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The Future of the Navy's Amphibious
and Maritime Prepositioning Forces
  November 2004  


Cover Graphic



Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this study are fiscal years (which run from October 1 to September 30), and all dollar amounts are in 2005 dollars.

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.

The cover shows various Wasp class amphibious assault ships and Maersk-type maritime prepositioning ships.





                
Preface

Today, the U.S. Navy numbers about 293 battle force ships, including 35 amphibious warfare ships, which are designed to carry marines and their equipment into combat. In addition, the Navy has 16 cargo ships that make up the maritime prepositioning force, which carries equipment and 30 days' worth of supplies for three Marine infantry brigades (though not the marines themselves). The Navy plans to modernize both its amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships over the next 30 years. Its plans include developing a sea-basing capability that would allow the Navy to deploy and sustain Marine Corps units on shore without needing to build up a supply depot on land. Carrying out those plans would require the Navy to spend an average of $2.4 billion a year over the next three decades to buy new amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships--more than twice what it has spent on those categories of ships since 1980. At the same time, the Navy has modernization plans for other types of ships that, if fully implemented, would also require more resources than the Navy now spends on ship construction.

Are there ways to modernize the amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces at a lower cost than what the Navy plans to spend? This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study--prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Committee on Armed Services--addresses that question. It examines the Navy's modernizations plans for amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships and their budgetary implications. It also evaluates four lower-cost options for those ships, two of which would cost roughly what the Navy has spent annually since 1980 and two of which would require a spending increase of a little over one-third. Those alternatives would result in smaller, less capable forces than the Navy envisions--or than exist now--but they would provide some of the capabilities that the Navy and Marine Corps desire. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this study makes no recommendations.

Eric J. Labs of CBO's National Security Division wrote the study under the general supervision of J. Michael Gilmore. Raymond Hall of CBO's Budget Analysis Division prepared the cost estimates under the general supervision of Jo Ann Vines. Hannah Robinson provided assistance in preparing some of the figures, and Natalie Fries (a former CBO intern who is now a commissioned naval officer) provided early research for this project. Michael Simpson, Barbara Edwards, Arlene Holen, and Elizabeth Robinson of CBO provided thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of the study. In addition, numerous officials and analysts from the Navy and Marine Corps provided information that improved the analysis, and Robert Work of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments offered valuable insights and comments. (The assistance of such external participants implies no responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.)

Christian Spoor edited the study, and Christine Bogusz and Leah Mazade proofread it. Cynthia Cleveland formatted the tables. Maureen Costantino designed the cover, produced the figures, and prepared the study for publication. Lenny Skutnik printed the initial copies, and Annette Kalicki prepared the electronic versions of the report for CBO's Web site.

Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Director
November 2004




CONTENTS
 
  Summary
 
Introduction
      Today's Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces
      Requirements for Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces
      The Navy's and Marine Corps's Vision for Sea Basing
 
The Navy's Plan for Modernizing the Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces
      The LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Dock
      The LHA(R) Amphibious Assault Ship
      The LSD(X) Dock Landing Ship
      The Future Maritime Prepositioning Ship
      Budgetary Implications of the Navy's Plan
 
Lower-Cost Alternatives to the Navy's Plan for Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces
      Option 1A: Buy Fewer, More-Capable Ships Within Historical Spending Levels
      Option 1B: Buy More, Less-Capable Ships Within Historical Spending Levels
      Option 2: Create a More Survivable Sea-Basing Force
      Option 3: Deemphasize Sea Basing in Favor of Forward Presence
      Effects of the Options on the Industrial Base
 
Measures of Capability Under the Options
      Number of Amphibious Warfare and Maritime Prepositioning Ships
      Amount of Amphibious Lift on L-Class Ships
      Total Amount of Lift on Amphibious Warfare and Maritime Prepositioning Ships
      Number of JSFs Carried on Large Amphibious Assault Ships
      Number of Forward-Deployed Expeditionary Strike Groups
      Time Needed to Deploy Marine Infantry Battalions to a Conflict
      Implications of the Analysis

Tables
   
S-1.  Schedule for Replacing Existing Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships with New Classes
S-2.  The Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces in 2035 Under Alternative Force Structures
1-1.  Characteristics of Current Amphibious Warfare Ships
2-1.  Schedule for Replacing Existing Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships with New Classes
2-2.  Characteristics of Current and Proposed Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships
2-3.  Average Annual Construction Spending and Procurement for Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships, 2005 to 2035
2-4.  Shortfalls in Sustaining a 293-Ship Navy, 1990 to 2025
3-1.  Projected Average Annual Spending for Construction and Operation and Support, 2005 to 2035
3-2.  Estimated Costs of New Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships
   
Figures
   
S-1.  Composition of the Current and 375-Ship Battle Force Fleets
S-2.  Inventory of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under the Navy's Plan
S-3.  Projected Funding to Construct a 375-Ship Fleet Compared with Actual Ship Funding
S-4.  Inventory of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Alternative Force Structures
1-1.  Composition of the Current and 375-Ship Battle Force Fleets
1-2.  Composition of the Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces
1-3.  Comparison of an Amphibious Ready Group and an Expeditionary Strike Group
2-1.  Inventory of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under the Navy's Plan
2-2.  Amphibious Lift, by Category, Under the Navy's Plan
2-3.  Annual Purchases of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under the Navy's Plan
2-4.  Projected Funding to Construct a 375-Ship Fleet Compared with Actual Ship Funding
3-1.  Annual Purchases and Costs of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Option 1A
3-2.  Inventory of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Option 1A
3-3.  Annual Purchases and Costs of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Option 1B
3-4.  Inventory of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Option 1B
3-5.  Annual Purchases and Costs of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Option 2
3-6.  Inventory of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Option 2
3-7.  Annual Purchases and Costs of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Option 3
3-8.  Inventory of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Option 3
4-1.  Total Number of Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Under Alternative Force Structures
4-2.  Components of Amphibious Lift on L-Class Ships Under Alternative Force Structures
4-3.  Lift Capacity for Troops and Vehicles on L-Class Ships Under Alternative Force Structures
4-4.  Total Lift Provided by the Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces Under Alternative Force Structures
4-5.  Total Number of Joint Strike Fighters Carried by Amphibious Ships Under Alternative Force Structures
4-6.  Average Number of Expeditionary Strike Groups Forward Deployed Under Alternative Force Structures
4-7.  Time Needed to Deploy Marine Infantry Battalions in a Hostile Environment Under the Navy's Plan
4-8.  Time Needed to Deploy Marine Infantry Battalions in a Hostile Environment Under Alternative Force Structures
   
Boxes
   
S-1.  The Roles of Different Amphibious Ships in Conducting Amphibious Operations
1-1.  The Requirement for Amphibious Lift
1-2.  Sea and Air Connectors for the Sea Base
2-1.  Developing Cost Estimates for Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships
2-2.  The Survivability of Surface Ships in the Navy

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