Should he before or after parole hearing? 2) If transfer back to Ca. is accepted, can Sam Robertson still conduct the hearing or is it out of his jurisdiction? (Harry Dwyer?) 3) What else can I do to serve as a reminder or as further emphasis? (personal letter, etc.) 4) What is the state of the upcoming hearing at FCI- Phoenix? The last one was postponed because the Commission's counsel was reviewing the file. Sam Robertson wasn't at the last hearing that was postponed. Will he, in fact, conduct this hearing? \259\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \259\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0031 (Handwritten notes) (Exhibit 46). Clinton also sent two handwritten letters to Kowalski in February 1998, in advance of the review hearing. One stated in --------------------------------------------------------------------------- part: We need someone to ``step up to the plate'' on this one. I firmly feel that if everything in this case was the same and the prisoner's name was Rosario Stevens (only an example), then Mr. Stevens would have been released in July 1996. I understand the scenario of decisions based on name recognition, be it positive or negative. This man deserves to be released to return to his family after 14 years. He did the crime and he has done the time. We all deserve a second chance! I am living proof of that. Please help us achieve what is right! \260\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \260\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0176 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton to Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (Feb. 13, 1998)) (Exhibit 47). In the other letter to Kowalski, Clinton made slightly more sophisticated arguments, analyzing the applicable sentencing provisions, arguing that Gambino was eligible for release.\261\ In this letter, Clinton denied that Gambino was a member of La Cosa Nostra and claimed that the Gambino name was a common one: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \261\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0173 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton to Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (Feb. 13, 1998)) (Exhibit 48). As documented by copies of pages from the Sicilian phone book, Gambino is a very popular name. A large majority is unrelated to the Gambino crime family.\262\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \262\ Id. at RCC0175. Remembering an occasion when Clinton made the same argument to Kowalski in person, Kowalski said: ``I was very professional . . . I didn't laugh.'' \263\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \263\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the spring of 1998, Clinton scheduled another meeting with Ragghianti and Kowalski. Both Ragghianti and Kowalski recall that Clinton basically repeated the same arguments that he had made in December 1997, claiming that Gambino had been treated unfairly by the Parole Commission and should be released.\264\ At the end of this meeting, as Clinton, Kowalski, and Ragghianti were saying their goodbyes in the lobby, Parole Commission Chairman Michael Gaines walked through the lobby.\265\ Clinton apparently recognized Gaines on sight, and eagerly introduced himself to him. According to Gaines, Roger ``acted like he knew who I was,'' despite the fact that he did not know Clinton.\266\ According to all of those present, Gaines kept the conversation with Clinton short and limited to superficial matters.\267\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \264\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \265\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). \266\ Id. \267\ Id; Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii. July 1998 Meeting After the spring 1998 meeting, Clinton continued to make telephone calls to Ragghianti and Kowalski to press his case. Between May 1998 and July 1998, Clinton called Kowalski and Ragghianti at least 11 times.\268\ He even called Ragghianti at home on at least one occasion.\269\ In July, Clinton apparently asked for and received another meeting with Kowalski and Ragghianti. While Clinton was waiting for Kowalski at the Parole Commission offices, he had a second fortuitous run-in with Chairman Gaines. Again, Gaines attempted to avoid any substantive discussion with Clinton and ended the discussion as quickly as he could.\270\ The meeting between Clinton, Ragghianti, and Kowalski went much like the previous two meetings. Roger repeated his arguments that Rosario Gambino had been treated unfairly and deserved to be released. Neither Kowalski nor Ragghianti provided extensive substantive comments about the case but simply tried to listen to Clinton's concerns.\271\ At the conclusion of the meeting, Ragghianti and Clinton looked over pictures of Clinton's new baby, and then Ragghianti saw Clinton to the elevators.\272\ Referring to the Gambino case, Ragghianti told Clinton ``the only thing worse than no hope is false hope'' and that she ``did not want him to have false hope.'' \273\ Then, as Clinton got onto the elevator, Ragghianti counseled him to pray about the Gambino matter.\274\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \268\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, July 1, 1998, at 10-11; Aug. 1, 1998, at 14-15); WorldCom Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, May 23, 1998, at 8-9). \269\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Aug. 1, 1998, at 14). \270\ Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). \271\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \272\ Id. \273\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). \274\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The FBI Investigation of Clinton's Contacts with the Parole Commission In late August 1998, the FBI sought to review Rosario Gambino's file at the Parole Commission.\275\ Michael Stover said that the FBI's original interest appeared to be in Rosario Gambino rather than Roger Clinton.\276\ Stover provided the FBI with all of the documents relating to the Gambino case, including those relating to Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission.\277\ On September 11, 1998, Stover informed Ragghianti that the FBI had visited USPC offices to review the Gambino file. In the following days, the agents returned to interview Stover, Ragghianti, and Kowalski about their contacts with Roger Clinton.\278\ Ragghianti was ``very annoyed'' that Stover had not told her earlier about the FBI's interest in the Gambino file.\279\ Ragghianti told Committee staff that her ``private view'' was that Stover had initiated the FBI's investigation of Roger Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission.\280\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \275\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \276\ Id. \277\ Id. \278\ USPC Document Production 00922 (Memorandum from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). FBI interview summaries relating to Ragghianti, Kowalski, and Stover presumably exist, but the Justice Department has refused to produce them to the Committee. After producing hundreds of pages regarding the Clinton-Gambino matter, the Justice Department stopped producing records in August 2001 because of its ``ongoing criminal investigation'' into the Clinton-Gambino matter. \279\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \280\ Id. There appears to be no support for Ragghianti's view. Rather, it appears that Roger Clinton was of investigative interest to the FBI well before this point. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After the FBI began its investigation of Roger Clinton's lobbying for Gambino, Michael Stover learned that Marie Ragghianti and Tom Kowalski had been maintaining contact with Roger Clinton over the preceding eight months. While discussing the FBI's interest in the Gambino matter with Stover, Tom Kowalski indicated that he and Ragghianti had two additional meetings with Clinton, as well as a number of telephone conversations after the December 1997 meeting.\281\ Stover knew only about the December 1997 meeting and was not happy to learn about the additional meetings, especially given the fact that he was not consulted about them before they took place. Ragghianti defended her decision to keep Stover from knowing about the meetings with Clinton on the basis that, as Chief of Staff, she did not report to Stover.\282\ While Ragghianti may have been above Stover in the hierarchy of the Parole Commission, her decision to engage in a series of contacts with Roger Clinton without consulting her General Counsel is troubling and suggests that she wanted to provide Roger Clinton with an extraordinary measure of access. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \281\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \282\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As the FBI conducted its investigation of Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission, Ragghianti and Stover disputed the propriety of the series of contacts between Clinton and Commission staff between December 1997 and July 1998. Ragghianti wrote of the meetings in a memo drafted just after she learned the FBI was involved: ``[a]fter his initial visit, Mr. Clinton called and came in 2 other times. I did not record additional memoranda on either of the subsequent visits, because he did not offer additional information, but seemed only to want to be heard.'' \283\ Rather than scrupulously attempting to avoid any appearance of impropriety and follow Stover's advice, Ragghianti continued her contacts with Roger Clinton unapologetically and without informing Stover. Ragghianti told Committee staff that there was ``no question'' in her mind about the propriety of her meetings.\284\ She dismissed Stover's concerns, suggesting he was motivated by a feeling that ``he had been ignored'' and that ``he didn't like Roger Clinton.'' \285\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \283\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). \284\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \285\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The split between Ragghianti and Stover over the propriety of staff contacts with Clinton appears to be part of a broader animosity Ragghianti harbored for Stover, but it is unclear whether their dispute over the Clinton contacts was a symptom of her antagonism or a catalyst for it. During her interview with Committee staff, Ragghianti went out of her way to criticize Stover, describing him as ``a bull in a china shop'' who ``doesn't have a fine touch in extending common courtesy.'' \286\ Ragghianti similarly criticized Stover's handling of the Roger Clinton matter. She wrote in a September 14, 1998, memo: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \286\ Id. I think the record should show that I felt that Mr. Stover had, in the past, been gratuitously rude to Mr. Clinton. My personal philosophy was that Mr. Clinton deserved to be treated at least courteously by this Commission, which is why I agreed to see him. Nevertheless, it seemed appropriate that I should not visit with him alone, not only because of ``appearances,'' but because I did not really know the intricate details of reading inmate files, nor the precise legal constraints on what information might be appropriately shared with interested parties.\287\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \287\ USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). When asked what her basis was for writing that Stover had been ``gratuitously rude'' to Clinton, Ragghianti said she could not recall but that it might have come from Chairman Gaines and may have been the reason Gaines asked her to handle the second Clinton contact rather than Stover, whom he had asked to handle the first.\288\ Stover said that Ragghianti had never discussed with him his handling of the 1996 Clinton contact.\289\ Ragghianti complained that Stover, ``did not give Clinton the benefit of any doubt,'' that he viewed Clinton as ``guilty until proven innocent,'' and that Stover's memo was ``very heavy-handed.'' \290\ For his part, Stover did not engage in any attacks on Ragghianti, but he did maintain that it was unwise for Ragghianti to engage in a series of contacts with Clinton about the Gambino case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \288\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \289\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \290\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- a. Clinton's Continued Attempts to Contact the Commission In the fall of 1998, Roger Clinton was apparently unaware that the FBI was looking into his contacts with the Parole Commission. Following the initial FBI interviews of Parole Commission staff in the fall of 1998, Roger Clinton continued calling Commission staff. Ragghianti and Kowalski did not respond to most of these calls. When they received these calls, they reported them to Michael Stover. On the one occasion where Clinton did successfully reach Tom Kowalski, Kowalski prepared a memo to the file summarizing the conversation.\291\ Clinton also called seeking a meeting with Chairman Gaines, despite having been informed repeatedly that he could not meet with members of the Parole Commission.\292\ Gaines, Ragghianti, and Stover then met to discuss how to respond to Clinton's request for a meeting with Gaines. They decided to send a letter to Clinton informing him that he could not meet with Gaines and that he could no longer meet with staff. Stover prepared the initial draft of the letter, and then Ragghianti ``toned it down.'' \293\ Curiously, the letter was addressed to Roger Clinton at 1015 Gayley Avenue in Los Angeles, a commercial mailbox used by Tommy and Anna Gambino.\294\ The letter, dated October 26, 1998, stated: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \291\ USPC Document Production 00915 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, to File (Oct. 2, 1998)) (Exhibit 50). \292\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). \293\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \294\ U.S. Postal Service Document Production (Application for Delivery of Mail Through Agent, June 2, 2001) (Exhibit 52). The Chairman has asked me to express his sincere regrets that he cannot accept your kind invitation to meet during your trip to Washington this week. As I have mentioned before, it is agency policy that members of the Commission cannot engage in private meetings of any kind with parties having an interest in parole proceedings. This is true even if the meeting is sought --------------------------------------------------------------------------- for purely social reasons. Similarly, our policy also restricts the ability of Commission staff from engaging in any continued series of calls or discussions on official matters that are not in the context of an agency proceeding. Should you have any further request, I encourage you to write us.\295\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \295\ USPC Document Production 00876 (Letter from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to Roger C. Clinton (Oct. 26, 1998)) (Exhibit 53). The sentence regarding staff contacts appears to be at odds with the practice of Ragghianti and Kowalski before the FBI began investigating. When asked about whether the policy against third party-meetings as stated in the letter was in fact the practice of Commission staff beforehand, Stover said, ``Sometimes you state a policy at the moment of its creation.'' \296\ He said he was trying hard to set a useful policy for future precedent and that he saw Ragghianti's sending the letter with his language about staff contacts included as a victory on that issue.\297\ It is curious that before the FBI began its investigation of Clinton and Gambino in September 1998, Ragghianti was strongly in favor of meeting with Clinton, and then, once the FBI began its investigation, she suddenly agreed with Michael Stover's longstanding advice to stop meeting with Clinton. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \296\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \297\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite the letter's clear instructions to put future requests in writing, Clinton immediately called Ragghianti upon receiving the fax.\298\ In a voice mail message left for Ragghianti, Clinton said he was embarrassed and hurt that anyone at the Commission might have thought he was asking for something inappropriate and asked Ragghianti to return his call, which she did not.\299\ Ragghianti described the message as ``long, wordy, [and] slightly incoherent'' and quoted Clinton as saying, ``I guess I went over the line. I didn't mean to do anything wrong.'' \300\ Ragghianti said she did not acknowledge the call in any way.\301\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \298\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). \299\ Id. \300\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \301\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In November 1998, Hearing Examiner Sam Robertson recommended reexamination of the Commission's decision and a possible reduction of time to be served. Apparently unaware that Robertson's recommendation was only preliminary advice and not a final action on the case, Clinton sent ``a lavish letter of gratitude'' to the Commission on November 17, 1998.\302\ The letter states in part: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \302\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51); USPC Document Production 00875 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton, to the U.S. Parole Commission (Nov. 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 54). There are certain situations in almost everyone's life that require standing up for what is right, regardless of the possible consequences. . . . Over the past few years, and for several reasons, this particular case became very personal with me. I felt it necessary to stand and fight for what I thought was fair. I never asked for, never expected and never received any preferential treatment. You simply treated me with respect by allowing me, through written correspondence,\303\ to express my passionate feelings regarding this case. The entire process was handled in a fair and professional manner. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \303\ To the extent Clinton's letter suggested that his contacts with the Parole Commission were limited to ``written correspondence,'' it is, of course, completely untrue. At the conclusion of the hearing on Friday, October 30th, 1998, a release date was given. It is to be January 15, 1999. I have marked that date on my calendar as a day of celebration. I will celebrate in my own private way, filled with satisfaction and pride. With your decision, I feel that justice has now been --------------------------------------------------------------------------- served for everyone. With the utmost respect, appreciation and gratitude, I want to thank you from the bottom of my heart.\304\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \304\ USPC Document Production 00875 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton, to the U.S. Parole Commission (Nov. 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 54). Neither Ragghianti nor Kowalski acknowledged the letter in any way.\305\ In January 1999, the Parole Commission overruled Robertson's recommendation and set a new parole date of March 2007.\306\ In April 1999, the full Parole Commission denied Gambino's final appeal and left in place a parole date of March 2007.\307\ Parole Commission Chairman Michael Gaines recused himself from this decision, based on his involvement in the myriad meetings and discussions regarding Roger Clinton's involvement in the Gambino case and the resulting FBI investigation of Clinton's contacts with the Commission.\308\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \305\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). \306\ USPC Document Production 00665 (Memorandum from John R. Simpson, Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Jan. 13, 1999)) (Exhibit 55). \307\ USPC Document Production 00817 (Notice of Action on Appeal, Apr. 14, 1999) (Exhibit 56). \308\ USPC Document Production 00820 (Memorandum from Michael J. Gaines, Chairman, to File (Apr. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 57). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In mid-January 1999, the FBI again contacted the Commission requesting access to the Gambino file.\309\ On Friday, January 22, 1999, FBI Agent Jackie Dalrymple went to the Parole Commission Offices to review the file.\310\ While she was there, Roger Clinton again attempted to contact Ragghianti and Kowalski, leaving messages on their voice mail.\311\ Ragghianti and Kowalski notified General Counsel Stover who suggested that Agent Dalrymple be notified.\312\ Dalrymple asked to hear the two voice mail messages and, upon hearing them, asked Ragghianti and Kowalski not to delete them for a few days.\313\ On Monday, January 25, 1999, Agent Dalrymple returned and asked to tape record the two voice mail messages. Stover advised Ragghianti to cooperate, and she did.\314\ When asked about the content of the messages, Ragghianti said she could not recall precisely what her message said but that she was surprised Clinton was calling yet again.\315\ Ragghianti said she ``felt kind of bad'' about allowing the FBI to tape the message, comparing it to how she felt years ago in Tennessee when ``friends were in trouble with the law'' because of actions she had taken.\316\ Ragghianti recalled that Kowalski's message was longer than hers and that Clinton had said something on Kowalski's message that ``made it sound like they were in cahoots.'' \317\ Ragghianti recalled that she said jokingly to Kowalski, ``My God Tom, what do you two have going?'' \318\ She believed Kowalski was embarrassed by the message and that is why he ultimately cooperated with the FBI.\319\ There is no support for Ragghianti's suggestion, but it is telling that Ragghianti thought Kowalski would need some sort of secret motivation to work with the FBI. Every indication is that Kowalski worked with the FBI merely because he believed it is important to cooperate with law enforcement when requested to do so. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \309\ USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). \310\ Id. \311\ Id. \312\ Id. at 00869. \313\ Id. \314\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \315\ Id. \316\ Id. See generally n.214. \317\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \318\ Id. \319\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. The FBI's Request to Have an Agent Pose Undercover After listening to Roger Clinton's messages to Ragghianti and Kowalski, the FBI decided to intensify its investigation of Clinton. The FBI came to Ragghianti and suggested a plan whereby Kowalski would set up a meeting with Clinton away from the Parole Commission headquarters, at a local restaurant.\320\ Kowalski would then introduce Clinton to another Parole Commission staffer who could help Clinton with the Gambino case.\321\ In reality, this Parole Commission staffer would be an undercover FBI agent. This agent would then be able to talk to Clinton about the Gambino case and determine if Clinton was attempting to influence the Commission illegally. General Counsel Michael Stover had no objection to the FBI plan.\322\ Marie Ragghianti, though, rejected this proposal out of hand without consulting with Chairman Gaines or the rest of the Parole Commission.\323\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \320\ Id. \321\ Id. \322\ Id. \323\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ragghianti's basis for rejecting the FBI proposal was highly suspect. She felt that the Parole Commission ``did not conduct its business in restaurants'' and that it would make the Parole Commission look bad if someone overheard the discussion between Clinton and the undercover FBI agent.\324\ She also felt that it was entrapment to allow the FBI to operate under Parole Commission auspices in order to obtain evidence against Roger Clinton.\325\ Ragghianti also was annoyed by Stover's approval of the FBI plan. She felt that he had ``crossed over the line and lost legal objectivity'' and ``had no concern'' for the Commission.\326\ However, Ragghianti appears to be the one who ``crossed over the line and lost legal objectivity'' in rejecting the FBI's request. Her reason for rejecting the request--that it did not reflect the way the Commission normally conducts business--misses the point. In order to be successful, an FBI operation of this sort requires exactly the sort of informal environment to which Ragghianti objected. The fact that such a meeting would be less formal and less professional than normal Commission business is exactly why the FBI wanted to do it. If Clinton were so inclined, a relaxed environment would make him feel comfortable enough to make candid admissions that might yield evidence of illegality in the Gambino case. Ragghianti's reason for opposing the request, therefore, was essentially that it was likely to be successful. Moreover, her characterization of the FBI proposal as ``entrapment'' is without merit and represents a judgment that she lacked both the expertise and the responsibility to make. The FBI agents and their superiors are accountable for entrapment issues in their investigations, not the Parole Commission Chief of Staff. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \324\ Id. \325\ Id. \326\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The real question is what was Marie Ragghianti's actual motive for rejecting the FBI request. Ragghianti had a reputation for ethical conduct prior to coming to the Commission. That she would make such a decision is, therefore, surprising. However, she clearly went out of her way to be accommodating to Roger Clinton. Whether Ragghianti was trying to curry favor with the Clinton Administration or whether she just genuinely liked Roger Clinton is unclear. But, for Ragghianti to ignore the advice of the Parole Commission General Counsel regarding such a sensitive legal matter suggests, at best, that she was not objective in her handling of the Clinton-Gambino matter. At worst, Ragghianti may have been trying to protect Roger Clinton. The effect of Ragghianti's decision certainly was to protect Clinton. Her decision to reject the undercover plan may have had a crippling effect on the FBI investigation. As described below, the FBI would continue with its attempts to determine the purpose of Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission. Rather than having an undercover FBI agent directly in contact with Clinton, though, the FBI had to work through Tom Kowalski, who allowed the FBI to place listening devices in his office. However, Kowalski, unlike a trained FBI agent, was uncomfortable talking to Clinton while his office was bugged. Law enforcement sources who helped investigate the Clinton- Gambino case have informed the Committee that the undercover contacts with Clinton were exactly the thing that the case was missing.\327\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \327\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. The FBI's Recording of Clinton's Conversations with Thomas Kowalski After Ragghianti rejected the initial FBI proposal, Agent Dalrymple proposed another possible approach to Roger Clinton. In late January 1999, she suggested that Tom Kowalski page Roger Clinton, and then when Clinton called back, the FBI would tape their conversation.\328\ The FBI would provide Kowalski with suggested questions for Clinton to determine Clinton's purpose in contacting the Parole Commission. Even though the FBI had significantly reduced the scope of its request, Ragghianti still opposed cooperation.\329\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \328\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). \329\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite her opposition to the FBI's request, Ragghianti took the FBI request to other staff at the Parole Commission. According to Ragghianti's contemporaneous notes \330\ of a meeting held later that day, her initial reaction upon hearing of the request was to question whether any taping at the Commission's headquarters in Maryland would be illegal, ``recalling the Linda Tripp debacle related to a similar tape recording.'' \331\ Ragghianti also referred to her experiences in Tennessee, explaining that she had not cooperated with an FBI request for her to allow them to make recordings of her conversations.\332\ Deputy DAEO Sharon Gervasoni advised Ragghianti and Kowalski that she would ordinarily urge that Clinton's call be answered by another letter requesting that Clinton send his inquiries in writing.\333\ Given the FBI's request, however, she recommended that General Counsel Stover, who was home on sick leave, be contacted for his input about how to handle the situation.\334\ Stover told his colleagues that a similar situation had arisen before and that the Commission employee was advised that the decision of whether to record a conversation to assist the FBI was a personal decision left to the employee and not one to be dictated by the Commission.\335\ Therefore, Stover advised that the Commission precedent be followed and that Kowalski should make the decision about whether and to what extent he wished to cooperate with the FBI.\336\ Ragghianti disagreed, inquiring as to ``why any USPC employee might be free to exercise that kind of decisionmaking in an issue so important to the functioning of the Commission.'' \337\ Because she disagreed with Stover on how to handle this issue, Ragghianti took it to the Parole Commissioners for their decision.\338\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \330\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \331\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). \332\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). See n.214. \333\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). \334\ Id. Stover said he was sick with the flu and a 102-degree temperature on this day, so it was difficult for him to remember the details. He does recall staff from the Commission called him at home and insisted that he ``weigh in'' on the matter. After reviewing Ragghianti's meeting notes, Stover said he did not see anything in them that was inconsistent with his recollection. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). \335\ USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). \336\ Id. \337\ Id. \338\ Id. at 00870. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At 4:35 p.m. that day, Chairman Gaines convened a meeting with Commissioner Reilly, Commissioner Simpson, Chief of Staff Ragghianti, and Deputy DAEO Gervasoni to discuss the FBI's request.\339\ Two main issues arose during this meeting. First, there was discussion about whether Kowalski should be able to decide for himself whether to cooperate with the FBI or whether that was a decision for the Parole Commission to make. Second, there was extensive discussion about why the FBI was investigating Clinton and whether the investigation was part of the Office of Independent Counsel investigation of President Clinton. The Commissioners ended the meeting by reaching ``the general consensus that no one present should tell Mr. Kowalski what to do.'' \340\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \339\ Id. at 00867. \340\ Id. at 00871. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, because of the concerns that the Commissioners and Ragghianti had about why the FBI was investigating Roger Clinton, Ragghianti followed up to determine the purpose of the Clinton investigation. According to Ragghianti, she had fears that the FBI's investigation of Roger Clinton was a ``witchhunt.'' \341\ These fears appear to have been based partly on Ragghianti's erroneous belief that the FBI investigation was part of the Office of Independent Counsel investigation of President Clinton.\342\ Ragghianti first called Lynn Battaglia, the U.S. Attorney in Maryland.\343\ Agent Dalrymple had told Ragghianti to call Battaglia if she had any concerns. Battaglia told Ragghianti that the investigation was ``not a wild goose chase,'' that she knew Agent Dalrymple was a ``good agent,'' and that this was not ``a witch hunt.'' \344\ Some of Ragghianti's fears about the investigation were allayed by Battaglia's assurances.\345\ Battaglia's familiarity with the case also convinced Ragghianti that this investigation was being conducted by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Maryland, not Independent Counsel Starr.