


CHAPTER FOUR



President Richard M. Nixon addresses a Republican Policy Committee luncheon.

CHAPTER FOUR

Meeting the Challenge (1969-1984)



[Policy Committee changes in response to the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, under chairmen Gordon Allott (1969-1973), and John Tower (1973-1985).]

Examining Senate operations in 1976, a political scientist asked: “If the policy committees don’t make policy, and the steering committees don’t steer, and the conferences don’t confer and consult, what do they do?” The trend away from strong party leadership in Congress during the late 1960s and the 1970s had weakened the institutional framework that the Policy Committee had been designed to provide for developing party policy. After Richard Nixon’s election as president in 1968, the executive branch increasingly set the Republican legislative agenda. The Policy Committee continued its regular luncheon meetings, maintained a research service, and drafted thoughtful papers for Republican senators to use, but its work rarely surfaced in the media or even the *Congressional Record*. Then the 1976 election, in which the

party lost the presidency, stimulated a dramatic reevaluation and reinvigoration of the Senate Republican Policy Committee that altered its functions and visibility.¹

Senate rules give the minority party considerable authority to speak, to object, and to delay action as a way of forging revisions and compromise. During the years the Senate Republicans remained in the


During the years the Senate Republicans remained in the minority, from 1955 until 1981, the party bore responsibility for scrutinizing the majority's legislative agenda and providing constructive alternatives.

minority, from 1955 until 1981, the party bore responsibility for scrutinizing the majority's legislative agenda and providing constructive alternatives. Minority senators could make themselves heard through reports and debates, and by building coalitions with members of the majority to revise, amend, defeat, or pass legislation. For twelve of the twenty-six

years that Senate Republicans spent in the minority, Republican presidents occupied the White House. Having a Republican president both improved and complicated the minority's position. As the noted congressional scholar Charles O. Jones observed, "The minority leader is in the anomalous position of having to exercise responsibilities associated with enacting the President's programs—i.e., building majorities—while at the same time insuring that minority views are expressed." When the president was of the opposite party, "the minority leader must show special talents and personal dedication if alternative policy analysis is to thrive and contribute to decision making."²

1969: Senator Allott Elected Chairman

The election of a new Republican Policy Committee chairman in January 1969 took place just before the inauguration of Richard Nixon as president returned control of the executive branch to the Republicans, following eight years of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.





Senator Gordon L. Allott (R-CO).




After an active campaign, Senator Gordon Allott defeated Robert P. Griffin (a senator from Michigan from 1966 to 1979), by a vote of 25 to 18, for the chairmanship of the Republican Policy Committee. Senate Republican Minority Leader Everett Dirksen enjoyed a close relationship with Senator Allott. When Dirksen had become leader in 1959, he had made the extraordinary gesture of resigning his seat on the Senate Appropriations Committee in Allott's favor, to help the Colorado senator's chance of reelection in 1960. By coincidence, Dirksen also had given up his seat on the Labor and Public Works Committee for freshman Senator John Tower, who later succeeded Allott as Policy Committee chairman.³

Gordon Allott had a reputation as "a master of legislative procedure." Studious and reserved, he arrived at decisions methodically and maintained them persistently. Allott devoted considerable attention to building a strong national defense. During the 1960s, he supported President Johnson on the war in Vietnam while opposing most of Johnson's Great Society legislation. The columnist George Will, who once worked for Allott on the Policy Committee staff, referred to the "stolid Westernness of Allott's policies and personality."⁴

Nine months after Senator Allott took over as chair of the Policy Committee in 1969, Republican leader Everett Dirksen died. In the race to succeed Dirksen, Allott was briefly a candidate but withdrew to throw his support to the Republican whip, Hugh Scott (senator from Pennsylvania from 1959 to 1977), despite Scott's identification with the party's moderate wing. It was a gesture, said Senator Allott, toward ensuring "a unified party in the Senate." When Scott became Republican leader, Allott resumed the practice of holding a press conference as Policy Committee chairman after each luncheon—a role that Senator Dirksen had claimed for the floor leader.⁵

Closing Ranks Behind the Nixon Administration

In 1969, Chairman Allott called some rare executive meetings of Republican Policy Committee members to discuss the committee's functions, personnel, and problems. Although he recognized that differences





Senators (left to right) Robert P. Griffin (R-MI), Hugh D. Scott (R-PA), and Gordon L. Allott (R-CO).

