

(2) The product determined by multiplying by a fraction the total amount received or accrued by the trust from the debtor with respect to the obligation. The numerator of the fraction is the amount of receipts or sales of the debtor that is based, in whole or in part, on the income or profits of any person and the denominator is the total amount of the receipts or sales of the debtor. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the only receipts or sales to be taken into account are those taken into account in determining the payment to the trust pursuant to the loan agreement.

(Sec. 856(d)(4) (90 Stat. 1750; 26 U.S.C. 856(d)(4)); sec. 856(e)(5) (88 Stat. 2113; 26 U.S.C. 856(e)(5)); sec. 856(f)(2) (90 Stat. 1751; 26 U.S.C. (856(f)(2)); sec. 856(g)(2) (90 Stat. 1753; 26 U.S.C. 856(g)(2)); sec. 858(a) (74 Stat. 1008; 26 U.S.C. 858(a)); sec. 859(c) (90 Stat. 1743; 26 U.S.C. 859(c)); sec. 859(e) (90 Stat. 1744; 26 U.S.C. 859(e)); sec. 6001 (68A Stat. 731; 26 U.S.C. 6001); sec. 6011 (68A Stat. 732; 26 U.S.C. 6011); sec. 6071 (68A Stat. 749; 26 U.S.C. 6071); sec. 6091 (68A Stat. 752; 26 U.S.C. 6091); sec. 7805 (68A Stat. 917; 26 U.S.C. 7805), Internal Revenue Code of 1954)

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§ 1.856-6 Foreclosure property.

(a) *In general.* Under section 856(e) a real estate investment trust may make an irrevocable election to treat as “foreclosure property” certain real property (including interests in real property), and any personal property incident to the real property, acquired by the trust after December 31, 1973. This section prescribes rules relating to the election, including rules relating to property eligible for the election. This section also prescribes rules relating to extensions of the general two-year period (hereinafter the “grace period”) during which property retains its status as foreclosure property, as well as rules relating to early termination of the grace period under section 856(e)(4). The election to treat property as foreclosure property does not alter the character of the income derived therefrom (other than for purposes of section 856(c)(2)(F) and (3)(F)). For example, if foreclosure property is sold, the determination of whether it is property described in section 1221(1) will not be affected by the fact that it is foreclosure property.

(b) *Property eligible for the election—(1) Rules relating to acquisitions.* In general, the trust must acquire the property after December 31, 1973, as the result of having bid in the property at foreclosure, or having otherwise reduced the property to ownership or possession by agreement or process of law, after there was default (or default was imminent) on a lease of the property (where the trust was the lessor) or on an indebtedness owed to the trust which the property secured. Foreclosure property which secured an indebtedness owed to the trust is acquired for purposes of section 856(e) on the date on which the trust acquires ownership of the property for Federal income tax purposes. Foreclosure property which a trust owned and leased to another is acquired for purposes of section 856(e) on the date on which the trust acquires possession of the property from its lessee. A trust will not be considered to have acquired ownership of property for purposes of section 856(e) where it takes control of the property as a mortgagee-in-possession and cannot receive any profit or sustain any loss with respect to the property except as a creditor of the mortgagor. A trust may be considered to have acquired ownership of property for purposes of section 856(e) even though legal title to the property is held by another person. For example, where, upon foreclosure of a mortgage held by the trust, legal title to the property is acquired in the name of a nominee for the exclusive benefit of the trust and the trust is the equitable owner of the property, the trust will be considered to have acquired ownership of the property for purposes of section 856(e). Generally, the fact that under local law the mortgagor has a right of redemption after foreclosure is not relevant in determining whether the trust has acquired ownership of the property for purposes of section 856(e). Property is not ineligible for the election solely because the property, in addition to securing an indebtedness owed to the trust, also secures debts owed to other creditors. Property eligible for the election includes a building or other improvement which has been constructed on land owned by the trust

and which is acquired by the trust upon default of a lease of the land.