\346\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \341\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \342\ During the Parole Commission's debate of this issue, Commissioner Simpson also expressed concerns that the Office of Independent Counsel was involved: ``Commissioner Simpson again stated that someone needs to ask Jackie Dalrymple what they're investigating. There was subsequent discussion regarding the fact that it appears at this time not to be related to Ken Starr. Commissioner Simpson stated that we need to call [Eric] Holder if we believe it's a Starr matter.'' USPC Document Production 00870 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). However, Deputy DAEO Gervasoni ``expressed doubts'' about whether the Commission should contact Holder's office. She said that her ``impression of Holder is that he's a `stickler,' `by the book' kind of person,'' and that the Commission would need a ``good reason to refuse cooperation'' with the FBI. Id. \343\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \344\ Id. \345\ Id. \346\ Michael Stover also discovered that the Roger Clinton investigation was not being conducted by Independent Counsel Starr. According to a memorandum prepared by Ragghianti, ``Mr. Stover advised Ms. Ragghianti that he had been advised by Roger Adams [who was informed by the FBI when they visited his office] that the investigation was Ken Starr's; however, Mr. Stover stated that sometime later, he had received a call from an FBI asst. general counsel, who said that the investigation had the attention of both the FBI Director & Gen'l Counsel.'' USPC Document Production 00870 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). Ragghianti also said that Stover had told her on another occasion that he believed the investigation had been initiated in a U.S. Attorney's Office in California. Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, Ragghianti still was not comfortable with Michael Stover's conclusion that whether Tom Kowalski cooperated with the FBI was a personal decision, not a Parole Commission decision. Therefore, Ragghianti and Stover called the Deputy Attorney General's office and discussed the matter with Kevin Ohlsen, the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General, and David Margolis, an Associate Deputy Attorney General.\347\ They called to see if ``any responsible person in Main Justice was aware'' of the investigation.\348\ Ohlsen promised to look into it and later told Stover that the ``higher-ups knew about it.'' \349\ Ragghianti also recalls that Ohlsen and Margolis informed them that the FBI's proposed contacts with Roger Clinton were not ``entrapment,'' but on the other hand, they stated that the Parole Commission did have a say in whether Kowalski should cooperate with the FBI.\350\ But, according to Ragghianti, by this point, the Commissioners did not want to have any more meetings about the Gambino matter because they were concerned that they would have to recuse themselves from a decision on the Gambino case.\351\ Therefore, they allowed Kowalski to decide for himself whether to cooperate with the FBI.\352\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \347\ Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001) \348\ Id. \349\ Id. \350\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \351\ Id. \352\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to Marie Ragghianti, the Parole Commission staff also debated whether they should inform the White House regarding the FBI's investigation. According to Ragghianti, they debated this point a ``number of times'' but decided not to inform the White House. While it is comforting that Parole Commission decided not to inform the White House about the investigation, it is slightly troubling that such action was even seriously considered. Clearly, the FBI was conducting a proper, authorized investigation that targeted the President's brother and potentially involved the White House. For the Parole Commission to inform the White House of such an investigation would likely have hindered the legitimate FBI inquiry. Kowalski quickly agreed to cooperate with the FBI's investigation.\353\ He went to an FBI office where there were facilities to record a telephone call and placed one to Roger Clinton's cell phone.\354\ Kowalski left a voice mail for Clinton, but Clinton did not call back.\355\ Kowalski could not recall for certain whether they were ever successful in recording a live telephone conversation with Clinton but said they may have.\356\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \353\ USPC Document Production 00866 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, to File (Jan. 27, 1999)) (Exhibit 58). \354\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). \355\ Id. \356\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Given their inability to obtain any useful evidence from a recorded telephone call, the FBI then arranged to record a meeting between Kowalski and Clinton at the Parole Commission offices. In Spring 1999, Clinton called Kowalski and told him that he was coming into town for the White House Easter Egg hunt and arranged to come by the Parole Commission offices and meet with Kowalski.\357\ The FBI wired Kowalski's office with a microphone under his desk and monitored the conversation from a car in front of the building.\358\ Kowalski said the FBI had suggested questions to ask Clinton such as, ``Is there anything you want me to do,'' and ``Should I do anything further?'' \359\ Clinton and Kowalski had the meeting, but Clinton did not provide any incriminating responses to Kowalski's questions.\360\ Kowalski said that after the meeting, the agents came to his office and indicated they would have to close the investigation.\361\ That was the last time Kowalski recalled having contact with the FBI regarding this matter.\362\ Indeed, it appears that the FBI's interest in Clinton's contacts with the Parole Commission did come to an end with the taped meeting between Clinton and Kowalski.\363\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \357\ Id. \358\ Id. \359\ Id. \360\ Id. A transcript exists of this taped conversation between Clinton and Kowalski. Despite specific requests from the Committee for the transcript, the Justice Department has refused to produce it. Despite the fact that they have provided the Committee with hundreds of pages regarding Clinton's involvement in the Gambino case, and the FBI's investigation of Clinton's role in Gambino case, the Justice Department claims that the transcript, and a number of other documents cannot be provided to the Committee because of the Department's ``ongoing criminal investigation.'' \361\ Id. \362\ Id. \363\ Other commission staff also had the impression that the FBI had ceased its investigation. According to Michael Stover, ``things were pretty tense at the Parole Commission about this,'' before he went on vacation from late March to early April 1999. However, when he returned, the issue appeared to be over because ``the FBI had not heard what they wanted to hear Roger say.'' From Stover's perspective, they had ``dropped the matter.'' Stover said he was not aware of any other incidents in which conversations with Roger Clinton were recorded, and he was also unaware of other contacts between Roger Clinton and Parole Commission personnel. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Given the fact that the Committee has not been provided with the transcript of the taped conversation between Clinton and Kowalski, it is difficult to determine all of the reasons why the FBI was not able to pursue the investigation of Clinton's lobbying of the Parole Commission. However, Kowalski made it clear that he was not comfortable participating in the taped conversation with Clinton. Kowalski's lack of comfort likely had some impact on Roger Clinton, and if Clinton had been planning to make any illegal proposals, he was unlikely to do so in such a meeting. The failure of the taped conversation with Kowalski makes Ragghianti's decision to reject the FBI undercover proposal even more significant. If the FBI was able to have a trained, professional undercover agent discussing Gambino's parole with Clinton, it might have made a significant difference in the FBI's case. However, due to Ragghianti's refusal to cooperate with the FBI, it is impossible to know what would have happened. 3. Roger Clinton's Apparent Attempt to Involve the White House in the Parole Decision One set of notes produced to the Committee by the National Archives indicates that Roger Clinton approached White House staff regarding the Gambino case. Notes produced to the Committee from the files of White House Deputy Counsel Bruce Lindsey indicate that Lindsey and Clinton met on February 19 of an unknown year regarding the Gambino matter. While assigning a date to the notes without Bruce Lindsey's or Roger Clinton's cooperation is somewhat speculative, the facts suggest that the meeting most likely occurred in February 1999.\364\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \364\ In February 1998, Clinton was still in the middle of his series of meetings with Commission staff, and likely did not yet see the need to escalate matters to the White House. By February 2000, the Commission had rejected Gambino's bid for parole, but it was likely still too early for Clinton to be meeting with Lindsey regarding a pardon or commutation for Gambino. Nothing in the notes suggests that Clinton was asking for executive clemency; rather, the discussion appeared to be limited to parole. In addition, Gambino's commutation petition was not filed with the White House until November 2000. NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation, Nov. 2000) (Exhibit 59). In February 1999, on the other hand, Clinton was still trying to obtain meetings with Parole Commission staff, but their receptiveness had dropped off considerably, since, unknown to Clinton, the FBI was investigating the matter. In January 1999, the Commission overturned the preliminary decision in favor of Gambino, and was moving towards a final resolution of Gambino's parole bid in April 1999. A final piece of evidence supporting the conclusion that the meeting took place in February 1999 is the fact that Bruce Lindsey conducted legal research regarding the Gambino case in April 1999. NARA Document Production (Summary page from Lexis-Nexis Research, the White House, Apr. 5, 1999) (Exhibit 60). This research may have been prompted by Clinton's meeting with Lindsey. Accordingly, February 1999 is the likely time when Roger Clinton approached Lindsey and asked for his assistance with Gambino's parole bid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lindsey's notes reflect that Roger Clinton explained the procedural history of Rosario Gambino's criminal case and bid for parole. Clinton apparently claimed that: (1) Gambino had only dealt one kilogram of heroin; (2) Gambino's codefendants were treated more leniently than Gambino; and (3) there was no evidence that Gambino was linked to organized crime.\365\ The first and third claims are false. The second claim is true but, according to a federal appeals court, was justified in light of his leadership role in the conspiracy. Clinton apparently made special reference to Parole Commission General Counsel Michael Stover, who had rejected Clinton's previous entreaties to the Commission.\366\ Lindsey's notes state, ``Michael Stover-- counsel to Mike Gaines'' and then have an arrow pointing from Stover's name to the word ``improper,'' which is underlined.\367\ The notes also indicate that Clinton provided Lindsey with a number of documents relating to the Gambino parole case.\368\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \365\ NARA Document Production (Handwritten Notes) (Exhibit 61). \366\ Id. \367\ Id. \368\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assuming that the meeting took place on February 19, 1999, and related to the Gambino parole effort rather than the Gambino clemency effort, the question is what, if any, action did Lindsey or other White House staff take as a result of the meeting with Roger Clinton. Neither Parole Commission nor White House records reflect any contacts between the White House staff and the Parole Commission regarding the Gambino case, other than the one previously described.\369\ However, Roger Clinton's attempt to reach out to Bruce Lindsey demonstrates that Clinton was intent on using his influence at the White House improperly to influence the Parole Commission's handling of the Gambino case. While Clinton may not have successfully enlisted Bruce Lindsey in his effort, it is disturbing that Clinton's overtures received any consideration at the Clinton White House at all, much less the lengthy meeting and follow-up research indicated by the documents in Lindsey's file. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \369\ The contact took place in January 1996 when Commissioner Michael Gaines called Trey Schroeder at the White House to let him know that Clinton was contacting the Commission about Gambino. See n.195 and accompanying text. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite Roger Clinton's efforts, Rosario Gambino's bid to obtain parole failed. In April 1999, the Parole Commission denied Gambino's final appeal and set a parole date of March 2007.\370\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \370\ USPC Document Production 00010 (Sentence Monitoring Computation Data, Mar. 19, 2001) (Exhibit 62). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Roger Clinton's Financial Relationship with the Gambinos Undeterred by his failure to win parole for Rosario Gambino, Roger Clinton's contacts with the Gambino family continued. Clinton's relationship with Tommy Gambino included a March 1999 trip together from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C.\371\ It is unknown what Gambino and Clinton did in Washington or with whom they met. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \371\ American Express Document Production (Exhibit 63). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clinton's relationship with Gambino also had a significant financial dimension. In 1999, Roger Clinton was playing a game of pick-up golf with three strangers at a public course in Los Angeles.\372\ Somewhere near the tenth hole, Tommy Gambino drove up in a golf cart and had a brief conversation with Clinton, handed Clinton a box, and left.\373\ Clinton told his golfing partners that the person who had been talking to him was Tommy Gambino and that he was ``helping'' Tommy Gambino's father.\374\ Clinton then opened the box Gambino had given him. In the box was a gold Rolex watch.\375\ What Roger Clinton did not know was that two members of his foursome were Air Force intelligence officers.\376\ They were apparently troubled by Clinton's relationship with Gambino and the receipt of the Rolex and reported the incident to the FBI, which was continuing its investigation.\377\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \372\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001. The Committee requested records relating to this matter, including summaries of FBI interviews with the Air Force intelligence officers. The Justice Department declined to produce those records to the Committee because of its ongoing criminal investigation of Roger Clinton. \373\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton's Dogged Effort for Drug Trafficker, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2001. \374\ Id. \375\ Id. \376\ Id. \377\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Later in 1999, Clinton received a $50,000 payment from the Gambinos. On September 27, 1999, Anna Gambino, Tommy Gambino's sister, wrote a check to Roger Clinton's company in the amount of $50,000 dated September 29, 1999.\378\ The funds used to pay Clinton appear to have originated with Lisa Gambino in Staten Island, New York. Anna Gambino deposited three cashier's checks from Lisa Gambino dated April 30, 1999, totaling $227,889.97 into the account from which she later paid Roger Clinton's company $50,000.\379\ The bank records indicate that without this deposit, there would have been insufficient funds to cover the check to Clinton.\380\ However, Lisa Gambino has refused to answer requests for an interview. Accordingly, the Committee has been unable to determine the nature of the relationship between Lisa Gambino and Anna Gambino or why Lisa Gambino paid Anna Gambino the money.\381\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \378\ The discovery of this check in Roger Clinton's bank records is what led the Committee to begin inquiries regarding Rosario Gambino. When the Committee received the original check from Tommy Gambino in response to a subpoena, it became apparent that the check had been filled out by three different individuals using three different pens. Anna Gambino apparently signed the check, which was presumably blank; Tommy Gambino then apparently filled out the amount of the check, $50,000; and then the ``payable to'' line was filled out in Roger Clinton's handwriting, payable to Odgie Music. Tommy Gambino Document Production (Exhibit 64). \379\ Fidelity Federal Document Production (Exhibit 65). \380\ Fidelity Federal Document Production (Exhibit 66). \381\ The Committee was, however, able to determine the source of the funds. The cashier's checks provided to Anna by Lisa Gambino were the proceeds of a $499,000 mortgage on her home in Staten Island, New York. Staten Island Savings Bank Document Production (Exhibit 67). In the loan application documents, Lisa Gambino wrote a note in her own hand indicating she was seeking the loan ``for an investment.'' Staten Island Savings Bank Document Production (Exhibit 68). Given the refusal of Roger Clinton and Tommy Gambino to cooperate, however, the Committee has also been unable to definitively determine the purpose of the $50,000 payment to Roger Clinton. However, as discussed below, Clinton suggested to the FBI and the media that the money was a loan, which appears to be false. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Other evidence connects Lisa and Anna Gambino to reputed organized crime figures. Both the accounts of Anna and Lisa Gambino received frequent inflows of funds from Antonio Genovese,\382\ a New York businessman who was partners with Giovanni Gambino in G&G Concrete Company.\383\ Giovanni ``John'' Gambino is the brother of Rosario Gambino and was convicted of murder and heroin distribution, together with his other brother, Giuseppe ``Joe'' Gambino.\384\ G&G Concrete played a central role in a 1995 dispute between another New York construction firm, Nasso and Associates, and the city's School Construction Authority (``SCA''). The disagreement was settled, but according to reports, Nasso had failed to disclose that it received financing from G&G Concrete partner Antonio Genovese.\385\ Both Genovese and John Gambino had worked for Julius Nasso, the grandfather of the principal of Nasso and Associates, before forming G&G Concrete.\386\ According to news reports: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \382\ See Fidelity Federal Document Production. \383\ William K. Rashbaum, Concrete Case; Firm Allegedly Tied to Mob Helps Build Federal Prison, Newsday, Jan. 23, 1995. \384\ Selwyn Raab, Two Admit Importing Heroin for Mafia Crime Family, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1994. \385\ William K. Rashbaum, Concrete Case; Firm Allegedly Tied to Mob Helps Build Federal Prison, Newsday, Jan. 23, 1995. \386\ Id. Testimony at the 1987 trial of Genovese mob boss Anthony Salerno's [sic] disclosed that the elder Nasso met with then-Gambino boss Paul Castellano and others in an effort to convince another firm to step aside and let Nasso take the $26 million Javits Convention Center job.\387\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \387\ Id. The controversy led to Nasso and Associates being prohibited from bidding on New York City school projects.\388\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \388\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. The FBI's Interview of Roger Clinton In the same time that Roger Clinton was receiving $50,000 and a gold Rolex from the Gambinos, the FBI was continuing its investigation of his relationship with Tommy Gambino. The report of Clinton's receipt of the Rolex reinvigorated the investigation, leading to the interview of Clinton. At some point in 1999, the Justice Department also issued a grand jury subpoena to Tommy Gambino.\389\ Through his attorney, James Henderson,\390\ Gambino informed the Justice Department that he planned on invoking his Fifth Amendment rights.\391\ Accordingly, the Department did not call Gambino to the grand jury.\392\ Instead, Gambino and his attorney participated in an interview with the Justice Department.\393\ However, reportedly, little resulted from the interview.\394\ Due to the Justice Department's decision to withhold documents selectively relating to the Clinton-Gambino investigation from the Committee, including the Tommy Gambino interview summary, it is not clear exactly what Gambino was questioned about, whether he was truthful, or whether he was interviewed before or after Roger Clinton. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \389\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001). \390\ Although Henderson is the former head of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Strike Force in Los Angeles, he has represented individuals alleged to have ties to organized crime, including Tommy Gambino, Louis Caruso, a ``reputed soldier in the Los Angeles mob family,'' and Ronald ``The Cigar'' Sacco, an alleged $1 billion per year bookie with reputed ties to organized crime families. John L. Smith, Oddsmaker Going Back to Control Board to Clear His Name, Las Vegas Review Journal, June 11, 1997; Seth Rosenfeld, Alleged Bookie Gets Huge Bail, San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 31, 1993. \391\ Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of California (Aug. 16, 2001). \392\ Id. \393\ Id. \394\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On September 30, 1999, the same day that Roger Clinton deposited the $50,000 Gambino check, two FBI agents interviewed Clinton at his home in California.\395\ It is not clear what prompted the FBI's interview, and specifically, whether they were aware of the $50,000 check. The FBI interview summary shows that Clinton attempted to mislead the FBI agents on several occasions and had to change his story a number of times. Even with Clinton's belated efforts to correct his falsehoods, in the end he appears to have lied to the FBI agents about multiple topics. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \395\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00001 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding His Brother's Knowledge Clinton's first falsehood related to whether he discussed his efforts on behalf of Gambino with President Clinton: Clinton stated he did not discuss his decision to assist the Gambino family in this case with anyone. . . . Clinton stated he did not tell his brother, the President of the United States, specifically what he was working on. He believes, however, that the President knew he had some business with the U.S. Parole Commission, but did not know specifically what he was working on. He did not tell his brother that he was working on the Rosario Gambino case. He did not seek advise [sic] or referrals from the President in his efforts to contact the Parole Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino.\396\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \396\ Id. at FBI-RC-00003. As discussed earlier, Clinton told Thomas Kowalski the opposite. According to Kowalski, Clinton explicitly told him on several occasions that the President knew what Roger was doing for Gambino.\397\ Michael Stover's contemporaneous record of his conversation with Clinton in January 1996 is also far more consistent with Kowalski's recollection than with Clinton's claims to the FBI: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \397\ See n.251 and accompanying text. [Roger Clinton] began the conversation by informing me that his brother ``[]is completely aware of my involvement.'' Roger Clinton stated that his brother had recommended to him that he not meet with Commissioner Getty . . . because Commissioner Getty's Kansas City Regional Office was about to be closed. Roger Clinton informed me that his brother suggested that he contact Commissioner Gaines instead.\398\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \398\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). Clinton told Kowalski that the President knew of his efforts on behalf of Gambino; then, he told the FBI that he never discussed the matter with his brother. Clinton told Stover that the President was actively advising him in his efforts to contact the Commission; then, he told the FBI that his brother was not involved at all. If he had said nothing further on the matter, the worst one could conclude would be that either Clinton was lying to Kowalski and Stover or he was lying to the FBI. However, Clinton went further by telling the FBI ``that he did not represent to anyone on the Parole Commission that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist the Gambino family or that the President was supporting his effort to assist in getting Rosario Gambino released from prison.'' \399\ If Kowalski is to be believed, then Clinton's statement is false. According to Kowalski, Clinton did represent that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist Gambino.\400\ Unlike Clinton's statement to the FBI, Kowalski's statement is not a self-serving denial standing alone. Rather, Kowalski has no discernable motivation to lie, and his recollection about Clinton's representation of his brother's knowledge is consistent with the contemporaneous, written record of a conversation in which Clinton made very similar statements to Stover.\401\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \399\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00003 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). \400\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). \401\ USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding Payment from the Gambinos Clinton told the FBI that his efforts on behalf of Rosario Gambino were ``above board.'' \402\ He told the agents that immediately after learning that Commission personnel were unable to discuss particulars of the case with him without violating the Privacy Act, he ``processed the proper paperwork to register as an official representative of Rosario Gambino.'' \403\ The agents then began to ask about compensation for Clinton's assistance: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \402\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00003 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). \403\ Id. It appears that this statement was also untrue. The Parole Commission did not provide the Committee with any such paperwork, and internal Parole Commission documents repeatedly refer to the fact that Clinton had not filed the appropriate paperwork under the Privacy Act. See, e.g., USPC Document Production 00879 (Memorandum from Sharon Gervasoni, DDAEO, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Sept. 23, 1998)) (Exhibit 69). Clinton was asked if he was ever given anything of value for his assistance in this matter. He advised he had not received anything for this assistance. Clinton stated that Tommy Gambino said if he (Clinton) could help get his father released from prison, ``we will take care of you.'' Clinton said that he knows what that means. He stated ``I'm not stupid, I understand what the big picture is.'' . . . Clinton advised it was his understanding [that] if he were successful, he would be financially compensated. . . . Clinton then stated that he had received two airline tickets to Washington D.C. from Tommy Gambino and expenses for the trips. Tommy Gambino put the airline tickets on his credit card. Clinton also admitted to having received an undisclosed amount of expenses, but did not provide any information as to how the expense money was furnished to him.\404\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \404\ Id. at FBI-RC-00004. The trip to Washington D.C. mentioned here appears to be a different trip than the one mentioned earlier, because the earlier trip was paid for on Roger Clinton's company credit card, not on Gambino's. Accordingly, Clinton and Gambino may have traveled to Washington together on more than one occasion. After Clinton initially denied that he had ever received anything of value for his assistance to the Gambino family (other than the airline tickets and expense money), the agents began questioning him about any gifts he may have received from the Gambinos. Clinton then partially addressed the $50,000 he had either just received or was about to receive from Gambino that day: \405\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \405\ The Roger Clinton FBI interview summary does not state what time of day on September 30 the interview was conducted. Similarly, Roger Clinton's bank records do not indicate what time of day Clinton deposited the $50,000 check from Gambino. In the absence of more documentation, it is difficult to be certain that Clinton had received the Gambino check at the time of the FBI interview. However, considering the fact that the check was dated September 29, and deposited September 30, it is distinctly possible that Clinton received the check before September 30. If Clinton had the check in his possession at the time of the FBI interview, his statements about payment from Gambino would have been explicitly false. Clinton advised he is currently trying to buy a house in the Torrance, California area and Tommy Gambino has offered to loan him an undisclosed amount of money for the down payment. This loan is not compensation for his assistance to the Gambino's [sic] in attempting to get Rosario Gambino released from prison. The offer is for a loan which must be repaid. It is not to give Clinton the money. This offer was made regardless of the outcome with Clintons [sic] efforts to obtain Rosario Gambino's release.\406\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \406\ Id. at FBI-RC-00005-06. Clinton's explanation of the Gambino ``loan offer'' is misleading for a number of reasons. First, if Clinton had received the $50,000 check from Anna Gambino at the time of the interview, his statements would clearly be misleading, as he would have received an actual payment, not just an ``offer.'' Second, there is no evidence that the payment from Gambino was a loan, or was ever intended to be a loan. There is no record of repayment of the $50,000 in either Clinton's or Gambino's bank records. Also undermining Clinton's claims that the money from Gambino was a loan are the other large payments Clinton received in this same period, which were clearly intended to be loans and which Clinton repaid in short order. For example, in the same time period, Clinton received and repaid a large loan from Gerard Guez, CEO of the Tarrant Apparel Group. According to Guez, Clinton said he needed money to buy a house and promised to repay Guez from funds he would soon receive as payment for a performance in Korea.\407\ On October 25, 1999, Guez wired $100,000 to Roger Clinton's business checking account.\408\ Less than three months later, Clinton had repaid the entire amount (with no interest) through two checks from his personal checking account: one on December 17, 1999, for $50,000 and another on January 6, 2000, also for $50,000.\409\ Clinton did purchase a home for $570,000 on September 27, 1999, with a down payment of $114,000.\410\ The deed transfer was recorded on October 29, 1999, four days after Guez wired the funds and two days after Clinton withdrew $115,703 from his account.\411\ The $100,000 from Guez appears to have been the primary source of funds for the down payment rather than the $50,000 from Gambino. Even if Roger Clinton used some of the money from Gambino ($15,703 at most) for the down payment, there appears to be no record of his repaying any of it. This is in contrast to the $100,000 from Guez, which Roger repaid in full within three months. Accordingly, the claim that the payment from Gambino was a loan for a down payment on his house is clearly false. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \407\ Telephone Interview with Gerard Guez, CEO, Tarrant Apparel Group (June 11, 2001). \408\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 70). \409\ Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 71). \410\ Property Transfer Record, Los Angeles County, CA (Doc. #:99- 2032105). \411\ Id; Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 72). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There is also evidence that Clinton attempted to coach Tommy Gambino and influence his potential testimony regarding this payment. When it became clear that the Committee was investigating the $50,000 payment from Gambino, Roger Clinton reportedly called Gambino and attempted to convince him that the payment had been a loan. As The New York Times reported: According to one person close to the Gambinos, Roger Clinton called Tommy Gambino on Monday [June 25, 2001] because questions were being raised about the 1999 payment. ``Don't you remember this is money you gave me for my house for a loan?'' this person quoted Roger Clinton as saying to Tommy Gambino. Tommy Gambino, this person said, thought it best not to reply on the chance that the phone was tapped.