existed among Republican senators over the Vietnam war and over social and economic policy, and that senators would not be bound by any party position, Allott argued that “there must be a fundamental change from the past eight years” when Democrats held the White House. The Policy Committee “must be in every possible accord” with President Nixon’s policies. To facilitate this new relationship and to make the Policy Committee more responsive to Republican senators’ needs, Allott distributed a questionnaire asking senators whether the Policy Committee should produce succinct, factual briefs on the issues, or conduct longer-range studies; whether it should offer staff-level seminars; whether it should invite experts to speak on current issues at the weekly lunches; and

whether it should establish staff-level contacts with the Nixon administration. When few senators responded to the survey, Allott interpreted the reason as a general desire not to depart from past practices.⁶

With top staff members of the Republican Policy Committee leaving to join the Nixon administration, Chairman Allott appointed Edward “Ned” Beach as the committee’s new staff director. A retired Navy Captain, Beach had written a popular novel about submarines, *Run Silent, Run Deep*. Captain Beach simultaneously directed the staffs of the Policy Committee and the Republican Conference, which still operated out of the same suite of offices in the Russell Senate Office Building. Under Beach, the staff devoted the greatest share of its efforts to preparing substantive but essentially neutral analyses of issues, giving both pro and con points of view. In May 1969, the Policy Committee changed the format of the *Senate Republican Memo*, which became a weekly study focused on one particular issue—with a disclaimer indicating that these staff studies did not necessarily represent the views of Republican senators. The committee also instituted a *Senate Republican Report* to present lengthier, more in-depth analysis of certain key issues. “Our aim,” Allott explained, “is to provide a variety of information oriented to future problems as well as current legislative and political issues.” The Policy Committee staff also coordinated a “Republican employment center” for Capitol Hill; supervised official photographers; coordinated intern activities; and drafted speeches for senators and end-of-the-session reports for the floor leader.⁷


At a Policy Committee luncheon in October 1969, the chairman contrasted Republicans and Democrats in the Senate and observed that “the Democratic Policy Committee has in fact become the Majority Leader, the Calendar Committee, and the Rules Committee, upon which we as Republicans have no representation and no voice.” He said that “as realists we must face the fact that we do have ideological differences within our Party in the Senate; but no greater than those which exist in the other Party.” The problem was to overcome fragmentation, find some common ground, unify Republican voting, and elect a Republican majority in the

Senate. Chairman Allott called on Republican senators to stand with President Nixon “because, as he will not and cannot be separated from us, neither can we, nor will we be separated from him” in upcoming elections. The minutes of the meeting noted that all of the senators present participated in the ensuing discussions and were “very frank in their opinions.”⁸

While Allott urged his colleagues to “close ranks behind the President,” other Republican senators complained about their difficulty in communicating with the White House. The president’s advisers seemed to take little notice of their warnings and, as a result, the administration was adopting major policy decisions with what the senators considered little regard to legislative realities. Conference Secretary North Dakota Senator Milton Young (who served in the Senate from 1945 to 1981) commented that “in the early leadership meetings the President tended to listen a great deal, but now they resemble briefings of decisions already made and already discussed on a higher level which are simply passed along for the senators’ information.”⁹

1973: A Change in Chairmen But Not Direction

Despite hopes that President Nixon’s landslide reelection would build a majority in Congress, Republicans lost two seats in the Senate in 1972. Gordon Allott was among those defeated for reelection. A contest to succeed him as Policy Committee chairman developed between Robert A. Taft, Jr. (senator from Ohio from 1971 to 1976), the son of the committee’s founder, and John Tower (senator from Texas from 1961 to 1985). Tower won by a vote of 22 to 19. As his predecessor had done, Chairman Tower began by sending a questionnaire to Republican senators, asking their opinions about the functions and role of the Policy Committee and its staff. Tower observed that the Democrats used their Policy Committee “to consider issues which are likely to result in an agreement on a policy position,” and wondered whether the Republicans could do likewise. Tower retained the staff he inherited and carried on its general patterns of research and analysis, but he also wanted to expand the committee’s role.¹⁰





Senators James L. Buckley (R-NY) and John G. Tower (R-TX) outside the Policy Committee room.

