

**AFGHANISTAN: IN PURSUIT OF SECURITY AND
DEMOCRACY**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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OCTOBER 16, 2003
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CONTENTS

	Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ...	6
Durch, Dr. William J., senior associate and co-director, The Future of Peace Operations Project, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC	37
Prepared statement	40
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement ..	36
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, prepared statement	34
Lindborg, Ms. Nancy, executive vice president, Mercy Corps, member of Inter- Action, Washington, DC	56
Prepared statement	59
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement	3
North, Brig. Gen. Gary L., Deputy J-5 for Political and Military Affairs, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, DC	20
Rodman, Hon. Peter W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, DC	15
Prepared statement	17
Taylor, Hon. William B., Jr., State Department Coordinator for Afghanistan, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC	8
Prepared statement	11
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Feingold	79
Tomsen, Hon. Peter, former U.S. Special Envoy and Ambassador to Afghani- stan, 1989-1992 and U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, 1995-1998, McLean, VA	49
Prepared statement	51

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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2003

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding. Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Alexander, Biden, Feingold, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

This week, the Senate has been debating the \$87 billion Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill for Iraq and Afghanistan. Though most of the attention to the bill has been focused on funding devoted to Iraq, the bill includes \$10.5 billion to continue military activities in Afghanistan, and \$1.2 billion in assistance to accelerate Afghan reconstruction. About one third of reconstruction funds are targeted for bolstering training and support for the new Afghan National Army and police force. About \$300 million will be devoted to infrastructure, including roads, schools, and health clinics.

It is clear from this supplemental request that President Bush is committed to succeeding in Afghanistan. Congress must be similarly committed to this goal. American national security and prosperity depends on Senate passage of the supplemental appropriations bill.

Some of the debate on the supplemental has attempted to juxtapose spending requests for Iraq and Afghanistan with domestic spending priorities. Such debate may score some political points, but it is shortsighted. The viability of our economy and our ability to fund domestic programs in the long run depend directly on winning the war on terrorism. We cannot leave Iraq or Afghanistan in a condition that breeds terrorists or festers as a symbol of American failure in the Middle East. Such an outcome would expand anti-U.S. resentment, weaken our international influence, undercut prospects for broader peace settlements in the region, and possibly encourage other governments to pursue weapons of mass destruction or terrorist sponsorship. These potential outcomes would make us more susceptible to catastrophic terrorist attacks. And if such attacks occur, Members of Congress must understand that right behind the tremendous loss of life, the next casualties will be the future of the American economy and our ability to generously fund commitments to our seniors, to the education of our children, and

to innumerable other important goals on which there is a broad consensus in the Congress.

In this context, we should see Afghanistan as not just a problem, but rather as an opportunity. Afghanistan was the opening front in the war on terrorism, and visible progress there will resonate for an international audience. Moreover, our experience in Afghanistan can help us succeed in Iraq. In Afghanistan, we have broad international participation endorsed by a consensus U.N. Security Council resolution. Now, we are already working successfully with an indigenous national government, and that government has done thoughtful planning for the future of its people. Afghanistan still presents tremendous challenges. As in Iraq, security is the chief obstacle to achieving our post-conflict goals. The remnants of the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda continue attacks on United States and allied forces, as well as on civilians and international aid workers. The security situation has been declining over the last few months, forcing the suspension of critical assistance and undermining reconstruction and transition efforts. Establishing security is essential to begin the process of building a viable economy in Afghanistan, encouraging investment, and developing a private sector that can generate income and jobs that are not tied to foreign assistance or the illicit drug trade.

Afghanistan's population is far less educated than Iraq's. It lacks abundant oil resources that could serve as an engine for reconstruction. Many areas of Afghanistan lack even rudimentary infrastructure. The infrastructure that does exist is often in disrepair.

The Afghan government will require assistance to ensure that basic necessities that we take for granted, such as electricity and safe drinking water, are increasingly available. These challenges must be undertaken amidst the uncertain process of establishing a broadly supported constitution and electoral process.

We must also continue to support efforts to improve education and expand the role of women in Afghan society. I was encouraged by the progress on these fronts announced last Friday in a speech by our First Lady to the National Association of Women Judges. Mrs. Bush noted that four million Afghan children now go to school, including about one million girls. She announced efforts to establish a teacher training institute and to establish, or reestablish, the American School in Kabul, which had been an important center for education before the Taliban. She also highlighted the work of the University of Nebraska at Omaha, which has helped to edit and print five million textbooks in Pashtu and Dari. I know of Senator Hagel's great pride in this program.

An important step to enhancing overall security in Afghanistan is expanding the reach of forces outside of the capital, Kabul. We're pleased that our NATO allies took over the International Security Assistance Force, the ISAF, in August. This week, the United Nations Security Council built on this positive development by voting to expand ISAF operations beyond Kabul. We thank the United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, and The Netherlands, and others that have led and participated in ISAF over the past year, for their commitment to the fight against terrorism.

Another opportunity to enhance security in Afghanistan is accelerating the deployment and expanding the capabilities of Provincial

Reconstruction Teams, the PRTs. These teams have the potential to extend reconstruction efforts beyond Kabul in conjunction with the ISAF. We need to ensure that they have the resources necessary to continue this integrated mission.

Our hearing today is intended to assess reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and to review what else can be done to advance our political, economic, and security goals in that country.

We are joined by two distinguished panels representing our government and the private sector. On our first panel, we will hear from Ambassador William B. Taylor, the State Department's Coordinator for Afghanistan; Mr. Peter Rodman, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and General Gary North, Director of Politico-Military Affairs for South Asia on the Joint Staff.

On our second panel, we will hear from Ambassador Peter Tomsen, former Special Envoy for Afghanistan; Dr. William Durch, senior associate and co-director of the Project on the Future of Peace Operations at the Henry L. Stimson Center; and Ms. Nancy Lindborg, executive vice-president of Mercy Corps and spokesperson for the InterAction umbrella group for non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

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Taliban regime and al-Qaeda continue attacks on U.S. and allied forces, as well as on civilians and international aid workers. The security situation has been declining over the last few months, forcing the suspension of critical assistance and undermining reconstruction and transition efforts. Establishing security is essential to begin the process of building a viable economy in Afghanistan, encouraging investment and developing a private sector that can generate income and jobs that are not tied to foreign assistance or the illicit drug trade.

Afghanistan's population is far less educated than Iraq's, and it lacks abundant oil resources that can serve as an engine for reconstruction. Many areas of Afghanistan lack even rudimentary infrastructure, and the infrastructure that does exist is in disrepair. The Afghan government will require assistance to ensure that basic necessities that we take for granted—such as electricity and safe drinking water—are increasingly available. These challenges must be undertaken amidst the uncertain process of establishing a broadly supported Constitution and electoral process.

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We welcome all of our witnesses and look forward to their insights.

The CHAIRMAN. We welcome all of our witnesses and look forward to their insights. But before hearing those, I recognize the distinguished Ranking Member of our committee, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome all. I'm anxious to hear your testimony.

Let me begin—Mr. Chairman, you may have done this; I apologize for being a few moments late—by complimenting the Secretary of State and the President for a very important accomplishment at the U.N. today. Ever since the President made the U-turn in seeking international support a couple of weeks ago, it's been the hope and expectation of many of us that he would follow through on that, and he's done it. I think it's a very important step. Notwithstanding the fact that initially the Germans and the French and

the Russians are saying they're not going to contribute forces or money, this is—there has been now a international ratification of the U.S. presence in the region, the U.N. blessing in the process, and the U.N. is invested. It took a long time in getting there, in my view, but it's there, and they're to be complimented for that.

And the reason I mention that, it does relate, in my view, to the subject of our hearing today, even though that was not what the resolution is about. We're very slow learners, it seems, because we still have—which I hope this resolution reflects an end of—an internecine battle between the civilian military commanders and the State Department and others about how we should proceed in Afghanistan. We're going to be told today how progress is being made, and it's true. There's also a bunch of malarkey in what we're going to be told today, because these guys have to say what they have to say.

The fact of the matter is, we've missed an opportunity to do what many of us on this committee, including the Senator about to sit down, have been pleading be done from the beginning. But because there has been this overwhelming reluctance on the part of some in the administration to get involved in genuine, quote, "nation-building," we essentially elected a mayor of Kabul and turned the rest over to the warlords, and we're paying a price for it now, and I will not go through in any detail, notwithstanding many of the good things that are happening.

Ever since the fall of the Taliban, the Pentagon has been pointedly refraining from taking any active, concrete steps to support a plan to expand ISAF. Now, you are engaged in an incredibly disingenuous undertaking, saying, well, the allies won't do it. And we'd come back and say, we spoke to the allies in Afghanistan, in Europe, in other capitals, and they said, we'll do it if you guys will be part of it. We were saying, no, no. No, thanks. We even stiff-armed the Germans and the French, who offered to send forces into Afghanistan early on.

So hopefully this nonsense is about to come to an end and there really is a new policy in the making. Civilian leaders claim, as I said, none of our allies are willing to supply the necessary troops. And, as I said, this is always a cynical argument. When ISAF was first set up, I had a long, long talk, within months of us getting there, with its first commander, Major General John McColl, of Britain. He told me that other ISAF commanders, which they have since reiterated, that any expansion of the peacekeeping force would have to rely heavily upon the United States, not for troops, but for logistics, air lift, intelligence, and extractions capability. Every person I met on the ground in Afghanistan wearing an American uniform said, we must expand ISAF. Every one. You'd meet a single person, and I challenge the administration to give me the name of any high-ranking official who served in Afghanistan at the time on the ground actually shooting and getting shot at, who didn't think we had to expand ISAF beyond Kabul.

But now our allies have come along. The Germans, I think, in large—for a number of reasons, not the least of which is a genuine attempt to begin to repair the rift that exists in the transatlantic relationships here—are already supplying 2000 more troops to a NATO peacekeeping force, and they'll now supply 450 more.

NATO allies are ready to step up to the plate and take on additional peacekeeping duties if we're willing to give the support they need. We, in Congress, have already made it really clear where we stand. We, last year, passed the Afghan Freedom Support Act [AFSA] authorizing a billion dollars for expansion of ISAF. So we don't have to tell you where we stand. We think it should have been done a year ago.

So let's remember, with all due respect, the key issue here, for me at least, is the expansion of ISAF in a way to decrease our own burden of bringing about security in Afghanistan and give some prospect, some prospect, that there can be a government there that's going to be able to sustain itself after we've gone.

I'll never forget walking into a high-ranking administration official and saying, but we have a security problem. They said, there's no problem with Afghanistan. And I said, what do you mean? Ismail Khan is running the show. She said, that's right. There's no problem. There's security. Ismail Khan is in charge. We never have been able to have a situation in Afghanistan where there are not warlords. Now I'm paraphrasing what was said in a meeting with high-level American administration officials.

So our allies seem to be ready to begin to help us lighten the load. Every German, French, and Turkish soldier deployed to bring security to the Afghanistan countryside potentially frees up an American soldier to help fight the Taliban, which is—they're in a resurgent stage, and hunt down al-Qaeda.

And so, again, I have a longer statement, Mr. Chairman, and I'll ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the record, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, in May of last year I voiced my concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. "If current trends continue," I said in a floor speech, "we may soon find that our hard-won success on the battlefield has melted away."

I wish I could now report that events of the past year had proven my concerns ill-founded. But while our attention has been focused on the war in Iraq, we have failed to consolidate our victory in Afghanistan. As we consider the President's request for \$87 billion to fund war and reconstruction operations on two separate fronts, it is high time for us to reexamine our policy in Afghanistan.

The Taliban are regrouping at an alarming pace, and continue to mount ever-bolder attacks from bases in the barely-governable border region with Pakistan. As recently as March, the Pentagon was still describing Taliban action as "onesies and twosies"—small-scale hit-and-run assaults by one or two men.

Well, this summer the enemy moved up to two-hundreds-ies. In August, the Taliban launched a series of raids in troop-strength of over 200. We're not talking about isolated pot-shots, we're talking about a genuine guerrilla insurgency.

The Taliban and their al-Qaeda confederates roam freely through the entire south and southeastern portion of the country. Everywhere they go, they use murder, kidnaping, and the threat of even greater violence to compel cooperation from the local populace. They target any Afghans assisting reconstruction efforts. In September, for example, Taliban thugs murdered four humanitarian workers in Ghazni—for the "crime" of providing their community with drinking water. According to the only survivor of the massacre, the killers said, "we warned you not to work for NGOs."

There is a vicious logic to such bloodshed. The Taliban uses terrorism to send the local population a vivid message: neither the Americans nor the central government will protect you.

Our troops, and those of our coalition partners, are doing a remarkable job in combating the Taliban and al-Qaeda—but they're not tasked with the mission of providing security for the Afghan people.

What's been the result? Reconstruction efforts in many parts of the country have been brought to a standstill. Humanitarian groups have withdrawn from Kandahar and other areas after the assassination of their staff.

One aspect of the Afghan economy, however, has continued to thrive. Unfortunately, it's the drug trade. Last year—while the country was under U.S. military control—Afghanistan returned to its former position as the world's number-one source for opium and heroin.

In February, at a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee, I highlighted the nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism. "Warlords, drugs, and terrorists," I said at that time. "The connection is as clear as a bell: Terrorists use drug profits to buy safe haven from warlords."

A few weeks ago, the U.N.'s top narcotics official made exactly the same point: "The terrorists and the traffickers are the same people," said the executive director of the U.N.'s Office on Drugs and Crime. He said the U.S. had ignored his pleas to crack down on the drug trade in Afghanistan, despite the fact that opium and heroin profits are believed to enrich anti-American warlords.

In 2002, Afghanistan produced 3,750 tons of opium. According to the UN, this year's harvest will be of a similar size. That's about twenty times the size of the harvest in the last year of Taliban rule.

And the scale of the profits shows just how lucrative the business is for narco-terrorists. The drug trade is worth at least \$1.2 billion annually to Afghanistan—an amount equal to the entire sum spent by all donor countries (including the U.S.) on relief and reconstruction last year, and more than double the budget of the Afghan government. Other estimates place the value of the trade twice as high, at \$2.5 billion annually. That kind of money buys an awful lot of cooperation—and the terrorists know it. In Afghanistan, as everywhere else in the world, you get what you pay for.

Which leads to the President's budget request: Why on earth are we STILL nickel-and-diming the effort to fight terrorism by draining the swamp in Afghanistan?

The President proposes spending \$1.2 billion on relief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan in FY 2004. This sum is inadequate—and there's even less to the proposal than meets the eye. One-third of the sum is recycled money—funds raided from existing accounts, and desperately needed elsewhere.

What remains is a mere \$800 million in new money—less than one percent of the overall package!

I say it again: You get what you pay for. If the administration isn't willing to make good on President Bush's promise of a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan, we run the grave risk of seeing all our hard-won military gains evaporate.

But, as I've said before, this isn't just a question of money. More than anything else, it's a question of security.

"Anyone knows that without security, very little else is possible; humanitarian workers can't move around, internally displaced people won't go back to their homes, refugees won't return to the country, the Afghan diaspora won't be willing to send money in and send in themselves to try to help put structure back into that terribly war-torn nation."

These aren't my words—they're a direct quote from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld [April 22, 2002].

Everybody who's looked seriously at the issue agrees: the best way to bring stability to the country would be to expand the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF. Since its creation, the force has been permitted to operate only in the capital—and because of its presence there, Kabul is now one of the few secure sites in Afghanistan.

On Monday, Mr. Chairman, the U.N. Security Council unanimously voted to expand the mandate of ISAF. The impetus for this development was the offer, by our NATO ally Germany, to send several hundred troops to the city of Kunduz. Ever since the fall of the Taliban, I (along with other members of this committee) have been forcefully advocating an expansion of ISAF. And ever since the fall of the Taliban, the Pentagon has been pointedly refraining from taking any active, concrete step to promote such a plan.

The civilian leaders of the Pentagon claimed that none of our allies were willing to supply the necessary troops. This was always a cynical argument. When ISAF was first set up, I had a long talk in Kabul with its first commander, British Maj. Gen. John McColl. He told me, and other ISAF commanders have since reiterated, that any expansion of the peacekeeping force would have to rely heavily on the U.S.—not for troops, but for logistics, airlift, intelligence, and extraction capabilities. Without such support, any Pentagon talk of welcoming an expansion ISAF is merely empty rhetoric.

Well, thank God for our allies. The Germans are already supplying more than 2,000 troops to the NATO peacekeeping force, and they'll now be supplying 450 more. Other NATO allies are ready to step up to the plate and take on additional peacekeeping duties—IF we're willing to give them the support that they need.

We in Congress have already made clear where we stand: The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorized \$1 billion for the expansion of ISAF. If the administration wants to back up the President's words with action, all they have to do is request appropriation of these funds.

Let's remember the key issue here: expansion of ISAF is a way to decrease our own burden for bringing security to Afghanistan. Our allies are willing to lighten our load. Any additional resources we put into this endeavor will be more than matched by the benefit we receive.

The U.N. peacekeeping effort is a force multiplier: every German, French or Turkish soldier deployed to bring security to the Afghan countryside potentially frees up an American soldier to fight the Taliban, hunt down al-Qaeda, or (God willing) maybe even rotate home sooner.

This is a turning point—a moment of great danger, but also of great opportunity. The danger lies in doing nothing—just letting current trends continue, idly permitting our victory in Afghanistan to turn into a long-term defeat. The opportunity lies in taking action—actively supporting the expansion of ISAF, using it to stabilize the country and lay the groundwork for reconstruction. The President's massive \$87 billion spending request also provides us with an opportunity: if we spend a tiny fraction of this money on Afghanistan's recovery—if we provide adequate funding for reconstruction efforts and for expanded peacekeeping operations—we can help safeguard our own national security.

You get what you pay for.

I welcome our distinguished guests, and look forward to hearing their thoughts on this vitally important topic.

Senator BIDEN. So let me conclude by saying that I really am prayerful, as they say, that what we're beginning to see is a reflection of a change of policy of this administration toward one failed state that we're trying to reconstruct, called Afghanistan, and preventing another state from becoming a failed state, called Iraq. Because the one thing I assume we could all agree on, if we fail in Afghanistan, we are going to be talking about, in my view, a country seven times as big, with nuclear weapons sitting on one border, and a country that is, in its present security leadership, hostile to the United States on another border, with more than seven times, probably—I guess it's probably 14 to 15 times the population, seeking nuclear weapons. And if that is accompanied by the bookends of us not succeeding and guaranteeing the peace in Iraq, we're in for, as they say on the east side of Wilmington, Delaware, a world of hurt that has nothing to do with terrorism, that goes far beyond terror, far beyond terror.

So I hope you're here to tell us the good news about your overwhelming enthusiasm supporting expanding ISAF. I hope you're about to get in the program. Because if you're not, I think we're in trouble.

I yield the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, you have your challenge.

And we look forward to your testimony, in this order—first of all, Ambassador Taylor, then Assistant Secretary Rodman, and Brigadier General Gary North.

Ambassador Taylor.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, JR., STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

We're up to this challenge. I think there will be more of the news that you and Senator Biden have been looking for in this discussion. I hope there will be a minimum of malarkey and nonsense, that you will—

Senator BIDEN. That was a generic assertion. It wasn't directed to you.

Ambassador TAYLOR. No, we don't—we're not worried.

But there is good news and bad news coming out of Afghanistan, and I don't want to be accused of just giving you the good news. I'll start off with the bad news.

The bad news is—we read about all the time, the security situation, in particular in the south and southeast, is not good. In fact, it's getting worse. Poppy is being grown in ever-broader fields. The violence against civilians, the violence against the military, the violence against Afghans, the violence against our aid workers is increasing, in particular in the south and the southeast, along that belt, along that border with Pakistan.

The central government is more than a mayoralty in Kabul, but it doesn't have full control over the entire country. There are strongmen—some people call them warlords—out in the countryside that are causing trouble, are harassing Afghans, that are extorting money from businesses, that are fighting each other, that are stealing from the government. An example of that, of course, we were just seeing in Mazar, has been in the past week, we've seen these kinds of problems.

There's good news, however, coming out, as well. And this is just the straight—these are the facts. This is not to gloss it. Women are more free to participate in public life than they've ever been before, I believe is a fair statement. As they appear in public, they are increasingly appearing in scarves, not in burqas. I was there for 9 months, and in the beginning of my 9-month period, about a year ago now, I would bet—this is in Kabul, but at—other places will be a little different, but in Kabul 90 percent of the women in public were in burqas. When I left last summer, in July, it was down to about 60 percent, an improvement. And I'm told—I was there a couple of months ago—it continues to come down. There is progress here on the social front.

Afghanistan is now governed by a President and an administration that, although a coalition, not all from the same party, not all seeing exactly the problems and the solutions in the same way, but, nonetheless, a government that has held together for 18 months. It has held together, and it continues to govern. We're not worried about fighting within the government. We are seeing politics in Kabul. This is, I think, an advance over where it had been before.

They are about—the Karzai government is about to publish a constitution. The constitution has been in the making for months. It is, by most accounts, a good constitution. It will respect human rights, equal treatment for women. There are provisions in there that—at least in the earlier drafts, that we have problems with, we continue to work with them on. President Karzai and others on the commission drafting the constitution listened to these. But our sense is that this is going in the right direction. It will establish elections for next summer, for next June.

On this business of the mayoralty of President Karzai in Kabul, he has taken steps over the past couple of months, really since the summer, to expand the influence of his government. He's done this in a couple of ways. One is, he has fired some Governors. He has switched some Governors. He pulled some Governors from provinces back up into Kabul. He sent some of his trusted ministers, people who are clearly loyal to him, to take the Governor's mansions in several of these provinces. He has stripped the Governor of Herat of his military title. He has demanded that the Governors in these various places that imports come in, that those Governors send in the revenues to the central government, which they had not been doing. That's what I was talking about earlier, on stealing from the government. This has been the demand, and he has now enforced that demand.

Senator Lugar indicated at the beginning—he actually has enabled me to shorten my remarks dramatically, because he went through some of the good things that are going on on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as an example. These small military teams are in four places around the country right now. They will be in another four or five over the next 2 or 3 months. These are having a great effect already in the areas that they are. Do they need more resources? You bet. Or should we have more of them? Absolutely. And I'm sure we can talk about that. But the point is, we are getting forces, military forces, together with civilians, USAID and the State Department's representatives, in these PRTs, out into the field, and they are having a good effect.

You both mentioned ISAF and the expansion of ISAF into other provinces. This could happen in a couple of ways. And the German PRT is an example of that ISAF expansion. There could be other models that we ought to talk about.

Disarmament is about to start. Later on this month, on the 25th of October, in Konduz, no coincidence that that is one of our PRT locations, a pilot program to disarm militias will start. So in less than 2 weeks. This will be a pilot program that will be followed with other pilot programs in Mazar, also a site of a PRT, and in Gardez, one of the first PRTs that we have. Again, the ability for the United States and Coalition partners to get out into the regions, out into the provinces, to improve the security, to improve the ability to provide reconstruction support, and to demonstrate to the people of Afghanistan that the Government of Afghanistan is not confined to Kabul, I think is a major accomplishment of these PRTs.

Reconstruction is accelerating after a slow start, I will say. The headline of our reconstruction effort is a major road from Kabul to Kandahar. The President has committed the United States to completing this road, to paving this road, by the end of this year. Now, this will connect the capital in the northern part of the country, if you will, to the second largest city in the Pashtun Belt. This will have political benefits, it'll have economic benefits, it has security benefits if you can drive quickly on this road, if you can go—right now, in the worst parts of this road, you have to average about 15 kilometers—about ten miles an hour. It's not hard to stop a car going ten miles an hour to ask for money; and these illegal checkpoints up and down this road, that happens. If, on the other hand,

you are able to drive 60, 70, 80 miles an hour, as the Afghans will, on this road, and are on the paved portions of this road, security is better, medical care is better, the benefits of this road are dramatic, and this is a major commitment of the United States to Afghanistan, from President Bush to President Karzai.