\412\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \412\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Pardon for Felon Considered After Kin Paid Roger Clinton, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Roger Clinton's Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch Roger Clinton also attempted to mislead the interviewing FBI agents regarding the gold Rolex that he received from Tommy Gambino. Clinton first attempted to tell the agents that he never received any gifts from Gambino and then altered his story several times: Clinton was asked if he had received any gifts from Tommy Gambino while he was assisting the family with the case, and Clinton initially responded ``no.'' After further inquiry, Clinton then advised ``I was shown a Rolex watch once, but it was not given to me.'' Clinton explained that the watch was on the wrist of Tommy Gambino who asked Clinton if he ever had a Rolex. Clinton related that he and Tommy Gambino were discussing watches and cigars at a coffee shop in Beverly Hills, the name and location of which Clinton could not remember. * * * Clinton stated that after leaving the coffee shop, Tommy Gambino took him to look at watches at an unnamed ``pawn shop,'' also in Beverly Hills, California where they encountered actor and Hollywood celebrity George Hamilton. Clinton said Hamilton, who is ``a friend of Tommy's,'' sells watches and cigars. Clinton said Hamilton had a briefcase full of watches which he displayed to Clinton and Gambino, but they left without buying a watch.\413\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \413\ DOJ Document Production FBI-RC-00004-05 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). So, Clinton's initial response when asked specifically about the watch was to deny that he had ever received one. That version of events, however, did not withstand scrutiny for --------------------------------------------------------------------------- long: Clinton subsequently reversed his earlier denials and admitted to having actually received a watch from Tommy Gambino, who told him it was an ``Italian custom'' to give such a gift as a token of appreciation. Clinton could not remember either when he was given the watch, or where he was when he received it. Clinton claimed, however, he did not keep it, but returned it to Gambino after he had ``heard'' the watch is a ``fake.'' Clinton could not remember who told him the watch was an imitation, or when he had learned it was a ``fake.'' \414\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \414\ Id. at FBI-RC-00005. Thus, Clinton's second story was that he did receive a watch from Gambino but had returned it. Again, this story did not --------------------------------------------------------------------------- withstand scrutiny and was withdrawn: Clinton again amended his previous statement when pressed for details regarding the watch's return. Clinton stated that even though it was supposed to be ``a fake,'' he did not return the watch because it was a gift of appreciation from the family. Clinton contended that he never wore it because it was ``too gaudy'' with a thick gold band and a blue face. Clinton said he was confused in that he did not know the present location of the watch. Clinton stated ``Tommy could have it,'' or that he may actually still have the watch. He stated ``he really didn't know.'' Clinton advised ``It could be in my flippin trunk for all I know, it could be in my garage, or almost anywhere.'' Clinton offered to locate the watch ``if it is really important, but it's going to take a lot of effort, so don't ask unless you really need it.'' Clinton was asked to look for the watch after the interview and contact the interviewing agents if he located it. Clinton agreed to do so. Clinton asked if Tommy Gambino was in trouble and if he was involved in something Clinton should know about. He stated that as far a [sic] he knew, Tommy Gambino is very clean.\415\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \415\ Id. Hence, Clinton's third version was that he had received the watch, did not return it, and was unsure of its location. Despite all three earlier claims, Clinton later produced a Rolex watch to the agents and offered the following explanation --------------------------------------------------------------------------- of how he had obtained it: Clinton stated that he does now own a silver Rolex watch. He bought it from an unknown street vendor in front of a ``rainbow'' or ``multicolored'' hotel in Tijuana, Mexico. He paid $250 dollars for the watch in cash and has no receipt of the purchase. He could not provide either the name, street address or approximate location of the hotel.\416\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \416\ Id. at FBI-RC-00006. At this point in the interview, the agents took the unusual step of warning Clinton about the potential consequences of --------------------------------------------------------------------------- lying to the FBI: [T]he interviewing agents advised Clinton of the provisions of Title 18, U.S. Code Section 1001 and the criminal exposure of making false statements to federal agents. Clinton was informed it was a violation of law to provide false information to federal law enforcement officers and that he could be prosecuted, fined and imprisoned for doing so. Clinton was then asked, after being advised of Title 18, U.S. Code Section 1001, would he care to change or otherwise amend any of his previous statements, and Clinton replied ``No,'' he was comfortable with what he had said.\417\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \417\ Id. Clinton's bumbling efforts to mislead the interviewing FBI agents should not distract from the central fact that Roger Clinton was attempting to conceal from the FBI the true nature of his relationship with Tommy Gambino, reputed underboss of the Los Angeles Mafia, and his efforts to win the release of Rosario Gambino, a convicted heroin trafficker and organized crime figure. Clinton's efforts on behalf of the Gambino family were not merely embarrassing. His behavior was unconscionable and his attempts to conceal certain key aspects of his involvement from the FBI were illegal. Clinton was attempting to use his influence to affect the decision of the U.S Parole Commission; he was receiving money from the Gambino family; and he may have been doing it with the full knowledge of his brother, the President. For Roger Clinton to refuse to cooperate fully and truthfully with the FBI in an investigation of these deeply disturbing issues only strengthens the conclusion that Clinton knew his activity was highly unethical and quite possibly illegal. F. The Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency for Rosario Gambino In November 2000, Rosario Gambino requested that President Clinton exercise his power of executive clemency and commute his prison sentence. Gambino filed with the White House a two- page commutation petition, as well as a twelve-page brief with a number of attachments.\418\ Gambino's brief in support of his commutation request made a number of familiar arguments: (1) that Gambino was given a higher ``offense severity rating'' than his co-conspirators; (2) that Gambino had been subjected to prejudice based on national origin; and (3) that Gambino had an ``outstanding institutional record'' and strong family support, which merited release from prison.\419\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \418\ NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation, Nov. 2000) (Exhibit 59). \419\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The arguments raised by Gambino were seriously flawed. As has been noted before, a federal appeals court explicitly rejected the first two. The Parole Commission repeatedly and properly found that Gambino's offense severity rating was correctly set at level eight, the highest available to the Commission. This rating was based on the courts' and the Commission's judgment that Gambino was at the head of a major heroin distribution ring and had been involved in other major organized criminal activities. Gambino's argument focused on the claim that his co-defendants received a less severe rating of level six while being equally involved in the heroin distribution ring. This claim does not have great merit. First, there was evidence that it was Rosario Gambino, rather than Erasmo Gambino or Anthony Spatola, who headed the heroin distribution ring. In addition, the Parole Commission also determined that Erasmo Gambino may have incorrectly been granted a rating of level six, and likely should have received a more severe rating. The Commission found that it ``need not give the ringleader of a major heroin conspiracy a lower rating just because his subordinates have been rated too low.'' \420\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \420\ USPC Document Production 00664 (Memorandum from John R. Simpson, Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Jan. 13, 1999)) (Exhibit 55). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It also appears that Gambino's arguments of discrimination based on national origin were completely spurious. The only evidence cited in support of Gambino's claim was a Parole Commission memo stating that ``Gambino appears to come from an immigrant background in which family connections are simply exploited (as in the current offense) to get around the law.'' \421\ This quote simply provides no evidence of prejudice against Gambino. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily rejected Gambino's claim of racial prejudice.\422\ The Court likely recognized that the Commission memo stated a simple fact, namely that Gambino's background indicated that he did, in the current offense, employ family loyalty as a tool to ensure the success of his criminal enterprise. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \421\ USPC Document Production 00890 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44). \422\ Gambino v. United States Parole Comm'n, 216 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2000). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gambino's claim that he was a model prisoner was incorrect. Gambino did have one official infraction in his prison record, and the Committee also learned that Gambino was transferred from at least one prison because he was ``muscling'' other prisoners.\423\ While these offenses may not be as serious as other inmates' infractions, they are not the actions of a model prisoner. Finally, Gambino argued brazenly that he had ``strong family support'' and could be provided a job by his son Tommy upon release. Given the allegations suggesting that Tommy Gambino is an organized crime figure in his own right and that his business partner is convicted mobster Dominick ``Donnie Shacks'' Montemarano,\424\ it is hardly an argument for Rosario Gambino's release that he would return home and take a job in the ``family business.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \423\ Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). \424\ See Arnold H. Lubasch, 2 Convicted of Racketeering in Mafia Construction Case, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987 (describing Montemarano's conviction). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is clear that the Gambino commutation petition was filed with the White House and rejected at some point in January 2001. Beyond that, few facts about consideration of his petition are known. The inability to discover this information is the result of two unfortunate decisions. First, former Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey and former Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe refused to be interviewed by Committee staff regarding their handling of the Gambino matter. Second, the Bush Administration withheld from the Committee four deliberative documents regarding the Gambino commutation decision.\425\ Both of these decisions are disturbing. Lindsey and Cabe would be able to shed light on whether the President was receptive to his brother's pleas and how close the Gambino commutation came to being granted. It is difficult to understand why the Bush Administration would want to withhold from the Committee key documents about the Gambino matter. The documents have a direct bearing on an apparent attempt by the former President's brother to sell his access to the White House to an alleged member of the Sicilian Mafia. Documents like these, which have a direct bearing on a case involving the sale of access to the clemency process by a presidential sibling, should not be withheld from Congress. The decision of the Bush Administration to withhold these documents has kept the Committee from determining how the Gambino commutation request was handled at the White House. These documents likely would inform the Committee whether the Gambino commutation was seriously considered, what position White House staff took on the matter, and whether the President was receptive to the Gambino request. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \425\ Letter from Gary M. Stern, General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 2, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The few documents received by the Committee suggest that the Gambino commutation may have received serious consideration at the White House. Two documents located in the files of Meredith Cabe indicate that Cabe requested a National Crime Information Center (``NCIC'') background check on Rosario Gambino.\426\ Cabe was the primary attorney in the White House Counsel's office handling clemency-related matters in the waning days of the Clinton Administration.\427\ The two documents were printed from a computer diskette labeled, ``pardon lists.'' \428\ One of the documents reads as follows: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \426\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). \427\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate White House Counsel, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). \428\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NCIC for Michael Mahoney? NCIS [sic] \429\ for Rosario Gambino, [date of birth redacted], no social security number, incarcerated at Terminal Island, CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \429\ The reference ``NCIS'' is apparently a typographical error by Cabe. Supporting this conclusion first is the fact that there is no relevant database called ``NCIS.'' Second, the preceding sentence references NCIC. Third, another document prepared by Cabe indicates that she was requesting an NCIC check on Gambino. Please provide all information known regarding Kimberly Johnson's incident report for ``threatening bodily --------------------------------------------------------------------------- harm'' Ask DOJ to contact sentencing judge in Diana G. Nelson case? NCIC: Peter Ninemire, [date of birth redacted], [social security number deleted]: what happened if we commute entire federal sentence; is he remanded to state custody??? \430\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \430\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The other document prepared by Cabe reads as follows: 1. NCIC Checks Michael Mahoney, Rosario Gambino, [date of birth redacted], no social security number, incarcerated at Terminal Island, CA Peter Ninemire, [date of birth redacted], [social security number deleted]: John Bustamente, [date of birth redacted], [social security number deleted] 2. Follow up questions Kimberly Johnson: please provide all information known regarding incident report for ``threatening bodily harm'' Diana G. Nelson: Please contact sentencing judge regarding position on commutation. Peter Ninemire: can you determine what happened if we commute entire federal sentence; is he remanded to state custody??? \431\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \431\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). These documents suggest that Gambino may have been a serious candidate for clemency. Cabe was interviewed by Committee staff prior to the discovery of the Clinton-Gambino matter and explained that she was responsible for obtaining NCIC checks on serious candidates for clemency.\432\ The purpose of such a background check was to ensure that there was no further criminal activity on the part of the petitioner that had not been disclosed on the petition.\433\ The fact that the White House was requesting a background check on Gambino suggests that his name had passed some level of serious scrutiny, and the White House was considering the commutation. The other names listed with Gambino's also suggest that the commutation was being seriously considered. Gambino's name is listed with Michael Mahoney, Peter Ninemire, John Bustamente, Kimberly Johnson, and Diana G. Nelson.\434\ Three of those five individuals received executive clemency.\435\ This fact indicates that Cabe's list was not some preliminary list of individuals whose names had been received by the White House. Rather, since sixty percent of those on the list with Gambino actually received executive clemency, the list appears to consist of individuals receiving serious consideration. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \432\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate White House Counsel, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). \433\ Id. \434\ NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). \435\ See ``Clemency Recipients'' <http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/ recipients.htm> (Pardons Granted by President Clinton and Commutations Granted by President Clinton). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee has not been able to determine exactly when the President decided not to grant clemency to Rosario Gambino. However, Roger Clinton's telephone records make it appear that he was holding out hope for a commutation until the final moments of the Clinton Administration. The very first call placed by Roger Clinton after the expiration of his brother's term as President on January 20, 2001, was to the cell phone of Tommy Gambino. It seems likely that the call was to break the news to Tommy Gambino that his father would not be receiving a commutation. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that Clinton also placed telephone calls to three other individuals immediately after his call to Gambino, informing them that they did not receive the pardons that Roger Clinton had been attempting to get them. After he called Tommy Gambino, Roger Clinton called Dan Lasater, George Locke, and Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan and informed them that the President had not granted them pardons, despite Roger's request.\436\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \436\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001); Telephone Interview with George Locke (Mar. 27, 2001); Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). See also Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb. 1, 2001) at 8-9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Rosario Gambino case is one of the most disturbing matters reviewed by the Committee as part of its clemency investigation. The President's brother worked to free a convicted heroin dealer and member of organized crime from prison. The President's brother engaged in these activities because of his friendship with Tommy Gambino, himself a reputed senior organized crime member. He also engaged in these efforts because of the promise of a lucrative reward from the Gambino family, a reward that Clinton received in part, even though he did not succeed in winning Rosario Gambino's release. Moreover, when questioned by the FBI, Roger Clinton lied repeatedly in order to cover up the true nature of his relationship with the Gambino family. This episode sets a new low for presidential siblings. III. THE LINCECUM PARDON OFFER Among the first public reports of Roger Clinton's pardon- related activities was the story of Garland Lincecum. Garland Lincecum has claimed that he and his family were bilked out of $235,000 by Roger Clinton and two of his associates, Dickey Morton and George Locke, who claimed that they could sell presidential pardons.\437\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \437\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Garland Lincecum was convicted in July 1998 along with three co-defendants for wire fraud and mail fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud investors of $8 million.\438\ Lincecum's co-defendants were Valerie Miremadi, Anthony Miremadi, and Paul Eggers, a former general counsel to the Treasury Department in the Nixon Administration and candidate for the governorship of Texas.\439\ All were convicted for their roles in the scheme. Lincecum was sentenced to 87 months in prison, which he began serving in April 1999.\440\ According to the government, the defendants had engaged in a ``prime bank'' fraud, a common scheme described by the Securities and Exchange Commission as involving ``the purported issuance, trading, or use of so-called `prime' bank, `prime' European bank or `prime' world bank financial instruments, or other `high yield investment programs[.]' '' \441\ Investors are told that ``prime banks'' use their funds for short-term loans and that they will be able to earn a return of 100 percent or more.\442\ Lincecum, however, maintains that little or no money was actually lost in this investment scheme and that all investors' funds were treated with care.\443\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \438\ Nixon Official Facing 5 Years for Fraud, United Press International, Aug. 1, 1998. \439\ Id. \440\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \441\ ``Warning to All Investors About Bogus `Prime Bank' and Other Banking-Related Investment Schemes,'' Securities and Exchange Commission, <http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/primebank.shtml>. \442\ Nixon Official Facing 5 Years for Fraud, United Press International, Aug. 1, 1998. \443\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lincecum also had a prior conviction from 1982 for transporting an individual across state lines in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.\444\ Lincecum served 40 months in prison on those charges but maintains that he is innocent of any crime for his role in either fraudulent scheme.\445\ He also believes that his co-defendants in the 1998 trial received much lighter sentences than he did, despite their more serious involvement in the investment plan.\446\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \444\ Id. Lincecum's prior conviction related to his role in finding investors for a fraudulent gold refining process. Lincecum and two other individuals claimed to have a new process for refining gold ore. Lincecum and his investors then used the ore, which authorities charged was worthless, as collateral to borrow $250,000 from a bank in Pennsylvania. Lincecum and his partners were all convicted. Interview with Robert ``R.V.'' Wilson (Apr. 25, 2001). \445\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \446\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The other key actors in the Lincecum matter were George Locke and Dickey Morton. George Locke was an Arkansas State Senator from 1970 to 1983 but was convicted of cocaine distribution charges in 1986.\447\ Locke's conviction stemmed from drug dealing activities he conducted in Arkansas in the 1980s together with Dan Lasater and Roger Clinton.\448\ Locke was also a partner of Lasater's in the investment firm of Collins, Locke, and Lasater in Little Rock.\449\ Dickey Morton was a star running back for the University of Arkansas during the 1970s who then played briefly for the Pittsburgh Steelers. In 1974, Morton married Sandra Clark, who was the daughter of Jimmy Clark, Locke's business partner.\450\ Locke and Morton have been close since 1973 and have had a number of business ventures together.\451\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \447\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 1 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). \448\ Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). \449\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 1 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). \450\ Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). \451\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 2 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. Garland Lincecum's Account 1. The Initial $35,000 Payment The first time that Garland Lincecum discussed a presidential pardon with anyone was in August 1998 after he was convicted in the prime bank fraud but before he was sentenced.\452\ Richard Cayce, a longtime business associate, approached Lincecum.\453\ Cayce told Lincecum that he was involved in business with Roger Clinton and two of his associates, Dickey Morton and George Locke.\454\ Cayce said that Clinton, Morton, and Locke had the ability to obtain presidential pardons.\455\ Cayce told Lincecum that he could obtain a pardon if Lincecum could pay Clinton, Morton, and Locke $300,000.\456\ Lincecum told Cayce that he was interested in this proposal, but that it would take him some time to come up with the necessary funds.\457\ Cayce told Lincecum that if he was interested, he should come up with $25,000 to $35,000 immediately to indicate that his interest was serious.\458\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \452\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \453\ Id. \454\ Id. Cayce had extensive business contacts with Morton and Locke prior to approaching them about the Lincecum pardon. Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 2-3 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). According to George Locke, Cayce was attempting to enlist Roger Clinton's support for an entity called the Legacy Foundation. Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). The Legacy Foundation claimed to be a charitable organization selling tax- exempt charitable bonds. Id. Cayce and others involved in the Legacy Foundation wanted to use the Clinton name to help sell the charitable bonds. Id. After the Securities and Exchange Commission launched an investigation, the Legacy Foundation halted its plans to issue the bonds. Cayce was trying to enlist Clinton, Morton, and Locke's support for the Legacy Foundation during the same time as Lincecum was trying to obtain his pardon. However, Morton and Locke have claimed that all of the money exchanged between Cayce, Lincecum, and CLM related to the Legacy Foundation, not any attempt to sell pardons. Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). As discussed in the conclusion below, this claim is not credible. \455\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \456\ Id. \457\ Id. \458\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lincecum went to his mother, Alberta Lincecum, and borrowed $35,000 from her.\459\ Alberta Lincecum confirmed that she provided $35,000 for Garland's initial payment and also said that she overheard telephone conversations between Garland and other unnamed individuals regarding his effort to buy a pardon. In her interview with Committee staff, Alberta Lincecum stated that she listened, on an extension, to a telephone conversation between Garland and other individuals where those unknown individuals told Garland that he needed to come up with $100,000 for a pardon.\460\ Alberta Lincecum cashed a certificate of deposit and wrote a personal check to Garland for $35,000.\461\ Garland then signed the check over to Richard Cayce.\462\ Cayce told Lincecum that he would cash the check and deliver the cash personally to Roger Clinton.\463\ According to Lincecum, Cayce also offered to loan him $70,000 to help pay for the pardon and to provide these funds directly to Morton.\464\ Bank records indicate that the MM Foundation, an organization controlled by Cayce, wired $70,000 to CLM, L.L.C.,\465\ a company created by Clinton, Locke, and Morton.\466\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \459\ Id; Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \460\ Id. \461\ Id. \462\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \463\ Id. \464\ Id. \465\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 74). \466\ Records indicate that Dickey Morton was the registered agent for the company. Arkansas Secretary of State Document Production (Articles of Organization) (Exhibit 75). Clinton's and Locke's involvement in the company was confirmed by George Locke. Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The First Dallas Meeting After Garland Lincecum informed Cayce that he was interested in paying $300,000 for a pardon, Cayce informed Dickey Morton that Lincecum was interested.\467\ Cayce told Morton that Lincecum would want to meet with him personally to discuss the arrangements for the pardon.\468\ Morton sent the following remarkable fax to Cayce (handwritten notations on the fax are indicated in parentheses): --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \467\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). \468\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RE: Political Meeting Agreement Richard: The following is an understanding of the way this meeting will occur on Tuesday August 12, 1998, along with the compensation required to get you this meeting. Please review and sign and fax back to my fax number by this early afternoon if your group wants to consumate [sic] this meeting. 1. Call an airline representative for reservations for Roger Clinton, Mrs. Roger Clinton, and Molly Clinton \469\ from Los Angeles to Dallas, Friday the 7th of August 1998, for a late direct flight first class. You pre-pay by your credit card today August 7th 1998. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \469\ Given that Molly Clinton is Roger Clinton's wife, it is not clear who Morton was referring to as ``Mrs. Roger Clinton.'' 2. The 1/3 of cookies ($) that we discussed or 33,000 cookies ($) will be delivered by your representative or you, cookies need to be ready to eat. A time and place will be setup early Monday morning for exchange for the meeting to set up for Tuesday, place needs to a private meeting place, as we do not need any auto graph [sic] seekers there. Roger will send his representative to --------------------------------------------------------------------------- meet you. 3. The meeting will be set for Tuesday, as to time and place, when you deliver cookies to Roger's representative on Monday morning the 11th of August. 4. The rest of cookies ($ money) can be delivered Tuesday right before meeting. By signing you accept conditions of meeting. I am not the representative of Roger Clinton in this transaction, you will meet him in Dallas, Texas. Best regards, Dickey Morton ($ cookies = money) \470\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \470\ Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey Morton, to Richard Cayce (Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76). In his proffer to the Committee, Morton claimed that this --------------------------------------------------------------------------- letter was written at the behest of Cayce: Casey [sic] asked that a confirmation letter be sent to him spelling out the agreement. Casey [sic] stated that the letter must be written in code since the Legacy Foundation was at present, working covertly with the federal government. Casey [sic] told Morton not to mention money in the letter.\471\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \471\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 4 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). In this proffer, Morton also maintained that the 100,000 ``cookies'' in the letter referred to the ``appearance fee'' charged by Roger Clinton for meeting with Cayce and Lincecum, not any payment for a pardon. Cayce made the requested arrangements and met with Clinton, Locke, Morton, and Lincecum in a Dallas hotel in approximately August 1998.\472\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \472\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001); Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On the morning of the meeting, Cayce first met alone with Clinton, Locke, and Morton in a hotel room.\473\ Garland Lincecum was not present at the meeting, but after the meeting, Cayce informed Lincecum that Cayce provided to Roger Clinton the $35,000 in cash that Lincecum had raised from his mother.\474\ Dickey Morton and George Locke admitted, through their lawyer, to accepting $7,000 and $5,000 respectively at this meeting.\475\ They also confirmed that Roger Clinton accepted $18,000 in cash as his share of the payment.