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This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) memorandum was prepared in response to a request from the Ranking Democratic Member of the House Committee on National Security. It reviews how requirements for strategic airlift have changed since the Cold War and looks at the costs and capabilities of three illustrative airlift purchases.

Rachel Schmidt of CBO's National Security Division and Victoria Fraider and JoAnn Vines of CBO's Budget Analysis Division prepared the memorandum under the direction of Cindy Williams, R. William Thomas, and Michael A. Miller. The authors gratefully acknowledge the careful assistance of Shaun Black and the useful comments of Lane Pierrot. Christian Spoor edited the manuscript, and Leah Mazade provided editorial assistance. Cynthia Cleveland prepared the memorandum for publication.
 
 

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

• Airlift in Perspective
• Setting Requirements for Strategic Airlift
• Actual Delivery Capability Versus Theoretical Fleet Capacity

HOW MANY C-17s ARE NEEDED?

• Heavy Cargo Deliveries
• Missions Unique to the Military
• Costs of Various Airlift Options

APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE
 

FIGURES
1.	Airlift Requirements for the First Two Weeks of Deployment
2.	Airlift Fleet Capabilities, Goals, and Requirements
3.	Shares of Early Airlift Requirements by Cargo Type
TABLES
1.	Estimated Costs in 1996 Dollars of Three Strategic Airlift Options
2.	Estimated Annual Operation and Support Costs for Selected Airlift Aircraft
A-1.	Estimated Costs in Current Dollars of Three Strategic Airlift Options

 

SUMMARY

The need for strategic airlift, the planes that carry troops and equipment between continents, has lessened markedly in recent years. Current requirements for the first two weeks of a major regional conflict are 36 percent to 58 percent lower than those estimated during the Cold War for a confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, during the 1980s, the actual number of airlift aircraft was insufficient to handle the deliveries that the Department of Defense (DoD) estimated would be needed for a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. Current plans to maintain an airlift fleet with a theoretical capacity of 49 million to 52 million ton-miles per day come much closer to meeting delivery requirements that the Pentagon has set for itself. Yet critics might question why meeting DoD's airlift requirements is receiving relatively more emphasis today.

The defense bill for fiscal year 1996 will complete funding for 40 C-17 aircraft. Some military analysts would prefer to buy 80 to 100 additional C-17s to replace the Air Force's aging C-141 Starlifters. But a combination of C-17s and the Lockheed Martin C-5D or the C-33, a military version of Boeing's 747-400 freighter, might provide sufficient capability at lower cost.

The Congress might want to consider three criteria for evaluating airlift options: ability to meet delivery requirements for two major regional conflicts; ability to perform special missions, such as air-dropping a brigade after traveling between continents or repositioning outsize equipment within a theater by air; and cost. How to balance the tradeoffs between performance and cost depends on the likelihood that the United States will become involved in two major conflicts at the same time or in crises that will require U.S. forces to perform special missions.

After the Air Force retires its C-141s, purchasing 80 more C-17s would allow it to meet its airlift requirements, increase the share of planes in its fleet that can carry outsize cargo, and address special military missions. Based on the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) estimates, the Air Force would pay more than $36 billion (in 1996 dollars) to purchase and operate 80 additional C-17s through 2020.

DoD is planning to send less outsize cargo to major regional contingencies than it would have sent to a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. Thus, a mixture of C-17s and planes that cannot carry most outsize equipment, such as C-33s, might still meet requirements to deliver cargo to major regional contingencies. If there was adequate room at airfields in regions of potential conflict, buying 32 more C-17s plus 30 C-33s would provide the same delivery capability as 80 additional C-17s. That option would also be nearly $8 billion cheaper: it would cost about $28 billion to buy and operate the planes through 2020 (in 1996 dollars). If, however, U.S. forces were limited to a few airfields that had a small amount of ramp space, that option might not deliver cargo as quickly as would 80 more C-17s. And such a combination would not provide as much flexibility to handle specific military missions such as strategic brigade airdrops.

Compared with the C-33, the C-5D might enhance DoD's ability to perform some military missions but still cost less than buying only C-17s. CBO estimates that buying and operating 65 C-5Ds would cost more than $27 billion through 2020--nearly $9 billion less than 80 additional C-17s (in 1996 dollars). However, the C-5D does not have all of the C-17's capabilities. For example, it could not be used to land on the shortest runways. And if access to airfields was limited, a fleet with 65 C-5Ds might not deliver cargo as quickly as could 80 additional C-17s.

The appropriate mixture of planes depends on how much DoD and the Congress are willing to pay for the flexibility provided by 80 additional C-17s. The options described in this memorandum could cost $8 billion to $9 billion less through 2020. The near-term costs of those alternatives could be higher or lower than for 80 more C-17s, depending on the timing of the purchases. Those cost issues may be of particular concern now, when the Congress is adding acquisition programs to the defense budget and, at the same time, trying to eliminate the federal budget deficit.

This document is available in its entirety in PDF.