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Department Seal Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements
1998 Report submitted to the Congress, Washington, DC
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A. INTRODUCTION

This Report is submitted pursuant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, which requires as part of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Annual Report, a discussion on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements.

B. SCOPE OF THE REPORT

This Report addresses U.S. compliance, compliance by Russia and other successor states to the former Soviet Union (FSU) to treaties and agreements concluded bilaterally with the Soviet Union, and compliance by other countries that are parties to multilateral agreements with the United States. The issues addressed reflect activities from January 1, 1998, through December 31, 1998, unless otherwise noted.

C. ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS

1. POLICY

Effective arms control requires parties to comply fully with arms control obligations and commitments they have undertaken. Compliance with agreements freely negotiated by parties is a fundamental cornerstone of international law. The U.S. approach to compliance is deeply rooted in our own legal system and fundamental principles and values. To that end, the United States is committed to adhering to the same high standard of compliance that it requires of others.

2. UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS TO EVALUATE AND ENSURE TREATY COMPLIANCE

Our deep-seated legal tradition, a political commitment to U.S. arms control agreements that enhance our security and that of our allies and friends, and our open society, create powerful incentives to comply with agreements to control nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Legal and institutional procedures to ensure compliance have been established, and they reflect the seriousness with which these obligations are taken and reinforce these underlying policies and principles. Department of Defense (DoD) compliance review groups oversee and manage DoD compliance with arms control agreements. Department of Energy (DoE) compliance review panels and arms control coordinating committees ensure compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). The Verification, Compliance Analysis Working Group (VCAWG), an interagency organization, oversees and manages the analysis of compliance with arms control agreements of our Treaty Partners. In addition, the VCAWG is responsible for the preparation of an annual report detailing the assessment of both the United States and other nations to obligations undertaken in all arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements to which the United States is a participating state. Moreover, an interagency review is conducted when other Treaty Parties officially raise questions regarding implementation of U.S. arms control obligations. Finally, Congress performs oversight functions through committee hearings and budget allocations.

3. ISSUES RAISED BY OUR TREATY PARTNERS CONCERNING U.S. COMPLIANCE

Because of the broad scope of current arms control verification regimes and their extensive notification and data exchange requirements, the United States has committed some errors, but has acknowledged them to our treaty partners and taken steps to correct them. The United States continues to make every effort to comply with all obligations associated with each arms control agreement to which it is a party.

INF Treaty

All U.S. activities are consistent with its Treaty obligations. However, Russian inspectors, located at the former Pershing II production facility at Magna to verify the Treaty's ban on intermediate range missile production, have expressed concerns about the procedures used in presenting for inspection certain other boosters exiting the facility. The United States continues to pursue resolution of this issue within the framework of the Special Verification Commission.

START Treaty

At the end of the START Treaty's first phase of reductions, U.S. strategic forces were well below the limits that came into effect in December 1997, and have met or are approaching limits that do not come into effect until December 1999. By December 5, 1999, each Party to the Treaty is obligated to reduce their aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms to 1,900 and their total number of attributable deployed warheads to 7,950. As of January 1, 1999, U.S. numbers in these two categories were 1,480 and 7,958 respectively.

As might be expected under a verification regime as complex as START, the United States and the Russian Federation have developed a difference of views with regard to how the sides have implemented certain Treaty requirements. Most of the issues under discussion were initially raised in 1995. Because of the importance the United States attaches to the START process, the United States continues to pursue resolution of these matters with its Treaty partners, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The Chemical Weapons Convention

The United States has fully complied with its obligations to declare its chemical weapons and related facilities as required under the Wyoming MOU (Memorandum of Understanding). The United States has taken no action, which would defeat the object or purpose of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA), which has yet to enter into force. The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on April 29, 1997. While the United States provided a full and complete declaration of its chemical weapons-associated facilities, it was delayed in filing a declaration on chemical industry facilities until Congress passed the implementing legislation. This legislation has been passed and the Administration is drafting an executive order to authorize the collection of the required data to meet the treaty obligation.

