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In 1981, a Congressionally mandated study of mobility found that the United States lacked adequate means to transport troops and equipment overseas rapidly. Subsequently, the Administration initiated steps to improve U.S. airlift and sealift assets. A near-term improvement plan was approved by the Congress in 1983. In the fiscal year 1987 budget, the Administration has requested funds to begin production of the C-17 aircraft, intended to be the next generation of airlifter, replacing aging C-141s and C-130s. This analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examines the Administration's plan to purchase the C-17 and compares it with alternative approaches to improving U.S. strategic mobility. The study was requested by the Senate Committee on Armed Services. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, this report offers no recommendations.

R. William Thomas of CBO's National Security Division prepared the study under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and John D. Mayer, Jr. William P. Myers of CBO's Budget Analysis Division performed the cost analysis. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Steven Sheingold and Bonita J. Dombey of CBO and Martin J. Suydam, Jr. of the General Dynamics Corporation. (The assistance of an external reviewer implies no responsibility for the final product, which rests with CBO.) Paul L. Houts edited the manuscript, and G. William Darr prepared it for publication.
 

Rudolph G. Penner
Director
September 1986
 
 

SUMMARY

CHAPTER I - U.S. AIRLIFT: REQUIREMENTS VERSUS CAPABILITY

• Meeting Mobility Requirements and Goals
• Recent Improvements and Future Plans in Airlift
• Strategic and Tactical Aircraft Choices

CHAPTER II - THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN FOR AIRCRAFT IMPROVEMENTS

• Planned Changes in Force Structure
• Costs of the C-17 Program

CHAPTER III - ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE STRATEGIC MOBILITY

• Alternative I: Achieve Airlift Goal Earlier
• Alternative II: Accept a Lower Airlift Goal
• Alternative III: Emphasize Maritime Prepositioning Instead of Airlift
• Summary of Cost Comparisons

APPENDIX A - DESCRIPTIONS OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

APPENDIX B - SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF TOTAL AIRLIFT COST ESTIMATES
 

SUMMARY TABLE 1.	DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS AND THEIR CAPABILITY
SUMMARY TABLE 2.	COST OF OPTIONS
TABLE 1.	ADMINISTRATION'S AIRLIFT PLAN
TABLE 2.	THE C-17 AIRLIFT PROGRAM: ACQUISITION COSTS
TABLE 3.	OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS FOR VARIOUS AIRCRAFT
TABLE 4.	ACHIEVE AIRLIFT GOAL EARLIER: QUANTITIES AND ACQUISITION COSTS
TABLE 5.	ACCEPT A LOWER AIRLIFT GOAL: QUANTITIES AND ACQUISITION COSTS
TABLE 6.	EMPHASIZE MARITIME PREPOSITIONING: QUANTITIES AND ACQUISITION COSTS
TABLE 7.	SUMMARY OF COSTS FOR THE OPTIONS
TABLE A-l.	CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. MILITARY AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT
TABLE A-2.	CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
TABLE B-l.	SENSITIVITY OF COST ESTIMATES TO THE DISCOUNT RATE
TABLE B-2.	SENSITIVITY OF COST ESTIMATES TO C-5 PEACETIME OPERATING RATE
SUMMARY FIGURE	INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT COMPARISON
FIGURE 1.	FISCAL YEAR 1989 AIRLIFT CAPABILITY
FIGURE 2.	U.S. AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT
FIGURE 3.	INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT CAPABILITY: ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN
FIGURE 4.	OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS PER AIRCRAFT
FIGURE 5.	INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT COMPARISON
FIGURE 6.	"SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT" APPROACH TO FORCE PLANNING
FIGURE 7.	INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT COMPARISON: LOWER AIRLIFT GOAL

 

Strategic mobility is a critical element in U.S. military strategy. For political and economic reasons, the United States cannot maintain adequate forces abroad to meet all of its security commitments. Thus, it must be prepared to meet military aggression by rapidly deploying active and reserve units from their U.S. bases to the area where they are required, be it Europe, the Far East, Southwest Asia, or some unanticipated locale.

Strategic mobility is provided in three ways-airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning. Airlift is used to move units to combat theaters rapidly. Sealift, which has historically moved over 95 percent of cargo during wars, will continue to meet most of the requirement to deploy heavily equipped forces, as well as provide most of the supplies to sustain combat once troops are in position. Prepositoning equipment and supplies means to place them in or near potential areas of conflict, thereby reducing the need to transport these items. Military or civilian aircraft would then move troops to the sites where their equipment is waiting.

In 1981, as a result of an overall review of mobility requirements, the Department of Defense (DoD) decided it should have the capability to move 66 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) by air in the event of future military conflicts. This amount is the goal for strategic or intertheater aircraft that can move cargo over intercontinental distances. In 1983, as a first step to meet this goal, the Administration began to purchase 50 C-5B and 44 KC-10A aircraft. When the last of these aircraft are delivered in 1989, airlift capability will increase from 28.7 MTM/D in fiscal year 1983 to some 48.5 MTM/D, or 73 percent of the long-term goal of 66 MTM/D. The Administration plans to meet that goal by adding 210 new C-17 aircraft to the inventory by the year 2000. The C-17 aircraft offers new capability, but the program for it will require $29.3 billion in procurement and development costs. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study analyzes the Administration's plan for meeting mobility needs, with its emphasis on the C-17, and compares it with three alternative approaches that would use existing types of aircraft or ships.

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