Failure is not an option in Afghanistan, as you've both said, but it's still possible. We need to do more. We need to accelerate what we are doing. As you have both indicated, the President is asking, in the supplemental that you're debating right now, for another billion dollars. On top of a billion dollars, it's \$920-some-million that we are now putting in, and this money will go for security, for reconstruction, for democratic development. Senator Lugar has already gone through a lot of this. I won't go through the details, but that's in my prepared text, Mr. Chairman, which I hope can be entered into the record.

So, first, resources; second, personnel. You're about to receive the President's nomination for the new Ambassador to go out there, and that will be before your committee very shortly. In addition, there will be a small team of senior advisors who will go out with the new Ambassador to help move forward, to help accelerate these programs that we've been talking about. We've got the resources. Now we're going to talk about adding people to help move this thing forward, move this reconstruction work forward.

And, finally, a new focus. So in addition to new resources and new people, a new focus. Unity of effort, which is very important in Afghanistan, will be improved very shortly as the commander of forces, who's been in Bagram, moves down to Kabul. And this will enable the military commander, the Ambassador, USAID efforts, the entire embassy work to be all co-located. This, I think, will also contribute to an acceleration and a coherence of a policy.

Mr. Chairman, I will stop there, leave it to my colleagues to—and we look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Taylor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, JR., STATE DEPARTMENT
COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, we have the opportunity to help the government of Afghanistan succeed this year. Afghanistan is about to adopt a constitution in December and is preparing for elections next summer. But there are forces that are determined to block that success. For us, failure is not an option. But it is unfortunately still possible. That is why we need to refocus on Afghanistan, provide adequate resources and support this Afghan government.

Your hearing today is a welcome opportunity to discuss these goals.

One can focus on the bad news coming out of Afghanistan or the good. There is plenty of both.

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan remains a desperately poor country, with tattered infrastructure, a deteriorating security environment in the south and east, an unacceptable level of poppy cultivation and a central government whose authority is resisted in the some of the provinces.

Increased violence against international security and development personnel and against innocent Afghans is also a cause for real concern. The security situation all along the border with Pakistan has clearly worsened recently. It is particularly worrisome that Taliban units appear larger and better organized. The deterioration has led some humanitarian organizations to curtail important aid programs, jeopardizing key development goals in affected areas.

The central government continues to have difficulty extending its authority and providing services due to financial and other constraints. Too many regions remain under the sway of local strongmen supported by private armies that have sometimes only limited loyalty to the central government; these men terrorize the local Af-

ghans, extort money from businesses, steal from the government and fight one another. The fighting in Mazar-e Sharif last week is only the most recent example.

Poppy production and narcotics trafficking have continued within Afghanistan since Operation Enduring Freedom began in late 2001. We estimate that some 30,000 hectares were under cultivation last year and that the crop this year may be even larger.

But there is good news coming out of Afghanistan as well.

Women are more free to work and to go to school. Gradually, as they appear in public, women are replacing their burqas with scarves. A variety of media and press outlets have emerged, representing a range of political and social viewpoints. Numerous radio stations are up and running.

Politically, Afghanistan is now governed by a legitimate leader, selected by Afghans themselves in a peaceful, representative process. That in itself is unprecedented in Afghan history.

Since the inauguration of his government 16 months ago, President Karzai and his government have been actively implementing the Bonn Agreement. They have established judicial and human rights commissions to try to protect the rights of minorities and women. They have established a Constitutional Commission that is now finalizing a draft Constitution that should be released to the public within days and adopted by a Constitutional Loya Jirga later this year. By most accounts the constitution will protect human rights, establish a separation of powers and institutionalize democracy.

The Afghan Government is steadily strengthening the institutional capacity of its ministries. It has put a systematic budget process in place and overseen the issuance of a new currency one year ago.

The Government has also established an electoral commission that is now working with the UN and international donors to prepare for nation-wide elections next summer.

President Karzai has taken strong steps recently to extend his government's reach across the country. He has replaced seven governors, including the powerful governor of Kandahar. He stripped military command from the governor of Herat. He demanded that governors remit the customs and other revenues that they collect to the central government, and he sent his Finance Minister to each of the major provinces to enforce this demand. President Karzai recently reformed the Ministry of Defense.

Meanwhile, the Coalition is deploying small military teams around the country to enhance security, extend the reach of the central government and help with reconstruction. These Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), established in Gardez, Bamiyan, Kunduz, and Mazar-e Sharif, have been well received by the local population and have begun to prove themselves to the skeptical NGO community. The U.K. and New Zealand are leading two of the PRTs, and the Germans are about to take over the PRT in Kunduz. The United States is preparing to dispatch similar teams to other areas, including Kandahar, Jalalabad, Parwan, Herat and Ghazni in the next two and a half months. The British PRT in Mazar played an important role in calming the tensions between two competing commanders in the region last week.

In August, NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, the alliance's first major deployment outside Europe. NATO has given its preliminary approval for an expansion of the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul, which could further extend security through PRTs or another ISAF mechanism. In New York, the U.N. Security Council has just agreed on a UNSC resolution approving the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul to the provinces of Afghanistan. The international community and the United Nations are working very well together in Afghanistan.

The international coalition is building a new Afghan National Army. This effort, led by the United States and supported by France, Great Britain and many other nations, will by next summer provide President Karzai with the single, largest, best trained military force in the country.

Later this month a pilot disarmament project will begin in Kunduz. This effort will be followed by disarmament pilot projects in Gardez, Mazar and Kabul.

On the economic front, the major cities of Afghanistan are experiencing new growth. Shops are full of goods; streets are bustling. Legal economic growth last year was 30 percent; it is estimated to be 20% this year.

Afghanistan is expected to have the best harvest in 25 years, with the more stable northern areas producing a significant surplus.

The Afghan people are beginning to see the fruits of international development programs. The road from Kabul to Kandahar will be paved by December 31, this year. This will cut the travel time from the capital to the second largest city from 15 hours to five. Schools are being built and clinics staffed and equipped.

The Afghan people are beginning to anticipate a more hopeful future. They are tired of war and the politics of extremism that made Afghanistan a desperate and dangerous dead end.

The American and international presence in Afghanistan is welcomed by most Afghans. The concern most Afghans express is that we not leave too soon, before the job is done. We did that before.

Last month we marked the act of war that took place on our soil two years ago, and this is the point to stress: Afghanistan no longer harbors terrorists. It is no longer a threat to the United States and the world. On the contrary, it is a country whose leaders and people are committed to a new future as responsible members of the world community.

The Afghan people have accomplished a great deal—and Congress, the American people and the international community can take pride in what we have done to assist them—but the gains to date remain tenuous, and much remains to be done.

That is why the President announced a new initiative to accelerate progress in Afghanistan. Let me outline the key components of this initiative. It consists of new funds, new people and new focus.

As part of the Supplemental Appropriation, the President is asking for \$799 million in additional funding for accelerating success in Afghanistan. This sum will be augmented by \$390 million that is being reprogrammed from existing DOD and State Department resources, for a total of almost \$1.2 billion to be committed between now and next June. This will be on top of regularly appropriated funds, which have totaled over \$900 million annually in 2002 and 2003.

This new assistance will be used to address the three major challenges we confront in Afghanistan: the need, first and foremost, to improve security; the need, secondly, to accelerate reconstruction; and finally, the need to support liberal democracy as Afghanistan writes a constitution and prepares for elections next year.

The most significant challenge today is security, especially in the south and east along the border with Pakistan, where the Taliban still has some support. Continued insecurity risks slowing down the essential development efforts now underway, undermines the credibility of the central government and threatens prospects for free and fair elections next year. Therefore, almost half of this package will be devoted to security: accelerate the training and deploying of the Afghan National Army, build a new police force, encourage disarmament and demobilization of militias, and protect Afghanistan's leaders.

Developing the Afghan government's own capacity to address security threats is in Afghanistan's interests and ours. Afghan National Army units are already participating in operations against the Taliban. Strengthening Afghan security institutions is the single most important step we can take in extending the reach and authority of the central government. Afghanistan's legitimate leaders must have the capacity to fill the security vacuum now being filled by local militia leaders and their forces.

- The support for the ANA will help establish and equip the essential core of a multi-ethnic national army, with approximately 10,500 soldiers trained by next summer.
- Assistance to the police will enable training of 18,000 additional national police by mid-2004 and their deployment throughout the country. It will also provide training, equipment and infrastructure for 4,000 members of a new Afghan Border Police. It will fund a new 2,600-person highway patrol to protect commerce and travelers on Afghanistan's roads and end the unapproved tolling stations that are financing private militias.
- Hand in hand with these programs to build the central government's security capabilities, we will provide additional funds for programs to disarm and demobilize members of Afghan militias and reintegrate them into society.
- We will also increase funding for measures to provide physical security to Afghanistan's President, which is critical to the stability and progress of that country.

About 30 percent of the \$1.189 billion package will be for reconstruction assistance, including roads, schools, health facilities, small projects and initiatives to provide the framework for private sector growth. These infrastructure projects will also have a broader impact, especially roads that will link together the major cities of Afghanistan, drawing the country together economically and politically.

- A top priority for the new funds will be accelerated work on roads, including the road linking Kandahar and Herat, as well as over 600 miles of secondary roads that farmers use to bring their crops to market.

- Funds will also be used to build or rehabilitate 150 additional schools—with the target of raising enrollment to 85 percent—and to build 60 additional health clinics that could reach an additional 3 million Afghans.
- Other areas that will receive additional funding include community-level projects implemented by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as well as industrial parks, power generation projects and other initiatives to improve the physical and institutional infrastructure for private sector growth.

The third element of this package, accounting for about 20 percent of the total, will be funding for democracy and governance programs, including support for the Constitutional Loya Jirga and elections, which will give Afghans from every corner of the country a voice and stake in the country as a whole, and help strengthen Afghanistan's identity as a nation. Some of our planned governance funding will be used to help the government pay salaries; that too will strengthen the authority of central institutions. We will provide technical experts to ministries and will enhance the capabilities of the U.S. embassy to support the Karzai government.

We expect that strengthened security institutions, including the border police, will help address the scourge of narcotics trafficking. Improved roads will help farmers produce legitimate, perishable crops that can be competitive in faraway markets, instead of cultivating poppy. Roads will also strengthen the central government's ability to respond to reports of poppy cultivation. Other reconstruction and development programs will offer alternative livelihoods. But I would stress that our most effective strategy in combating narcotics will be to strengthen the central government's authority throughout Afghanistan.

In addition to new funds, the President is sending new people to Kabul. Your committee will soon consider the nomination of Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad to be the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. The embassy will be strengthened by a group of senior advisors to the Ambassador who will help accelerate the reconstruction efforts. The embassy staff and security detail will be increased. USAID is sending new people to manage its programs. These new people will require additional space, as anyone who has visited Embassy Kabul will attest. The Government of Afghanistan is allowing us to build a temporary facility right across the street from the existing compound to house these new people.

Finally, new focus. To enhance unity of effort in Afghanistan the military headquarters, previously located an hour north of Kabul, is moving to Kabul so the military and civilian authorities can be co-located. The Combined Forces Commander's office will be "right down the hall from the Ambassadors." This will enable us to concentrate our military, diplomatic and reconstruction efforts to achieve success.

Mr. Chairman, we are at a defining moment in Afghanistan. Our success in consolidating and building on the progress to date will have lasting implications for Afghans and Americans alike.

This three-pronged strategy, focusing on security, reconstruction and democracy and governance is our best opportunity to ensure success.

There is no question that the challenges are daunting and that much remains to be done. But it is equally true that we have much to build on, and we have the Afghan people on our side and on the side of their many friends in the international community. Afghans are eager to turn a new page in their troubled history.

In February, President Bush and President Karzai reaffirmed

their common vision for an Afghanistan that is prosperous, democratic, at peace, contributing to regional stability, market friendly, and respectful of human rights.

With Congress's support, I am confident that we will realize that vision.

After my colleagues speak, we would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Taylor.

Let me just mention that the full statements that each of you have will be made a part of the record, and you will not need to ask for permission, but proceed as you wish to either summarize or give the statement. We're here to hear from you in whatever form would be most helpful.

Mr. Rodman.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. RODMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden. I'll just touch on a few points, if I may, not read my whole statement.

I want to thank you and congratulate you both for holding this timely and important hearing, especially in light of the President's supplemental request. I agree completely with what both of you said about what is at stake here, and that is the administration's commitment, as well. I will do my level best, Senator Biden, to keep this a malarkey-free zone but I will take your advice, if I may—

Senator BIDEN. That's all right. You're in the Congress, you're allowed to—

Mr. RODMAN. Well, we owe you our best judgment. But I will also take your advice, if I may, not to rehash the debate of the past. We do have a different perspective on the past. But I also see a convergence, a lot of things happening now, which, as you said, you're happy with. So we're moving forward in a good direction, and that's the spirit in which I think we should have this discussion.

Let me say a little bit about the security situation. This is clearly General North's area of competence, but there are two kinds of security problems. And one is, of course, the enemy, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, who are seeking to disrupt. General North will know the facts better. The second challenge is the intramural conflicts among the Afghan forces, as we have a central government that has not yet established its authority. This is the "warlord" issue.

My feeling is that both of these are manageable. The Taliban and al-Qaeda will seek to disrupt, but we're ready for them. The fact that they will seek to disrupt and whether they succeed or not are two different issues. We think we're prepared for an offensive that they may be launching. And it may be, at the end of the day, after they test the solidity of what we are building, that it is the enemy, not we, who have hard strategic choices to make.

The other issue, the warlord issue, is a political problem. We believe we have a strategy to deal with that. It is essentially President Karzai's strategy, but it has a number of elements. It, of course, is building Afghan institutions, like the army and police. That's something that we've discussed for a long time. We also believe, second, that President Karzai has a well-thought-out political strategy to assert his authority, and we've seen this since early this year. As Ambassador Taylor mentioned, in the spring, the President and his Finance Minister said, OK, the customs revenues will flow to the central government as they are supposed to do. He replaced Governors one after the other, and there are other things I suspect he has in mind. He's consulted with us, and we have signaled our backing for what he is doing. What we've seen in the last several months is a President who is asserting his authority and succeeding because he has prepared the ground whenever he has undertaken some new step forward.

The third element of the strategy is the PRTs, and we think this has been a success. This is an idea that was conceived of about a year ago to advance a number of purposes—to facilitate reconstruction, to help extend the authority of the central government—to be, in some sense, a surrogate for the authority of the central government—and to contribute a little bit to security. And we've also succeeded, as we've discussed, in internationalizing it. This is yet another vehicle for internationalizing the effort. And so we're pleased that the British and the New Zealanders and now the Germans are engaging in this. We also think that given what the Germans are doing, there may be others that will follow along the way they have done.

And that, the internationalization of the effort, is the fourth point I would stress. We are very pleased that the Germans are taking over the PRT. When they suggested doing this under ISAF auspices, we said fine, and we're prepared to work out some details. There are issues like deconfliction, which become a little different in this circumstance, but they are soluble, and that was our attitude as soon as we heard that suggestion. And NATO, as you know, in the past week, has plunged into this exercise after taking over ISAF earlier in the year. So we're now looking at the question of expanding ISAF around the country, and the question of how the PRTs fit into this. All of this is on the table. NATO is addressing this energetically, and we will do our part to make this work.

So we think this is very positive. It's not as easy as all that. One of the concerns we have with PRTs under ISAF is, well, where are the troops going to come from? It's great to have NATO make this commitment, and we welcome it, but the time will come when we want to identify forces, and we hope our allies will identify forces to make this a reality. We will do our best to encourage this and we welcome it.

I will conclude right there, and say that we agree with you and the committee on the stakes involved. We don't underestimate the problems. I agree with Ambassador Taylor on a lot of things that are negative in the country. We also think that after 25 years of the nightmare that Afghanistan has been through, and the fact that even before all of this began 25 years ago Afghanistan was a poor and isolated country, we think that only 2 years after liberation the country is on a good track. The American people can look back on the liberation of Afghanistan as something very positive, and we can be confident that we're moving in the right direction.

The purpose of the President's supplemental request is to invest—in a serious and significant way that has a big impact—in some progress that we think is taking place. We think the Afghan people deserve that.

Now, what we did in Afghanistan, we did for our own security, not only out of altruistic motives, and the same is true of our effort today to ensure that Afghanistan succeeds and never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the Committee about our policy and our progress in Afghanistan.

The Afghan people have been through a terrible ordeal over the last quarter-century. Their country was one of the poorest and least developed in the world, even before the ordeal began. But then came Communist misrule, a Soviet invasion, a war of liberation against the Soviet occupation, and then the Taliban. An entire generation of war and tyranny left the country's institutions, economy, and social structure in shambles.

In the two years since Operation Enduring Freedom helped Afghans liberate their country, we see a nation rebuilding; we also see large-scale international support for that rebuilding:

- The Bonn Agreement filled the political vacuum by bringing Afghan political forces together in a process to build first an interim government, then a transitional government, and soon an elected, permanent constitutional government.
- Famine was averted in 2001; tons of hybrid feed were distributed. A new currency was introduced; International Monetary Fund arrears were cleared. International development assistance is flowing in. A national ring road is being built to promote not only economic growth and regional trade but national unity.
- Two million refugees have returned home.
- New security institutions are being built—Ministries of Defense and Interior, a National Army, national police, and border and highway police.

This is, overall, a remarkable story. We acknowledge the continuing problems; no one can doubt how serious some of them are. But how could these problems be unexpected in a country that has been through such an ordeal? Recognizing these challenges, the United States is redoubling its effort to accelerate the pace of the progress being made. This effort is reflected in the President's Emergency Supplemental Appropriation request for almost \$800 million for Afghanistan and in renewed efforts to galvanize international support.

THE SECURITY SITUATION

Let me focus on the security situation.

The Afghan people face two sources of insecurity. The first is the operations of the enemy—the Taliban, al Qaeda, and spoilers like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The second is the degree of instability occasioned by rivalries among local commanders (or "warlords") not yet fully responsive to the authority of the central government.

We take seriously both of these challenges. The Coalition is working with the government of President Karzai to address them. We think that neither challenge is a threat to the consolidation of the political process laid down in Bonn, or to the progress being made.

We have seen the Taliban step up their military activities in recent months. After operating in only small units, the Taliban have attempted to graduate to larger-unit attacks, sometimes with more than 100 fighters. The net result so far, however, has been that CJTF-180—and Afghan forces—have disrupted enemy operations and inflicted serious casualties on the enemy.

Operations Warrior Sweep (since early August) and Mountain Viper (since early September) have driven the enemy out of the sanctuary they sought in the south and southeast; this resulted in the capture of over 800 weapons, grenades, mortars, and rockets, and over 50,000 lbs. of ammunition. As many as 200 Taliban and other enemy fighters were killed.

We anticipate that the challenge from the enemy will continue. They may attempt a fall offensive of some kind. But the Coalition and the Afghan government are ready. The enemy will certainly test us, but we expect that this offensive will fail. At that point, the enemy—not we—will face hard strategic decisions.

We are greatly encouraged by Pakistan's recent military operation—Operation al-Miwan—against the Taliban in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan's cooperation is crucial.

The second security concern, as I mentioned, is the instability that remains as the central government gradually extends its authority over the country. We are working with President Karzai and the international community in four principal areas to deal with this challenge.

The *first* is the development of effective, national, and professional security institutions, particularly the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the national police and border and highway police.

This Committee is familiar with our program to build and train the ANA. In September the Afghan government appointed the leadership of and activated the Central Corps in Kabul. Eleven ANA battalions have now graduated from the Kabul Military Training Center, and a twelfth is in training. Next year, we hope to accelerate the rate of training from 6,000 a year to 10,000. Of the eleven graduated battalions, we have 4,000 soldiers either deployed with Coalition forces or completing more advanced or specialized training.

ANA battalions have ably conducted presence patrols and combat operations. The reaction of the Afghan public to ANA presence patrols has been uniformly positive. As one local leader said, "Wherever the ANA goes, stability breaks out." The ANA has also performed well in combat.

The two greatest challenges are attrition—a problem that is very real but that has recently diminished—and a large gap between the high demand for the ANA for a variety of missions and the limited supply so far of ANA units.

In parallel with the building of a truly national army, we have also worked to help President Karzai and Defense Minister Fahim reform the Ministry of Defense, so that all Afghans will see it as a genuinely national institution. In September, President Karzai announced new appointments for the 22 top positions, introducing greater political and ethnic balance. This reform process, we expect, will continue.

The Ministry of Interior controls the National Police and the Border Police. The Department of Defense hopes to be able to support our State Department colleagues in assisting these efforts as well.

Second: At bottom, the warlord problem is a political problem. Since last spring, our government has worked with President Karzai in support of his political strategy to extend his national authority. We believe he has a well-thought-out strategy, and we have made clear the U.S. Government's backing of his reform efforts:

- Last May, with our support, the central government concluded an agreement requiring provincial governors who controlled customs posts to turn over revenues to the Ministry of Finance. Virtually nothing had been received before that agreement. Since then, more than \$90 million has been turned over, putting the central government ahead of its revenue projections for this year.
- In 2003, President Karzai and the Ministry of Interior have replaced about one-third of Afghanistan's provincial governors and about one-half of its provincial police chiefs—all in a concerted effort to improve governance outside of Kabul and to extend the authority of the national government.
- In August, President Karzai simultaneously transferred the governor of Kandahar, Gui Agha Shirzai, to a ministry in Kabul; changed the governors of Zabol and Wardak provinces; and replaced Ismail Khan as corps commander in Herat.
- This move was a significant assertion of authority by President Karzai. At the time, the United States made an important public declaration that it endorsed President Karzai's reforms to assert the legitimate authority of the central government and to improve provincial governance.
- In addition, more recently, we have supported the efforts of President Karzai's commission, led by Minister of Interior Jalali, to find a solution to the frequent military clashes in Mazar-e-Sharif between Generals Dostam and Atta. Special Presidential Envoy Dr. Khalilzad engaged himself in support of this process on his recent visit, and our Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the area also played a role in defusing tensions.

The *third* dimension of our accelerated effort is the further deployment of these Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

The PRTs, as we anticipated a year ago when their concept was devised, are a flexible instrument for achieving several purposes, including: to facilitate reconstruction efforts around the country; to contribute to the facilitation of security where needed; to bolster the presence and authority of the central government; and to provide another vehicle for internationalizing the overall effort.

PRTs typically comprise 60-100 military and civilian personnel representing several agencies in the U.S. Government. Their composition is meant to be flexible, adapting to the particular needs of a region; they include a civilian led reconstruction team, engineers, security and military observer teams, linguists, and interpreters, and a medical team. The PRTs work with Afghan government ministries, local officials, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to facilitate their efforts.

Four PRTs, as you know, are already deployed, and four more should be deployed in the next few months. The U.K., New Zealand, and now Germany are taking over some of these teams.

Our *fourth* line of activity is support for international partners, including on security issues where they have the lead. We will work with the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and with Japan on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of militia forces. We support U.K.-led program against narcotics. We are supporting German efforts in police training and Italian efforts in judicial reform.

In addition, we welcome the fact that NATO has taken over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, and that Germany (as noted) has proposed to take over the PRT in Konduz.