\476\ Bank records provide corroboration, indicating that Roger Clinton made a series of large cash deposits into his bank accounts around the same time frame.\477\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \473\ Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \474\ Id. \475\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). \476\ Id. \477\ Between August 19, and August 25, 1998, Clinton made three separate deposits totaling $12,500. Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 77). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cayce informed Lincecum that he discussed the pardon arrangements with Clinton, Locke, and Morton, and that they assured him that, through Clinton's contacts, they would be able to obtain the pardon.\478\ After the private meeting, Cayce, Locke, and Morton came down to the hotel lobby, where they met with Garland Lincecum.\479\ Roger Clinton did not participate in this meeting. During this meeting, Garland Lincecum asked whether he would definitely receive a pardon in exchange for his money.\480\ Morton explained that he would receive a pardon, not merely that he and Roger would make their ``best efforts'' to obtain a pardon.\481\ Garland said he would not have agreed to pay the money merely for a promise of ``best efforts.'' \482\ Morton stated that Roger Clinton could obtain pardons in batches of six at a time.\483\ Concerned about this arrangement, Lincecum asked if this was legal, and Morton assured him that it was.\484\ Morton claimed that most pardon petitions were rejected because the applicants failed to fill out the paperwork properly.\485\ He explained that he, Locke, and Roger Clinton used a Washington, D.C., law firm to prepare the necessary paperwork on the pardon and that Roger would then personally deliver the paperwork to his brother, the President.\486\ George Locke told Lincecum that they had obtained pardons in this way previously but declined to name any of the individuals who had obtained pardons in this manner. Locke said that after Lincecum received his pardon, he would likewise accord the same confidentiality to Lincecum if ever asked about it.\487\ Morton confirmed during this meeting that he had already received $100,000 of the necessary $300,000 towards Lincecum's pardon.\488\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \478\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \479\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I); Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \480\ Id. \481\ Id. \482\ Id. \483\ Id. \484\ Id. \485\ Id. \486\ Id. \487\ Id. \488\ Id. The $100,000 that had been paid at this point consisted of the $70,000 wired by the M.M. Foundation plus the $30,000 to $35,000 delivered in cash. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Roger Clinton did not participate in this hotel lobby meeting.\489\ However, after the meeting, Cayce asked Lincecum if he had noticed an individual who had been watching the meeting from a second-story balcony overlooking the lobby.\490\ Lincecum stated that he had, and Cayce told him that the individual was Roger Clinton.\491\ Lincecum asked Cayce ``well, why didn't the little bastard come down?'' \492\ At this point, Cayce told Lincecum that he had met with Clinton, Locke, and Morton earlier that morning and that Roger Clinton told him he would help obtain the pardon.\493\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \489\ Id. \490\ Id. \491\ Id. \492\ Id. \493\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lincecum believed the claims of Morton and Locke for a number of reasons. First, he had heard from Cayce that they had the ability to obtain diplomatic passports.\494\ This suggested to Lincecum that they had influence in the U.S. government. Second, Cayce confirmed for Lincecum that Roger Clinton was indeed working with Morton and Locke on these matters.\495\ Third, Lincecum trusted Morton and Locke. Morton was a standout football player with the University of Arkansas and had a reputation as a devoted family man.\496\ Locke was a former Arkansas state senator who had been close to Bill Clinton when he was Governor.\497\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \494\ Id. \495\ Id. \496\ Id. \497\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In his proffer to the Committee, Cayce offers a slightly different version of events with regard to the two initial payments. Cayce claims that he, not Alberta Lincecum, was the source of the initial cash payment.\498\ He also claims that he provided $30,000, rather than $35,000, in cash to Clinton, Locke, and Morton at the Dallas meeting.\499\ According to Cayce, the cash from the Dallas meeting plus the $70,000 wire from the MM Foundation were intended to pay for his attempt to purchase diplomatic passports and were unrelated to Lincecum's attempt to obtain a pardon. While the differences between the accounts of Cayce and Lincecum are noteworthy, they are not highly significant. First, Cayce's account cannot be given great weight, since Cayce has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and provided his information in the form of a proffer. Second, while there are some differences between Cayce and Lincecum, for the most part, Cayce supports Lincecum's account. Cayce confirms that Morton and Locke offered to sell a pardon to Lincecum. Cayce also confirms that Roger Clinton was directly involved in the plot to sell a pardon to Lincecum. Cayce merely disagrees on the amount of money that was paid by Lincecum for the pardon. This difference does not undermine the core of Lincecum's allegations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \498\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). \499\ Id. The two numbers may be reconcilable. If the Lincecums gave Cayce $35,000, he may have used $5,000 for airline tickets, hotel accommodations, and other expenses for Roger Clinton and his companions on the trip to Dallas. According to Guy and Alberta Lincecum, their copy of the $35,000 check that they gave to Richard Cayce was lost. Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001); Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). The Committee was unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain records of the $35,000 directly from the bank. However, the fact that a $30,000 cash payment occurred was corroborated by George Locke and Dickey Morton, through their attorney, who explained that all three received cash from Cayce, with Roger Clinton receiving $18,000, Morton receiving $7,000, and Locke receiving $5,000. Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Lincecum's Attempts to Raise the Remaining Money Between August and November 1998, Garland Lincecum had a number of contacts with Morton regarding the payment of the remaining $200,000 towards his pardon. Lincecum stated that Morton and Locke maintained a ``soft pressure'' on him that was very effective in motivating Lincecum to find the money.\500\ According to Lincecum, Morton had a ``take it or leave it'' attitude and often offered to return the money that Lincecum had already paid.\501\ In Lincecum's mind, Morton's position only confirmed that the cash-for-pardon scheme was legitimate and that Morton was not swindling him.\502\ However, Lincecum still had some concerns about paying all $300,000 up front before he received the pardon. At one point, he asked Morton if he could make arrangements to pay a portion of the fee after he received the pardon.\503\ Lincecum even offered to place part of the funds in escrow until he received the pardon.\504\ Morton responded to these suggestions by telling Lincecum that the pardon business was ``strictly cash and carry.'' \505\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \500\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \501\ Id. \502\ Id. \503\ Id. \504\ Id. \505\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the fall of 1998, when he was still trying to come up with the remaining $200,000, Lincecum was concerned that Morton, Locke, and Clinton would sell off the remaining pardon slots available to Roger Clinton.\506\ Garland Lincecum could not travel to Arkansas himself because the court sentenced him but had not yet ordered him to report to prison. Accordingly, the court had ordered Lincecum not to leave Texas.\507\ So, he sent his brother, Guy Lincecum, to meet with Morton in Little Rock, Arkansas and hand-deliver a letter from Garland to demonstrate his serious intention to find the necessary funds for the pardon.\508\ Guy traveled to Little Rock and met with Morton at a Holiday Inn.\509\ Guy delivered the letter to Morton, Morton read it, and Morton then told Guy that he was puzzled as to why Guy had traveled all the way to Little Rock when he could have just mailed the letter.\510\ Guy told Morton that he traveled to Little Rock because Garland wanted him to know that he was serious about wanting the pardon.\511\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \506\ Id. \507\ Id; Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \508\ Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \509\ Id; Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). Guy Lincecum provided hotel records to corroborate the account of his trip. Guy Lincecum Document Production (Exhibit 78). \510\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \511\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After his meeting with Morton and Locke, Garland Lincecum was convinced that he wanted to obtain the pardon, but he was faced with the obstacle of raising the outstanding $200,000. To raise these funds, he initially turned to Jim McClain, a Dallas real estate developer he had done business with in the past.\512\ Lincecum knew that McClain had a conviction in his past and might also be interested in obtaining a pardon himself.\513\ Lincecum approached McClain and explained the offer he had received from Morton and Locke.\514\ McClain informed Lincecum that he was interested in obtaining a pardon and offered to pay $300,000 for his own pardon, as well as loan Lincecum $200,000 for Lincecum's pardon.\515\ McClain explained that he would be able to make the payment as soon as a major real estate deal he was working on closed.\516\ Lincecum called Morton to check and see if they had a ``slot'' for a pardon available for McClain. Lincecum remembers that when he asked Morton this question, Morton told Lincecum to wait while he purported to check with Roger Clinton on another telephone line.\517\ Lincecum heard Morton's side of the conversation as Morton purportedly confirmed with Roger Clinton that there was indeed a ``slot'' available for McClain.\518\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \512\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \513\ Id. \514\ Id. \515\ Id. \516\ Id. \517\ Id. \518\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As Lincecum was receiving pressure from Morton to complete his payment for the pardon, he wrote a check for $500,000 to Morton, telling him to hold the check until he was able to get the necessary funds from McClain.\519\ Lincecum hoped that the check would help reserve his and McClain's ``slots'' and keep Morton, Locke, and Clinton from selling them to someone else.\520\ However, after waiting for several weeks, it became clear that McClain was having difficulty with his real estate deal and would not be able to provide any funds, either for his own pardon or as a loan for Lincecum's pardon.\521\ Accordingly, this $500,000 check was never cashed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \519\ Id. \520\ Id. \521\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When Committee staff interviewed McClain, he confirmed many key aspects of Lincecum's account. McClain confirmed that he had a number of discussions with Lincecum about buying a pardon through Morton, Locke, and Clinton.\522\ McClain stated that Lincecum initially told him it would cost $500,000 to obtain a pardon.\523\ Then, after checking with Morton and Locke, Lincecum returned to McClain and told him that a pardon for past offenses would cost $500,000 and a pardon for crimes currently under investigation was $1 million.\524\ McClain spoke to his lawyer about Lincecum's offer.\525\ The lawyer told McClain that he should not discuss these matters any further unless he wanted to be indicted again.\526\ At that point, McClain stopped discussing the matter with Lincecum.\527\ McClain denies that he ever took any steps toward raising the money for the pardon and also denies that he had any discussions with Morton, Locke, or Clinton regarding pardons.\528\ One document produced by one of Dickey Morton's companies, however, undermines McClain's claim. A November 9, 1998, letter from Morton to McClain states: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \522\ Telephone Interview with Jim McClain (Apr. 25, 2001). \523\ Id. \524\ Id. \525\ Id. \526\ Id. \527\ Id. \528\ Id. We had an extremely good week, with President Bill coming down to visit with us this week. After the Senator and I and Roger got together we all agreed to go forward. My only question is are you wanting to do business or not, since we have not heard from you and I left several messages on your voice mail and with your associate at Charter Financial. If so give me a call, if not, good luck.\529\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \529\ Dickey Morton Document Production 000044 (Letter from Dickey Morton, to Jim McClain (Nov. 8, 1998)) (Exhibit 79). While it is not certain that Morton is referring to an offer to obtain a pardon, the time frame is consistent with the period in which Lincecum was discussing the pardon with McClain. 4. Lincecum's Payment of $200,000 After failing to raise funds for the pardon from any other source, Lincecum approached his family and asked his mother and brother to provide the necessary money.\530\ In November 1998, Alberta Lincecum, Garland's mother, cashed a number of certificates of deposit and on November 23, 1998, had a cashier's check for $100,000 issued to CLM.\531\ Morton had told Lincecum that he should make the check payable to CLM, which was the company formed by Clinton, Locke, and Morton.\532\ Alberta Lincecum provided the check to Garland Lincecum, who then mailed the check to Morton, who on November 25, 1998, deposited the check into the CLM account at the First National Bank of Crossett in Arkansas.\533\ The $100,000 used by Alberta Lincecum to pay for her son's pardon came from her life savings.\534\ Her late husband had invested their savings in CDs, which she used for her living expenses as they came due.\535\ Alberta is 85 years old and has significant health problems, which cause her to need more than the approximately $900 per month provided by her monthly social security benefits.\536\ As a result of losing this money in the pardon scheme, Alberta is finding it difficult to make ends meet and is unable to travel or make any other large expenditures.\537\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \530\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001); Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001); Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \531\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 80). \532\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001); Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001); Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \533\ Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001); Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \534\ Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \535\ Id. \536\ Id. \537\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Approximately one month later, Guy Lincecum provided the remaining $100,000 for Garland's pardon. Guy had a large amount of funds in an account at Edward Jones Investment, which constituted his retirement savings.\538\ Before Guy cashed out the account, he had an investment representative send a letter to Dickey Morton informing Morton that Guy had $100,000 available in his account.\539\ After he was able to clear the funds from the account, on December 22, 1998, he had a check issued by Edward Jones Investments to him.\540\ On December 29, 1998, Guy traveled to Little Rock and hand-delivered the check to Morton.\541\ Guy signed the check over to Morton and handed it to him.\542\ When Morton accepted the check, he told Guy that they were ``paid in full'' for Garland's pardon.\543\ Shortly thereafter, on December 31, 1998, the check was deposited into CLM's account at the First National Bank of Crossett.\544\ To withdraw the $100,000, Guy had to pay a significant amount in taxes.\545\ He also is unable to open a small business that he was planning on running after he retired from his job.\546\ He now lives with his mother, helping care for her.\547\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \538\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \539\ Edward Jones Investments Document Production (Fax from Bill Hayes, Investment Representative, to Dickey Morton (Dec. 16, 1998)) (Exhibit 81). \540\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \541\ Id; Guy Lincecum Document Production (Southwest Airlines, Ticket Stub, Dec. 29, 1998) (Holiday Inn, Bill, Dec. 28, 1998) (Exhibits 82, 78). \542\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \543\ Id. \544\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 83). \545\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \546\ Id. \547\ Id; Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. The Division of Lincecum's Money Among Clinton, Locke, and Morton Between August and December 1998, the CLM bank account at the First National Bank of Crossett received $270,000 related to the Lincecum pardon.\548\ In fact, apart from the $100 opening deposit on August 17, 1998, the Lincecum-related deposits were the only deposits to the account until June 1999 when the balance had dwindled to under $1,000.\549\ Bank records indicate that the $270,000 was divided between Morton, Locke, and Clinton. Morton, the only individual who had power to withdraw money from the CLM account, signed checks totaling $67,000 from the CLM account for his company, Southern Belle Construction.\550\ Morton issued two checks to George Locke totaling $65,000.\551\ Morton also signed three checks to Roger Clinton totaling $25,500.\552\ The following table summarizes how the money provided by Lincecum and Cayce was divided among Clinton, Locke, and Morton: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \548\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 84). \549\ Id. \550\ Id. \551\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 85). \552\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 86). Funds Provided to CLM for the Pardon ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date Amount Source of Funds Use of Funds ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8/98 $35,000 Alberta Lincecum Expenses and $30,000 in cash to CLM.\553\ 8/19/98 $70,000 Richard Cayce Wire from the M.M. Foundation to CLM. 11/25/98 $100,000 Alberta Lincecum Deposited into the CLM bank account. 12/31/98 $100,000 Guy Lincecum Deposited into the CLM bank account. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \553\ See n.499. Significant Activity in the CLM Account ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date Transaction Amount To/From ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8/19/98 deposit - wire $70,000 MM Foundation (Dallas, TX) 8/21/98 debit -$4,000 Southern Belle Construction 8/25/98 debit -$52,000 George Locke 8/26/98 debit -$4,000 Southern Belle Construction 11/25/98 deposit $100,000 Alberta Lincecum 11/25/98 check #1014 -$20,000 Southern Belle Construction 12/01/98 check #1015 -$13,000 George Locke 12/10/98 check #1016 -$10,000 Roger Clinton 12/10/98 check #1017 -$5,500 Roger Clinton 12/10/98 check #1019 -$5,000 Southern Belle Construction 12/14/98 check #1020 -$5,100 Southern Belle Construction 12/21/98 check #1023 -$8,100 Southern Belle Construction 12/22/98 check #1026 -$8,000 Southern Belle Construction 12/28/98 check #1029 -$5,000 Southern Belle Construction 12/31/98 deposit $100,000 Guy Lincecum 1/7/99 check #1030 -$10,000 Roger Clinton 4/1/99 check #1062 -$8,300 Southern Belle Construction -------------------------- Total to Roger Clinton: $25,500 \554\ Total to George Locke: $65,000 Total to Southern Belle: $67,000 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The remainder of the funds in the CLM account was apparently used for other small company transactions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \554\ When the $18,000 provided to Roger Clinton in cash is added to the two checks, Roger Clinton's share of the Lincecum funds amounts to just over $43,500. See n.499. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Lincecum's Attempts to Receive the Pardon As of December 1998, Lincecum had paid in full for his pardon and expected that he would receive the pardon soon thereafter, before he was sent to prison.\555\ He had a number of telephone contacts with Morton and Locke between December 1998 and April 1999, when he reported to prison, attempting to determine the status of his pardon request.\556\ A number of times after paying for the pardon, Garland asked Morton if he could meet with Roger Clinton to discuss how his request was progressing.\557\ Each time Garland asked, Morton told him that Roger was traveling or otherwise unavailable.\558\ As a result, neither Garland nor Guy Lincecum ever met with or discussed the pardon matter with Roger Clinton.\559\ Garland also could not get a definitive answer from Morton on where his pardon stood until shortly before he reported to prison in April 1999. At that time, Morton told Garland that he would have to serve some amount of prison time before they were able to get the pardon.\560\ After Garland was sent to prison, his brother Guy took over as the principal contact with Morton and Locke and continued to press them on Garland's pardon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \555\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \556\ Id. \557\ Id. \558\ Id. \559\ Id. \560\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After Garland was sent to prison, Guy Lincecum frequently contacted Morton and Locke to inquire as to the status of Garland's pardon.\561\ After Garland had served several months in prison, the Lincecums became very anxious that they receive the pardon as agreed. Most of these contacts between Guy Lincecum and Dickey Morton took place over the telephone, and Morton provided a number of different excuses for the delay in receiving the pardon. Initially, Morton told Guy that Garland would have to serve at least three months in prison.\562\ After that time had passed, in the fall of 1999, Morton then informed Guy that the controversy over the President's grants of clemency to the FALN terrorists would delay any grant of clemency to Garland.\563\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \561\ Id. \562\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \563\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the same period of time in 1999 and 2000 after Garland had been sent to prison, Garland and Guy Lincecum attempted to introduce friends and business associates to Morton, Locke, and Clinton, believing that they offered valuable business opportunities. The Lincecums believed that Morton, Locke, and Clinton, through their political contacts, would be good partners for a variety of business deals. Morton had informed the Lincecums that they had contacts in China who could provide them with cheap cement and drywall, which could be sold at a large profit in the United States, as the U.S. was experiencing a shortage of those products.\564\ Morton told the Lincecums that they were also able to bring the cement and drywall into the U.S. without customs problems because of Roger Clinton's connections.\565\ As a result, Lincecum introduced a number of business associates to Morton and Locke, including Robert Wilson, Jim McCaskill, Rod Osborne, David Crockett, and Harvey Greenwald.\566\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \564\ Id. \565\ Id. \566\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). It should be noted that a number of these individuals who had business dealings with Morton and Locke had extremely negative experiences with them. McCaskill, Osborne, and Crockett all claim that they were cheated out of substantial sums of money by Morton and Locke in their business dealings. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- By the summer of 1999, Guy had grown frustrated with the failure to receive the pardon. As he arranged a meeting in Dallas to discuss a deal to import cement, he planned on asking Morton about the status of the pardon.\567\ In June 1999, Guy Lincecum, Richard Cayce, and Harvey Greenwald met with Dickey Morton and George Locke in a Dallas hotel to discuss a possible deal to import cement into the U.S. through Morton and Locke.\568\ After the meeting, Guy Lincecum approached George Locke and asked him about the status of Garland's pardon. Locke told Guy that he had reviewed Garland's trial transcript and was convinced that Garland had been wrongfully convicted.\569\ Locke then told Guy that the pardon was ``a done deal.'' \570\ Guy understood Locke's comments to mean that they had paid for the pardon in full and that Garland would be receiving it shortly.\571\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \567\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \568\ Id. \569\ Id. \570\ Id. \571\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, Garland did not receive his pardon in the summer of 1999. Nonetheless, he continued to show some optimism that he would receive it. In October 1999, Garland sent a letter to Dickey Morton largely concerning business ventures he planned on pursuing with Morton. In this letter, Garland stated, ``I am sure that within 60 days of my release there will be four parties prepared to proceed on a similar item for themselves.'' \572\ This letter indicates that Garland expected to be released from prison in a much shorter time frame than his 87- month prison sentence suggested. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \572\ This letter was apparently drafted by Garland Lincecum in prison and then handed to his brother Guy Lincecum, who mailed it to Morton. Dickey Morton Document Production 000321 (Letter from Guy Lincecum, to Dickey Morton (Oct. 26, 1999)) (Exhibit 87). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to the efforts of Guy Lincecum, one of Garland's friends and business associates, R.V. Wilson, also attempted to obtain assurances from Clinton, Locke, and Morton that the pardon would be issued. In June 1999, Wilson said he traveled twice from his home in Mississippi to Arkansas to meet with Morton and Locke, ostensibly about importing cement and drywall from China.\573\ Wilson knew that Lincecum had paid $235,000 for a pardon and was being stalled, so Wilson brought up the issue during a meal at the Southern Kitchen, a restaurant in Little Rock.\574\ Wilson said that when he raised the issue of Lincecum's pardon, Locke and Morton both looked ``scared to death.'' \575\ Wilson said Locke raised his hand and waved it in his face as if wiping something away and Dickey Morton began touching him.\576\ Wilson said he then realized that Morton was patting him down to see if he was wearing a wire because they thought the FBI had sent him.\577\ They said they would not discuss it.\578\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \573\ Telephone Interview with R.V. Wilson (Apr. 25, 2001). \574\ Id. \575\ Id. \576\ Id. \577\ Id. \578\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After the meal, Morton gave Wilson a ride to his hotel and while in the car, without Locke present, Morton said that ``the Senator'' didn't want those matters discussed in front of him in public.\579\ Wilson said, ``I thought this was all legal,'' to which Morton replied that it was ``100 percent legal'' but that it was ``politically sensitive.'' \580\ Morton said that while he was part of the company, CLM, Roger Clinton and George Locke handled all the pardon matters.\581\ Then Morton refused to talk any more about it.\582\ Wilson said he tried to obtain a meeting with Roger Clinton during his visits to Arkansas but was always told that Roger was on the golf course or sleeping.\583\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \579\ Id. \580\ Id. \581\ Id. \582\ Id. \583\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, through the fall of 1999, despite the efforts of Guy Lincecum and R.V. Wilson, there was still no forward progress in receiving the pardon. Accordingly, when Guy Lincecum next met with Morton and Locke in person, he raised the issue again. Following another meeting about selling imported construction products, Guy Lincecum cornered Dickey Morton in the restroom of an Applebee's restaurant in Ardmore, Oklahoma, and confronted him once again about his brother's pardon.\584\ Guy asked, ``Is this legal?'' \585\ Morton said that it was and that the reason people fail to obtain pardons is that their lawyers do not know how to fill out the forms properly.\586\ Morton assured Guy that CLM had two of the best lawyers in the country working on Garland's case, that they would complete the forms, and that Roger would deliver them to the President personally.\587\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \584\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). \585\ Id. \586\ Id. \587\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At the meeting in Ardmore, Oklahoma, Guy had introduced Morton and Locke to Jim McCaskill, who wanted to sell cement for CLM on commission.\588\ Morton had provided phone numbers for McCaskill to call when he had buyers ready to place orders, but during the winter of 1999-2000, McCaskill was having trouble contacting Morton, which was preventing him from completing any sales.\589\ So, a second meeting was arranged in Oklahoma in late spring 2000 to address the problems McCaskill was having in contacting Morton and Locke.\590\ McCaskill, Guy Lincecum, Morton, and Locke met early in the morning at a fast food restaurant in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. In the parking lot as they were leaving, Guy turned to Morton and asked again when Garland would be pardoned and released from prison.\591\ Morton turned to Locke and asked, ``When is Garland scheduled to be released?'' \592\ Locke pulled out a small book; he opened it, flipped through it, and said, ``He is scheduled to be released in July, the third quarter.'' \593\ Jim McCaskill who corroborated Guy Lincecum's account to Committee staff witnessed this exchange.\594\ Guy took Locke's statement to be a definitive assurance as to when the pardon would be received. However, shortly after this meeting, Guy said that Locke and Morton stopped returning his phone calls.\595\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \588\ Id. \589\ Id. \590\ Id. \591\ Id. \592\ Id. \593\ Id. \594\ Telephone Interview with Jim McCaskill (May 2, 2001). \595\ Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite the failure of Guy Lincecum and R.V. Wilson to obtain assurances from Morton and Locke that Garland Lincecum would be receiving a pardon, the Lincecums continued to be optimistic that Garland would receive a pardon from President Clinton. Garland Lincecum informed Committee staff that he fully expected his name would be included on the list of pardons issued on President Clinton's last day in office and that he had ``done everything except pack my bags.'' \596\ Obviously, when he learned that he had not received a pardon, he was deeply disappointed and felt that Morton, Locke, and Clinton had cheated him.\597\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \596\ Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). \597\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Roger Clinton's Reaction to the Allegations Despite repeated attempts to obtain Roger Clinton's version of events, he failed to cooperate with the Committee's investigation. He refused to be interviewed by Committee staff. His lawyer indicated that if called to testify before the Committee, Clinton would likely assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, through his lawyer, Clinton also refused to answer questions posed to him in writing.