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The Navy's plans for its combat aircraft have been a topic of Congressional debate for many years. This year, for example, the Congress debated whether the Navy could afford to purchase two new aircraft carriers while also funding its plans to modernize and increase the number of its combat aircraft. Over the next few years, the Congress may need to make reductions in proposed Navy budgets, which could heighten concerns about the affordability of these plans. Faced with severe budgetary limits, the Congress will make decisions about funding for combat aircraft that will determine the size and capability of Navy and Marine Corps air forces through the mid-1990s. Longer-term decisions about development of two new aircraft will influence force size and composition into the next century. This analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyzes the effects of the Administration's plans for the Department of the Navy's combat aircraft, as expressed in the President's budget for fiscal years 1988 and 1989, but does not reflect ongoing Congressional action. The report also discusses alternatives that would hold down budgets. The study was requested by the Senate Committee on Armed Services. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, the study contains no recommendations.

Lane Pierrot of CBO's National Security Division prepared the study under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and John D. Mayer, Jr.; William P. Myers of CBO's Budget Analysis Division provided extensive costing assistance and helped structure the alternatives. The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of William M. Kostak, Richard L. Fernandez, Jack Rodgers, and Marvin M. Smith of CBO, and Dov S. Zakheim of Systems Planning Corporation. (The assistance of external participants implies no responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.) Sherry Snyder edited the manuscript. Rebecca Kees and Kathryn Quattrone prepared the final report for publication.
 

Edward M. Gramlich
Acting Director
November 1987
 
 

SUMMARY

I - INTRODUCTION

II - NAVAL MISSIONS, AIRCRAFT, AND STRATEGY

• Missions
• Aircraft
• Strategy

III - ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS FOR NAVAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT

• Aircraft Inventories
• Requirements for Naval Aircraft
• Aircraft Shortfalls
• Affordability of Current Plans

IV - ALTERNATIVES TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS

• Option I. Maintain 15 Carriers But Buy Fewer Aircraft and Delay Retirements
• Option II. Maintain 15 Carriers But Delay New Programs
• Option III. Accept 13 Deployable Carriers, Reduce Aircraft Procurement Evenly
• Option IV. Accept 13 Deployable Carriers, Cancel New Programs
• Congressional Action to Date

V - LONG-TERM BUDGET PRESSURES

• The New Aircraft
• Historical Trends in the Costs of Navy Aircraft
• Impact of Cost and Other Factors on Force Size
• Congressional Action

APPENDIX--PERCENTAGES OF NAVY REQUIREMENTS MET IN THE YEAR 2015 UNDER VARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS
 

TABLES
S-1.	Comparison of the Administration's Plan and Alternatives
1.	Naval Aircraft and Their Missions
2.	Planned Procurement of Naval Combat Aircraft
3.	Composition of Naval Air Wings
4.	Shortfalls (Overages) of Naval Combat Aircraft in 1994
5.	Categories of Aircraft Requirements for the A-6 in 1994
6.	Navy Estimates for Aircraft Retirement Ages
7.	Five-Year Procurement Costs for Navy Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1988-1992
8.	Comparison of the Administration's Plan and Alternatives
9.	Derivation of Savings Under Alternative Approaches
10.	Force Structure Under the Administration's Plan and Options III and IV
11.	Percentages of Fighter/Attack Requirements Met in the Year 2015, Assuming 3 Percent Annual Budget Growth
12.	Percentages of Fighter/Attack Aircraft Requirements Met in the Year 2015 Under Alternative Assumptions
13.	Timing of Future Budgetary Pressures Associated With Replacement of Aircraft Carriers
A-1.	Percentages of Fighter/Attack Requirements Met in the Year 2015, Assuming 1 Percent Annual Budget Growth
A-2.	Percentages of Fighter/Attack Requirements Met in the Year 2015, Assuming 5 Percent Annual Budget Growth
FIGURES
1.	Examples of Radii of Unrefueled Soviet Bombers and Fighters from the Kola Peninsula
2.	Number of Naval Combat Aircraft: Requirements, Inventory, and Shortfall
3.	Average Age of Naval Combat Aircraft
4.	Number of Fighter/Attack Aircraft Procured, Fiscal Years 1981-1992
5.	Navy's Plans for Aircraft Procurement in the Four-Year Period (1988-1991) Common to the Last Two Five-Year Plans
6.	Total Average Unit Flyaway Costs of Navy Attack and Fighter Aircraft, by First Year of Procurement

 

Improvements in the U.S. naval forces are the centerpiece of the current Administration's conventional defense policy. The Navy will soon have 600 ships, including 15 deployable aircraft carriers. According to the Administration, a naval force of this size is needed in a major European war to seize control of the northern Norwegian Sea, provide support to the defense of northern Norway, and also make the Soviet Union withhold forces that might otherwise be used against convoys involved in the resupply of Europe. The Navy refers to this approach as its forward offensive strategy. In addition, aircraft carriers are deployed worldwide in peacetime to carry out U.S. military objectives.

While the Navy has already bought the ships to achieve a 600-ship Navy, it has not--based on its own planning factors--bought enough aircraft to meet the requirements of its 15 carriers. Even its current five-year plan would not alleviate the shortfalls in aircraft--the difference between the Navy's stated requirements and its aircraft inventories. This suggests underutilization of expensive aircraft carriers in wartime. Moreover, that plan calls for average real growth in aircraft procurement costs of 7 percent a year from 1987 through 1992, while the latest Congressional budget plan calls for three years of real declines in overall defense spending. Thus, the Navy faces difficult choices as it attempts to procure enough aircraft within severe budgetary limits.

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