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The Administration announced its plan to modernize all parts of the United States strategic deterrent in October 1981. Since then it has substantially completed one wave of procurement of strategic offensive forces, encompassing all legs of the triad: land-based and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles plus long-range bombers. Plans for a second wave of procurement are under way and may well cost more than the first. The Administration's budget requests show that spending for strategic forces will grow more rapidly than that for the total defense budget.

By many commonly used measures, the Administration's program has added significantly to the capability of U.S. strategic forces and will continue to do so. However, not everyone agrees with the priorities and goals of the Administration's program. The constrained budget outlook is likely to sharpen debate about the relative share of the nation's future resources devoted to defense and about allocations within the defense budget for strategic forces. Reductions in the defense budget over the past two years have been accommodated without any fundamental change in planned strategic programs. If the budget trend continues, however, Congress may be faced with more difficult choices, possibly affecting the structure of U.S. strategic forces for many years.

This study analyzes the effects of the Administration's plan for modernizing the strategic offensive forces and discusses alternatives that would reduce costs. The study was requested by the House Committee on Armed Services. In keeping with the Congressional Budget Office's mandate to provide objective analysis, the study contains no recommendations.

Bonita J. Dombey of CBO's National Security Division prepared the study under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and John D. Mayer, Jr. William P. Myers of CBO's Budget Analysis Division provided detailed cost analysis. The author sincerely appreciates the contributions of James West, Jeffrey Merkley, and Dan Kaplan of CBO, and many others who made useful suggestions at various stages of the study. Paul Houts and Sherry Snyder edited the manuscript. Nancy H. Brooks, Rebecca Kees, and Kathryn Quattrone prepared the report for publication.
 

Edward M. Gramlich
Acting Director
November 1987
 
 

SUMMARY

I - INTRODUCTION

II - ISSUES FACING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

• Comparison of Current Force Levels of the United States and Soviet Union
• Perspectives on U.S. Deterrence Strategy and Its Requirements

III - COSTS AND EFFECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

• Goals of Continued Modernization
• The Administration's Modernization Program from 1981 to 1987
• U.S. and Soviet Modernization Plans Beyond 1987
• How the Balance of Forces Might Change Under the Modernization Plans
• Cost of Continuing Modernization
• Effects of Recent Arms Control Proposals

IV - ALTERNATIVES TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

• Alternative I: Do Not Backfit Trident Submarines
• Alternative II: Limit Further Land-based Modernization
• Alternative III: Cancel Manned Penetrating Bomber
• Alternative IV: Delay Further Modernization
• Congressional Action to Date

APPENDIXES

A - Description of the United States Triad of Strategic Offensive Forces
B - Measures and Methods Used in This Analysis
C - Details of the Strategic Modernization Program Assumed in the Analysis
D - Soviet Strategic Forces
 

TABLES
S-1.	Budget For Strategic Forces
S-2.	Costs and Effects of Administration's Strategic Plan and Alternative Approaches
1.	Budget For Strategic Forces
2.	United States and Soviet Strategic Forces in 1987
3.	Deployed U.S. Strategic Forces: 1981 and 1987
4.	Funded U.S. Strategic Forces: 1981 and 1987
5.	Major Strategic Investment: 1987-1992
6.	Changes in U.S. Plans Under Illustrative, "Fully Modernized" Approach
7.	Costs and Effects of Administration's Strategic Plan and Alternative Approaches
8.	Illustrative Effects of Alternatives on Warheads Available for Retaliation in the Year 2000
C-1.	Land-Based Missile Force Under the Administration's Modernization Program
C-2.	Strategic Bomber Force Structure Under the Administration's Modernization Program
C-3.	Sea-Based Strategic Force Structure Under the Administration's Modernization Program
C-4.	Characteristics of U.S. Ballistic Missile Forces
C-5.	Characteristics of U.S. Strategic Bomber Forces
D-l.	Illustrative Soviet Ballistic Missile Forces and Characteristics
FIGURES
1.	Strategic Forces as a Percentage of the DoD Budget
2.	Current U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces in 1987
3.	U.S. Warheads Surviving a Soviet Attack in 1987
4.	Projected U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces in 1996
5.	U.S. Warheads Surviving a Soviet Attack in 1996
6.	Performance of U.S. Retaliatory Forces Against an Illustrative Set of Soviet Hard Targets, in 1987 and 1996
7.	Illustrative U.S. Force Under Reykjavik Proposal
8.	Illustrative Soviet Force Under Reykjavik Proposal
9.	Comparison of the Capability of the MX/Rail and Small ICBM
10.	Soviet Warheads Needed to Destroy 50 Percent and 90 Percent of U.S. Baseline SICBM Force, As a Function of Dispersal Area

 

United States strategic forces are primarily intended to deter the Soviet Union from initiating a nuclear war. To do so, U.S. policy calls for them to be able to survive a Soviet nuclear strike and retaliate in an appropriate and timely manner. Since the 1960s, the Soviets have upgraded and significantly expanded the capabilities of their strategic forces. The Administration believes that in response the United States must increase not only the numbers of its forces and their chance of surviving a Soviet strike, but also their destructive capability, endurance, and responsiveness.

Indeed, modernizing and upgrading the strategic forces and their associated command and control has been one of the highest priorities of the Administration's defense program. The Administration has already substantially completed one wave of strategic procurement, including the first 50 MX missiles to be placed in existing silos, B-1B bombers, and the majority of new Trident submarines. When fully fielded, these systems will increase available strategic warheads by roughly 25 percent above 1981 funded warhead levels. The Administration plans a second wave of procurement that may well cost more than the first. The broad scope of the program, coupled with its substantial cost and limits on Congressional willingness to increase total defense spending, is likely to generate sharp debate.

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