[DOCID: f:hr767.107]
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107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 107-767
_______________________________________________________________________
Union Calendar No. 482
DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE: THE PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS [PSI]
BACKLOG POSES A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
__________
SIXTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
October 24, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DAVE WELDON, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, October 24, 2002.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's sixth
report to the 107th Congress. The committee's report is based
on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs and International Relations.
Dan Burton,
Chairman.
(iii)
C O N T E N T S
Page
I. Summary..........................................................1
Findings................................................. 1
Recommendations.......................................... 2
II. Background.......................................................2
III. Discussion......................................................11
Findings................................................. 11
Recommendations.......................................... 36
(v)
Union Calendar No. 482
107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 107-767
======================================================================
DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE: THE PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS [PSI]
BACKLOG POSES A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
_______
October 24, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the
following
SIXTH REPORT
On October 9, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform
approved and adopted a report entitled ``Defense Security
Service: the Personnel Security Investigations [PSI] Backlog
Poses a Threat to National Security.'' The chairman was
directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.
I. Summary
The Government Reform Committee, National Security,
Veterans Affairs and International Relations [NSVAIR]
Subcommittee conducted an oversight investigation of the
Defense Security Service. The subcommittee examined the
agency's personnel security investigation [PSI] program to
determine the reasons behind a growing PSI backlog. Personnel
security investigations are conducted to determine whether an
individual should be granted access to classified information.
This is a critical first step in safeguarding the Nation's
secrets.
Findings:
1. The Defense Security Service cannot accurately
determine the size or forecast the elimination of the
personnel security investigations backlog.
2. There was a lack of management oversight of the
Defense Security Service by the Department of Defense
[DOD] that contributed to a backlog of personnel
security investigations.
3. Acquisition of the Case Control Management System
[CCMS] and the Joint Personnel Adjudication System
[JPAS] did not comply with the requirements of the
Clinger-Cohen Act and may not provide effective
caseload management.
4. There are no common standards for investigating
and adjudicating a personnel security clearance in a
timely manner.
5. Defense Security Service and the Office of
Personnel Management [OPM] personnel security clearance
investigators have difficulty accessing State and local
criminal history record information [CHRI].
Recommendations:
1. The Secretary of Defense should continue to report
the personnel security investigations program including
the adjudicative process as a material weakness under
the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act to ensure
needed oversight is provided to effectively manage and
monitor the personnel security process from start to
finish.
2. The Secretary of Defense should set priorities and
control the flow of personnel security investigation
requests for all DOD components.
3. The Secretary of Defense should closely monitor
the interface between JPAS and CCMS to ensure effective
management of investigative and adjudicative cases and
avoid further backlogs.
4. The National Security Council should promulgate
Federal standards for investigating and adjudicating
personnel security clearances in a timely manner.
5. The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General
jointly should develop a system which allows DSS and
OPM investigators access to State and local criminal
history information records [CHIR].
II. Background
Acts of espionage have had serious consequences for the
United States, military personnel and citizens. To prevent acts
of espionage, and to ensure the interests of the United States
are protected requires certain information concerning national
security be protected against unauthorized disclosure.
Information may not be classified unless its unauthorized
disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
national security. The degree of expected damage from
unauthorized release determines which of the three levels of
classification will be applied: TOP SECRET--``exceptionally
grave damage'' to the national security; SECRET--``serious
damage'' to the national security; and, CONFIDENTIAL--
``damage'' to the national security.\1\
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\1\ Executive Order No. 12356 of Apr. 2, 1982, National Security
Information Guidelines, Sec. 1.1, Classification Levels, Code of
Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register National Archives
and Records Administration.
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Each year thousands of classified programs and projects are
carried out by the U.S. Government. These activities generate
millions of items of classified documents and information used
by the military, civilian and contract employees. This
classified information is not only in the form of documents. An
enormous inventory of classified equipment and components must
be safeguarded. Increasingly, classified data is being
processed, transmitted and stored electronically, posing
serious new problems of protection.
The Department of Defense through the Defense Security
Service conducts personnel security investigations [PSI] to
determine whether an applicant should be granted access to
classified information. Upon completion of the PSI by DSS, the
information collected is sent to one of eight adjudication
facilities for security clearance determination.\2\
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\2\ Executive Order No. 12968 of Aug. 2, 1995, Access to Classified
Information, Sec. 1.2, Access to Classified Information, Code of
Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register National Archives
and Records Administration.
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At the end of fiscal year 2001 DSS reported, 2,127,476
active duty military, civilian, and contractor employees held
personnel security clearances: 62,108 employees held
confidential clearances, 1,607,727 employees held secret
clearances, 209,897 held top secret, and 247,744 held top
secret/SCI clearances. On average, an initial top-secret
investigation takes DSS approximately 521 days to complete and
the Office of Policy and Management approximately 108 days to
complete and costs approximately $2,400 per investigation for
DSS and approximately $2,775 per investigation for OPM.\3\
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\3\ Email from Lt. Colonel Leo Clark, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Subject: DSS Final Report, Feb. 15, 2002, (in subcommittee
files).
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The Department of Defense is requesting $443.0 million for
DSS operations for fiscal year 2003 a decrease of $51.3 million
over fiscal year 2002.\4\ The investigation budget for DSS and
OPM is $269.7 million and $157.4 million respectively.\5\
Despite the overall reduction, DOD is requesting an additional
$3.6 million for case control management system improvements in
fiscal year 2003 and increase of 29 percent over fiscal year
2002.\6\
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\4\ Defense Security Service, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Estimates,
February 2002, Exhibit Fund-14 Revenue and Expenses, (in subcommittee
files).
\5\ See supra note 3.
\6\ Defense Security Service, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Estimates,
February 2002, Exhibit Fund-9a, Activity Group Capitol Investment
Summary, (in subcommittee files).
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Three primary business areas comprise the DSS mission: No.
1, the Personnel Security Investigations Program, the
investigations conducted under this program are used by the DOD
adjudication facilities to determine an individual's
suitability to enter the armed forces, to access classified
information, or to hold a sensitive position within the
Department of Defense; No. 2, the National Industrial Security
Program [NISP] established by Executive Order 12829,\7\ which
primarily ensures private industry, colleges, and universities
that perform government contracts or research safeguard
classified information in their possession; and No. 3, the
Security Training and Education Program, which provides
security education and training programs to support DSS
components, DOD agencies, military departments and
contractors.\8\
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\7\ Executive Order No. 12829 of Jan. 6, 1993, National Industrial
Security Program, Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal
Register National Archives and Records Administration.
\8\ Defense Security Service, FY2003 Amended Budget Submission,
February 2002, p. DSS-2, (in subcommittee files).
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In addition, DSS supports counterintelligence, operation
and maintenance, and research and development activities of the
Department of Defense Polygraph Institute [DODPI].\9\ DODPI is
an educational, research and policy-establishing institute for
the forensic discipline of psychophysiological detection of
deception. The Defense Security Service is under the direction,
authority, and control of the Office Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
(OASD-C3I) in accordance with the provisions of DOD Directive
5105.42.\10\
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\9\ Ibid., p. DSS-11.
\10\ Department of Defense, Directive No. 5105.42, Subject: Defense
Security Service [DSS], May 13, 1999, (in subcommittee files).
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Top secret, secret, and confidential clearances require
reinvestigation every 5, 10, and 15 years, respectively. The
importance of reinvestigating and reevaluating a personnel
security clearance is as much a matter of national security as
the original background check. According to GAO, failure to
have an up-to-date security clearance would pose a threat to
national security.\11\
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\11\ Testimony of Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director, U.S.
General Accounting Office, NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 106-
267, p. 38.
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DSS conducts personnel security background investigations
within the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the trust territories. DSS
requests the military departments and other U.S. Government
agencies, as appropriate, to complete investigative leads in
areas not set forth above.\12\
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\12\ Defense Security Service, Personnel Security Investigation
Manual, revised Oct. 15, 1999, 1-329. DSS PSI Mission, pp. 6-7, (in
subcommittee files).
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A Defense Security Service personnel security investigation
[PSI] is intended to determine an individual's loyalty to the
United States, character, trustworthiness, honesty,
reliability, discretion, and judgment are such that the person
can be expected to comply with government policy and procedures
for safeguarding classified information.\13\
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\13\ See supra note 2, Sec. 3.1.
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In 1994, the Joint Security Commission determined
``national security policy was fragmented and lacked an
effective mechanism to ensure commonality. Multiple groups with
differing interests and authorities worked independently of one
another with insufficient integration of security policy and
procedures.'' \14\ Because of this fragmentation of security
policy and structure, the President established the Security
Policy Board to consider, coordinate, and recommend policy
directives for national security. The Security Policy Board was
the principal mechanism for reviewing and proposing to the
National Security Council [NSC] legislative initiatives and
Executive orders pertaining to security policy, procedures and
practices that do not fall under the statutory jurisdiction of
the Secretary of State.\15\ \16\
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\14\ Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence, p. 2, Feb. 28, 1994, Joint
Security Commission, Washington, DC 20505.
\15\ Security Policy Board Mission Statement (in subcommittee
files).
\16\ The Bush administration transferred the duties assigned to the
Security Policy Board to NSC Policy Coordination Committees pursuant to
Presidential Directive, NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security
Council System, Feb. 13, 2001, (in subcommittee files).
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In August 1995, under Executive Order 12968, ``Access to
Classified Information,'' the President directed the Board to
develop a set of uniform investigative standards and
adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access
to classified information.\17\ In 1997, the Security Policy
Board issued standard procedures to govern the access to
classified information.\18\ The investigative standards
developed by the Security Policy Board include examination of:
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\17\ See supra note 2.
\18\ Security Policy Board, Investigative Standards for Background
Investigations for Access to Classified Information, SPB Issuance 1-97,
Mar. 24, 1997, (in subcommittee files).
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<bullet> Birth and citizenship records;
<bullet> Corroboration of education;
<bullet> Verification of employment for the past 7 years and
interviews with supervisors and co-workers:
<bullet> Interviews with character references with social
knowledge of the subject;
<bullet> Neighborhood checks and interviews with neighbors to
confirm all residences for the past 3 years;
<bullet> National agency checks including the FBI and CIA;
<bullet> Financial review including a credit bureau check;
<bullet> Local agency check of criminal history records and
other public records to verify any civil or criminal court
actions involving the individual; and
<bullet> A personal interview with the individual.
The objectives of the investigative standards are to (1)
examine and assess various aspects of an individual's
trustworthiness and reliability, taking into account both
positive and negative issues and (2) bring some uniformity and
consistency to Federal processes to avoid unnecessary and
costly reinvestigations when an individual switches
agencies.\19\
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\19\ See supra note 2, Sec. 2.4.
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The standards for reinvestigations are essentially the same
as those for initial investigations, with two exceptions.
Reinvestigations do not require corroboration of proof of birth
and citizenship, and education. The basis for not requiring
this information for reinvestigation cases is that it is
obtained in the initial investigation, and does not change.\20\
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\20\ Ibid.
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The process of obtaining a security clearance begins with a
request from a military commander, contractor, or other DOD
official for a security clearance for an individual because of
the sensitive nature of his or her duties. The individual
completes the appropriate personnel security form for the level
of classification needed--CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP
SECRET.\21\ The Personnel Security form requires the candidate
for a security clearance to provide personal background
information needed to conduct the personnel security
investigation. The questionnaire is then forwarded to the
Defense Security Service's Operations Center.
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\21\ See supra note 12, Sec. 4, pp. 14-15.
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Defense Security Service analysts review clearance requests
to ensure all necessary forms are complete, develop a scope for
the investigation, and assign the required work to 1 or more of
the 12 DSS field-operating locations throughout the United
States. An investigation may be sent to one or more operating
locations depending on where the individual seeking clearance
has lived, worked, or attended school. Once received in the
field, an investigation is assigned to an investigator who
seeks information in that geographic location about the
individual's loyalty, character, reliability, trustworthiness,
honesty, and financial responsibility.
As the investigation elements are completed, the field
sends reports to the DSS Operations Center, where case analysts
determine if all investigative criteria have been met and all
issues relevant for a clearance decision have been resolved.
DSS sends the completed investigation to one of eight
adjudication facilities for security clearance determination.
The Army, Navy, Air Force, the National Security Agency
[NSA], the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals [DOHA], the Joint Chiefs of
Staff [JCS], and the Washington Headquarters Service [WHS]
operate the eight adjudication facilities.
The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient
period of the applicant's life to determine if the person is an
acceptable security risk.\22\ The adjudication process is the
weighing of a number of variables known as the ``whole person
concept.'' \23\ The whole person concept is the consideration
by the adjudicator of all available, reliable information about
the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, when
reaching a determination. In deciding if a clearance should be
granted or denied, the adjudication facility staffs base their
decision on the following adjudicative factors: \24\
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\22\ Security Policy Board, Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, SPB Issuance 2-97,
Mar. 24, 1997, (in subcommittee files).
