Actions Needed to Improve
Aviation Security
The Honorable Kenneth M.
Mead
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairmen
Lieberman and Durbin, Ranking Members Thompson and Voinovich, and
other Members of the Committee:
We want to
first express our sorrow to the many families who have lost or are
missing loved ones as a result of the terrorist attacks on
September 11th. We
also want to acknowledge the national response the President,
Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey, other Department heads,
the Congress, law enforcement, and the many rescue and relief
workers have taken regarding these attacks.
We
have been reporting on aviation security for at least a decade and
have made numerous recommendations for strengthening the system
covering a broad range of issues within the security
system—advanced security technologies, passenger and baggage
screening, airport access control, and cargo security.
In the last several years alone, we have issued reports
showing vulnerabilities with screening of passengers; checked and
carry-on baggage and cargo; access to secure areas of the airport;
and issuing and controlling airport identification badges.
We
also have conducted numerous criminal investigations resulting in
prosecutions involving the falsification of airport
identification, security screener training records, and background
checks. Most
recently, a private security company was placed on 36 months
probation and ordered to pay over $1 million in fines and
restitution for failing to conduct background checks and
falsifying training records on employees staffing security
checkpoints at a major U.S. airport.
Also, three days following the terrorist attacks, we
arrested 12 non‑U.S. citizens who illegally obtained
security badges necessary to gain admittance to secure areas at
another major U.S. airport. We
would like the Committee to know that we temporarily detailed some
of our law enforcement staff to the Federal Air Marshal Program,
and we are assisting the FBI in various aspects of its
investigation.
The
horror and tragedy of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
with the loss of thousands of lives and the resultant economic
damage, illustrates the vulnerability of the current security
system. It also shows
that our transportation systems, in this case aviation, can be
used as a weapon against us.
The aviation security system, as a vital national security
interest, is a critical line of defense, but it is not foolproof,
particularly against terrorists who are willing to die in their
criminal schemes. This
is why the effort to stop terrorist attacks along with the
strengthening of transportation security is so important.
Also,
public confidence in the security of the Nation’s transportation
systems, especially aviation, has been seriously damaged and needs
to be restored. The
President, Departments of Justice and Transportation and others
already have a broad range of security measures underway to
address this issue. One
such measure is increasing the workforce in the Federal Air
Marshal Program. Other
additional measures currently in place at all the Nation’s
commercial airports include increased security such as:
eliminating curbside baggage check-in, intensified passenger and
carry-on baggage screening at security checkpoints, and limiting
access beyond the screening checkpoints to passengers with tickets
or ticket confirmations.
Today, I
would like to highlight some issues concerning governance and
organizational structure of how to approach aviation security and
then proceed to some specific areas that need to be strengthened.
We will be sharing these points in detail with the
Secretary’s Rapid Response Teams.
Governance, Organization and
Delivery of Aviation Securit
The
current U.S. system has a variety of organizations responsible for
various elements of aviation security.
Other nations use models different from ours.
In Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, the airports
are responsible for screening.
In the Netherlands, the government is currently responsible
for passenger screening, but employs a security company to conduct
the screening operations.
Given
the scope and complexity of the security challenge as we now know
it, coupled with a longstanding history of problems with the
aviation security program, we believe the time has come to
consider the option of vesting governance of the program and
responsibility for the provision of security in one Federal
organization or not‑for‑profit Federal corporation. This entity would have security as its primary and central
focus, profession, and mission.
Under the current system, those charged with aviation
security oversight and regulation (FAA) and those charged with
providing the security (the airlines and airports) are themselves
facing other priorities, missions, and, in some cases, competing
economic pressures.
A
centralized, consolidated approach by an organization with a
security mission would require passenger and baggage screeners to
have uniform, more rigorous training, and performance standards
applicable nationwide. The
employees of this entity would not necessarily need to be Federal
employees, but would be required to meet established performance
standards, and would be subject to termination if they do not
perform. This should
result in more consistent security at our Nation’s airports.
A Federal
organization or Federal corporation would be responsible for
screening passengers, employees (anyone with access to the
aircraft or secure areas of the airport), carry-on baggage,
checked baggage, and cargo. It
would also issue, control and account for identification media at
airports nationwide; search aircraft and airport facilities with
canine units; and manage airport access control systems.
The organization could also include the current Federal Air
Marshals; and could take over responsibility for developing,
purchasing and deploying advanced security technologies, such as
explosives detection equipment.
The organization, not the airlines, FAA, or airports, would
determine when the security equipment should be used to screen
baggage and be responsible for the maintenance and upgrading of
this equipment.