(2) *Personal property.* Personal property (including personal property not subject to a mortgage or lease of the real property) will be considered incident to a particular item of real property if the personal property is used in a trade or business conducted on the property or the use of the personal property is otherwise an ordinary and necessary corollary of the use to which the real property is put. In the case of a hotel, such items as furniture, appliances, linens, china, food, etc. would be examples of incidental personal property. Personal property incident to the real property is eligible for the election even though it is acquired after the real property is acquired or is placed in the building or other improvement in the course of the completion of construction.

(3) *Property with respect to which default is anticipated.* Property is not eligible for the election to be treated as foreclosure property if the loan or lease with respect to which the default occurs (or is imminent) was made or entered into (or the lease or indebtedness was acquired) by the trust with an intent to evict or foreclose, or when the trust knew or had reason to know that default would occur (“improper knowledge”). For purposes of the preceding sentence, a trust will not be considered to have improper knowledge with respect to a particular lease or loan, if the lease or loan was made pursuant to a binding commitment entered into by the trust at a time when it did not have improper knowledge. Moreover, if the trust, in an attempt to avoid default or foreclosure, advances additional amounts to the borrower in excess of amounts contemplated in the original loan commitment or modifies the lease or loan, such advance or modification will be considered not to have been made with an intent to evict or foreclose, or with improper knowledge, unless the original loan or lease was entered into with that intent or knowledge.

(c) *Election*—(1) *In general.* (i) An election to treat property as foreclosure property applies to all of the eligible real property acquired in the same taxable year by the trust upon the default

(or as a result of the imminence of default) on a particular lease (where the trust is the lessor) or on a particular indebtedness owed to the trust. For example, if a loan made by a trust is secured by two separate tracts of land located in different cities, and in the same taxable year the trust acquires both tracts on foreclosure upon the default (or imminence of default) of the loan, the trust must include both tracts in the election. For a further example, the trust may choose to make a separate election for only one of the tracts if they are acquired in different taxable years or were not security for the same loan. If real property subject to the same election is acquired at different times in the same taxable year, the grace period for a particular property begins when that property is acquired.

(ii) If the trust acquires separate pieces of real property that secure the same indebtedness (or are under the same lease) in different taxable years because the trust delays acquiring one of them until a later taxable year, and the primary purpose for the delay is to include only one of them in an election, then if the trust makes an election for one piece it must also make an election for the other piece. A trust will not be considered to have delayed the acquisition of property for this purpose if there is a legitimate business reason for the delay (such as an attempt to avoid foreclosure by further negotiations with the debtor or lessee).

(iii) All of the eligible personal property incident to the real property must also be included in the election.

(2) *Time for making election.* The election to treat property as foreclosure property must be made on or before the due date (including extensions of time) for filing the trust’s income tax return for the taxable year in which the trust acquires the property with respect to which the election is being made, or April 3, 1975, whichever is later.

(3) *Manner of making the election.* An election made after February 6, 1981, shall be made by a statement attached to the income tax return for the taxable year in which the trust acquired the property with respect to which the election is being made. The statement shall indicate that the election is made

under section 856(e) and shall identify the property to which the election applies. The statement shall also set forth—

- (i) The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the trust,
- (ii) The date the property was acquired by the trust, and
- (iii) A brief description of how the real property was acquired, including the name of the person or persons from whom the real property was acquired and a description of the lease or indebtedness with respect to which default occurred or was imminent.

An election made on or before February 6, 1981 shall be filed in the manner prescribed in 26 CFR 10.1(f) (revised as of April 1, 1977) (temporary regulations relating to the election to treat property as foreclosure property) as in effect when the election is made.

(4) *Status of taxpayer.* In general, a taxpayer may make an election with respect to an acquisition of property only if the taxpayer is a qualified real estate investment trust for the taxable year in which the acquisition occurs. If, however, the taxpayer establishes, to the satisfaction of the district director for the internal revenue district in which the taxpayer maintains its principal place of business or principal office or agency, that its failure to be a qualified real estate investment trust for a taxable year was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, the taxpayer may make the election with respect to property acquired in such taxable year. The principles of §§ 1.856.7(c) and 1.856.8(d) (including the principles relating to expert advice) will apply in determining whether, for purposes of this subparagraph, the failure of the taxpayer to be a qualified real estate investment trust for the taxable year in which the property is acquired was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. If a taxpayer makes a valid election to treat property as foreclosure property, the property will not lose its status as foreclosure property solely because the taxpayer is not a qualified real estate investment trust for a subsequent taxable year (including a taxable year which encompasses an extension of the grace period). However, the rules relating to the termination of foreclosure

property status in section 856(e)(4) (but not the tax on income from foreclosure property imposed by section 857(b)(4)) apply to the year in which the property is acquired and all subsequent years, even though the taxpayer is not a qualified real estate investment trust for such year.