D. COMPLIANCE BY SUCCESSORS TO TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

1. THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, and required the complete elimination of all U.S. and former Soviet INF missiles and launchers, that is, those missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and their associated support equipment and structures, no more than 3 years after the Treaty entered into force.

The principal goal of the INF Treaty was achieved on May 28, 1991, with the destruction of the last Soviet declared SS-20 missile launcher and transporter vehicle. That event marked the final elimination of all declared Treaty-limited items under the provisions of the INF Treaty; however, the ban on the possession, production, or flight-testing of INF missile systems remains in force and must be effectively verified for the duration of the Treaty. To accomplish this task, the Treaty established a verification regime, which uses methods that are mutually reinforcing - national technical means (NTM), and an inspection regime consisting of on-site inspection and continuous portal monitoring - to detect and deter violations of Treaty obligations. The inspection regime began in 1988 and, by the terms of the Treaty, continues until May 31, 2001.

The Parties have the right to conduct an annual quota of short-notice inspections at former INF missile facilities. By the terms of the Treaty, the annual quota for short-notice is ten inspections per year for each side for the remaining years of the inspection regime. The Parties also have the right to perform continuous monitoring at the portals of any facility at which ballistic missiles that use a stage that is "outwardly similar" to a stage of banned INF missiles are assembled. Currently, the United States monitors the portal at the missile final assembly plant at Votkinsk, Russia, while Russian inspectors monitor the missile production facility at Magna, Utah.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States recognizes 12 former Soviet republics as successor states to the INF Treaty, who remain subject to the Treaty's indefinite ban on the possession, production, and flight-testing of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Six of those states - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - have inspectable facilities covered by the INF Treaty located on their territories. The first four of the six are active participants in the Special Verification Commission (SVC), which is the implementing body for the INF Treaty. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have only one inspectable facility each on their respective territories but do not participate in inspections or attend meetings of the SVC. Because of these factors, as a matter of policy, the United States has elected not to conduct short-notice inspections at the two facilities on their territory. The United States informed the other Parties that it also would no longer conduct INF inspections at the former Soviet facilities in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).

Inspections at Votkinsk. During SVC-XX, in November 1997, the Parties concluded a package of documents related to longer-term inspection procedures for new Russian missiles exiting the missile production plant at Votkinsk, i.e., the "Start" Space Launch Vehicle (SLV), the "Start-1" SLV, and the SS-27 ICBM for both silo and road-mobile launcher. These documents, and the procedures they codify, have allowed the United States to continue exercising its Treaty inspection rights for these new missiles, including the use of non-damaging CargoScanÔ imaging, at the Votkinsk portal.

2. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START) IMPLEMENTATION

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) was signed on July 31, 1991. The December 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of twelve independent states, four of which had strategic offensive arms (SOA) located on their territory - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. The five Parties ratified START and it entered into force on December 5, 1994.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine are in compliance with the START SOA central limits. START requires that each side reduce SOA to a level that does not exceed 2,100 deployed launchers, 9,150 deployed warheads, and 8,050 deployed ballistic missile warheads no later than three years following entry into force (EIF). By the end of the fourth Treaty-year, the successor states had reduced their aggregate forces to 1,506 deployed launchers, 7,342 deployed warheads, and 6,434 deployed ballistic missile warheads. At these deployed launcher and warhead levels, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have already met the Phase II Treaty limits, which were to be met at 60 months after EIF (December 1999). Additionally, START Treaty successor states of the Soviet Union are legally obligated to reduce at least 22 heavy ICBM SS-18 silo launchers each year during this time frame until the limit of 154 heavy ICBM silo launchers remaining is reached. Thus far, 128 of the original 308 heavy ICBM silo launchers have been eliminated. However, no eliminations occurred in 1998, and Russia has announced it will not eliminate any such launchers in 1999.