\23\ See supra note 12, Sec. 4, p. 18.
\24\ Ibid., p. 17.
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<bullet> Allegiance to the United States;
<bullet> Foreign influence;
<bullet> Sexual behavior;
<bullet> Personal conduct;
<bullet> Financial consideration;
<bullet> Alcohol consumption and drug involvement;
<bullet> Emotional, mental, and personality disorders;
<bullet> Criminal conduct;
<bullet> Security violations;
<bullet> Outside activities; and
<bullet> Misuse of information technology
The ultimate determination of whether the granting or
continuing of eligibility for a security clearance must be
clearly consistent with the interests of national security
based upon careful consideration of the adjudication factors,
each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the ``whole
person.'' \25\
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\25\ Department of Defense, Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, DOD 5200.2-R, (in
subcommittee files).
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Since 1985, blue ribbon commissions \26\ and the General
Accounting Office [GAO], have recommended the quality,
timeliness and frequency of personnel security background
investigations be improved.\27\
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\26\ Keeping the Nation's Secrets: A Report to the Secretary of
Defense by the Commission to Review DOD Security Policies and
Practices, Nov. 19, 1985, DOD Security Commission, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC 20301, (in subcommittee files).
\27\ DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks, (GAO/NSIAD-00-12) in October 1999.
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More recently, management deficiencies identified by GAO
and the DOD-OIG included the failure of the Defense Security
Service, formerly known as the Defense Investigative Service,
to provide accurate and timely personnel security
investigations, inattention to personnel training, and the
acquisition and installation of new information technology
systems without the benefit of risk assessment, proper testing
or backup.\28\
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\28\ Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General Audit
Report, Program Management of the Defense Security Service Case Control
Management System, Report No. D-2001-019, Dec. 15, 2001.
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According to the 1994 Joint Security Commission Report,
delays in the investigative and adjudicative process contribute
directly to government costs.\29\ As far back as 1981, the
General Accounting Office reported to Congress nearly $1
billion was wasted annually because of investigative backlogs
at the Defense Security Service.\30\
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\29\ See supra note 14, p. 47.
\30\ Ibid.
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The subcommittee conducted three Defense Security Service
oversight hearings: on February 16, 2000,\31\ September 20,
2000,\32\ and March 2, 2001.\33\ The purpose of the hearings
was to examine performance and management challenges
confronting DSS, particularly the agency's plans to address the
personnel security investigations backlog and the extent to
which the automated case control management system can be
improved to address the backlog of security clearances.
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\31\ Defense Security Service Oversight Hearing, 106th Cong., 2d
sess., (2000) National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations [NSVAIR] Subcommittee hearing, Feb. 16, 2000, Serial No. 106-
152.
\32\ Oversight of the Defense Security Service: How Big is the
Backlog of Personnel Security Investigations?, 106th Cong., 2d sess.,
(2000) National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
[NSVAIR] Subcommittee hearing, Sept. 20, 2000, Serial No. 106-267.
\33\ Defense Security Service: Mission Degradation?, 107th Cong.,
1st sess., (2001) National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations [NSVAIR] Subcommittee hearing, Mar. 2, 2001, Serial No. 107-
40.
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The backlog was a result in large part due to lax OASD-C3I
oversight, DSS mismanagement, CCMS malfunctions, and OASD-C3I
and DSS's inability to keep pace with changing personnel
security clearance criteria and Presidential directives.
Hearing testimony offered optimistic views for determining
the size and timetables for the elimination of the personnel
security investigations backlog \34\ and ``dramatic
improvements'' \35\ in the case control management system
despite recommendations to replace the system.\36\
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\34\ Testimony of Lt. General Charles J. Cunningham Jr., USAF
(Ret), Director-Defense Security Service, National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations [NSVAIR] Subcommittee hearing,
Feb. 16, 2000, Serial No. 106-152, p. 114.
\35\ Statement of Lt. General Charles J. Cunningham Jr., USAF
(Ret), Director-Defense Security Service, National Security, Veterans
Affairs and International Relations [NSVAIR] Subcommittee hearing,
Sept. 20, 2000, Serial No. 106-267, p. 75.
\36\ TRW's Evaluation of DSS CCMS, Final Report, July 21, 1999,
Contract No: DASW01-99-F-3060-P001, June 22, 1999, (in subcommittee
files).
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Based on the testimony and documentary record, the
subcommittee concludes lax oversight of DSS by the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (OASD-C3I) contributed
directly to the degradation of DSS productivity and
effectiveness.\37\
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\37\ An Assessment of the Department of Defense Personnel Security
Program: A Report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Personnel
Security Investigations Process Review Team, Oct. 31, 2000, (in
subcommittee files).
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Proactive intervention by OASD (C3I) did not occur until
October 1999, after the backlog had attained crisis
proportions.\38\ Only after much criticism and scrutiny from
Congress,\39\ the media,\40\ other government agencies,\41\ and
defense contractors \42\ did the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence [C3I] request a serious review of the status and
options regarding the personnel security investigations
backlog.
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\38\ Ibid., p. 44.
\39\ The General Accounting Office [GAO] reviewed DOD's personnel
security investigative functions at the request of Congressman Ike
Skelton, ranking member, House Committee on Armed Services. GAO issued
the report DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks, (GAO/NSIAD-00-12) in October 1999.
\40\ USA Today, Pentagon Crisis: Security Check Backlog, Edward T.
Pound, June 3, 1999, (in subcommittee files).
\41\ Memorandum: Investigation Standards for Access to Classified
Information, Oct. 26, 1996, from Peter D. Saderholm, Director-Security
Policy Board to Richard J. Wilhelm, et. al., Co-Chair, Security Policy
Forum, (in subcommittee files).
\42\ Aerospace Industries Association, 1250 Eye Street NW., Suite
1200, Washington, DC 20005, Background Investigation Timeliness
Tracking Survey, December 2000, (in subcommittee files).
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The review produced an internal report issued February 8,
2001 entitled Personnel Security Investigations: Mission
Degradation! \43\ This report called for ``bold action'' \44\
and contained worse news, and more sweeping recommendations,
than the Assistant Secretary anticipated. The report shows that
the time to complete personnel security investigations upon
which clearances are based is getting longer. As the time to
complete investigations has grown, the number of investigations
pending is also growing. In December 2000, output exceeded
input for the first time, but it remains to be seen whether
this constitutes a trend or a one-time improvement.
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\43\ Personnel Security Investigations: Mission Degradation! OASD
(C3I) Security Directorate Draft Report for Comment, Richard F.
Williams, Director of Security, Feb. 8, 2001, (in subcommittee files).
\44\ Ibid., p. 1.
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Between June 9, 1999 and February 8, 2001,\45\ memoranda,
program initiatives, and policy directives to eliminate the PSI
backlog resulted in little improvement to provide timely
investigations and clearances to soldiers, sailors, airmen,
Marines, DOD civilian and defense contractors.
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\45\ Ibid., p. 21-24.
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As a result, defense contractors are losing qualified new
hires that cannot wait almost a year for DSS to complete an
initial investigation.\46\ In addition, defense contractors
have found themselves unable to perform billions of dollars of
work because employees have not obtained routine clearances.
These delays threaten to affect some facilities' ability to
effectively perform on defense contracts and meet cost
schedules. A survey conducted by the Aerospace Industries
Association revealed, as of December 2000, 12 percent of the
secret clearance requests were pending for more than 1 year and
30.6 percent of the top secret clearance requests were pending
for more than 1 year. Another survey conducted in November 1999
revealed it cost the aerospace industry an estimated $149.9
million for clearances more than 90 days old.\47\
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\46\ See supra note 42.
\47\ Aerospace Industries Association, 1250 Eye Street NW., Suite
1200, Washington, DC 20005, DSS Clearance Backlog Summary, November
1999, (in subcommittee files).
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In 1997, the DOD Office of Inspector General reported, the
Director of the Defense Security Service had designated DSS as
a ``reinvention laboratory'' to assess the agency's policies
and procedures in an effort to determine their relevance and
responsiveness to the users of DSS services.\48\ Under this
``reinventing government'' initiative, DSS management and
employees reviewed the investigation process to identify ways
to improve the quality and timeliness of investigations.\49\
Initiatives developed by DSS managers included:
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\48\ Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Report No. 97-196, Personnel Security in the Department of Defense, p.
17, July 25, 1997 (in subcommittee files).
\49\ Ibid., p. 5.
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<bullet> reorganizing and streamlining the agency,
<bullet> becoming a performance based organization
[PBO],
<bullet> implementing new investigative procedures to
improve the timeliness of investigations,
<bullet> automating the scope development and review
of investigations, and
<bullet> charging a fee for service.\50\
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\50\ Ibid.
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The following year, the Department of Defense Office of the
Inspector General (DOD-IG) conducted an audit of DSS to
determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the management of
the personnel security program. Specifically, the DOD-IG
reviewed the processes for conducting and the procedures for
disseminating information related to personnel security
investigations [PSI].\51\
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\51\ Ibid., Executive Summary.
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Although, at the time, the audit conducted by the
Department of Defense-Office of the Inspector General
``strongly supported'' Defense Security Service reinvention
efforts,\52\ GAO found DSS's initiative exacerbated the problem
of accurate and timely personnel security investigations
contributing to a massive backlog of PSI cases.\53\
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\52\ Ibid., p. 12.
\53\ See supra note 27.
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The backlog of PSI cases can be attributed to a number of
factors. In his memorandum of June 15, 2000, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I) wrote, ``the periodic
reinvestigation [PR] backlog has reached significant
proportions largely as a result of the PR quota that was
imposed from FY96 to present by this office as well as the
implementation of new national policy which lowered the
interval for SECRET PR's from 15 to 10 years and set a new 15
year PR requirement for CONFIDENTIAL PR's.'' \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Memorandum: Personnel Security Investigations Backlog, June
15, 1999, from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence Arthur L. Money to Secretaries of the
Military Departments, et. al., (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1995, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) directed
DOD components to cease submitting periodic reinvestigation
[PR] requests that were due to DSS,\55\ and then in June 1996,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) revised this directive
and established a quota system allowing DOD components to
submit up to 40,000 secret and 42,000 top secret PR requests
per year.\56\ Although these directives were intended to reduce
the turnaround time to process PSI cases, the directives
created a backlog and a pent-up demand for security clearances.
In addition, at that time, the Assistant Secretary announced
that DOD would adopt new investigative standards.\57\ These
standards provided less complete information for use by
adjudicators in determining whether to grant clearances, which
further delayed the security clearance process. And, finally
there were system failures of the newly deployed automated case
control management system for tracking and processing PSI
cases.\58\ All of these factors: the PR quota system; new
investigative standards; and CCMS failures all affected DOD's
capacity to process PSI cases and contributed to the backlog.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See supra note 27, p. 30.
\56\ Ibid.
\57\ Ibid., p. 19.
\58\ Ibid., p. 26-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Carol Schuster of the General Accounting
Office, ``Since 1998, various DOD documents and statements have
cited several widely divergent backlog estimates ranging from
about 452,000 to 992,000.'' \59\ The backlog was a result, in
part, of internal procedure changes in DSS. According to the
General Accounting Office, DSS officials stated that once the
agency became a reinvention laboratory, it was allowed to
operate, for the most part, at its own discretion with little
or no oversight from the Assistant Secretary of Defense-
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD-
C3I).\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Statement of Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director, U.S.
General Accounting Office, NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 106-
267, p. 8.
\60\ See supra note 27, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Knowing the accurate size of the backlog is an important
step toward effectively managing and eliminating the backlog.
In 1999 DSS attempted to determine the size of the PSI case
backlog. The MITRE Economic and Decision Analysis Center was
hired to work with DSS to conduct an analysis of the backlog
through the use of formal statistical sampling and manual
counts.\61\ MITRE reported in 2000, with 95 percent confidence,
the true size of the backlog population falls between 206,107
and 558,552 cases.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Mitre Technical Report, The Defense Security Services Backlog
of Periodic Reinvestigations: Statistical Analysis and Risk
Prioritization Procedure, p. iii-iv, February 2000, Paul R. Garvey, et.
al., (in subcommittee files).
\62\ Ibid., p. v.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 1998, to expedite PSI case processing, the
Defense Security Service acquired and deployed a new
information technology system referred to as the Case Control
Management System at a cost of $100 million.\63\ The stated
goals of CCMS were to simplify the investigative process by
eliminating unnecessary manual activity, and automate the
processes associated with the overall management of PSI
cases.\64\ CCMS was supposed to expedite PSI case processing by
linking all relevant information critical to an investigation
through a network of DSS subsystems.\65\ PSI case processing
includes the collection, tracking, adjudication, and
disseminating of information about security clearances for more
than 15 million individuals. The CCMS network is primarily
located at the DSS Personnel Investigations Center in Fort
Meade, MD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ General Accounting Office briefing for the House Committee on
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations [NSVAIR], briefing slide, p. 30, Nov. 8,
1999, (in subcommittee files).