The Germans, as you know, have proposed that their PRT in Konduz come under ISAF. We have agreed to this idea and are working out the details. We are open, as well, to expanding ISAF's mandate more broadly—as the new UN Security Council Resolution 1510 earlier this week now permits. If ISAF's role does expand, some of the issues we will need to pay attention to are:

- That the new arrangements ensure deconfliction between ISAF and OFF and do not impede OFF operations;
- That all these activities support the political strategy of President Karzai that the U.S. is supporting; and
- That the new arrangements be backed by real commitments of forces from NATO partners.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with an example of how these diverse strands of policy can come together to help win the war against the Taliban.

In 2002, Paktia province in the east was considered one of the areas with the highest levels of enemy activity. Since then, the United States deployed a PRT near Gardez, the capital, and supported civil affairs and reconstruction activity. President Karzai replaced the governor, police chief, and sidelined local commanders who had been abusing the people. New national police were deployed, and we sent in the Afghan National Army on presence patrols. PRT activities—sometimes in concert with ANA deployments—have reinforced stability and won the confidence of the local population. Together, these reforms and deployments have transformed the security situation.

As we continue our efforts to improve security and to support reconstruction, the lesson of Paktia province should inform the work of all of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. PRT team members, through their patrolling and interactions with local Afghan elders and officials, have enhanced security. The PRTs are also extending the reach of the Afghan central government, which now has a representative at each PRT location. And quick-impact projects like the building of schools and clinics, or the drilling of wells, have helped PRTs to develop close relationships with Afghan communities. Our challenge is to expand the geographical impact of these activities, both by increasing the number of PRTs and extending their reach through satellite locations.

While the State Department and USAID are the lead agencies for Afghan reconstruction, DOD has also gladly supported them. DOD—primarily through civil affairs teams (300 civil affairs personnel deployed) and PRTs—is supporting the rebuilding of over 300 schools and 50 medical facilities, installing over 600 wells, and hiring over 30,000 Afghans countrywide.

I will conclude as I began, acknowledging the seriousness of the challenges that we and the Afghans face in rebuilding a country devastated by a quarter century of war. But we have a strategy, and we are accelerating our effort.

Our goals in Afghanistan clearly have bipartisan support. The President's Emergency Supplemental request is an opportunity for this nation to reaffirm and strengthen its commitment. That appropriation can make a significant difference.

Our nation's role in liberating the Afghan people is a success story. All Americans can be proud of what we and our Coalition partners helped accomplish. We did it for our own security, not simply out of altruism, and that is equally true today of our effort to ensure that Afghanistan becomes a successful, modern state and never again a safe haven for terrorists.

Our partnership with the Afghan people continues to grow and strengthen. The Administration and the Congress have much to do together to complete what we have begun.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Rodman. We'd like to hear now from Brigadier General Gary North.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. GARY L. NORTH, DEPUTY J-5 FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, THE JOINT STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC

General NORTH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to come talk to you and your colleagues today of these areas of concern of our U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.

Many of the topics have been covered, and so I would like to discuss the Afghan National Army [ANA] very briefly and address the security situation from a military perspective, and then turn to you, sir, for questions.

In regards to the Afghan National Army, in May 2002 our Task Force Phoenix, ably assisted by specialist training teams from other countries, began training the Afghan National Army to build a multiethnic force under civilian control, which is very quickly becoming a symbol of national unity in Afghanistan. Over 11 Afghan National Army battalions have graduated from the Kabul Military Training Center, with a 12th in training and a 13th forming. Our intent is to complete the Afghan central corps training by the June 2004 elections with a total of 15 battalions.

In January 2004, we plan to accelerate the Afghan National Army training, increasing the capacity graduated per year from the current capacity of 6,600 soldiers to 10,000 soldiers per year. Of the 11 currently graduated battalions, we have over 4,800 soldiers that are deployed as operational soldiers who have been out alongside with our Coalition Forces or are completing specialized training to serve in both armor and mechanized infantry or combat service support battalions. Over \$80 million of donations and pledges of equipment from international Coalition members have supported this effort.

The successes we are experiencing in the ANA, as well, are beginning to be reflected in our Ministry of Defense reform initiatives in the Afghan Ministry of Defense where over 22 candidates have been confirmed for top-tier posts. They bring strong qualifications to the ministry and adequately reflect the Afghan ethnic diversity. And these 22 members just finished their first week of full-assistance training. I received an out-brief on that today from members in Kabul, and they are very excited about the opportunities of the future of the Ministry of Defense reform initiatives.

In regards to the security situation, as Ambassador Taylor mentioned, it is somewhat tense at times in the south and southeast quadrants. Our Coalition military forces, including the Afghan National Army troops, are successfully repulsing both Taliban, al-Qaeda, and assorted anti-Coalition Force elements. By all reports, the Afghan National Army is performing extremely well in combat operations alongside Coalition elements.

The objectives of our two most recent operations, Warrior Sweep and Mountain Viper, which have been publicized in the open press, in both southern and southeast Afghanistan, were to interdict anti-Coalition Forces by infiltration, deny the enemy sanctuary, and de-

stroy enemy forces, and these resulted in the capture of over 800 weapons—grenades, mortars, rockets—and over 50,000 pounds of ammunition, and as many as over 200 Taliban and other enemy combatants were killed in these actions.

Additionally, we're greatly encouraged by the recent Pakistani military activities against anti-Coalition Forces and Taliban and part of Operation Miwan in the federally administrative areas. Pakistan's success will greatly enhance our own efforts along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Gentlemen, at this point I'd like to stop and be subject to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Let me just sketch out provisionally the architecture of our hearing today. We have debate on the floor, as you know, on the supplemental appropriations bill, and the Chair has been advised that approximately at 3 o'clock there will be two rollcall votes stacked one after the other. We have good participation in this hearing, I hope that will continue, and what we will attempt to do is to keep the hearing going. Senator Biden and I will depart and return at some point. And, likewise, members may wish to stay and ask their questions while we are absent. But it's important that we all have opportunities to take advantage of this panel. We have another very talented panel still to follow. So I would suggest a 7-minute limit on our first round of questioning.

I would commence by asking Ambassador Taylor a very specific question. Ambassador Tomsen will testify later, as I understand, that he recommends that non-military funds for Afghanistan be moved into a single State Department account under your control, instead of several separate accounts—at least at present it appears that way—to improve the efficiency and the quality of our aid to Afghanistan. Has the administration considered this proposal? And would having the funds in a single account improve or speed implementation of our assistance?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, in my previous job, before I went to Kabul, I coordinated assistance going into the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. And, as you know, in both of those accounts there is a single account. There is one line item, and it's for the former Soviet Union, another one for the East European countries. And that does help, and Ambassador Tomsen and I worked together in that time. That's where I met Peter. And so we know that can work.

We have examined it, in answer to your question. Very specific question, very specific answer. Yes, we've examined it. There are pros and cons to this. I see some pros, and others see some cons. And we will continue to talk about this within the government. We think it's a good idea.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just ask, what can our committee do, if anything, to accelerate the pros, in this situation? Now, I don't want to illustrate excessive bias in my question, but, at the same time, it appears to me we should get on with it, and I'm just wondering what the problem is.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, we are, of course, getting on with it. And it turns out that the supplemental that you're debating right now will essentially go into four main accounts. It will go into

the police account, into the FMF for the army that we talked about, to a larger ESF account, economic support fund accounts, and that has a lot of flexibility within it, as well. And then, finally, there's an anti-terrorism account that we use to protect some of the senior people in Kabul.

So those are fairly discreet areas—army, police, economic, and protection. And so as it stands right now, that is working out OK. So I think we are making this thing work, and it's—I will take your concern, your interest, your suggestions back and we'll continue the pros and cons.

The CHAIRMAN. Please do.

Now, I think, Secretary Rodman has pointed out that there is no profit in rehashing all of the past, and I will not do that. I would just say that I think that our activities have evolved over the course of a number of briefings that we have enjoyed. Some have been with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State or others. My general perception at the beginning, after the war was essentially fought in Afghanistan and before the mopping-up operations continue—they are still extremely important—continued, was that Secretary Rumsfeld essentially indicated that our job was a military mission. In those days, nation-building was really not on the charts. Now, it was mentioned occasionally, but often in a pejorative way.

Now, bit by bit, we came to a conclusion—by “we,” I think it's the country, the administration—that a successful Afghanistan was very important to us, very important to the war against terrorism. The fact that a failed state there could be an incubator for terrorism again, a recycling of the whole problem became very alarming.

Nevertheless, the resources to do all of that have not necessarily followed instantly. We have been preoccupied in Iraq, and we have other responsibilities. So these we all understand.

My rationalization of Iraq and Afghanistan is that we are getting better at it all the time. I object totally with anybody who thinks we really had a good plan to begin with anyplace, but I would just add that none of us are that wise, and we all benefit by experience.

In Afghanistan, our experience is that the capital has a fair degree of security. We are certainly profiting by having a President, President Karzai, a constitutional group, and a number of people, as we've heard outlined, now coming into the Armed Forces of Afghanistan who fight well and who understand the centrality of it.

When the three of us—that is, Senator Hagel, Senator Biden, and I—met with him in Amman, at the World Economic Forum, President Karzai, indicated to us that he was collecting some customs taxes, some revenues even at the borders. Clearly it is a good role for a central government, to have that degree of recourse. So this is not one in which entire blobs of territory are covered by warlords with a President nearby in the capital. There is an extension, but it is tenuous and it is different and complex.

President Karzai also outlined the constitution, which was complex. Our committee would like to see the draft of the constitution at some point. We've been told it's, out there. And if you would be forthcoming, that would be helpful, because this is an important

constitution to look at in the context of constitutions in Iraq and maybe elsewhere.

As I heard the President discussing this, there are all sorts of checks and balances and very unusual clauses. As we discovered with our Iraqi witnesses the other day, constitution business is going to be even more complex the harder you lay down a hand in whatever month you start or try to stop it. But, nevertheless, it is proceeding.

President Karzai said he had a 5-year plan, a financial plan. He outlined that. His Finance Minister was with him. There are some holes in the plan, and this is where we came in. We can help fill in the holes, as you suggested, or others could help fill in the holes. But the strength of the fact was that he had a 5-year plan. He really has some idea, as did his ministers, of where they were going for 5 years.

I've been troublesome in suggesting the same in Iraq. Someday it would be helpful to see that. Someday we will see it. Maybe not today. But they have one in Afghanistan.

Now, are you acquainted with the plan? Obviously. And you're acquainted probably with the holes or the suggestions. To what extent is our government able to work hand in glove, say, with the Finance Minister and with our European allies in NATO and with others to make certain that that part of it is sound, and that they are able to finance a progressive administration?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, that Finance Minister was the single person that I dealt with the most in my time in Kabul. He's very, very good, as you saw. He does have the plan. It's well worked out. Even the development of that plan, however, was not easy. As I mentioned before, a Coalition cabinet that has very diverse representatives in there from a lot of different parts of the country, as well as ethnic groups, and sitting in powerful positions to be able to affect that plan. He was able—and the Finance Minister drove this. President Karzai, obviously, was standing behind him, but he drove it, and he was able to come up with a budget last year. And that budget, as you say, was a 1-year, but then extended out for several years, 5 years, and he has a very good plan of how to get there.

So in answer to your first question, we deal very directly, hand in glove, with that Finance Minister and helping—part of my job there was to help him mobilize the rest of the international community.

Another good thing about Kabul and Afghanistan is that the international community is working very well together, as you've mentioned. We've got a good U.N. resolution, we've got a good U.N. team, frankly. We've got Germans and French and Americans and others all working very closely together, not just on the army, but certainly on the army.

So that international community came together and focused on the different holes that they've mentioned to you. They're not all filled. Part of the President's request in the supplemental that you're debating will help fill some of those holes. One of the holes was actually payment of salaries for civil servants, for bureaucrats, the bureaucracy in the government and in the provinces, and those are gradually being filled, and that's part of our plan.

So we appreciate your support on that. We will continue to ask, on a regular basis, for funds to enable us to continue to help that government move forward.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be great, and some periodic reports from you as to how that's going, now that at least there is some scheme, some discipline and outline.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, one other thing. You mentioned the constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ambassador TAYLOR. President Karzai, of course, is in Malaysia right now. He has taken a copy with him. It's been the subject of a lot of discussion, debate, changes—some steps forward, some back, we hear, in those debates. It's within the Afghan government. Again, this is a very healthy debate that's going on, an important one that will shape their country, at least for the foreseeable future.

He has that draft with him. He also left a committee behind, including Dr. Ghani, the Finance Minister, to work the final details of that constitution. We have drafts, which I'd be happy to share with you, with the committee. The final draft should be the one that will go to the constitutional loya jurga in December, should be available within days, and we will certainly get that to you.

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate that.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Gentlemen, we have a lot of questions and there's a lot of interested colleagues here. Let me stick to a few specific subjects, if I may, with one short preamble.

I hope as we pass, and I believe we will pass, the \$87 billion appropriation, which I personally will vote for—although I think we'll see some changes in the accountability requirement, the essence of it will pass—I hope the portion of—assuming we don't get a single State Department account, which I strongly favor; I am biased in that regard—but even if it stays the way it is, in essentially four accounts, I hope that economic account we will be more fastidious than we have been in the past in terms of directing aid, to direct it to Karzai so it's through Karzai.

The idea that you would allow—I'm going to use—let me be anecdotal here—a road to be built in Afghanistan and Ismail Khan take credit for it, is bizarre. To me, it's absolutely bizarre. Why—if Karzai didn't have the military capability of controlling the country, which we all know he didn't, and hopefully someday will, at last there has—what are the reasons anybody needs Kabul for? They need Kabul for money. They need Kabul for something. What value is Kabul to Kandahar, or what value is Kabul to Herat or any other place, unless they can dispense it? And so I strongly, strongly, strongly, strongly urge you, if you haven't already done it—and it would be helpful, at least to me, possibly the whole committee, for you to give us a sense of how these funds are actually distributed. A lot of us used to be local officials. This is a local mayor, a local councilman. I mean, we understand how—where the dollar actually gets disbursed to the contractors to build the road and whether it matters. We have councilmen fighting over whether or not the money to build the road or the sewer system in his district was announced by him or announced by the mayor or an-

nounced by the Governor. Well, it makes a big difference in Afghanistan.

And so I hope you'll fill us in on that. Not now, but at some point. I may draft a formal question for you so I know how that works.

But let me move to the security piece just a second, the ANA, general. And, by the way, I know it sounds so trite just for us to say it, but you guys do a helluva job. I mean, I've watch those kids over there, been over there, I mean—they're not—I shouldn't say "kids," they're—you know, I'm just getting so old, they seem like kids. They're incredible. Absolutely incredible. And they are, to use the other expression we overuse, they are in harm's way. They are in harm's way. And we've gone down those roads, and at high speeds with night-vision goggles to make sure—I wondered where in the hell we were going. I was hoping the driver had his goggles on as he was going at high speeds to avoid those checkpoints and so on at night. So it's still an unsafe place.

My question is this. We had testimony—again, I don't want to go back and rehash who was on first and who was on second. This is where we are right now. The goal is a—correct me if I'm wrong now, Ambassador Rodman, or you, general—the goal is a 70,000-person Afghan army. We initially had—and, again, understandably, I'm not—again, not a criticism—we had fairly high expectations that we'd be training this force up pretty quickly and have—and, by now, it was predicted we would have considerably larger Afghan National Army up and running than we do now. I hope our—your counterparts in Iraq keep an eye on Afghanistan. This malarkey that we're going to have—my word, I'm not talking about you guys—this malarkey we're going to have a stood-up Iraqi Army of x-thousand people in the next 18 months is absolutely bizarre, unless it's totally new. It hasn't happened any other place we've tried it, including Afghanistan. What is the realistic number—and this is a case where humility is very much in order. This is a case—my advice to you, as your staffer here, is go low so you don't have me repeating what you said to me later when you've given me a high number and you're embarrassed by it. OK? What is a realistic number that we think we can get to to have a trained Afghan National Army that can set foot outside of Kabul and function without the support, without the support, of international security force or American forces? What are we realistically looking at?

Because the American people got it. They figured it out. You do one of three things. We supply all the force for security, we supply it with our allies, or it gets supplied indigenously by trained forces that represent a new army. Tell me what we have now and what you realistically look at 12 months from now.

General NORTH. Yes, sir. It's an excellent question. And to humility, thank you for your comment on our young men and women in the military, both in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I travel quite a bit to Afghanistan, and every time I go I'm reminded that we've got the best military in the world—funded, equipped, trained like no other—and, you know, they're just absolutely phenomenal.

In regards to realism, there is a difference between Afghanistan and Iraq. Iraq had a military, and some of those people will be able

to be trained into a new Iraqi military. Afghanistan has over 30 years of militia forces that are, at best, what we would call local thuggery, in some regards. They are very capable, very tough, very rough individual soldiers, but they do not have what we envision to build, which is a professional, disciplined, led by leadership, trained, and able to operate in something other than small groups of four to six people at a time.

Realistically, what we have built is a three-phased approach that started in May 2002, which was phase one, to build these initial 15 battalions for a central core—

Senator BIDEN. For the record, how many in a battalion?

General NORTH. Six-hundred is the goal, sir. And so we—our plan is to build those, the 15 battalions, by the elections of June 2004. That is phase one. And then we have a second phase and a third phase, which takes us out to 2008. The number—

Senator BIDEN. We're talking about—again, so people listening to us—because we get—it's amazing how informed the American public is. We leave here, and I'll get in the train, and the conductor will ask me, "Now, how many troops is that?" We're talking about 9,000, roughly.

General NORTH. That's correct. And with headquarter staffs, we look at about 10,000.

Senator BIDEN. Gotcha.

General NORTH. Now, the number 70,000 came out of Bonn II from President Karzai and his staff, in concert with our leadership in the international community and the discussion of what does Afghanistan really need. It's all tied into DDR and—

Senator BIDEN. DDR?

General NORTH. That's demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration. As you bring down those militia forces led by the warlords, the regional leaders, and so the—I can't give you what we believe today, on the 16th of October, what we envision in the year 2008.

Senator BIDEN. I see.

Last, my time's up, but I don't want to leave one piece out here, Senator Sarbanes asked a very interesting question of Secretary Rodman last time he was here about the pay rate. Our understanding is that—and maybe it wasn't you, Mr. Secretary, but it was—the question was asked the last time we had a hearing on Afghanistan and discussed the military—it was asserted that the sum of pay for the average Afghan soldier was about \$50, which was less than what it was for the folks in there cleaning the barracks. Now, I don't know if that's true or not. Can you tell us anything, now or for the record, about whether or not the pay is sufficient to attract them out of the warlord's band? Because when I spoke to a number of other members of the cabinet, including the Tajiks, one of the issues was it's awful hard to get these guys to decide they want to be in the ANA versus staying with their friendly warlord, both in terms of spoils, money, and pay. Can you talk to that just a second, about the pay?

General NORTH. Yes, sir.

Initially, the pay scale for the young recruits was set at \$50 a month. Again, this was an issue that those of us who live in a society where that's not very much money, we thought that might be

too low. We worked with President Karzai and his leadership, and he agreed that that was the appropriate amount at the time. Since then, we have raised the basic pay scale for the young recruit to \$75, and as they graduate, they start getting more, the NCOs get more, the officers get more.

Senator BIDEN. For the record, could you submit the pay scale as envisioned? It would be very helpful.

General NORTH. I'd be happy to do that.

[The following information was subsequently provided:]



**ANA Pay Change
14 Sep 03
Change in Dollars**

28

Afghanistan



New ANA Monthly Pay Table (Off.)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>0 Year</u>	<u>1st Year</u>	<u>2d Year</u>
GEN	\$850	\$860	\$870
LTG	\$750	\$760	\$770
MG	\$650	\$670	\$680
BG	\$450	\$458	\$466
COL	\$400	\$405	\$410
LTC	\$350	\$355	\$360
MAJ	\$300	\$305	\$310
CPT	\$220	\$225	\$229
1LT	\$180	\$184	\$188
2LT	\$160	\$163	\$167

No Change to current Pay Table

Afghanistan



New ANA Monthly Pay Table (Enl.)

Rank	0 Year		1 st Year		2 nd Year	
	Prev. Rate	New Rate	Prev. Rate	New Rate	Prev. Rate	New Rate
CSM/SGM	\$180	\$180	\$183	\$183	\$187	\$187
1SG/MSG	\$140	\$140	\$143	\$145	\$147	\$150
SFC	\$110	\$115	\$113	\$120	\$115	\$125
SSG	\$90	\$100	\$92	\$105	\$95	\$110
SGT	\$80	\$85	\$82	\$90	\$85	\$95
SDR	\$70	\$70	\$73	\$75	\$75	\$80
PFC	\$60		Deleted From Pay Table			
PV2	\$55					
PVT	\$50					

Changes shown in Red

General NORTH. There is, of course, a component of the pay scale that we should all appreciate. One, we're building an army who not only gets a reasonable pay, but we're providing for the men of the army—and this is of their own accord in my discussions with them in the field, the best housing they've ever lived in, a roof that doesn't leak, hot and cold running water, and three of the best meals they have ever gotten every day, as well as a uniform that is a professional uniform. And, on graduation, they get a green beret that they are extremely proud of.

So in the macro sense, that pay is a composite. What we get is the disciplined, integrity soldiers who—

Senator BIDEN. I wasn't suggesting we're not treating them well. My only point is, are we being competitive in the marketplace? And that's the only point I'm raising. Is there enough incentive under the present system for them to, in effect, decommission from where they have been and sign up. As you know, there's a lot of other spoils in the system where—

General NORTH. Absolutely.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Poppy is grown like wheat in this country.

General NORTH. And it is very tough to compete for those people who are on the payrolls of a warlord who can pay them much more. But that's not the caliber of soldier we're looking for.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Gentlemen, welcome. We appreciate your testimony.

General, you mentioned, following along with Senator Biden's questions, in your testimony, that you graduated 11 battalions, your objective is to get to 15. Could you give us some sense of where those 11 battalions are? You mentioned some are special trained now, but the bulk of those, are they in the south, south-east? Where are they in Afghanistan?

General NORTH. Senator, the bulk of those battalions right now are barracked in the Kabul area. These are the central core battalions in the—from the center part of Kabul out to the KMTC training center on the eastern portion of Kabul. We currently, today, have two battalions plus a company in the field doing training operations in the south and southeast, and we rotate a battalion in a rotational manner to Gardez to operate in the area of our PRTs, and that Gardez and to the southeast of Gardez is well over the July to September timeframe this past summer, over a thousand members of the ANA took part in their first combat operations. So we put them in the field in a rotational basis to upgrade their basic training, and then in the Pol-e-Charki area in the east of Kabul, we have barrack capacity when the battalions are not in the field training to have them in garrison.

Senator HAGEL. Any in the west, western part of the—

General NORTH. No, sir, not yet. The west is extremely stable. If you took a counterclockwise map around the western part of the country, there's a stable portion. In the north we have incidents, but the majority of our incidents and the majority of our focus are in the south and southeast.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Let's stay in the south and southeast for a moment and go to you, Ambassador Taylor. Both you, I believe, and General North noted the difficulties we were having in the south and southeast reconstitution of the Taliban, other forces. I serve on the Intelligence Committee, so I'm sensitive to the other issues here. Why is it that they're getting stronger? I think, in your words, Mr. Ambassador, "getting worse," things are getting worse in the south and southeast as you led with the bad news, which we appreciate. Why is that?

Ambassador TAYLOR. I think for a couple of reasons, Senator. One is, there is no doubt that the Taliban, probably supported by some remnants of the al-Qaeda, which you have heard about in other briefings, are still active. The second is, in the south, along the border with Pakistan, it is very difficult for us to—well, it's impossible for us to go across the border. And the Taliban and the other people who are disrupting and are killing people on the Afghan side of the border, can go across the border into Pakistan. So when you look at a map of where the problems are, what strikes you is, there's about a 20 kilometer swath of red—red is kind of high risk, yellow, medium, and blue—the north and the west is basically blue, there's a swath of yellow, and the red is really along the Pakistan border. So there's clearly a problem associated with cross-border operations.