Culminating several years of negotiation, the Parties, during the twenty-first session of the Special Verification Commission (October-November 1998), signed four documents that serve to fulfill the requirements of the START Treaty's Twenty-Second Agreed Statement and will significantly facilitate simultaneous implementation of the INF and START Treaties. These documents have the practical effect of suspending certain INF and START administrative and logistical provisions and applying, in their place, corresponding provisions from the INF or START Treaties. The tangible benefits of these agreements will be the simplification of the cost settlement process for expenses incurred during monitoring activities under both Treaties by using START timelines for settlement of all INF costs. The U.S. and its Treaty partners will realize the benefits of this work during the upcoming billing cycle.

Notwithstanding the overall success of START implementation and the resolution of some issues, a number of new START compliance issues and concerns emerged in the fourth year of Treaty implementation. This is to be expected under a treaty as comprehensive and detailed as START, which governs all facets of two widely disparate strategic nuclear force structures. The Parties continue to work through the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the Treaty's implementing body, to ensure smooth implementation of the Treaty and effective resolution of compliance issues and questions.

3. THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) SYSTEMS

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Since entry into force of the ABM Treaty in October 1972, the United States has monitored ABM Treaty-related activities. That monitoring and verification effort continues. In 1998, the United States detected no activities on the part of the states of the former Soviet Union that gave rise to questions regarding compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

E. OTHER NATIONS' (INCLUDING SUCCESSORS TO THE SOVIET UNION) COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

1. THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits development of biological warfare (BW) capabilities beyond those justifiable for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. Currently there are 140 States Parties to the Convention.

The issue addressed in this Report is whether the nations reviewed are complying with the obligations assumed under the 1972 BWC and are providing accurate data under agreed BWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).

1) China. The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC, and maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of BW agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program, and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains non-compliant with these obligations.

2) Egypt. Egypt has signed but has not ratified the BWC. The United States believes that Egypt had developed BW agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct BW continues to exist.

3) Iran. The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBMs.

The United States reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced BW agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.

4) Iraq. Until the August 17, 1995, defection of General Hussein Kamel Hassan to Jordan, Iraq claimed that it had met its obligations under the BWC. Iraq then presented UNSCOM with dramatically new information on its past BW program, including details concerning weaponization, agents, and sites. Iraq's accounts of weapon development and deployment remain incomplete, as are its accounts of overall military dimensions and concepts of use. Many UNSCOM biological inspection teams visited Iraq in 1996-98 to obtain further details about Iraq's BW. UNSCOM has yet to receive documentation which supports; (1) the information contained in Iraq's Full, Final, and Complete Declaration, (2) Iraqi claims that all BW agents and weapons have been destroyed, or (3) Iraqi claims that its BW program has been dismantled.

As a signatory to the BWC in 1972, Iraq was obligated not to take any actions which would have defeated the object and purpose of the BWC and its accession to the BWC in 1991 obligated Iraq to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, and delivery means in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. The United States believes that since 1972 Iraq has developed, produced, and stockpiled BW agents and weapons. Though the recent Iraqi disclosures have been substantial, we believe that Iraq has not yet presented all details of its offensive BW program. The United States suspects that Iraq is not in compliance with the BWC.

5) Libya. Evidence suggests Libya is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents. Such development or production would violate key provisions of the BWC. Libya also has failed to submit the data declarations stipulated in the CBMs.

Evidence indicates that Libya has the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program and that the Libyan Government is seeking to move its research program into a program of weaponized BW agents.

6) Russia. Previous assessments of Russian compliance have highlighted the dichotomy between what appears to be the commitment from President Yeltsin and other members of the Russian leadership in attempting to resolve BWC issues and the continued involvement of "old hands" in BWC Protocol negotiations and in what Russia describes as its defensive BW program.

With regard to former Soviet biological weapon related facilities, some research and production facilities are being deactivated and many have taken severe personnel and funding cuts. However, some facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce BW agents. The Russian Federation's 1993-1998 BWC data declarations contained no new information and its 1992 declaration was incomplete and misleading in certain areas. With regard to the trilateral process that began in 1992, while there has been progress toward achieving the openness intended in the Joint Statement (which calls for a series of confidence-building visits and information exchanges), the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns.

