

F. Nordy Hoffmann

Senate Sergeant at Arms, 1975-1981

Interview #2

Phil Murray and the CIO

(Thursday, July 7, 1988)

Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

RITCHIE: It struck me while I was reading the transcript of your first interview that your family's background was business and management, and here you spent most of your career in the organized labor movement. Did you ever think that was incongruous, perhaps, from your early years?

HOFFMANN: I have thought of that very often. But even when I was with my family in the Bon Marche they did something which really went against my grain, and I said to my grandfather: "I don't think this is right." It was a very simple thing. They used to have what they called "the picnic." Well, the picnic was to take the family--the family of people who worked for the store, that's the whole family, it's a family store--to a place called Faraway, which was the McDermott's summer home, over close to McNeil Island on the other side of Tacoma. They would give them the day off and provide the boats and the food and all that stuff, and everybody had to go, whether they wanted to or not. I resented that, and I told my grandfather, "I don't think it's right to do that." I said, "I think they ought to make the

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choice, do they want this or don't they want this." He looked at me and he said, "You're really a rebel." I said, "No, I'm not, I'm just giving you an expression of how I feel about it." That was the only part that I ever had as far as labor unions were concerned.

I do, however, think that there is one other thing that should go into the record. That was when I was at Notre Dame. I was president of the Monogram Club, which is all athletes in various sports, I'd been elected to that. This was in 1931. And at the end of 1931 there was a fellow whose name shall go unmentioned, who was locally from Washington, D.C., which is kind of interesting, and he was let go from the university six weeks before he was to graduate. The Monogram Club took this up. Now, you've got to remember that I had just been hired as an assistant coach for '32 and '33, but I was also the president of the Monogram Club, and they took the position that the penalty was too severe to let him go from the university and not let him graduate. The Club took a definite, hard-line position that being that the penalty of expulsion from the University was too severe. I met with Father Steiner, who was one of the old heads there and talked to him because he was our advisor, and said, "What shall I do?" He said, "You can only do one thing. You're president of the Monogram Club, you have to take this and do with it the way you think."

I felt that the man who had been accused had been over zealous about what he was doing. We took our position up with the university president and the vice president, and they tried to tell us to go away, don't do this. The Monogram Club at that point was something like eighty-four or eighty-five people who were athletes. Not all football players, there were tennis players, there were soccer players, there were golf players. The president said no, they were not going to relent. This was the way it was going to go. We then took it upon ourselves to say, "Fine, if that's the ultimatum, we, the Monogram Club members, will be over there Saturday noon, on the main steps of the administration building for our final meeting, and we will be packed and ready to go home." I could just see my whole career going out the window, but I knew that if I didn't do this, these guys would look at me as a coward. I would be no leader, I would be a follower. So I just said, "No, I'm not going to do that. We're going to stay with it."

Father Steiner had told me to stay with my guns. I was right and I ought to stay with them. So we went up on the porch, and there were eighty-five athletes from the Monogram Club at the bottom of the steps, with their bags packed. They were ready to leave. This was in May. I met with the president of the university and the vice president. The vice president advised me that he had just signed a contract with me and this was a pretty

bad way to accept a contract. I retorted quickly to him and said, "I'm of little help to the university if I walk away from a job that I was elected to carry out as a leader, and expect these people to follow me when I'm a coach." And that's how I felt. Well, as a result of that we had the negotiations, and they finally said to us, "Okay, we will campus him--or give him a minor penalty--but he won't be able to compete in athletics." He was a baseball pitcher; we had a double-header with Michigan State that day, and he was to pitch the second game. I said, "Well, there's one caveat. That cannot carry over on this Saturday's game. He's got to pitch the second game." The president of the university said, "No, no." I said, "That's the deal. We're here and we're ready to make a deal with you, but that's what it's going to be." Finally he condescended and said, "Okay, we'll do it that way."

Well, it might be interesting to note that in that time--and Notre Dame was national champion for two years in a row--there wasn't one line in print about this happening. We saw to that. We were not trying to disgrace Notre Dame. All we were trying to do was to get justice for this fellow who had fulfilled three and three-quarters years of his residency, to complete his studies and get a degree. As a result of that, you say I came from a management side--I think that I had something in my background which must have been there, because we did win. We did it

quietly, everybody went back to their rooms, and everybody competed, and we had no more problem with it, and they didn't fire me because I had done it. Basically, it gives you a concept of what was in me, because there were two examples, first in the store, and then at Notre Dame.

When I left coaching and went back to Seattle I worked in a Shell Service Station. We had a fight or disagreement with the Teamsters who were trying to organize us. We went down and had a vote on it. I did not particularly care the way that was handled as far as they were concerned. They probably didn't care the way it was handled as far as we were concerned, but nevertheless it was over. I left there and came back to Pittsburgh, to take a job with Curtiss-Wright. At that point in time, I think I told you that I became interested in the union, and followed through on that interest because of the Tool and Dye workers, for whom I had a great deal of respect for. They were artisans as far as I was concerned. They insisted that because of my educational background that I should have an interest in the union. I then later had some things happen in the plant which gave me a feeling that I should join the union and help it, and I did.

When I left Curtiss-Wright I went to work for the Steelworkers Union, Phil Murray and Clint Golden and I worked in the national office at various things. I was given various assignments. We were doing time-and-motion studies for a lot of

people all through our contracts. We were also assessing the type of plants. I remember I was sent to look at a Steel and Wire plant in Worcester, Massachusetts. The plant was so obsolete that I can't tell you. Joe Scanlon and I looked at this, studied it, and came back with a recommendation that that plant should be torn down. They ought to build a new one if we're going to stay in competition. Some twenty years later they did tear that plant down and built an up-to-date wire company. But basically that was the type of thing that I was sent out to do. Where there was a real problem within a staff or something, they sent me in to mediate it and get it back on track. Whatever he sent me to do, that was what I did. Some of it was very, very difficult.

You've got to remember that in those days we were fighting the Commies. They were in our hair all the time. We had to know where they were going, and how they were going. I got a lot of help to know where they were going to come into our meetings and try to break up our meetings, or as they did a great deal they would come into a meeting and when the guys would get tired of the yakking going on they would leave, except the Commies. They would stay and then try to pass some pieces of legislation which would be devastating. So we had to get people who would stay with us for the rest of the time and outvote them. This was all a practical experience that I had with the trade union movement.