(d) *Termination of 2-year grace period; subsequent leases—(1) In general.* Under section 856(e)(4)(A), all real property (and any incidental personal property) for which a particular election has been made (see paragraph (c)(1) of this section) shall cease to be foreclosure property on the first day (occurring on or after the day on which the trust acquired the property) on which the trust either—

(i) Enters into a lease with respect to any of the property which, by its terms, will give rise to income of the trust which is not described in section 856(c)(3) (other than section 856(c)(3)(F)), or

(ii) Receives or accrues, directly or indirectly, any amount which is not described in section 856(c)(3) (other than section 856(c)(3)(F)) pursuant to a lease with respect to any of the real property entered into by the trust on or after the day the trust acquired the property.

For example, assume the trust acquires, in a particular taxable year, a shopping center upon the default of an indebtedness owed to the trust. Also assume that the trust subsequently enters into a lease with respect to one of several stores in the shopping center that requires the lessee to pay rent to the trust which is not income described in section 856(c)(3) (other than section 856(c)(3)(F)). In such case, the entire shopping center will cease to be foreclosure property on the day the trust enters into the lease.

(2) *Extensions or renewals of leases.* Generally, the extension or renewal of a lease of foreclosure property will be treated as the entering into of a new lease only if the trust has a right to renegotiate the terms of the lease. If, however, by operation of law or by contract, the acquisition of the foreclosure property by the trust terminates a pre-existing lease of the property, or gives the trust a right to terminate the lease, then for purposes of section

856(e)(4)(A), a trust, in such circumstances, will not be considered to have entered into a lease with respect to the property solely because the terms of the preexisting lease are continued in effect after foreclosure without substantial modification. The letting of rooms in a hotel or motel does not constitute the entering into a lease for purposes of section 856(e)(4)(A).

(3) *Rent attributable to personal property.* Solely for the purposes of section 856(e)(4)(A), if a trust enters into a lease with respect to real property on or after the day upon which the trust acquires such real property by foreclosure, and a portion of the rent from such lease is attributable to personal property which is foreclosure property incident to such real property, such rent attributable to the incidental personal property will not be considered to terminate the status of such real property (or such incidental personal property) as foreclosure property.

(e) *Termination of 2-year grace period; completion of construction—(1) In general.* Under section 856(e)(4)(B), all real property (and any incidental personal property) for which a particular election has been made (see paragraph (c)(1) of this section) shall cease to be foreclosure property on the first day (occurring on or after the day on which the trust acquired the property) on which any construction takes place on the property, other than completion of a building (or completion of any other improvement) where more than 10 percent of the construction of the building (or other improvement) was completed before default became imminent. If more than one default occurred with respect to an indebtedness or lease in respect of which there is an acquisition, the more-than-10-percent test (including the rule prescribed in this paragraph relating to the test) will not be applied at the time a particular default became imminent if it is clear that the acquisition did not occur as the result of such default. For example, if the debtor fails to make four consecutive payments of principal and interest on the due dates, and the trust takes action to acquire the property securing the debt only after the fourth default becomes imminent, the 10-percent test is applied at the time the

fourth default became imminent (even though the trust would not have foreclosed on the property had not all four defaults occurred).

(2) *Determination of percentage of completion.* The determination of whether the construction of a building or other improvement was more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent shall be made by comparing the total direct costs of construction incurred with respect to the building or other improvement as of the date default became imminent with the estimated total direct costs of construction as of such date. If the building or other improvement qualifies as more than 10 percent complete under this method, the building or other improvement shall be considered to be more than 10 percent complete. For purposes of this subparagraph, direct costs of construction include the cost of labor and materials which are directly connected with the construction of the building or improvement.