7) Syria. Syria has signed but has not ratified the BWC. The United States reaffirms its previous judgment that it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive BW capability.

8) Taiwan. The United States believes that Taiwan has been upgrading its biotechnology capabilities by purchasing sophisticated biotechnology equipment from the United States, Switzerland, and other countries. The evidence indicating a BW program is not sufficient to determine if Taiwan is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC.

2. THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

During 1998, most of the provisions of the CFE Treaty were implemented with continuing success. By the end of 1998, the States Parties had reduced more than 51,500 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment inside the CFE zone according to full Treaty provisions and against national reduction obligations. In addition, many States Parties have further reduced their holdings to lower levels than required - notifying voluntary reductions of over 3,200 items of equipment below limits. By the same time Russia had notified for destruction or conversion another approximately 13,000 items towards obligations outside the CFE area of application and inherited from the former Soviet Union (FSU). Meanwhile more than 3,300 intrusive on-site inspections had taken place by the end of the year. Throughout 1998 negotiations continued on adaptation of the Treaty to new political circumstances, including the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the enlargement of NATO. At the OSCE Ministerial in December 1998, the CFE States Parties agreed that the 1999 OSCE Summit was the goal for completion and signature of the adapted Treaty.

Five of the issues discussed in last year's Report have been judged as either resolved or apparently resolved, including Russia's failure to declare a unit and its TLE and the longstanding issue of Russian ACVs improperly marked as ambulances. In addition, the United States and Russia reached agreement on procedures to resolve a sixth issue (denial of Treaty-required in-country and inspection time).

Nevertheless, the majority of the compliance issues that were described in last year's Report continue to be of concern. Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to exceed their overall maximum levels of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in one or more categories. Russia continues to station forces on the territory of Moldova without Moldovan consent. Russia continues to declare more items of equipment as decommissioned than the Treaty allows to be exempted from counting against TLE limits. As a result, although Russian data shows Russia to be in compliance with the interim limits in the original flank zone (limits that will be replaced by lower ones on May 31, 1999), Russia actually exceeds these limits in at least one category if the excess decommissioned items are properly counted against limits. Armenia and Azerbaijan have continued to fail to declare a proper reduction obligation and neither has carried out the reductions it would be required to complete according to Treaty rules. Azerbaijan has by far the greatest shortfall in this regard, but has been notifying and completing additional reductions -- albeit late. There has been no progress in resolving the issues related to the transfer of TLE from Russia to Armenia, or of Armenian forces located on the territory of Azerbaijan without that state's permission. Other continuing unresolved concerns include: Ukraine's exceeding its limits in ground TLE categories in active forces in zone 4.3; Russia's continued refusal to report MT-LB-U APC look-alikes which are accountable under the CFE Protocol of Existing Types (POET); and Russia's and Belarus' occasional improper denial of full access sites during on-site inspections. Similarly, concerns remain over Belarus' use of the Treaty exemption for equipment temporarily in the CFE zone while awaiting export. In addition, the eight CFE successor states to the FSU have made little or no further progress on meeting their collective obligation to declare and complete TLE reductions equal to those the Soviet Union would have been obligated to complete. Finally, Russia and Ukraine continue to share an unfulfilled obligation to carry out naval infantry/coastal defense (NI/CD) related reductions equal to those contained in the Soviet Union's legally binding commitment of June 1991. Although Russia and Ukraine finally agreed on the division of the assets of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet in late 1997 (which had been thought to be the main problem blocking resolution of the NI/CD-related reduction issue), there was no progress on this issue during 1998.

During 1998, several new issues arose. Armenia failed to report two types of APC look-alikes that had previously been declared in its data and which the United States has reason to believe are still present. One of these, the MT-LB-U, is also not reported by Russia. Belarus improperly denied on-site inspection access to a site on the basis of subordination rather than the Treaty-specified basis of geography -- a practice which it, like Russia, had occasionally followed in the past. Concerns surfaced over Russian practices used by Russia to complete its destruction obligations east of the Urals (EoU). Finally, the latest Ukrainian data show Ukraine to be in excess of its overall declared limits in ACVs in active forces.

3. THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 1994

In general terms, compliance with the Vienna Document has continued to be good. A very few states failed to submit data as of January 1, 1999, on time in December 1998. In addition, there have been some other - mostly minor - notifications, data, and inspection problems similar to those in CFE. Meanwhile, in Vienna, work is under way on measures to update and improve the Vienna Document 1994.

4. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

This Report updates developments relevant to other nations compliance with the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and addresses in particular developments, in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and China. Additionally, 54 countries have not complied with their obligations under Article III of the NPT to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and put into effect a full-scope safeguards agreement within 18 months after joining the NPT. The United States will continue to urge all NPT Parties required to do so to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

1) China. During 1998, China further consolidated its nuclear export control system by publishing regulations, which established formal controls over nuclear dual-use equipment, material and technology. All private and public entities, including the Chinese military, have been directed by China's State Council, inter alia, not to export equipment, material and technology on international control lists without a license; and not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded or nuclear explosive activities. Regulations are in place covering both trigger lists items (i.e., those items relevant to Article III.2 of the NPT), and nuclear dual-use items. As promised in the context of the October 1997 Washington summit, China promulgated the nuclear dual-use regulations by mid-1998 and they are consistent with previous Chinese commitments regarding their substance. "Catch-all" control authority exists for Chinese government departments and the government has the authority to control items, which may not be on control lists. Controls apply to technology in the form of exchanges of personnel as well as to the transfer of written information.

However, there continued to be some contacts between Chinese entities and Pakistan's unsafeguarded and nuclear weapons program. Chinese officials continued to cooperate constructively on cases brought to their attention and their actions demonstrate a continued commitment to compliance with the export control provisions of the NPT.

China's 1997 decision to join the Zangger Committee was also a very positive step from the perspective of China's commitment to an effective nuclear export control system and to its obligations under the NPT. China was a constructive participant in the activities of the Committee in 1998 and its membership will increase the opportunities for bringing China more firmly into the 20-year-old regime of nuclear supplier states.

2) Iran. Although Iran's rudimentary program has apparently met with limited success so far, the United States finds that Iran has not abandoned its efforts to expand its nuclear infrastructure to support nuclear weapons development. U.S. pressure and Iran's highly questionable NPT nonproliferation credentials have caused nuclear suppliers to refrain from cooperation with Tehran, Russia being the most notable exception. Iran is aware that its nuclear intentions are suspect despite its status as an NPT State Party and that these suspicions have limited its ability to obtain foreign technology, equipment, and facilities.

In late 1995, Iran accepted part one of the IAEA Strengthened Safeguards System, which allows the IAEA to conduct environmental sampling at declared facilities. Acceptance of additional Strengthened Safeguards measures (i.e., Part II measures) by Iran has not yet occurred, but such measures are seen as important in the effort to ensure compliance by non-nuclear-weapon states with their NPT Article II obligations.

3) Iraq. The United States has determined that Iraq violated its Safeguards Agreement when it pursued an active nuclear weapons development program and that this program violated Iraq's obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT. The United States Government has further determined that Iraq is continuing its effort to undermine the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process by withholding relevant information, and to preserve as much nuclear-related technology as possible for a renewed weapons effort.

Iraq's nuclear weapons program violated Article II of the NPT. Its construction of secret nuclear facilities, including a facility for nuclear weapons development and assembly, contributed to its violation of Article II. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article III, which requires safeguards be applied "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

4) Libya. The United States has determined that Libya has demonstrated a continuing interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons but that its nuclear program has not progressed beyond the early stages of developing an independent nuclear research and fuel-cycle related capability for a nuclear weapons program. Libya's longstanding interest in acquiring nuclear weapons strongly suggests that its nuclear research and procurement efforts are aimed at development of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. This may be inconsistent with Libya's NPT Article II obligations.