Noting that the Democratic Policy Committee had taken the initiative in trying to state a fiscal policy for the Congress, Senator Tower urged that the Republican Policy Committee propose its own fiscal policy for the Conference to adopt after one of the weekly luncheons. New York Senator James Buckley (who served from 1971 to 1977) prepared a working paper on fiscal responsibility. “The fundamental purpose is not only to support the President in his attempt to exercise fiscal restraint, but also to

provide the senators doing so with some kind of political base upon which to ground their actions.” The proposal pledged the Republican senators would vote to sustain the president’s vetoes of appropriation bills to control federal expenditures. However, the Conference amended the proposal by adding “in each Senator’s judgment.”¹¹

Senator Tower instituted an “early warning service” to keep Republican senators advised of floor problems as they developed. He assigned Policy Committee staff to monitor the Senate floor and instructed them to prepare a new *Weekly Notice*, giving a brief digest of the principal provisions and anticipated costs of upcoming bills, along with the administration’s position, and any controversial amendments. Tower continued the weekly Policy Committee lunches and provided an opportunity for ranking committee members to report on legislative developments. “It is hoped,” he added, “that only those members who have problems worthy of the attention of the entire group will speak, since otherwise valuable time would be expended to the detriment of all those present.” He promised to maintain regular contact with the White House liaison office and to give “direct and wholehearted support” to the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee within the letter of the law.

These initiatives would require cutbacks on the amount of staff time devoted to speech writing and to production of the weekly *Memo*. Tower emphasized that the purpose of this reorientation was “to enable the Republican members of the Senate to operate more cohesively and with better awareness of the problems, and make it possible for them more easily to present a united considered front on hot legislation or opposition trickery.”¹²


Tower’s efforts to revitalize the Policy Committee unfolded against the backdrop of the Watergate scandal. While Senate Republicans continued to support the president, the constant exposure of new revelations strained their relationship. On October 31, 1973, Senator Tower convened an executive meeting of the Policy Committee at which the senators demanded “full and open disclosure on all matters at issue” if the president hoped to command future support from Republican legislators.

When President Nixon agreed to meet with Republican senators to answer their questions, Senator Tower credited the Policy Committee's initiative. The president, he said, had concluded that "his first task was to establish a new rapport with senators of his own party."¹³

A Policy-Making Role


As Policy Committee chairman, John Tower rarely attempted to coordinate efforts with Republican floor leader Hugh Scott. Both men preferred to deal with senators individually rather than collectively. Other than the weekly lunches, Senator Tower called only a few meetings of the Policy Committee and tended to make his own decisions over what programs to pursue. Tower made the Policy Committee staff available as an extension of Republican senators' staffs, and the Republican Policy Committee tended to be better staffed than its Democratic counterpart. In the 1970s, the Republican Policy Committee used its full appropriation for research while the Democratic Policy Committee routinely returned about half its annual appropriation, suggesting that Senate Democrats depended more on standing committee staff for support.¹⁴

William F. Hildenbrand (who served as administrative assistant to the Republican minority leader from 1969 to 1975 and as Senate Republican secretary from 1975 to 1981) commented that "the Policy Committee chairman hasn't really set policy, as you would think a Policy Committee by its name would have. But it's never worked out that way." Policy Committee chairmen had generally avoided confrontations with their party's floor leaders. "The Conference rules are pretty explicit in terms of the minority and majority leader being responsible for everything that happens on the floor," Hildenbrand noted, adding that Senator Tower "from time to time would have small groups get together and issue papers, for example. But no one sets policy but the Conference itself, which is comprised of all the Republicans. They get together and they decide what their policy's going to be."¹⁵





Senator John G. Tower (R-TX).




Calls for Reform and Redirection

By the 1970s, the leadership of both parties in Congress had grown more diffuse. Political scientists concluded that the Senate by nature diminished party discipline and deterred strong party leaders, especially in the use of policy analysis to support a unified party program. Power and influence in the Senate was divided among the many standing committees and subcommittees. Such diffusion provided access for the many interests in a large and diverse society, but proved a handicap in rallying party support behind legislation. In recommending ways to strengthen party leadership, the congressional scholar Randall Ripley saw the Policy committees as “an institutional peg” that leaders could use to expand their role in policymaking. However, Ripley also warned that “the Policy Committees necessarily will have to be selective about what they do in providing policy analysis since they are small committees with small staffs and many competitors.”¹⁶

The need for revision grew as dramatic changes occurred on Capitol Hill. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 provided each senator with committee staff and also mandated minority staffs for all committees. The Vietnam War and Watergate scandal heightened congressional distrust of the executive branch agencies, causing Congress to seek its own independent sources of information. Congress expanded the General Accounting Office and Congressional Research Service to meet increasing demand for information. Regardless of their seniority, almost all senators were able to chair or become ranking member of a subcommittee, thus gaining additional staff. At the same time, the chairmen of the full committees lost some of their control over subcommittees and the committee’s agenda. Committee meetings were opened to the “sunshine” of public and media scrutiny.¹⁷