Thus, for example, direct costs of construction incurred as of the date default became imminent would include amounts paid, or for which liability has been incurred, for labor which has been performed as of such date that is directly connected with the construction of the building or other improvement and for building materials and supplies used or consumed in connection with the construction as of such date. For purposes of applying the 10-percent test the trust may also take into account the cost of building materials and supplies which have been delivered to the construction site as of the date default became imminent and which are to be used or consumed in connection with the construction. On the other hand, architect's fees, administrative costs of the developer or builder, lawyers' fees, and expenses incurred in connection with obtaining zoning approval or building permits are not considered to be direct costs of construction. Any construction by the trust as mortgagee-in-possession is considered to have taken place after default resulting in acquisition of the property became imminent. Generally, the trust's estimate of the total direct costs of completing construction as of the date the default became imminent

will be accepted, provided that the estimate is reasonable, in good faith, and is based on all of the data reasonably available to the trust when the trust undertakes completion of construction of the building or other improvement. Appropriate documentation which shows that construction was more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent must be available at the principal place of business of the trust for inspection in connection with an examination of the income tax return. Construction includes the renovation of a building, such as the remodeling of apartments, or the renovation of an apartment building to convert rental units to a condominium. The renovation must be more than 10 percent complete (determined by comparing the total direct cost of the physical renovation which has been incurred when default became imminent with the estimated total direct cost of renovation as of such date) when default became imminent in order for the property not to lose its status as foreclosure property if the trust undertakes the renovation.

(3) *Modification of a building or improvement.* Generally, the terms "building" and "improvement" in section 856(e)(4)(B) mean the building or improvement (including any integral part thereof) as planned by the mortgagor or lessee (or other person in possession of the property, if appropriate) as of the date default became imminent. The trust, however, may estimate the total direct costs of construction and complete the construction of the building or other improvement by modifying the building or other improvement as planned as of the date default became imminent so as to reduce the estimated direct cost of construction of the building or improvement. If the trust does so modify the planned construction of the building or improvement, the 10-percent test is to be applied by comparing the direct costs of construction incurred as of the date default became imminent that are attributable to the building or improvement as modified, with the estimated total direct costs (as of such date) of construction of the building or other improvement as modified. The trust, in order to meet the 10-percent test, may

not, however, modify the planned building or improvement by reducing the estimated direct cost of construction to such an extent that the building or improvement is not functional.

Also, the trust may make subsequent modifications which increase the direct cost of construction of the building or improvement if such modifications—

(i) Are required by a Federal, State, or local agency, or

(ii) Are alterations that are either required by a prospective lessee or purchaser as a condition of leasing or buying the property or are necessary for the property to be used for the purpose planned at the time default became imminent.

Subdivision (ii) of the preceding sentence applies, however, only if the building or improvement, as modified, was more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent. A building completed by the trust will not cease to be foreclosure property solely because the building is used in a manner other than that planned by the defaulting mortgagor or lessee. Thus, for example, assume a trust acquired on foreclosure a planned apartment building which was 20 percent complete when default became imminent and that the trust completes the building without modifications which increase the direct cost of construction. The property will not cease to be foreclosure property by reason of section 856(e)(4)(B) solely because the trust sells the dwelling units in the building as condominium units, rather than holding them for rent as planned by the defaulting mortgagor. (See, however, section 856(e)(4)(C) and paragraph (f)(2) of this section for rules relating to the requirement that where foreclosure property is used in a trade or business (including a trade or business of selling the foreclosure property), the trade or business must be conducted through an independent contractor after 90 days after the property is acquired.)