This
entity would also be able to maintain close ties to the
intelligence community, revise requirements or procedures without
going through a lengthy rulemaking process, require employees to
be U.S. citizens and have background and credit checks, and
provide screening personnel better salaries and a career path.
Any
change in the governance and organization of this system will
require careful analysis, cannot be done overnight, and will
require a transition period.
In the interim, we must sustain the current system and
improve security measures now in place
Changes Needed to Supplement
and Enhance Security Actions Already Underway
The aviation
security system in place today is a layered system of systems in
place at the Nation’s airports.
This system involves prescreening passengers at
check‑in; screening passengers’ checked and carry-on
baggage, and cargo at security control points in the airports;
controlling access to secure areas of the airport; and restricting
access to secure areas of the airport to unauthorized individuals.
Aviation
security in the U.S. is also based on a system of shared
responsibilities among FAA, air carriers, and airport operators.
FAA is responsible for establishing and enforcing
regulations, policies, and procedures; identifying potential
threats and appropriate countermeasures; deploying Federal Air
Marshals on selected U.S. air carrier flights; and providing
overall guidance and oversight to ensure the security of
passengers, crews, baggage, cargo, and aircraft.
Air carriers
are primarily responsible for applying security measures to
passengers, crews, baggage, and cargo.
This includes screening all passengers, and passengers’
carry-on and checked baggage, which is usually performed by
contractors. Airports,
run by State or local government authorities, are responsible for
the security of the airport environment and for providing law
enforcement support for implementation of air carrier and airport
security measures.
The
Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (OIG)
and the General Accounting Office (GAO) have issued numerous
reports identifying weaknesses in the aviation security system and
recommending corrective actions.
Many of these weaknesses are still present and need to be
addressed without delay. To address those weaknesses, FAA needs to take the following
immediate actions to improve aviation security:
·
Increase use of bulk
explosives detection machines for screening of passengers’
checked baggage.
·
Issue the final rule
on certification of screening companies to improve the screening
of passengers, carry-on items, and cargo, and improve screener
performance.
·
Establish standards
for measuring security screeners performance based on
computer‑assisted testing methods and unannounced testing of
screeners by FAA.
·
Strengthen controls
to prevent access to secure areas of the airport by unauthorized
individuals.
·
Conduct criminal
checks for all employees working at the airport with unrestricted
access to secure areas of the airport.
FAA also
needs to take actions to improve weaknesses in its Cargo Security
program, and continue with ongoing efforts to increase the Federal
Air Marshal program workforce.
We will be providing this information to the Secretary’s
Rapid Response Teams.
Security
of Checked Baggage
Explosives
detection equipment such as the CTX machine was developed to
assist screeners in identifying threat items in passenger baggage.
In our 1998 report on Deployment of Explosives Detection
Equipment, we recommended that FAA develop a strategy to more
effectively utilize the CTX machines and enhance screener
performance. Recently,
Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 2000,
which requires FAA to maximize the use of explosives detection
equipment. Today,
however CTX machines are still underused, and screeners’
performance needs improvement.
FAA
has taken action to increase utilization of bulk explosives
detection machines. However,
we do not accept the utilization goals that FAA has chosen.
It is too low. Nor do we accept that FAA’s goals are responsive to the
requirements mandated in the Airport Security Improvement Act of
2000. The majority of
the machines are still underutilized.
A bulk explosives detection machine in use has an
immediate, powerful, and visible deterrent effect on potential
terrorist attack. One
sitting idle does not.
Screening
Checkpoint Security
In our 1996
report on efforts to improve airport security we found screeners
frequently failed to detect threat items at security checkpoints.
More recently, GAO completed a review titled
Long‑Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’
Performance.
In this 2000 report, GAO found that long-standing problems
combine to reduce screeners’ effectiveness in detecting
dangerous objects, most notably (1) the rapid turnover of
screener personnel, and (2) human factors conditions that for
years affected screeners’ hiring, training, and working
environment. GAO found that despite several laws enacted by Congress,
concerns remain over screeners’ ability to detect dangerous
objects. Furthermore,
FAA has acknowledged that screeners’ detection of dangerous
objects during testing is unsatisfactory and needs improvement.
This is a long-standing problem – one that was reported
on over a decade ago by the Department of Transportation and GAO.
The Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 directed FAA to certify
screening companies and improve screener performance.
FAA was prepared to issue its final rule on the
Certification of Screening Companies the week of September 10,
2001. However,
following the September 11 tragedy, the Department of
Transportation elected to delay the final rule publication so that
the Rapid Response Teams could re‑evaluate the certification
requirements.