Senator HAGEL. May I ask a question on that? And I apologize. You know, we're all under time constraints here. But if that's the case, and I'm sure it is the case, you've identified it. I know it's imperfect, and it's porous all along there.

I assume, then, you are taking a force structure to match those reconstitution of Taliban, al-Qaeda, others, working closer with the Pakistanis, which gets us into how we're doing there. Give us some assurance that we're doing exactly that, or something, that is going to deal with this so that the next time you're up here you're not coming to give us bad news again that we still have a situation getting worse there, when we know, as you say, it's a matter of moving back and forth on that border, especially if the Pakistanis are our allies here. What are we not doing we should be doing more of? Take all those pieces in any order.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, let me do a little bit, but I know that Secretary Rodman and General North may also have comments on exactly—

Senator HAGEL. You're an old West Pointer Ambassador. Don't get off on that.

Ambassador TAYLOR. No, no. I respect that—we do work well together. One of the things you talked about earlier is how well the—

Senator HAGEL. They teach you that at West Point.

Ambassador TAYLOR. They do. They do. They teach us some things.

But on your questions about working with the Pakistanis, this past week we have seen the beginning of some real progress that the Pakistani military is putting into the border areas, putting into border areas where no military has been, whether it be Pakistani, whether it be Indian, whether it be British, in 150 years. So they

are—the Pakistanis are sending military forces and getting some forces killed. They had two soldiers killed there in a sweep of Taliban and al-Qaeda. It's difficult, as you know, for President Musharraf to go after Taliban. It's not so difficult to go after al-Qaeda. But he is doing this, and it is—this is the beginning. Secretary Armitage—Deputy Secretary Armitage, of course, was just in Kabul, Kandahar, but also Islamabad last week, and he had very clear conversations on this topic with President Musharraf. And he is very—he is convinced that they are now—the Pakistanis are now going in the right direction.

Secretary Rodman and General North can describe to you the military operations that the Coalition has undertaken against these larger formations of Taliban.

Before I pass it to them, the other thing that is a problem, that is in answer to your question, "What is the problem down there," is the slow pace of reconstruction in the area where the security is worse. It's difficult for NGOs to work. It's difficult for the international community to work. It's not impossible. The road that I mentioned, going from Kabul to Kandahar, goes right through that swath, and we're taking extraordinary measures to secure ourselves. But we get—our workers, our construction engineers, our security people get attacked regularly along that stretch, so—but that just means it's difficult to work. It's not impossible. We have the PRTs along the—both in Gardez, hopefully in Ghazni, and we will in Kandahar, that will provide some security for that. But the Coalition Forces, as well, are providing security. But—

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Ambassador TAYLOR [continuing]. I know that Secretary Rodman—

Senator HAGEL. Secretary Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. Just to add, one of the crucial variables is clearly the cooperation of Pakistan, and it's something we raise with them constantly. We credit the good faith of the Pakistani President and leadership when they say that they have the same interests we do in shutting down the Taliban and al-Qaeda. And as has been discussed, the objective conditions are pretty formidable in the border area—the terrain—and the populations are sympathetic to some of the terrorists. The operation in Waziristan a couple of weeks ago was the most important anti-Taliban operation that they have conducted.

So our sense is that the Pakistani Government is committed. There are elements in the Pakistani Government who we suspect are sympathetic to the old policy of before 9/11, and that's an issue. But it's a subject of constant consultation and discussion, and I have to say, again, the trend is in the right direction.

Senator HAGEL. You say the trend's in the right direction, but the Ambassador came before us, said things are getting worse, so I'm a little—

Mr. RODMAN. I would say the operation 2 weeks ago was the most positive and significant Pakistani military operation against the Taliban, and we consider that a good sign. And I think we see other signs that they are—the Pakistanis are coming to grips with the fact that they have to make a clear decision as a government and enforce it on their own government.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. General North, would—you have 30 seconds, and I apologize for this. You're worth more than 30 seconds, but I—

General NORTH. In my 30 seconds, my sound bite is, our U.S. military forces aren't going to match them, we're going to overmatch them.

Senator HAGEL. All right, thank you. And one last very quick answer if you could give it to me, you mentioned the road between Kandahar and Kabul. Where are we? You were very bullish, and I agree, and that's a vital lifeline. Where are we? Are we getting it built? Are we behind schedule, ahead of schedule?

General NORTH. We are on schedule, Senator. The schedule is to have it fully paved from Kabul to Kandahar by the end of December.

Senator HAGEL. By the end of—

General NORTH. By the end of this December.

Senator HAGEL. This December.

General NORTH. Yes, sir.

Senator HAGEL. So you've covered how many miles, then?

General NORTH. We are probably about 200—150, 200 miles. It is going at about five kilometers a day, is being paved. We are on schedule to finish that. That's assuming that there is not a bad security problem, which, as I indicated, there's—however, we should be—people should be driving Kabul to Kandahar in 5 hours on a fully paved road by the end of this year, and it used to—about 2 months ago, when we were there, it—three months ago—it was 15 hours. This will be a major—so we are on track now. Next year we'll put more layers on that, so it lasts 15 years, as opposed to 2 years, but we're going to get that one paved by the end of December.

Senator HAGEL. Well, that's a significant accomplishment. I congratulate you.

General NORTH. USAID, sir. I will give them credit. They've done good work on this.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

I thank Chairman Lugar for holding this hearing on Afghanistan. While much of our attention has been focused on Iraq over the past year, we cannot lose sight of our interests in helping support the transition to stability and democracy in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the first battle in the war on terrorism, a battle that is joined but not won, and we cannot fail.

Afghanistan has come a long way in two years. The Taliban has been driven from power and President Hamid Karzai has given the Afghan transitional government hope and inspired leadership. But Karzai's government does not control security throughout Afghanistan. The security situation is volatile and dangerous. And without security, there will not be stability and democracy.

In southeastern Afghanistan, in the Kandahar region, the original regional base of the Taliban, political violence is on the rise. The Taliban have reappeared and are contributing to these tensions. There and elsewhere in the country, regional warlords, many connected to the international trade in illegal narcotics, force their will and undermine Karzai's authority.

One option to enhance security in Afghanistan is to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul, at least until a new Afghan army and border patrols are able to do the job. NATO took over leadership of ISAF in August. Last week, NATO endorsed expanding ISAF beyond the Kabul. We need to support NATO's efforts.

We are currently debating a supplemental appropriations request which includes \$800 million in aid for Afghanistan. Hopefully it will pass this week. Even with these additional funds, there is still much more to do. America cannot shoulder the burden in Afghanistan alone. Reconstruction in Afghanistan is estimated to cost at least \$15 billion over the next decade. The Tokyo pledging conference in January 2002 produced pledges of \$4.5 billion. According to the U.N. Development Program Donor Assistance Database, donor countries had committed \$3.9 billion, and disbursed \$1.7 billion. We must encourage our friends and allies must do more so that the Afghan people experience the full benefits of liberation.

America's efforts in Afghanistan are directly related to our interests in winning the war on terrorism, halting the spread of illegal narcotics, and promoting stability and democracy in central and South Asia.

I would like to conclude by thanking Senator Lugar for mentioning the comments by First Lady Laura Bush last week about the contributions of the University of Nebraska's Center for Afghanistan Studies. One of our witnesses today, Ambassador Peter Tomsen, was a former faculty member of that program. The State of Nebraska, and the American people, are proud of the Center's well-established expertise, long-running relationship with the Afghan people, and the Center's contributions to improving educational opportunities for Afghans.

I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, in order to make the vote, I'm going to have to ask one question. I regret I couldn't ask the others. I'll try to followup in writing. But let me just ask Mr. Taylor and Mr. Rodman.

Why is there such a great disparity, tens of billions of dollars worth, between the amount of assistance the administration wishes to devote to Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction and the amount devoted to Afghanistan? Are Afghanistan's needs really so much more manageable?

Ambassador Taylor.

Ambassador TAYLOR. They're not more manageable. They're less manageable. The time difference, Senator, I think is important. When we were putting together our request—that is, the Afghan portion of the supplemental—we were focused, and are focused, on the time between now and June. And the reason we're focused on that time period is, that's the time when we're preparing for elections. We want a moderate government to emerge from good, solid elections next June. What we're doing in our acceleration of our work, and it's in the supplemental appropriation, is to focus on security, improve security, which is what General North talked about, in terms of accelerating the ability to train ANA troops, to train more police, move forward on the DDR, on the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration program. So that security is one piece, then these roads that we just talked about. Again, we think that within 8 months we can put all of that billion dollars to work.

Now, I don't do Iraq, thankfully, but I can tell you that that \$20 billion is over a longer period of time than 8 months.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. Just to add to that, there's a difference in absorptive capacity, given that Afghanistan is a much poorer country. So to bring it up to an Afghan standard is different than Iraq, which was more developed. Iraq has infrastructure, which turns out to be, you know, badly in need of restoration after years of neglect. So the economic need is different. It's not clear that Afghanistan could handle orders of magnitude more than we're providing.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the panel.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I thank Senators Lugar and Biden for holding this important hearing, and I thank all of the witnesses for being here today. This week it is particularly important for the committee to focus on Afghanistan, as the full Senate debates a massive supplemental appropriations bill that is devoted, primarily, to Iraq. While some in the administration have been claiming that Iraq is the central battle in the fight against terrorism—one more justification of dubious credibility for a misguided policy—a situation that is unquestionably directly related to the campaign against the forces that attacked this country on September 11th has, I believe, been neglected. As tremendous resources and attention are focused on Iraq, the security situation in Afghanistan is getting worse, and I fear that many of our policy goals are become more difficult to achieve. So I look forward to this opportunity to survey the current situation and to hear from the witnesses before us and my colleagues on the committee about what steps can be taken to bring our policy onto a firmer footing.

Senator HAGEL [presiding]. May I do this, sir? I just got word we've got about 3 minutes left. And I know you've not voted, Senator. If you want to run it down a little bit, go right ahead, but—and then I will hand over my fleeting authority as Chair of the committee, to the gentleman from New Jersey, and I will vote. And then the chairman would ask you to just recess—

Senator CORZINE. OK.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. The committee until he comes back. We'll all be back eventually.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator CORZINE [presiding]. Thank you.

I'd ask how the deliverance of international aid, how the follow-through relative to the Tokyo conference has occurred, whether pledges have actually—whether the check's in the mail or the reality of those efforts is followed through.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, one indication of that is the Finance Minister, that we talked about earlier, has come to the conclusion that of that \$5 billion that was pledged at Tokyo, actually \$4.5 billion plus a couple of more hundreds of millions of dollars, to get up to about \$5 billion in Tokyo and subsequently, that that has been committed about probably 90 percent. That is—

Senator CORZINE. Committed, but not—

Ambassador TAYLOR [continuing]. Committed, and a lot of that is actually in play, is actually working, but committed—when you're talking about absorptive capacity, as Secretary Rodman was just talking, it is a matter of beginning the work on assessing the road, then getting the people in place, and then that's actually—the work actually gets going. So, yes, it's in play, it's committed, contractors are moving in.

The short answer, though, is the international community has come through on those initial Tokyo commitments to the extent that the Finance Minister Ghani is very concerned that he does—he's not looking at additional commitments—he doesn't see additional commitments going out over the next 3 or 4 years. So he would like for us to get back together, as an international community, and make pledges in response to a new assessment of "the needs" that the World Bank is about to do.

Senator CORZINE. OK. I was going to ask whether there were any garbage trucks, but we'll leave that for another time.

Ambassador TAYLOR. We're not buying garbage trucks.

Senator CORZINE. I think the committee will stand in recess until we return from the vote.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing is called to order again. I apologize to the witnesses and those who are with us in the hearing for our procedures today, but they're likely to continue. This is one of those days.

Let me indicate that I know of no Senators presently, although I could be informed otherwise, who have further questions of this panel. Now, if I may ask you gentlemen, however, to stand by temporarily, I would like to recognize the next panel. We can commence with that testimony; we have the benefit of that testimony. Some members may return, but many will stay over for the second vote. It's been my experience recently that votes often go on well beyond 15, 20, and even 25 minutes. So rather than have all of us wait in suspense, if you could accommodate us in this way, we would very much appreciate it.

And I'd just express the appreciation of our panel, to all three of you, for your testimony, for your forthcoming responses. So I will excuse you for a moment from the witness table. If you would, please stand by at least until members return and we ascertain whether they might have one last question for you.

At this point, I will recognize the next panel, and that will include the Honorable Peter Tomsen, former Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Dr. William J. Durch, co-director of The Future of Peace Operations Project, Henry L. Stimson Center, and Ms. Nancy Lindborg, executive vice-president of Mercy Corps, member of InterAction.

I'm advised that Ambassador Tomsen will return shortly. Meanwhile, I would like to recognize Dr. Durch. If you would, please proceed with your testimony. As I indicated to the first panel, your full statements will be made a part of the record, so please proceed in any way that you wish.

**STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. DURCH, CO-DIRECTOR, THE
FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROJECT, HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. DURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to testify before the committee on the question of security in Afghanistan.

I will submit my testimony for the record and summarize it briefly here and try not to repeat what's been covered by the first panel.

The United States has been engaged in Afghanistan for over 2 years now, fighting remnants of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, promoting political and economic change, but funding of political stability has been at levels insufficient to promote rapid recovery. Yet the December 2001 Bonn Agreement is a schedule for rapid recovery, and, as we've heard, its most important political milestones are moving looming in 2004. The people and the peace process both need protection, and we're finally moving to accelerate the training and equipping of Afghan security forces to help provide it. But even that accelerated process is not going to meet the present Bonn timelines, and direct assistance is needed from ISAF and the PRTs,

which is where I'd like to focus on some of the details, noting first and briefly some lessons from other conflicts that bear directly on Afghanistan.

First is the need for local faction leaders to buy into the peace process. Militia leaders who want to cooperate may not demobilize their forces unless some sort of change to security systems is in place. Demilitarization of politics is highly desirable before national elections to reduce the risk of return to warfare. And I say, in Afghanistan's case, this would include specifically the demilitarization of Kabul, as provided in Bonn.

Third is the importance of cutting off would-be spoilers' access to commodities they can use to fund resistance to the peace process. In Afghanistan, that means getting a handle on opium production, which was 3,400 tons last year, accelerating to 4,000 this year. Three-quarters of the world's heroin is sourced in Afghanistan.

The fourth lesson, the need to get neighboring states onboard. If they play local favorites or take a cut from illegal commerce, peace and legitimate government most likely will not survive.

Finally, the great powers, and the United States in particular, needs to stay engaged. This doesn't guarantee success, but without it the transition is almost certain to fail.

In terms of ISAF, in spring 2002 to counter speculation that expansion would necessarily entail several hundred thousand troops, my project developed a concept of operations briefed at the State and Defense offices, to congressional staff, and NGOs on an ISAF expansion concept. And the most recent update, which we will post on the Web after this hearing, calls for an increase to just over 17,000 troops, so about another 12,000. About 2,700 to provide security in cities where the U.N. assistance mission is deployed, and we are deploying PRTs, but the majority, eight- or nine-thousand air and ground forces, to provide security for repair and use of roads, as we've been talking about. I think road repair, which is finally underway, as we have heard, may be the single most visible and important investment we can make to Afghanistan's unity and economic growth.

But use of repaired roads will require security. Expanded ISAF should operate jointly with the Afghan National Army and with the Interior Ministry's new highway patrol force, and hand off responsibility to those forces as they gain numbers and experience.

Germany, as we've heard, has agreed to staff the Gardez PRT, and prefers, I believe, that it report to NATO ISAF rather than to Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]. So this raises the question, should the PRTs remain under OEF command and control, or should they be chopped to ISAF now that it's under NATO command?

The PRT concept has been presented, is highly adaptive to local conditions. I would suggest that PRTs outside the areas of greatest insecurity work under NATO ISAF. PRTs in the three most dangerous regions continue to work for OEF, where a single chain of command can be crucial. The ISAF highway security forces on the Kabul/Kandahar road would need to coordinate closely with OEF, or OEF will need to take on this job until overall security improves.

I think the PRTs can and should be a kind of trellis for growing a greater regional security presence, international and domestic.

There's a debate about their functions. The relief and development community wants and needs security providers. The PRT planners and commanders argue they can and do act more effectively on behalf of the central government. However, to the extent that the PRTs civilianize, then whatever capacity they have for providing security will probably be limited to force protection. If ISAF does expand, as suggested, its forces can assume the principal community security burdens from the PRTs. I think it would be a good match.

PRTs should usefully emphasize, I think, two sets of activities—networking and support of law enforcement infrastructure. PRT commanders need topnotch communications, not just for themselves, but for the Governor and for his district officials, and they should be building structures that civilian aid providers are reluctant or unable to build—courts, jails, police stations—for use by the police officers and rule-of-law officials that could be trained at the new facilities that would be co-located with the PRTs, which I think is a great idea. They need more ground mobility, probably some air assets, maybe small unmanned vehicles for reconnaissance in their areas, and discretionary spending.

The PRTs and their officers are the cutting edge of U.S. influence at the local level, the avatars of the central government, and we like to think, since we trust them with the job, we should trust them with some of the money, provided what they do is consistent with the Kabul government's development objectives.

Finally, they need to have public-affairs officers, maybe a radio broadcast capability, and a small dedicated engineering team to help them with their work.

Turning to local training, the training program for the Afghan National Army is going to have 9,000 troops by mid 2004. As we saw, the national goal is 70,000. Even if training is accelerated, the nominal force will reach its goal by 2010.

There's welcome acceleration of police training of all types. These rates will help government goals for police staffing be achieved by 2006. We might have some trained forces in the field by the time of the elections. I hope that, if the supplemental passes, the training facilities can be set up at breakneck speed so that we might have some trained police in the field by late winter 2004, because there's a need for security for the census and for voter registration months and months before the actual election. And I'm worried that we won't have sufficient security for that process.

Acceleration of police training is quite welcome, but other elements of rule of law also need help. There are funds in the supplemental, but the requested funds for rule of law amount to 36 cents per Afghan. The request for elections and government support amount to \$2.75, roughly speaking, per potential voter. We plan to pay the national police and soldiers less than \$900 a year to provide vital security services, but we're planning to spend \$125,000 per head for expatriate technical advisors, which may be necessary, but this is a rather great disparity in compensation.

In the current supplemental, 5 percent less construction funding for Iraq could more than double the amount of new money available for reconstruction in Afghanistan. Absorptive capacity may be constrained, and I do appreciate that, but I would bet it could ab-

sorb more than 36 cents per head for rule of law. Stability in the country is of vital interest to the United States. Since time is money and we don't have all the time in the world, I'd suggest that we use money.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Durch follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. DURCH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is an honor to have been invited to testify before the committee on the question of security in Afghanistan and the international community's potential contributions to it. Since American military operations began just over two years ago, this Committee has been at the forefront of thinking and action, in the best bipartisan tradition, to promote America's vital interest in post-conflict security and stability in Afghanistan. In these situations we tend to say that "failure is not an option" but it's still a possibility unless we work very hard to avoid it.

The Pashtun-majority half of the country that shares a border with Pakistan is presently so unstable, for example, that civilian aid providers cannot access much of it. The United Nations Security Coordinator has recently declared a substantial part of the South and Southeast off limits to UN personnel. Attacks on US and allied forces and aid providers in this part of the country have accelerated sharply since last spring (see figure 1), as have US and Afghan forces' engagements of Taliban and Taliban supporters. The border with Pakistan is porous and many of the Taliban supporters who cross the border to engage US and Afghan forces are residents of Pakistan's border provinces. Most rocket and mortar attacks against friendly forces since the June 2002 Loya Jirga that launched the present transitional government of Afghanistan have occurred in the Southeast (table 1). Most of the bomb-related incidents, however, have occurred in or near Kabul.

The United States has remained engaged in Afghanistan, fighting remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban and promoting political and economic change, but funding the latter at levels insufficient to promote rapid recovery. The December 2001 Bonn Agreement, however, laid out a schedule for rapid recovery and its most important political milestones are now looming: new constitution, census, voter registration, and elections. The people and the peace process both need protection and, having stressed that such protection needs to be home-grown, the United States and the international community are finally moving to accelerate the training and equipping of Afghan national forces, army and police. Even that accelerated process will not keep pace with the present Bonn timelines, however. Direct international help is required: some combination of expanded presence for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and rapid evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept. I would like to focus my remarks here today on these two security tools. I would like to start, however, by placing Afghanistan in the context of other post-conflict peace operations and the lessons that consistently arise from those operations.

Lessons for Afghanistan from other war-to-peace transitions

Close examination of more than a dozen other internal conflicts and efforts to help countries make the transition back to a stable peace yields five important lessons: *First*, local faction leaders' buy-in to the peace process is critical; they must be willing to shift their power struggles from military to political channels and to risk loss of power in elections. Militia leaders who want to cooperate and become politicians within the new governing structure may not agree to demobilize their forces, however, unless some sort of change-to security system is in place that they consider effective and fair. At the moment, there is no "change-to" security structure for most localities in Afghanistan. Ad interim, that role may need to be filled by international peacekeepers, but the faster and more effective are the training programs for national forces, the more likely will our friends and allies be to volunteer for such peacekeeping duties because they will be able to see their relief forces already forming.

The first lesson is closely tied to the *second*, that demilitarization of politics is highly desirable before national elections. If factions' heavy weapons have been cantoned and their military formations demobilized, there is not much they can do to promote a rapid return to warfare. That lesson was bitterly learned in Angola, where more than 300,000 civilians died in a resumption of fighting after elections that the main rebel leader failed to win.

In the case of Afghanistan, the most urgent case of demilitarization involves Kabul itself. Only the United States is in a position to press for the demilitarization of Kabul as provided in the Bonn Agreement. It should build barracks for Northern Alliance forces, perhaps at Charikar, between Kabul and the Panjshir Valley, and canton heavy weapons at Bagram Air Base under American supervision.

The *third* lesson is the importance of cutting off would-be spoilers' access to highly portable, high-value commodities that they can use to fund resistance to the peace process. In Afghanistan, that means getting a handle on the exploding opium poppy crop (3,400 tons of opium gum produced last year and more than 4,000 tons expected this year).¹ In the past two years, Afghanistan has resumed its former position as the source of three quarters of the world's heroin, which now feeds half a million addicts in the immediate region and much of Europe's heroin consumption, and funds organized criminal cartels and most likely al Qaeda. Note that, unlike Iraq's main marketable resource, Afghan heroin is self-aggrandizing (that is, if outsiders and the government do nothing to hinder it, the market takes off, generates a narco-criminal economy, provides resources for fundamentalist and terrorist organizations, and causes major damage locally, regionally, and globally).

The *fourth* lesson is the need to get neighboring states to support the peace process in Afghanistan. If they play local favorites, look away as contraband crosses their borders or take a cut from that commerce, peace and legitimate government in Afghanistan most likely will not survive.

Fifth, the great powers, and the United States in particular, need to stay engaged in the peace process. Such engagement does not guarantee success—the record of difficult transitions with great power engagement is mixed—but the historical record elsewhere suggests that, without it, Afghanistan's transition from war to peace is almost certain to fail.²

Implementing Peace in Afghanistan: the role of ISAF and the PRTs

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), now under NATO command, and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept are the primary quick impact tools at the disposal of the international community for helping the Afghan government provide security in key locales during this critical transitional period, while national security forces are trained.