\598\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \598\ Letter from Bart H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite his refusal to cooperate with the Committee, Roger Clinton did speak to the press. Shortly after the Lincecum allegations became public, The New York Times reported that ``Roger Clinton said through a spokeswoman today that though he knew Mr. Locke and Mr. Morton, he never heard of C.L.M. and had never authorized either man to use his name in any way.'' \599\ Bank records indicating that he deposited two large checks from CLM, however, directly contradict this denial. Later, in an appearance on Larry King Live, Clinton was asked about the Lincecum allegations and stated that ``I can tell you that there is no truth to money for pardons. There is zero truth to that, zero truth.'' \600\ He declined to offer any details refuting the Lincecum allegations but generally suggested that Morton and Locke may have swindled Lincecum without his knowledge: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \599\ Neil A. Lewis, Swindle Is Reported to Use the Name of Roger Clinton, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9. \600\ Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 21, 2001). King. So this guy is lying to Mr. Serrano of the L.A. Times when he tells him he gave money and he was --------------------------------------------------------------------------- promised a pardon. Clinton. No, sir, I'm not saying he is lying. I'm not saying he's lying. King. You just said there was no money changed hands and he said-- Clinton. I said there was no--let me clarify: there was no money exchanged with me. King. You never got a penny. Clinton. And I never heard one word about a pardon. * * * Clinton. Now there are some details that we can dress it up with, but the bottom line is I didn't do it. I don't care what this flipping guy says and his buddy [sic]. I don't care what they say. It doesn't matter to me. But I'm not saying they are lying about what they are saying, because they are not saying that I took it. They are not saying that I was there. * * * King. Is it possible, Mark [Geragos, Roger Clinton's lawyer], that someone in the middle here--is this possible--hypothetical scenario--someone that knows Roger and knows these guys sets up a deal where he, this someone, gets money, tells him I got Roger, I will get it to Roger. They pay it as best they can and he says he will get it to Roger. Roger is innocent and they are kind of innocent. Clinton. Ding, ding, ding, ding, ding. Geragos. Which is exactly what I said. When you've got triple hearsay, and then you've got somebody saying I pointed to a mezzanine over there, start to think about what the quality of that accusation is.\601\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \601\ Id. However, the explanation offered by Roger Clinton to Larry King is not even remotely credible. While Clinton claimed that he never heard of CLM, he actually had a one-third ownership interest in the company, as well as other companies owned by Morton and Locke.\602\ Furthermore, bank records clearly establish that Clinton received a substantial portion of the funds that were bilked from Lincecum's mother and brother. Clinton received three checks from CLM totaling $25,500 and deposited them into his bank account.\603\ As discussed earlier, the source of these funds was the retirement savings of Guy and Alberta Lincecum.\604\ There are only two explanations offered for how Roger Clinton acquired a substantial share of the life savings from a federal prisoner's mother and brother: the one offered by the Lincecums and the one offered by Locke and Morton. Yet, Clinton denies both and offers no explanation of his own, denying on national television that he even received the money when it is well documented that he did. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \602\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). A document produced to the Committee by American Gypsum and Cement Products, one of Dickey Morton's companies, suggests that Roger Clinton was a ``member'' of that company as well. See Dickey Morton Document Production 000654 (Letter from Rod Osborne, American Gypsum Cement Products, to Robert Hutchison, Hutchison Consulting Company (Feb. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 88). \603\ First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 86). \604\ Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Dickey Morton and George Locke's Reactions to the Allegations Dickey Morton and George Locke have not provided the Committee with an extensive account of the Lincecum matter. Committee staff did conduct a telephone interview of George Locke shortly after the Committee began its investigation of the Lincecum allegations. However, shortly after that interview, George Locke and Dickey Morton hired a lawyer and decided not to cooperate with the Committee's investigation. Therefore, the Committee was unable to interview Morton at all, and it was unable to contact Locke after the initial interview. Rather than cooperate with the Committee, Morton and Locke invoked their Fifth Amendment rights against self- incrimination.\605\ However, Morton and Locke's attorney did provide the Committee with a proffer of what Morton and Locke would testify to if the Committee immunized them.\606\ Because the proffer was provided by the attorney and was not made under penalty of perjury, it is of limited value. However, between the Committee staff's interview of George Locke and the proffer from Locke and Morton, the Committee is able to understand Morton and Locke's response to the Lincecum allegations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \605\ In response to a document request from the Committee, Locke stated that he had no responsive records. Letter from George Locke, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 9, 2001) (within Appendix I). See also Letter from Marietta Alphin, Hampton, Larkowski & Benca, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 3, 2001) (within Appendix I). By contrast, Morton provided extensive corporate records in response to a subpoena. \606\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In short, Morton and Locke acknowledge that CLM received $200,000 from Lincecum and another $100,000 from Richard Cayce. However, they deny that the money had any connection to an effort to obtain a presidential pardon for Garland Lincecum.\607\ Rather, they claim that Cayce and Lincecum paid the $300,000 to CLM as ``appearance fees'' charged to them by Roger Clinton. Morton and Locke claim that Cayce and Lincecum paid this money to CLM because they wanted Clinton's support for the plan to sell tax-exempt bonds through Cayce's Legacy Foundation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \607\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Locke and Morton claim that Richard Cayce, who had a prior business relationship with Morton, approached Morton with ``an exotic plan'' to make money by selling tax-exempt bonds through a charitable organization, the Legacy Foundation.\608\ Locke said that Cayce wanted to use the Clinton name to sell these bonds and specifically wanted to use Morton's contacts with George Locke and Roger Clinton to see if President Clinton would support the charity.\609\ Morton told Cayce that he knew Locke and agreed to take the idea to Locke to see if Locke would ask Roger Clinton to present it to the President.\610\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \608\ Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). \609\ Id. \610\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Locke told Committee staff that people had often approached Roger Clinton asking him to talk to the President about a variety of issues and that Roger always helped them.\611\ However, Locke said that Roger was ``always left out in the cold'' afterwards.\612\ After a number of these unpleasant experiences, Roger Clinton decided that he would not assist anyone with their business unless he received an ``appearance fee'' paid up front.\613\ According to Locke, the fee guaranteed only a meeting with Roger Clinton to present a request and nothing more.\614\ Locke informed Committee staff that he and Dickey Morton used Roger Clinton's name in their business ventures, with Roger's permission, and that they paid Roger for the right to use his name.\615\ When asked how Roger Clinton's name was used, Locke stated that Morton used it ``when making contacts with buyers and sellers.'' \616\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \611\ Id. \612\ Id. \613\ Id. \614\ Id. \615\ Id. \616\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When Locke contacted Roger Clinton about Cayce and the Legacy Foundation, Roger agreed to meet with Cayce only if they paid him such an appearance fee.\617\ Morton then arranged the meeting with Cayce, sending the coded letter referring to the number of ``cookies'' required to meet with Roger Clinton.\618\ In his interview with Committee staff, Locke acknowledged meeting Cayce, Morton, and Roger Clinton in Dallas in August 1998.\619\ Locke claimed that, at this meeting, Cayce discussed two main topics: the plan to have Clinton endorse the Legacy Foundation and Cayce's desire to obtain a U.S. diplomatic passport.\620\ The proffer from Morton and Locke is similar to Locke's account in the interview but provides more detail. The proffer claims that Cayce met with Morton and Locke on August 12, 1998, and provided them with $30,000 in cash.\621\ Morton and Locke then met with Roger Clinton and divided the cash between them, with Roger receiving $18,000, Locke receiving $5,000, and Morton receiving $7,000.\622\ Also according to the proffer, on August 13, Cayce met with Clinton, Morton, and Locke, and Cayce discussed his desire to have Clinton's support for the Legacy Foundation. The proffer also states that Cayce asked about the possibility of obtaining a diplomatic passport through Roger Clinton. The proffer also claims that Cayce inquired whether Clinton could obtain pardons for two individuals, and while Morton and Locke do not recall whom Cayce mentioned, they are certain that it was not Lincecum.\623\ Locke and Morton maintain that the additional $70,000 wired to CLM by the MM Foundation on August 19 represented the completion of the $100,000 appearance fee charged to Cayce by Clinton, Locke, and Morton for the August 12 meeting. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \617\ Id. \618\ Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey Morton, to Richard Cayce (Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76). \619\ Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001) \620\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). \621\ Id. \622\ Id. \623\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Locke and Morton claim that in September and October 1998, they had two meetings with Cayce in Las Vegas regarding the Legacy Foundation.\624\ Roger Clinton came with Morton and Locke to each of these meetings, and accordingly, Cayce was charged $100,000 for each meeting.\625\ However, Cayce did not pay, and after the second meeting, Morton and Locke claim that they refused to provide Roger Clinton for any more meetings with Cayce until they had paid $200,000 for the previous two meetings.\626\ Morton and Locke claim that they then met with Cayce and Garland Lincecum. They claim that Lincecum provided them with a check for $600,000 and told them that the check would be good in two weeks.\627\ Cayce informed Morton and Locke that the additional $400,000 represented an ``investment'' in CLM.\628\ Morton and Locke claim that Cayce and Lincecum never made good on the $600,000 check.\629\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \624\ Id. \625\ Id. \626\ Id. \627\ Id. \628\ Id. \629\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In their proffer, Morton and Locke state that in November 1998, CLM received a check from Lincecum for $100,000.\630\ Then, in December, CLM received another check from Lincecum. With these two checks, Morton and Locke believed that Cayce and Lincecum had paid for the two meetings Cayce had with Roger Clinton in Las Vegas.\631\ Morton and Locke acknowledge that they divided this money with Roger Clinton, providing him with more than $25,000 of the $200,000 they received.\632\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \630\ Id. \631\ Id. \632\ In his interview, Locke claimed he received only ``a small portion'' of the payment, and claimed that he could not recall exactly how much. Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). When asked to estimate how much he received, Locke said it was approximately $20,000 to $25,000. Id. Locke also said he was surprised to learn that CLM had received $200,000 from any source for any reason, an assertion which contradicts the proffer provided by his lawyer. Id. In fact, Locke received $65,000 from CLM, or approximately three times the amount he admitted to Committee staff. First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 85). According to Locke, he thought the money had come from Richard Cayce, not from Garland Lincecum's brother and mother. Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). Locke told Committee staff that the purpose of the payments had nothing to do with any effort to obtain a pardon. Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With two exceptions, Morton and Locke deny that they ever discussed pardons with Richard Cayce, Garland Lincecum, or Guy Lincecum. The first time they did discuss pardons was at the first meeting between Cayce, Morton, Locke, and Clinton when Cayce asked whether they could help him obtain pardons for two friends.\633\ Clinton, Morton, and Locke claim that they did nothing to assist Cayce.\634\ Morton and Locke also admit to having discussed pardons on one other occasion.\635\ Morton and Locke acknowledge that they met with Guy Lincecum and Jim McCaskill in March 2000 at a McDonald's restaurant in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, to discuss their business dealings.\636\ While Lincecum and McCaskill claim that they had a detailed discussion about Garland Lincecum's efforts to buy a pardon through Clinton, Locke, and Morton, Locke and Morton tell a different story. They claim that Guy Lincecum informed them, for the first time, that Garland Lincecum hoped to obtain a pardon.\637\ Locke offered his advice: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \633\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). \634\ Id. \635\ Id. \636\ Id. \637\ Id. First you must hire an attorney. That attorney must make application with the Department of Justice for a pardon. Then it would be up to the president as to whether a pardon would be given. Lincecum asked if the president normally gives pardons. Locke informed Lincecum that usually at the end of his term most presidents' [sic] give pardons.\638\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \638\ Id. However, Locke and Morton deny that Guy Lincecum ever asked for Roger Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon.\639\ After this discussion, Morton and Locke say that they had no further communications with Guy Lincecum regarding the pardon.\640\ Other than these two brief discussions, Morton and Locke deny any communications with Garland Lincecum, Guy Lincecum, or Richard Cayce regarding presidential pardons. Obviously, there is a significant conflict between the Lincecums' account and that of Morton, Locke, and--to the extent he has offered an account--Roger Clinton. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \639\ Id. \640\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Analysis The Committee is faced with two starkly different accounts of the Lincecum matter. However, there are certain facts that are beyond dispute. First, Richard Cayce provided Morton, Locke, and Clinton with $30,000 or $35,000 in cash. Second, Cayce wired $70,000 to CLM. Third, Garland Lincecum provided CLM with $200,000. Fourth, the $300,000 in funds provided to CLM were divided between Clinton, Locke, and Morton, with Clinton receiving $25,500 in checks and as much as $18,000 in cash, Locke receiving $65,000 in checks and $5,000 in cash, and Morton receiving $67,000 in checks and $7,000 in cash. Dickey Morton apparently used the remaining funds, approximately $112,500, to pursue other business interests. It is also clear that no work was ever undertaken on the Lincecum pardon. Neither the White House nor the Justice Department ever received a pardon petition for Lincecum or ever considered Lincecum for a pardon in any way. Moreover, there is no evidence that Morton and Locke even hired a Washington law firm to prepare a pardon petition for Lincecum. There are also a number of key facts in dispute, centering on the purpose of the funds paid to CLM, with the Lincecums claiming that the money was paid to secure a pardon for Garland Lincecum, and Morton and Locke claiming that the money was paid for ``appearance fees'' to meet with Roger Clinton. There is no single piece of evidence that proves the Lincecums' account is true. However, collectively, the preponderance of the evidence supports the Lincecums' account. In contrast, little evidence supports the denials offered by George Locke and Dickey Morton, and some evidence contradicts their claims. The following is a summary of the evidence that supports the Lincecums' account. <bullet> GFirst, there are a number of witnesses who support the Lincecums' account. Garland and Guy Lincecum both gave clear and detailed accounts of their conversations. In addition, Alberta Lincecum, Jim McCaskill, and R.V. Wilson all claim that they observed or participated in discussions with Morton and Locke regarding the Lincecums' efforts to purchase a presidential pardon. <bullet> GSecond, the denial offered by Locke and Morton is not convincing. Morton and Locke maintain that Garland Lincecum had his mother and brother raid their savings so that he could pay Roger Clinton $200,000 in ``appearance fees'' for meetings regarding the Legacy Foundation. Given the fact that the Lincecums appear to live under relatively modest circumstances, it is difficult to believe that they would give $200,000 of their money to pay for these meetings. Rather, the Lincecums have offered the only convincing explanation that has been offered about why they would surrender their life savings--because they were attempting to obtain a pardon for Garland. <bullet> GThird, Garland Lincecum, Guy Lincecum, Alberta Lincecum, and every witness who supported their account cooperated with the Committee. On the other hand, Locke, Morton, and Roger Clinton all refused to cooperate with the Committee. The Lincecums, R.V. Wilson, Jim McClain, and Jim McCaskill were all willing to step forward and say what they knew, facing the potential of prosecution if they were lying. Therefore, their story has much more credibility than any accounts offered by attorneys for Clinton, Locke, or Morton, who have either taken the Fifth or made it clear that they would take the Fifth. <bullet> GFourth, the documentary evidence tends to support the Lincecum account. For example, on August 7, 1998, Dickey Morton sent Richard Cayce a letter demanding payment of $100,000 in relation to a ``political meeting''--not a business meeting.\641\ While this document does not explicitly refer to a pardon, the phrase ``political meeting'' applies more accurately to an illicit pardon-for-cash discussion than to a legitimate business proposition. Another document that supports Lincecum's account is an October 1999 letter to Dickey Morton discussing a potential oil deal between Morton and some of Lincecum's associates. In the letter, Lincecum, writing from prison, states, ``I am sure that within 60 days of my release there will be four parties prepared to proceed on a similar item for themselves.'' \642\ It is not clear whether the ``item'' referred to by Lincecum is a pardon, but it is clear that he anticipated a prompt release when he wrote the letter. Given that Garland had served only six of the 87 months required by his sentence when he wrote the letter, it appears to be contemporaneous corroboration of Garland's claim that he expected to receive a pardon after paying CLM. The letter supports Lincecum's claims because it establishes that his expectation significantly predates his public allegations about the payment-for-pardon scheme. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \641\ Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey Morton, to Richard Cayce (Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76). \642\ Dickey Morton Document Production 000323 (Letter from Guy Lincecum, to Dickey Morton (Oct. 26, 1999)) (Exhibit 87). While there is a preponderance of evidence showing that Garland Lincecum attempted to purchase a presidential pardon through Dickey Morton and George Locke, there is less evidence that shows Roger Clinton was an active participant in the scheme. However, the evidence against Roger Clinton is still substantial. There are three main pieces of evidence that suggest Roger Clinton participated in the scheme to defraud the --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lincecum family. <bullet> GFirst, Roger Clinton received at least $25,500 (or more likely $43,500, including the cash payment admitted by Locke and Morton) from CLM.\643\ Yet, Roger Clinton claimed that he ``never heard of CLM'' and never authorized Morton or Locke to use his name in any way. Clinton's denials do not square with the indisputable fact that he received two checks from CLM totaling $25,500. Considering Roger Clinton's sporadic employment in this time frame, this was not an insignificant amount of money likely to be forgotten. The only two explanations that have been offered for these payments are that: (1) Roger Clinton was selling pardons or (2) Roger Clinton was selling his name. Clinton denied both but has offered no alternative. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \643\ While Roger Clinton's receipt of a portion of the cash delivered by Richard Cayce is not established with absolute certainty, two factors strongly support it. First, in their proffer, Locke and Morton state that they gave Clinton $18,000 of the $30,000. Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). Second, Roger Clinton's bank records indicate that he deposited $12,500 in late August 1998, after the meeting in Dallas. Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 77). <bullet> GSecond, in his proffer, Richard Cayce has claimed that he discussed the Lincecum pardon with Clinton, Locke, and Morton. Cayce maintains that Clinton, Locke, and Morton all told him that they could arrange the pardon for Lincecum, provided that he paid $200,000 to them. While Cayce offers a clear and damning statement against Clinton, it cannot be given significant weight for the same reason that the proffer of Morton and Locke cannot be given significant weight. Richard Cayce has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, and has made his statements through his lawyer. On the other hand, Cayce told Lincecum in August 1998, shortly after the meeting with Clinton, Locke, and Morton, that he had discussed the purchase of a pardon with them and that they had agreed to do it. Therefore, there is some contemporaneous corroboration of Cayce's proffer. Moreover, unlike Locke and Morton, Cayce does not appear to have profited at the expense of the Lincecum family. His organization, the M.M. Foundation, actually lost $70,000 to CLM. Hence, it is difficult to imagine a motive for Cayce to lie to Lincecum in 1998 about whether he had discussed a pardon with Clinton, Locke, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- and Morton. <bullet> GThird, Garland Lincecum has stated that he saw Roger Clinton at the meeting in Dallas where he first arranged the purchase of the pardon. Lincecum did not participate in the meeting where the purchase of the pardon was discussed with Roger Clinton, but he did see Roger Clinton watching his meeting with Cayce, Locke, and Morton from a mezzanine in the hotel. Obviously, the mere fact that Lincecum saw Roger Clinton at a hotel in Dallas while he met with Cayce, Morton, and Locke regarding his pardon does not prove that Clinton was involved. However, that fact becomes significant when combined with the allegation that Cayce met with Roger Clinton earlier that day and discussed the purchase of a pardon with Clinton. Therefore, there is substantial evidence that Dickey Morton and George Locke participated in a scheme to defraud Garland Lincecum and his family of a significant sum of money by promising them that they could obtain a pardon in exchange for $300,000. There is also evidence that Roger Clinton participated in this scheme. Bank records establish conclusively that Clinton received, at a minimum, $25,500 from Morton and Locke that they had obtained directly from the Lincecums, yet Clinton has offered no satisfactory explanation as to why he received this money. However, the evidence against Roger Clinton in the Lincecum matter is somewhat equivocal. A full understanding of his role in the Lincecum matter could not be obtained without full and honest cooperation from Dickey Morton, George Locke, and most importantly, Roger Clinton. All three refused to provide the requisite level of cooperation. IV. OTHER PARDON CANDIDATES In addition to Gambino and Lincecum, the Committee obtained evidence connecting Roger Clinton to many other pardon seekers--many more than the six, unnamed ``close friends'' for whom Clinton has publicly admitted lobbying. While Clinton was unsuccessful in actually obtaining a pardon for anyone but himself, he nonetheless attempted to misuse his position and access to the President for personal gain. It appears that President Clinton may have categorically decided to deny clemency petitions advocated by his brother. Roger Clinton told the media that his brother's rejection of his appeals caused ``a serious rift'' between him and his brother: Saying he told his brother he would forgo a pardon for himself if the president would grant clemency to his friends, Roger Clinton added: ``I cried about a couple of days; I was in an emotional funk. I didn't know how to feel. It was so important to me that these people on the list, that they get it and not me. I guess he didn't think so[.]'' \644\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \644\ Susan Schmidt, Clinton's Brother Promised Pardons, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 2001. Regardless of whether President Clinton's clemency decisions involving his brother were categorical or based on the merits of each individual case, the unusually large number of cases associated with Roger Clinton merit further inquiry and explanation. Some of the clemency-seekers discussed below were likely in the category of ``close friends.'' Others, however, had only met Roger Clinton, if at all, after he began lobbying on their behalf. More importantly, several of the cases involve solicitations or promises of some form of payment, such as cash or lucrative business interests, in exchange for Clinton's assistance. A. Dan Lasater and George Locke In the early 1980s, Dan Lasater was a Little Rock, Arkansas, bond broker and partner in the firm Collins, Locke, and Lasater. Lasater was a close associate of the Clintons, raising money for Bill Clinton's political campaigns and loaning money to pay Roger Clinton's drug debts. George Locke was an Arkansas state senator and business associate of Lasater's. In December 1986, Dan Lasater pled guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and was sentenced to 30 months in prison.\645\ Roger Clinton and George Locke were also convicted for their involvement in the Lasater cocaine distribution conspiracy.\646\ Clinton was sentenced to 24 months in prison and Locke was sentenced to 15 months.\647\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \645\ Dan Lasater Document Production (Petition for Pardon, May 4, 2000) (Exhibit 89). \646\ Id. \647\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Clintons have a long association with Lasater and Locke, dating back years before the cocaine convictions. Bill Clinton met with Dan Lasater, David Collins, and George Locke the day after losing his re-election bid for Governor to Frank White in 1980.\648\ The purpose of the meeting was to secure Lasater's support for his bid to regain the governorship in 1982.\649\ Lasater subsequently became a major donor and fundraiser for Clinton's political campaigns. At the request of then-Governor Bill Clinton, Lasater gave Roger Clinton a job in 1983 on his horse farm in Ocala, Florida.\650\ When Roger Clinton could not pay debts to his drug dealer, Lasater loaned him $8,000.\651\ In its final report, the Senate's Special Committee on Whitewater detailed the troubling evidence that Governor Clinton's office steered state bond business from the Arkansas Housing Development Agency and the Arkansas State Police Commission to Lasater's firm, providing it an unfair advantage over other firms competing for the underwriting business.\652\ In 1990, Governor Clinton issued a conditional state pardon proclamation restoring all of Lasater's rights, privileges, and immunities under state law before his cocaine conviction, ``including the right to own and possess firearms provided, however, no such restoration is effective until a federal removal of disabilities has been granted.'' \653\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \648\ Investigation of Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters, S. Rep. No. 104-280, at 361. \649\ Id. \650\ Id. at 361-62. \651\ Id. at 362. \652\ Id. at 363-71. \653\ Dan Lasater Document Production (State of Arkansas Proclamation, Nov. 13, 1990) (Exhibit 90). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lasater filed a federal pardon application to the Justice Department on May 4, 2000.\654\ In the petition for clemency, Lasater maintains, ``I never sold cocaine, ever.'' \655\ Rather, Lasater says he merely ``shared my financial success'' with friends by paying for their dinners and drinks and drugs: ``If we were in a social setting and cocaine was available, anyone who wanted to could participate. No one forced it on anyone.'' \656\ However, this account from the clemency petition appears to have been somewhat sanitized. According to news reports, affidavits gathered by Julius ``Doc'' Delaughter, the State Police Investigator who conducted the Lasater investigation, tell a more damning story: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \654\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \655\ Dan Lasater Document Production (Petition for Pardon, May 4, 2000) (Exhibit 89). \656\ Id. The extent of Lasater's alleged partying and coke distribution, and of his preying on teenage girls and young women, is outlined in dozens of affidavits taken by Delaughter. In one affidavit, Patricia Anne Smith alleges: ``I was introduced to cocaine by Dan Lasater when I was 16 or 17 years old and a student at North Little Rock Old Main High School. . . . I was a virgin until two months after I met Dan Lasater. Lasater plied me with cocaine and gifts for sexual favors.'' She claimed he also arranged for her to see a doctor and be --------------------------------------------------------------------------- put on birth-control pills. Other young girls related similar stories. Lisa Ann Scott, who was 19 when she first encountered Lasater and one of his broker partners, George Locke, alleged she received cocaine from both men from the middle of 1984 to the beginning of 1985: ``The first time I met Dan Lasater and George Locke was at George Locke's apartment. On this particular evening George Locke gave me approximately ten snorts of cocaine. I received approximately eight to ten snorts from Dan Lasater.'' Scott also detailed a trip to Las Vegas that she took with other girls on Lasater's jet where cocaine was made available.\657\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \657\ Jamie Dettmer, Dan Lasater: A Friend of Bill's, Insight, Nov. 6, 1995. Lasater told Committee staff that he discussed his pardon petition with Roger Clinton on several occasions.\658\ He also forwarded a copy of his petition to Roger Clinton on May 8, 2000, four days after filing it with the Justice Department.\659\ Lasater understood that Roger would bring his petition to the President's attention but did not recall Roger saying anything about contacts with other White House staff regarding the petition.\660\ He recalled Roger talking about his plan to give the President a list of people that Roger wanted to receive pardons but did not know whether that actually happened.\661\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \658\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \659\ Dan Lasater Document Production (Letter from Dan Lasater, to Roger Clinton (May, 8, 2000)) (Exhibit 91). \660\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \661\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- George Locke also sought a pardon through Roger Clinton. Discussions about a pardon between Clinton and Locke began after Bill Clinton's reelection in 1996.\662\ Roger informed Locke that ``when the time was right that he would ask `big brother' if he would consider giving Roger, Dan Lassiter [sic] and George Locke a pardon[.]'' \663\ In December 2000, Locke prepared a pardon petition and sent it to Roger Clinton at the White House.\664\ Shortly thereafter, Roger informed Locke that he was going to discuss the pardon with the President.