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USIPeace BriefingBridging the Public Security Gap
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Formed Police Unit (including contingent-owned equipment) | $4,189,325 |
Military contingent (including contingent-owned equipment) | $4,827,657 |
UN police (personnel onlynot including UN-provided equipment) | $6,315,500 1 |
FPUs are thus 50% less costly than individual UN police, owing to the difference in personnel costs (The annual mission subsistence allowance for UN police is $50,000, while the annual personnel cost for each FPU member is only $13,000). Although FPUs are only slightly less expensive than an equivalent number of soldiers, they are considerably more cost-effective. While 90 percent of FPU members can be tasked to perform daily mission requirements, only about 50-60 percent of soldiers may be available for duties "outside the wire."2 Thus FPU personnel are more economical in the performance of their mandated policing functions than individual UN police and more available to perform public security-related functions than soldiers.
The Function of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units
Mike Dziedzic (far right) organized a December 2005 conference at the CoESPU that addressed "Overcoming Challenges to Stability Policing" and focused on developing a doctrine for "Stability Police and the 'Intelligence-to-Evidence Gap.'"
Owing to the prominent role that SPUs have come to play in international peace missions, it is imperative that properly trained and equipped units can be generated in sufficient numbers to meet the increasing demand.
International capacity to provide SPUs, however, has been hard-pressed to keep pace. Specialized training programs are required to prepare units for the rigors of peace and stability operations, and international doctrine for their use must be developed and standardized. These are the core missions that have been assigned to the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units. In the G-8 Action Plan on Expanding Global Capacity for Peace Support Operations, CoESPU was charged with:
- Operating training programs, including 'train the trainer' courses and pre-deployment training for specific missions; and
- Developing a common doctrine and common operational standards for employing carabinieri/gendarmerie-like forces in peace support operations.3
Funded by the Italian government with assistance from the United States under the global peace operations initiative, the intention of CoESPU is to "train the trainers" who will return to their home countries to prepare their own stability police units for international deployment.
Training:
The CoESPU curriculum covers stability policing concepts and doctrine, operational planning, international and humanitarian law, and negotiation and mediation. The faculty includes Italian carabinieri, university professors, and military officers (active and retired). All instruction is provided in English.
In December 2005, the first class graduated from CoESPU, less than 18 months after the G-8 proposed that the Center come into existence. Twenty-nine senior officers from India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal completed the first high-level course. This was followed in March 2006 by graduation of 98 company-grade offices and NCOs from India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Senegal and Cameroon from the mid-level course. CoESPU has an annual capacity to offer four high-level courses (40 students per class) and five mid-level courses (100 students per class), which equates to a maximum capacity of 660 students per year.
In addition, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations has teamed with CoESPU to conduct a command development seminar for its formed police unit commanders and their police commissioners. The first seminar was held in mid-March for all current FPU commanders. Future seminars are envisioned every six months so that FPU commanders can attend either prior to deployment or shortly after arrival on mission. Thus CoESPU has succeeded not only in developing and conducting a full training curriculum, but it has formed a partnership with the UN to instill the leadership and command skills required for successful international service for all current and future FPU commanders.
Doctrine:
Participants of the March 13-17, 2006 Command Development Seminar for UN Formed Police Unit commanders at CoESPU. Participants included commanders of the 25 FPUs currently deployed on UN Missions, along with their Police Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners.
In April 2005, CoESPU conducted an assessment of the March 2004 riots in Kosovo (with support from the National Defense University, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and the U.S. Institute of Peace).
The ensuing report, "The Future Roles for Stability Police Units," summarized current SPU doctrine, suggested how the Kosovo experience might inform that doctrine, and identified doctrinal gaps.
Bridging the intelligence-to-evidence gapthe ability to use intelligence to develop admissible evidence about violent spoilers and obstructionistswas the most critical area of doctrinal concern identified in the report. In December 2005, CoESPU organized a workshop on the role of stability police units in completing the intelligence-to-evidence sequence. The workshop was attended by representatives of the UN, NATO, and the European Union. The concepts developed at that event are currently being circulated by CoESPU among those organizations. With these activities the Center has established itself as a reputable clearinghouse for ideas across all international organizations that field SPUs, while advancing the development of common doctrine and identifying lessons for responding to emerging challenges.
Recommendations
Sustaining the Training:
The "train-the-trainer" concept presumes that, having attended CoESPU's courses, sending countries will commit themselves to use the graduates to prepare SPUs in their respective nations. A number of steps should be taken to ensure that this happens, some of which may entail a modest increase in resources available to CoESPU:
- A diplomatic "publicity campaign" should be undertaken to inform countries that have the potential to contribute SPUs to future missions about the prospects for training at CoESPU. These countries should be made a priority for training.
- Countries that send students to CoESPU for training should certify that graduates will actually return and conduct training for deployable units or be made available for international duty in some other capacity.
- Mobile assistance teams from CoESPU (MATs) should be available to support potential SPU contributing countries in establishing and conducting in-country training programs.
- MATs could be used to assist current and prospective SPU contributing countries in conducting exercises that are designed to maintain the readiness of their units and enhance their interoperability with military contingents.
Equipping New Units:
The total cost to purchase all "contingent-owned equipment" items required by the UN to outfit one FPU is a little over $6 million. At present, there is no mechanism to assist countries that have the personnel and political will to organize additional SPUs but lack the resources to procure all the necessary equipment. Even though the UN reimburses SPU contributing countries for the use of contingent-owned equipment at the rate of almost $750,000 per year through UN peacekeeping assessments, the upfront cost of equipping new FPUs is liable to be a serious limiting factor. This is a particular concern for African countries that are a priority for CoESPU training under the Global Peace Operations Initiative.
- G-8 members, other bilateral donors, and the more affluent police contributing countries should consider providing assistance to potential SPU contributing countries that lack financial resources to purchase the equipment required to meet UN standards (e.g. armored personnel carriers). One "no-cost" option would be to donate the equipment or provide up-front funding to equip units committed to serve on UN missions. The donor would be reimbursed over time by the UN from peacekeeping assessments.
Conclusion
Establishing public security is essential to the success of a peace or stability operation. Stability police units have demonstrated their critical contribution to overcoming the public security gap that inevitably arises during these missions. In a recently issued directive (DoD 3000.05), the Pentagon has explicitly stated that, "U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so." The United States lacks gendarmerie-type police forces that are most needed for this purpose. The policy issue that remains to be answered is how the United States will close the public security gap in future peace and stability operations if coalition partners cannot be found to provide the number of stability police required.
Notes
1. Mark Kroeker, "Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Reimbursement," briefing, conference on "Overcoming Challenges to Stability Policing," Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, Vicenza, Italy, December 7, 2005.
2. Ibid.
3. G-8 Summit G8 Information Center, "Summit Documents: G8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations," http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/peace.html
Of Related Interest
- Seminar on Conflict Management and Negotiations
Training Program, May 2006 - The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units: Exploring the Way Ahead
Workshop Report, December 2004 - Global Peace Operations Initiative: Future Prospects
USIPeace Briefing, October 2004 - Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Component
Special Report, April 2004 - Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations
Special Report, April 2002 - Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations: Advancing Best Practices
Peaceworks, April 2002 - Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security
This USIPeace Briefing was written by Michael Dziedzic, senior program officer in the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at the United States Institute of Peace, and Colonel Christine Stark, U.S. Army, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policies.
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.
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