ISAF Expansion

The Afghan government, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and most of the NGO aid providers in the country have advocated expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul since early 2002. In spring 2002, to counter speculation that such expansion would necessarily entail several hundred thousand troops, and to give the ISAF debate some reasonable analytical underpinnings, my project at the Stimson Center drafted a concept of operations that replicated ISAF-Kabul in seven other cities, taking into account their population and security situation relative to Kabul. We briefed the results to key offices in the Departments of State and Defense, to congressional staff, and to NGOs, and have posted them on the web, with periodic updates. The concept calls for an increase in ISAF personnel from the present 5,000 to just over 17,000 troops (for results of the latest update, see figure 2 and tables 2 and 3). Some of these troops (about 2,700) would provide security in cities where UNAMA has its regional offices and the initial PRTs have been deployed. Note that each of these urban areas of operation would be fairly circumscribed, drawn to encompass the town, its adjoining airport, and a modest buffer zone, amounting to 1,000-1,500 square kilometers.

The majority of expanded ISAF forces (8-9,000 air and ground forces) would provide security for the repair and use of the roads linking those cities together. The numbers needed for this task were derived from standard NATO models for protecting lines of communication, with added air support for surveillance and rapid reaction. As national forces come on line, the US/international contribution to this task could increasingly revert to tactical air cover and intelligence (helicopter mobility and reinforcement, helicopter reconnaissance, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [UAV] surveillance assets). Expanded ISAF should operate jointly, to the extent possible, with the Afghan national army and the Interior Ministry's highway patrol force, and with the Afghan national police, and hand off responsibility to those forces as they gain numbers and experience.

¹United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003* (Vienna, Austria: UNODC, March 2003), pp. 170-180. Owais Tohid, "Bumper Year for Afghan Poppies," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 24, 2003.

²For complete discussion see Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 1-66.

In mid-2002, the US government lifted its objections to the expansion of ISAF; in August 2003, NATO formally assumed command of the force; and, on Monday, the UN Security Council unanimously agreed to expand its mandate to permit operations outside Kabul. It is now up to the North Atlantic Council to do so. Germany would like to send 450 troops to the northeastern city of Kunduz, where the UN's pilot militia demobilization and disarmament effort, the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program, is slated to start soon. It would prefer that deployment be under the aegis of NATO and the UN mandate for ISAF.

PRT Command and Control

Since Germany has also agreed to staff the Kunduz PRT, this raises an interesting question of command and control. Should the PRTs remain under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or should they perhaps transfer to ISAF, now that NATO provides a standing framework for ISAF planning and operations? What will better facilitate tie-ins to central government development plans, to UNAMA, to the training and equipping of Afghan security forces, and to the extension of the central government's authority, in fact and in perception? As the PRTs in the northern tier of the country internationalize (British in Mazar, New Zealanders in Bamian, Germans in Kunduz), are they better viewed as extensions of OEF or as elements of a separate post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction effort?

Because the PRT concept has been presented as highly adaptive to local conditions, I would suggest that PRTs outside the areas of greatest insecurity—that is, outside the South, Southeast, and East—work under NATO/ISAF but that PRTs in the three most dangerous regions continue to work for OEF, because a single chain of command can be crucial where combat is a daily risk. NATO and OEF should be able to work out cross-support arrangements for NATO's PRTs, although if the force structure sketched above were to be implemented, ISAF could provide its own cross-support in most circumstances.

PRT Needs and Priorities

The PRTs' primary goals are local reassurance and extension of central government influence. They can and should also be a trellis for growing a greater security presence, both international and local. There is debate about the details of their functions, however. The relief and development community wants and needs security providers, not competing provision of assistance, but they themselves may or may not be seen locally as acting in the name of the Afghan government—as opposed to their home government, agency, or organization. PRT planners and commanders argue that they can and do act on behalf of the central government, although it is not clear how local actors actually credit PRT activities—as support from the central government or from Washington. I sympathize with both sets of arguments, make just two points: First, to the extent that the PRTs civilianize, with development experts, agronomists, veterinarians, and the like, then whatever capacity they have for providing security—which averages one or two platoons of troops per PRT—will necessarily be directed to force protection and not community security. Second, if ISAF does expand as suggested, its forces can assume the principal community security burdens in their defined areas of operation.

The PRTs can usefully emphasize two sets of activities in any case: networking and support of law enforcement infrastructure. PRT commanders need top-notch communications, not only for reachback to OEF in dangerous circumstances but to promote communications within their areas of operations. That means satellite phones for use by the governor and his district officials, in the absence of landlines or commercial cellular service (which will appear as soon as security is good enough to protect its relay towers). It means building structures that civilian aid providers are reluctant or unable to build: courts, jails, and police stations for use by the officers trained at the new facilities to be co-located with several PRTs.

To facilitate their work, the PRTs also should be given better ground mobility and spending authority. Equip them with Humvees instead of commercial 4X4s. Give them some air assets (small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles would be ideal). Give them discretionary spending authority up to some ceiling amount, say, \$25,000 per project. The PRTs and their officers are the cutting edge of US influence at the local level and the avatars of the central government. Since we trust them with the job, we should trust them with the money to do the job, provided what they do is consistent with the Kabul government's development objectives.

Finally, each PRT should have a public affairs officer to keep the public and local government informed of what they are doing and where they are headed. Consider giving each a radio broadcast capacity—shortwave or FM as indicated by terrain

and local listening habits. Give them each a small, dedicated engineering team, if reconstruction is to remain in their portfolios.³

Rebuilding Afghanistan's security sector

The 18 month old training program for the Afghan National Army (ANA) will have produced ten battalions, about 6,000 professional troops, by the end of 2003 and aims to have another 3,000 trained by mid-2004 when national elections are presently scheduled. The national goal, set last year at the "Bonn II" meeting, is 70,000 soldiers. If training is accelerated, as proposed by the Administration, to around 10,000 recruits per year, the nominal force goal will be reached in 2010.

There is welcome acceleration of police training of all types in the Administration's plans. Police training courses are designed to last about 16 weeks, meaning that each of eight training centers co-located with a PRT should be able to train between 1,500 and 2,700 police candidates per year (at 750-900 officer candidates per class). The justification for the supplemental suggests a breakout of 18,000 national police, 4,000 border police, and 2,600 highway patrol officers trained annually. These rates will meet government goals for police staffing by 2006 and provide a baseline force to help secure Afghanistan's electoral process. That process must get underway soon in preparation for the scheduled June elections, however. By late winter 2004, the training program may have graduated its first class, assuming that the facilities can be set up at breakneck speed this fall. So we are looking at perhaps 6,000 newly trained national police to secure a census (in a country where ethnic background matters a great deal and the last census predates the civil war) and voter registration; and perhaps 12,000 by next summer to secure the election (including protection for candidates, voters, voting places, and integrity of ballot boxes and vote counts). Localities may therefore have to rely in large part on local security forces and it is very important that these forces, and those who pay them, work on the side of transitional government.

While the acceleration of police training is needed and welcome, the amount of money proposed to rebuild the other institutions of law enforcement and criminal justice seems rather meager. Funds requested for rule of law (\$10 million) amount to 36 cents per Afghan, yet Afghanistan's formal justice system is essentially non-existent. The request for elections and governance support amounts to roughly \$2.75 per potential voter (using U.S. Census Bureau population estimates).⁴ By contrast, the supplemental requests roughly \$125,000 per expatriate technical adviser. Such advice may be needed but compares rather unfavorably with the roughly \$1,300 per year that AID pays its national hires or the \$840/year that we plan to pay national police and soldiers to provide vital security services.

Indeed, in the current supplemental request, 5% less reconstruction funding for Iraq could more than double the amount of new money available for reconstruction in Afghanistan. Stability in Afghanistan is a vital interest of the United States. Since time is money and we do not have all the time in the world to achieve stability, we better use money.

³I am grateful for a number of these ideas and observations to Lt. Col. Christopher Allen, former commander of the Gardez PRT. Cited with permission.

⁴U.S. Census Bureau, "IDB Summary Demographic Data for Afghanistan," available online at : www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum?cty=AF

Table 1: Summary Data: Stimson Center Afghanistan Security Incidents Database, June 2002 through August 2003

	Kabul Area	East	South East	South	West	North	Central Highland	North East	Row Totals:
Caches Discovered	40	12	28	19	3	2	3	4	111
Light Arms	5	1	9	4	1	0	2	0	22
Rockets, Artillery, Mortars	9	8	10	7	2	1	1	1	39
Bombs and Mines	26	3	9	8	0	1	0	3	50
Incident Frequency	50	33	54	52	11	16	0	7	223
Light Arms	20	8	23	36	5	13	0	0	*105
Rockets, Artillery, Mortars	9	14	23	7	3	2	0	0	58
Bombs and Mines	21	11	8	9	3	1	0	7	60

Sources: International wire services (via Lexis/Nexis); United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Relief Web: Afghanistan* (www.reliefweb.int); monthly reports of the British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG).




Fig. 2: Protecting Afghanistan's Main Roads and Border Crossings




Table 2: Data for Calculating ISAF Expansion

UN areas of responsibility (AOR):	Capital	East	South East	South	West	North	Central Highland	North East
UNAMA regional offices:	Kabul	Jalalabad	Gardez	Kandahar	Herat	Mazar-e Sharif	Bamiyan	Kunduz
ISAF-Kabul AOR and proposed new AORs (sq. km.)	1,720	1,000	1,000	1,500	1,200	1,200	1,000	1,000
City populations relative to Kabul (fractions)	1.00	0.05	0.01	0.16	0.12	0.09	0.04	0.08
Regional threat indices relative to Kabul for each threat type (rounded).								
Principle threats Indicated in UNSYG's report of 18 March 2002:								
Al Qaeda/Taliban remnants	1.00	1.50	1.60	1.20	0.80	0.70	0.60	0.80
Political/factional violence	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.80	0.80	1.10	0.70	0.70
Other violent crime	1.00	1.30	1.10	1.10	0.90	1.10	0.90	1.00

**Table 3: Estimated Troop Levels Needed to Expand ISAF into Key Cities/Towns,
While Protecting Main Road Links between Garrisons, and to Borders**

UN Areas of Responsibility (AOR):	Capital	East	South East	South	West	North	Central Highland	North East	Totals, all areas:
UNAMA offices and PRTs	Kabul	Jalalabad	Gardez	Kandahar	Herat	Mazar-e Sharif	Bamiyan	Kunduz	
Garrison forces, based on AOR threat level and population relative to Kabul	5,000	280	120	760	530	510	150	320	7,670
Highway security and border crossing forces	520	610	360	1,830	2,060	2,010	300	1,160	8,850
Force totals:	5,520	890	480	2,590	2,590	2,520	450	1,480	16,520

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Durch.
Ambassador Tomsen.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TOMSEN, FORMER U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY AND AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1992 AND U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA, 1995-1998, McLEAN, VA

Ambassador TOMSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. Thank you also for your leadership and commitment in helping Afghanistan to attain the stability, peace, security, and economic revival it so desperately needs and so richly deserves.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ambassador TOMSEN. The bipartisan Afghan Freedom Support Act, which Senator Hagel took the lead in sponsoring in the Senate, and this committee, under the able leadership of yourself, sir, and former Chairman Biden, advanced to passage, laid out a clear and comprehensive road map toward success in Afghanistan. The President signed the AFSA into law in 2002.

Mr. Chairman, there are recent indications that the Administration is belatedly attempting to implement the farsighted provisions of the Afghan Freedom Support Act. Since early September, the Administration is finally matching concrete action with rhetoric and promises. Its request for \$1.2 billion for Afghanistan in the emergency supplemental, joined with the \$600 million for Afghanistan in the fiscal year 2004 budget, demonstrate the necessary high level of serious attention—determination and purpose, which has been lacking since the destruction of the Taliban/al-Qaeda regime. The administration's approach appears correctly aimed at restoring lost momentum in Afghanistan, addressing the growing security threat posed by the ominous Taliban comeback, instilling inter-agency discipline both in Washington and Afghanistan while giving fresh impetus to reconstruction.

Mr. Chairman, I have two suggestions for action by the committee for you to consider. You've already mentioned the first one. Thank you, sir.

The second one is Senate support for increased funding for Afghanistan in priority areas. In this regard, let me draw attention to the House Appropriations Committee's bill, which has been reported out. It recommends more funding than the President has requested in a number of critical areas, including education, road-building, private-sector development, irrigation, power generation, support for the Karzai government's infrastructure, elections, health, anti-narcotics, and police. Even if both Senate and House approve these increases, the emergency supplemental request for Afghanistan reconstruction will still be about 2 percent of the \$87 billion.

I would suggest that additional funds also be provided for expansion of the PRTs. The \$50 million requested by the administration will prove severely inadequate to meet the ambitious goal of doubling the number of PRTs and ensuring that the civil affairs projects they implement are not under-funded. In this connection, I would mention that only \$14 million was allocated for fiscal year 2003 implementation of civil affairs projects by the PRTs in Afghanistan. The newspapers, New York Times, Washington Post,

other media, report the outstanding General Petraeus' comments in Northern Iraq, only Northern Iraq, and he says he's spent in 6 months over \$25 million so far in that limited area.

I think I would urge some caution in some of the comments earlier that Afghanistan's absorptive capacity is limited. I don't think it is. I think that a lot more could have been spent and should have been spent so far.

The New York University study, which was headed up by Barney Rubin, mentions that only \$197 million has actually been spent on projects in Afghanistan to date, despite the \$4.5 billion that was pledged.

I have some comments on security, but it's already been covered in your statement and by others at this hearing.

I would like to suggest two other cautions related to political as well as security aspects, Mr. Chairman. The first is that the United States keep out of the Afghan political briar patch. The U.S. and the international community have a golden opportunity to support the legitimately chosen and internationally recognized moderate Afghan regime headed by President Karzai. President Karzai, Foreign Minister Abdullah, and their moderate colleagues reflect the democratic aspirations and moderate outlook of most Afghans. The new U.S. initiative must, however, avoid a too-tight U.S. embrace of President Karzai and his regime. Unfortunately, steps by senior U.S. officials in Afghanistan have already given ammunition to allegations by the Taliban and other opposition forces that President Karzai is an American puppet. Such direct U.S. involvement in Afghan internal politics is ultimately counterproductive. Afghans want their President to be following his own agenda, not that of a foreign power.

Unfortunately, an Afghan perception of American interference emerged from last year's loya jurga. One Afghan participant in that important event, whom I respect, told me that of the 1,500 Afghan loya jurga delegates, 1,000 went home to their villages stating that the Americans manipulated the loya jurga.

The bottom line is that we should not follow the examples of British, Soviet, and Pakistani king-making in Afghanistan. We should remain aloof from Afghan politics, even while assisting the legitimate Karzai government. We must encourage cooperation and compromise and let the Afghans themselves determine the balances in their leadership.

The second caution is a note that the U.S. initiative's new push should also avoid repeating the blow-back effect created during the Afghan-Soviet war and the Taliban period. Both Clinton administrations and the first year of the George W. Bush administration outsourced most of U.S./Afghan policy to Pakistan. And Pakistan's policy, managed by the Pakistani Military's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, promoted Afghan radicals supported by Pakistani extremist parties, and, later, al-Qaeda.

Some argue that President Musharraf has been doing as much as he can since publicly siding with the United States and the war on terrorism. I don't agree with that. I think President Musharraf can do more. He should not be permitted to dodge criticism of ISI's continuing support to the Taliban and other anti-Karzai radical Afghan militants based in Pakistan.

Last year, President Musharraf, addressing a news conference, took responsibility for guiding the ISI. The September 7, 2002, edition of the Pakistani Daily News quoted him as stating, "The government formulates policies and tells ISI what to do. They, ISI, do not do on their own. Hence, if there is anything wrong, the government is to blame, not the ISI." Therefore, it's most important that the United States not again be drawn into Pakistan's own maneuvering to put its favorite Afghans in Kabul.

There are recent developments which, once again, have raised Afghan suspicions on this score, and I can go into them if you wish.

Let me end by stating that Afghan reconstruction, when it's successful, will have tremendous regional and global benefits for the United States. Success in Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, is often set in the context of negative results, such as counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, ending violations of human and gender rights. These are all worthy goals and in U.S. interests to pursue. But success in Afghanistan will also create positive results for the region, for the United States, and for the world. Afghanistan's turmoil has long been an obstacle to regional economic and democratic development. A peaceful, developing Afghanistan could instead become a facilitator of regional economic and democratic development.

Afghanistan is located at the center of Eurasia. Global trade, transportation, and energy corridors potentially could crisscross a stable Afghanistan promoting economic cooperation rather than geopolitical competition among the nearby great powers of Eurasia. The resulting jump in Eurasian trade through Afghanistan would encourage the movement of ideas, including free market democracy along the trade routes, much as Buddhism and, later, Christianity spread through Asia via the maze of Eurasian Silk Road trading conduits 2,000 years ago.

The new approach by the administration could, thus, usefully include a long-term Afghan strategy, which this committee has recommended previously. This strategy would incorporate broader regional goals to parallel Afghanistan's reconstruction goals. It is not farfetched to envision a future regional ASEAN-type free-trade zone in Central Asia, a U.S. Government-supported track-2 process toward this goal, or a Helsinki-style conference in the region to assist stability, economic cooperation, human rights, and open communication among the regional states surrounding Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by expressing hope that Congress will approve the administration's request for additional funds for Iraq and Afghanistan. Success in Afghanistan will encourage success in Iraq, and vice versa. To repeat that common refrain, failure is not an option, either in Afghanistan or in Iraq.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Tomsen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TOMSEN, FORMER UNITED STATES SPECIAL ENVOY AND AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1992, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA, 1995-1998

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this hearing. Thank you also for your leadership and commitment in helping Afghanistan to attain the stability, peace, security and economic revival it so desperately needs and so richly deserves.

The bipartisan Afghan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) which Senator Hagel took the lead in sponsoring in the Senate, and this Committee under the able leadership

of Chairman Lugar and former Chairman Biden advanced to passage, laid out a clear and comprehensive roadmap toward success in Afghanistan. The President signed the AFSA into law in December, 2002. The bill correctly assumed that the well-executed, quick, American-led military victory over the Taliban-Al Qaeda was only the first of multiple innings. As in Iraq, securing that victory has also entailed planning and executing a successful reconstruction strategy to succeed in subsequent innings.

To this end, AFSA called on the Administration to formulate a comprehensive Afghan policy and to provide sufficient resources to fulfill America's share of the costs of Afghan reconstruction. It correctly stressed the importance of Afghan institution rebuilding, Afghan ownership of the reconstruction process and careful interagency coordination to ensure that State, DOD, USAID and the CIA would all read from the same sheet of music in rebuilding Afghanistan. The bill recommended the creation of a Coordinator in the State Department to oversee interagency cooperation. The AFSA further stressed the importance of ensuring women's rights and implementing an effective anti-narcotics policy. It set aside one billion dollars for ISAF expansion to strengthen the hand of the legitimate national government in Kabul and to weaken the power of the warlords in Afghanistan's regions.

These sensible recommendations in Congress' Afghan Freedom Support Act were not just pulled out of a hat. They were the product of a series of hearings in both Houses of Congress and a great deal of focused, hard work and well informed deliberation by Senators, members of Congress and their staffs.

Mr. Chairman, until just last month, most policy and operational elements in the AFSA had so far either not been implemented, or had been only marginally implemented. In Washington and Afghanistan, drift, policy incoherence, interagency compartmentalization and squabbling, unfulfilled promises, plus under-funded, slow and poorly managed execution of reconstruction projects continued to characterize the Administration's approach to Afghanistan—two years after the U.S.-led coalition's brilliant military victory over the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and nine months after passage of the AFSA.

A FRESH U.S. INITIATIVE

Mr. Chairman, there are recent indications that the Administration is attempting to reverse the drift in its Afghan policy, restore lost momentum, address the growing security threat posed by the ominous Taliban comeback, instill interagency discipline in both Washington and in Afghanistan, and give real impetus to reconstruction. We can lament that these initiatives did not immediately follow up the military victory over the Taliban almost two years ago. We can lament that Congress' recommendations on problems of under-funding, interagency disunity and lack of a coherent umbrella strategy on Afghanistan identified in last year's AFSA were mostly ignored.

It is, therefore, most welcome that, since early September, the Administration is finally matching concrete action with rhetoric and promises. Its request for \$1.2 billion for Afghanistan in the Emergency Supplemental, joined with the \$600 million for Afghanistan in the FY '04 Budget, demonstrate the necessary high level of serious attention, determination, and purpose which has been lacking since the destruction of the Taliban-Al Qaeda regime.

REQUEST FOR SENATE ACTION

In June, 2002, this Committee stepped up to the plate and cooperated closely with its counterparts on Chairman Henry Hyde's Committee in the House to obtain congressional approval of the AFSA. Below are two recommendations which the Committee could now undertake to support the Emergency Supplemental. Early attention to these recommendations in the Senate or in Conference would further strengthen execution of AFSA's key provisions.

(a) *Fortify Ambassador Taylor's position as Coordinator of non-military assistance to Afghanistan.* Ambassador Taylor's ability to manage reconstruction programs would be significantly strengthened by placing all non-military funds for Afghanistan in an account which he supervises. Different agencies and offices scattered around the government continue to separately manage their own budgets. This omission has added to the bureaucratic disunity, confusion and red tape which have undermined our economic, humanitarian, democracy and security programs in Afghanistan. Ambassador Taylor brilliantly managed the U.S. assistance programs for the Newly Independent States before being asked to assume his current responsibilities on Afghanistan. He is thoroughly acquainted with the U.S. assistance bureaucracy; he is known and respected by his counterparts in the international assistance community. Centralizing the

non-military assistance budget for Afghanistan under Coordinator Taylor will significantly upgrade the efficiency and quality of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan.

(b) *Senate support for increased funding for Afghanistan in priority areas.* The House Appropriations Committee has reported out a bill which recommends more funding than the President has requested in a number of critical areas, including in education, private sector development and power generation, support for the Karzai government's infrastructure, elections, health, anti-narcotics and police. Even if both Senate and House approve these increases, the Emergency Supplemental requests for Afghanistan will still be less than 2% of the \$87 billion. I would suggest that additional funds also be provided for expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The \$50 million requested by the Administration will prove severely inadequate to meet the ambitious goal of doubling the number of PRTs and ensuring that the civil affairs projects they implement are not under-funded.

RISING SECURITY THREATS CHALLENGE ECONOMIC, DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS

The Administration's initiative on Afghanistan will need to give priority attention to improving security. The Taliban have regrouped. Staging from Pakistan, Taliban attacks on U.S.-led coalition forces, local Afghan government officials and international aid workers have eroded or stopped reconstruction activity in many areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Taliban, in cooperation with Al Qaeda and supported by elements in the Pakistani ISI and Pakistani radical Muslim parties, will likely next focus on provinces adjoining Kabul as well as Kabul itself. Confrontations between warlords in some regions of Afghanistan and increasing criminal activity further undermine security.

These worrisome security trends could postpone the Bonn Conference's roadmap of a constitutional Loya Jirga in December and Afghan elections in 2004. Deteriorating security will also block or delay implementation of women's programs, from school attendance to seeking employment opportunities outside the home. Unable to get their produce to market due to insecure roads, Afghan farmers will plant more opium and sell it to the sophisticated opium mafia operating from Pakistan, Central Asia and Russia. The disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) process could also be further delayed.

The Administration has wisely decided to give more attention to rebuilding Afghanistan's national police force. This emphasis will improve security throughout Afghanistan, undercut the warlords' local monopoly of power, and nicely complement the training and equipping of the Afghan army. NATO ISAF deployment outside Kabul, which the United Nations Security Council has just approved, will also buttress security in Afghanistan.