(4) *Application on building-by-building basis.* Generally the more than 10 percent test is to be applied on a building-by-building basis. Thus, for example, if a trust has foreclosed on land held by a

developer building a housing subdivision, the trust may complete construction of the houses which were more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent. The trust, however, may not complete construction of houses which were only 10 percent (or less) complete, nor may the trust begin construction of other houses planned for the subdivision on which construction has not begun. The trust, however, may construct an additional building or improvement (whether or not the construction thereof has begun) which is an integral part of another building or other improvement that was more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent if the additional building or improvement and the other building or improvement, taken together as a unit, meet the more than 10 percent test. For purposes of this paragraph, an additional building or other improvement will be considered to be an integral part of another building or improvement if—

(i) It is ancillary to the other building or improvement and its principal intended use is to furnish services or facilities which either supplement the use of such other building or improvement or are necessary for such other building or improvement to be utilized in the manner or for the purpose for which it is intended, or

(ii) The buildings or improvements are intended to comprise constituent parts of an interdependent group of buildings or other improvements.

However, a building or other improvement will not be considered to be an integral part of another building or improvement unless the buildings or improvements were planned as part of the same overall construction plan or project before default became imminent. An additional building or other improvement (such as, for example, an outdoor swimming pool or a parking garage) may be considered to be an integral part of another building or improvement, even though the additional building or improvement was also intended to be used to provide facilities or services for use in connection with several other buildings or improvements which will not be completed. If the trust chooses not to undertake the construction of an additional building

or other improvement which qualifies as an integral part of another building or improvement, so much of the costs of construction (including both the direct costs of construction incurred before the default became imminent and the estimated costs of completion) as are attributable to that “integral part” shall not be taken into account in determining whether any other building or improvement was more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent. For example, assume the trust acquires on foreclosure a property on which the defaulting mortgagor has begun construction of a motel. The motel, as planned by the mortgagor, was to consist of a two-story building containing 30 units, and two detached one-story wings, each of which was to contain 20 units. At the time default became imminent, the defaulting mortgagor had completed more than 10 percent of the construction of the two-story structure but the two wings, an access road, a parking lot, and an outdoor swimming pool planned for the motel were each less than 10 percent complete. The trust may construct the two wings of the motel, the access road, the parking lot, and the swimming pool: *Provided*, That the motel and the other improvements which the trust undertakes to construct, taken together as a unit, were more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent. If, however, the trust chooses not to undertake construction of the swimming pool, the cost of construction attributable to the swimming pool, whether incurred before default became imminent or estimated as the cost of completion, shall not be taken into account in determining whether the trust can complete construction of the other buildings and improvements. For another example, assume that the trust acquires a planned shopping center on foreclosure. At the time default became imminent several large buildings intended to house shops and stores in the shopping center were more than 10 percent complete. Less than 10 percent of the construction, however, had been completed on a separate structure intended to house a bank. The bank was planned as a component of the shopping center in order to provide, in conjunction with

the other shops and stores, a specific range and variety of goods and services with which to attract customers to the shopping center. The trust may complete construction of the bank: *Provided*, That the bank and the other buildings and improvements which the trust undertakes to complete, taken together as a unit, were more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent. If the trust chooses not to construct the bank, no actual or estimated construction costs attributable to the bank are to be taken into account in applying the 10-percent test with respect to the other buildings and improvements in the shopping center. For a third example, assume that a defaulting mortgagor had planned to construct two identical apartment buildings, A and B, on the same tract of land, that neither building is to provide substantial facilities or services to be used in connection with the other, and that only building A was more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent. The trust, in this case, may not complete building B. On the other hand, if the facts are the same except that pursuant to the plans of the defaulting mortgagor, one of the buildings is to contain the furnace and central air conditioning machinery for both buildings A and B, the trust may complete both buildings A and B: *Provided*, That, taken together as a unit, the two buildings meet the more-than-10-percent test.

(5) *Repair and maintenance.* Under this paragraph (e), “construction” does not include—

(i) The repair or maintenance of a building or other improvement (such as the replacement of worn or obsolete furniture and appliances) to offset normal wear and tear or obsolescence, and the restoration of property required because of damage from fire, storm, vandalism or other casualty,

(ii) The preparation of leased space for a new tenant which does not substantially extend the useful life of the building or other improvement or significantly increase its value, even though, in the case of commercial space, this preparation includes adapting the property to the conduct of a different business, or

(iii) The performing of repair or maintenance described in paragraph (e)(5)(i) of this section after property is acquired that was deferred by the defaulting party and that does not constitute renovation under paragraph (e)(2) of this section.