1976: Commission Offers Specific Recommendations

In 1976, the Commission on the Operation of the Senate set out to streamline and improve the legislative process. The Commission conducted




interviews, took testimony, and gathered reports on the functioning of Senate business. One of these reports, by Jack L. Walker of the Institute for Public Policy Studies, urged that the Senate revise the structure and selection of the two policy committees to enable them to exert greater control over the legislative agenda. Walker called for the policy committees to speak with more authority for their party conferences, and for their staffs to become more involved in coordinating the legislative activities of the standing committees.¹⁸

In another report to the Commission, political scientist Charles O. Jones envisioned that the policy committees would originate and develop specific programs, which the conferences would modify and endorse, and which the standing committees would turn into legislation. His model re-

Political scientist Charles O. Jones envisioned that the policy committees would originate and develop specific programs, which the standing committees would turn into legislation.

quired discipline to punish recalcitrant committee chairmen and members who did not serve the party's purposes. Jones detected that the Republican Policy Committee's weekly lunches gave it a "slightly more substantial policy role than its Democratic counterpart." Yet he noted that the Republi-

can Policy Committee neither issued policy statements nor attempted to develop party positions. Instead, the policy committee used its staff for "tracking legislation, providing research and reports at the request of individual Senators, and speech-writing or other political work." As useful as these policy-related activities had become, the political scientists thought the policy committees should be doing more. Jones recommended that the Republican Policy Committee be composed of the ranking members of the standing committees and chaired by the party's floor leader to achieve "a more vital, policy-oriented minority." While choosing to keep the Policy Committee chairmanship separate from the floor leadership, Republicans reconstituted the Policy Committee in 1983 to include all committee chairmen and floor leaders.¹⁹



Alternatives to President Carter's Programs

It was the election of a Democrat, Jimmy Carter, as president in 1976 that convinced John Tower of the need to revitalize the Policy Committee, in order to forge alternatives to Carter's policies. For eight years, Senate Republicans had taken their policy leads from the White House, he noted, "now we have to take our own initiatives." In December 1976, Senator Tower hired President Gerald Ford's chief congressional liaison, Max L. Friedersdorf, to be the new staff director of the Policy Committee. A former journalist and congressional staff member before his White House service, Friedersdorf came to Capitol Hill well known and highly regarded. Senator Tower gave him broad leeway to recruit an almost entirely new staff who turned the Policy Committee into a Republican "think tank." As a result, the Congressional Quarterly's *Politics in America* would credit



Senate Republicans in the Policy Committee hearing room.

Senator Tower with transforming the committee into “an active research and information arm of the Republican Party.”²⁰

The Policy Committee identified taxes and energy as the major areas in which the Carter administration would most likely move. Senator Tower assigned these subjects for study by two ad hoc subcommittees of the Policy Committee. A subcommittee chaired by New York Senator Jacob Javits, the ranking Republican on the Joint Economic Committee, would handle taxes, while energy would go to a subcommittee chaired by Wyoming Senator Clifford Hansen, the ranking Republican on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee. The subcommittees took testimony and then had the Policy Committee staff—working with minority staff members of the standing committees—put together alternative tax and energy proposals.

Lacking support from executive branch agencies, the Policy Committee staff ingeniously turned to the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the General Accounting Office. Although Republican senators had often viewed these agencies as arms of the Democratic majorities, they noted that the congressional analyses differed in significant aspects from the Carter administration’s assertions. The Policy Committee staff compiled and analyzed the reports of these organizations on Carter’s energy goals. After several weeks of study, all of the staff aides met in Friedersdorf’s office to merge their individual contributions into unified drafts. The subcommittees examined the drafts line by line, approving them as a committee would handle a bill. The drafts then went to the full Policy Committee for review, and finally were voted upon in the Conference.²¹

When President Carter submitted his energy proposals in 1977, the Policy Committee was ready to release its own “Republican Energy Initiative.” The Republican proposals differed sharply from Carter’s by encouraging greater supply through deregulation rather than by enforcing conservation through gasoline and “gas guzzler” taxes. “Our plan calls for less, rather than more, governmental regulation of America’s energy capacity,” said Republican Minority Leader Howard Baker, who placed them

in the *Congressional Record* “so that the ideas of the Republican conference might be more widely disseminated.” This marked a rare occasion when a Policy Committee report appeared on its own rather than as background information for Republican senators. Later, as the energy situation worsened, Senator Baker reported audiences cheering when he told them “that Republicans recommended a solution to the energy crisis long ago, and that if the President had adopted it, there would be no lines [at the gas pumps] today.”²²