I absolutely felt so strongly about Phil Murray, and about Clint Golden, that those two people had a tremendous influence on me--particularly Phil Murray. I would go anyplace with Phil Murray where I could sit and talk to him and try to find out what happened to the labor movement before. What happened in the mine workers, in the big strikes out in the West, the bad strikes in Illinois, what caused those, and why were they brought about? He recapped all these things to me in conversations where we would be sitting on his front porch, or something like that. It was a great education that I got, and I just couldn't get enough to find out what was going on in the labor movement, why it was. We began to move in this labor movement, which I felt was strongly for the working man and woman, and we really did, I think, make an excellent contribution.

Those were the days when the membership had gone through the steel strikes Bethlehem Steel and the rest of them, and now we were trying to bring together the total union membership. I was then doing what they called PAC-work [Political Action Committee] which was collecting money for supporting candidates of their choice. We redid a lot of the things inside the union, which gave the membership--rightfully so--the right to make their own decisions. Then they would come to us and say, "Here's what we have decided, and we want to carry out this course." We had legislative education committees from all over the country, they

would come in here, we would teach them how a bill became law, what the legislative operation was, how you went in to see a senator, how you went in to see a congressman, what you did when you got back home--all little tiny things that probably nobody would be interested in.

We were saying to them that when you come in to do this, and you go into a senator's office, you're probably not going to get to see a senator, but you're going to get to see somebody. The first thing you do is remember who the woman was that you talked to, the first woman you talked to in that office. And when you got home you sat down and wrote her a letter and thanked her for being so nice. One of the guys said, "Why are we doing this?" I said, "Because any letter you may want to send from your local will go over this woman's desk, and she'll always remember that you took the time to thank her for being so nice to you. So you've introduced yourself, and this is how you really influence people, you start right at the bottom and influence them on up." I went through a thousand of those little things that meant so much to me and had been taught to me by my great friend from Chicago, Congressman Al Sabath, the chairman of the Rules Committee. He taught me about these things, and told me how important they were.

I tried very hard to bring the trade union movement into a position--and I had some of the best help in the world in some of the people who were working with me, they were all very dedicated people. And I suppose there's another thing that made them dedicated. I felt strongly about something, I always have, and this goes back to my family, that if you are going to stay permanently in some place you ought not to be renting. You ought to be buying a house. At that point in time, I went to Phil Murray with this. He thought I was some kind of a nut when I came up with this. I said, "It's my feeling, and I'm just going to express it to you, and you can turn it down if you want to, but I think that the union treasury will not be raided because you could loan these people enough money for a down payment on a house. It would come out of their salary, so you're not going to lose any money--you can charge them interest if you want to--and let them go out and buy a house so they are a permanent member of that community, they're not just a fly-by-night who's coming in and going out."

I think I had roughly eight or nine people in the office in Washington, and Phil agreed to it, and these people all owned their own homes. They were building a nest egg for the future. In fact, some of them bought two homes, one down at the beach. This was my feeling of the way you strengthened the loyalty of the people to the trade union movement. You're not buying them, it's

their money. It's their dues. What you're doing is giving them a chance to make a real contribution to a community, so that you can say these people are not renters, they're not fly-by-nights, they're here to stay. I think it worked in our favor.

President John Kennedy, after he was elected, told me that he felt that the Steelworkers were as good a trade union movement as he had seen anywhere in his life, and that they were doing the kind of work that had to be done. But that took from 1953 to 1960 to build that, so it wasn't done overnight. It was about seven years that we just poured everything we had into that kind of an operation. Phil agreed to that, and Phil thought it was a great idea. Then of course he died, and David McDonald took over. McDonald did not have the same vision--and it's nothing against him, he's dead and I wouldn't speak anything except good about him--he didn't have the vision that Phil had. Phil came from the trade union movement, which thought that you couldn't trust anybody who had a college education. Phil did not have that feeling, he felt that they would be the first people to try to help you. I think that afterwards, it began to be a political operation, for McDonald, and I was opposed to it. I fought it, and of course we came to a parting of the ways. He didn't want this thing to continue because he didn't like it.

RITCHIE: Didn't want what to continue?

HOFFMANN: Didn't want the Legislative Education Committee to continue the way it was operating. It slowly deteriorated. Then McDonald lost and Abel came in. Abel believed the Legislative Education Committee in this thing, because he came out of the guys who I had helping me when we first started it. So it was kind of reinstated. But most of the people in the trade union movement felt that we did have something going, because we had moved it toward the local union people and away from a national office, which is sometimes the death of those people. If they don't have a part of it, they're not going to be doing anything for you. You better understand that you've got to give them something to do to make them part of this whole thing, and give them the credit, which is what we did. We'd have them come down here and the Navy would take them down to look at Dam's Neck, or someplace like that, and none of us who were part of this would have our names in the papers. They'd get their names in the local papers as having gone to this thing. That made them look good in the community, and they should have. Therefore they became a part of the community that people would go to--people outside the labor movement--and say "I read your name in the paper and I'm kind of interested in what you're doing. I'm glad that you're doing this for us." This was basically my theory, and I think it worked very well. Not that I was alone in this. I had a lot of people who were helping me, and they were damn good people, they really were. They were dedicated trade unionists.

RITCHIE: You've described being in the Steelworkers in the late '30s and '40s, which was part of the CIO. On the outside, people looking at the CIO and the Steelworkers thought of them as a radical, militant labor group. You describe a more cautious and moderate group, who are concerned about home ownership and Communist influences, and trying to work out accommodations. How is it that their public image was so much more radical than your description?

HOFFMANN: Well, I think I can put it this way. I think it applies to me because it's funny. I have a younger brother, the youngest in the family is brother Michael. Michael had wanted to go the Harvard School of Business, and he applied and didn't get in. So my mother called me one day. Of course, my brother and I had never seen eye to eye on anything, really. I'm the old one and he's the young one, and he had to listen. I don't blame him, it's something that grew. I was probably obnoxious as hell myself in those days. But he really resented me, and I said, "Fine and dandy, I'm going my way." But my mother called me and said, "Michael would like to go to the Harvard School of Business and he's not going to get in. Can you do anything?" I said, "Yeah, I know somebody up there." I'd been up there to teach a couple of times at the place. She said, "Well, do me one favor, don't tell him. Don't let him know you've got anything to do with this. Let him think it's on his own." I said okay. So I got a hold of my