\665\ Both Locke and Lasater deny that they paid any money to Roger Clinton to obtain his help lobbying for the pardons. Rather, Locke believes that ``Roger still felt responsible for the investigation and conviction of George Locke and Dan Lassiter [sic] and was, in essence, attempting to set the record straight between Locke, Lassiter [sic] and Clinton.'' \666\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \662\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 9 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). \663\ Id. \664\ Id. \665\ Id. \666\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee has been unable to obtain detailed information about the President's reasons for denying the Locke and Lasater pardons. The only information obtained by the Committee comes from Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel, who stated that President Clinton, Bruce Lindsey, and Beth Nolan discussed the Lasater and Locke pardons.\667\ Angel stated that President Clinton believed that Lasater and Locke deserved pardons on the merits of their cases.\668\ However, according to Angel, the White House staff opposed the Lasater and Locke pardons because they believed they would be too controversial.\669\ Angel himself expressed concern to the President that conservative publications had written about Lasater and Locke and that they were the subject of ``conspiracy theories'' and the ``conservative conspiracy theorists'' would ``go nuts'' if the pardons were granted.\670\ Whether the President rejected the Lasater and Locke pardons for these reasons or others is unknown. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \667\ Interview with Eric Angel, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). \668\ Id. \669\ Id. \670\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It appears that Roger Clinton called Dan Lasater and George Locke on January 20, 2001, immediately after President Clinton left office. Roger Clinton told Lasater and Locke in these calls that he had failed to obtain their pardons. According to Lasater, Roger Clinton said he was embarrassed that his brother would not do that favor for him.\671\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \671\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. J.T. Lundy In 1982, J.T. Lundy became President of Calumet Farms, the legendary horse-breeding farm that had dominated U.S. horseracing for decades.\672\ Lundy gained control of the farm through his marriage to Calumet heiress Cindy Wright.\673\ Despite continued success at the track, by 1991, Calumet was bankrupt.\674\ Lundy was convicted in February 2000 on charges of bank fraud and bribery; he was sentenced in October 2000 to four and a half years in prison and $20 million in restitution to the FDIC.\675\ The jury found that Lundy paid a $1.1 million bribe to a Houston bank in exchange for $65 million in unsecured loans.\676\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \672\ Jacalyn Carfagno, Fabled Silks, Faded Glory; The Rise and Fall of the Legendary Calumet Farm, Houston Chronicle, Mar. 29, 1992. \673\ Id. \674\ Id. (``Calumet's board learned that the farm had $400 in the bank and $40 million in debt currently due. It was a steep plunge for a farm that had been transferred, debt-free, to a new generation of owners less than a decade before''). \675\ Calumet Farm Executives Sent to Prison for Bribery, Fraud, Associated Press, Oct. 20, 2000. \676\ Id. During the financial downfall of Calumet Farms, its largest asset and most famous stallion, Alydar, died under suspicious circumstances. Prosecutors in Houston argued unsuccessfully that Lundy was complicit in the death of Alydar, who was insured for $35 million. Janet Patton, Closing the Book on Calumet Story: Farm's Friends Hope Sentencing Spells the End, Lexington Herald Leader, Oct. 21, 2000. A U.S District Judge found, ``There is some physical evidence, and circumstances surrounding the event that are suspicious, but I cannot conclude he is responsible.'' Id. However, Alydar's groom, on duty when he was injured, was convicted of perjury before a Houston grand jury investigating the incident. Calumet Farm Executives Sent to Prison for Bribery, Fraud, Associated Press, Oct. 20, 2000. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dan Lasater knew J.T. Lundy through their mutual involvement in the horseracing business.\677\ Following his release from prison, Lundy had employed Roger Clinton at Calumet farms.\678\ Lasater indicated that he had discussed with Roger Clinton the possibility of obtaining a pardon for Lundy and that he believed Lundy and Clinton may have met to discuss a pardon as well.\679\ Documents indicate that, in late 1999, J.T. Lundy and his son Robert had extensive contacts and discussions with Lasater and Clinton regarding several business deals.\680\ It appears that Lundy was offering these business opportunities to Lasater and Clinton in return for Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon for Lundy before his case went to trial. On September 14, 1999, J.T. Lundy wrote to Dan Lasater: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \677\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001), \678\ Josh Tyrangiel, Viveca Novak, and Michael Weisskopf, Brother, Where Art Thy Standards? Time, July 9, 2001. \679\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \680\ Id. I absolutely give you my word that all things we have given to you and everything we have told you is 100% true and proven. You can use what has been told to you without any worries or any concerns. I have been working on these projects for several years and have put together the whole structure. This is not hear say --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [sic] I am telling you. * * * We have every document, map, studies, mining plans and everything to provide for you. * * * Once again I want to thank you for helping to save me.\681\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \681\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0006 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Dan Lasater (Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 92). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On the same day, Robert Lundy wrote to Lasater: My Venezuelan partners Aura Diaz and Robert Korsakas are scheduled to meet with British Petroleum on Sept. 20. BP is being represented by an agent from Spain, BP has a [sic] tentatively offered .38 cents USD a metric ton. There are an [sic] estimated reserves of 107,000,000+. (.38 X 107 million metric tons = $40,660,000) We have not accepted this offer, we [sic] feel the concessions are worth .30 to .55 cents per metric ton. All of our information is from the Venezuelan Government's geological reports of the coal in the Franja Nor Oriental coal region of Tachira State. Our concessions are located in this region. The concessions we have offered to BP are Concession Las Mesas Escalante, #16, #17 and #18.\682\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \682\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0007 (Letter from Robert Lundy, to Dan Lasater (Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 93). On October 11, 1999, Robert Lundy wrote to Roger Clinton (and --------------------------------------------------------------------------- provided a copy to Dan Lasater) the following letter: I wish to find out when you and Dan [Lasater] will be able to schedule a meeting in Florida. Dan said, he will work with your schedule and will be available at your convenience. * * * I want to point out a couple of things to you. As you know, Dan and J.T. have been doing deals together for more than 25 years. I am sure that Dan will tell you that J.T. has never told him anything that is not 100% right. Dan has told J.T., He [sic] agreed to put the stock in his name for the group's interest. This way there will be no hassles or worries. * * * If you recall when we met at the Dallas Airport, we talked about racehorses. . . . J.T. really wants to get back into it full time. . . . With the impute [sic] and directions from everyone, we can all have a lot of fun and make money. * * * I know you understand the anxiety that J.T. is going through. Please try to set up a meeting date as soon as your schedule permits.\683\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \683\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0010 (Letter from Robert Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Oct. 11, 1999)) (Exhibit 94). Approximately one month later, on November 10, 1999, J.T. Lundy wrote to Roger Clinton, indicating his growing concern as his --------------------------------------------------------------------------- trial date grew nearer: I am sorry to worry you and Dan continually, but I am sure both of you know why I am so anxious, with the trial date set for January 16, 2000. Dan and I talk nearly everyday. . . . I wrote Dan a Fedex letter, last Saturday, to explain my ideas of how we can handle everything. You and Dan can make final plans. We will go on and transfer the stock share over to Dan now. This will allow you and your group some time to see if anyone owes you a favor that needs to be repaid. If you find that something good develops, we will work and get the rest of the stock for you at a reasonable price. I have suggested a way that Dan can own your stock, and there is no way any outsider can every [sic] know the true owners. Also, no one can ever get their hands on any of your money. And it is TAX FREE! * * * Robert will need your proxy so he will still have the 51% majority vote, as he does now. With your help, we can work out a way to postpone everything until between November 8, 2000; and January 19, 2001.\684\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \684\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0011 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Nov. 10, 1999)) (Exhibit 95). On November 30, 1999, J.T. Lundy sent another letter to Roger Clinton with almost the exact same wording but with a more --------------------------------------------------------------------------- frantic tone: You will make a great deal of money. Dan can give you an idea of the amounts you will get. With you and Dan's help, a way can be worked out to postpone everything until after the November 8 election, and before the date you all leave office in 2001. PLEASE get in touch with Dan soon. He has all the details of what you will received and he is willing to take care of everything for you all. Time is getting short! PLEASE HELP ME NOW! \685\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \685\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0012 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Nov. 30, 1999)) (Exhibit 96) These documents demonstrate that, as Lundy's trial date neared, he was more and more urgently seeking Lasater's and Clinton's participation in the Venezuelan coal deal. They also demonstrate that Lasater was intimately involved in the deal and that Lundy clearly expected the deal to have some impact on his legal troubles. Together with Lasater's admission to Committee staff that he and Lundy discussed obtaining a pardon for Lundy through Roger Clinton, the documents strongly suggest that Lundy was providing Roger Clinton a sweetheart business deal in exchange for his help in trying to obtain a pardon. First, the repeated reference to timing ``everything'' so as to occur after the presidential election but before the end of the Clinton Administration suggests that whatever Roger's part in the deal involved, it would be politically damaging if discovered just before the election. It also suggests Roger's part in the deal would require some official, presidential act, which could not occur after President Clinton left office. Second, the repeated references to Lundy's rapidly approaching trial date suggest that Roger's part in the deal would have some impact on Lundy's legal jeopardy. The most likely explanation is that Lundy was seeking some form of executive clemency through Roger Clinton. When questioned about these matters, Dan Lasater was less than forthcoming.\686\ Lasater at first claimed that other than some matters related to horseracing, he and Lundy did not have any business dealings together.\687\ His denial directly contradicted the extensive documentary evidence discussed above; Lasater was presumably unaware the Committee possessed those documents. Regarding pardon discussions, Lasater said he had asked Roger Clinton about a pardon for Lundy on one occasion but that Roger had said he thought a pardon was not appropriate before someone had gone to prison.\688\ Lasater did not recall any discussions of a commutation for Lundy and did not know when the meeting between Lundy and Clinton occurred.\689\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \686\ Lasater has also lied to federal authorities in the past. In 1986, a federal judge found that he lied under oath in the course of the bankruptcy trial of his partner George Locke. Investigation of Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters, S. Rep. No. 104-280, at 362. Moreover, the Senate Special Committee on Whitewater noted in its final report that Lasater did not disclose the judge's finding to the Committee. Instead Lasater falsely claimed, ``it has never been alleged that I committed any fraudulent act or lied in the course of any investigation.'' Id. \687\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \688\ Id. This remark is similar to what Dickey Morton told Garland Lincecum. See Section III.A.6., ``Lincecum's Attempts to Receive the Pardon.'' \689\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When asked if Clinton was doing any business with Lundy, Lasater said not to his knowledge, and ``I don't know how they could have.'' \690\ When asked whether he had ever discussed holding Clinton's interest in an investment, Lasater said he had not.\691\ Lasater's denial directly contradicted the statement in Robert Lundy's letter to Roger: ``Dan has told J.T., He [sic] agreed to put the stock in his name for the group's interest. This way there will be no hassles or worries.'' \692\ After denying he had agreed to hold stock for Clinton, Lasater said that Lundy was ``really at his wits end the nearer he got to actually going into prison.'' \693\ Lasater said Lundy mentioned ``some things'' to him but that he did not pass them on to Roger. Lasater said Lundy was ``asking a question out of desperation'' and mentioned helping Roger with proceeds of a coal deal in Venezuela.\694\ Lasater said Lundy did not mention a number or an estimate of how much Roger could make and that he just ``blew it off.'' \695\ However, Lasater had in fact received a letter from Robert Lundy estimating the deal's total worth at nearly $41 million, and J.T. Lundy had written to Roger (and sent a copy to Lasater), saying: ``You will make a great deal of money. Dan can give you an idea of the amounts you will get.'' \696\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \690\ Id. \691\ Id. \692\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0010 (Letter from Robert Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Oct. 11, 1999)) (Exhibit 94). \693\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \694\ Id. \695\ Id. \696\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0007 (Letter from Robert Lundy, to Dan Lasater (Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 93); Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0011 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Nov. 10, 1999)) (Exhibit 95). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When confronted with questions about specific documents, Lasater's answers became less responsive and more vague. Committee staff asked about the letters to Roger Clinton from J.T. Lundy and copied to Lasater stating, ``With you and Dan's help, a way can be worked out to postpone everything until after the November 8 election, and before the date you all leave office in 2001.'' \697\ In response, Lasater claimed that he had merely invested money and lost it. He stated that the ``only thing'' he did ``on the Venezuela coal deal'' was to put in money.\698\ Lasater said that Lundy thought the whole deal would make $10 million of which Lasater owned 20 percent, but Lasater said he had made no money.\699\ Lasater's admission to owning 20 percent of the coal deal contradicted his earlier claim to have no non-horse-related business dealings with Lundy. Moreover, his admission came only after he learned that Committee staff had reviewed documents related to the deal. Lasater went on to deny that he ever discussed the coal deal with Roger Clinton, repeating that he merely ``blew it off.'' \700\ Given that Lasater invested his own money and owned 20 percent of the venture, this statement presumably refers to the idea of involving Roger Clinton in the deal. Apparently still referring to Clinton's involvement, Lasater went on to say that ``it was too far out'' and ``you just don't do those things.'' \701\ Then, Lasater declared: ``there is nothing in the coal deal. I guarantee it.'' \702\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \697\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0012 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Nov. 30, 1999)) (Exhibit 96) \698\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \699\ Id. \700\ Id. \701\ Id. \702\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is unclear whether Roger Clinton asked President Clinton to grant executive clemency to J.T. Lundy. Regardless, Lundy did not receive clemency. It is also uncertain whether Roger Clinton received any financial benefits from Lundy. Clinton did receive tens of thousands of dollars in travelers checks purchased in Venezuela in 1999 and 2000, but it is not clear if any of those checks have a connection to the Lundy matter. C. Blume Loe On August 10, 1999, Blume Loe was convicted on charges of tax fraud.\703\ Loe was the manager of High Port Marina, a complex of boat slips, restaurants, and other businesses on Lake Texoma at the Texas-Oklahoma border.\704\ The lake is owned by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and was leased by Loe's family.\705\ At the time of his conviction, Loe's parents were already serving time in prison on charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and defrauding the Corps of Engineers, which was entitled to a portion of gross sales under the terms of the lease.\706\ Blume Loe failed to report $450,000 of income on his tax returns and claimed that the money was a series of loans from his mother.\707\ However, Loe was found to have been a knowing participant in a scheme to hide the money from the Corps of Engineers and the IRS.\708\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \703\ Bill Lodge, Manager of Lake Texoma Marina Convicted of Fraud, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 11, 1999. \704\ Id. \705\ Id. \706\ Id. \707\ Id. \708\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Blume Loe had worked for Dan Lasater in the 1980s as a salesman at his bond firm and presumably knew Roger Clinton through their mutual association with Lasater.\709\ On May 30, 2000, Loe wrote to Roger Clinton seeking his assistance in obtaining a pardon: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \709\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). When Loe's wife spoke to the media, she indicated that Loe had met Roger Clinton ``in the late 1970's when they were students at University of Arkansas.'' Alison Leigh Cowan, House Committee Asks Roger Clinton to Explain Some Ties to Pardon Requests, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2001. I thought I would be direct. Yes, this is me, and yes, this is Blume Loe asking you to get with brother Bill, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- and get me PARDONED. As you know I was convicted on some tax charges. I never believed your brother's Government would get a conviction, but they did. I was sentenced to prison, and I know you know what that means. Seems now I am going through all those things that I never believed I would have to do to get this thing taken care of. For one, I am sitting in this goddamn law library typing a letter like a prison writ-writer. If these guys around me knew what I was writing, or who I was writing to, [G]od knows what would happen. So anyway, it's me, and I need your help.\710\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \710\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002 (Letter from Blume Loe, to Roger Clinton (May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97). Loe had attempted to contact Clinton through some mutual friends, David Burnett and David Crews. According to Dan Lasater, David Crews' sister, Lana Crews, had once been Roger Clinton's girlfriend.\711\ Loe's letter describes his previous attempts to contact Clinton: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \711\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). I talked to Dave [Burnett], and we discussed how this could get this done. Dave talked to David Cruse, [sic] and David Cruse [sic] says he talked to you about this deal. I hope all this happened like I was told, but if it did not I would not be surprised. I learned in here that things are not always like they have been told. However, whether you have talked to anyone about me, to date, or not, I am now reaching out to you personally.\712\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \712\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002 (Letter from Blume Loe, to Roger Clinton (May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97). David Crews confirmed that David Burnett contacted him about helping to secure Roger Clinton's help in obtaining a pardon for Blume Loe.\713\ Crews knew Roger Clinton and estimated that he probably saw him once a year.\714\ However, Crews said he did not want to approach Roger with ``something like this.'' \715\ Crews denied that he did anything to assist Loe in his effort to obtain a pardon.\716\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \713\ Telephone Interview with David Crews (May 29, 2001). \714\ Id. \715\ Id. \716\ Id. Loe's letter also refers to contacts between his lawyer --------------------------------------------------------------------------- and Roger Clinton: You will be receiving a package from my attorney on appeal about the pardon issue. Her name is Cindy Goosen, and all the paperwork on my side should be in that package. She's a good lawyer, and you can talk to her. She knows what time it is. She ain't no idiot, like my trial lawyer was. Talking to her is talking to me. * * * I also know that what I am requesting is extraordinary. While I know that you are trying to get one, I hope yours comes, if at all, at about the same time mine comes . . . if you know what I mean. I would not be approaching you with this if I was not desperate with no where else to turn. I need your help on this.\717\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \717\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002-3 (Letter from Blume Loe, to Roger Clinton (May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97). When Committee staff contacted Loe's lawyer, Cynthia Goosen, and attempted to arrange an interview, she first responded by claiming that she could not discuss any matters related to Loe because of the attorney-client privilege.\718\ After being informed that any contacts with Roger Clinton, whom she did not represent, would not fall within the attorney- client privilege, Goosen then claimed that ``any work done pursuant to any attempt to obtain clemency would have been protected by the attorney work product privilege'' and that ``as to any related matters which may not fall strictly within the privilege, it is my policy as an attorney to treat same as confidential and not to disclose same unless compelled to do so by judicial process.'' \719\ The refusal of Blume Loe and his lawyer to cooperate with the Committee's investigation limits what can be known about Loe's efforts to obtain a pardon.\720\ Likewise, because of Roger Clinton's refusal to cooperate, it is unclear whether Loe was one of the names Clinton submitted to his brother for consideration. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \718\ Letter from David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 14, 2001) (within Appendix I). \719\ Letter from Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 22, 2001) (within Appendix I). \720\ Despite Loe's refusal to speak to Committee staff, his wife's comments on the matter were reported in the press: ``She said she and her husband may have discussed going to Roger Clinton for help, `but we didn't know how to contact him,' said Ms. Loe. `I wouldn't call us a dear friend,' she said. `We haven't talked to him in over 20 years.' '' Alison Leigh Cowan, House Committee Asks Roger Clinton to Explain Some Ties to Pardon Requests, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Rita Lavelle Roger Clinton did not limit his pardon lobbying to personal friends. He also agreed to assist Rita Lavelle, an Environmental Protection Agency Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response in the Reagan Administration. In 1983, Lavelle was convicted of making false statements, obstructing a Congressional Committee, perjury before a Senate Committee and perjury before a House Committee.\721\ She was sentenced to six months in prison, five years of probation, and a $10,000 fine.\722\ The charges against Lavelle stemmed from an investigation of allegations that she had continued to work on matters relating to a Superfund clean-up site despite formerly being employed by one of the alleged polluters of the site. Lavelle was convicted of lying about precisely when Justice Department and EPA lawyers had advised her to recuse herself. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \721\ Rita Lavelle Document Production 005 (Petition for Pardon, Jan. 7, 2001) (Exhibit 98). \722\ Id. at 005. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lavelle has maintained her innocence, appealing her conviction and attempting since the Reagan Administration to obtain executive clemency.\723\ She argues first that her former employer, Aerojet, was not charged with dumping at the Superfund site in question, Stringfellow, because ``they never did.'' \724\ Secondly, she contends that she was under no obligation to recuse herself but that she had merely made ``a personal promise'' to the Senate Confirmation and Oversight Committee not to work on matters ``directly involving'' her former employer.\725\ And thirdly, she alleges that her accusers had received campaign contributions or had other connections with named Stringfellow dumpers who ``would economically benefit by stalling and de-railing EPA's cleanup orders[.]'' \726\ She has also implied that political corruption tainted the appellate review of her conviction: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \723\ Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001). \724\ Rita Lavelle Document Production 013 (Petition for Pardon, Jan. 7, 2001) (Exhibit 98). \725\ Id. at 014. \726\ Id. Approximately three weeks after the Appellate Court Hearing, Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy asked me to come to Kennedy's Office. They were on the Judiciary Committee and they wished me to testify against Ed Meese who was nominated for the new Attorney General. Having worked for Mr. Meese and President Reagan since the early days in California when Reagan was Governor, it was obvious to them I could evoke some ``tantalizing'' memories. At first they were charming then they got down to threats if I didn't co-operate. Finally Kennedy told me either I appear before his committee and testify against Meese or I would lose the Appeal and go to Jail. My Irish Pride and Catholic Optimism took over and after informing them there was only one innocent person in the room and she was leaving, Kennedy screamed the prophetic ``and she is --------------------------------------------------------------------------- going to jail.'' Several months later (to be specific the Friday before the Inauguration of Reagan for his second term) the Court made a ``small'' announcement that they were denying the Appeal with NO Comment. The three member Appellate Court Hearing was now reduced to two Democrats who had ``No Comment.'' The one Republican Member had accepted a Sabbatical to England and had not provided comment prior to leaving.\727\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \727\ Id. Sometime in 2000, Lavelle decided to seek to obtain clemency from the Clinton administration. She first approached a friend, Michael Dodds, who was a contract security provider who frequently traveled with Roger Clinton overseas.\728\ Lavelle told Committee staff that Dodds knew that she was having trouble finding work because of her felony conviction and that he helped her contact Roger Clinton to request that Roger hand-carry her pardon petition to President Clinton.\729\ At one point, she spoke to Dodds and Clinton on the phone simultaneously about her request.\730\ Later, Lavelle said that, through Michael Dodds, Roger Clinton asked for ``$10,000 or $30,000'' to hand carry the petition for her.\731\ Although Dodds claimed that he ``never supposed that [Clinton] might want payment'' and that Clinton merely thought Lavelle's case was deserving, Lavelle's memory on this point is clear.\732\ In fact, Lavelle said that such a fee request ``was to be expected'' and that it ``was not a quid pro quo.'' \733\ Lavelle explained that she was bankrupt and that, although she could not afford to pay, Roger Clinton ``was kind enough'' to carry it without payment.\734\ Dodds denied the allegation that Clinton asked Lavelle for money.\735\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \728\ Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001). \729\ Id. \730\ Id. \731\ Id. \732\ Telephone Interview with Michael Dodds (July 31, 2001). \733\ Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001). \734\ Id. \735\ Telephone Interview with Michael Dodds (July 31, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clinton instructed Lavelle to send her petition to an address at the White House Usher's office. Lavelle did so.\736\ She also spoke to Roger Clinton by phone about her pardon petition several times.\737\ In the first contact after Clinton had agreed to deliver her petition, he called to say that the President was ``favorably disposed'' to granting her clemency.\738\ But, on the Friday night before the inauguration, Roger Clinton called again and asked Lavelle, ``Do you have $100,000 to get this through?'' \739\ Lavelle said she interpreted the comment as a joke because she was bankrupt and could not possibly raise $100,000 so quickly.\740\ Also, Clinton had already told her that it was probably too late to get her petition granted.\741\ Nevertheless, Roger Clinton did ask Lavelle if she had $100,000 in connection with the pardon effort. Clinton went on to explain that ``the President is under a lot of pressure'' and asked ``what can you do with the Bush team?'' \742\ Lavelle replied that she was ``close to the conservative elements.'' \743\ Roger told her that ``political equity was more important than money at this point.'' \744\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \736\ Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001). \737\ Id. \738\ Id. \739\ Id. \740\ Id. \741\ Id. \742\ Id. \743\ Id. \744\ Id. Lavelle also claims that Clinton then asked her, ``Who do you know at Pepperdine?'' Lavelle said she realized later that this was a reference to former Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's aborted departure to become Dean of Pepperdine Law School. Lavelle understood Roger Clinton to be probing to see if she could assist in obtaining a deal or if her pardon could become part of a deal between President Clinton and the Office of Independent Counsel. The President was engaged in last-minute negotiations that ultimately led to the agreement not to prosecute that was announced hours before Clinton left office. Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lavelle did not receive clemency on inauguration day and, much as he apparently did with others for whom he had lobbied, Roger Clinton called to tell her that he was upset and embarrassed that his requests for pardons were not granted.\745\ Lavelle spoke to Clinton one more time after his brother was out of office, but she could recall only that the conversation focused on his claim that he was framed on a drunk driving charge that had recently received a lot of press attention.\746\ Lavelle's account provides a disturbingly cynical view of politics and the pardon process. It also illustrates that Roger Clinton was willing to use his relationship and access to the President to help not only dear friends, as he has claimed in the press, but also any stranger who might possibly provide money or ``political equity'' beneficial to the Clintons. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \745\ Id. \746\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. John Ballis In 1990, Houston real estate developer John Ballis pled guilty to paying a savings and loan president $371,000 in kickback money ($300,000 of which was provided in the form of a cash-stuffed duffel bag delivered via helicopter) in exchange for $6.7 million in loans.\747\ As part of the plea arrangement, Ballis provided authorities with details about the bribe and was given immunity from further prosecution arising out of the investigation.\748\ Ballis was sentenced to two years' probation and 160 hours of community service.\749\ Shortly after completing his community service, however, Ballis was indicted again for the crime to which he had earlier pled guilty as well as obstruction of justice.\750\ Prosecutors had cancelled the plea agreement on the grounds that Ballis had not met his obligation under the bargain to be complete and truthful in his debriefing.\751\ Ballis was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 12 and a half years in prison.\752\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \747\ Steve McVicker, Bad Deal; John Ballis Was a Crook. But He Expected the Federal Government to Keep Its End of a Bargain, Houston Press, Dec. 4, 1997. \748\ Id. \749\ Id; Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from John Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99). \750\ Id. \751\ Steve McVicker, Bad Deal; John Ballis Was a Crook. But He Expected the Federal Government to Keep Its End of a Bargain, Houston Press, Dec. 4, 1997. \752\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from John Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1989, Ballis married Joni Anderson.\753\ Anderson-Ballis had been a reporter for KTHV television in Little Rock, Arkansas, as well as an employee of Lasater and Co., a Little Rock-based securities company owned by Dan Lasater.\754\ Anderson-Ballis said she knew Bill Clinton, Roger Clinton, Bruce Lindsey, and Virginia Kelly (President Clinton's mother) ``fairly well.'' \755\ She said John Ballis began seeking executive clemency soon after the revocation of his plea agreement in 1994.\756\ Anderson-Ballis wrote to President Clinton seeking clemency for her husband in November 1994: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \753\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0022 (Letter from Joni Anderson-Ballis, to President William J. Clinton, the White House (Nov. 21, 1994)) (Exhibit 100). \754\ George Wells, Former Reporter Appears, Arkansas Democrat- Gazette, Sept. 19, 1986. Anderson-Ballis appeared as a witness before a grand jury investigating Dan Lasater for cocaine distribution. Id. \755\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). \756\ Id; Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0022 (Letter from Joni Anderson-Ballis, to President William J. Clinton, the White House (Nov. 21, 1994)) (Exhibit 100). I have met with Bruce Lindsey on this matter. He can show you the documents and fill you in on the details. He can also tell you about Representative Jack Brooks' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- interest and involvement in the case. * * * I'm aware the demands on your time are overwhelming and if it were not for our friendship, you'd probably never see this letter. However, friendship aside, this situation is one that warrants your consideration.\757\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \757\ Id. See also Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0025 (Letter from Joni Anderson-Ballis, to Bruce Lindsey, Special Counsel to the President, the White House (Nov. 21, 1994)) (Exhibit 101). The request did receive attention early on, according to Anderson-Ballis. She met with Webster Hubbell about the issue when he was Associate Attorney General and with Bruce Lindsey for two hours once when President Clinton was in Houston to attend a fundraiser.\758\ She also wrote letters to Roger Clinton and Bruce Lindsey. Her letter to Roger suggests he played an active role in advocating for Ballis: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \758\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Roger the Dodger-- I can't tell you how much your help means to me. I'm sure you understand. * * * Please ask Bill if he got the letter and also get any advice on how I should proceed with this. Mention to him that Primetime Live is interested in doing a piece at this point (Rick Nelson is the contact there)--I'm sending them documents today.\759\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \759\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0021 (Letter from Joni Anderson-Ballis, to Roger Clinton) (Exhibit 102). Despite Ballis' connections, and even though the federal judge who initially sentenced Ballis wrote a letter supporting a grant of clemency,\760\ no executive action was taken on Ballis' case. One reason cited at the time was that Ballis had not yet exhausted his judicial appeals.\761\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \760\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0019 (Letter from the Honorable Lynn N. Hughes, U.S. District Judge, District Court for the Southern District of Texas, to President William J. Clinton, the White House (Oct. 28, 1994)) (Exhibit 103). \761\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0028 (Letter from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Lynn N. Hughes, U.S. District Judge, District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Jan. 6, 1995)) (Exhibit 104). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Roger Clinton did not stop trying to help Ballis, however. In December 1997, when he was lobbying the U.S. Parole Commission for the release of organized crime figure Rosario Gambino, he also inquired about a furlough for John Ballis.\762\ According to Parole Commission staffers Marie Ragghianti and Tom Kowalski, Roger Clinton knew that Ballis had recently received a tentative release decision from a Parole Commission hearing examiner and was merely inquiring about the possibility of a furlough release for the holidays. Ragghianti and Kowalski referred him to the warden of Ballis' prison on the furlough issue and emphasized that the hearing examiner's decision was merely a recommendation and had to be approved before becoming final.\763\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \762\ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). \763\ USPC Document Production 00889 (Exhibit 40). Other documents, however, indicate that during his December meeting with Parole Commission staff, Clinton did more than merely ask about a holiday furlough. Clinton also provided copies of correspondence from Lois Franco, a criminal justice consultant apparently hired by Ballis. The correspondence consists of a fax from Franco to Clinton detailing the procedural status of Ballis' case and attached letter to the Commissioners arguing for Ballis' early release. USPC Document Production 00961 (Exhibit 105). The fax indicates that Ballis had instructed Franco to provide the information at Clinton's request and thanks Clinton for his assistance. Id. at 00961-63. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clinton was successful, at least according to Ballis, in helping him obtain a parole date of March 26, 1998, after serving 40 months of his 12-year prison term. Upon learning in January 1998 of the parole date, Ballis wrote a letter to Roger: \764\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \764\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0014-015 (Letter from John Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 15, 1998)) (Exhibit 106). I finally got my copy of the Notice of Action--it was here the whole time--they just couldn't locate it--if --------------------------------------------------------------------------- you believe that bullsh*t. But anyway I thought you might like to see the result of your help & work. I can't thank you enough. I sure hope your meeting w/ Disney went OK & that you have a good trip to Korea.\765\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \765\ Id. at RCC0014. While Ballis' letter credits Clinton with helping him obtain his release, it is unclear exactly what, if anything, he did for Ballis before meeting with Parole Commission personnel in December 1997. After Ballis was released from prison, Roger Clinton continued to help him in his effort to obtain executive clemency. Oddly enough, with all the help Clinton had given John Ballis through the years, they did not meet in person until 1999. Ballis wrote to Clinton in January 1999: It was so nice to finally get to meet you. I trust you had a nice trip home and are getting ready to go to D.C. I wanted to get you the information on my commutation request so you would be able to familiarize yourself with it before your trip. * * * As you know, I have served my prison time and am currently in the half-way house until March 10, 1999. I will remain under the jurisdiction of the justice system until 2004 when my sentence ends. I am also required to pay fines and restitution in excess of 4 \1/2\ million dollars. * * * I could go on and on about the injustices in my case, but, I'd rather put it all behind me and rebuild my life. I'm hoping you can help me do this by assisting me in getting Executive Clemency. This would eliminate future parole supervision--which lasts until 2004--and do away with the fine and restitution portion of my sentence.\766\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \766\ Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from John Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99). Joni Anderson-Ballis told Committee staff that she met with Roger Clinton about her husband's case about a week before the end of the Clinton Administration.\767\ Clinton told her that he was making a list of people that he planned to give to his brother and ask that they be granted executive clemency.\768\ Clinton also told her that he was trying to obtain a pardon for himself but did not know whether he was going to receive one. Anderson-Ballis told Clinton to tell the President to ``please take another look at the Ballis case.'' \769\ She also said that she doubted that Roger actually asked the President to grant a pardon to her husband.\770\ However, there is documentary evidence suggesting that Roger Clinton did indeed present Ballis' name to the President. The National Archives produced to the Committee a document with the name ``John Ballis'' printed on it, and next to it, in President Clinton's handwriting was the following note, ``Meredith call him on this I think there's a different option than the one we discussed-- BC.'' \771\ While this document does not contain Roger Clinton's name, it was produced to the Committee in the middle of a number of documents relating to Roger Clinton, so it is possible that Roger provided Ballis' name to the President. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \767\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). \768\ Id. \769\ Id. \770\ Id. \771\ NARA Document Production (Handwritten Note) (Exhibit 107). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although it is not certain whether Roger Clinton lobbied the White House on the Ballis pardon, the Ballis case apparently did receive serious consideration in the closing days of the Clinton Administration. Ballis' name appears on three White House documents, in addition to the note from President Clinton to Meredith Cabe: a table of cases being tracked by Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe and two draft memos to the President.\772\ In the entry for Ballis, the Meredith Cabe table notes, ``Atty. Don Clark of Houston, dropped of [sic] papers personally; BRL?'' \773\ Joni Anderson- Ballis said that Clark was the last lawyer they hired to work on the case.\774\ According to the draft memos dated December 17 and December 20, 2000, White House Counsels Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe all recommended to the President that he grant clemency to Ballis.\775\ The December 20, 2000, memo recommends that the President, ``Commute remaining period of sentence of confinement (for which he is currently paroled), and remit fine, leaving intact the obligation to pay restitution.'' \776\ Anderson-Ballis said that their attorney, Don Clark, had traveled to Washington to meet with Administration officials regarding the Ballis request and also that Clark received a call two nights before the inauguration from Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel.\777\ Apparently, Angel was pursuing the ``different option'' suggested by the President in his note to Meredith Cabe. Angel asked Clark if there was any piece of the clemency request that Ballis would accept such as having the probation commuted but the restitution left intact.\778\ Clark replied that they would accept whatever was granted but that they preferred to receive a ``complete pardon.'' \779\ After the call from Angel, Ballis was optimistic about the prospects, but in the end, he received no commutation.\780\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \772\ NARA Document Production (Exhibits 108, 109, 110). \773\ NARA Document Production (Exhibit 108). \774\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). \775\ NARA Document Production (Exhibits 109, 110). \776\ NARA Document Production (Exhibits 110). \777\ Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). \778\ Id. \779\ Id. \780\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Anderson-Ballis said that she had not spoken to Roger Clinton since the end of the Clinton Administration.\781\ Anderson-Ballis stated that she was initially mad at Roger when no commutation was granted but not any longer because she realized that ``Bill loves his brother, but he does not respect him.'' \782\ When asked if Roger was paid for his work on the clemency request, Anderson-Ballis stated that he was not, and that anything that Roger did was out of friendship.\783\ Anderson-Ballis stated that ``Roger is a good guy, but he is a lost soul.'' \784\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \781\ Id. \782\ Id. \783\ Id. \784\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- F. Steven Griggs In 1992, Steven M. Griggs pled guilty in the Eastern District of Missouri to conspiracy to manufacture and possess 100 grams or more of methamphetamine.\785\ Before being sentenced, however, he fled and remained a fugitive until being captured over a year later.\786\ Griggs was sentenced to over 24 years in prison and will not be released until 2013.\787\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \785\ Steven Griggs Document Production (Petition for Commutation, June 20, 2000) (Exhibit 111); Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001. \786\ Id. \787\ Steven Griggs Document Production (Petition for Commutation, June 20, 2000) (Exhibit 111). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In June 2000, Griggs submitted a commutation petition to the White House and Justice Department.\788\ Griggs' request for a commutation was based on the argument that a 24-year prison sentence was too harsh for a first-time nonviolent offender, even one engaged in large-scale methamphetamine manufacture.\789\ In an effort to ensure that the petition would be granted, Griggs' father sought Roger Clinton's help through an old family friend. Griggs' father is Chief Carl ``Grey Owl'' Griggs of the Northern Cherokee Nation of Missouri and Arkansas, an American Indian tribe, which is not recognized by the United States.\790\ The Clinton family friend is Daley McDaniel, the owner of a moving company in Hot Springs, Arkansas.\791\ McDaniel knew Chief Griggs because McDaniel had been seeking admission into the tribe.\792\ McDaniel told Committee staff that he also knew Roger Clinton very well, that he ``helped raise Roger.'' \793\ At one point, Roger Clinton had dated McDaniel's daughter.\794\ McDaniel described how he had suggested to Chief Griggs that Roger might be able to help the Northern Cherokee Nation obtain official recognition by the U.S. government.\795\ McDaniel said that, when Bill Clinton was governor of Arkansas, McDaniel could leave a message and his call would always be returned within a few days.\796\ But, McDaniel did not enjoy the same access to Bill Clinton after he became President.\797\ So, McDaniel decided to try to use Roger Clinton to gain the President's attention on the Northern Cherokee Nation recognition issue.\798\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \788\ Id. \789\ Id. \790\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001; Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). \791\ Id. \792\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001. \793\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). \794\ Id. \795\ Id. \796\ Id. \797\ Id. \798\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When McDaniel told Chief Griggs about his plans to obtain federal recognition for the tribe, Griggs raised the issue of his son's imprisonment.\799\ McDaniel could not recall whose idea it was initially, but together they decided to also enlist Roger's help in getting Steven Griggs out of prison.\800\ According to McDaniel, the Chief told him that his son was in prison for marijuana.\801\ Not until after a New York Times article \802\ on the Griggs case was published did McDaniel learn that Steven Griggs was actually in prison for methamphetamines and that Griggs had been a fugitive for a year.\803\ McDaniel said he had not spoken to the Chief since the article was printed and that he felt like the Chief had misled him about the merits of his son's case.\804\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \799\ Id. \800\ Id. \801\ Id. \802\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001. \803\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). \804\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- About six months before the end of the Clinton Administration, McDaniel called Roger Clinton to discuss the tribal recognition issue and the Steven Griggs case.\805\ McDaniel told Roger that Griggs was in prison for drug possession and ``needed a pardon from Bill.'' \806\ Roger said, ``sure.'' \807\ McDaniel gave Roger the Chief's phone number and believes that Roger spoke with the Chief two or three times by phone, beginning that evening.\808\ However, McDaniel was never privy to their conversations, and he did not believe Roger ever met the Chief in person.\809\ McDaniel said Roger helped ``by running messages back and forth to his brother.'' \810\ McDaniel and Chief Griggs sent faxes about the case to Roger who would then forward them to the President.\811\ McDaniel also said he had a lot of interaction with Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe related to the Griggs case.\812\ Cabe even called him on his cell phone to ask him questions about the case.\813\ Documents substantiate McDaniel's account of Cabe's involvement. One of the tables used by Cabe to track pardon cases contains an entry for Stephen M. Griggs and notes under the heading, ``Referred/ Contacted by'' that ``Daley McDaniel strongly supports; acc. to McDaniel, Roger Clinton also supports[.]'' \814\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \805\ Id. \806\ Id. \807\ Id. \808\ Id. \809\ Id. \810\ Id. \811\ Id. \812\ Id. \813\ Id. \814\ NARA Document Production (Exhibit 108). This table was located in a file identified as belonging to Bruce Lindsey labeled ``General Pardon File.'' This document's reference to Roger Clinton raises questions about the veracity of Bruce Lindsey's testimony before the Committee at its March 1, 2001, hearing where Lindsey was asked, ``were you aware at the time the pardons were being considered at the White House in January of this year that the President's brother [Roger Clinton] was advocating on behalf of certain individuals?'' Lindsey replied, ``No, sir, I don't believe so.'' ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. 418-19 (Mar. 1, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to Gary Krupkin, attorney for the Griggs family, one motive for Chief Griggs' and McDaniel's efforts seeking recognition for the tribe was to be able to establish a casino under the tribe's auspices.\815\ Daley McDaniel said he never discussed any exchange of money with Roger Clinton or Chief Griggs.\816\ McDaniel also denies that he discussed a potential casino with Clinton or Griggs.\817\ McDaniel did admit to one reference to a casino in discussions with Roger Clinton. On December 25, 2000, McDaniel was speaking to Roger Clinton about the Griggs commutation while Roger was in the Oval Office.\818\ McDaniel said he heard the President in the background saying: ``Ask Daley if there are any casinos involved in this thing. I don't want any surprises.'' \819\ McDaniel told Roger that there were no casinos involved and offered to have Chief Griggs write a letter ``saying there were no plans to build any casinos.'' \820\ Roger told McDaniel that no such letter was necessary.\821\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \815\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2001. \816\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). \817\ Id. \818\ Id. \819\ Id. \820\ Id. \821\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The following day, McDaniel spoke to Roger again. Roger called and said ``Big Brother wants you to send him everything about Steven.'' \822\ According to McDaniel, the President had instructed that the materials be sent by overnight mail.\823\ McDaniel called Chief Griggs who worked through the night to prepare and send a packet about Steven Griggs' accomplishments in prison.\824\ Roger Clinton provided a new fax number and a new address, which McDaniel said ``had something to do with ushers.'' Soon afterward, Roger Clinton called McDaniel to say that the information packet had been lost for a time but had now been found.\825\ Clinton told McDaniel he was ``heading to Big Brother's office to deliver it.'' \826\ Again, documents substantiate this account. The National Archives produced to the Committee a copy of an envelope sent by the Northern Cherokee Nation to Roger Clinton at the White House.\827\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \822\ Id. \823\ Id. \824\ Id. \825\ Id. \826\ Id. \827\ NARA Document Production (Envelope from Northern Cherokee Nation to Roger Clinton) (Exhibit 112). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clinton's call led McDaniel and Griggs to believe ``it was a done deal.'' \828\ McDaniel said the prison put Griggs ``in protective custody'' just before the end of the administration, leading the family to believe his sentence was going to be commuted.\829\ They thought he was being protected from other inmates who might be jealous of his being suddenly released.\830\ McDaniel said that, on the last day of the administration, Griggs was ``on pins and needles'' expecting the pardon to come down.\831\ Indeed, Clinton had delivered the packet to the President, and the President appears to have been favorably disposed to granting a commutation. The President wrote a note to Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe on the outside of the envelope containing the Griggs material, ``Meredith, looks like a case for commutation pls check out-- BC.'' \832\ Despite the apparent support from the President himself and despite the assistance of Roger Clinton in moving Griggs' last-minute petition to the head of the line, Griggs did not receive clemency. Daley McDaniel suspected that the President had learned something ``at the last minute'' that stopped him from granting the pardon.\833\ McDaniel speculated that it might be the fact that Steven Griggs had been a fugitive, which McDaniel himself did not learn until later \834\ and which had not been referenced in the petition. After the announcement of who had received pardons, McDaniel called Roger to find out what happened.\835\ Clinton told McDaniel that he and his brother had ``a bad argument.'' \836\ Roger told McDaniel that ``it got rough'' and that even the pardons for Roger's personal friends that he had wanted most were denied.\837\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \828\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). \829\ Id. \830\ Id. \831\ Id. \832\ NARA Document Production (Envelope from Northern Cherokee Nation to Roger Clinton) (Exhibit 112). \833\ Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). \834\ Id. \835\ Id. \836\ Id. \837\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee staff made numerous attempts to interview Chief Griggs and Steven Griggs regarding these matters. After initially indicating a willingness to allow Chief Griggs to be interviewed, Griggs' attorney then indicated that he could not allow the Chief to participate in an interview. The attorney also indicated that if Chief Griggs were subpoenaed to testify, he would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. G. Phillip Young Phillip Young along with his family operates Catfish Young's, a catering business and restaurant in North Little Rock, Arkansas.\838\ In 1992, Young pled guilty to illegally transporting federally protected game fish across state lines.\839\ Young had bought approximately 4,000 crappie in Louisiana for use in his family restaurant.\840\ It was a felony offense, and he was sentenced to 10 months in prison.\841\ In November 1998, with the help of his attorney, Gene O'Daniel, Young began the process of applying for a pardon.\842\ Young brought O'Daniel copies of the Justice Department pardon forms and asked him to help file a petition.\843\ O'Daniel said he did not know what prompted Young to request a pardon, but he filled out the forms and worked with the Pardon Attorney's Office to submit, correct, supplement, and finalize the application.\844\ It was final and complete at some point in 1999.\845\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \838\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). \839\ Gene O'Daniel Document Production (Phillip Young's Petition for Pardon, Nov. 13, 1998) (Exhibit 113). \840\ Id. \841\ Id. \842\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001). \843\ Id. \844\ Id. \845\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to O'Daniel, Young asked him for a copy of his pardon petition so that he could give it to Roger Clinton.\846\ Afterwards, in early January 2001, he learned from Young that someone had offered to obtain a pardon for Young if Young would pay Roger Clinton $30,000. Young told O'Daniel that he had rejected this offer and that the unnamed person had come back and offered to obtain the pardon in exchange for a $15,000 payment to Roger Clinton.\847\ Young refused to tell O'Daniel who made the offer, and O'Daniel told Young not to accept it.\848\ O'Daniel said he based his advice on his previous experience with Roger Clinton.\849\ In 1985, O'Daniel had represented Sam Andrews, Jr., who was convicted on cocaine charges on the testimony of Roger Clinton.\850\ In the course of the trial, O'Daniel had seen surveillance tapes of Roger that convinced him that Roger Clinton was a ``bullsh*tter'' who could not be trusted to deliver a pardon.\851\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \846\ Id. \847\ Id. Young mentioned to O'Daniel that there was a ``Hollywood producer,'' Harry Thomason, who could help get a pardon, but O'Daniel did not think Young made any effort to contact Thomason. Id. Dan Lasater also reported that he ``was told that Patsy Thomason had helped Jimmy Manning get a pardon'' and that he had ``heard that Sony Tucker of Hamburg, Arkansas, was trying to get pardon with Patsy Thomason's help.'' Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \848\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001). \849\ Id. \850\ Id. \851\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When interviewed by Committee staff, Phillip Young provided a conflicting account. According to Young, in late 2000, his brother Carey suggested that John Burkhalter, a friend of Carey's, might be able to help Young obtain a pardon because Burkhalter knew Roger Clinton.\852\ Carey Young had met Burkhalter while in college and had remained friends since.\853\ Carey Young knew that Burkhalter was friends with Roger Clinton.\854\ Phillip Young said that he and his brother Carey discussed between themselves whether Clinton would charge a fee to help him obtain pardon.\855\ Phillip Young claims that, between themselves, they surmised that Roger would want between $10,000 and $15,000.\856\ Carey Young then approached Burkhalter about getting Clinton to work on Young's pardon.\857\ He called Burkhalter in October or November 2000 to determine whether Burkhalter would be willing to ask Clinton to deliver a copy of the pardon petition directly to the President.\858\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \852\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). \853\ Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001). \854\ Id. \855\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). \856\ Id. \857\ Id. \858\ Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the meantime, Phillip Young discussed the situation with his lawyer, Gene O'Daniel.\859\ Without naming Burkhalter, Young told O'Daniel he knew someone who knew Roger Clinton and that he was considering asking Clinton to help with the pardon.\860\ Young said that O'Daniel's reaction was to advise against getting Roger Clinton involved.\861\ While Carey Young was waiting to hear back from Burkhalter, Young said O'Daniel called him repeatedly to ask whether he had gone through with his plan to involve Clinton in the pardon effort.\862\ Young told O'Daniel he had spoken with Clinton but decided not to use his help.\863\ Young told Committee staff, however, that his claim to have spoken with Clinton was a lie fabricated merely to ``get O'Daniel off of his back'' and that he had not actually spoken to Clinton.\864\ Given Young's claim to have lied in order to deflect questions from O'Daniel, it is odd that O'Daniel did not even recall the supposed lie. Instead, O'Daniel said that he did not know whether Young ever spoke directly to Roger.\865\ After he told O'Daniel that he was not going to use Clinton, Young heard back from Burkhalter.\866\ Burkhalter had spoken with Roger Clinton, who told him it was too late to help Young obtain a pardon.\867\ Carey Young confirmed this aspect of his brother's story, saying he had a total of two discussions with Burkhalter about the pardon: one to ask him to contact Roger Clinton and one in which Burkhalter reported Clinton's answer that it was too late.\868\ Carey Young also insisted that there was no mention of money during either of these conversations.\869\ John Burkhalter likewise said he never discussed money with Roger Clinton, Carey Young, or Phillip Young in connection with Clinton's possible assistance.\870\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \859\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). \860\ Id. \861\ Id. \862\ Id. \863\ Id. \864\ Id. \865\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001). \866\ Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). \867\ Id. \868\ Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001). \869\ Id. \870\ Telephone Interview with John Burkhalter (May 8, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- O'Daniel's and Young's accounts of their conversations about Roger Clinton are fundamentally incompatible. While both agreed that Young mentioned the possibility of enlisting Roger Clinton's help through an unnamed intermediary (presumably Burkhalter), they disagreed about the crucial facts regarding discussions of a fee. O'Daniel provided a more detailed account about an initial price of $30,000, which was rejected and then discounted to $15,000. Also O'Daniel clearly understood the price to have originated with either Roger Clinton or the intermediary rather than with Young. O'Daniel was certain on this point because, he said, Young told him that the intermediary had asked Roger whether he could ``guarantee'' that if Young paid the money that he would get the pardon.\871\ Roger reportedly said ``no,'' and then Young refused to pay.\872\ In Young's account, no amount of money was ever discussed with anyone other than in speculation with his brother. Carey Young supports his brother's account, saying that he and his brother had conversations about whether they might have to pay Roger Clinton a ``lobbying fee.'' \873\ He said they did guess at some numbers but could not recall the numbers.\874\ However, Carey Young could not corroborate his brother's version of the conversations with his attorney. When asked if his brother had ever discussed conversations with his lawyer, Young said he had not.\875\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \871\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001). \872\ Id. \873\ Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001). \874\ Id. \875\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- O'Daniel's understanding of what his client had said led him to report the matter to the Office of the Pardon Attorney. He said he felt an ethical obligation to inform the Justice Department and that he was also trying to protect his client.