\64\ See supra note 48, p. 9.
\65\ See supra note 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1999, assessments of the case control management system
were conducted by TRW \66\ and a DOD Red Team.\67\ Those
assessments found deficiencies in acquisition strategy, program
management, system integration, and operations and maintenance.
It was estimated that an additional $87.2 million to $103
million would be needed fiscal year 1999-2006 to address the
deficiencies for a system that was projected to cost $100
million when fully operational.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ See supra note 36.
\67\ DOD Red Team Advanced Draft, Red Team Recommendations--
Transition Ahead, July 14, 1999.
\68\ See supra note 36, Sec. 7, p. 67-68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to GAO, the case control management system
suffers serious weaknesses and will be far more difficult to
fix than DSS anticipates. During the September 2000 NSVAIR
Subcommittee hearing, addressing the CCMS issue, the Director
of DSS stated, ``there were dramatic improvements resulting
from the software enhancements and corrections that have been
implemented within the last 6 months.'' \69\ Yet the DOD-IG in
December 2000 recommended the Assistant Secretary of Defense-
C3I analyze whether the investment for the Case Control
Management System provides the best business solution when
compared to alternative solutions for opening, tracking, and
closing personnel investigation cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ See supra note 35, p. 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Security Service is making progress since the
subcommittee's oversight investigation of the agency began a
little more than 2 years ago. However, DSS has a long way to go
to resolve systemic problems of tracking and promptly
completing personnel security investigations. In the meantime,
national security risks increase and the need for additional
financial resources grows.
According to Donald Mancuso, Acting Inspector General,
``Simply put, the inability to track and promptly complete
personnel security investigations has had a devastating effect
on the Department's ability to ensure that national security is
protected and that military, civilian and contractor employees
have the timely clearances needed to complete their jobs. On a
human level, the lack of timely clearances prevents people from
obtaining employment in DOD, and in the case of contractor
employees, causes the loss of hundreds of millions of tax
dollars paid to contractors or for employees awaiting
clearances.'' \70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Testimony of Donald Mancuso, Acting Inspector General, Office
of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, NSVAIR Subcommittee
hearing, Serial No. 106-267, p. 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Discussion
FINDINGS
1. The Defense Security Service cannot accurately determine the size or
forecast the elimination of the personnel security
investigations backlog.
The Defense Security Service has a personnel security
investigation backlog that has ranged from approximately
350,000 to 900,000 cases. The disparity in the range is a
result of different methodologies used to count the backlog,
efforts to prioritize the most sensitive personnel security
investigations, and the elimination of cases as a result of
changes in employment status for the individual needing a
security clearance. Priorities for investigations by category
include presidential support, sensitive compartmented
information [SCI], and special access programs [SAPs] which
impose need-to-know or access controls beyond those normally
provided for access to confidential, secret, or top secret
information.\71\ The inability to prioritize investigations has
resulted in extensive delays in clearances for some high
priority projects.\72\ Additionally, there is currently no
automated method for notifying DSS of a priority investigation.
The requester has to notify DSS when a priority investigation
is provided and special processing is necessary. DSS manually
pulls the request and moves the investigation case to the front
of the queue.\73\ It is currently taking, on average, more than
a year to complete a personnel security reinvestigation for
someone needing a top-secret clearance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ See supra note 37, p. 19.
\72\ Ibid.
\73\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testifying before the NSVAIR Subcommittee, GAO's Carol
Schuster, Associate Director for National Security Issues
stated, ``There were several reasons that led to this backlog.
The implementation of a quota system on the number of PSI
requests that could be submitted created a pent-up demand
contributing to the backlog. Then we had new requirements \74\
that were instituted during this period for re-investigations
on secret and confidential clearances. Those had not been
requirements before. So this added to the backlog. Also, the
automated case control management system that we were talking
about just did not work. CCMS system failures contributed to
the backlog.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Between August 1996 and February 1999, DSS issued 31 policy
letters directly related to the manner in which investigations were to
be conducted. Several letters announced policy changes that gave
investigators greater discretion in how they would meet the standards
or pursue issues that might be of significance in deciding to grant
clearances. Several of these policies were inconsistent with Federal
investigative standards in the requirement to conduct local agency
checks of criminal history records, and the verification of public
records regarding divorce, bankruptcy, or other court actions,
involving the subject.
\75\ Testimony of Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director, U.S.
General Accounting Office, NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 106-
152, p. 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carol Schuster stated DSS also pointed to additional
factors contributing to the backlog, ``One is that they feel
that there are more people requesting clearances because of the
growing number of information technology jobs that may require
clearances, and the reduction of DSS staff and investigators
the agency experienced as a result of DOD downsizing. So all of
those problems collectively contributed to the problem.'' \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A consultant for DSS reported in February 2000 the effect
downsizing had on the Defense Security Service. ``As a result
of the general downsizing of defense agencies in recent years,
DSS staffing has been significantly reduced, dropping from
about 4,000 in 1991 to about 2,500 in 1998. In particular, DSS
investigators fell from 1,650 to 1,250 during the same period.
Meanwhile, the investigative workload for clearances has
remained fairly constant over that time.'' \77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ See supra note 61, p. 1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As congressional \78\ and media \79\ scrutiny intensified,
concerns were raised regarding the growing backlog of personnel
security investigations, and the affect the backlog would have
on national security. As a result, the NSVAIR subcommittee
asked the General Accounting Office to determine how DSS
estimates the backlog, assess the soundness of DOD's backlog
estimates, and identify the plans DSS developed to address the
backlog problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Letter from Congressman Ike Skelton of Missouri to the General
Accounting Office a review of DOD's personnel security functions, Mar.
25, 1998.
\79\ See supra note 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The General Accounting Office reported its findings in
August 2000. According to GAO findings, the personnel security
reinvestigations backlog for defense, civilian, and contractor
personnel was approximately 505,000 reinvestigations, and
growing, with an additional 480,000, which had not yet been
submitted to DSS from DOD and the military departments.
However, the subcommittee learned the actual backlog size was
still unknown because existing personnel security databases
cannot provide an accurate count of overdue reinvestigations.
``In the absence of a Department-wide database that can
accurately measure the reinvestigation backlog, DOD estimates
the backlog on an ad-hoc basis, using manual counts and
statistical sampling as the primary methods. Using the sampling
method, DOD makes a rough and known to be inaccurate estimate
from existing personnel security databases.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ DOD Personnel: More Action Needed to Address Backlog of
Security Clearance Reinvestigations, (GAO/NSIAD-00-215), p. 1-2, U.S.
General Accounting Office, in August 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In that regard, the subcommittee also learned the survey
process for determining the backlog was flawed. When the Office
of the Secretary of Defense asked Military Departments and
Defense agencies to survey their commands and organizations in
1999, they failed to provide the methodology for determining
the size of the backlog. As a result, no standard format was
used to obtain the figures. Some just filled out the
information by using manual counts, while others did a sample
survey. A second survey conducted a few months later again did
not address methodology. As a result, it appears programs and
agencies reported lower numbers giving the erroneous impression
that DOD was making progress eliminating the PSI backlog.
From June 9, 1999 to February 8, 2001 the Department of
Defense issued 13 policy directives and reports to manage and
eliminate the growing backlog of personnel security
investigations. These included:
<bullet> June 9, 1999--Deputy Secretary of Defense
memorandum, Personnel Security Clearance Investigations
Backlog, directed the elimination of the backlog by
September 30, 2000. The memorandum expanded the DOD
investigative capacity by shifting a part of the DOD
civilian PSI workload to the Office of Policy and
Management, directed each military department and
defense agency to provide a quarterly plan for
eliminating the backlog. The Deputy Secretary further
directed that each military department and defense
agency to administratively terminate or downgrade all
clearances not based on a current investigation or not
in process for reinvestigation by September 30, 2000.
<bullet> June 15, 1999--Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I) memorandum, Personnel Security Clearance
Investigations Backlog, implemented the Deputy
Secretary's memorandum of June 9, 1999 by directing a
minimum number of additional periodic reinvestigations
to OPM for DOD civilian employees and all others to
DSS. The Assistant Secretary stressed military
departments and defense agencies would be expected to
identify the resources necessary to fund backlogged of
periodic reinvestigation's over and above those already
programmed as well as accomplish the adjudications at
the backend end of the PSI process.
<bullet> September 29, 1999--Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I) memorandum, Personnel Security Clearance
Investigations, directed all initial investigations of
DOD civilian personnel, except overseas investigations,
would be conducted by OPM, and rescinded the June 9,
1999 directive to administratively terminate or
downgrade all clearances not based on a current
investigation or not in process for reinvestigation by
September 30, 2000.
<bullet> November 1999--At a meeting of the Defense
Management Council, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
called for the creation of an Overarching Integrated
Process Review Team [OIPT] to find a cure for the PSI
backlog problem, and to chart a new path for the
future. The Team defined the backlog to be those
periodic reinvestigations exceeding the timeframe for
which a reinvestigation is required and which has not
yet been submitted to the investigative agency.
<greek-l><bullet> deg. The Team asked the military
departments to determine their backlog according to the
established backlog definition. For DOD agencies and
contractors the team used previously developed
estimates rather then developing new counts. The Team
reported their findings and recommendations in January
2000. The Team determined that the periodic
reinvestigation backlog totaled 505,786. The Team
recommendations included the transfer of all secret and
confidential investigations to OPM and restoration of
funding for the Joint Personnel Adjudication System to
improve management of the population actually receiving
access to the most classified information.
<bullet> March 31, 2000--Deputy Secretary of Defense
memorandum, Personnel Security Clearance Investigations
Backlog, directed implementation of the OIPT
recommendations and extended the timeline for
eliminating the PR backlog to March 31, 2002.
<bullet> June 1, 2000--Deputy Secretary of Defense
memorandum, Personnel Security Investigation Process
Review, directed a comprehensive review to baseline the
reform of the personnel security process, to establish
a ``get well'' date, and make additional
recommendations to expedite the personnel security
process effort. A Process Review Team was established
to accomplish this effort.
<bullet> June 22, 2000--Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) memorandum, Personnel Clearance Backlog
and Security Initiatives, generally referred to as the
``Spend Plan,'' extended the timeline for eliminating
the PR backlog to September 30, 2002. The plan provided
monthly targets for all DOD components for submitting
investigative requests to DSS and OPM, along with the
associated funding. PSIs were distributed between DSS
and OPM in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of
Defense memorandum dated March 31, 2000.
<greek-l><bullet> deg. The plan called for sending
415,841 cases to OPM in fiscal year 2001 and 395,908 in
fiscal year 2002. During the same period, DSS was to
process 558,619 new cases and 128,000 existing cases in
fiscal year 2001; and 388,598 new cases plus 307,000
existing cases in fiscal year 2002. This accounted for
all carryover work at DSS and all new work to be
submitted over fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002,
both backlog cases and the steady-state workload.
<greek-l><bullet> deg. In addition, the memorandum
call for the appointment of a senior official by each
component to monitor processing of personnel security
investigations to DSS and OPM, and to establish
procedures for monitoring and executing the plan within
the component.
<bullet> August 22, 2000--Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I) memorandum, Personnel Security Clearance
Investigations, implemented the Spend Plan by providing
instructions to the components for submitting
investigative requests including quarterly progress
reports. To ensure success, the military departments
and defense agencies were required to appoint a senior
official to monitor the processing of investigations to
DSS and OPM and encouraged to have their Inspectors
General include compliance as a matter of interest
during inspections for fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year
2002.
<bullet> September 11, 2000--Deputy Secretary of
Defense memorandum, Personnel Security Investigation
Process Review, directed all military departments and
defense agencies to conduct a periodic reinvestigation
survey because the backlog baseline may have changed
considerably due to a lapse of time and the efforts of
the Departments in submitting PR requests.
<bullet> October 11, 2000--The report, An Assessment
of DOD's Plan to Eliminate the Periodic Reinvestigation
[PR] Backlog, responds to the second of three
assessment directives issued by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense on June 1, 2000. The June 1, 2000 directive
called for the establishment of a process review team
[PRT] to assess DOD's plan to eliminate the backlog of
overdue periodic reinvestigations by September 30,
2002. The PRT determined DOD would not meet the
September 30, 2002 target date for elimination of the
PR backlog. The PRT did not consider the submission of
the overdue PR requests sufficient to eliminate the
backlog. Rather, the PRT considers the backlog
eliminated once the investigations have been completed
and adjudicated and the workloads of DSS and the
Central Adjudication Facilities [CAFs] return to a
steady state.
<bullet> October 31, 2000--The report, An Assessment
of the Department of Defense Personnel Security
Program, responds to the first and third directive
issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on June 1,
2000 to determine where DOD currently stands in
reforming the PSI process, and recommend how to
expedite the reform effort. The assessment team
conducted a thorough review covering the major steps in
the PSI process including requesting the investigation,
conducting the investigation, adjudicating the results
of the investigation, and oversight and funding of the
program.