friend up at Harvard and I said, "Is there any chance of getting him in?" He said, "Let me see." So he got him in. I said, "Now, do not tell him that I had anything to do with this." He guaranteed me he wouldn't--he was one of the professors. Mike went in there, and he was in a course with this man who had been good enough to get him in for me. He said, "Does anybody in this classroom have any relatives who are with the Communist Party or Fellow Travelers," or something like that. My brother put his hand up. This guy was really chagrined. He said, "Yes, my brother is a Fellow Traveler. He works for the CIO." This guy just was abashed. He called me that night and said, "I have to break this agreement. Michael just does not understand what this is all about. I've got to tell him that it was you, because you've been here, who helped him get into Harvard." I said, "Okay, if you want to." He said, "I want you to do something else. I want you to put him to work this summer in the auditing department of the Steelworkers." I said, "Okay, I'll do it." So I called Phil, and Phil said, "Yes, no problem." Well, Michael came down to see me. He apologized. He said, "I didn't know all these things." I said, "I know you didn't, and nobody's saying that there's anything wrong, except that you ought to know that I'm not a Fellow Traveler." He said, "I found out that you're one of the biggest Commie fighters in the country." I said, "Well, I don't advertise it on billboards, but that's how I

feel." As a result of that, he came in and found out how the Steelworkers handled their money, in the auditing department, and then later on became president of a paper company. He said the greatest education he ever had was working for the Steelworkers in the auditing department that summer vacation, because he found out what trade unions were all about. He was a much better president of a company than he would have been had that not happened to him. But that gives you a rough idea, in trying to answer your question, how this came home to roost with me. People believed the media, even my brother.

RITCHIE: Some people have said that the Communists were good organizers, especially in areas that other unions wouldn't touch; tougher areas, like the Southern textile workers and others who weren't being unionized, that they tended to be the first ones to go in.

HOFFMANN: That could have been, I don't know about that. I don't have first hand information. All I know is that they tried to infiltrate us, into the local unions up around McKeesport and places like that, out in South Chicago, in the Gary mills and places like that. They were there and they were a presence. But we knew where they were going, and I think they wanted to get into us, but they were having an awful time because we were fighting them. I'm not going to tell you how we were fighting, because we were fighting them legally, and I knew when they were going to

show up at a meeting. I had some information coming back to me, and we would just see that when they came to that meeting we would have enough guys to outvote any of them, if they wanted to stay there all night, we didn't care. So they were never able to really infiltrate into the Steelworkers. We fought them. We did it with legitimate means, and we had information which would tip us off if something was going on.

They were very difficult. We had them in conventions, and we had problems with them at conventions, but we were never to the point where we were fearful of them. We respected the fact that they did know how to organize--and they really did. They were devoted people to what they believed in, except that they ran into devoted people who didn't believe what they believed, and they had a hell of time trying to move us. So I would say, Father Coughlin and all these guys who were talking about the Communists, little did they know what was going on. They were vicious, they tried anything. I'll guarantee you that on a couple of occasions they almost got me, but they just missed me. They tried everything. It was an unbelievable experience, but you can take a look at the records. They never got into the Steelworkers Union. They were into the CIO, we cleaned that out, but they never got into the Steelworkers Union. We kept them out. There were some percentage of them in East Chicago and places like that, but we always outvoted them.

RITCHIE: I've read that Phil Murray was staunchly anti-Communist.

HOFFMANN: That's who I was working for, and he just absolutely did not believe that they could make any contribution to the men and women of the working force of America, and he fought them. It was his bag, and that's why I was working on it.

RITCHIE: One of the accounts I read said that because he was such a strongly religious person that that influenced his opposition to the Communists.

HOFFMANN: I think that it probably did. I don't think there's anything wrong about it. He liked the free enterprise system, and he felt that the Communists were going to be dominated by a group of people telling them exactly what to do, and we were striking for freedom. Why did we organize if it weren't for the rights of the people who were working the mill? The Communists weren't going to give them any rights, they were going to take their rights away. But they didn't know that. We had to be sure that they didn't make the in-roads that they tried to do. You go back and look at the history of labor, and you go back to World War I with the IWW, they were in Seattle, that's where they started. Industrial Workers of the World--we called them "I Won't Work." But that was in Seattle, it's again taking me back to my early days where I was raised in that damn thing, so I knew a

little bit about it. I fought them because I had a total disbelief in the Communist idea of how a country ought to be run. I had somebody who I was working for who felt strongly about this, and he was just terrific as far as I was concerned to work for, because he felt more strongly than I did. He was the motivator. He was the leader. He was the man who kept us going. He came up with the ideas, and he kept up with everything that was going on. He wanted to know. He just would not take anything for granted.

RITCHIE: There was an advisor he had by the name of Father Charles Rice.

HOFFMANN: Yes.

RITCHIE: Did you ever meet him?

HOFFMANN: Charles Owen Rice. Yes, in Pittsburgh.

RITCHIE: I've heard about his connection with the labor movement. What kind of person was he?

HOFFMANN: Hell of a nice guy, and he fought the Commies, I'll guarantee you. See there was the UE, and the IUE, and some of the other unions who were closely aligned with these guys, some of the maritime unions in those days were closely aligned. Rice

was a priest up in the Northside of Pittsburgh, and he was a dedicated man. Charles Owen Rice was one of the finest guys I ever knew. He really fought the Commies.

RITCHIE: And he worked with the union?

HOFFMANN: He didn't work for us. He was a priest and had his own parish, but he was always available if you needed somebody to be a speaker, or something like that. It's strange, some of the things you do. Thinking about the Northside now, I went up there one night, and we were talking about the idea of owning your own home. I began talking, and all of a sudden I looked out at this audience of men and women in this local union, and they were paying no attention to me at all. I was talking about housing, we ought to have housing laws and all that, and I said, "How many in here own their own home?" Everybody put their hand up. I said, "How many here own a second home?" And half of them put their hand up. I said, "Well, excuse me for talking about something that you have no interest in whatsoever." They had no interest in public housing, because everybody up there owned their own home. If you want to take a look at the most frugal people in the world, they owned their own homes, they were paying, they never lost their home, and they always tried to buy something else. They were

trying to better themselves. That's one night that I turned off the speech that I had practiced and worked on for weeks, found

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out that I was absolutely talking to the wrong audience. But I had the presence of asking them, and to stop, because they'd all have gone to sleep in another fifteen minutes, I'm sure of that.

We had a lot of people in the United States, in universities, who felt as strongly as we did about the organization, like Charles Owen Rice did, and we ran into them as professors, people at Penn State, places like that, where we have a lot of our records, as far as the Steelworkers are concerned. But by and large I was put in to do wage operations, check the wage rate, check the various studies of wages, how the wages got to be that way, what changes there were. Joe Scanlon and I went up and down that Butler-Mon Valley, going through these plants, one after another, doing time and motion studies, and going through all that. This was a new phase of trade unionism.