SOME POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Mr. Chairman, Administration officials from today's earlier panel have described in detail the Administration's fresh initiative to regain lost momentum in Afghanistan. This effort will be bolstered by a number of positive developments in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan enjoyed a bumper wheat crop this year. Two million refugees have returned—the largest voluntary repatriation of refugees ever recorded. Sharing of revenue with the Kabul government began last year with \$80 million remitted. So far, about \$140 million has been transferred by warlords to the central government this year. There appears to be a consensus building on a division of labor between NGOs and the PRTs. Kabulis, assisted by some foreign investors, are beginning to restore small business activity which is contributing to a surge in trade, shopping, and construction in Kabul. Some long-delayed mega-projects are finally going forward. President Bush's intervention forced acceleration of work by USAID contractors on the long-delayed repair of the Kabul-Kandahar road. Millions of Afghan children are back at school. If security improves, the Bonn process can continue along its implementation path, although the 2004 elections will almost certainly choose a President, not a Parliament.

U.S. MUST KEEP OUT OF THE AFGHAN POLITICAL BRIAR PATCH

The U.S. and the international community have a golden opportunity to support the legitimately chosen and internationally recognized moderate Afghan regime headed by President Karzai. President Karzai, Foreign Minister Abdullah and their moderate colleagues reflect the democratic aspirations and moderate outlook of most Afghans. The new American initiative's goal to strengthen the Karzai regime and

its reach into Afghanistan's regions and provinces will have beneficial effects in both the short and long run. As that government revives Afghan institutions and expands its economic and security presence outside Kabul, warlord rule and radical Taliban influence will slowly weaken.

The new U.S. initiative must, however, avoid a tight U.S. embrace of President Karzai and his regime. Unfortunately, steps by senior U.S. officials in Afghanistan have already given ammunition to allegations by the Taliban and other opposition forces that President Karzai is an American puppet. Such direct U.S. involvement in Afghan internal politics is ultimately counterproductive. Afghans want their President to be following his own agenda, not that of a foreign power.

It is well to remember that no country has ever succeeded in deciding who rules in Afghanistan. The British imposed Shah Shuja—he was executed by the Afghans. The Soviets for eight years tried to forge unity between the bickering Khalqi and Parchami Afghan communist factions. Moscow appointed, removed, assassinated, and exiled numerous Afghan communist leaders during this period, but never succeeded in establishing a stable Afghan leadership. In an environment we never understood, the U.S. reaped similar negative consequences in playing musical chairs with Saigon generals in the 1960s.

Unfortunately, an Afghan perception of American interference emerged from last year's Loya Jirga. One Afghan participant in that important event whom I respect told me that, of the 1,500 Afghan Loya Jirga delegates, 1,000 went home to their villages stating that the Americans manipulated the Loya Jirga. A U.S. official recounted to me that we failed to get a Prime Minister appointed because we were "outmaneuvered" by Afghans at the Loya Jirga opposing the idea.

The bottom line is that we should not follow the examples of British, Soviet and Pakistani kingmaking in Afghanistan. We should remain aloof from Afghan politics, even while assisting the legitimate Karzai government. We must encourage cooperation and compromise, and let the Afghans themselves determine the balances in their leadership. Our diplomats, military personnel and aid workers should not appear to be just another faction—or factions—maneuvering within the murky, emotional Afghan polity. We are far more likely to succeed in Afghanistan if we are not seen as the latest in the historic queue of foreigners trying unsuccessfully to select Afghan leaders.

STOP OUTSOURCING TO PAKISTAN

The new U.S. initiative should also avoid repeating the "blowback" effect created during the Afghan-Soviet war and the Taliban period. Both Clinton Administrations and the first year of the George W. Bush Administration "outsourced" U.S. Afghan policy to Pakistan. And Pakistan's policy, managed by the Pakistan's military's Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI), promoted Afghan radicals supported by Pakistani extremist parties and later Al Qaeda. Today, General Musharraf and his allies in the Pakistani military are following a two-track policy administered by ISI of: (a) cooperating with the U.S. in hunting down Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan, most of them foreigners, and (b) continuing to preserve their two-decade-long investment in radical Afghans, including the Taliban, and the virulently anti-American Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan's ISI, with Osama bin Ladin and Pakistani religious parties, constructed the extremist Muslim infrastructure straddling the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. That infrastructure continues to harbor almost all of the Taliban cabinet, Hekmatyar, and probably Osama bin Ladin himself.

Some argue that President Musharraf has been doing as much as he can since publicly siding with the U.S. in the war on terrorism. But President Musharraf can do more. He should not be permitted to dodge criticism of ISI's continued support to the Taliban and other anti-Karzai radical Afghan militants based in Pakistan. Last year, President Musharraf, addressing a news conference, took responsibility for guiding the ISI. The September 7, 2002 edition of the Pakistani daily "News" quoted him as stating: "The government formulates policies and tells ISI what to do. They (ISI) do not do on their own. Hence, if there is anything wrong, the government is to be blamed, not the ISI."

The U.S. should not again be drawn into Pakistan's own maneuvering to put its favored Afghans in Kabul. In the 1980s and 1990s, the CIA coordinated with ISI in supporting the Afghan extremists, in particular Hekmatyar, while keeping Afghan moderates such as Hamid Karzai and Abdul Haq at arms length. After 9/11, moderate Afghan leaders were stunned when Secretary of State Colin Powell at an Islamabad news conference seemed to be promoting Pakistan's agenda in calling for Taliban representation in the post-Taliban government. During CENTCOM commander Tommy Frank's November, 1991 war strategy visit to Islamabad, the CIA

introduced Afghan warlord Gul Agha to him as one deserving U.S. support. Gul Agha, with CIA and U.S. Special Forces backing, was subsequently able to re-occupy the governor's headquarters in Kandahar. President Karzai recently managed to replace Gul Agha, but only after seventeen months of the warlord's corrupt, despotic rule which witnessed a resurgence of Taliban presence in the Kandahar region. This month's news reports about the release of the former Taliban Foreign Minister, Mullah Mutawakil, from an American prison in Kandahar has reignited Afghan suspicions that Islamabad and Washington are again attempting to manipulate Afghan politics.

AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL BENEFITS

Success in Afghanistan is often set in the context of negative results, such as counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, ending violation of human and gender rights. These are all worthy goals and in U.S. interests to pursue.

But success in Afghanistan will also create positive results, for the region, for the U.S. and for the world.

Afghanistan's turmoil, for example, has long been an obstacle to regional economic and democratic development. A peaceful, developing Afghanistan could instead become a facilitator of regional economic and democratic development.

Afghanistan is located at the center of Eurasia. Global trade, transportation and energy corridors potentially could criss-cross a stable Afghanistan, promoting economic cooperation rather than geo-political competition among the nearby Great Powers of Eurasia. As in the Silk Road era, Afghanistan could be the connecting point for trade along continental North-South and East-West axes, bringing together markets and economics, moving Caspian basin and Russian Siberian resources to resource-starved South Asia, and moving Chinese products west to the Middle East and Europe.

The resulting jump in Eurasian trade through Afghanistan would encourage the movement of ideas, including free market democracy, along the trade routes—much as Buddhism and later Christianity spread through Asia via the maze of Silk Road trading conduits two thousand years ago. Eventual rising living standards and middle class development in the broader Eurasian region would follow, reinforcing democratic and free market currents. So would the success of Karzai government in restoring Afghanistan to the democratic track it was on before the Soviet invasion ushered in more than two decades of war.

The Administration's new approach could thus usefully include a long-term Afghan strategy which will incorporate broader regional goals to parallel Afghanistan reconstruction goals. The two sets of objectives would reinforce one another. Bold creativity and thinking big could produce lasting benefits. It is not far-fetched to envision a future regional ASEAN-type free trade zone in Central Asia; a U.S. government-supported track II process toward this goal; or a Helsinki-style conference in the region to assist stability, economic cooperation, human rights and open communication among the regional states surrounding Afghanistan. The Helsinki conference model could also begin the process of recognizing controversial but *de facto* borders, including the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Line of Control separating Kashmir. Many South Asian and Western scholars believe that giving international legality to the Durand Line and the Line of Control is the only way to solve these disputes. A broadly inclusive Helsinki-style regional conference would give "cover" to leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to conclude productive boundary negotiations. Once the negotiations are underway, the International Court of Justice in The Hague could assist the parties in reaching a final resolution.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by expressing hope that Congress will approve the Administration's request for additional funds for Iraq and Afghanistan. Success in Afghanistan will encourage success in Iraq, and vice-versa. Failure is not an option in either country.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Tomsen.

The predicted second vote has commenced, which means that my colleagues are probably voting and hopefully will be returning very shortly. I think in fairness to our witnesses, we will recess temporarily again so that you will be heard in full and hopefully by a larger audience, Ms. Lindborg. And then, as Senators return now, if some have questions for our previous panel, they may wish to raise those. Hopefully, we'll have some stability after the second

vote, and proceed in a more orderly way with each of our witnesses in our questions.

So, for the moment, the hearing is recessed again, and we will be back shortly.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is called to order again.

Let me ask Senator Biden if he has additional questions for the first panel. I asked them, and they have patiently stayed in reserve.

Senator BIDEN. I apologize, gentlemen. We had back-to-back votes, and we were being importuned on the floor by an upcoming vote that relates to things that you have some interest in.

No, I thank you for waiting. But with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I may have one or two questions in writing. And, general, I'd like to explore, in a written question, timetables with you. Again, not looking to hold you down to precise—but just to get a sense of what we're looking at, in terms of, (a) the possibility of expanding ISAF, what NATO is looking—what we're looking down the road and hoping for, and what the ANA is likely to look like. And then I want to talk a little bit about police forces. But I will not do that with you now. I may do a few questions. No hurry in getting back on it. Doesn't have to be in right away, but I would like it for the record. OK?

And I thank you very much. I apologize for you having to wait for me to come back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Obviously, we're delighted for you to stay as long as you wish, but we thank you all, and the panel is excused from official duty at this point. We hope you'll be responsive to questions from Senator Biden and others in writing when they come.

Thank you very much.

Now, we have had initial statements by Dr. Durch and by Ambassador Tomsen, and I'll call now upon Ms. Lindborg for her statement.

Thank you for your patience.

STATEMENT OF MS. NANCY LINDBORG, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, MERCY CORPS, MEMBER OF INTERACTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden. Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak about the challenges in Afghanistan. And thanks especially for the continued leadership and commitment that both of you have shown in this issue. It's been very appreciated.

The burden of going last, I'll try not to be too repetitive, but I will offer a slightly different perspective, which is one from an NGO that's worked in Afghanistan since 1986, which is the case for a number of our NGO colleagues. And I've just returned, and we have, until recently, worked without serious incident in Afghanistan—under the chaos of the mujadin, under the rule of the Taliban—but in just the last 10 months, Mercy Corps alone has had two staff members killed, four staff members kidnaped, gunfire sprayed at our vehicles, two cars burned, and a bomb lobbed at our sub-offices. And other agencies have had similar experiences. Since

September 2002, armed attacks against the assistance community have gone from about one a month to a current average of one every 2 days. Ten aid workers have been murdered since March.

And I have with me here the latest 15-page weekly summary from our NGO security network that summarizes the many bombings, kidnappings, robberies, and killings of Afghan citizens and army and police members that don't make it into the headlines, the night letters that are posted at mosques warning communities not to cooperate with assistance programs. And on October 6, there was a notice posted on two mosques in Kandahar city warning all staff members of aid agencies to quit their jobs within 6 days.

Currently, half of the country's 32 provinces are currently deemed high risk for aid work, according to UNAMA. It is clearly in the best interest of a confluence of bad actors—the poppy growers, the Taliban, and the warlords, and various power brokers—to keep the country destabilized. And as increasing parts of the country are declared to be no-go zones by both national and international assistance workers, communities are left with decreasing confidence in the future of the new Afghanistan.

Of particular concern is the impact of this on the Bonn process, which others have spoken about. I think that basically in the 22 months since the Taliban failed, the international community has failed to provide the two essential ingredients for both security and democracy, as this hearing is focused on, and that's security in a serious and committed way, and enough financial assistance.

And this week, I'm pleased both by the comments of the previous panel, but by the two important opportunities that we have to signal our commitment to a safe and democratic Afghanistan. One is the unanimous resolution passed by the U.N. Security Council on Monday that enables the NATO-led ISAF to expand. And I know that both of you have been very vocal about the need to do this. And hopefully now there will be no further barriers to doing so. And coupled with the opportunity to put additional funding into Afghanistan, I'm hopeful that that will help us turn the tide.

I think, as you both know, Afghanistan has been seriously underfunded as it has struggled to emerge from the conflicts. There has been a—if you compare it with the per-capita spending in recent conflicts, such as Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, where there was an average of \$250 per person on an annual basis, in 2002, there was an average investment of \$64 per person in Afghanistan, which is a serious and troubling comparison.

The additional funds that the supplemental that you're currently discussing provides for Afghanistan are essential and can push forward a number of critical programs. I understand there's been an amendment put forward just this morning by Senators Biden and Byrd that would put an additional \$387 million into the request, and I urge you to support the request at that higher level.

However, ending the—

Senator BIDEN. Just for the record, so I can go back to the floor, it's Byrd and Biden.

Ms. LINDBORG. I'm giving precedent to those who are present.

Senator BIDEN. No, I know you are. I know you are.

Ms. LINDBORG. But I stand corrected.

Senator BIDEN. I appreciate it very much. I just want Senator Byrd to hear that.

But I'm kidding. Go ahead.

Ms. LINDBORG. Any increase in foreign assistance underscores the need for a secure environment in which reconstruction and democracy can be effective. And this is a lesson that we've learned in a lot of other environments. In fact, I participated as a member of the CSIS/AUSA blue-ribbon commission on post-conflict reconstruction this past year, which included Members of Congress, bipartisan Members of Congress, military leaders, senior policy experts from the government, and the international and non-governmental sector. Really the No. 1 finding was that security is the essential ingredient for any reconstruction to go forward and that unless the security needs are addressed up front, the spoilers will find the weak areas and retain leverage to affect the political outcomes, they will spoil the peace. And I think this is a description of what's happened in Afghanistan over the past year and a half.

I understand that if the Foreign Relations Authorization bill is passed, it could include an amendment that's based on some of the findings in this commission. And while I'm aware the prospects for that legislation remain uncertain, I hope that it could still be considered in the future.

And I'm also very encouraged to hear that in the coming year, this committee may focus more heavily on our country's ability to respond more effectively in post-conflict reconstruction environments, and I find that very heartening.

However, despite that lesson, as you know, and many, many calls for an expanded ISAF, until this week it remained confined to Kabul. Instead, the U.S. response was to create the PRTs. And I hate to be the only one today to not jump on the PRT bandwagon, but I think that although they were a creative experiment, in the four pilots thus far they lacked the mandate and they lacked the resources to provide either security or reconstruction. They were not strategically located in insecure areas. Anywhere they were, aid workers were also able to work, and they focused on often duplicative efforts to build small-scale projects such as schools and clinics.

The military has a core competency that nobody else has, which is the provision of security. There are many other local and international organizations with the core competency to provide community development assistance. And I think that as we move forward, if the PRTs are to be a part of the security environment, they need to have a substantially evolved mandate to refocus on security.

The announced expansion of ISAF to the PRT in Kunduz, it's a good first step, in terms of signaling that it will expand, but it must go far beyond that, the ISAF must, if it is to truly and effectively address the security needs of Afghanistan.

The British have recently begun their version of a PRT in Mazar, with a much more explicit mandate to provide security and a focus on disarmament and a reconstruction of large government infrastructure projects. That's an approach worth watching if we do intend to remain with the PRT model.

Obviously, the long-term solution is in the development of the Afghanistan National Army and police. It's far behind schedule. I was

hopeful to hear what the previous speakers had to say about that, moving that forward.

Finally, I would just note that the solution is not to channel all assistance through the military or to provide all aid workers with firearms and military escorts, which I fear is sometimes the conclusion that one reaches. Rather, we need to focus on creating the ambient environment, ambient security that enables Afghanis to invest in their future and for reconstruction, democracy, and development work to go forward. Aid workers are not asking for armed escorts and guards, just as the people of Afghanistan are not asking, each and every one of them, to have armed escorts. Rather, we need to focus on creating the overall secure environment that allows people to confidently invest in their future.

I saw a lot to be very optimistic about in my recent visit, but it was mainly confined to Kabul and to the safer parts of Kandahar City. There are good things happening. I visited women who have doubled their income through micro-credit programs and have exciting plans for the future of their families. I visited with my Mercy Corps country teams, where people who have worked for us for 12 years are absolutely committed to staying the course, despite the very real risks that they face, and they see this as a critical turning point for their country, and they are devastated that that future may be slipping through their fingers.

As you consider the supplemental request that's on the Floor, I would urge you to ensure that whatever needs to happen to enable ISAF to truly expand and to truly, in a genuine committed way, address security needs in Afghanistan, that you do so. And, second, I urge you to support the increased allocation in the Byrd and Biden amendment to increase the part of this supplemental that would benefit Afghanistan.

I don't think that there's so much an absorptive capacity problem in Afghanistan. There's much more capacity than we're currently using. There is just security constraints with—there are many projects that are stalled that could be further invested in if there was a secure environment that enabled it to go forward.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. NANCY LINDBORG, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
MERCY CORPS, MEMBER OF INTERACTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak about the challenges in Afghanistan, and thank you especially for the continued leadership and commitment you have demonstrated on this important issue.

I have just returned from Afghanistan last week. Mercy Corps had until recently worked without serious incident in Afghanistan since 1986, under the chaos of the mujahedin and under the rule of the Taliban. But just in the last ten months, Mercy Corps alone has had two staff members killed, four staff members kidnapped, gunfire sprayed at one of our vehicles, two cars burned and a bomb lobbed at one of our sub-offices.

Other agencies have had similar experiences, as since September 2002, armed attacks against the assistance community have gone from one a month to a current average of one every two days. Ten aid workers have been murdered since March.¹ And I have in hand the latest 15-page weekly summary from the NGO security network summarizing the many bombings, kidnappings, robberies and school burnings that don't make it into the headlines. Night letters are posted at mosques warning

¹ Barbara Stapleton, ACBAR Security meeting, October 2, 2003, Kabul.

communities not to cooperate with western aid agencies and threatening them not to attend the funerals of those killed while doing so.² On October 6th, a notice was posted at two mosques in Kandahar City warning that all local staff members working for any international organization have a deadline of six days to resign from their jobs.

Currently half of the country's 32 provinces have areas deemed high risk for aid work, according to UNAMA. It is in the best interest of a confluence of bad actors—poppy growers, Taliban and warlords—to keep the country destabilized. And as increasing parts of the country are declared to be no-go zones by both national and international assistance workers, communities are left with decreasing confidence in the future of a new Afghanistan.

On June 17th, more than 80 NGOs issued a call for expanded International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), citing the chilling impact of insecurity on the ability of Afghan families to invest in their own future, on the reconstruction progress and on the process of elections and voter registration.

Of particular concern is the impact of this rising insecurity on the Bonn Process, which calls for a new constitution and elections by June 2004. Elections require an environment free from violence, intimidation and coercion. Large parts of the south and southeast are currently too unsafe for election monitors to travel, threatening to undermine efforts to enable the Afghan people to freely choose their own government by the June 2004 deadline.

In the twenty-two months since the Taliban fell, the international community has failed to provide the two essential ingredients for democracy and reconstruction: security and sufficient financial assistance. We have squandered precious time and, even more importantly, the confidence of the Afghan people that we won't walk away from them again, as many of them believe we did a decade ago.

This week, we have two important opportunities to signal our commitment to a safe and democratic Afghanistan: On Monday, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that approves the expansion of the now NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond the limits of Kabul city, which enables us to make a genuine commitment to security. And this week you and your colleagues have the chance to put critically needed new funding into Afghanistan with the passage of the President's Emergency Supplement Request.

Since 2002, Afghanistan has been consistently under-funded. Despite early pledges at the Tokyo donor conference in 2002, and an April 2002 declaration of a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan by President Bush, Afghanistan has only received a fraction of the \$10.2 billion the World Bank/UNDP assessment identified as necessary for the first five years. The majority of those initial donor pledges have not yet fully materialized, nearly two years later, and even those funds currently committed are shockingly low compared to other post-conflict settings. In 2002, donors spent an average of \$64 per person in Afghanistan, compared to an average of \$250 per person in Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo and Bosnia.³

It is time to launch a new, comprehensive assessment to determine how much Afghanistan really needs over the next five years to move towards political stability, security and legitimate economic growth. The initial World Bank assessment was done quickly and without full information. It is time to conduct a more thorough assessment and pledge to respond on the basis of need.

The additional funds for Afghanistan requested in the new emergency supplemental are essential and will push forward critical programs. House leadership has already voted to increase the President's request for Afghanistan, as they have noted the high priority that Afghanistan represents and the many important projects not yet funded. I urge you to do the same. However, any increase in foreign assistance funds underscores the need for a secure environment in which reconstruction and democracy can be effective, a lesson drawn from the cumulative experiences of the past decade. This last year I participated as a member of the CSIS/AUSA Blue Ribbon Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction where a diverse group of bipartisan members of Congress, military leaders and senior policy experts from the US government, international organizations and the non-governmental sec-

² Afghanistan Non-Governmental Organization Security Office (ANSO) Weekly Situation Summary, Report Number—038/03.

³ In four recent post-conflict settings (Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo and Bosnia), donors spent an average of \$250 per person in aid versus per capita expenditures of \$64 for Afghanistan. Using that as the yardstick, Afghanistan assistance would equal \$5.5 billion per year for each of the next four years. At the Tokyo 2002 conference, donors pledged \$4.5 billion in reconstruction funding over five years. Even more sobering is the contrast to the proposed Iraq annual figure of \$20 billion for Iraq for this year alone. *CARE International and the Center on International Cooperation, Policy Brief, September 15, 2003*

tor considered how we as a country might better organize our response to the continuing challenges of winning the peace by rebuilding failed nations.

One key finding of the Commission was that "Security is the *sine qua non* of post-conflict reconstruction . . . if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail. Unless comprehensive security needs are addressed up front, spoilers will find the weak areas and retain leverage to affect the political outcomes, vitiating the peace."⁴

I understand that if the Foreign Relations Authorization bill is passed, it is likely to include an amendment that is based on some of the findings and recommendations of that Post-Conflict Commission. While I am aware that prospects for this legislation are uncertain, I hope such an amendment can still be considered in the future, as we will continue to wrestle with these issues if the last decade is any indicator. I am also encouraged to hear that in the coming year this Committee intends to focus more heavily on our country's ability to respond effectively to post-conflict situations.

Despite these lessons from the past and our continued calls for an expanded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), however, those 5,300 troops have until this week been constrained by a mandate to operate only within the city of Kabul, while the rest of Afghanistan has spiraled into unrest and violence.⁵ Instead, the US response was to create Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), small groups of 40–100 military personnel. Although a creative experiment, the PRTs have thus far lacked the mandate and resources to provide either security or reconstruction. They have not been strategically located in those insecure areas inaccessible to aid workers, but rather have focused on often-duplicative efforts to build small-scale projects such as school and clinics. The military has a core competency held by no one else, which is the provision of security. There are many other local and international organizations whose core competency is to provide community development assistance at a lower cost and with greater expertise if the security environment permits.

The PRTs must have a serious shift in focus and mandate if they are to play a useful and coordinated role in the expansion of ISAF. The announced expansion of ISAF to the PRT in Kunduz is a good first step, but it must go far beyond that to address effectively the security needs of Afghanistan and reach into the more insecure parts of the country. The British have recently begun their version of a PRT in Mazar with a more explicit mandate to provide security with a focus on disarmament, army and police training, and reconstruction of large government infrastructure. This approach is well worth watching as a model for evolving the PRT approach.