<bullet> December 14, 2000--The Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) revised the Spend
Plan to incorporate the adjustment of the backlog from
505,786 to 316,995 in accordance with the Process
Review Team's survey results pursuant to the directive
issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on September
11, 2000.
<bullet> February 8, 2001--Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I) Security Directorate
released the draft report, Personnel Security
Investigations: Mission Degradation, which called for
bold action to address current PSI backlogs. The
purpose of the draft report is four fold: No. 1, to
serve as a frame of reference for surfacing various
options and reactions to organizations both within and
outside the Department; No. 2, to be used to further
refine the situation with those who are performing PSI
work for DOD; No. 3, to serve as a think piece for DOD
senior executives who will be reviewing the progress on
balancing PSI funding and workload issues; and No. 4,
to present options for consideration by the
interagency.
On June 9, 1999, Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre
issued a memorandum, ``Personnel Security Clearance
Investigations Backlog'' directing the military departments,
defense agencies, and contractors to eliminate the backlog by
the end of fiscal year 2000.\81\ This was the first of four
target dates calling for the elimination of the PSI backlog.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Memorandum: Personnel Security Investigations Backlog, June 9,
1999, from Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre to Secretaries of
the Military Departments, et. al., (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Deputy Secretary's memorandum of June 9,
1999 attempted to ease the pressure on DOD investigative
capacity by shifting a part of the workload to the Office of
Personnel Management. The memorandum also directed each service
and DOD agency to provide the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence a
quarterly plan for eliminating the backlog. The Deputy
Secretary of Defense further directed the services and defense
agencies to administratively terminate or downgrade all
clearances not based on a current investigation or not in
process for reinvestigation by September 30, 2000.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 15, 1999, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Arthur L.
Money issued a memorandum ``Personnel Security Clearance
Investigations backlog'' implementing Deputy Defense
Secretary's June 9, 1999 memorandum with respect to cost,
process, and prioritization.\83\ The memorandum directed all
components to identify the resources necessary to fund the
elimination of the backlog. The memorandum changed personnel
security reinvestigation policy directing each service, agency,
and contractor not to apply for security investigations for
those within 1 year of separation from DOD employment, or who
will be assigned to duties for which a personnel security
clearance is not required.\84\ This policy change had serious
national security implications by allowing a person to continue
in a sensitive position without the required periodic
investigation. The policy change was a violation of personnel
security clearance standards adopted and approved by the
Security Policy Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ See supra note 54.
\84\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In that regard, even when the Deputy Secretary of Defense
thought OASD (C3I) had a handle on the true size of the
backlog, no provision was made for providing for additional
funds to eliminate the backlog of PSI requests, nor was there
any specific strategy available for processing the minimum
number of additional PSI requests over and above those already
programmed to be conducted.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ Memorandum: Personnel Clearance Backlog and Security
Initiatives, June 22, 2000, from Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) William J. Lynn to Secretaries of the Military
Departments, et. al., (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO also pointed out this directive had drawbacks,
specifically the lack of funding. Carol Schuster stated, ``We
recommended to the Secretary of Defense to direct the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I) to identify and prioritize overdue
investigations and fund and implement initiatives to conduct
these investigations in a timely manner.'' \86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ Statement of Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director, U.S.
General Accounting Office, NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 106-
152, p. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 29, 1999, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Arthur L.
Money issued a memorandum ``Personnel Security Clearance
Investigations'' directing the submission of all initial
investigations and reinvestigations of DOD civilian personnel
to OPM effective October 1, 1999.\87\ It stated DSS would
continue to conduct investigations for military personnel, for
civilian personnel stationed overseas, and for contractor
personnel.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Memorandum: Personnel Security Investigations, Sept. 29, 1999,
from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence Arthur L. Money to Secretaries of the
Military Departments, et. al., (in subcommittee files).
\88\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By November 30, 1999, it became apparent the actions DOD
had taken to date were not getting the results anticipated. As
a result, Deputy Secretary of Defense called for the creation
of an Overarching Integrated Process Team [OIPT] to find a
solution for the backlog problem and to ``pioneer a different
path to solve the crisis of the continuing personnel security
investigations backlog,'' and to submit a plan by January 20,
2000.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ Memorandum: Personnel Security Investigations Backlog, Mar.
31, 2000, from Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre to Secretaries
of the Military Departments, et. al., (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The team reported their findings and recommendations in
January 2000. The team determined the backlog totaled 505,786
and recommended additional personnel security investigation
cases be transferred to OPM.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ See supra note 43, p. 21-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As mentioned earlier, DOD's two attempts to determine the
backlog size had methodological limitations, produced estimates
that were 6 months old or older, and did not include thousands
of overdue reinvestigations that had been submitted. The two
estimates, one by the Overarching Integrated Process Team and
the other by the MITRE Corp., were developed independently and
used different estimating methods but coincidently arrived at
similar estimates of about 505,000 overdue reinvestigations.
These estimates differed from several previous backlog
estimates that were cited by GAO in various DOD documents and
statements.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ See supra note 80, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the February 16, 2000 NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing,
the DSS Director stated, ``I am accepting their number.
However, I do not have total confidence in it.'' \92\ When
asked to clarify this statement, the DSS Director said, ``While
the number (PSI backlog) could be lower, I think the number is
higher. That is my professional judgment.'' \93\ Carol
Schuster, Associate Director of GAO concurred stating, ``I
cannot tell you what the size of the backlog is. I would really
question whether they have an exact fix it on.'' \94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ See supra note 34, p. 111.
\93\ Ibid.
\94\ See supra note 11, p. 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This was finally confirmed by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I) during the September 2000 NSVAIR
Subcommittee hearing. ``While there is some concern about the
various methodologies used to arrive at the size of the
backlog, it was acknowledged that a more accurate assessment
would prove problematic. The difficulty in assessing the
precise scope of the backlog is due to the limitations of the
current DOD central clearance database, which contains records
for approximately 2.5 million cleared DOD military, civilian
and contractor personnel. This problem will be resolved when
DOD fields the Joint Personnel Adjudication System in fiscal
year 2001. JPAS will require continuous tracking (and input) of
an individual's actual access requirement upon which the
periodic reinvestigation is based.'' \95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Statement of J. William Leonard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, NSVAIR
Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 106-267, p. 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JPAS is designed to provide DOD with the ability to provide
real-time data on the number of personnel currently authorized
to have access to classified information, and will facilitate
accurate forecasting of reinvestigation requirements. In
addition, JPAS could further support reciprocity by including
clearance data from non-DOD agencies.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ See supra note 37, p. 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOD stated, ``JPAS will provide all DOD components, for the
first time, a single, central, fully integrated system for
managing their cleared personnel and providing accurate
statistics on such things as projected periodic review
requirements and whose PSI is pending or closed.'' \97\ In
addition, the DOD-IG reported, JPAS will provide DOD with a
common information resource for granting and sharing personnel
security eligibility determinations and recording personnel
access to sensitive information.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ DOD response to Questions for the Record Inquiry, Mar. 27,
2001, House Government Reform Committee, NSVAIR Subcommittee, Defense
Security Service hearing, Mar. 2, 2001, (in subcommittee files).
\98\ Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General Audit
Report, Acquisition Management of the Joint Personnel Adjudication
System, Report No. D-2001-112, May 5, 2001, (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the projected ability to field JPAS in fiscal year
2001, once again, was overly optimistic. According to the DOD's
Deputy Inspector General, ``Although the future Joint Personnel
Adjudication System is the long term solution, it is agreed
that the case control management system would be modified this
year as an interim alternative. Due to subsequent slippage in
baselining the system, the change may not be made until fiscal
year 2002.'' \99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing,
Serial No. 107-40, p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without knowing with any certainty the size of the PSI
backlog but suspecting it could be higher, the DSS Director
said at the February 16, 2000 NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, ``We
believe that we can bring the backlog, as we now know it, we
can eliminate the backlog by the end of calendar year 2001.''
\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ See supra note 34, p. 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following month, DOD changed the PSI backlog
elimination target date a third time. On March 31, 2000, Deputy
Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre issued another
memorandum,\101\ ``Personnel Security Clearance Investigations
Backlog'' directing the Military Departments, Defense agencies,
and contractors shift all new Secret and Confidential level
investigations to OPM through its contractor US Investigations
Services [USIS] and changing the target date for elimination of
the backlog to March 31, 2002.\102\ DSS would retain
responsibility for all top secret investigations and
reinvestigations for military and contractor personnel. The
objective was to reduce pressure on DSS for conducting hundreds
of thousands of investigations while leveraging OPM's
investigative capacity.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ See supra note 89.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 1, 2000, Deputy Secretary of Defense Rudy de Leon
issued the memorandum, ``Personnel Security Investigation
Process Review'' directing a comprehensive review of the
personnel security process, to establish a ``get well'' date,
and make additional recommendations to expedite the personnel
security process effort. A Process Review Team was established
to accomplish this effort.\104\ Once again the Department was
attempting to ascertain the size of the backlog and when it
would be eliminated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ Memorandum: Personnel Security Investigation Process Review,
June 1, 2000, from Deputy Secretary of Defense Rudy de Leon to
Secretaries of the Military Departments, et. al., (in subcommittee
files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 22, 2000 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
William J. Lynn issued the memorandum, ``Personnel Clearance
Backlog and Security Initiatives,'' generally referred to as
the ``spend plan.'' \105\ The directive included monthly
targets for all DOD components for submitting PSI requests to
DSS and OPM, along with the associated funding to eliminate the
backlog. The Comptroller estimated the Department would need an
additional $201.6 million over 2 fiscal years to fund PSI cases
taken over by OPM in addition to the funds already planned in
the budget at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ See supra note 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department had finally recognized additional funding
was needed to address the growing PSI backlog.
GAO had recommended as part of their review of the
Personnel Security Investigation Program in October 1999 that
DOD provide additional funding to address the PSI backlog.
According to Carol Schuster, ``One of the problems that has
occurred over the last couple of years is they have mandated
(PSI) submissions, but the money has not been behind it. So the
services have been cajoled to put in submissions, but the money
has to be reprogrammed from other programs in order to cover
it. That has been true for 1999, it has been true for 2000, and
it is true for 2001. When the money is not there and the
services choose not to reprogram the money for that purpose,
then the submissions are not made.'' \106\ The Comptroller also
moved the backlog elimination target date to September 30,
2002.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ See supra note 11, p. 47.
\107\ See supra note 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``spend plan'' mandated that each DOD component submit
a designated quota of backlogged cases each quarter of fiscal
year 2001 and fiscal year 2002. If implemented as planned, all
backlogged cases as of September 2000, were to be submitted by
the end of fiscal year 2002. These cases were to be in addition
to those cases coming due for reinvestigation and new cases.
Together, these new submissions represented a very large influx
of cases given that there was already a large backlog of
unprocessed cases at DSS. GAO had estimated that the number of
PSI cases involved was 2.2 million, raising additional
concerns.
Several other attempts were made to increase capacity to
process PSI cases. These included entering into contracts with
private sector investigative firms and bringing a number of
reservists onto active duty to assist DSS.\108\ General Charles
J. Cunningham Jr., USAF (Ret), Director, Defense Security
Service informed the subcommittee, ``Our plan to use private
sector contractors to augment our investigative workforce has
continued to materialize and is proving to be a successful
endeavor. In addition, to contractor augmentation, we are also
using military reservists to augment our investigative
workforce. Currently, approximately 45 reservists who have
prior investigative and interviewing experience are integrated
into our agent workforce.'' \109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ See supra note 36, p. 78.
\109\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although these were positive steps, they were not seen as
enough to handle the increase in PSI cases expected as a result
of the implementation of the spend plan. According to GAO,
``it's really hard to tell exactly what kind of an effect this
large influx of cases is going to have and whether the use of
private contractors and reservists and the like are going to
make a dent in that.'' \110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ See supra note 11, p. 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carol Schuster stated, ``we've already gone over how flimsy
the 500,000 is so we don't really know whether that's a good
estimate or not. We do know how many cases are called carryover
cases-those already submitted to DSS. Over the next 2 years,
they've got 435,000 of those cases. Then you've got the
backlogged cases and then you've got new cases coming in. So
all told, we're talking about an enormous workload here of 2.2
million cases coming into the investigative community. As I
understand it, the spend plan for this 2-year period is just to
get the cases submitted, and then it is up to the investigative
community to somehow deal with that. We haven't really seen the
influx yet. A lot of the cases that are going to OPM really
start at the beginning of the fiscal year in October
(2000).''\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other efforts to reduce the backlog and identify potential
high-risk cases included the development of a predictive model
or algorithm to track those cases. Carol Schuster stated,
``They are taking several actions. One in particular, I think,
is very promising. They are working on an algorithm that will
try to identify those cases that are most likely to result in a
denial of a clearance, based on their past experience. That
will allow them, if they can get this to work, to identify
those cases that are most risky to the government and be able
to process those in a priority manner.'' \112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ See supra note 75, p. 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the subcommittee's DSS oversight hearing in February
2000, DSS Director General Charles J. Cunningham submitted
written testimony which stated, ``DSS has established several
initiatives to more effectively manage this significant
increase in clearance demand while at the same time reducing
the inherent risks associated with outdated investigations in
individuals already accessing classified information, thus
reducing the vulnerability of insider threat. One of those
initiatives is the development of a predictive model to
identify those cases that pose a higher risk based on responses
to certain questions on the personnel security questionnaire.