I was on the negotiating team with the Curtiss-Wright Corporation on the first contract we ever got with them out there. We came down to the War Labor Board in Washington at that particular time, and we could make the answers, but the Curtiss-Wright people couldn't. We finally said to the board, "Look, we can make an answer, why can't they make an answer? They have to go out and get permission from the corporation. Can't they be forced to come in here and negotiate like we are?" And they did. We were trying to get a decent wage and an incentive. It's a very difficult thing to try to figure out an incentive for a

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welder, one welder on the trailing edge side or the lead edge side, to find out if they're doing the same kind of work. Or to go into a coke mill. A coke mill which pushes eighty-four ovens one day and eighty-five the next day is a controlled production, and yet they had to have some kind of an operation where they could get an incentive which would keep them working, and I had to go up there to Clareton to do this. It was one of the most difficult things I ever did, because how the hell can you set an incentive on a controlled production? Fortunately, I worked with some damn good people with the corporation and we came up with some answers.

It applied to a lot of things, and I'll just give you a for instance. Part of that whole incentive thing, the Homestead Works had a plant in Charleston, West Virginia. This was a big plant that made guns and stuff like that. So we went down there on the train--that's the only way you could go--with the people from the steel corporation, and Earl Moore said to me after the second day down there, "How long is this going to go on?" I said, "I feel the same thing, I don't want to stay down here either." He said, "They're charging me a dollar for orange juice. I can't

be doing that sort of a thing." This was on Veterans' Day. He said, "Well, let's go up and honor the veterans." We went up and

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watched the parade. He said, "What's it going to take to get this done?" I said, "Ten percent incentive, the same as we got at Homestead." He said, "Done." So we went back down and told the guy.

Well, he goes and gets on the train and goes back up, but I've got to talk to the local union on three shifts and tell them what we did. When I went to the local union hall, which was just outside of the main gate in Charleston, I can still see that place, a guy pulled up in one of those open cars with isinglass covers on the side of it in those days. I saw him go into the back of the car and he took out a double-barreled shotgun, and he was coming into the hall. I said, "Where the hell are you going with that thing?" He said, "Is your name Hoffmann?" I said, "Yeah." He said, "This is for you, if I don't like the contract." I said, "You're kidding!" He said, "No, I'm not kidding." I said, "All right, I'll make a deal with you. Put the gun back in your car. If you don't like the contract I'll come out in the street, because at least the city will have to clean up the mess instead of the local union." Well, he laughed, he thought that was funny. But he put the gun back. Fortunately, the contract was what he wanted, so I didn't have the problem. But that was the way you went in and negotiated with your local unions in those days. They were tough. Those people were rugged, and they still are up in the West Virginia hills. They came out

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of the coal mines, and if you look at the early history you'll find that the coal mines were the absolute backbone of the labor movement.

RITCHIE: I guess it helped you a lot that you were built like a football player.

HOFFMANN: Yeah, it got me in and out, I'll tell you that. I was very happy on many occasions. But getting back to Phil, Phil was a wonderful man to work for, but he had quirks. We had a fellow who worked for us who was married and had about ten kids, and he was running around with somebody else, that Phil knew. Phil called me up, he was in a hospital in Pittsburgh, he had something wrong with him. He said, "What are you doing?" I said, "Nothing much." He said, "Why don't you come on up." So I drove up to Pittsburgh and went to his room. He said, "You know, this guy bothers me. He's running around with this girl, and he's got ten kids." I looked at him and I said, "Does he do a good day's work?" He said, "No problem, he's real great." Well, I said, "You can't be his God too. If he's doing a good job, that's all you've got to worry about, but now you're getting into his private life. Is that what you're going to take over?" Phil looked over and he said, "Ah, it's nice of you to come up and see me, thank you very much." Never again did he mention this incidence, because I hit a chord which I guess a lot of people wouldn't have said to Phil, but I did.

Phil was like that. I remember in New York we were negotiating something, I can't remember what it was, but we were going out to dinner that night, and I usually made all the reservations and that sort of thing for Phil. He had about eight guys in there and he was mad at somebody in the trade union movement. So he began with the first guy and said, "What do you think of this guy?" Well, everybody came down the line saying he was a no-good so-and-so. Everybody agreed that he was no good. I agreed too, but I didn't want to get into that kind of a trap. I knew it was going to come to me, and I was hoping that somebody would call him, but nobody did. He said, "All right, Nordy, what do you think about it?" I said, "Well, Phil, probably a little different than anybody else that's spoken. I felt that since I've been in the trade union movement and doing what I've been doing that you were the guy that brought this man in, you taught him everything he knew. So to criticize him would be to criticize you, and I'm not about to do that." He said, "Let's all go to dinner." That was the end of that. That was the way Phil took it. But Phil was funny. He'd much rather have you tell what you really felt. He was not a man who liked to have eulogies made of him in public. If you had something to say, say what you had to say, and say it to his face. That's the way he was.

RITCHIE: He seems to have taken a paternal attitude towards the people who worked for him.

HOFFMANN: He did. He did in a way, but I don't think that was wrong. Phil was such a good man. He was a very religious man. He practiced his religion. He didn't wear it on his coat sleeve or anything like that, but he was a good man. He lived a good, hard, clean life, and worked very, very hard.

RITCHIE: How would you compare him to his predecessor in the CIO, John L. Lewis.

HOFFMANN: Oh, they were different men, totally. John L. Lewis was much more egotistical. He had an unbelievable command of the various things, but he believed in himself totally, and not somebody else who might be working for him. Phil was just the opposite. Phil went with the people who were working for him. I remember many times at the convention, we were in Los Angeles and we had a dues increase before the floor of the convention. I was always on the stage close to Phil. If he wanted something, all he had to do was move his hands and I generally, by that time, knew what the hell he wanted. This discussion had gone on for quite a while, and it was getting a little out of hand, I thought. He didn't, and he was right. I said to him, "Why don't you cut this off?" He said, "They'll cut it off, don't worry about it, just stay loose." I said okay, and about fifteen minutes later a guy made a motion: "Let's get this thing over, let's vote on it." By that time everybody was ready, and they voted Phil's way, which was what he knew. But he let them talk, he let them go until they

really drowned themselves out with all that stuff. That's the way he was, that's the way he operated. He didn't dictate, he went with what they wanted him to say, and they had unbelievable respect for him, they really did.