\876\ He didn't want Young to get into more trouble or to have the application denied because of Roger Clinton.\877\ Sometime in January 2001, O'Daniel called Sam Morison in the Pardon Attorney's Office and told him that there were people trying to sell pardons and were using Roger Clinton's name.\878\ Morison replied that he was aware that people were trying to get around the Justice Department and go directly to the White House.\879\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \876\ Telephone Interview with Gene O'Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29, 2001). \877\ Id. \878\ Id. \879\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Phillip Young did receive a pardon from President Clinton. There is no evidence, however, that Roger Clinton actually intervened in the Young case. Rather, Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe recalls that the Justice Department recommended denial of Young's pardon request but that President Clinton granted it because it seemed like a minor offense.\880\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \880\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H. Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan was sentenced to three years imprisonment in July 1984 on charges of possession with intent to distribute four and a half pounds of cocaine.\881\ While in prison, McKernan met and became friends with Roger Clinton.\882\ McKernan served one year of his three-year sentence and was paroled.\883\ He had become such close friends with Clinton that, after being released, they continued to speak by phone on a weekly basis.\884\ McKernan even attended Clinton's wedding.\885\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \881\ Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan Document Production (Petition for Pardon, July 10, 1998) (Exhibit 114). \882\ Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). \883\ Id. \884\ Id. \885\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1995, McKernan received a Louisiana state pardon, and in 1998, petitioned for a federal pardon. McKernan argued that he deserved a pardon because he had turned his life around and his criminal record negatively impacted his ability to become a lawyer or own a firearm. McKernan said he did not discuss his pardon application with Roger Clinton when he filed it. Later though, he did discuss it with Roger, and Roger said he would urge his brother to grant it. Although Clinton also told McKernan that he would ``get Bill Clinton to look at it,'' McKernan said he did not give Roger Clinton a copy of the petition.\886\ McKernan said he asked Roger Clinton about the application on a number of occasions, and Roger told him the pardon would likely be granted at the end of the administration.\887\ McKernan said that Roger never gave him any assurance that the pardon would be granted but said he thought that McKernan had ``a good shot'' because he was an ``ideal candidate.'' \888\ On initial inspection, it does appear that McKernan fit the profile that President Clinton had outlined to the White House Counsel's Office for the type of cases that he most wanted to review for potential pardons: non-violent drug offenders ``who had convictions from an abuse problem and who had kicked the habit and had been clean since then.'' \889\ Yet despite his friendship with Roger Clinton and despite fitting the profile the President was interested in pardoning, McKernan's petition was denied. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \886\ Id. \887\ Id. \888\ Id. \889\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On the last day of the Clinton Administration, when the list of those pardoned was released to the media, McKernan learned that he did not receive a pardon.\890\ According to McKernan, he spoke to Roger Clinton twice that day about whether he had received a pardon.\891\ Phone records confirm that Roger Clinton placed two calls to McKernan on January 20, 2001, each lasting 11 minutes.\892\ The records also indicate that, in between these two contacts with McKernan, Clinton twice called former President Clinton's number in Chappaqua, New York.\893\ The first call to McKernan occurred at 8:02 p.m.\894\ During this conversation, McKernan asked whether he had received a pardon.\895\ Roger said that ``it doesn't look good'' but that he would check.\896\ Immediately after ending the call to McKernan, Roger Clinton called his brother's number at 8:13 p.m. for two minutes. Roger later called Bill Clinton's number again at 11:06 p.m. for one minute. At 11:07 p.m., Roger called McKernan for the second time.\897\ Roger told McKernan that McKernan's pardon had been signed and that it was the only one among those Roger had requested that was granted.\898\ According to McKernan, Clinton said, ``I don't want to get your hopes up, but I was told that yours was signed.'' \899\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \890\ Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). \891\ Id. \892\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb. 1, 2001, at 9). \893\ Id. \894\ Id. \895\ Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). \896\ Id. \897\ Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb. 1, 2001, at 9). \898\ Telephone Interview with Joseph ``Jay'' McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). \899\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The next business day, January 22, 2001, Richard Crane, McKernan's lawyer, contacted Hope McGowan at the Pardon Attorney's Office and told her what Roger had said.\900\ He asked if there could be some kind of clerical error or mistake that could have improperly kept McKernan's name off the public list of pardons issued by President Clinton.\901\ McGowan told Crane that Meredith Cabe was the person handling pardons at the White House Counsel's Office and she would know for certain.\902\ Crane said his sense was that McGowan ``didn't care enough about the issue to even write it down,'' and therefore, he was surprised to see his contact written about in the newspapers.\903\ Contrary to what Roger Clinton had told McKernan, the President had not granted his clemency request. Because Roger Clinton refused to cooperate with the Committee's investigation, it is unclear why Roger Clinton believed that President Clinton had granted the McKernan pardon. There is strong circumstantial evidence, though, that the President himself told Roger that he had granted the McKernan pardon. It is unclear why the President would do this. The case of Mitchell Wood, as described below, offers one plausible theory. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \900\ Id. \901\ Id. \902\ Id. \903\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Mitchell Wood The Mitchell Wood story is the opposite of the Jay McKernan story. While McKernan's pardon was supposedly granted but never actually issued, Wood's pardon was issued unexpectedly. In December 1986, Mitchell Wood pled guilty and was sentenced to four months in prison on cocaine charges resulting from the investigation of Dan Lasater, David Collins, George Locke, and Roger Clinton.\904\ Wood was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission who said he had obtained cocaine from Lasater, Collins, and Clinton, but never sold it.\905\ At his sentencing, Wood told the judge that he had already ``overcome a cocaine habit about two and a half years ago. He also said he had nearly paid off heavy debts he incurred because of his habit and had returned to normal health.'' \906\ The sentencing judge said ``he believed Wood `has learned his lesson,' but said that `some imprisonment' should be imposed `if fairness all around is to be achieved.' '' \907\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \904\ George Wells, More Sentenced in Lasater Case, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Dec. 23, 1986. \905\ Id. \906\ Id. \907\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wood informed the Committee that, after his imprisonment, he underwent a major lifestyle change. Impressed by this change, his friends, and even his probation officer, encouraged Wood to seek a pardon.\908\ Wood applied for a pardon through the Justice Department in December 1995 but was denied by President Clinton on December 28, 1998.\909\ It is unclear how or why the Wood case came to be considered a second time despite having already been rejected by the President once before. When interviewed by Committee staff, Meredith Cabe indicated that the Justice Department had recommended against granting clemency to Wood but that his ``was the type of case the President would want to consider.'' \910\ Cabe indicated that the President wanted to review the Wood case despite the Justice Department's negative recommendation.\911\ Cabe recalled that Wood's conviction was ``at the same time as Roger Clinton's'' but was apparently unaware that Wood had admitted to actually receiving cocaine from Clinton.\912\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \908\ Telephone Interview with Mitchell Wood (Apr. 4, 2001). \909\ Fax from Dave Blake, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 8 (Feb. 15, 2001) (within Appendix I). \910\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). \911\ Id. \912\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wood stated that he never asked for help from Roger Clinton, Dan Lasater, or George Locke in obtaining the pardon.\913\ Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe stated that she had no indication that Clinton had lobbied for Wood's pardon.\914\ Likewise, none of the documents reviewed and none of the witnesses questioned in the Committee's investigation provide any indication that Roger Clinton lobbied for Mitchell Wood's pardon. Dan Lasater said he had not seen Mitchell Wood in 10 to 15 years.\915\ According to George Locke, who described himself as a close friend of Wood's, he ``thought that he had been denied and was surprised to hear the news that he had been pardoned.'' \916\ Locke also said, however, that he had never discussed Wood's pardon request with Roger Clinton.\917\ Wood himself was surprised and baffled that his petition was granted after having been previously denied. He said, ``I have no earthly idea how it happened. I didn't know anybody. I'm just blessed[.]'' \918\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \913\ Telephone Interview with Mitchell Wood (Apr. 4, 2001). \914\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). \915\ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \916\ Telephone Interview with George Locke (Mar. 27, 2001). \917\ Id. \918\ Brian Blomquist, Pardon Probe: Clinton Library Books Will Be Checked Out, N.Y. Post, Feb. 10, 2001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The McKernan and Wood cases present a decidedly odd coincidence. The cases are similar in that both men knew Roger Clinton around the time of his conviction and both were non- violent drug offenders. Yet, McKernan received an unexpected denial after being informed that the President had granted his petition, and Wood received an unexpected pardon after an initial denial. While no final conclusion can be drawn from this coincidence, it suggests a possibility that perhaps there was some miscommunication about the precise identity of Roger Clinton's old friend with the non-violent drug conviction. It is also possible that President Clinton granted a pardon to Mitchell Wood when, in fact, he intended to grant a pardon to Joseph McKernan. Without the complete cooperation of Roger Clinton and officials from the Clinton Administration, however, the truth about what exactly happened in these two cases remains in question. J. Mark St. Pe On January 2, 2001, Mark St. Pe's lawyer, Walter Wiggins, transmitted a letter to Roger Clinton addressed to him at the White House Usher's Office. The letter states: As we have discussed previously, the case of Mark St. Pe is a sympathetic one for the reasons outlined exhaustively in the materials transmitted herewith for your immediate review and consideration. Please bring this case to the attention of your brother, Bill Clinton, the President of the United States. This is truly an opportunity for you to have a direct impact in the cause of justice for Mr. St. Pe.\919\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \919\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Walter F. Wiggins, Jr., Counsel for Mark St. Pe, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 115). Wiggins told Committee staff he was both a ``friend of a friend'' of Mark St. Pe and a friend of Roger Clinton.\920\ According to Wiggins, however, Clinton and St. Pe did not know each other.\921\ Wiggins said he submitted St. Pe's clemency application to the Justice Department at the same time that he gave it to Roger Clinton, in January 2001.\922\ In addition to the clemency application, Wiggins had been in contact with the U.S. Attorney in Little Rock in an attempt to reduce St. Pe's sentence (St. Pe is from Louisiana but is currently imprisoned in Forrest City, Arkansas).\923\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \920\ Telephone Interview with Walter F. Wiggins, Jr., Attorney for Mark St. Pe (June 12, 2001). \921\ Id. \922\ Id. \923\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wiggins said he contacted Roger Clinton because he was exploring all possible avenues to obtain clemency for St. Pe.\924\ He said he turned to Roger as an obvious way of getting attention for the clemency petition.\925\ Wiggins had not heard that Roger was presenting other clemency petitions to the President but assumed that Roger would have been doing so.\926\ Wiggins said that there was absolutely no monetary inducement of any kind for Roger Clinton to help St. Pe and that Roger did whatever he did out of friendship with Wiggins.\927\ Wiggins agreed to cooperate with the Committee and offered to send a copy of St. Pe's clemency petition to the Committee.\928\ Wiggins did not, however, actually send any documents despite several follow-up phone calls attempting to arrange for their production to the Committee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \924\ Id. \925\ Id. \926\ Id. \927\ Id. \928\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wiggins sent a copy of St. Pe's commutation petition to Roger Clinton at the White House. While the Committee is unable to conclude definitively what happened in the St. Pe case, it appears that Roger Clinton provided materials on the St. Pe case to President Clinton. The National Archives produced to the Committee a copy of the envelope Wiggins used to send the St. Pe clemency petition to Roger Clinton at the White House.\929\ Under the address, in what appears to be the President's handwriting, there is a note stating ``To M Cabe.'' \930\ This note, if it is indeed in the President's handwriting, would indicate that Roger Clinton provided the St. Pe petition to President Clinton, who then provided it to Meredith Cabe for review. However, what happened after that point is unknown. It is unclear how seriously the St. Pe petition was considered. However, it was ultimately denied. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \929\ NARA Document Production (Envelope from Walter Wiggins to Roger Clinton) (Exhibit 116). \930\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- K. William D. McCord When Dan Lasater was convicted on cocaine distribution charges, his Little Rock bond company was taken over and renamed by William D. McCord.\931\ George Locke, co-conspirator in the Lasater cocaine distribution ring, is McCord's father- in-law.\932\ In 1995, McCord was convicted on federal gambling charges, pled guilty, and received probation.\933\ The National Archives produced to the Committee a handwritten cover page reading: ``Meredith Cabe, William Doyne McCord, Petition for Pardon'' in the midst of other Roger Clinton- and clemency- related documents from the files of the Clinton White House.\934\ However, the National Archives did not produce an actual petition for clemency. Because of its placement in the files, this cover page suggests that the consideration of McCord's petition had some relationship to Roger Clinton. Moreover, the Committee received an uncorroborated allegation that George Locke believed McCord had paid Roger Clinton $10,000 in late 2000 or early 2001 in exchange for Clinton's help with his clemency petition. While Clinton's bank records do indicate several large cash deposits in that time frame, McCord denied that he paid Roger Clinton any money.\935\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \931\ Julian E. Barnes, McCord Admits He Helped Run Gambling House, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 2, 1995. \932\ Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002). \933\ Id. \934\ NARA Document Production (McCord Petition Cover Page) (Exhibit 117). \935\ Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- McCord sent a petition to the Justice Department's Pardon Attorney in early 1999.\936\ He also sent one to the White House at some point but could not recall when or to whom he directed it.\937\ McCord completed and filed the forms himself with some informal help from his probation officer and a friend who is an attorney.\938\ McCord said he met Roger Clinton 25 years ago when he had a box next to Clinton's mother's at the Oaklawn Park race track.\939\ However, now they are merely casual acquaintances.\940\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \936\ Id. \937\ Id. \938\ Id. \939\ Id. \940\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When asked about his most recent contacts with Roger Clinton, McCord recalled that they had met by chance at a Hot Springs Golf Tournament sometime after McCord had filed his clemency petition.\941\ Around the same time, McCord also had a drink with Clinton at a restaurant in Hot Springs.\942\ He was uncertain, but McCord thought he may have discussed his pardon petition with Clinton briefly during one of these meetings.\943\ McCord said that he ``may have'' asked if Roger could help him but claimed that he could not remember Clinton's reply.\944\ He said Clinton ``didn't offer any favors'' and that he left with the impression that Clinton would not be assisting him.\945\ Asked explicitly whether he had paid anyone any money in connection with seeking a pardon, McCord said, ``no.'' \946\ He also said that no one asked for money for anything else of value to help him obtain a pardon.\947\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \941\ Id. \942\ Id. \943\ Id. \944\ Id. \945\ Id. \946\ Id. \947\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- McCord did admit to discussing his petition with George Locke, who was also seeking a pardon. McCord said Locke asked him for a copy of McCord's application on more than one occasion, ostensibly so that Locke could use it to learn by comparison how to complete his own application.\948\ However, McCord maintained that he did not ask for help from Locke because he knew that, after his conviction, ``Locke had lost all his contacts.'' \949\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \948\ Id. Locke made a similar request for a copy of Dan Lasater's petition as well. Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). \949\ Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE ROGER CLINTON INVESTIGATION A. Roger Clinton Roger Clinton was at the center of a number of allegations investigated by the Committee. Early in the Committee's investigation, Chairman Burton requested that Roger Clinton participate in an interview with Committee staff, but he declined.\950\ When Committee staff discussed with Clinton's attorney, Bart Williams, the possibility that Clinton would be called to testify before the Committee, Williams stated that it was likely that Clinton would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights if called to testify. Despite his unwillingness to speak to Committee staff, Roger Clinton used his access to the media to deceive the public about matters the Committee was investigating by appearing on Larry King Live and making several false statements. Clinton did, however, comply with a number of document subpoenas served upon him by the Committee. However, Clinton's refusal to provide testimony to the Committee voluntarily regarding his efforts to obtain pardons for his friends and associates has hampered the Committee's investigation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \950\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Roger C. Clinton (Mar. 13, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Moreover, on March 23, 2001, while the Committee was attempting to obtain the cooperation of Roger Clinton, he received a wire transfer of $15,000 from a Citibank account entitled ``E.C. 934(A) c/o Eric Hothem.'' \951\ Eric Hothem was an aide to First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. When contacted about this transfer, Hothem's lawyer referred the Committee to the President's lawyer, David Kendall.\952\ The Chairman then sought from Mr. Kendall an explanation of the account and the transfer.\953\ According to Kendall's reply: ``The account is a personal Citibank account of former President and Senator Clinton. The transfer you inquire about was a loan by President Clinton to his brother so that he might retain counsel to represent him in the Committee's and other investigations.'' \954\ It is unclear whether Roger Clinton has repaid or intends to repay the money.\955\ The payment occurred at the height of public outcry and investigative activity regarding the pardons and at a time when Roger Clinton was deciding whether to provide testimony to the Committee and to authorities in the Southern District of New York. The media also reported that Roger Clinton had fought bitterly with his brother about the denial of his clemency requests. It is unknown whether Roger Clinton's acceptance of $15,000 for his legal fees from his brother made him any less likely to provide testimony adverse to his brother to the Committee or to law enforcement agencies. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \951\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to David E. Kendall, Counsel for Bill and Hillary Clinton, Williams & Connolly, Attachment #1 (July 30, 2001) (within Appendix I). \952\ Id. at 1. \953\ Id. \954\ Letter from David E. Kendall, Counsel for Bill and Hillary Clinton, Williams & Connolly, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 20, 2001) (within Appendix I). \955\ Records indicate that shortly after the wire transfer, Roger Clinton paid his attorney only $10,000 as a retainer, not $15,000. Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 118). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Tommaso Gambino When the Committee discovered that Tommaso Gambino had a financial relationship with Roger Clinton, and that Clinton had tried to obtain a commutation for his father, Rosario Gambino, the Committee attempted to interview Tommaso Gambino. Gambino refused to participate in an interview. Gambino did, however, comply with a document subpoena. C. Lisa Gambino Committee staff attempted to interview Lisa Gambino about her role in providing $227,889 to Anna Gambino, funds which were used to provide at least $50,000 to Roger Clinton. Ms. Gambino refused to respond to repeated requests for an interview. D. Victoria Crawford and Kathy Vieth Victoria Crawford is Roger Clinton's manager and bookkeeper. Because Crawford managed Clinton's money, and apparently his travel as well, the Committee attempted to interview Crawford. Crawford refused to participate in an interview. Then, the Committee issued subpoenas to Crawford and her company, Crawford Management.\956\ Upon receiving this subpoena, Crawford and her partner, Kathy Vieth, invoked their Fifth Amendment rights rather than comply with the Committee's subpoena.\957\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \956\ Subpoena duces tecum to Victoria Crawford (Aug. 29, 2001) (within Appendix II); Subpoena duces tecum to Crawford Management (Aug. 29, 2001) (within Appendix II). \957\ Letter from Bruce F. Black, Counsel for Vicki Crawford and Kathy Vieth, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Sept. 6, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. George Locke After learning of George Locke's involvement in trying to obtain pardons through Roger Clinton, Committee staff interviewed Locke. Locke participated in an hour-long telephone interview on March 27, 2001. Locke also responded to a request for documents by informing the Committee that he had no responsive documents.\958\ However, after his interview with Committee staff, Locke retained a lawyer (the same lawyer representing Dickey Morton) and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights rather than cooperate further with the Committee.\959\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \958\ Letter from George Locke to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (received Apr. 9, 2001) (within Appendix I). \959\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 3, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- F. Dickey Morton Shortly after interviewing George Locke, Committee staff attempted to interview Dickey Morton.\960\ Morton refused to participate in an interview and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.\961\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \960\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Dickey Morton (Mar. 14, 2001) (within Appendix I). \961\ Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton and Larkowski, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 3, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- G. Richard Cayce When the Committee learned of Richard Cayce's central role in the Lincecum matter, Committee staff attempted to interview Cayce. However, Cayce's attorney, Jay Ethington, informed the Committee that Cayce would not participate in a voluntary interview and would assert his Fifth Amendment rights if subpoenaed to testify.\962\ Cayce did provide the Committee with a proffer detailing his potential testimony if he were immunized. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \962\ Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H. J.T. Lundy Committee staff attempted to interview J.T. Lundy regarding his efforts to obtain a pardon through Roger Clinton. Lundy is currently in federal prison, so Committee staff attempted to arrange an interview through Lundy's attorney, David McGee. Mr. McGee informed Committee staff, though, that Mr. Lundy would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights rather than cooperate with the Committee. I. Robert Lundy Committee staff also attempted to interview Robert Lundy, the son of J.T. Lundy. Robert Lundy was also involved in the effort to obtain a pardon for J.T. Lundy. However, David McGee, who also represented Robert Lundy, informed the Committee that Mr. Lundy would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights rather than cooperate with the Committee. J. Chief Carl Griggs As part of its investigation of Roger Clinton's efforts to obtain a commutation for Steven Griggs, the Committee attempted to interview Chief Carl Griggs, Steven Griggs' father. Chief Griggs' attorney, Gary Krupkin, initially indicated a willingness to allow the Chief to participate in an interview. However, when Committee staff attempted to schedule the interview, Krupkin expressed concern about allowing the Chief to participate in an interview while the criminal investigation of Roger Clinton was pending. Accordingly, Chief Griggs refused to participate in an interview with Committee staff. K. Blume Loe and Cynthia Goosen When the Committee learned of Blume Loe's request that Roger Clinton help him obtain a pardon, the Committee attempted to arrange an interview of Loe and his attorney, Cynthia Goosen.\963\ According to documents obtained from Roger Clinton, Goosen may have had contact with Roger Clinton about the Blume Loe pardon request. However, Goosen refused to participate in an interview with Committee staff, citing attorney-client privilege.\964\ Goosen made this claim despite the fact that much of the information sought by the Committee, for example, her contacts with Roger Clinton, would not be covered by the attorney-client privilege.\965\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \963\ Letter from David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 14, 2001) (within Appendix I). \964\ Letter from Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 22, 2001) (within Appendix I). \965\ Letter from David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 30, 2001) (within Appendix I). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- L. Bruce Lindsey Bruce Lindsey testified at a Committee hearing on March 1, 2001, regarding the Marc Rich pardon. After the hearing, the Committee discovered that Roger Clinton had lobbied for parole and executive clemency for Rosario Gambino. It appears that Roger Clinton had contacts with Lindsey on the parole matter and perhaps on the clemency request as well. Accordingly, the Committee asked Lindsey to participate in an interview with Committee staff regarding his role in the Gambino matter. Through his attorney, William Murphy, Lindsey informed the Committee that he would not participate in the requested interview. M. Meredith Cabe Meredith Cabe participated in a voluntary interview with Committee staff on March 16, 2001. However, after the interview, Committee staff learned of Roger Clinton's role in the Gambino matter. The evidence obtained by the Committee indicated that Cabe handled Gambino's clemency request at the White House. Therefore, Committee staff requested a new interview with Cabe. However, the Committee was informed by Cabe's attorney, William Murphy, that Cabe would not participate in an interview with Committee staff regarding the Gambino matter. N. Department of Justice The Department of Justice initially provided the Committee with records regarding two investigative matters related to Roger Clinton: first, records relating to the FBI's investigation of the effort to force John Katopodis to hire Clinton; and second, records relating to the FBI's investigation of Roger Clinton's relationship with the Gambino family. However, after providing the Committee with hundreds of pages relating to the Gambino matter, including sensitive Parole Commission files and the summary of Roger Clinton's interview with the FBI, the Justice Department suddenly stopped producing Gambino records to the Committee. The only reason the Justice Department gave for its decision was concern that Congressional access to the records would jeopardize the Department's ongoing criminal investigation of Roger Clinton. However, the records sought by the Committee related to the 1999 and 2000 investigation of Clinton and Gambino which was reportedly closed in 2000, not the Southern District of New York's investigation, which was commenced in 2001. The refusal of the Justice Department to provide these records prevented the Committee from developing any true understanding of the reasons for the Department's failure to pursue criminal charges against Roger Clinton. O. The White House Notwithstanding President Clinton's decision to refrain from invoking a privilege, the Bush Administration refused to provide the Committee with a number of key documents relating to the clemency process in the Clinton White House. As described previously, the only documents provided to the Committee regarding the consideration of clemency requests at the Clinton White House were produced by accident. Were it not for this inadvertent production, the Committee would not have had access to any documents at all from the Clinton White House related to the Gambino commutation effort. Despite the accidental production, the Bush Administration managed to withhold four additional Clinton White House records related to the Gambino commutation request.\966\ According to the National Archives, these four records contain internal White House deliberations regarding the Gambino matter.\967\ These records would potentially inform the Committee about how seriously the Gambino commutation was considered and why it was ultimately rejected. The Bush Administration's decision to withhold these records from the Committee is deeply troubling. In effect, it is keeping Congress and the American public from learning the full truth about the efforts of a major organized crime figure to obtain executive clemency through the paid efforts of President Clinton's brother. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \966\ See Letter from Gary M. Stern, General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 2, 2001) (within Appendix I). \967\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Exhibits referred to follow:] <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>