ANALYSIS OF THE
COSTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
1985-1989
Staff Working Paper
May 1984
NOTE
Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in the
text are fiscal years. All dollars are budget authority dollars that include
anticipated inflation using the Administration's economic assumptions. |
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Last year President Reagan called for the exploration
of defensive technologies that would render nuclear weapons "impotent and
obsolete." The resulting Administration plan--called the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI)--has sparked intense debate on the technological and arms
control implications of creating a novel strategic defensive system based
largely in space.
Many in the Congress are also interested in the costs of the SDI. This
paper, prepared at the request of the Arms Control, Oceans, International
Operations and Environment Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, examines near-term cost trends. It also discusses whether current
SDI plans include all the efforts needed to support a strategic defense.
In summary, the paper finds that:
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The Administration plans substantial growth in SDI spending over the next
two years; from $991 million in 1984 to $3,790 million in 1986. Press reports
suggest continued though slower growth through 1989. While such Vapid growth
is not atypical of newly started research and development (R&D) programs,
the SDI will consume an increasing share of DoD R&D resources, growing
from about 4 percent in 1984 to about 16 percent by 1989.
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Everything else being equal, growth in SDI funds between 1984 and 1985
would have been larger had the Administration funded the Army's Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) program at levels planned in its February 1983 budget.
Changes in BMD funding plans were probably tied to the shift in basing
plans for the MX missile. BMD changes not only offset growth in SDI but
may also portend a more fundamental shift in the Army's BMD effort, emphasizing
development of a capability to defend entire areas of the United States
sometime in the future rather than emphasizing the defense of specific
military installations in the nearer term. This could be of concern to
those who feel the United States may need to deploy a near-term ballistic
missile defense in response to a potential Soviet deployment.
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There are questions about the inclusiveness of the Administration's current
definition of SDI. The broad definition of strategic defense implied by
the President and stated explicitly by others in the Administration embraces
defense against all forms of nuclear attack. But the SDI currently contains
funds for research on defense against ballistic missiles. Important components
of a more comprehensive defense--most notably air defense--are missing.
In addition, there appear to be a number of relevant programs that are
not currently included in SDI even by the narrower definition of defense
against ballistic missiles.
In accordance with the mandate of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
to provide objective and impartial analysis, the paper makes no recommendations.
Lawrence J. Cavaiola and Bonita J. Dombey of CBO's National Security
Division prepared this paper under the general supervision of Robert F.
Hale. Francis Pierce edited the manuscript.
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