Threat image
projection (TIP) is an important component of FAA’s final rule
on Certification of Screening Companies.
TIP is software program installed on x‑ray machines
being deployed at screening checkpoints at airports nationwide.
TIP exposes screeners to projected simulated threats on a
regular basis to train them to become more adept at detecting
threats and to enhance their vigilance.
In its final rule, FAA will require that TIP be used to
measure the performance of individual screeners and screening
companies. However,
FAA still needs to establish standards for measuring screener
performance based on a combination of TIP testing and actual field
testing by FAA.
Airport
Access Controls
Controlling
access to secure areas of the airport is critical in protecting
the airport’s infrastructure and aircraft from unauthorized
individuals. During
late 1998 and early 1999, we successfully accessed
secure areas
in 68 percent of our tests at eight major U.S. airports.
Once we entered secure areas, we boarded aircraft 117 times.
The majority of our aircraft boardings would not have
occurred if employees had taken the prescribed steps, such as
making sure doors closed behind them.
In addition to recommending that FAA work with airport
operators and air carriers to implement and strengthen existing
controls to eliminate access control weaknesses, we also
recommended that comprehensive training programs be developed that
teach employees their role in airport security, and make employees
accountable for compliance. These
recommendations along with others were incorporated into the
Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000.
FAA recently
issued regulations making individuals directly accountable to FAA
for noncompliance with access control requirements.
But testing and assessing fines for security violations is
not the only answer. FAA
must assist airport operators and air carriers in developing and
implementing comprehensive training programs.
All security training programs, not just for access
control, must teach employees their role in aviation security, the
importance of their participation, how their performance will be
evaluated, and what action will be taken if they fail to perform.
Issuing
Airport Identification
Additional
actions are needed to improve the process used to ensure that
employees with access to secure areas of an airport are
trustworthy. Our 2000 report on Controls Over Airport Identification Media
looked at industry’s compliance with FAA’s background
investigation requirements at six U.S. airports and found that the
requirements were ineffective, and airport operators, air carriers
and airport users
frequently did not comply with these requirements.
We made recommendations to FAA to:
strengthen background investigation requirements to include
initial and randomly recurring FBI criminal checks for all
employees; expand the list of crimes that disqualify an individual
from unescorted access to secure airport areas; and incorporate in
background investigation requirements the use of credit checks and
drug tests to help assess whether individuals can be trusted with
the public’s safety and be permitted to work in secure airport
areas.
The Airport Security Improvement Act of
2000 incorporated some of our recommendations and required FBI
criminal checks at Category X airports as of December 2000. However, other airports will not enter this program until
December 2003, even though FAA has stated the capacity to
process additional checks exists.
We recommended that all airports be required, immediately,
to conduct criminal checks for all employees that have access to
secure airport areas, and for all screeners, including cargo
screeners. Also,
criminal checks must not be restricted to first‑time
applicants, as the current law provides, but should include all
employees regardless of their employment date.
Further, criminal checks must be recurring.
We
also must consider additional methods of determining the
trustworthiness of individuals, especially for individuals who
have not been in the U.S. long enough for a criminal records check
to be effective. FAA has stated that conducting foreign criminal checks
presents numerous problems and, therefore, would not be feasible.
FAA also declined to implement the use of credit checks and
drug tests because Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 did
not include these requirements.
But, we believe that alternate investigation methods, such
as those used by Canada, must be explored, including:
credit checks, requirements that applicants be U.S.
citizens, and an automated profiling system that takes into
consideration factors including an individual’s place of birth.
Cargo
Security
We
just completed a follow-up audit of FAA’s Cargo Security
Program. We continue
to find weaknesses in FAA’s policy for allowing cargo on
passenger aircraft. We will not discuss the details of those weaknesses here
today, but will be briefing the Secretary of Transportation, the
Federal Aviation Administrator, and the Secretary’s recently
created Rapid Response Teams.
Federal
Air Marshal Program
In the
1970’s, hundreds of security officers were hired through an
agreement between the FAA and U.S. Customs Service.
In 1973, after the Customs Sky Marshal program phased out,
the FAA continued a limited Air Marshal Program using volunteer
special agents from its Civil Aviation Security.
Following
the Cuban refugee problems in Florida and the hijacking of Trans
World Flight 847 in 1985, the Secretary of Transportation released
a report, in 1987, which concluded there was a need for an
expanded Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Program to supplement ground
security measures. Initially,
all FAA security specialists hired between 1985 and 1992 were
required to also serve as FAMs.
Currently, FAA has a dedicated staff of FAMs, but the
actual number of FAMs is classified.