I didn't know John Lewis that much, but I know that this guy, Phil Murray, was loved a hell of a lot greater by the trade union movement that we worked with, with steelworkers, than he John Lewis was there. But I think John Lewis was a necessity at that time, because you had to be a hardball player to be able to do what he had to do with the trade union movement in West Virginia, in hard coal, soft coal, it was a different category. But Phil was the guy who built this whole thing in the steelworkers, and everybody loved Phil--that's my own personal opinion--and respected him as a leader. He was a leader, there's no question about it.

RITCHIE: John L. Lewis thought that the movement was going to follow him when he broke with Roosevelt in 1940.

HOFFMANN: Right.

RITCHIE: But they didn't at all.

HOFFMANN: No way, no way. No, John Lewis had a lot of people, but he was more of a muscle-type operation. The Steelworkers were not a muscle-type. In some instances they may

have been, part of it, but in general no, it was not that way. Phil wasn't the kind of guy that they give you in the history books as the labor leader. He was a tough negotiator, but he was not a hard man, and wasn't out beating people into line and stuff like that. That was not what he did. Some of the trade unionists at that time did, but he didn't.

RITCHIE: Another major labor leader in the CIO at that time was Walter Reuther. How would you compare Murray and Reuther?

HOFFMANN: Well, I think they're absolutely different operations. See, Phil was never a guy who sought recognition, Walter was. Walter fed on it. That's my opinion, now maybe somebody else might not have the same thing. Phil didn't care who got the limelight. What he wanted to see was a strong union, and he wanted to see that we were servicing that union membership all over the United States in a way they ought to be serviced. He provided for that, and he let us go to create better services to the union.

I don't know whether I told you this, but at one point in time we were using the land grant colleges in the summer, all over the United States, to have meetings. I

wanted to find out what we were doing wrong, not what we were doing right but what we were doing wrong. I went in this class at four o'clock every afternoon and I had a blackboard which flipped over. I'd say, "All right,

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let's fill this blackboard." And I had a gal who would put on it what they said. Why were the Steelworkers not doing it the way it should be done? Then we'd flip the board and not erase it, and the next class would come in. You'd be surprised how many things were repetitious in the second meeting. We took that and we made it eventually into a manual into how to do things. We took that back to Phil and to the officers of the union, the board of directors, and said, "Here's what the members have said about why we're not doing what we should be doing, and we ought to be doing it better." That was his way of determining how we were providing our membership with the biggest effort we could possibly do. I don't know that Walter did that. I really don't, because I have been told by people in the Auto Workers, when they came to Washington, that they wanted to emulate what we were doing, because they felt we were on the right track, that is, utilizing the membership to give you the most out of what they wanted done, to let them provide you with the various achievements which we ought to be, and maybe not were coming to.

Walter had a different problem because he had that auto industry, and the question is: do you strike them all or do you strike one at a time? This is a different kind of a bargaining. We didn't have that bargaining. We had the Big Steel and the Little Steel. The Big Steel contract came in and we did a lot of negotiating. They didn't do that, they had to pick one and then

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go after that one, and then hope to God that it would stick with the others. But if you'll check the log you'll find that that didn't always happen. They had to strike the whole damn industry before they got through with it. We had to strike the industry too. Not all things are so tough, but I remember one time we had a great plan in New York, we were having a big steel strike and we were in New York at the Roosevelt Hotel. We'd been there--I get so goofy with the Roosevelt Hotel, I could tell you it by heart--and we were going to put this big ad in the paper about the steel strike, and we get it all ready and it goes to press, and that night the Andrea Dorea got sunk right off of New York. You might have just as well printed it on toilet paper because nobody ever read it! Those things you can't tell, that's a negotiating turn that will hit you right between the eyes. You just don't know that until it happens. But we just laughed it off and said, well, we've got to go on from here.

Walter was a brilliant guy. He was a dedicated man. But there's a difference of egos. Basically, that's what I would put it. I think that you've got to remember that Phil came out of the coal miners to begin with. They were a much more

reactionary group than were the new group of the Reuther brothers. Their facets of relationships within their corporations were different than it was with the steelworkers. The steelworkers were pretty much tried and true, and they knew what they had to do, and of

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course in those days that was a big industry. Make no mistake about it, they controlled a lot of things in this country. So I think that by and large the two men were absolutely different in their approaches to things. I'm not saying that Walter was right or Phil was right. Both had different memberships to adjust to. I know that many times people would come down to talk to Phil and have Phil talk to Walter. But that's basically what it was.

RITCHIE: What did Murray think about Reuther? Did they get along?

HOFFMANN: Oh, yes, they got along. He liked Walter. He thought Walter went a little bit long on some things, and he was concerned about it, but by and large he was willing to help Walter any way that he asked for. And he did, he helped him in many ways. But that was Phil's way of doing business. When Reuther came along, Phil was then a full-fledged leader. They looked at Phil with a great deal of affection. He was head of the CIO, and they had tremendous respect for him. Phil looked at Walter as a new labor leader, and he was, and he gave him every yard that he needed to move his operations around, cooperated with him in every way that I can think of. I don't know of anything that we didn't try to help do. He always had an admiration for Walter.

RITCHIE: On the other side was Bill Green and the AFL. How were relations at that stage?

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HOFFMANN: They were pretty strained. We looked like the new kid on the block when we started, and we were. They wanted no part of us. It wasn't until way down that they finally decided that it might be a good idea to get together. They thought that the CIO wouldn't go anyplace because they [the AFL] had staid negotiations which had been going on for many, many years, a century almost in this country, and we were coming in as an hourly-rate group. We were the new kid on the block, and they looked at us and said, "Oh, it'll go away." But we didn't go away. We were staying there. See, they had what was called in the old days "Labor's Non-Partisan League," that is, the AFL did. We began with a new kind of an operation, and a new look in how you approach getting your membership activized. The old AFL people wanted to keep it "in the temple," as we called their headquarters the temple. They wanted to do it. When they got new blood like me who came in, see I didn't want to do it that way. The Steelworkers wanted to do it by having the membership tell *us* what we ought to be doing instead of us telling *them* what we ought to be doing. That made them participate, and made it so

more useful than it had been before. I think we were the first trade union that began this kind of a practice. I could be wrong, but at least we were one of the first that began to do this.

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We never worried about the AF of L, whatever the hell they did. They were doing it without us. We ran into some arguments from time to time with the machinists and people like that. We were busy as hell organizing unorganized plants that the AFL would never have touched. They never touched the steel industry. It had always been there, but they never touched it. They never tried to organize it. Why, I don't know, but they never did. Then we came along and we organized it, and we organized all the other plants that went with it: the Aluminum Corporation and all the other plants that had some kind of a trade union function that we thought should have been organized, but they were not--how would I put that? Well, we were organizing the people and they were organizing the typical operation of a machinist, of a tool and dye maker, of somebody like that. That's what they were doing.

