§ 16.131

complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.

- (7) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve notice that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations.
- (8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts.
- (9) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
- (10) Subsection $(e)(\theta)$. To serve notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts.
- (11) Subsection (g). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

[Order No. 241–2001, 66 FR 41445, Aug. 8, 2001; 66 FR 43308, Aug. 17, 2001]

§ 16.131 Exemption of Department of Justice (DOJ)/Nationwide Joint Automated Booking System (JABS), DOJ-005.

- (a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4), (d), (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) and (H), (e)(5) and (8), (f) and (g): Nationwide Joint Automated Booking System, Justice/DOJ-005. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2). Where compliance would not interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement process, the DOJ may waive the exemptions, either partially or totally.
- (b) Exemption from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
- (1) From subsections (c)(3), (c)(4), and (d) to the extent that access to records

in this system of records may impede or interfere with law enforcement efforts, result in the disclosure of information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of collateral record subjects or other third parties, and/or jeopardize the health and/or safety of third parties.

- (2) From subsection (e)(1) to the extent that it is necessary to retain all information in order not to impede, compromise, or interfere with law enforcement efforts, e.g., where the significance of the information may not be readily determined and/or where such information may provide leads or assistance to Federal and other law enforcement agencies in discharging their law enforcement responsibilities.
- (3) From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement since it may be necessary to obtain and verify information from a variety to sources other than the record subject to ensure safekeeping, security, and effective law enforcement. For example, it maybe necessary that medical and psychiatric personnel provide information regarding the subject's behavior, physical. health, or mental stability, etc. to ensure proper care while in custody, or it may be necessary to obtain information from a case agent or the court to ensure proper disposition of the subject individual.
- (4) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that agencies inform each individual whom it asks to supply information of such information as is required by subsection (e)(3) may, in some cases, impede the information gathering process or otherwise interfere with or compromise law enforcement efforts, e.g., the subject may deliberately withhold information, or give erroneous information.
- (5) From subsection (4)(G) and(H) because the application of these provisions would present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts.
- (6) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time,

seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability to collect information for law enforcement purposes, may prevent the eventual development of the necessary criminal intelligence, or otherwise impede law enforcement or delay trained law enforcement personnel from timely exercising their judgment in managing the arrestee.

- (7) From subsection (e)(8) to the extent that such notice may impede, interfere with, or otherwise compromise law enforcement and security efforts.
- (8) From subsection 5 U.S.C. 552a(f) to the extent that compliance with the requirement for procedures providing individual access to records, compliance could impede, compromise, or interfere with law enforcement efforts.
- (9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

[Order No. 242-2001, 66 FR 41445, Aug. 8, 2001; 66 FR 44308, Aug. 17, 2001]

§16.132 Exemption of Department of Justice System—Personnel Investigation and Security Clearance Records for the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOJ-006.

- (a) The following Department of Justice system of records is exempted from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1),(2),(3),(5) and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k): Personnel Investigation and Security Clearance Records for the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOJ-006. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in a record is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k).
- (b) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons:
- (1) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in this system could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation, and thereby seri-

ously impede law enforcement or counterintelligence efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties, civil remedies, or counterintelligence measures.

- (2) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).
- (3) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of records in the system could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential criminal investigations. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States.
- (4) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
- (5) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).
- (6) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
- (7) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve notice that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations.
- (8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts.
- (9) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to