The algorithm will be applied at the front end of our
investigative process to ensure that the potential high-risk
investigations receive priority processing.'' \113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ Statement of Lt. General Charles J. Cunningham Jr., USAF
(Ret), Director, Defense Security Service, Serial No. 106-152, p. 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The MITRE Corp. was retained by DSS to develop the
algorithm. The MITRE Corp. produced ``a statistically based
prioritization procedure whereby a high percentage of the
`latent revocations' among the backlog could be identified and
given immediate attention, based solely on the information
provided in a standard Electronic Personnel Security
Questionnaire [EPSQ]. Such a method would allow the DSS to
allocate limited investigative resources so as to remove a high
percentage of the risky backlog cases in the shortest amount of
time.'' \114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ See supra note 61, p. iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responding to the question of what kind of risk assessment
had been developed to determine the danger the backlog poses to
national security, the DSS Director stated, ``GAO mentioned the
algorithm that we have been working on and we have now
completed. Our plan is to go into the total population of the
backlog, apply the algorithm, identify which records come up as
high risk from the algorithm, which we believe and have had
scientific support will predict 89 percent, based on a 6.5
percent sample size, that we use it against the backlog while
we are bringing the backlog down. So that we both work the
backlog down and, in the process, go after those that are
identifiable as highest risk in the backlog.'' \115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ See supra note 34, p. 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At that time, General Cunningham indicated DSS expected to
implement an algorithm and have a prioritization process for
backlog cases by July 2000. The algorithm for identification of
high-risk cases was implemented in November 2000.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ See supra note 97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The prioritization of backlog cases proved even more
difficult to implement. As a result, the lack of any effective
priority tracking procedures has subjected DSS to criticism
from both the DOD-IG and the services. In April 2000, an Office
of the Inspector General [OIG] audit report recommended that
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) develop
criteria to determine the highest priority mission-critical and
high-risk positions based on their impact on mission-critical
programs.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General Audit
Report, Security Clearance Investigative Priorities, Report No. D-2000-
111, Apr. 5, 2000, Executive Summary, p. 14, (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According the Acting Inspector General, ``I think the only
way to really handle the problem is to allow the various DOD
components the opportunity to prioritize what they feel is
truly important in their work, and to, therefore, fit those
concerns into the plan. So I think it should be on a broad
basis and not just for a few of the high-risk programs. When
you're seeking consensus and agreement on how to prioritize,
it's going to take a while longer than it would take to simply
direct it from the top. It is my understanding that process is
continuing, that the Department hopes to have some sort of
process in place in the next few months.'' \118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ See supra note 70, p. 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Acting Inspector General went on to say, ``The
clearance requests for important programs and higher risk
programs often languished while investigators often worked
routine cases. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(C3I) initially disagreed with the feasibility of developing a
prioritization method but has subsequently changed its position
and has been working with the services and DSS to comply with
the recommendation. I'm still frankly disappointed, however,
with the slow progress, and am concerned that it appears so
difficult to implement what is to us a basic workload
management tool. We believe this delay was unnecessary and
could have been avoided through firm decisionmaking by
leadership.'' \119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ Ibid., p. 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to DOD component resistance and ongoing CCMS problems,
DSS did not expect to implement a risk prioritization process
until January 2001. Regarding the implementation of a
prioritization process, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Security and Information Operations) stated, ``the
recent problems with CCMS and the resulting increase in DSS
case completion times, prioritization has become problem as
case completion times have soared to a year or more in some
cases. The OSAD (C3I) has taken the lead in developing with the
DOD component customers a draft prioritization plan.'' \120\ A
prioritization process for backlog cases was not implemented in
January 2001.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ See supra note 95, p. 66.
\121\ Ibid., p. 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2001 the subcommittee learned, from the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I) Arthur L. Money, ``CCMS, which is
part of all of this, is getting more stable and better, but it
needs a prioritization application program added to it so we
can prioritize things, and that is what that report (Personnel
Security Investigations: Mission Degradation) pointed out. That
internal report pointed out that we do not have prioritization
within DSS, which is being fixed and will be in place in April
2001.'' \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Testimony of Arthur L. Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, NSVAIR
Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 107-40, p. 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 22, 2000, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Arthur L.
Money issued a memorandum ``Personnel Security Clearance
Investigations'' implementing the Deputy Secretary's direction
to distribute the personnel security clearance workload between
DSS and OPM.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ Memorandum: Personnel Security Clearance Investigations, Aug.
22, 2000, from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence Arthur L. Money to Secretaries of the
Military Departments, et. al., (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Assistant Secretary also directed military departments,
defense agencies, and contractors, per the Comptroller's
``Spend Plan,'' to appoint a senior official to oversee the
execution of their workload plan. Under DOD Directive No.
5200.2 issued April 9, 1999,\124\ DOD components had previously
been directed to designate a senior official to implement and
administer the DOD Personnel Security Program. The senior
component official would be responsible for monitoring and
reporting the status of availability of sufficient funds,
ensuring the PSI backlog workload distribution is maintained,
and ensuring the timely adjudication of completed cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Department of Defense Directive, No. 5200.2, Apr. 9, 1999,
DOD Personnel Security Program, (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 11, 2000, Deputy Secretary of Defense Rudy de
Leon issued a memorandum, ``Personnel Security Investigation
Review'' directing military departments, defense agencies, and
contractors to review their requirements for personnel security
reinvestigations.\125\ The Process Review Team that the Deputy
Secretary created on June 1, 2000 determined that the backlog
baseline had changed due to lapse of time and the efforts of
the components in submitting personnel security reinvestigation
requests. An update of the backlog was considered essential for
planning and funding decisions. The results indicated that the
backlog had dropped by 187,677 cases from 505,786 as reported
in January 2000 to 318,109 in just 6 months.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Memorandum: Personnel Security Investigation Review, Sept.
11, 2000, from Deputy Secretary of Defense Rudy de Leon to Secretaries
of the Military Departments, et. al., (in subcommittee files).
\126\ An Assessment of DOD's Plan to Eliminate the Periodic
Reinvestigation Backlog, A Report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Personnel Security Investigations Process Review Team, Oct. 11, 2000,
p. 4, (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On October 11, 2000, the Deputy Secretary's Process Review
Team formally reported the results of their review analyzing
when DOD should expect the PSI process to ``get well'' as
tasked by the Deputy Secretary's memorandum of June 1,
2000.\127\ The Process Review Team report revealed a dispute
over what PSI cases were to be considered as part of the
backlog. The OASD (C3I) considered the backlog eliminated when
all of the overdue PRs have been completed for investigation.
``Although, this goal represents an important milestone, a
process review team reported, the elimination of the backlog
means completion of investigations associated with those PRs,
the adjudication of the investigations, and a return of the
pending workload to steady state.'' \128\ The Process Review
Team considers the backlog eliminated once the investigations
have been completed and adjudicated and the workloads of DSS
and the Central Adjudication Facilities [CAFs] return to steady
state. ``Assuming that DSS completes the last backlog
investigation by mid to late FY2003, the last backlog cases
would be adjudicated not later than the end of FY2003. At that
time, the backlog will be eliminated and investigative workload
will return to a steady state.'' \129\ This marked the fifth
time in a 1\1/2\ year period that the target date for
elimination of the backlog moved farther down range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ Ibid.
\128\ Ibid., p. 5.
\129\ Ibid., p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenting on DOD's ability to carry out this plan and
achieve the new benchmark date for the elimination of the
backlog, Deputy Inspector General Robert J. Lieberman said,
``As far as the prospects for execution of the current plan are
concerned, I don't think that we can be fully confident that we
understand how many new investigations are going to be required
until the system that Mr. Money referred to, the new system
that is just being fielded now, is actually in place and starts
generating experience data that we can all rely on. I think in
another year or so we will be looking at the numbers again and
perhaps the plan does not have to be stretched out. It may be
evident that we will achieve this steady-state sometime
earlier, but my guess is that we will not be seeing this
steady-state for a few months after the end of the project
plan.'' \130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Testimony of Deputy Inspector General, Robert J. Lieberman,
NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 107-40, p. 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On October 31, 2000, the Deputy Secretary's Process Review
Team responded to the remaining tasks as directed by the Deputy
Secretary's memorandum of June 1, 2000. This report responds to
the first and third tasks, to determine where DOD currently
stands in reforming the PSI process with recommendations of how
to expedite this reform effort.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ See supra note 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 14, 2000, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) issued a revised spend plan to
incorporate the adjustment of the backlog from 505,786 to
318,109 in accordance with the process review Process Review
Team's survey results. The report included performance
expectations for completing personnel security investigation
cases and a $44.1 million reduction in funding for fiscal year
2001 and fiscal year 2002.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), Plan for Eliminating the Personnel Security
Investigation Backlog, Dec. 14, 2000, (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 8, 2001, the Director of Security, OASD (C3I)
released a draft report on the status and possible options
regarding the conduct of personnel security investigations by
DSS.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ See supra note 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The draft report indicated, ``the time to complete the
types of investigations upon which clearances are based was
getting longer, not shorter.'' \134\ As the time to complete
investigations has grown, the number of investigations pending
also grew. ``If this trend remains static, there is no
probability that the backlog of periodic reinvestigations will
be reduced by the end of FY 2002, as currently directed.''
\135\ However, according to Assistant Secretary of Defense
Arthur L. Money, ``the draft report was not reviewed; and it is
not entirely accurate. You will see it has `draft' on it and so
forth, so it was a failing within my office of not having the
report vetted and made more accurate.'' \136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Ibid., p. 4.
\135\ Ibid., p. 10.
\136\ See supra note 122, p. 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenting on the February 8, 2001 draft report, the Deputy
Inspector General stated, ``It is likely that much of the data
being used to track progress against the plan is flawed, but
the errors are probably not egregious enough to distort the
overall trends, which are very disappointing.'' \137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ See supra note 99, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The draft reports states quite clearly, ``When observed as
a whole, the current process as defined by the various
directions and plans contained in the policy memoranda that
have been issued by senior DOD management since June 1999, is
not meeting the Department's need to provide timely
investigations and clearances.'' \138\ When queried further why
the draft report shouldn't be given more creditability, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary J. William Leonard said the draft
report did not include the PSI workload completed by OPM.
Secretary Leonard said if the draft report had included the OPM
workload, DDS turnaround time for completed PSIs would have
been lower. ``When we were here last September (2000), we
reported to the committee that a good part of our plan
encompassed off-loading work from DSS to OPM. So therefore, any
assessment of that plan would have to take into account what
OPM is doing.'' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ See supra note 43, p. 4.
\139\ Testimony of J. William Leonard, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence,
NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 107-40, p. 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPM had the capacity to handle personnel security
investigations, and after 1 year demonstrated the ability to
complete those investigations transferred from DSS in an
accurate and timely manner.\140\ OASD (C3I) senior management
wanted the subcommittee to accept the argument that the draft
report was flawed because the authors did not include OPM's
statistics in the calculation of the number of cases processed
and how long it was taking to process those cases. As Mr.
Leonard went on to say, ``And so, for example, for the first
quarter OPM did, I believe close to 28,000 investigations for
the Department of Defense, and if they were factored into case
completion times, for example, what it would have shown is that
Department-wide case completion times actually decreased.''
\141\ DSS was taking credit for OPM's ability to complete
personnel security investigations in a timely manner and wanted
to include those figures in a report that would have shown
improved progress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ See supra note 126, p. 15-16.
\141\ See supra note 139, p. 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also, it should be noted the composition of the
investigations handled by each is not the same. OPM handles
many cases that can be processed by simple computerized checks,
whereas almost all of DSS workload involves the most labor-
intensive and time-consuming background investigation work
related to top-secret clearances. Therefore, the time necessary
to complete a case varies widely between DSS and OPM. The
handling of PSIs by OPM was not intended to be a permanent fix
and as such should not be included in any measurement of DSS's
workload capacity.
When pressed further regarding the accuracy of the draft
report relative to the Department's need to provide timely
personnel security investigations and clearances, Deputy
Assistant Secretary J. William Leonard stated, ``Don't get me
wrong. I am not saying that we are where we want to be. We
recognize that we are not on a glide path, so from that point
of view, the fundamental thing you get out of that report is
accurate. And we are very mindful of that and we are focused on
that.'' \142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The January 2002 Department of Defense, Office of the
Inspector General semi-annual report to Congress highlighted
``The inability of the Defense Security Service Program to
ensure timely investigations also remains a serious concern.