In the 1970s, Senate Republicans were more united on energy matters than on economic policy. Senator Tower convened Republican senators in the Policy Committee room to examine the draft plan for economic revival. Tower invited Treasury Secretary William Simon to address the group, to listen to their proposals, and to critique their ideas. The Texas Senator “may look small,” wrote columnist David Broder, “but all his political actions have produced large waves.” Republicans found that despite his reputation as a natty dresser, Tower was “a shirt-sleeves kind of guy,” who directed these working sessions with his sleeves rolled up. Members later judged the effort worthwhile, both for producing a program and for attracting media attention.²³

Activist staff members of the Policy Committee injected an early version of supply-side economics into the economic plan, including

across-the-board tax-rate reduction to stimulate the economy. The Republican plan for permanent tax cuts, to counter Carter’s tax rebate proposals, was defeated by an almost straight party-line vote on April 28, 1977. “By not having to support a Republican administration,” the Congressional scholar and journal-

“Their goal is not to produce a package that will be adopted in all of its details, but to rally around a common set of principles that will allow them to build a record they can take to the public in the next election.”

ist Michael Malbin observed, “Senate Republicans are able to pick their targets with care. Their goal, they realize, is not to produce a package that will be adopted in all of its details, but to rally around a common set of





Senate Republicans in the Policy Committee hearing room.

principles that will allow them to build a record they can take to the public in the next election.”²⁴

Ronald Reagan in the White House

In 1979, Senator Carl Curtis (senator from Nebraska from 1955 to 1979) retired, and Robert Packwood (senator from Oregon from 1969 to 1995) replaced him as Republican Conference chairman. Where previously Max Friedersdorf had served as staff director of both the Conference and the Policy Committee, both of which continued to operate out of the same office, Senator Packwood chose to appoint a separate staff director for the Conference. The division became physical in 1983, when the Conference moved to the new Hart Senate Office Building while the Policy Committee remained in the Russell Building. Under Senator Packwood, the Conference ventured into videotaping and distribution of



(Left to right) Vice President George Bush, Senator James A. McClure (R-ID), Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY), Senator Howard Baker, Jr. (R-TN), President Ronald Reagan, and then-Representative Trent Lott (R-MS) in the Capitol.

senators' statements to the news media. In mid-1979, Max Friedersdorf left the Policy Committee to take a post on the Federal Election Commission; he later returned to the White House as congressional liaison under Ronald Reagan. The Policy Committee's new staff director, Richard Thompson, formerly administrative assistant to Senator James McClure (who served from Idaho from 1973 to 1991), held strongly conservative credentials that reflected the staff's outlook on issues.²⁵


The unraveling of President Carter's comprehensive energy plan, collapse of his tax rebates, and general resistance within Congress to the

administration's initiatives contributed to the president's defeat for reelection in 1980. That year, Senator Tower chaired the Republican platform committee, and members of the Policy Committee staff volunteered to draft the party platform. In the process, Senator Tower held a series of hearings around the country. While his own interests concentrated on foreign policy and defense issues, he was impressed with the repeated concern for social issues expressed passionately by those who attended his hearings. In the end, the convention produced

The political landscape changed dramatically when Ronald Reagan won the presidency and Republicans regained the majority in the Senate.

what Tower called a "progressive document because of its emphasis on the major problems of the day." Ronald Reagan ran on the platform, which helped define the early Reagan administration.²⁶

The political landscape changed dramatically when Ronald Reagan won the presidency and Republicans regained the majority in the Senate (although not yet in the House of Representatives). Preoccupied with his chairmanship of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Tower limited his role as Policy Committee chairman to presiding over the weekly luncheons. The Senate Republican Policy Committee was represented on the Reagan transition team, and several Policy Committee staff took positions in the new administration. The Reagan White House resumed the lead in formulating Republican policies. While the Policy Committee stepped back from writing independent papers, its members and staff communicated and worked closely with administration officials, making the legislative results a team effort. Vice President George Bush regularly attended the lunches, and from time to time President Reagan joined the senators to rally support for his proposals. Early in his presidency, Reagan won major victories in cutting taxes and designing a new budgetary blueprint. With Senate Republicans standing behind their president, the administration could aim its chief legislative efforts toward the House, to forge a coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats that enacted many of Reagan's programs.²⁷



Notes

¹ Charles O. Jones, "Senate Party Leadership in Public Policy," in Commission on the Operation of the Senate, *Policymaking Role of Leadership in the Senate*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, 25.

