

the existence of confidential investigations.

[Order No. 8-82, 47 FR 44255, Oct. 7, 1982, as amended by Order No. 6-86, 51 FR 15479, Apr. 24, 1986]

§ 16.104 Exemption of Office of Special Counsel—Waco System.

(a) The following system of records is exempted from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5) and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k): CaseLink Document Database for Office of Special Counsel—Waco, JUSTICE/OSCW-001. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in a record is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k).

(b) Only that portion of this system which consists of criminal or civil investigatory information is exempted for the reasons set forth from the following subsections:

(1) *Subsection (c)(3)*. To provide the subject of a criminal or civil matter or case under investigation with an accounting of disclosures of records concerning him or her would inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of that investigation and thereby seriously impede law enforcement efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties and civil remedies.

(2) *Subsection (c)(4)*. This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).

(3) *Subsection (d)(1)*. Disclosure of investigatory information could interfere with the investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others.

(4) *Subsection (d)(2)*. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(5) *Subsections (d)(3) and (4)*. These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) *Subsections (e)(1) and (5)*. It is often impossible to determine in advance if

investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete; but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide leads in criminal investigations.

(7) *Subsection (e)(2)*. To collect information from the subject individual would serve notice that he or she is the subject of criminal investigative or law enforcement activity and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(8) *Subsection (e)(3)*. To inform individuals as required by this subsection would reveal the existence of an investigation and compromise law enforcement efforts.

(9) *Subsection (e)(8)*. To serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to evade law enforcement efforts.

(10) *Subsection (g)*. This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

[Order No. 208-2000, 65 FR 75160, Dec. 1, 2000]

§ 16.105 Exemption of Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force System.

(a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a, subsections (c)(3), (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4), and (e)(1) and (4)(I): Flight Training Candidates File System (JUSTICE/FTTTF-001). This exemption applies only to the extent that information is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1).

(b) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures could reveal information that is classified in the interest of national security.

(2) From subsection (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4) because access to and amendment of certain portions of records within the system would tend to reveal or compromise information classified in the interest of national security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because it is often impossible to determine in advance if information obtained will be relevant for the purposes of conducting the risk analysis for flight training candidates.

(4) From subsection (e)(4)(I) to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in this system than have been published in the FEDERAL REGISTER. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary because greater specificity concerning the sources of these records could compromise national security.

[Order No. 278-2002, 67 FR 51756, Aug. 9, 2002]

§ 16.106 Exemption of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)—Limited Access.

(a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4), (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4), (e)(1), (2), and (3), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), (e)(5) and (8), (f) and (g).

(1) Criminal Investigation Report System (JUSTICE/ATF-003).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law enforcement process, ATF may waive the applicable exemption.

(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest not only of ATF, but also of the recipient agency. This would permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses or flee the area to avoid the thrust of the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because an exemption being claimed for subsection (d) makes this subsection inapplicable.

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (f) and (g) because these provisions concern individual access to investigative records, compliance with which could compromise sensitive information, interfere with the overall law enforcement process by revealing a pending sensitive investigation, possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information, including actual

or potential tax information, which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another individual's personal privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel.

(4) From subsection (d)(2) because, due to the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, to require ATF to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(5) From subsections (d)(3) and (4) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) From subsection (e)(1) because: (i) It is not possible in all instances to determine relevancy or necessity of specific information in the early stages of a criminal or other investigation.

(ii) Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing; what appears relevant and necessary when collected ultimately may be deemed unnecessary. It is only after the information is assessed that its relevancy and necessity in a specific investigative activity can be established.

(iii) In any investigation, ATF might obtain information concerning violations of law not under its jurisdiction, but in the interest of effective law enforcement, dissemination will be made to the agency charged with enforcing such law.

(iv) In interviewing individuals or obtaining other forms of evidence during an investigation, information could be obtained, the nature of which would leave in doubt its relevancy and necessity. Such information, however, could be relevant to another investigation or to an investigative activity under the jurisdiction of another agency.

(7) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual can only be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information