The Defense Security Service has increased its productivity and
the Office of Personnel and Management has provided good
support through its contractors to work off the backlog of
several hundred thousand overdue clearance investigations and
achieve reasonable turnaround times for new investigations
requests. The program remains hampered, however, by uncertain
projections of the future investigative workload. There is
widespread skepticism among DOD components about the ability of
DSS to efficiently handle more workload, yet DSS views the
outsourcing of much of the investigative workload to OPM as a
temporary measure. The long delayed transition of DSS to a pay-
for-service organization remains a key DOD management
objective, but DSS still lacks a cost accounting system.''
\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ Inspector General, Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report
to Congress, Apr. 1-Sept. 30, 2001. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. There was a lack of management oversight of the Defense Security
Service [DSS] by the Department of Defense that contributed to
a backlog of personnel security investigations.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence [C3I] is the Department of
Defense's senior agency official responsible or the personnel
security program. Responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary
(C3I) include oversight of the Defense Security Service, and
direction, administration and oversight of the DOD personnel
security program.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ See supra note 37, p. 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the DOD Personnel Security Committee [DODPSC]
and Executive Steering Group [ESG] were established in 1999 to
provide input and support to DOD's personnel security program
management.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1999, the General Accounting Office reported the Defense
Security Service operated for at least 4 years with little or
no oversight from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
[C3I] which is responsible for assessing the completeness of
DSS investigative work.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ See supra note 27, p. 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Substantiating this in his prepared statement for the March
2, 2001 NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Deputy Inspector General
Robert J. Lieberman stated, ``senior DOD leaders paid very
little attention to the Defense Security Service before the
crisis broke.'' \147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ See supra note 99, p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A report, issued October 31, 2001, to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense assessing the personnel security program observed
oversight of the personnel security program by the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) had not been
effective.\148\ DOD officials told GAO that once DSS became a
reinvention laboratory, it was allowed to operate, for the most
part, independently.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ See supra note 37, p. 9.
\149\ See supra note 27, p. 29-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an example, from August 1996 through February 1999, DSS
relaxed its investigative requirements through a series of
policy letters.\150\ Several of these letters gave
investigators greater discretion in how they would meet the
Federal standards or pursue investigative issues that might be
significant. These policy changes caused much confusion among
agency staff.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Ibid., p. 20.
\151\ Ibid. p. 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1996 and again in 1998, the Security Policy Board
advised DSS not to adopt policies that ran counter to the
Federal investigative standards.\152\ The Director of the
Security Policy Board staff stated, ``Apparently, rather than
fight for adequate funding, DSS has chosen an assault on
personnel security clearance standards.'' \153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ See supra note 41.
\153\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Board noted that DOD was a full partner in developing
the new standards and that the planned actions by DSS would
undermine the objectives of achieving reciprocity and PSI
standardization among Federal Government agencies, cause a
serious deterioration in the quality of investigative work, and
increased security risk. The Policy Security Board stated that
if DSS wanted to change the standards the agency should bring
such requests to the Board, which was specifically established
for that purpose. According to GAO, in spite of this advice,
DSS management adopted the relaxed investigative guidance.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ See supra note 86, p. 13-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When questioned how lack of oversight and mismanagement of
the agency contributed to PSI weaknesses found in GAO's review
of the Personnel Security Investigation Program, Carol R.
Schuster, Associate Director, stated, ``We found weaknesses in
several areas. The first area was relaxing the standards below
Federal standards, and also allowing perhaps too much latitude
with their investigators as to how far and how deeply they went
into the investigative areas. The second area was doing away
with some of the quality control mechanisms they had on those
investigations. They did away with the Quality Assurance
Branch, and supervisory review, for instance. In the training
area, they just really were not giving very much training to
the investigators. Because there were new investigative
standards, there was a need for such training. They also did
away with the Security Institute, which was training not only
to DSS investigators, but investigators throughout the
Government.'' \155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ See supra note 75, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of oversight also affected the acquisition of the
Case Control Management System. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I) has the responsibly for monitoring
major IT acquisitions.\156\ Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy
Inspector General stated, ``we have spent about $100 million so
far on CCMS.'' \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ See supra note 28, p. 3.
\157\ Testimony of Deputy Inspector General, Robert J. Lieberman,
NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 106-267, p. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the September 20, 2000 hearing, the subcommittee
learned CCMS would be designated a major acquisition project 4
years after the project began. In his prepared statement Donald
Mancuso, Acting Inspector General wrote, ``We understand that
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) intends to designate CCMS as
a major acquisition project, meaning there will be oversight by
an Integrated Process Team and the Chief Information Officer
[CIO] at the Office of the Secretary of the Secretary of
Defense level. This is a prudent step, but does not in itself
guarantee close oversight.'' \158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ Statement of Donald Mancuso, Acting Inspector General, DOD,
Office of the Inspector General, NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial
No. 106-267, p. 34-35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When acquiring major IT systems, the Clinger-Cohen Act
\159\ requires the Chief Information Officer [CIO] to monitor
and evaluate the performance of information technology programs
and advise the heads of agencies whether to continue, modify,
or terminate a program.\160\ Carol R. Schuster, Associate
Director, stated, ``to my mind (CCMS) is the biggest challenge
that they face. That automated system was just not planned
properly. It was not implemented properly. The people who were
trying to procure that system and manage it really were not
totally qualified to do that. They did not have the background
in a major acquisition program. They did not have the
information technology expertise to really do that.'' \161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ 41 U.S.C. Sec. 251 (The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996).
\160\ See supra note 98, p. 7.
\161\ See supra note 75, p. 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur J. Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
conceded CCMS oversight failures stating, ``A program that had
started in 1995, called case control management system, was
installed. Now, here was a major failure. It was installed
without testing, and the legacy system was turned-off never to
be turned back on, or never could be turned back on.'' \162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\ See supra note 122, p. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And, acknowledging the lack of acquisition and deployment
oversight of CCMS by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense J.
William Leonard stated, ``I am sitting here before you with the
full knowledge that a significant part of the solution is to
address shortcomings in past oversight from my organization,
especially with respect to things such as overseeing the
acquisition of a major automation system such as CCMS. I
recognize that and am very much committed personally and
organizationally to ensure that we address these issues in the
months to come.'' \163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ See supra note 95, p. 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, in that regard, there was more involved in the
failure of CCMS than just software and design problems. In
December 2000 the DOD Inspector General indicated in an audit
of the case control management system that ``despite the key
roll of CCMS in DSS operations that support virtually all DOD
critical missions, minimal acquisition oversight and guidance
was provided or offered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.'' \164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ See supra note 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Others have also noted the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (OASD-C3I) had difficulty providing adequate
management oversight. The Report of the Commission to Assess
U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization noted,
``The current ASD (C3I) organization suffers from three
difficulties: the span of control is so broad that only the
most pressing issues are attended to and (space) matters are
left, on a day-to-day basis, in the hands of middle-level
officials without sufficient influence within the Department
and the interagency arena.'' \165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ Public Law 106-65, Report of the Commission to Access United
States National Security Space Management and Organization, Executive
Summary, Jan. 11, 2001, p. 21, (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insufficient influence within the Department and
interagency arena was again evident in an OASD (C3I) August 22,
2000 directive \166\ concerning compliance with a newly
established workload plan for the elimination of the PSI
backlog. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) merely
``encouraged (emphasis added) the Military Departments and
Defense agencies to have their Inspectors Generals include
compliance as a matter of interest during inspections for
FY2001 and FY 2002 to preclude the recurrence of the PSI
backlog.'' \167\ As the PSI backlog grew to crises proportions,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) should have been made
clear the PSI backlog should be treated more than just as a
matter of interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ See supra note 123.
\167\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Acquisition of the Case Control Management System [CCMS] and the
Joint Personnel Adjudication System [JPAS] did not comply with
the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act and may not provide
effective caseload management.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) is
responsible for overseeing the design and implementation of
large information technology systems are on schedule, within
acceptable cost parameters, and have full user satisfaction.
The Subcommittee found the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I) has a poor record for controlling the
proliferation of incompatible IT systems, acquiring new systems
that meet user needs within reasonable timeframes, controlling
acquisition and upgrade costs, and ensuring the quality of
data.
As a result, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I) allowed the acquisition and development of CCMS
\168\ and JPAS \169\ without first determining whether the
systems were the most cost-efficient and cost-effective
solution for opening, tracking, closing, and adjudicating
personnel security investigation cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ The case control mangement system was deployed in October
1998.
\169\ The Air Force is testing and deploying JPAS. Current legacy
adjudication systems will operate in parallel with the deployed JPAS.
Initial operational capability is planned for October 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of oversight resulted in the deployment of a major
IT system, the case control management system, that has put
national security at risk and will require millions of
additional dollars to fix or replace. The Defense Security
Service's deployment of CCMS resulted in decreased productivity
contributing to the periodic reinvestigation backlog. CCMS has
become a costly attempt to maintain a failing status quo
despite recommendations to scrap the system.\170\ DSS will
spend more to fix the CCMS than it cost to acquire it.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ See supra note 36, Sec. 7, p. 67-68.
\171\ Ibid., p. 1-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CCMS was designed to guide and control the Defense Security
Service Enterprise System for opening, tracking, and closing
personnel security investigation cases. The Enterprise System
is a combination of 24 distinct primary information systems,
subsystems, applications, and interfaces that share common data
and connectivity.\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ See supra note 28, p. i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenting on the acquisition of CCMS, the Acting DOD
Inspector General Donald Mancuso stated, ``The need for a
modern DSS system with the capabilities intended for CCMS is
undeniable; however, as has often been the case over the last
decade with DOD information technology investments, execution
of this system acquisition project was flawed. In retrospect,
DSS and its contractors badly underestimated the technical risk
and failed to test adequately to manage those risks.'' \173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ See supra note 158, p. 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DSS believed establishing a paperless Enterprise System of
automated applications would avoid as much as $80 million in
operating costs over a 6 year period and $900 million over a 3
year period in reduced time for personnel security
investigations.\174\ Without knowing the extent to which CCMS
is meeting cost and benefit expectations, DOD was not in a
position to make informed decisions on whether to deploy the
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ See supra note 28, p. i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal information technology investment management
guidelines require Federal agencies to economically justify IT
projects before investing in them, and to justify them in an
incremental manner to spread the risk of doing many things over
many years on large projects.
In December 2000, the DOD Office of the Inspector General
issued an Audit Report citing DSS for not effectively managing
the high risk involved in the acquisition and integration of
CCMS and its Enterprise System by following the requirements of
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996,\175\ OMB Circulars and DOD
guidance for acquisition of information technology systems. The
Clinger-Cohen Act requires agencies to design and implement a
process for assessing and managing the risks of information
technology acquisitions to include analyzing, tracking,
evaluating, and reporting on risks and results of all major
information technology capital investments.\176\ In addition,
DOD regulations require every system acquisition program to
establish cost, schedule, and performance objectives and
thresholds before a major IT system is deployed.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ Ibid., p. 3.
\176\ Ibid., p. 15.
\177\ DOD Regulation 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major
Defense Acquisition Programs and Major Automated Information Systems
Acquisition Programs, Mar. 15, 1996 (revised June 2001), (in
subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In February 2000, Carol Schuster, Associate Director of
GAO's National Security International Affairs Division stated,
``DSS did not properly plan for the implementation of a new
system (CCMS) designed to automate its personnel security
investigation case processing. As a result, DSS has not been
able to process its investigations, the volume of
investigations sent to field offices and adjudication
facilities has decreased sharply, and according to DSS
officials, DOD may have to add $100 million to $300 million
more to the $100 million already spent on its automation
efforts to have a workable system. The automation efforts have
exacerbated DSS's efforts to cope with the large backlog of
overdue investigations.'' \178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\ See supra note 86, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carol Schuster went on to say, ``the basic underlying
factors are that it really was not planned very well as an
acquisition program. The people were not very well qualified in
either IT or acquisition management.'' \179\ DOD's Acting
Inspector General Donald Mancuso concurred stating, ``The
failure of CCMS, the DSS case control management system, was
also a major setback.'' \180\ The DOD-IG reported, ``Prior to
September 2000, neither the CCMS nor the rest of the Enterprise
System was designed as a major automated information system or
a special interest initiative. Funds contractually obligated
for the Enterprise System's development and modernization
amounted to $76 million from FY 1995 through FY 1999. Total
planned development and operation costs for FY 2000 through FY
2007 are estimated to be $312 million.'' \181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ See supra note 75, p. 32.
\180\ See supra note 70, p. 20.