Clearly the long-term solution for Afghanistan is the development of its own national army and police force. Efforts to create either force are currently far behind schedule, with only 4,000 of the 70,000 proposed army force trained to date. According to the most optimistic assumptions, the central government will only have 9,000 soldiers to deploy by mid-2004. The police training effort is similarly behind schedule. The requested supplement funds will be a critical boost to these efforts, but until these forces are prepared to take a more active role, we must address the security gap that exists now or risk all the progress already seen in Afghanistan.

The primary purpose of my recent trip to Afghanistan was to meet with the Mercy Corps country team and with colleague agencies to determine how and if we might be able to continue operations in the current and very dangerous environment. In various meetings held in Kabul and Kandahar, I heard many excellent and constructive recommendations worth considering: Patrol key roads in insecure regions, increase attention to the border areas through which a stream of Taliban fighters pass. Stop assistance to the many militias under warlord command. Roll out regional training of the Afghan National Army and local police to increase their presence beyond Kabul. Refocus the PRTs to have a security mandate and position them in insecure areas that aid agencies cannot reach.

The solution is not to channel all assistance through the military or provide all aid workers with firearms and military escorts. Rather, we need to focus on creating ambient security, a secure environment that enables Afghans to invest in their future and for reconstruction, democracy and development work to go forward. Aid workers are not asking for armed escorts and guards, but rather a strategic deploy-

⁴Findings of this commission are summarized in "Play to Win," January 2003, a joint report of CSIS and AUSA available at www.pcrproject.org.

⁵The 4,800 ISAF members in Afghanistan on a per capita basis equal one peacekeeper per 5,380 Afghans. This is compared with Kosovo (1 per 48), Bosnia (1 per 58), East Timor (1 per 86) and Rwanda (1 per 3,350) Care *International Policy Brief, January 2003*.

ment of peacekeepers into those areas most insecure and an increased focus on hastening the longer-term solutions of Afghan army and police training.

As you consider the President's Emergency Supplemental Request, I will close with two key recommendations:

1. I strongly urge you to ensure that ISAF has all the resources needed to expand beyond Kabul with a clear and genuine commitment to provide security in key provinces. Both Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden have strongly supported this in the past, and the UN Security Council resolution adopted unanimously on October 13 finally opens the door to achieving this important goal. Expanding ISAF only through the PRTs as currently configured or into already secure parts of the country will not be enough. A flexible and more strategically deployable ISAF is critical for immediate and short-term security, while the slow process of training Afghan police and army members continues.

2. I urge you to support the increased House allocation of \$1.176 billion for Afghanistan within the President's Emergency Supplement Request. These funds are critical. The House increase is a bi-partisan reflection of the high priority that Afghanistan must be given. These funds are a badly needed boost to Afghan assistance and will hopefully serve as a prod for other nations to join in with substantial packages of their own.

In my recent visit to Afghanistan, it is apparent there is much to be hopeful about—there is a building boom in Kabul and Kandahar and evidence of flourishing new businesses. More than two million refugees have returned and a record four—five million children have returned to school, up from three million last year. With your support, we can help ensure this progress is not jeopardized and instead moves forward even more quickly.

Thank you again for your ongoing support and important leadership on these issues.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Lindborg.

Let me suggest to my colleagues that we sort of take 10-minute turns and take advantage of this expert panel that we have before us.

I'd like to ask you, Dr. Durch, as I tried to sketch out with your testimony, the 17,000 troops that you mentioned—these are international forces as I understand it—how close are we to having 17,000 presently? Is that an idea of what we have there now, or our goal? It was not clear to me where they come from and how many we anticipated.

Dr. DURCH. Thank you, sir. Yes, 17,000 would be the goal. There's about 5,000 to 5,500 in Kabul now. The Germans want to put 450 troops into Kunduz, which, on my model, is about the right number for that town.

I was not proposing forces to blanket the country, but to have areas of operation like Kabul in the other seven cities, but then critically link them together so that you get a kind of a necklace effect and provide security that people can use, once the roads are repaired, for commerce.

The CHAIRMAN. This is sort of a minimal number, as you say, for cities with comparable security as Kabul and a little bit of a link.

Dr. DURCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you listened to Ms. Lindborg, and she's talking about an overall security atmosphere, not requiring security with each aid worker and what have you. At the same time, I'm trying, as I'm sure most listeners to this would be doing, to think through how we ever get to that kind of atmosphere, even with 17,000 people. You know, early on, when many of us questioned this by the ratios of population or square miles in Bosnia, for example, or Kosovo, to the numbers of people we had, the results were very, very starkly different from Afghanistan. This is a

very thin situation and a pretty large country. I'm curious as to how we get to a point ever, really, of having this confidence on the roadways, quite apart from the cities, that would be sufficient for aid people, and NGOs and what have you, to simply go out and to do good.

I thought Ms. Lindborg made a very good point that the Taliban and the warlords and the poppy growers and what have you, are people who almost have a vested interest in chaos or indifference from the international community, but they're not a majority of the country necessarily. Where do the people stand? Are they supportive of the United States? If you had pollsters going out now as the Pew Foundation has been doing with countries all over the world, asking, "What's your general feeling about Americans these days?" how would things stack up? Is there, in other words, a supportive community for us or for the Germans if they are to go out, or for anybody else among the 17,000—or are, in fact, they likely to be targets in the same way the aid workers are?

Dr. DURCH. Senator, working backward, I don't have active poll data that I can give you. We could certainly look it up and check. I do know that in terms of the expansion of the international security presence, my sense is that there's widespread support for that, and it's been asked for for almost 2 years, and that support still exists.

The ISAF expansion that I was sketching is a component of a larger system of security. That's why I've given them a very specific task. And in the larger studies, we've always said that this number is contingent on Operation Enduring Freedom still being there to engage the primary problem from the U.S. perspective in the al-Qaeda and the Taliban. So that remains the American job.

These guys have a limited task of security in the towns and over the roads as we get the roads fixed so that we don't have to pay attention to everything. I think the PRTs can coexist with an expanded ISAF as a visible American fix-it presence on the ground if they get some more resources, and I think all these things can work together.

And then behind it all, we have the army, the highway patrol, all of these local resources that we're training up that we should have been, I think, training faster, that we're now reaching an appropriate rate, but, again, the rate of training for them and the timeline for Bonn are beginning to collide. But that's ultimately the issue. The international forces are a stopgap measure. But also, I used the analogy of a trellis for the PRCs. ISAF itself is a trellis. I would like to see the Afghan forces come join international forces, gain field experience, hand off, so the internationals can move onto the next task or go home. And I think the faster it looks like we're training local forces, the more we're likely to get contributions from our allies to expand ISAF, because they see a light at the end of the tunnel. They see a replacement force that's already in hand or in training. And by all accounts, the training is very good, and I think the new plans are very good.

We have—if you were to set Iraq aside, which is a very large set-aside, I understand, but comparable peacekeeping in the Balkans, let's say, we have drawn down more forces from the Balkans over the last 2 or 3 years than would be needed for this concept in

ISAF, and many of the same countries provide troops to both missions. The troop providers for ISAF currently have provided, like, two-thirds to three-quarters of the troops in IFOR and in SFOR and KFOR, which were historically the most dense, in terms of peacekeepers to people, of any mission. We went in very strong, 50 to 1, basically. Iraq is about 150 Iraqis per U.S. soldier. So by Balkan standards, we're thin. In Kabul, the deployment is thinner still. So it is a risk. I think it's a risk we have to take, because the alternative is, I think, even greater risk to the international community and to the transition.

The CHAIRMAN. But initially now, we have 5,500 ISAF people there now. We need 17,000. We're still 11,500 short on the ISAF part of it.

Dr. DURCH. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I ask this, because this is going to be difficult to fill. When I visited Germany in August, we went through their manpower situation, and the Chancellor said, "We're going to help out in Afghanistan. Don't want to touch Iraq, but this is where we're going to make our contribution as a NATO partner," which is helpful. But essentially the Germans, as I understood their figures at that time, have about 25,000 personnel who do this sort of thing wherever they are. Only a third of those do they deploy abroad at any one time.

Dr. DURCH. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Another third are in retraining, another third are in refreshment and recuperation and so forth, which is not unlike other forces. They have thirds. But I said, "Well, are you going to have any more?" And they said, "Well, we might go to 30,000 at some point." That would be instead of having, say, 8,500 available, or maybe 10,000. But that's it. And this is a pretty big country.

You extrapolate into the other situations. Some of us in the Senate talk about people being sent here and there, but the fact is with the large countries of the world, there are not many people that go here and there. And I am trying to add up—how you get to 17,000 is a tough thing to do unless the United States does it. Now, at that point, we still come back to the mission of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. By this time, they should be subdued, but they aren't. In fact, their forces are very busy on the borders. We're asking for more cooperation from Pakistan, and getting some. But, at the same time, anybody who is in an armed forces out there is still engaged in very, very tough straits, looking for the last remnants or sometimes, unfortunately, being attacked by them. So all that's going on in the background, with this very thin ISAF force that we've already discussed. I'm just trying, in my own mind's eye, to think through how we come to some degree of closure on the very basics of a thin security situation given the potential participation. Do you have any suggestions, or have you written on that subject?

Dr. DURCH. Most of our European allies are contributing something to peacekeeping someplace, mostly in NATO operations, as opposed to U.N. Most of the major third-world contributions are contributing to U.N. operations, so the Bangladeshis, the Pakistanis, the Indians contributing substantial forces in Africa, for example.

The political situation in Afghanistan is such that probably Pakistani and Indian forces, not so good.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. DURCH. Russian forces, not so good.

I suspect that if you sat NATO down, if you sat the EU down and really had a serious heart-to-heart talk and said, look, guys, if you don't want to do Iraq, we have another problem here that really needs some assistance. Seventy-five percent of the world's heroin is constructed there. Most of it comes your way. You've really got a national security interest in controlling this problem. So help us out. Twenty-five, thirty-thousand deployable troops, yes, I—some of that has to do with volunteerism versus conscription, and it's a complicated problem for the Germans; it might be a little bit less complicated for our friends in Paris. The Dutch have done one tour; they could probably do another—the Belgians, the Swedes, the Norwegians, and some others. I think probably if it were, in fact, assigned No. 1 priority, which I think it ought to be, for our friends in Europe, they could come up with the troops to deal with this modest increment, I think. As I said, they basically demobilized that many from the Balkans in the last 2 or 3 years, and they kept them there for years on end.

The CHAIRMAN. So that's the one prime suggestion, that we have this heart-to-heart talk with our NATO allies and say, this is the No. 1 objective for NATO. Now we need to collectively get to the 17,500.

Dr. DURCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Let me pick up where you and the chairman left off.

I couldn't agree with you more, doctor. I think that this is a place where we may be able to do some real good, allow everybody to save face, and really begin—I mean this sincerely—allow everybody to rebuild the relationships that have been badly fractured between, among us and our NATO allies and us and the EU. We're kidding ourselves if we suggest this is not—there has not been some real damage done to the relationship.

And we, at one point—there were serious people talking about the possibility of total NATO deployment if NATO, including the French, were prepared to participate. There's probably a maximum of 30,000 people if they did everything that they—that could be done. And it seems to me this is the place where—we had a colleague we both served with for a long time, Lawton Chiles, and I'll never forget one day on the Floor, I had been here only a couple of years, and he was my seat-mate, and there was a bill that didn't seem like a very big thing, and it passed. And Lawton was ecstatic. And I looked over to him, and I said, "Lawton, what's the big deal?" He said, "Joe, it's so seldom when conscience and convenience cross paths in American politics. It's time to celebrate."

Well, this is a place where conscience and convenience, I believe, cross paths, with a little bit of diplomacy. The French are fully capable of supplying up to 5,000 forces in Iraq, if—I mean, excuse me, in Afghanistan, if they chose to. It's going to be a long haul. It's a big push. The Germans can do more. NATO generally can do

more. And the Turks and maybe—and, again, I'm not the President or the Secretary of State, but it seems to me one of the things I'd be working on now is that the Turks are ready to provide a division, there is real question whether or not the governing council in Iraq is prepared to accept them even if they're there. It seems to me this is a place where—even though the Turks had one time around the barrel in Afghanistan, this may be—knowing now the international community has put its stamp on this, and if they're convinced we will provide the lift capacity, the intel, et cetera, which I assume this is—all rests on. If we don't do that, then none of this matters. So I think there's a possibility here, with a awful lot of hard work and a little bit of luck, this may be able to be done.

But my question relates to—assuming that is done—and I have—and thank you very much for your specificity. I mean, you laid out here 17,000—total forces 16,520—how they are spread out from Kabul, to Kandahar, Herat, et cetera, and you have a rationale behind why that number is needed in those places, including garrisoned forces, based on the threat level and population level for highway security as well, in addition. So have this access, as the chairman said, connecting the dots. And we were in Afghanistan shortly after, quote, “we won.” Every minister I spoke to, from Kanuni on, was making the point that none of this does much good—it doesn't do much good to open up a university in Kabul if something can't get on the road in Herat and make the trip to the university. And so how are we going to connect this, and how was commerce going to thrive if you did not have the ability to transit the country?

But one of the things we—propositions we started off with—and this is more like a monologue than a question, and I apologize for this, but—was that we were—we had a brief moment there, in my view, where the sponsoring interfering surrounding five nations, who have historically decided to get their piece of the action on the ground that they'd protect as their own interest within—I mean, think about Afghanistan. Here you have Afghanistan divided ethnically—Pashtun, Tajik, et cetera—yet there's never been, to the best of my knowledge, in recent history, a desire to split the country. It's been who can dominate the country, who can be in charge of the country. As opposed to the Balkans, as opposed to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, where there was no desire to maintain, other than among the Serbs—there was a desire to break off into smaller pieces. And each of these factions within the country had their sponsor, whether it was Iran or Pakistan or Tajikistan, et cetera, and there was a brief moment there where they were all prepared to have an ISAF force come in, because we would essentially become the apartheid cops. They weren't at all sure that any of the surrounding countries were going to continue to be their sponsors, they weren't at all sure, relative to us and/or their competing forces, they could sustain their dominance in their particular area. So as I met with the warlords and the man we're about to confirm as Ambassador, I hope, who had—was there at the same time, when we met with each one of the various warlords, they're all ready to accept international forces at the time, not because they're so noble, but they figured their best bet to maintain

their influence and not have anyone else trench upon their authority was to have that occur.

It seems to me that it's a very different circumstance right now. They seem fairly secure. Again, I'll stick with Ismail Khan as an example. He seems fairly secure in his position in western Afghanistan. And he seems—and I don't want to overstate this—to have maintained very good relationships with the Iranians.

And so my question is this, how would you characterize—let's start with you, doctor, but also you, Mr. Ambassador, and, Nancy, you, as well, because you're there more than any of us—how engaged are the sponsors—the Iranians, the Pakistanis, et cetera—in interfering with and maintaining their traditional relationships with the warlords or ethnic groups within, Afghanistan? I'm not looking for an essay, but just generally, is it increasing, diminishing? Is it helpful, hurtful?

Dr. DURCH. Senator, my impression is that the Pakistani engagement is serious and perhaps mixed. The Iranian engagement is serious, and it depends on whether you're talking about the government or the hardliners, who basically control the military and foreign policy. In terms of the north, it seems a little more quiescent. But I think I would defer to Ambassador Tomsen for a more detailed explanation.

Senator BIDEN. Ambassador.

Ambassador TOMSEN. Thank you. And I'd also later defer to Nancy. As you mentioned, she's been out there.

Iran is, of course, predominantly Shi'a, and it doesn't have much of an ability in 85 percent Sunni Afghanistan to make inroads. It could pay off people, it can reach out to the Shi'a, but it's always been limited by this factor. It's also been limited by an antipathy toward Iran by most Afghans. This is very historical. It goes back to invasions from Iran into Afghanistan. Great suspicions there.

So their ability to interfere is limited. They have interfered, especially the revolutionary guards, the security side. They want to maintain some influence in Afghanistan, much as they want to maintain influence on the other side in Iraq with certain groups, usually radical Shi'a groupings.

In regards to Pakistan, I'm afraid we've had about 25 years of Pakistani interference and a buildup of Pakistani assets in the radical Islamic groupings in the North-West Frontier Province, Madrassas, the infrastructure along the Indo-Pakistani frontier. That infrastructure is still there. It spews out fighters that go into Kashmir, as well as into Afghanistan. Many of the fighters in Kashmir are from Afghanistan. Most of the fighters that died at the Indian Parliament were from Konar Province in Afghanistan, taken out by the ISI. Plus, you have most of the Taliban cabinet still in Quetta and areas along the North-West Frontier Province, including the Defense Minister, former Defense Minister.

I was on a TV show, Senator, yesterday with Ahmad Rashid, and he just returned from a trip to Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and he said that the Taliban operations now remind him of the Taliban operations in 1995 and 1996, when they were moving in quite substantially into Afghanistan. And he anticipated that this would get worse, not better.

Senator BIDEN. I think he's right.

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes. So our diplomacy with Pakistan, our bilateral diplomacy, is extremely important. It's more important than the expansion of ISAF, in terms of security in Afghanistan. There's one face of ISI which cooperates with us; there's another face of ISI which is still protecting and feeding this asset that they've built up over 25 years. They're waiting for the Americans to leave, and Musharraf is still playing both sides of the street, in my judgment.

The other states neighboring Afghanistan have a geopolitical reason to cooperate with the Coalition in Afghanistan.

Senator BIDEN. Ms. Lindborg, do you have anything to add?

Ms. LINDBORG. I would add a couple of observations, and certainly from the perspective of having worked for over a decade in both Quetta and throughout the southern part of Afghanistan. Our base of operations has historically been in Kandahar, Helmut, and Uruzgan. And we are seeing, over these past 10 months, a very strong resurgence of the kind of individuals who were quite active, as when we were there, under the Taliban. And the night letters that are saying, you know, you can't listen to music, you can't go to the funerals of those who were killed for working for assistance agencies, are becoming more and more in evidence. They're being posted in the—they're not even night letters anymore, they're day letters, and we see the traffic going back and forth. So I would echo and support what Peter said about that being absolutely vital.

I would add to that a couple of points, and that is, you know, during the bombing, the people in one of the districts in Uruzgan, which is the traditional seat of the Taliban, actually defied the Taliban in order to protect the Mercy Corps office there. They kept our vehicles, our computers from the Taliban, because they understood that they were the ones—that the community people were the ones who would ultimately benefit, and they said, you know, hands off on this.

And to get to your question, Senator Lugar, there is, I think, still a strong reservoir of support and goodwill among the Afghan people. When I was there last week, it was evident that we are well supported and well received once we're in the communities where we're working, and it's the traveling between the communities that becomes extremely dangerous.

To get to the point of how do you—when we're dealing with a scarce resource, how do you address security, I think we're very well aware of that challenge, and I think there are strategic things that we can do that we have not yet done. We can more strategically deploy peacekeeping forces on the primary roads. You can increase border activities. We can decrease support for some of the warlords, in addition to what's coming across the border from Pakistan.

As I mentioned in my testimony, there is this confluence of actors who benefit from having a destabilized Afghanistan. It's not just the Taliban, it's the huge opium industry, and there's all the various warlords, power brokers, who don't want to have a strong central government, and they're all able to opportunistically work together right now and keep out development.

Senator BIDEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may proceed in one followup on a point with the Ambassador.

Mr. Ambassador, one of the most difficult things, I find at least, to explain to my constituency, the public at large, the press, is how all these dots are connected. For example, I'm of the view—and I'd like you to critique what I'm about to say—and I'd like an honest critique if you disagree, because I have respect for your view—I have thought the calculus for Musharraf has been the degree to which he thinks U.S. policy in the region from Pakistan to Turkey is well thought out, totally committed, and fully engaged, and likely to succeed. It's the degree to which he is willing to increase the risk to him to take on this historically ungovernable province in the northwest, as well as the ISI's cozy relationship with the Pashtun for decades.

And if I were to draw a graph, graph this relationship immediately after the bombing, quote, "succeeded" and before we went into Iraq—this is not an argument not to go into Iraq, but before we went into Iraq—the degree of cooperation was rising relative to him cracking down on his own intelligence services and his willingness to take on the more radical elements within his country. So the degree to which we seem to be—have an incoherent or not totally coherent policy in Afghanistan—I mean, in Iraq and/or even in the Middle East, Israeli-Palestinian issue, that that heated up his radical base, is the degree to which he backs off.

And so what I'd like to posit here is—for your consideration, and either one of you can chime in; this is the last thing I will ask—is as much of an advocate for the international security force that I have been from the beginning, if the Lord Almighty came down and said you could do one of two things, you could have an incredibly robust international security force put in place immediately or you could show significant success with international support in Iraq, as well as in—on the road map, which do you want? I would take the latter in order to secure Afghanistan.

Ambassador TOMSEN. You mean the road map?

Senator BIDEN. The road map and—I mean, the two pieces here.

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. There's basically three big pieces we're dealing with—I mean, there are many more, but you can divide it anyway you want—Afghanistan, Iraq, and the road map, the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. To the extent that it looks like we're failing and/or not succeeding or not internationalizing the two most western problems we have in the region, that is Iraq and the road map, is the extent to which it seems to me the calculus for Musharraf and his government is, I'd better cut my deal, make my peace, make my accommodation with the more radical elements of my own country, rather than go out and be cracking down on anybody.

Is that a calculus that is inaccurate. Well, I mean, in other words, how do these relate—or do they relate? Maybe they have nothing to do with one another. But I don't know how we succeed without Musharraf—and it may be indirectly—I mean, the chairman was saying, how do you get to 16,200 or 17,800? And even if you do get to that number, is that enough in an environment where you don't have much greater cooperation—not marginally better, but much better cooperation—this is Joe Biden part, and I don't want to lay this on the chairman—but much better cooperation

with the Pakistani Government in dealing with the Pashtun and all that that entails, from the Taliban to al-Qaeda, cooperation, et cetera.

Do you understand what I'm trying to get at?

Ambassador TOMSEN. I do. I think so.

Senator BIDEN. Talk to me about that for a second, if you would.

Ambassador TOMSEN. The way I'd approach the answer is that Musharraf and the Pakistani generals who are running Pakistan think, and have some evidence for this, that the Americans are not good finishers; you could go around the world to different places and gather up arguments in this regard—and then when they look at Iraq and the road map and they look at the strength of the United States and its abilities to meet its commitments around the world, and then they look at Afghanistan, how long will the United States be in Afghanistan, he makes his calculations on—major calculations from that sort of scenario. But his main analysis, point of analysis, will be the situation in Afghanistan and the situation in Pakistan, of course. And he has the generals around him. He wants to keep their support. Of course, he has the Pakistani religious parties. And he has this infrastructure that the generals, through ISI, have built up along the frontier for the last 30 years, and they're not going to sweep it away. And they're going to try to play both sides of the street, and he'll go as far as he needs to with the Americans on picking up al-Qaeda types or—and maybe moving a regiment up to a part of the frontier, but they will continue to play both games at once and watch us very closely to see how we will proceed, and also to see how things are proceeding in Afghanistan.

In the meantime, this infrastructure, with the Taliban in it and the al-Qaeda and people like Gullboddin Hekmatyar, who has come back from Iran and is now shifting between Konar Province in Afghanistan in the area near Chitral on the Pakistan side, and he's sending people up into Uruzgan, as far as Uruzgan, too, they will continue to operate freely from northern Pakistan into Afghanistan, and they will not be inhibited. ISI knows every meter along the frontier. They know where—if Osama bin Laden is still there, they know where he is. They certainly know where Mullah Omar is, and they know what all of these Taliban leaders are doing and what operations they're mounting across the frontier. Even though they say, we don't have total control, they certainly know everything that's happening. And, in my judgment, they could be doing—Musharraf could be doing a lot more to control Taliban-al-Qaeda activities.

