Statement of Senator Carl Levin at the Senate Armed Services Committee Briefing on DOD Inspector General Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

• Department of Defense Inspector General Executive Summary of Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [PDF]

• Briefing slides prepared by the DOD Inspector General on its report [PDF]

More than two years ago, in October of 2004, I issued a report on the Alternative Analysis of the Iraq-Al Qaeda Relationship, [PDF] which was prepared and disseminated by the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under the leadership of Douglas Feith.

My report documented a number of actions taken by Under Secretary Feith and his staff to produce an alternative intelligence analysis of the alleged relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda in order to help make the case to go to war against Iraq. My report concluded:

“An alternative intelligence assessment process was established in the office of Under Secretary for Policy Doug Feith . . . that was predisposed to finding a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. His staff then conducted its own review of raw intelligence reports, including reporting of dubious quality or reliability. Drawing upon both reliable and unreliable reporting, they arrived at an ‘alternative’ interpretation of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship that was much stronger than that assessed by the IC and more in accord with the policy views of senior officials in the Administration.”

For example, the Feith office promoted the view that a meeting allegedly took place in Prague in April of 2001 – 5 months before 9/11 – between the lead 9/11 hijacker, Mohammed Atta, and an Iraqi intelligence officer. The Feith office took the position that this alleged meeting was “key” evidence of Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks – despite the fact that the Intelligence Community was skeptical that the meeting ever happened, and reported its skepticism in intelligence reports prepared for the highest officials in our government.

This morning, the DOD Inspector General will deliver both a classified report and an unclassified executive summary on the pre-Iraqi war activities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The executive summary confirms what I alleged about the Feith office two years ago. The Inspector General’s report states:

"The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers."

The Inspector General also finds that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy “was inappropriately performing Intelligence activities of developing, producing, and disseminating that should be performed by the Intelligence Community.”

In response to some of my specific questions, the Inspector General confirms today that:

• The Feith office produced “its own intelligence analysis of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda” and presented “its analysis to other offices in the Executive Branch (including the Secretary of Defense and the staffs of the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President)”;

• The “intelligence analysis produced by the Feith office differ[ed] from the Intelligence Community analysis on the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda”;

• The Feith office presented “a briefing on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship to the White House in September 2002 unbeknownst to the Director of Central Intelligence, containing information that was different from the briefing presented to the DCI, not vetted by the Intelligence Community, and that was not supported by the available intelligence (for example, concerning the alleged Atta meeting), without providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment”; and

• The briefing drew “conclusions (or ‘findings’) that were not supported by the available intelligence, such as the conclusion ‘intelligence indicates cooperation in all categories; mature symbiotic relationship’, or that there were ‘multiple areas of cooperation,’ and ‘shared interest and pursuit of WMD’ and ‘some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al Qaida specifically related to 9/11'.”

The Inspector General found that these “inappropriate” activities of the Feith office were authorized by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

These findings of the Inspector General reinforce the conclusion that I reached in my report more than two years ago: the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy generated its own intelligence analysis, inconsistent with the views of the Intelligence Community, in order to support the policy goals of the Administration.

Two recently confirmed senior Administration officials have publicly expressed their own concerns about these activities. On May 18, 2006, General Michael Hayden – now the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency – testified at his nomination hearing that he was not comfortable with the Feith office’s approach to intelligence analysis. Similarly, on December 5, 2006, Robert Gates – now the Secretary of Defense – testified at his nomination hearing that he understands that the Feith office was producing its own intelligence analysis and “I have a problem with that.”

The Inspector General found it unnecessary to make any recommendations in his report, because changed relationships between the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community “significantly reduce the opportunity for the inappropriate conduct of intelligence activities outside of intelligence channels” in the future.

Unfortunately, the damage has already been done. Senior Administration officials used the twisted intelligence produced by the Feith office in making the case for the Iraq war. As I concluded in my October 2004 report:

“Misleading or inaccurate statements about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship made by senior Administration officials were not supported by IC analyses but more closely reflected the Feith policy office views. These assessments included, among others, allegations by the President that Iraq was an “ally” of al Qaeda; assertions by National Security Advisor Rice and others that Iraq “had” provided training in WMD to al Qaeda; and continued representations by Vice President Cheney that Mohammed Atta may have met with an Iraq intelligence officer before the 9/11 attacks when the CIA didn’t believe the meeting took place.”

In November 2003, the top secret report of the Feith office was leaked to the Weekly Standard. Shortly thereafter, Vice President Cheney said publicly that the article in the Weekly Standard was the “best source” of information about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.

The bottom line is that intelligence relating to the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship was manipulated by high ranking officials in the Department of Defense to support the Administration’s decision to invade Iraq when the intelligence assessments of the professional analysts of the Intelligence Community did not provide the desired compelling case. The Inspector General’s report is a devastating condemnation of inappropriate activities in the DOD policy office that helped take this nation to war.

I want to thank the Inspector General for his independence in completing this review. I am concerned, however, that only a two-page executive summary of the Inspector General’s report is available in unclassified form. I plan to work with the Inspector General and others to obtain declassification of the report.