\181\ See supra note 28, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When questioned what was the biggest problem the agency
faced, the Director of DSS stated, ``It is the case control
management system because it becomes the pacing item for
everything else that happens in the agency in investigations.''
\182\ And, Assistant Secretary Money stated, ``What happened in
October 1998 was, essentially everything came to a grinding
halt in that no cases were coming out due to software failure,
system failures, and I will assert due to poor design on what
CCMS ought to be.'' \183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ See supra note 34, p. 117.
\183\ See supra note 122, p. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) and
the Defense Security Service are attempting to resolve CCMS
technical and program problems by initiating a series of
actions designed to improve and enhance system performance. In
August 1999, recognizing the agency did not have the capability
or in-house expertise to manage and support the case control
management system, DSS transferred management of the system to
the Air Force.
In addition, DSS is implementing a strategy to repair CCMS
technical and program problems to improve the system's ability
to open, track and close personnel security investigation
cases. The aim is to expand the utility, efficiency, and
effectiveness of CCMS to meet projected workload increases
resulting from implementation of the spend plan.
The strategy will involve a three-phase process and
timetable: Phase one would stabilize the existing system; phase
two would improve the current system; and the third phase would
implement enhancements to CCMS. Those enhancements, called
``target architecture,'' would be developed and implemented
over 5 years starting in fiscal year 2002. DSS has requested an
additional $93 million to develop and implement phase
three.\184\ According to the Director of DSS, ``This target
architecture provides a framework for future development and
implementation of the entire Defense Security Service
Enterprise System, including the case control management
system.'' \185\ DSS believes the three-phase approach will not
only allow for stabilization of the system and improvements to
CCMS, but will preserve the initial investment in the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\ Letter from Lt. Gen Charles J. Cunningham, Jr., USAF (Ret),
Director, Defense Security Service to Congressman Christopher Shays,
chairman, NSVAIR Subcommittee, July 26, 2000, (in subcommittee files).
\185\ See supra note 35, p. 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The August 22, 2000 memorandum issued by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I) included detailed instructions to
the DOD components transferring a portion of the personnel
security clearance workload to OPM to fulfill the comptroller's
spend plan directive. In part, this action was taken in an
attempt to relieve the pressure on CCMS thereby allowing the
system to more rapidly process incoming background
investigations.\186\ However, according to TRW, the case
control management system's serious weaknesses will be far more
difficult to fix than DSS anticipates.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\ See supra note 95, p. 62.
\187\ See supra note 36, p. 1-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2000, the DOD Inspector General recommended the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) analyze whether the
investment for the Case Control Management System provides the
best business solution when compared to alternative solutions
for opening, tracking, and closing personnel investigation
cases.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ See supra note 28, p. ii, (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2001, responding to the DOD IG's recommendation,
the Assistant Secretary for Defense (C3I) wrote, ``DSS and C3I
concur with the finding and recommendation as stated in the DOD
IG report. We will conduct an analysis of alternatives to
support the direction we plan to achieve for the future
architecture and will include the economic analysis and
calculation of the return on investment. In addition,
performance measures and information assurance requirements
will also be addressed.'' \189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ Memorandum: Audit Report on Program Management of the Defense
Security Service Case Control Management System (No. D-2001-019), Jan.
23, 2001, from Arthur L. Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) to
the DOD IG Office of Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Director,
Acquisition Management (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As criticism of OASD (C3I) and DSS intensified over the
handling of the case control management system, and as
questions were raised regarding the justification for spending
more to fix the system than it originally cost to purchase, DSS
brought in consultants to evaluate the system. Carol Schuster
stated, ``Regarding past evaluations, there was a DOD red team
that came in, and evaluated what they should do with that
system, and what went wrong with the system, and what they
would recommend. A TRW contractor evaluation also looked at it
from a technical standpoint.'' \190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ See supra note 75, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The assessments found deficiencies in acquisition strategy,
program management, system integration, and operations and
maintenance. TRW estimated that an additional $168 million
would be needed over the next 7 years to address these
deficiencies for a system that was projected to cost $100
million when fully operational. Ultimately, TRW believed CCMS
could not be reengineered cost-effectively and recommended
scrapping the system altogether. ``It is our engineering
judgment that CCMS is not viable long-term and that it should
be replaced. Such a replacement should be developed under the
auspices of a strong, acquisition-experienced program
management office.'' \191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ See supra note 36, p. 1-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carol Schuster stated, ``Both of those groups pointed out
numerous problems with the way the thing was put together, the
lack of documentation, the lack of checks and controls, just
what you would expect of an automated system, to the point that
the TRW investigation did not feel like it was salvageable.''
\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ See supra note 75, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the criticism, DSS persisted in plans to spend more
to fix CCMS, and contracted with TRW for a follow-up,
independent evaluation. In response to an inquiry from the
chairman of the NSVAIR Subcommittee regarding the justification
of continuing investment in CCMS, DOD responded, ``TRW reported
in October 2000 that they now believe it is possible to retain
and reuse substantial parts of the system. The system has
sufficient stability to support operations for the foreseeable
future. As improvements are made, alternatives are reviewed for
impact and application for the various subsystems. No
commitment to a future architecture for CCMS will be made
without first conducting a thorough analysis of alternatives.''
\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ See supra note 97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the October 2000 NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing,
addressing the CCMS issue, the Director of DSS stated, ``there
were dramatic improvements resulting from the software
enhancements and corrections that have been implemented within
the last six months.''\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ See supra note 35, p. 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2001, responding to questions \195\ for the record
from the NSVAIR Subcommittee, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I) reported, ``The case Control
Management System is not contributing to any increase in the
pending backlog. CCMS has been stabilized and recent
improvements allow the Defense Security Service to take
advantage of the original functional design to minimize human
intervention and repetitive tasks. Efforts were refocused on
stabilizing and improving the system to ensure a productive
system. Actions were taken as necessary to meet directed policy
scope changes, to baseline the current system, and to stabilize
key processing functions. While we have taken advantage of the
original CCMS functions as intended, the changing PSI and
technology requirements dictate an assessment of needs for the
current baseline as well as future requirements. Future target
architecture and business process reengineering requirements
are in the concept stage with a formal Analysis of Alternatives
scheduled for early fiscal year 2002.'' \196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ See supra note 97, p. 8.
\196\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also in May 2001, the DOD-IG issued an audit report \197\
regarding the acquisition management of the Joint Personnel
Adjudication System. JPAS will provide DOD with a common
information resource for granting and sharing personnel
security eligibility determinations and recording personnel
access to sensitive and non-sensitive compartmented
information. Its common database, linked by the Joint
Adjudication Management System [JAMS] and the Joint Clearance
and Access Verification Management System [JCAVS] applications,
will standardize security clearance adjudications in compliance
with DOD Regulation 5200.2-R,\198\ and will provide security
managers with eligibility verifications for personnel desiring
access to sensitive and classified facilities, weapon systems,
and information. JPAS will also provide reports for programming
and managing workloads at the Central Adjudication Facilities
[CAFs] and locations requiring cleared personnel.\199\ JPAS is
expected to minimize work delays for newly hired and visiting
personnel with adjudicated clearances.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ See supra note 99.
\198\ Ibid., p. 1.
\199\ Ibid.
\200\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with CCMS, OASD did not manage the JPAS as an
information technology investment when the acquisition strategy
changed from a network of distributed database systems to a
centralized database system.\201\ The DOD Chief Information
Officer [CIO] did not demonstrate oversight involvement in the
acquisition of the JPAS. JPAS supports the eligibility
adjudication and verification business processes for granting
security clearances to military, civilian, and contractor
personnel. Accordingly, any processing delay caused by JPAS
could also delay DOD and contractor personnel from performing
assigned functions. As a result, JPAS requires CIO oversight
because of its significance in supporting DOD missions.'' \202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ Ibid., p. 8.
\202\ Ibid., p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. There are no common standards for investigating and adjudicating a
personnel security clearance in a timely manner.
The subcommittee found there were no clear timeliness
standards for completing a personnel security clearance. As an
example, the length of time for completing a top-secret
clearance by the Defense Security Service in 2000 ranged from
298 days to 376 days.\203\ Completion times by OPM were lower.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ See supra note 43, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DSS Director General Cunningham indicated as a result
of reforms instituted, the agency would be able to do a case in
180 days and that his target for completing a personnel
security investigation was less than 100 days.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\ Testimony of Lt. General Charles J. Cunningham, Jr., USAF
(Ret), Director, Defense Security Service, NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing,
Feb. 16, 2000, Serial No. 106-267, p. 88.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also testifying regarding the length of time it takes to
complete a security clearance investigation, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense J. William Leonard stated, ``The reason
why the arrow is pointing to the left \205\ is because in one
particular category, the most complex cases, OPM case
completion times have gone up beyond the standard. However, the
reason for that is because of the amount of work that we are
giving out, we are dependent upon what I call `third-party
providers of information.' We have to do FBI checks, INS
checks, State Department checks, what have you. Those are the
other activities that we are dependent upon. The more we push
out, the more they have to respond to. That is the challenge we
have today as a community. I have directed my people to get
together on a community-wide effort. We need to collectively
address this, because it is not an OPM problem, it is a
community problem that impacts DSS and impacts every other
agency that does background investigations.'' \206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ Deputy Assistant Secretary Leonard is referring to a ``Plan
Success Factor'' chart that compared success factors for processing
PSIs by DSS and OPM. The success factor for OPM's Performance
Expectations was pointing left, toward failure, even though overall OPM
was at the high end of the chart. See NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing,
Serial No. 107-40, p. 29.
\206\ See supra note 139, p. 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Defense Security Service [DSS] and the Office of Personnel
Management [OPM] personnel security clearance investigators
have difficulty accessing State and local criminal history
record information [CHRI].
The Personnel Security Investigations Process Review Team
reported, ``Conducting a local agency check to obtain a
criminal history record is a national requirement for all
security clearance investigations. In some cases, a criminal
history record can be obtained from State and federal
repositories, thus fulfilling the local agency check
requirement. However, the cooperation and priorities of local
law enforcement agencies providing criminal history records
varies depending on jurisdiction. In many cases, conducting a
local agency check can cause significant delays in closing a
PSI investigation.'' \207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ See supra note 37, p. 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``State and municipal law enforcement agencies do not
receive separate funding or resources for conducting local
agency checks and often require payment for such checks as
local policies dictate. Payment of fees does not appear to be
an effective inducement for local agencies to comply with
requests in an expeditious manner as response time does not
change as a result of payment.'' \208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DSS drafted proposed legislation which required access be
given by all States to criminal history information through
automated systems where available. ``The legislation passed
without two key aspects: authorization for federal agencies to
obtain criminal history record information on the basis of name
or other common identifiers, and a prohibition on requiring
indemnification agreements.'' \209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ Ibid., p. 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Personnel Security Investigations Process Review Team
recommended the Office of the Secretary of Defense
representative to the Security Policy Board \210\ coordinate
with the Department of Justice to develop incentives for local
enforcement agencies to comply with requests for criminal
history record information and to press for the enactment of
the two unresolved issues.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ See supra note 16. [The Security Policy Board [SPB] was
abolished pursuant to NSPD No. 1. The functions of the SPB were
transferred to the National Security Council, Policy Coordinating
Committee on Feb. 13, 2000.]
\211\ See supra note 37, p. 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Secretary of Defense should continue to report the personnel
security investigations program including the adjudicative
process as a material weakness under the Federal Managers'
Financial Integrity Act to ensure needed oversight is provided
to effectively manage and monitor the personnel security
process from start to finish.
Given the fact personnel security investigations are not
conducted in a timely manner; many investigations are not
meeting required national investigative standards, and long
range milestones are planned beyond fiscal year 2001 to improve
DSSs automation capabilities, the subcommittee recommends DOD
continue to report the Personnel Security Investigations
Program as a material weakness under the Federal Manager's
Financial Integrity Act [FMFIA].
The FMFIA requires DOD's senior managers to identify and
solve department wide systemic problems. The General Accounting
Office recommended this action as a result of their review of
the PSI program. GAO found personnel security investigations
were not conducted in a timely manner nor were they meeting
Federal investigative standards, thus having a potential effect
on national security. During the NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing in
February 2000 Carol Schuster stated, ``They are designating
this investigation program, as a material weakness to the
Department of Defense under the Federal Manager's Financial
Integrity Act.'' \212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ See supra note 75, p. 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Defense has made some headway in reducing
the backlog of personnel security investigations as well as
resolving the problems associated with tracking, processing,
and adjudicating PSI's in a timely manner. However, the NSVAIR
subcommittee recommends the Department of Defense continue to
include the Personnel Security Investigation Program as a
material weakness under the Federal Manager's Financial
Integrity Act.
Specifically, the subcommittee recommends the Secretary of
Defense include in the Annual Statement of Assurance what
progress and what action the Defense Security Service and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) are taking
with regard to achieving the September 30, 2002 target date for
the elimination of the PSI backlog, and for reducing the time
it takes to grant a security clearance for new PSI's and
periodic reinvestigations.