Now, to go back to what I told you before. The Tool and Dye Makers were the people who really got me into the union. But they came out of the old AF of L. They felt that in order to organize these hundreds of thousands of people who were unorganized all these years was the way to go. Now, they were Tool and Dye Makers, and they were AFL people. Those were the guys who got me to do what I did, whatever the hell contribution it was. So I had a great deal of respect for some of those people. But I felt that they had ignored the rank and file in a big plant. They might

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pick out a tool and dye shop and organize that within a plant, and the rest of the guys would be unorganized. So the resentment then began to build. Phil came in and put all this stuff together. I don't know why they hadn't. They were more a trade operation, they worked on building trades, all that sort of thing. We didn't; we worked on the masses, and got the masses into the union. So there was no working agreement with the AFL at that time. It was later when that happened.

RITCHIE: Did you get involved in many jurisdictional disputes with AFL unions?

HOFFMANN: Not too often. Maybe with the machinists. That's the only one I know that we'd get involved with from time to time. And then we had the electrical workers, the IBEW and the UE, they were in jurisdictional disputes with CIO unions. But in steel we didn't have too much of that. They were not interested in the kind of people we had. Eventually the rivalry got smaller, and smaller, and smaller, and then they thought: why don't we both go together? And

Bill Green and Phil and rest of the guys got together and did some exchanging of ideas. Those were the days of the old trade union movement.

The trade union movement, if you trace its history, they were never interested--that is, the AFL--in anything else but the trades, building trade, whatever trade it was that they were

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involved in. Obviously, to prove the point, they were never interested in the Teamsters. They weren't into truck drivers and things like that, so they stayed away from it. Again, it was trades that they were interested in. That's where I think the whole thing started, why they call it the trade union movement. It was the trades which perpetuated the old AFL. Then when they came into the CIO, it worked out very well. I think it worked to everybody's advantage. I don't think everybody accepted it right away, but I think once that they saw it could work it was a much better operation. I think that they could service what the hell they were in business for--they were to service the people and not themselves. And that was a difficult problem that they sometimes didn't understand.

RITCHIE: You also mentioned earlier that you were involved with the PAC in raising money. The CIO really pioneered the whole idea of a political action committee.

HOFFMANN: They did, yes.

RITCHIE: What was the idea behind that? How did they operate that?

HOFFMANN: Well, I think what it did was to fight management's collection of money for all these candidates. The CIO decided that if they were going to support candidates they'd better have some money to give them to run elections, or to get

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out the vote, or whatever it was. Involved in all of that was the basic concept of a democracy, that you've got to help support a democracy both financially and with your voting power. They began to feel that this was one of the ways to do it. I remember when we started that, and boy, that was one of the things they put me into early. I was going around all over the United States. I drove my car every place to go and get people involved in what we were doing. It was a very, very difficult problem in those days to get them to give a buck. They'd give you a buck, give them a receipt, and then put the money into a pot, and try to spread it out so that it was divided into the places where it was given by the local unions. If you had a candidate who was supporting you, you tried to give him some money, tried to help him out with getting out the vote. This was a new concept in America. It had not been worked on except as I said through Labor's Nonpartisan League. They collected money, but not to the degree we did. We were new at this, and we had obviously a hell of a lot more people.

We would go in and collect these moneys. We would give prizes, we would do everything in the world to get our people activized. We felt that if they gave a buck, they would vote, that was the theory. It was a pretty good theory because it did work out that way. So we began this thing way back--oh, golly, I don't know how far back it was, but it seemed to me that we were

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doing this around '47, '48, '49 in that area. And it began to get bigger, because we had to find a better way to do it than we were doing it. And we finally got check-off, which we checked off--money for PAC--and the companies fought it like hell--the dues for PAC, which really goaded the companies because they had to give us the money after we got the guys to sign up (and they could get out of the thing anytime they wanted to). But by and large, once they got into it it was true, they voted and they held strong. This made a contribution--a lot of people might think this was a bad contribution. I frankly think it was a stronghold for our democratic form of government.

Now, if you take a look at it, if you want to go back and study someplace, if you want to do some research, you take a look at when the CIO began their PAC operations. From that point on, when it became apparent that the CIO was going in this direction, you'll find out that on the other side of the picture, where the Commies had been on the ascendancy, once this started, the Commies dropped off. Now, just check that for your own information. I have thought this for a long time. I don't think that I have ever worked it out where I can give you the proof, but I think that at that point in time they became less active, and less forceful, because the people began to put money into what they believed was their democracy, and democracy was not Communism. And I think

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that's one of our great contributions, although I don't think the labor movement's ever going to get credit for it, I do think that this had something to do with it in the long run.

When you're testing the AFL's old Labor's Nonpartisan League, that was just a nomenclature for what they were doing. They were not collecting that kind of money. But when the CIO came in and they began collecting money, that worried the hell out of the AFL, because we had a tremendous membership to do this sort of thing. Small unions in the maritime industry would give their eyeteeth to give some money to help a candidate. That began the deterioration of the period from the 1940s to the 1950s when Communism had been on the ascendancy. Once the CIO came into effect and began using their political strength by collecting money and helping candidates, you find that the old Communist idea was on the way down. There were other reasons, but that was one of the contributing reasons, at least I believe it.

RITCHIE: You mentioned about the AFL's Nonpartisan League. The AFL really did have a neutral concept of politics. Even though they tended to lean towards the Democratic party, there were a lot of Republicans in the AFL.

HOFFMANN: Oh, yes.

RITCHIE: But the CIO seemed really strongly connected to the Democrats.

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HOFFMANN: There's no question about it.

RITCHIE: Did that work on the local level as well?

HOFFMANN: In the beginning it didn't, because in the beginning the headquarters gave out the orders, but as I told you before, when we changed this--don't hold me to this, but I think it was around 1952 we began changing this--we found that the local people were making the bullets for us to shoot, where before we had been making the bullets for the local union people to shoot. They didn't understand it, and it was an educational process which took money and time, but the basic part of that time had been that the same people who were utilizing the idea of PAC contributions were now making the legislative education committees. Those same people worked together all over the United States, and they were the people who had originally made contributions. Now we said to them: "Okay, you made your contribution. What do you think we ought to be doing? It's your money." And don't think that didn't have an effect. It had an effect with a lot of locals, and I think that made a change, I really do. I think that ours was a much more open operation than the old Labor's Nonpartisan League. We were Democratic. We were voting for people who would support us.