We think it is a wise decision to substantially increase
use of this Program in the interest of restoring public confidence
and as a deterrent to criminal on aircraft.
This
concludes my statement. I
would be pleased to answer any questions.
Attachment
(4 Pages)
AVIATION SECURITY TESTIMONY AND REPORTS
AS
OF SEPTEMBER 14, 2001
TESTIMONY
Date
|
Title
|
Report Number
|
04/06/2000
|
Aviation Security
Statement of Alexis Stefani, Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate
|
AV-2000-076
|
03/16/2000
|
Aviation Security
Statement of Alexis Stefani, Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
U.S. House of Representatives
|
AV-2000-070
|
03/01/2000
|
Improving Aviation Safety, Efficiency,
and Security: FAA’s Fiscal Year 2001 Request For Research,
Engineering, and Development
Statement of Alexis Stefani, Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing
Before the Subcommittee on Technology,
Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives
|
AV-2000-054
|
03/10/1999
|
Aviation
Security
Statement
of Alexis Stefani, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for
Aviation
Before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Related Agencies,
Committee
on Appropriations,
U.S. House
of Representatives
|
AV-1999-068
|
05/14/1998
|
Aviation
Security
Statement of Alexis Stefani,
Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Aviation
Before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
U.S. House
of Representatives
|
AV-1998-134
|
AVIATION SECURITY TESTIMONY AND REPORTS
AS
OF SEPTEMBER 14, 2001
AUDIT
REPORTS
Date
|
Title
|
Report
Number
|
12/07/2000
|
Controls Over Airport Identification
Media
|
AV-2001-010
|
11/18/1999
|
Airport Access Control
|
AV-2000-017
|
10/21/1999
|
Deployment of Explosives Detection
Equipment
|
AV-2000-002
|
07/16/1999
|
Security of Checked Baggage on Flights
Within the United States
|
AV-1999-113
|
10/05/1998
|
Deployment of Explosives Detection
Systems
|
AV-1999-001
|
07/17/1998
|
Dangerous Goods/Cargo Security Program
|
AV-1998-178
|
06/01/1998
|
Management Advisory on Review of
Security Controls Over Air Courier Shipments
|
AV-1998-149
|
04/17/1997
|
Federal Air Marshall Program
|
R9-FA-7-006
|
07/03/1996
|
Efforts to Improve Airport Security
|
R9-FA-6-014
|
09/20/1993
|
Audit of Airport Security
|
R9-FA-3-105
|
|
|
|
AVIATION
SECURITY - INVESTIGATIONS
February
3, 1999, through September 14, 2001
Subject
Area
|
Date
|
Summary
|
Screeners & Baggage Handlers
|
September 14, 2001
|
Employees
who are non-U.S. citizens without proper INS status were
authorized to enter secured areas of Dulles, ongoing
investigation.
|
Security Badges
|
September 14, 2001
|
Arrest
warrants were issued against non-U.S. citizens who obtained
security badges at Miami International Airport.
|
Security Badges
|
September 13, 2001
|
Employee at
Miami International Airport pleads guilty to using job in ID
section to make false security badges for coworkers.
|
Cockpit Access
|
June 7, 2001
|
Civilian
used false FAA ID card to obtain unauthorized cockpit access
on three separate flights.
|
Access Control
|
June 5, 2001
|
Non-employee
of Miami International Airport illegally used an Airport
Secured ID Display Area access badge to gain entry to a
secured area.
|
Access Control
|
February 1, 2001
|
Miami
International Airport employee gained access to secured
areas by providing false data on Airport ID Badge
application.
|
Screeners
|
October 25, 2000
|
Private firm
(Argenbright) failed to conduct background checks on
checkpoint screeners at Philadelphia Airport.
Company fined
$1 million, $350,000 restitution and $200,00 in
investigative costs.
|
Access Control
|
May 1, 2000
|
Employees at
Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport allowed unauthorized personnel to
use their security badges to gain access to secured areas.
|
AVIATION
SECURITY - INVESTIGATIONS
February
3, 1999, through September 14, 2001
(continued)
Subject
Area
|
Date
|
Summary
|
Screeners
|
March 27, 2000
|
Private firm (Aviation Safeguards)
falsely certified on at least 70 occasions that criminal
background checks had been accomplished on employees seeking
access to secure areas at Miami International Airport.
|
Access Control
|
February 3, 1999
|
A former Miami-Dade County Police
Officer working for a private security firm falsely
certified that criminal background checks had been
accomplished on 22 employees seeking access to secure areas
at Miami International Airport.
Upon hiring, applicants had clearance to enter
secured areas of the airport.
|
|