STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI)
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARING ON
SARS: HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE?
May 21, 2003
Today, the front lines of the SARS battle in the United States
are drawn at our airports, our border crossings, our hospitals,
and the local doctor’s office. Our local health care
providers need resources and training to protect our country
from a SARS outbreak. We’ve been relatively lucky so
far, but we need more than luck to keep this public health
threat under control. We need resources and planning.
Right now our knowledge of SARS is limited. We don’t
know where the disease came from, we don’t know how
to rapidly and reliably test its presence, and we don’t
have a cure. But we have learned that if we identify SARS
patients quickly and isolate probable cases, we can prevent
the disease from spreading. That means our first and most
important line of defense is having first-responders who are
trained to spot SARS symptoms, have adequate resources, and
workable, sensible plans to safeguard the public.
We also know that some countries have done a better job
than others at preventing the spread of SARS. We know that
China was not, at first, up front with its citizens about
the disease and as a result, both confusion and the disease
have spread. In contrast, Vietnam successfully contained a
possible SARS outbreak through swift action. To protect our
own country, we need to learn from the experiences of others,
as well as devise ways to support other countries’ efforts
to stem their SARS infections.
When we look here at home, the facts paint a complex picture
of our readiness to fight SARS. The good news is that we have
a public health system that is engaged in this battle and
taking many of the steps needed. Few cases are being found,
and no fatalities to date. But on the other hand, we have
inadequate resources to support the good intentions and planning
of our health care system.
In my own home state of Michigan, the SARS readiness picture
is a promising one, but one that requires further development
and support. Out of a total of 43 persons evaluated in Michigan
for SARS to date, only 4 suspected cases have been identified.
All four cases are being treated, with no fatalities to date.
Michigan has also taken a number of steps to mount an effective
response to the SARS threat. It has determined that it has
legal authority to quarantine individuals posing an imminent
public health threat. The Michigan Department of Community
Health has assigned responsibility for combating SARS to a
specific state office, the Public Health Preparedness Office.
The state has issued guidelines to Michigan hospitals on how
to identify and treat suspected SARS patients, and sends out
regular e-mail updates to hospitals and all 64 local county
health departments.
The University of Michigan Medical School has also taken
a proactive role. For example, it has created a SARS working
group that meets weekly and includes representatives from
local community health departments. The working group has
set up a communications line called Telecare that takes calls
from people with questions about SARS. They have developed
a questionnaire for health care providers to screen emergency
room patients by asking about their travel history, exposure
to potential SARS patients, and symptoms. They are also working
on locating a facility that could be used to quarantine a
large number of SARS patients, were that to become necessary.
These precautions are essential, in part because Michigan
is the largest single area for border crossings between the
United States and Canada. Canada is the United States’
top trading partner with over $1 billion worth of goods and
services crossing the border every day, and more than 40%
of that trade moving between Michigan and Ontario. To give
you some idea of the potential impact SARS could have on Michigan,
every day over 36,000 vehicles – trucks, cars, and buses–
depart Canada and travel to Michigan. Furthermore, every day
the number of people coming into Michigan from Canada on trains,
cars, and buses exceeds 70,000. In addition, Great Lakes marine
traffic and the Detroit international airport bring in cargos
and passengers from all over the world. Together, these border
crossings make Michigan a key gateway that must be protected
to keep the United States safe from SARS.
To limit SARS risks at its border crossings, Michigan is
working actively with CDC, Customs, Border, and port personnel
to screen persons entering the United States. If persons crossing
the border show symptoms of SARS, for example, Michigan and
the CDC have designated three local health departments in
Chippewa County, St. Clair County, and Detroit to evaluate
and care for suspected patients, including possible hospitalization
and quarantine.
Many of these steps represent new and important improvements,
and the near absence of SARS in Michigan shows they seem to
be working. But our officials have also uncovered major shortcomings
that need to be addressed. For example, when the City of Detroit
drew up an Action Plan for Homeland Security, one of the first
such plans for a major city in the United States, it determined
that the city does not currently have a computerized database
system that can detect emerging public health problems. Detroit
Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick has now called for establishing a citywide
disease surveillance system that, consistent with privacy
protections, can track both infectious diseases and bioterrorism
incidents, and communicate directly with health care professionals,
state officials, and the CDC.
Another ongoing issue is training and protections for local
health care providers. In some countries, hospital workers
such as nurses have suffered SARS infections despite using
recommended safeguards. More work needs to be done to understand
how they became sick and to protect them. One part of the
problem may be that only certain types of surgical masks provide
adequate protection from SARS droplets, and these masks need
to be fitted carefully and changed daily. An even more basic
issue is to ensure that health care workers and family members
have adequate supplies of masks as well as other key health
care equipment such as respirators.
Another issue of importance is that, right now, Michigan
doctors have to send their SARS diagnostic tests to CDC labs
in Atlanta for analysis. Michigan laboratories want to set
up an in-state testing service to speed up the results and
reduce the burden on CDC labs. Another open issue is who will
pay for significant testing and quarantine costs, should those
become necessary.
Resource needs on the local level show how far we still
need to go to protect this country against SARS. They are
more than matched by questions on the international and national
level. How do we assist China in getting its SARS outbreak
under control to reduce SARS risks worldwide? Should the World
Health Organization be given additional authority to monitor
in-country disease outbreaks and quarantine procedures? How
do we encourage rapid development of a SARS vaccine?
We can isolate our patients, but we can’t isolate
our country. We need to work with the world community, and
we need the world community to work together to reduce the
threat of SARS and other diseases which know no boundaries,
just as we need the world community to pull together in the
war on terrorism.
Recent press coverage indicates that the SARS threat may
be coming under control worldwide, and I hope that is true.
But responsible government calls for taking steps today to
prevent the SARS problem from becoming a public health care
nightmare tomorrow.
We need the political will to take those preventative steps.
Last week, the Senate voted for more than $350 billion in
tax cuts over the next ten years. To help pay for its proposed
tax cuts, the Administration has proposed cutting spending
on a number of important programs, including for public health
care. That is a short-sighted mistake.
We can’t rely on private philanthropy to deal with
the public’s need. One example shows why. After the
9-11 and anthrax incidents in 2001, a U.S. citizen who is
also a co-founder of Home Depot, Bernard Marcus, took a tour
of the CDC’s laboratory facilities in Atlanta. He was
so disturbed by their dilapidated state that he personally
pledged $2 million to enable the CDC to equip a state-of-the
art emergency response center, which has played a key role
in the battle against SARS. It is incredible that a private
citizen had to step in to make up for the inadequate resources
of the federal government in such a vital area. While the
generosity of Mr. Marcus has made a real difference, we can’t
rely on that approach to construct a workable disease surveillance
system that can identify, monitor, and evaluate the severity
of infectious disease outbreaks in the United States.
I was a member of the Detroit City Council during the 1970's.
I know that if a contagious disease were to have broken out
in my city during those days, my phone would have started
ringing and not stopped. The experiences of local health care
professionals can tell us a lot about what is and is not working,
and I commend Senator Coleman for holding this hearing today
– his first, by the way, in Washington as Chairman of
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. I look forward
to hearing today’s testimony.
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