² Jones, "The Senate Minority and Policy Analysis," Commission on the Operation of the Senate, *Policymaking Role of Leadership in the Senate*, 34.

³ "Senate GOP Leadership," *Congressional Quarterly* (12 September 1969), 1672; Neil MacNeil, *Dirksen: Portrait of a Public Man* (New York: World Publishing, 1970), 165–166.

⁴ Norris Cotton, *In the Senate: Amidst the Conflict and the Turmoil* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972), 174; *Washington Post*, January 19, 1989.

⁵ *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (6 February 1970), 350; *Chicago Tribune*, September 16, 1969.

⁶ Republican Policy Committee Minutes, January 14, 21, 29, February 25, April 22, 1969.

⁷ Gordon Allott Memorandum to all Republican Senators, January 20, 1970, Memorandum from Edward L. Beach to Gordon Allott, October 13, 1970, Republican Policy Committee Minutes; Interview with Bill Gribbin, November 4, 1996, Senate Historical Office; "History and Functions of the U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee," January 18, 1973, Senate Historical Office.

⁸ Republican Policy Committee Minutes, October 28, 1969.

⁹ Republican Policy Committee Minutes, March 23, 1971, July 25, 1972.

¹⁰ Republican Policy Committee Minutes, January 9, 1973; *John Tower Reports to Texas*, 93rd Congress, 1st sess, vol. 12, February 1, 1973, Senate Historical Office.

¹¹ Republican Policy Committee Minutes, March 13, 15, 1973.

¹² Republican Policy Committee Minutes, April 10, June 7, 1973.

¹³ Republican Policy Committee Minutes, October 31, November 13, 1973.


¹⁴ Jones, "The Senate Minority and Policy Analysis," 38; Donald Allen Robinson, "If the Senate Democrats Want Leadership: An Analysis of the History and Prospects of the Majority Policy Committee," in Commission on the Operation of the Senate, *Policymaking Role of Leadership in the Senate*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 45.

¹⁵ William F. Hildenbrand Oral History Interviews for the Senate Historical Office, 113–114.

¹⁶ Randall B. Ripley, "Party Leaders, Policy Committees, and Policy Analysis in the United States Senate," in Commission on the Operation of the Senate, *Policymaking Role of Leadership in the Senate*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 5–11.

¹⁷ Barbara Sinclair, *The Transformation of the U.S. Senate* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1989), 51–70.

¹⁸ Jack L. Walker, "Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate," in Commission on the Operation of the Senate, *Policymaking Role of Leadership in the Senate*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), 118.



¹⁹ Charles O. Jones, "Senate Party Leadership in Public Policy," 24–25; and Jones, "The Senate Minority and Policy Analysis," 34.

²⁰ After making the staff changes, Senator Tower was unexpectedly challenged for reelection as chairman of the Policy Committee by the freshman Senator John Danforth (Senator from Missouri from 1976 to 1995). Although he won reelection, Tower told Policy Committee members that he would not have reorganized the staff until after the election, if he had expected a challenge. Republican Policy Committee Minutes, January 10, 1977; *Washington Post*, January 1, 1977; Michael J. Malbin, "The Senate Republican Leaders—Life without a President," *National Journal* (21 May 1977), 780; Interview with Bill Gribbin, Senate Historical Office; Alan Ehrenhalt, ed., *Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and at Home* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), 1148.

²¹ *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1148.

²² *Ibid.*; Republican Policy Committee Minutes, May 22, 1979.

²³ Ehrenhalt, ed., *Politics in America*, 1148; *Washington Post*, August 28, 1983.

²⁴ Bill Gribbin Interview; Anthony King, ed., *Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch, and Congress in the 1980s* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 92–93; *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., S19334.

²⁵ Bill Gribbin Interview; Republican Policy Committee Minutes, December 11, 1979.

²⁶ Republican Policy Committee Minutes, July 22, 1980; Bill Gribbin Interview.

²⁷ Republican Policy Committee Minutes, July 14, 1981; Bill Gribbin Interview; "The Reagan Re-Direction," in Lou Cannon, *Reagan* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1982), 321–348.

