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Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this paper are fiscal years. Likewise, unless otherwise noted, all dollar amounts are expressed in inflated dollars. |
As the Congress considers the defense budget for fiscal years 1983 and 1984, one important issue will be the Army's equipment modernization. The Administration is proceeding with a major investment program to improve ground combat capabilities by upgrading or replacing existing weapons systems. Congressional decisions on these programs will depend on the effects of modernization on the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces and on the money needed to achieve these effects. Prepared at the request of the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, this study analyzes these issues. In addition, it analyzes the growth in Army operating costs that would attend modernization, a topic that has been of concern to defense subcommittees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The study was prepared by Nora Siatkin of CBO's National Security and
International Affairs Division, under the supervision of Robert F. Hale
and John J. Hamre. Extensive assistance was provided by Bill Myers of CBO's
Budget Analysis Division, who developed the cost estimates, and by Johanna
Zacharias, who edited the paper. Joel Slackman and Julie Carr of the CBO
staff also contributed to the estimates of costs. The author gratefully
acknowledges the valuable assistance of Bonita J. Dombey, T. Keith Glennan,
HI, John D. Mayer, Jr., Edward A. Swoboda, and Richard R. Mudge of CBO,
and of Major General Patrick M. Roddy (USA, ret.). (The assistance of external
reviewers and contributors implies no responsibility for the final product,
which rests solely with CBO). Janet R. Stafford typed numerous drafts of
the manuscript and assisted in preparing the paper for publication. In
keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, this paper offers
no recommendations.
Alice M. Rivlin
Director
November 1982
SUMMARY
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER II. ARMY MODERNIZATION IN PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER III. THE EFFECTS OF MODERNIZATION ON FORCE RATIOS
CHAPTER IV. OPTIONS
CHAPTER V. LONG-RUN COSTS OF MODERNIZATION--A SELECTIVE ASSESSMENT
APPENDIX A. COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. ARMY
APPENDIX B. METHOD FOR ASSESSING THE IMPROVEMENTS IN FORCE CAPABILITIES
APPENDIX C. THE MODERNIZATION EFFORTS OF THE NON-U.S. NATO ALLIES
APPENDIX D. ESTIMATING ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS
TABLES | |
1. | PERCENTAGE OF WARSAW PACT FORCES MODERNIZED THROUGH 1987 |
2. | COMPARISONS OF RECENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO MEMBER NATIONS: 1980-1981 |
3. | WEAPONS SYSTEMS PROCUREMENT PROFILES: 1979-1987 |
4. | EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT RATES UNDER ADMINISTRATION PLAN, REDUCED PACE OPTION, AND MODIFIED PROGRAM COMPOSITION OPTION, BY WEAPONS SYSTEM: 1983-1987 |
5. | COSTS AND COMPLETION DATES OF GROUND COMBAT MODERNIZATION UNDER ADMINISTRATION PLAN, REDUCED PACE OPTION, AND MODIFIED COMPOSITION OPTION |
6. | PROCUREMENT PROFILES THAT WOULD ACCELERATE ARMY MODERNIZATION: 1983-1987 |
7. | ANNUAL RECURRING OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS FOR TANK BATTALIONS |
8. | ANNUAL RECURRING OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS FOR MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALIONS |
9. | COMPARISON OF ANNUAL RECURRING OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS FOR TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALIONS |
FIGURES | |
1. | CORPS SECTORS OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY IN NATO'S CENTRAL REGION |
2. | SHIFTING WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE BALANCE IN 1980: 90 DAYS FOLLOWING PACT MOBILIZATION |
3. | EFFECTS OF MODERNIZATION ON FORCE RATIOS IN EUROPE'S CENTRAL REGION 90 DAYS AFTER MOBILIZATION: 1987 |
The Warsaw Pact alliance, the principal opponent confronting NATO, has recently made significant gains in conventional ground combat weaponry, and evidence suggests these advances will continue throughout this decade. In response to the growth of the perceived Warsaw Pact threat, all member nations of NATO have committed themselves to programs that would upgrade their own nonnuclear capabilities. Provisions of a NATO agreement signed in 1977 stipulate that each member nation pledge to increase real annual defense spending by 3 percent. Fiscal pressure, especially on Western European governments, has made attainment of that goal difficult, however. Whereas the Congress would prefer to see our allies shoulder a larger share of the burden of defending NATO, economic realities may leave the major responsibility to the United States in the near term, and in particular, to the U.S. Army.
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