Senator BIDEN. What pressure points do we have? You're President of the United States, you have an altar call with—to use an old phrase—with General Musharraf. What do you tell him? What pressure points—is it productive for us to lay in conditions with the Pakistanis about aid issues relating directly to economic aid, or military aid, with the Pakistanis?

Ambassador TOMSEN. I'd list three pressure points, sir. One is what I talked about at the end of the statement—the constituencies in Pakistan—economic especially, but others, as well—that would benefit enormously if Afghanistan were stable and the trade routes would reopen across Central Asia; Pakistani light industrial goods

could go north into Russia, energy could come south in the Caspian. That's one argument I'd make.

Another is geopolitical. Their biggest concern in the Pakistani military is Indo-U.S. relations. And as the Indo-U.S. military relationship continues to go forward, it's going to spook them more and more. And if they—

Senator BIDEN. In which direction?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes, it could spook them in two possible directions, one to accommodate us more and the Afghans more, and the other is to turn more toward developing further this extremist variant, which they have created, and make it even more dangerous, and try to develop more instability inside Afghanistan, and centers for Islamist influence inside Afghanistan. They could go that way, too. But they wouldn't have much support for that route, Senator, in this day and age. Saudi Arabia is cracking down on funding, money-laundering and extremism in Saudi Arabia. The Syrians are less active. So there's not many—as opposed to, say, 10 years ago when they were developing the Taliban, there's not many allies that the Pakistani military can turn to, and it is a geopolitical or geo-strategic vice which is moving against them if the United States and India and Russia should cooperate more, and some of that cooperation would be targeted against Pakistan.

The final point, pressure point, is economic. In the supplemental, you have \$200 million, for instance, set aside for Pakistan in loan guarantees. But that is linked to Pakistan's total cooperation in the war on terrorism, which Musharraf says that he cooperates in now, and the President could mention that, as well, and maybe point out things that we know that they're doing, and say, we'd like to see these things stop. We want to see this proceed that is, even more help for you, but we can't do it, our hands are tied by Congress.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Let me ask you, Ambassador Tomsen, you mentioned, and I just jotted down, "keep out of the political briar patch" in the politics of Afghanistan, which is probably always good advice. But Senator Biden's question has been linking problems in Pakistan with Afghanistan. Some observers that we have heard indicate they believe that the United States, in our feelings that there ought to be fair and democratic elections in Pakistan, helped accelerate an election in Pakistan that resulted in some unfortunate aspects. The results apparently in two provinces very near Afghanistan have members that appear to be Taliban supporters. When President Musharraf came and had coffee with our committee, we asked him very candidly about all of this, and obviously he was not happy with those results. Especially since people were advocating, as members of parliament from those areas, that he be separated from one of two responsibilities, he indicated he was not about to bow to all of that. But the fact is, democracy worked. The people expressed themselves, and the results were not very salutary for Musharraf or for us.

I don't think the Senator from Delaware and I really know exactly who would elect whom, nor would we try to divine what the constitution will be. If you heard an earlier panel, they said that they're going to get a copy to us in due course. There will be a de-

bate about that. There are many who would observe that democracy, if it does proceed—and you've suggested some antecedents that are important that require security—the census, voter registration, these sorts of things take some doing. In the panel we had on the Iraq constitutional procedures and their elections, we have discovered that there are some pressures from other countries that they get on with this constitution right away. In fact, our own Secretary of State has suggested a fairly accelerated timetable as he's tried to negotiate with friends at the U.N. And yet we've found people are disagreeing as to who ought to elect the people who devise the constitution.

What are the roles and who votes on those? In other words, this is very, very tough going. Afghanistan will be having elections. We don't know how that may come out.

You're probably right, we should not get involved in the briar patch, but, on the other hand, Americans probably do care a lot about how that election comes out. For example, if Taliban supporters—not the Taliban themselves, but rather the people who generally have that point of view—came back, and wanted to adopt the Sharia Code again, and put women back in the position they were in before, and say, that's democracy, that's the way we feel about these things, a good number of Americans understandably would be very upset about that. Now, we could say, well, that's the way it goes, you know, we did the best we could, and we have fostered a constitution, and we got some pretty good rolls and people finally came to the polls and they came in good numbers—but then where would we be? You know, we're maybe back to square one in the war against terrorism. After all, the problem before was neglect. We all left. Taliban came in and, by and large, we saw the results of this. They weren't very happy, we think, for the Afghan people, but clearly they weren't very happy for us with camps and people who used the camps and finally attacked us.

So to what extent is our democratic ethic, our tolerance for whatever happens in Afghanistan, going to contribute to security for us? In other words, if at the end of this we have, in fact, a country that, by a democratic election has elected people who are going to bring hostility for Americans, and who are going to lend them support to the war of terrorists against us, what do we do about that?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Well, if that would happen, you know, if the Taliban would win the election and come to power in Afghanistan, we'd be in very difficult circumstances, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did in Pakistan, just across the border. They just got there and had an election, and we encouraged it.

Ambassador TOMSEN. But what I'd like to say is, I think there is about a 1 percent chance that that will happen, and I—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, why is that? Why are you so optimistic about it?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Even in Pakistan, sir, it's a coalition government, in Baluchistan in the North-West Frontier Province. There is not a extremist majority, although they have a plurality in each place. In all of the elections in Pakistan's history for their national assembly, the religious parties never got over 6 percent of the vote, and that's the national scene. And they never did that

well before this election after 9/11 in Baluchistan in the North-West Frontier Province.

If things go well in—oh, one more point is that the mullahs, the Pashtun mullahs, are in control of the Taliban. But, in Afghanistan and also Pakistan, you have the tribal aristocracy, which has traditionally run the tribal areas, and they are anti-extremist, and there's always been political competition between them.

If our security and reconstruction programs are successful in Afghanistan, we need to do better than we have for the last 2 years. We will see definitely a loya jurga like we saw last June, which is filled out by mostly tribal and clan leaders from around Afghanistan, mullahs. And over 50 percent of Afghanistan is non-Pashtun, and they don't like the Pashtun mullahs who brought the Taliban.

In fact, if I could reinforce what Nancy mentioned earlier to you in answer to your earlier question, the Afghan population does not want to see either the warlords or the extremists come back. They hate them. They're anti-warlord and they're anti-Taliban. Also, the Afghan population, as a whole, wants peace. You see this overwhelming desire everywhere after 23 years of war and destruction. So here, too, reconstruction and security programs, if they go better in Afghanistan and we begin to make progress, I think you'll see a leadership like Hamid Karzai emerge again in Afghanistan, from a loya jurga process or election process.

[A follow-up response was forwarded to Chairman Lugar by Ambassador Tomsen.]

OCTOBER 20, 2003

DEAR CHAIRMAN LUGAR,

During your hearing on Afghanistan last Thursday, you asked whether elections in Afghanistan might result in a victory for Afghan Muslim extremists. You noted that religious coalitions had won provincial elections in Pakistan's NWFP and Baluchistan Provinces.

There was not enough time to answer your question at the hearing. Hence, this follow-up letter.

Historically, the traditionalists have won Afghan elections to the National Assembly (1965 and 1969 Afghan elections) or to Loya Jurgas. Most of the rural population in Afghanistan is divided into tribes (south, east) and clans (the north). The rural populace generally elected their local khans to represent their interests in Kabul. While conservative and religious, these local leaders were relatively more wealthy, prestigious, educated and experienced in running local jurgas through which community disputes are settled. (The jurga is not only national, it is a vehicle to solve any dispute over water sharing, land ownership and even intra-family disputes. When asked, I advise Americans wishing to provide assistance to Afghans to set priorities through the village or district jurga, run by the elders. Let the jurga help decide—and provide manpower plus other inputs.)

The rural mullahs, who rose to prominence during the jihad, had marginal influence in the National Assembly and last year's Loya Jurga. This is partly because the tribal and clan leaders seek to exclude them; and it is partly because they are not at home in a democratic process. Rural mullahs were mostly strong supporters of the Taliban—Mullah Omar's approach was to convene religious meetings to sanction his decisions as "Emir," such as not to hand over Osama bin Ladin. In effect, the tribal/clan local leaders around the country dominated last year's Loya Jurga. It is interesting that Hamid Karzai head of the Pashun Popalzai tribe, was chosen as President in a secret ballot, receiving over 80% of the vote. His father, Abdul Ahad Karzai, assassinated by the Taliban/Al Qaeda in 1999, was Deputy Speaker of Parliament in the 1960s.

On the downside, a lot of money continues to flow from religious centers in the Gulf through Pakistan to more senior Afghan clerics, like Rabbani and Sayyaf. They will challenge Karzai in the next presidential or National Assembly election, running on a "Mujahidin," anti-U.S., anti-Western platform. If elected, they would re-

institute a Taliban style totalitarian Muslim extremist dictatorship at home, and an anti-U.S., anti-Western foreign policy abroad.

My own opinion is that Rabbani, supported by Sayyaf, will lose if facing Karzai. Rabbani was discredited by his tenure as “President” during the destructive Civil War period. More important, the great majority of Afghans, Pakistanis and Tajiks, suffered greatly under Rabbani’s Islamists, and the following Taliban, rule. They oppose both the Jihadis and the warlords.

The key to electoral success of Karzai and the moderates in the constitutional Loya Jirga, the planned National Assembly elections (scheduled for June, 2004 but likely to slip), or a direct presidential election will be accelerated progress in reconstruction and security. Rabbani and Sayyaf will try to argue that the Afghan people’s misery has not been eased by the Western supported moderates—their Islamist rule will better deliver the goods. As Nancy said during your hearing, so far we have failed to provide enough, and also effective, assistance to advance reconstruction and security by the Karzai regime. Let’s hope the new “push” the administration is highlighting will fill this gap. IFES should also have a civic education program on elections since there have not been elections in Afghanistan since the 1960s.

If rendered wisely, international assistance will bolster the Karzai regime’s ability to demonstrate to Afghan voters real progress in reconstruction and economic development areas, while improving the security situation and sidelining the warlords.

Should Karzai, Abdullah and their allies succeed in the planned constitutional Loya Jirga this December and in the 2004 elections, this result would have a healthy influence on further democratic, human rights, anti-drugs and security progress inside Afghanistan, and also importantly on Pakistan and Iran in all of these areas. In this connection, the Pakistani military’s requirement that candidates in the last Pakistani election have a college degree was interpreted to include Madrassa graduates. This proviso, which was meant to help religious party candidates, helped produce the religious coalitions in NWFP and Baluchistan. I have heard—but cannot confirm—that the Pakistani courts have since reversed the requirement.

Kind regards,

PETER [TOMSEN]

Ambassador TOMSEN. But maybe we should turn to Nancy, too, who knows the internal scene as well—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, indeed, we should. Would you comment on this?

Ms. LINDBORG. Well, I would simply add that, you know, the concern has been, since the fall of the Taliban, that without security we’d recreate the conditions that enabled them to rise in the first place. And the only real incentive for people to support the Taliban the first time around was the extraordinary insecurity that existed just prior. And we are back in that stage again in those crucial parts of the country, the south and southeast, where without an alternative, they will turn again to the Taliban, No. 1, because they have a track record for having provided a secure environment, nothing else, but they did create security. And No. 2, there is pressure for them, for the communities, to not support alternatives. They are being threatened by these night letters. They are—there are killings going on there in direct pressure to not support alternatives. And all of this, I think, underscores and points to how essential it is to not give more time for the confluence of spoilers to become more entrenched. I think that it’s essential that we move quickly to provide the secure environment, even if it’s only in strategic places, you know, identified as road security or those parts of the country that are the least secure, that are those parts of the population that, left alone, which is currently what is occurring as more and more parts of the south and southeast become no-go zones, that left alone they will return to their support for the only alternative being presented to them, which is the return to Taliban rule.

The CHAIRMAN. We've discussed NATO and the message that we need to have there, that is, the persuasion or desire consensus to get to the 17,500, which is, sort of, not diminimus, but an important goal. We're at 5,500 people in that category, so that's some distance away, which gets to the security point at whichever level we're talking about. But what I wonder about is your perception as observers not just of Afghanistan, but of the international scene. I wonder whether other countries see the problem in Afghanistan, and the potential crisis of a return to prior conditions. As you say, Ms. Lindborg, the Taliban offers security; maybe that's the reason people let them go to begin with. They provided some security. Absent international commitment, including our own, but hopefully not exclusively that, we could have a recurrence of this. But do European countries see it that way, or do other countries outside of Europe? In other words, is this a priority for anybody but us?

I ask this, because in other contexts, sometimes states from European countries say, we understand your anguish from September 11 and the tragedy that occurred in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. We can understand why you're angry about that and why you would then say to the Taliban, either give up al-Qaeda or we come after you, but, on the other hand, we don't anticipate somebody's going after the Eiffel Tower or the Brandenburg Gate. You know, this is really not in the cards. We are not the focus of the war on terror or anybody else. That's your problem. So if you want to solve it, more power to you. And we say, well, after all, we're NATO allies. We're together. And to his credit, Lord Robertson, a great advocate for this, really went way out on the limb and offered leadership well beyond what our Department's intention, in my judgment, was prepared to do.

Now, we've come along, and we all agreed in the first round not to rehash month by month all of the evolutions that have come up with this. But, on the other hand, I'm still troubled by the fact that I just don't see out there how we get to the 17,500 arithmetically with NATO, with the Europeans, if the staying power is what Pakistan is looking for, or the Afghans, too. I just feel that this is coming up short, even as you've got the road map of how it might be successful, in part because other nations really do not see, troubling as it may be, that the Taliban would come back and that essentially bad things would happen to Afghans. But they would say historically that's been going on for a long time. What's new? You know, here you have a radical adjustment that you're suggesting, that there might be new life for this country and for the people that are there. But if so, you're sort of on your own, America. You are going to have to, sort of, make it happen. And then this requires quite a bit of argument in our politics as to the resources we have to make it happen, given other commitments or other problems that are on the trail that we're wrestling with as we speak on the floor.

Can any of you offer some general comment as to why Afghanistan becomes interesting to the rest of the world in a way that we would like to see it interested—reform, change, democracy, human rights for women, other things that are important for us? Do other nations really share that? And if so, do you think they're prepared

ultimately, even under strong persuasion, to bring to the floor the resources and money and personnel?

Do you have a thought, Ms. Lindborg?

Ms. LINDBORG. I'll say two quick things and then pass it to my colleagues, who I'm sure have much more to comment on.

But, first of all, I think that the tremendous amount of heroin that's flooding Europe out of Afghanistan is certainly of interest to—

The CHAIRMAN. So that's a handle, at least. We ought to speak to everybody about the idea that if you've got a drug problem in your country, if you're a Brazilian or an Argentine or what have you, you've got a problem in Afghanistan.

Ms. LINDBORG. And I believe that it affects Europe much more than it does us on the—I mean, that's the prime market for Afghans in heroin.

Second, you know, my understanding is that the U.S. Government did not support the expansion of ISAF. And either actively didn't support it or we opposed it from—depending upon who you talked to when.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we're very conflicted, and Senator Biden's reflected that very well.

Ms. LINDBORG. And I think we've seen from the past—and certainly the Balkans were an interesting example of this—that when there isn't that leadership, others are not going to step up to the plate.

And, third, I think that all—certainly Afghanistan is sensitive to the notion or the perception of an occupying force, and it's an extremely sensitive question, which is why having a U.N. mandate for an international force is a critical component for the peacekeeping force. And if we, this government, has dropped its objection and actively supports it, which my understanding, is a shift, and to do so under a U.N. mandate, my hope is that that will change the nature of the debate and the nature of the response.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Tomsen.

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes, thank you. And I'd defer also to our colleague on the right here.

I think Senator Biden's tactics, diplomatically, are splendid. That's the way to go with the Europeans. Look at Iraq and look at the importance of Afghanistan. The Europeans will tick off all of the points that we tick off on the importance of succeeding in Afghanistan.

Another argument that we can make, sir, is what's in my statement, the positive outcome of stability in Afghanistan, which is located right in the center of Eurasia and will open up those global trade routes—east, west, north, south—and help Pakistan and South Asia generally, as well as Iran and other countries. We should not forget that side of the argument.

I want to add something here about Afghanization. Nancy touched on it. We have to proceed gingerly in Afghanistan, because the Afghans are very sensitive. We don't want to join that long queue of foreigners who have attempted to choose Afghan leaders, because we will fail. The Soviets were there for 8 years. They tried all the tricks that they tried in Eastern Europe and Mongolia and elsewhere, they assassinated Afghan leaders, they played musical

chairs, and they failed, and they failed miserably. If we get the image in Afghanistan of an occupier, we're going to have problems.

So I also agree with Nancy's point, to the extent that you can internationalize this under a U.N. mandate and still get the job done—I want to quickly add that—we should do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Durch.

Dr. DURCH. Senator, I'd like to endorse both sets of comments just made. I think, you know, we have a larger common project with our European allies in terms of the values we assign to democracy and human rights and open markets and human dignity. And I think the European Union's been working on a project for the last half year trying to knit itself—half century—trying to knit itself together and is only beginning to reach out now with an active foreign policy. We saw one military extrusion in the Congo this summer, which worked pretty well.

So I think we need to encourage that, not necessarily as a—you know, a separate pillar. Maybe through NATO, and Afghanistan gives us an excellent lever to do that.

I think we need to think about this like NPR thinks about fundraising. We need to extend some matching grants to our allies and give them something to match, whether it's logistics support or communications or whatever it is, and knowing that they'll have reach-back to the OEF will protect and we'll protect them. And cast it as a common objective.

In terms of Afghanistan being a serious problem for a generation, well, sometimes you get inured to chronic pain, but it doesn't mean you have to suffer it if there's an alternative. I think we can come up with the troops. I think if we accelerate the training of local forces and stress that, and stress that the money's going to be there to build the rule-of-law institutions that go behind them, and if the elections go OK, then this will look like a time-limited enterprise, that we're really helping to stand something up that will have some chance of being stable when we let it go.

A final remark, though, going back to my initial points, that one of the five lessons that we know from history is that a troubled country that's surrounded by sharks, essentially, is probably doomed. And so we really have to stress the role of Pakistan, getting them onboard with the peace process, not undermining it and getting their own border situation under control. How we do that, I would defer to my more learned colleagues. But if we don't do that, then we're really on a treadmill and we're running backward.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that's a good point, the neighborhood is a very difficult one, and we have foreign policy issues with a number of the neighbors.

But let me defer now to my colleague.

Senator BIDEN. I just want to make one somewhat provocative, not suggestion, but comment. I wonder what history would have said had we decided, instead of going into Iraq, that we went into the North-West Province of Pakistan with 150,000 American forces to get al-Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban, I wonder what that would have done. And I'm being obviously very provocative, but—because I—maybe I've been hanging around with the chairman for too many years. An awful lot of the theories that we come up with as to how to proceed in American foreign policy run up

against reality. And the reality is, as long as Pakistan is unwilling or unable to deal with the radicalization or the maintenance of a radical province, among other things, as long as there is essentially a no-man's land where there is safe haven for the Taliban, for extremists to go either into Kashmir and/or into Afghanistan, I don't know how you solve this problem. I don't know how you—other than—I guess what you're saying, Nancy, is success begets success, or one of you said it earlier in a different context, that to the extent that we show staying power, to the extent that we stabilize things on the ground, to the extent to which we then have—increase our leverage of being able to get Islamabad to act responsibly, to get the Iranians to back off, to get, you know, whatever. But, you know, there is, sort of, that immovable object. You've got a province that hasn't been governable for—correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Ambassador—forever. And it is essentially what—you know, if you think of the Wild West, it's the no-man's land where the bad guys could hang out for respite and before they headed back into—all the way from Albuquerque to Dodge. I mean, you know, they—so what do you think would have happened had we—when the next President comes along or this President says, I'm not going to sustain this any longer. We're going in. I want to tell you, Musharraf, we're going in, and we're going to find, you know, root out the Taliban, if we could. I'm not sure we could.

Talk to this again—

Ambassador TOMSEN. Well, there's some 20 million people there in those two provinces. There are 140 million altogether in Pakistan. So I think it would not be advisable. I think it's one of those cases where it's easy to get in, but hard to get out, and you wouldn't accomplish your objective. Indeed, in this particular area, things would get worse, rather than better.

The answer, though, is Musharraf and his government. They can do much more. They do have instruments to influence and, in many areas, control Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, not only through security forces, but through economic means. And they could certainly stop over 80 percent of these incursions that are going into Afghanistan attacking our troops, attacking the troops of the Kabul government, police posts, et cetera. They could certainly stop the overwhelming majority of those activities if they wanted to.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both. And, Ms. Lindborg, as they say, keep your head down.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we both very much appreciate your testimony; likewise, your patience with all of our floor problems. We have been delighted to have this opportunity, the two of us, to question you more extensively. And we have, I believe, established a good combination for the record of your initial papers as well as the questions and responses.

We look forward to staying in touch with you and we hope that you will continue to furnish good counsel to our committee.

With that, our hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF AMB. WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

AFGHANISTAN

Question 1. How do you think the Afghan people view their situation since the fall of the Taliban government? What is the visible evidence that they are better off now than a year ago?

Answer. The large majority of the Afghan people see that they are better off now that the Taliban are gone. The people of Afghanistan enjoy more freedom and equality, greater security, and better opportunity today than two years ago. While some Afghans are frustrated with the pace of reconstruction, the visible evidence is irrefutable. Afghans are better fed; agricultural output increased 82% in 2002 and will increase again in 2003. Life expectancy is increasing, thanks in part to USG construction of health clinics and provision of rural health care to over 2.5 million Afghans. Girls and boys are returning to schools, with approximately 200 schools, 25 million textbooks, and in-service training courses for 1,600 teachers provided by the USG. Under the transitional government of Afghanistan legal reform, police training, and infrastructure development are all improving the everyday lives of Afghans. A new constitution will be decided upon by a representative Loya Jirga this year and Afghans will participate in free elections next year. Perhaps the most evident sign of change is on the streets of Kabul, women are free to walk unescorted, kites are flying, and music is playing—all were banned under the Taliban.

Question 2. The Afghan government has accused Pakistan of doing too little to prevent militants from regrouping on the borders. Since September, Pakistan has begun to raid tribal villages in search of al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants and has made arrests. Why is Pakistan conducting raids now, when they didn't conduct raids earlier? How effective are these efforts? How can the United States do a better job at pressuring Pakistan to increase their efforts at rooting out al-Qaeda and the Taliban? What is your assessment of the goals of Pakistan in Afghanistan?

Answer. For the United States to succeed in its goal of a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, we must also be successful in Pakistan. Within these broader objectives, we are working with both countries to end the security threat from their common border area. The United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan's other neighbors all share with the current government of Afghanistan a common objective in seeing Afghanistan emerge as a non-threatening, stable, prosperous, and democratic country. In the past two years, Pakistan has apprehended over 500 suspected Taliban/al-Qaeda suspects, including Rhalid Sheik Mohammad and Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Pakistan ranks fourth in the world in the amount of terror-related assets frozen. These people are as much of a threat to Afghanistan as to the United States, Pakistan, or any other country. For over a century, the tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border have had substantial autonomy. However, recognizing the significant threat that insurgents pose to regional stability, Pakistan recently mounted successful operations in the tribal areas, netting eighteen suspects and killing eight. Pakistan recognizes that the problems along its border are a threat to it, and is responding to our requests for increased control in these areas. They are expanding government control in these areas for the first time in 150 years. The increased presence on the ground is helping to make them more effective in capturing Taliban and al-Qaeda. We are helping to make their efforts more effective with intelligence cooperation, funding for equipment and computer databases, a national criminal fingerprint system, and construction of border posts and roads.