5) North Korea. In 1998 the United States and the IAEA continued to monitor North Korea's implementation of the freeze on its nuclear activities at Nyongbyon agreed to in the 1994 Agreed Framework. The United States is satisfied that the facilities at Nyongbyon remain frozen in compliance with the Agreed Framework, but the IAEA has continued to be unsuccessful in gaining the DPRK's cooperation in preserving essential historical information on reactor operation and plutonium separation.

Although the Agreed Framework creates a process for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, the DPRK's efforts over the past few years to obstruct the implementation of full-scope IAEA safeguards required by the NPT continue, as does international concern about the DPRK's nuclear intentions, especially in view of suspicions about the nature and purpose of construction activity at Kumchang-ni.

Conclusive statements cannot yet be made about the extent to which North Korea is concealing evidence that would indicate a violation of its Article II commitment. The DPRK's persistent refusal to cooperate with the IAEA's efforts to preserve important historical information on the 5 MWe reactor's fuel, its repeated refusal to allow special inspections at two nuclear waste sites, and its unwillingness up to the end of 1998 to satisfy U.S. concerns about Kumchang-ni, may reflect an attempt to hide evidence that it has violated Article II. The United States believes that this pattern of obstruction and non-cooperation raises serious questions about a potential violation.

The United States has determined that North Korea has not met its NPT Article III obligations, and that serious questions persist about North Korea's violations of its Article II obligation "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." North Korea can satisfy its Article III obligations by coming into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report. Under the Agreed Framework this is not required until just before delivery of key nuclear components of the LWR project, but if this project is to proceed to completion in a timely manner, some cooperation between the DPRK and IAEA will be essential well in advance of that time. For North Korea to assure the United States and other countries that it is in compliance with its Article II obligations it will have to resolve concerns about the nature and purpose of the possibly nuclear-related construction at Kumchang-ni. It is the position of the United States that this cannot be achieved without appropriate access to the site by a team of U.S. technical experts.

5. U.S-RUSSIAN WYOMING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on chemical weapons signed by then Secretary of State James Baker and then soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze in Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, provides for a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange.

This agreement was proposed by the United States and has been a goal of U.S. policy since 1984. It reflects an effort by the United States and the Russian Federation to facilitate the process of negotiation, ratification and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. The United States and Russia, along with 119 other nations, have signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, production, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons and requires their destruction. The Convention entered into force on April 29, 1997.

6. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction was ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force on on April 29, 1997. As of December 31, 1998, there were 121 States Parties to the Convention.

This report finds the implementation of the Convention continuing to move forward, despite a few problems associated with starting a new organization and the steep learning curve. The second year of treaty implementation saw many of the problems encountered in the first year being solved and implementation is proceeding smoothly.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) appears to be settling into its operational mission. It completed its initial round of inspections for all of the declared CW facilities and began industrial data verification in 1998, on schedule. The interface between the U.S. and the OPCW is working well and more information is coming through due to our leadership in improving transparency of the OPCW's work. We are continuing our push for transparency of inspection results, but some other States Parties are less enthusiastic about public dissemination of the information in their declarations. In addition, we still encounter some delays in obtaining data declarations from the OPCW, as well as inconsistent redaction of data, but this situation has improved significantly and has had little impact on our ability to analyze declarations.

Countries that were original State Parties to the CWC were required to submit their initial data declaration not later than 30 days after entry into force. Countries that ratify subsequently, or accede become State Parties 30 days after the deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession and are required to submit their initial data declaration 30 days after becoming a State Party.

Under the CWC, a State Party is required to declare, inter alia, whether it:

The United States continues to work closely with the OPCW to help it expedite the dissemination of declarations and the results of inspection activities. We are emphasizing the importance of electronic data management in an effort to improve the ability of the OPCW and States Parties to access the information provided to the OCPW. We believe modern information technology solutions will significantly ease the workload on the Technical Secretariat and increase its ability to assess the risks in developing its verification plans. This effort has been slowly working toward fruition, and it appears it may be resolved within the coming 12 months.

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Bureau of Arms Control | Department of State