(6) *Independent contractor required.* If any construction takes place on the foreclosure property more than 90 days after the day on which such property was acquired by the trust, such construction must be performed by an independent contractor (as defined in section 856(d)(3) and § 1.856-4(b)(5)(iii)) from whom the trust does not derive or receive any income. Otherwise, the property will cease to be foreclosure property.

(7) *Failure to complete construction.* Property will not cease to be foreclosure property solely because a trust which undertakes the completion of construction of a building or other improvement on the property that was more than 10 percent complete when default became imminent does not complete the construction. Thus, for example, if a trust continues construction of a building that was 20 percent complete when default became imminent, and the trust constructs an additional 40 percent of the building and then sells the property, the property will not lose its status as foreclosure property solely because the trust fails to complete construction of the building.

(f) *Termination of 2-year grace period; use of foreclosure property in a trade or business—*(1) *In general.* Under section 856(e)(4)(C), all real property (and any incidental personal property) for which a particular election has been made (see paragraph (c)(1) of this section) shall cease to be foreclosure property on the first day (occurring more than 90 days after the day on which the trust acquired the property) on which the property is used in a trade or business conducted by the trust, other than a trade or business conducted by the trust through an independent contractor from whom the trust itself does not derive or receive any income. (See section 856(d)(3) for the definition of independent contractor.)

(2) *Property held primarily for sale to customers.* For the purposes of section

856(e)(4)(C), foreclosure property held by the trust primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business is considered to be property used in a trade or business conducted by the trust. Thus, if a trust holds foreclosure property (whether real property or personal property incident to real property) for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business more than 90 days after the day on which the trust acquired the real property, the trade or business of selling the property must be conducted by the trust through an independent contractor from whom the trust does not derive or receive any income. Otherwise, after such 90th day the property will cease to be foreclosure property.

(3) *Change in use.* Foreclosure property will not cease to be foreclosure property solely because the use of the property in a trade or business by the trust differs from the use to which the property was put by the person from whom it was acquired. Thus, for example, if a trust acquires a rental apartment building on foreclosure, the property will not cease to be foreclosure property solely because the trust converts the building to a condominium apartment building and, through an independent contractor from whom the trust derives no income, engages in the trade or business of selling the individual condominium units.

(g) *Extension of 2-year grace period—(1) In general.* A real estate investment trust may apply to the district director of the internal revenue district in which is located the principal place of business (or principal office or agency) of the trust for an extension of the 2-year grace period. If the trust establishes to the satisfaction of the district director that an extension of the grace period is necessary for the orderly liquidation of the trust's interest in foreclosure property, or for an orderly renegotiation of a lease or leases of the property, the district director may extend the 2-year grace period. See section 856(e)(3) (as in effect with respect to the particular extension) for rules relating to the maximum length of an extension, and the number of extensions which may be granted. An extension of the grace period may be granted

by the district director either before or after the date on which the grace period, but for the extension, would expire. The extension shall be effective as of the date on which the grace period, but for the extension, would expire.

(2) *Showing required.* Generally, in order to establish the necessity of an extension, the trust must demonstrate that it has made good faith efforts to renegotiate leases with respect to, or dispose of, the foreclosure property. In certain cases, however, the trust may establish the necessity of an extension even though it has not made such efforts. For example, if the trust demonstrates that, for valid business reasons, construction of the foreclosure property could not be completed before the expiration of the grace period, the necessity of the extension could be established even though the trust had made no effort to sell the property. For another example, if the trust demonstrates that due to a depressed real estate market, it could not sell the foreclosure property before the expiration of the grace period except at a distress price, the necessity of an extension could be established even though the trust had made no effort to sell the property. The fact that property was acquired as foreclosure property prior to January 3, 1975 (the date of enactment of section 856(e)), generally will be considered as a factor (but not a controlling factor) which tends to establish that an extension of the grace period is necessary.

(3) *Time for requesting an extension of the grace period.* A request for an extension of the grace period must be filed with the appropriate district director more than 60 days before the day on which the grace period would otherwise expire. In the case of a grace period which would otherwise expire before August 6, 1976, a request for an extension will be considered to be timely filed if filed on or before June 7, 1976.