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Just take a look at what happened yesterday in the Senate [vote on bill requiring 30-days notification of workers before plant closings]. Look at that vote [72-27]. Now that 27 Republicans, or whatever the hell it was, voting for this plant closing thing, that's the most unbelievable thing in the world. Now, if you don't think that the AFL-CIO had made a contribution toward the culmination of that vote--the elections are coming up. Now, years ago, they wouldn't have worried anything about it, but they know damn well that they are organized, and they have done a good job, and people are going to look at that. In other words, I don't care whether a guy belongs to a union or doesn't. If he's working in a plant and suddenly this plant closes and tomorrow you're gone, with no notice, the guy's going to say, "What the hell kind of an operation is this?" They look back to the Congress--take a look at the loan they made to Chrysler, kept Chrysler in business. They know that makes good sense, and they were watching what these guys were going to do on this plant closing, because a lot of these runaway plants

have closed and sold out to the Japanese, and we've lost the thing forever. A lot of people may say that doesn't have anything to do with it, but it does have a lot to do with it. If you look at that vote yesterday, seventy something to twenty something, and they picked up an awful lot of Republicans--it has an effect. I had a long-range effect, and I just think we shouldn't write it off as if it doesn't exist.

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RITCHIE: So it was the beginning for you of a combination of labor and the Democratic party, starting with the PACs back in the '30s and the '40s.

HOFFMANN: Well, starting in the '40s. See we didn't start collecting money that early. I don't think it was until about '47 or '48 that we began really doing a job on PACs. From that point in time, yes, I was collecting money. I'm still collecting money for the Democrats. By and large, I don't think there were too many Republicans that they supported, although there were a couple who were very, very good people, and the people in the labor movement would speak out and say: "Look, these people have supported us, and we've got to support them." And they did support them. But the decision was made where it belongs: on the local level, with the rank and file. That's what has to happen.

RITCHIE: You also told me that it was in '47 or '48 that you came down here to set up the labor lobbying effort for the Steelworkers.

HOFFMANN: Nineteen forty-seven.

RITCHIE: Was that after the Taft-Hartley Act had passed or before?

HOFFMANN: That was during that time. It passed about that time.

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RITCHIE: And the sentiment in Congress was very anti-labor.

HOFFMANN: Oh, there's no question about it. But labor had their fit in this sort of thing. I remember that it started out as the Kennedy-Ives bill in the Senate, and it had to go over to the House. We had a meeting at the AFL-CIO, I remember George Meany was up there that time. Joe Keenan was sitting right behind me in this meeting, and I spoke up and I said, "If we're going to take the Kennedy-Ives bill over to the House, anything is germane, and God help us when we get over there." And Meany told me to sit down and shut up. I did, because Joe Keenan pulled me down. We had a break right after that, and we went outside and he and a couple of other guys got together and said, "You're absolutely right, but don't push it any farther because he's mad." I said, "I know

he's mad, but what's going to happen? We're going to get clobbered," and we got Taft-Hartley.

RITCHIE: Landrum-Griffin came out of Kennedy-Ives.

HOFFMANN: I mean Landrum-Griffin. We got Landrum-Griffin because of that. I've never brought it up, but Joe Keenan has brought it up on many occasions, saying "I'm glad you spoke up, because you were absolutely right, and those of us who work on the Hill knew it." It was a question then, because having learned, as I told you, from my friend from Chicago who taught me all these things, how to operate this thing. I suppose that brought about

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what was later our Legislative Education Committee, which commissioned a picture to be made. At first the PAC Committee and Labor Education were one, but later on they were separated.

One of the things we did there, which I felt in the beginning was excellent, that money had to be controlled very carefully. Going back to law school, I was taught that there were two kinds of money: YOM and OPM. "Your own money," and "other people's money." And don't confuse the two of them. So we took that, put it away, let the director in the district decide. We would go to him and say, "So and so needs some money," so that we wouldn't be the money people. We would say to him, "He needs some money, it's up to you to make the decision." He would make the decision, request out of the international office the amount of money--five thousand, two thousand, whatever they were going to give him--and he would deliver the check from the local unions in that very area. He would probably have two or three local union presidents with him when he did this thing. That's what we did to make it a stronger operation.

You see, a lot of people talk about having an organization, but they don't really have an organization. We used to have meetings. The first meeting would be after the reorganization. I'd have the president, and the vice president, and the secretary-treasurer come down to Washington, and I would make all these meetings with Congressmen just to say: hello; how are you; we're

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the Steelworkers; we don't want anything; we just want you to know who we are. Then the second meeting would be by district directors in groups over the United States, this is our echelon in the Steelworkers. Then the third meeting would be the Legislative Education Committee, in which we would bring a group of people in, and they would go visit all these people, so we really got three people who were coming in within a period of six months, just to say hello. Not asking for a thing, which kind of shocked everybody, because that was a kind of lobbying nobody ever heard of before. But then when they had something coming up they turned on the heat. Then you could turn it on from the top, from the second

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echelon, and from the rank and file. You're turning it on three ways, and these guys understand that kind of heat. So that's the way we worked it out. We built that thing with a lot of thought, a lot of concern, and I had some unbelievable good people, who had unbelievably good judgment on how to operate this thing. People who knew the legislative process. I had one guy who worked for me who was an educator, who understood the education principles to go back to the local union. I had others who would be able to design small business operations and how they could be involved in it, what their reaction to it is from a standpoint--you'll think this is crazy, but this is how well we did it--we organized this thing to understand that in order for you to get a set-aside contract out

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of the government, which is one of the things we did for some our small plants, we had to be prepared to go in and do the same kind of a job with the companies. So this was a joint venture. We arranged to have this sort of thing done. It was funny to see these company representatives, because they didn't know their fanny from third base when it came to understanding the operations of the government in buying or procuring (I shouldn't even say that word today with all the stuff that's going on), but we did this. We got a lot of set-aside contracts in which no dimes ever changed hands.

I've got to tell you this: at one point in time we had a steelmill in Illinois that needed some new electric furnaces. They guy who ran this company was the most anti-union guy in the world when he started. And when we got all this stuff done he wanted to name the plant after me, because I had gotten him five millions dollars from the Congress so he could put these electric furnaces in. He was so thrilled that he came down to Washington. We were in the old CIO Building, at 718 Jackson Place. My office was on the mezzanine, and he came in there and laid five thousand dollars down on my desk, for me. I said, "What's this for?" He said, "For what you did. You got this for us." I said, "I don't take your money. I'm well paid by the Steelworkers. I don't need your money. That's not why I did it. I did for those people that are working for you." He said,

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"You're serious." I said, "I'm dead serious. I don't want your money." So I gave him his money back. That's probably the best thing I ever did in my life. He told everybody about that. He couldn't believe this. He said, "What can I do for you?" I said, "Give me a union shop." He said, "I would go through the roof if this were not you asking this." He said, "You know, I'm not the greatest union lover." I said, "I know that, I've been dealing with you. But I've been trying to show you what I can do for you. It won't cost you one penny, because I believe in this. He said, "I'll give it to you." He gave us a union shop contract in his plant, and it was a damn good plant, and still operating in the Midwest.

