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TRIDENT II MISSILES:
CAPABILITY, COSTS, AND ALTERNATIVES
 
 
July 1986
 
 
NOTES

All years in this report are fiscal years, unless otherwise stated.

Unless otherwise indicated, all budget figures are in fiscal year 1987 dollars.

Figures in the text and tables of this report may not add to totals because of rounding.

Budget figures do not include the cost of procuring ballistic missile warheads. These costs, which are paid by the Department of Energy, are classified.
 
 
PREFACE

The Administration is currently modernizing all three legs of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad: bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-based missiles. As part of this effort, the Administration has asked the Congress to approve initial procurement in fiscal year 1987 of the Trident II missile, which would be deployed aboard Trident submarines.

The Trident II missile, which would be larger, more powerful, and nearly twice as accurate as the Trident I missile that it would replace, would greatly increase U.S. ability to destroy hardened targets in the Soviet Union. This planned increase in U.S. capability has raised concerns about the effect that acquiring the Trident II will have on the ability of the United States to keep a crisis from escalating to nuclear war. Moreover, the costs to achieve this capability are high. This analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) addresses the costs and capabilities associated with the Administration's program and compares that program with three alternatives. This study was requested by the House Committee on the Budget. In accordance with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, the report makes no recommendations.

Jeffrey A. Merkley of CBO's National Security Division prepared the study, under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and John D. Mayer, Jr. The author thanks Theodore A. Postol of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, for his comments on an earlier draft. (External reviewers bear no responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.) The author also gratefully acknowledges the contribution of William P. Myers, who assisted with the cost analysis; the contributions of Bonita Dombey, Brad Cohen, and Bertram Braun of CBO's National Security Division; and the assistance of Dorothy Amey, also of CBO. Sherry Snyder, assisted by Nancy H. Brooks, edited the manuscript, and Rebecca J. Kees prepared it for publication.
 

Rudolph G. Penner
Director
July 1986
 
 

CONTENTS
 

SUMMARY

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER II - ASSESSING HARD-TARGET CAPABILITY

CHAPTER III - ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES

APPENDIX A - METHOD USED TO CALCULATE SSKP

APPENDIX B - THE CHOICE OF TRIDENT II WARHEADS

APPENDIX C - PERFORMANCE OF U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILES AGAINST TARGET SETS HARDENED TO 5,000 PSI
 
 
SUMMARY TABLE  PROGRAM COSTS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S TRIDENT II PROGRAM AND SAVINGS UNDER ALTERNATIVE PLANS
TABLE 1.  SYSTEM FOR RATING THE HARDNESS OF TARGETS
TABLE 2.  CLASSIFICATION OF CURRENT U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS
TABLE 3.  CLASSIFICATION OF CURRENT SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS
TABLE 4.  PROCUREMENT AND COSTS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S TRIDENT II PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES
 
 
SUMMARY FIGURE 1.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. ICBMs AND SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
SUMMARY FIGURE 2.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
SUMMARY FIGURE 3.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A SMALL TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE 1.  CAPABILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS AGAINST THE TARGET SPECTRUM
FIGURE 2.  CAPABILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, BY CLASS, AGAINST THE TARGET SPECTRUM
FIGURE 3.  NUMBER OF U.S. AND SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE HARD-TARGET WARHEADS, FISCAL YEARS 1970-1985
FIGURE 4.  PERFORMANCE OF U.S. ICBMS AND SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1970-1985
FIGURE 5.  PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1970-1985
FIGURE 6.  PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A SMALL TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1970-1985
FIGURE 7.  NUMBER OF U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, HISTORICALLY AND UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 1970-2000
FIGURE 8.  NUMBER OF U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, BY CLASS, UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE 9.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. ICBMs AND SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE 10.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE 11.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A SMALL TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE 12.  NUMBER OF U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, BY CLASS, IN FISCAL YEAR 2000 UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES
FIGURE 13.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. ICBMs AND SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE 14.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE 15.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A SMALL TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE B-l.  EFFECTIVENESS OF MARK 4 AND MARK 5 WARHEADS ON THE TRIDENT II MISSILE AGAINST TARGETS HARDENED TO 2,000 PSI AND 5,000 PSI
FIGURE B-2.  CAPABILITY OF A SINGLE TRIDENT II MISSILE AS A FUNCTION OF WARHEAD TYPE AND TARGET HARDNESS
FIGURE C-l.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. ICBMs AND SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE C-2.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A LARGE TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000
FIGURE C-3.  ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES: PERFORMANCE OF U.S. SLBMs AGAINST A SMALL TARGET SET, FISCAL YEARS 1985-2000


 

SUMMARY

The United States has deployed three types of strategic nuclear weapons: bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-based missiles. This triad is designed to deter the Soviet Union from initiating a nuclear war and, if deterrence fails, to enable the United States to employ nuclear weapons in a manner chosen by the U.S. national command authority. All three types of weapons are being modernized. One hundred B-1B bombers are being delivered; air-launched cruise missiles are being deployed on existing B-52 bombers; and development of a new advanced technology or "stealth" bomber continues. Also, the deployment of 50 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been approved. Trident submarines, seven of which have already been deployed and one of which is on sea trials, will continue to replace the older Poseidon submarines.

In addition to these plans, the United States intends to deploy a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Trident II. The Administration has requested the Congress to fund the first procurement of this missile this year. Its ongoing development and planned procurement is expensive, totaling more than $26 billion between fiscal year 1987 and the year 2000.

The Trident II would eventually replace the Trident I missile on the first eight Trident submarines and would be deployed as original equipment on the subsequent Trident submarines. The greater payload and improved accuracy of the Trident II would enable it to carry larger warheads and deliver them more precisely, making the Trident II very effective in attacking targets, such as Soviet ICBM silos, that have been hardened against nuclear blasts. By the year 2000, approximately 4,800 hard-target warheads would be deployed on Trident II missiles on 20 Trident submarines, resulting in more than a fourfold increase in the number of U.S. hard-target warheads deployed on ballistic missiles.

This planned increase in U.S. hard-target capability would transform the ability of the United States to conduct large-scale attacks on hardened targets in the Soviet Union. The Administration maintains that this change would enhance U.S. deterrence of a Soviet strike. Others counter that the change would have the opposite effect, increasing the probability that a crisis would escalate to nuclear war.

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