(4) *Information required.* The request for an extension of the grace period shall identify the property with respect to which the request is being made and shall also include the following information:

(i) The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the trust,

(ii) The date the property was acquired as foreclosure property by the trust,

(iii) The taxable year of the trust in which the property was acquired,

(iv) If the trust has been previously granted an extension of the grace period with respect to the property, a statement to that effect (which shall include the date on which the grace period, as extended, expires) and a copy of the information which accompanied the request for the previous extension,

(v) A statement of the reasons why the grace period should be extended,

(vi) A description of any efforts made by the trust after the acquisition of the property to dispose of the property or to renegotiate any lease with respect to the property, and

(vii) A description of any other factors which tend to establish that an extension of the grace period is necessary for the orderly liquidation of the trust's interest in the property, or for an orderly renegotiation of a lease or leases of the property.

The trust shall also furnish any additional information requested by the district director after the request for extension is filed.

(5) *Automatic extension.* If a real estate investment trust files a request for an extension with the district director more than 60 days before the expiration of the grace period, the grace period shall be considered to be extended until the end of the 30th day after the date on which the district director notifies the trust by certified mail sent to its last known address that the period of extension requested by the trust is not granted. For further guidance regarding the definition of last known address, see §301.6212-2 of this chapter. In no event, however, shall the rule in the preceding sentence extend the grace period beyond the expiration of (i) the period of extension requested by the trust, or (ii) the 1-year period following the date that the grace period (but for the automatic extension) would expire. The date of the postmark on the sender's receipt is considered to be the date of the certified mail for purposes of this subparagraph. This subparagraph does not apply, however, if the date of the notification by certified mail described in the first sen-

tence is more than 30 days before the date that the grace period (determined without regard to this subparagraph) expires. Moreover, this subparagraph shall not operate to allow any period of extension that is prohibited by the last sentence of section 856(e)(3) (as in effect with respect to the particular extension).

(6) *Extension of time for filing.* If a real estate investment trust fails to file the request for an extension of the grace period within the time provided in paragraph (g)(3) of this section, then the district director shall grant a reasonable extension of time for filing such request, provided (i) it is established to the satisfaction of the district director that there was reasonable cause for failure to file the request within the prescribed time and (ii) a request for such extension is filed within such time as the district director considers reasonable under the circumstances.

(7) *Status of taxpayer.* The reference to "real estate investment trust" or "trust" in this paragraph (g) shall be considered to include a taxpayer that is not a qualified real estate investment trust, if the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the district director that its failure to be a qualified real estate investment trust for the taxable year was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. The principles of §1.856-7(c) and §1.856-8(d) (including the principles relating to expert advice) shall apply for determining reasonable cause (and absence of willful neglect) for this purpose.

(Sec. 856(d)(4) (90 Stat. 1750; 26 U.S.C. 856(d)(4)); sec. 856(e)(5) (88 Stat. 2113; 26 U.S.C. 856(e)(5)); sec. 856(f)(2) (90 Stat. 1751; 26 U.S.C. (856(f)(2)); sec. 856(g)(2) (90 Stat. 1753; 26 U.S.C. 856(g)(2)); sec. 858(a) (74 Stat. 1008; 26 U.S.C. 858(a)); sec. 859(c) (90 Stat. 1743; 26 U.S.C. 859(c)); sec. 859(e) (90 Stat. 1744; 26 U.S.C. 859(e)); sec. 6001 (68A Stat. 731; 26 U.S.C. 6001); sec. 6011 (68A Stat. 732; 26 U.S.C. 6011); sec. 6071 (68A Stat. 749; 26 U.S.C. 6071); sec. 6091 (68A Stat. 752; 26 U.S.C. 6091); sec. 7805 (68A Stat. 917; 26 U.S.C. 7805), Internal Revenue Code of 1954))

[T.D. 7767, 46 FR 11269, Feb. 6, 1981; 46 FR 15263, Mar. 5, 1981, as amended by T.D. 8939, 66 FR 2819, Jan. 12, 2001]