But to answer your question, what we were trying to do was to keep plants operating. Now, the way they're doing it today, they're buying off these people, which I think stinks. You don't need to buy them off, you need to keep people working. It's not just today, it's been going on for so many years it isn't funny, but that was not the way we operated in the trade union movement. We tried to be as honest--now, I know there were people who took money, and all that sort of thing. That's fine and dandy. That's their business. But they've got to get up and look at themselves in the mirror every morning, and that's a pretty damn difficult thing to do if you know damn well you're a thief, and you're taking money under false pretenses to begin with. But

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if you can provide jobs for people over a long length of time, isn't that reward enough? I think it is. Maybe I'm crazy, maybe I'm just working under the wrong theory. But that's what I've always believed.

RITCHIE: You were telling me also about Adolph Sabath who gave you training on the legislative process. . . .

HOFFMANN: Chairman of the Rules Committee.

RITCHIE: On a regular basis for a couple of months.

HOFFMANN: He did, during the summer.

RITCHIE: What do you think spurred him on to become your teacher?

HOFFMANN: I really don't know. I've never known, except he took a liking to me for some reason. Why, I don't know. But he took a liking to me and did that. I guess he didn't want me to go down the wrong road. He spent that time, God rest his soul, he was a fine, fine man. I loved that man, because he took that time. It was probably the best training anybody could have ever gotten, coming down to Washington and not knowing where to go. I didn't know what door to open, or what to knock on. And he told me how to do this, and he told me what to do. He told me how important it was.

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I think he believed basically in the trade union movement and felt that I was at least on the right track. I came with hat in hand and said, "I don't know a damn thing about it and I've got to find somebody to help me." Somebody, and I'm not sure who it was, introduced me to this man. We had lunch, and he asked me about the Steelworkers. He had a lot of Steelworkers out in Illinois. I'm not sure, but one of the guys who probably intervened with him was a fellow who I worked with in the Steelworkers, who was subdistrict director in Chicago, Johnny Doherty. And I think Johnny Doherty probably knew Al Sabath very well, and

asked him to help me. That's the way I think it went, although nobody has ever told me that. That's just my supposition. Johnny Doherty was a great friend of mine. I loved John. He's dead a long time ago. He was close to Phil. John must have said, "We've got a new guy down there, can you give him a hand?" I think John was the one who told me to go and see him. I went to see him, and he just religiously kept me every single day, five days a week until the end of the summer when they weren't in session.

He taught me who the good ones were, who the bad ones were. I'll never forget this--he said, "Don't worry about the guys who are going to go for you, worry about the guys that don't. Try to convince them that you've got something going." He was a man who was meticulous about the little details that go into the legislative process, that make it work. I think that's one of the

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reasons why I listened to him so intently. I really did. I paid attention to everything. I made a lot of notes; I don't know what I did with those notes today, but every day I would write some stuff down. As soon as I'd get through with a session, I would go and put it all together. I kept it for a long time, but like a lot of other things I chucked it. Probably never should have, I should have kept some of those things, because they were so interesting. Little anecdotes of how to do it. I was only a kid, I didn't know too much. I knew nothing about it. Never been here before. I didn't know what lobbying was all about.

RITCHIE: Were there many unions that had lobbyists at that time?

HOFFMANN: Most of them did. Most of them did, in the CIO, that was in the old days. We used to meet every week, and we'd work together. The CIO had people who headed it up, and we had meetings to discuss things, and at that time some of these unions were Commie-dominated. We knew that. Little by little we edged them out, one way or another. But by and large that was the way we got to know. I remember one time, one of the guys from the UAW came over to me and he said, "You've got to get involved over in the House on this wheat for Pakistan." I looked at him and I said, "Wheat for Pakistan? I don't have any locals over in

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Pakistan!" He said, "No, but we need this." I said, "No way." And I never did get involved in it. So he went to Phil Murray and talked to Phil about the fact that I didn't do anything about wheat for Pakistan. And Phil said to him, "What did he say to you." "He said 'we don't have any locals in Pakistan.'" Phil looked at him, and said, "You know, we really don't." /Laughs/ So he was defending me. But that was basically how dumb I was. I didn't realize what he was trying to put together. We had to help those people, and he was trying to tell me that. The only people I was interested in helping were the Steelworkers who were paying my salary.

RITCHIE: Well, it always helps to know your own constituency. In 1948 labor got a big boost from the election. Truman won, and you brought in people like Hubert Humphrey, and Estes Kefauver, and Lyndon Johnson. There was a large number of Democrats who were elected and many of them with labor support.

HOFFMANN: Right.

RITCHIE: Did the climate change considerably after the 1948 election?

HOFFMANN: Oh, yes, it really did. It changed tremendously. Strange that you would ask about that election. I was on the PAC, and in 1948 I called Phil from Chicago, and I said, "Mr. Murray, Truman's going to win this election. I just

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bet ten bucks in a bar." He said, "I knew you were in a bar. You must be drunk. What do you mean Truman's going to win?" I said, "He's going to win this election." Lo and behold, Truman won the election. The next time we came around, Eisenhower was running. I was just south of San Francisco, and I called him again. I said, "Mr. Murray, we're going to get clobbered by Eisenhower." He said, "You been drinking again?" I said, "No sir." He said, "I don't think you're right." I said, "Well, I do." Suffice to say, the next day we got swamped. That Saturday, Phil came to San Francisco, we had a meeting. I met him at the train and we went up to the hotel. He had to go to a dinner. At lunch he had Johnny Doherty and a bunch of guys there. He said, "I'll never doubt this guy again." He came to me and told me Truman was going to win, and Truman won. He told me that we were going to get clobbered by Eisenhower, and we did." He went to this dinner, and afterwards we went across the street and had a sandwich--he never ate at a banquet. He and his wife were there, and he went up to bed, and I got a call five o'clock in the morning. Phil had died in his sleep, and that was the end of that.

RITCHIE: That's also the end of the tape, actually.

HOFFMANN: Yeah! [Laughs.]

[End of Interview #2]

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