In a prepared statement submitted to the NSVAIR
Subcommittee, the Deputy Inspector General stated, ``We
included the personnel clearance problem in the list of top DOD
management challenges submitted to congressional leaders last
December and recommend continued DOD and congressional
oversight until the problem is truly resolved. I am confident
that ultimately it is fixable with sustained management
emphasis, but the current goal of eliminating the investigative
backlogs by September 30, 2002, is clearly at risk. In
addition, it is uncertain that all backlog cases will be
adjudicated until well after that date.'' \213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\ See supra note 99, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DOD-OIG reported, ``any large-scale shift of
investigative workload back to DSS should be done incrementally
and on a trial basis, with close oversight of the results. Any
transfer must be justifiable on the basis that DSS will be able
to out-perform OPM in terms of the cost, timeliness, and
quality of investigations. The DOD-OIG plans additional audit
work on these issues for the remainder of FY 2002.'' \214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ See supra note 143, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Deputy Inspector General said, ``I would
not be surprised if the current plan has to be recast one more
time, because I don't think that we can be fully confident that
we understand how many new investigations are going to be
required until the system (JPAS) that Mr. Money referred to,
the new system (JPAS) that is just being fielded now, is
actually in place and starts generating experience data that we
can all rely on.'' \215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ See supra note 130, p. 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concerns regarding the viability of the September 30, 2002
target date were also raised by the General Accounting Office,
``Then you've got the backlog cases, and then you've got the
new cases coming in. So all told, we're talking about an
enormous workload. I think they can submit the cases within the
2 years, but whether they can get them investigated and
adjudicated, I have questions about that.'' \216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ See supra note 11, p. 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Secretary of Defense should set priorities and control the flow
of personnel security investigation requests for all DOD
components.
The Department of Defense does not have a centralized unit
for tracking and prioritizing personnel security investigations
and is therefore unable to determine the size or project an
accurate date for the elimination of the PSI backlog. The
NSVAIR Subcommittee recommends DOD establish a centralized unit
to prioritize and control the flow of personnel security
investigation requests.
According to DSS Director, General Cunningham, ``The
submission of requests for personnel security investigations is
a function and responsibility of the individual military
departments, defense agencies and defense contractors. More
importantly, the Department of Defense prioritization comes
from many sources and is difficult to integrate into our
operations. This leaves the Defense Security Service at a
severe disadvantage in trying to balance investigation
requirements for a myriad of customers, all of whom have
competing requirements and clearance needs.'' \217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ See supra note 35, p. 80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The General went on to say, ``The personnel security
process basically involves three phases, identifying the need
for a security clearance and then prioritizing those requests,
conducting the personnel security investigation, and
adjudicating the PSI request.'' \218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ Ibid., p. 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the issue of prioritization, the Acting Inspector
General stated, ``The April 2000 IG DOD report on Security
Clearance Investigative Priorities \219\ discussed a number of
DSS case management issues. The principal concern was the lack
of a meaningful process for prioritizing the workload. We
determined that investigative resources were generally applied
on a first in, first out basis, so that clearance requests for
important programs and higher risk positions often languished
while investigators worked on routine cases. Since timely
investigations are a major problem, we deemed it particularly
unreasonable not to have a viable prioritization process that
both the requestors of the clearance and the investigators
understand.'' \220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\ See supra note 117, p. i.
\220\ See supra note 158, p. 30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) Arthur L. Money
stated, ``There is a lack in CCMS to do prioritization. That is
being fixed as another add-on to the software in April that
will wash through the system, so by August there will not be
this accumulation of cases, which have not worked their way
through. So the prioritization will help the services once they
prioritize.'' \221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ See supra note 122, p. 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, according to the Director of DSS, ``With an
anticipated significant number of security clearance requests
expected through fiscal year 2001, it seems logical to me that
the existing Department of Defense planning, programming and
budgeting system would greatly improve the identification of
requirements and simplify the process. It also seems logical
that the establishment of central requirements facilities in
the military departments would be most advantageous.'' \222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ See supra note 35, p. 80-81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The subcommittee also suggests the Office of Management and
Budget [OMB] undertake a study to determine the feasibility of
transferring the management of DOD's Personnel Security
Investigation Program to the Office of Personnel Management and
report their findings to the appropriate congressional
oversight committees.
Legitimate concerns have been raised regarding the
viability and the success of achieving the September 30, 2002
target for the elimination of the backlog. Deputy Assistant
Secretary J. William Leonard stated, ``The plan also extended
the deadline for elimination of the investigation backlog until
fiscal year 2002.'' \223\ Deputy Assistant Secretary Leonard
was referring to the directive issued by Under Secretary of
Defense William J. Lynn's on June 22, 2000, ``By using the
services of the Office of Policy and Management for select
investigations, we plan to clear the backlog of clearances by
fiscal year 2002.'' \224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ Testimony of J. William Leonard, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence,
NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 106-257, p. 55.
\224\ See supra note 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Deputy Inspector General is skeptical DOD can
achieve this target date stating, ``The success of tracking,
processing, and adjudicating PSI's in a timely manner is also
doubtful. According to 2001 Defense Security Service data, it
is taking 403 days on average for initial top-secret
investigations, compared to 359 days in September 2000, when
you had your last hearing on the subject. Likewise, it is
taking 470 days on average for top-secret periodic
reinvestigations, compared to 386 days in September 2000. The
trends since this time last year have gone the wrong way, as
far as this most sensitive part of the investigative workload
is concerned.'' \225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\ See supra note 99, p. 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When compared to the results OPM is achieving, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary J. William Leonard stated, ``OPM's
performance has been outstanding. They have--an earlier
question from Mr. Kucinich in terms of how long it takes to do
an investigation, they have established time lines, anywhere
from 35 days for a background investigation all the way up to
180 days, depending upon what the requirements are. By and
large, they are meeting those standards in every case.'' \226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ See supra note 139, p. 40.
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3. The Secretary of Defense should closely monitor the interface
between JPAS and CCMS to ensure effective management of
investigative and adjudicative cases and avoid further
backlogs.
Without more consistent oversight of major information
technology acquisitions, there can be no assurance that policy
under the Clinger-Cohen Act is being translating into practice.
Therefore, the subcommittee recommends the Secretary of Defense
direct an immediate and one-time review of internal procedures
to ensure compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act by all DOD
Military Departments and agencies, and the Office of Budget and
Management initiate a review, cost/benefit analysis, and
assessment of transferring the management and oversight of DOD
agency information technology acquisitions to the General
Services Administration [GSA].
The deficiencies in DOD's Personnel Security Investigations
Program systems are in large part due to DOD's non-compliance
with the Clinger-Cohen Act. Both the General Accounting Office
and the Office of the Inspector General have raised concerns
whether the CCMS and JPAS will be fully operational and
integrated to accomplish the task of prioritizing, opening,
tracking, and adjudicating personnel security investigations.
Deputy Inspector General Robert J. Lieberman stated,
``Unfortunately, the DOD historically has not has a strong
record in the support systems area and the entire Defense
Personnel Security Program clearly has been hampered by
inadequate systems for many years.'' \227\
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\227\ See supra note 99, p. 13.
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In regards to DOD's ability to eliminate the PSI backlog
and prioritize PSI cases, the Deputy Inspector General said,
``Everything is going to have to go right in terms of fielding
new systems; and I know, Mr. Chairman, I have been over here on
numerous subjects before you before, and the common theme
running through all of them is that we have bad information
systems and need something better, and historically, the track
record for systems coming in on time, on schedule and actually
being fully functional is not particularly good. So there is a
risk there. If the new systems come in on schedule and are
fully operational, we do not have anything that remotely looks
like the CCMS fiasco, then we will have a fighting chance to
get from here to there.'' \228\
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\228\ See supra note 130, p. 51-52.
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The Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General
released audit reports critical of DOD's acquisition management
of both Case Control Management System \229\ and the Joint
Personnel Adjudication System.\230\
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\229\ See supra note 28.
\230\ See supra note 98.
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The DOD Inspector General reported, ``Programs are defined
as Major Information Technology Investment if OASD (C3I)
determines that a program requires special OSD management
attention because of the importance of the program's DOD
mission, the high development, operating, or maintenance costs,
or the program's significant role in administering DOD
programs, finances, property, or resources.'' \231\ ``Despite,
the system's (JPAS) criticality in support of DOD missions,
acquisition management oversight was not provided in accordance
with the Clinger-Cohen Act.'' \232\
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\231\ Ibid., p. 2.
\232\ Ibid., p. 8.
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CCMS and the Enterprise System for personnel security
investigations were also allowed to proceed ``without the
benefit of program oversight and guidance.'' \233\ ``The
failure of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) to actively
participate in the acquisition of CCMS contributed greatly to
the systems failures.'' \234\ \235\
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\233\ See supra note 28, p. 7.
\234\ Ibid.
\235\ The failure of OASD (C3I) to monitor and evaluate the
performance of major IT systems appears to be a systemic problem that
the subcommittee has found in other Defense Department agencies. [See
DOD Systems Modernization: Continued Investment in the Standard
Procurement System Has Not been Justified, (GAO-01-682), U.S. General
Accounting Office, July 2001. NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing record, The
Standard Procurement System (SPS): Can the DOD Procurement Process be
Standardized?, Feb. 7, 2002, (in subcommittee files).] ``The Clinger-
Cohen Act of 1996, OMB guidance, DOD policy, and practices of leading
organizations provide an effective framework for managing information
technology investments, not just when a program is initiated, but
continuously throughout the life of the program. Together, they provide
for economically justifying proposed projects on the basis of reliable
analyses of expected life-cycle costs, benefits, risks, and a basis for
investment selection, control, and evaluation decisionmaking. The
department has not met these investment management tenets for the
Standard Procurement System.'' [See Statement of Joel C. Willemssen,
Managing Director, Information Technology Issues, U.S. General
Accounting Office, NSVAIR Subcommittee hearing record, p. 5, The
Standard Procurement System (SPS): Can the DOD Procurement Process be
Standardized?, Feb. 7, 2002, (in subcommittee files).]
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4. The National Security Council should promulgate Federal standards
for investigating and adjudicating personnel security
clearances in a timely manner.
Federal standards do not contain any specified time
requirements for agencies to complete their investigative work
for granting personnel security clearances. Because of the
national security implications resulting from the length of
time it takes agencies to grant security clearances, the
subcommittee recommends that the appropriate National Security
Council, Policy Coordinating Committee develop such Federal
standards pursuant to National Security Presidential Directive
No. 1.\236\
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\236\ See supra note 16.
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The General Accounting Office reported, ``Defense Security
Service customers (the military departments, DOD civilian
agencies, and industrial contractors) and adjudication
officials stated that they need DSS to complete its
investigations within 90 days. The Office of Personnel
Management uses a standard of completing its work in 35, 75, or
a maximum of 120 days, depending on the price the customer is
willing to pay for the service.'' \237\
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\237\ See supra note 27, p. 16.
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According to Carol Schuster, ``As I understand it, they are
working to come up with some metrics that would have
expectations for how long it should take for each kind of case.
When we looked at investigations before, they were all over the
board. So there isn't any standard right now for how long it
should take for a particular kind of case. And there is any
number of kinds of cases in this 2.2 million backlog. Some of
them are very automated and don't take really very much time,
and others are full field investigations that require a whole
lot of work and over 200 days to complete.'' \238\
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\238\ See supra note 11, p. 45-46.
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5. The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General jointly should
develop a system which allows DSS and OPM investigators access
to State and local criminal history information records [CHIR].
During the March 2001 DSS oversight hearing, Assistant
Secretary of Defense Arthur L. Money said in his prepared
statement, ``In closing, I would like to ask for your help.
First, we need automated access to State and local government
criminal history records akin to that provided law enforcement
agencies.'' \239\
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\239\ Statement of Arthur L. Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, NSVAIR
Subcommittee hearing, Serial No. 107-40, p. 32.
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In that regard, Deputy Assistant Security J. William
Leonard indicated DSS investigators could only access local and
State criminal history record by means of a fingerprint card.
Secretary Leonard stated, ``We have to submit finger print
cards, which is a time-consuming and expensive process. In
those instances where we cannot access their automated records,
we literally have to send an agent out, put shoe leather on the
ground, go to the local police office or local sheriff's office
and stand in line.'' \240\
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\240\ See supra note 139, p. 64.
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Recently, subcommittee staff was advised by GAO that since
September 11th there has be a greater demand for FBI
fingerprint records for background checks by State and local
officials. As a result, the increased demand for fingerprint
cards is placing a greater burden on DSS to complete personnel
security background investigations in a timely manner. The
Department of Defense needs to develop policy in conjunction
with the appropriate NSC Policy Committee to develop a system
which will allow for better access to local and State criminal
records by DSS agents and to submit Congress any legislation
needed to implement this change.