WPChR 2ABcR Z23|o"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<;o;rfolWSGrfffZAeAe8.888888888888f>fffff]````J>J>J>J>rffffrrrrxffoffxffofff]]]]o````ffffffrrJ>J>J>J>lox;x;x;x;x;rrrrffWWWoSoSoSoSxGxGxGrrrrrrxfoZoZoZox;rWoSxGxfxfofrNe.}S1SSS```==`9}}`9(PPS88SSrr(P9ee\\w.e77\\\wwweeeCe.wR)EreewwwwIeenR\\\wwwxio\eEfRfIfRxe|W87y\r\rxWlRx\\]\ceIfIs`Wx\rriIe77\``rigewiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiIIIIIIIeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee777777777777\\\\\\\````````````rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrxfx8xs8s\"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2J#c<C c"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"X^FJa3SS}FSFFFFofSS}3o}SOJO}otaxSSSFSS*SSSSSSSSSSOo}}}}fOfOfOfO}}}}}}}oooo}}}}fOfOfOfOOOOOO}}ooottttaaaxxxOota}NF}JokkTKSS3aaAA}}3aSF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^HJS<aa}FSFFFF}oaa}<a]XX}kaaSFSS*SSSSSSSSSS]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]XXXXX}}}}kkkX}kNF}J}}}\\VV<xx}SS}}<xVF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQX`A"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%jjjrjbrzgwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkklWdPZH\I\I\IlWoY2(mWgRklWaMlWs\SCYG\IhSr\lWw_s\_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR&)o=3no P['C&P &%e8.|e P['CP&8SF> P['CPd:SHvX pTCd'l80lX pTCDS?3s\  PCPDS??皝4  p(AC&u![2*d[ P['CP u![2*P[e xzCX)o=3PRoe xzC&X&r!Y1)LY P['CP )o=3no P['C&P &]I(!̤PI P['ChP u![2*d[ P['CP &[G' ԦGG P['C^P2PowGHH.K PFTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: See also Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip  J op., at 7); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 451, n.10 (1989). Significantly, the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against more than the actual imposition of two punishments for the same offense; by its terms, it protects a criminal defendant  JN from being twice put in jeopardy for such punishment.  J& See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970). That is, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits merely punishing  J twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally,  J for the same offense. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (emphasis added).  Petitioner clearly was neither prosecuted for nor convicted of the cocaine offenses during the first criminal proceeding. The offense to which petitioner pleaded guilty and for which he was sentenced in 1992 was attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it, whereas the crimes charged in the instant indictment are conspiracy to import cocaine and attempt JF ed importation of the same. Under Blockburger v.  J United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), where the"   same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which  J` the other does not. See also Dixon, 509 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (emphasizing that the same inquiry generally applies [i]n both the multiple punishment and  J multiple prosecution contexts). Under the Blockburger test, the indictment in this case did not charge the same offense to which petitioner formerly had pleaded guilty.  Petitioner nevertheless argues that, because the  JH conduct giving rise to the cocaine charges was taken into account during sentencing for the marijuana conviction, he effectively was punished for that conduct during the first proceeding. As a result, he contends, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the instant prosecution. This claim is ripe at this stage of the prosecution"although petitioner has not yet been convicted of the cocaine offenses"because, as we have said, courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure  J that punishment in more than one trial. Brown v.  J Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). See also Ball v. United  Jh States, 470 U.S. 856, 861, 864!865 (1985) (explaining that, for purposes of the double jeopardy inquiry, punishment must be the equivalent of a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence);  J Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall., at 173. Thus, if petitioner is correct that the present case constitutes a second attempt to punish him criminally for the same cocaine  JP offenses, see Helvering, 303 U.S., at 399, then the prosecution may not proceed. We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that petitioner's double jeopardy theory"that consideration of uncharged conduct in arriving at a sentence within the statutorily authorized punishment range constitutes punishment for that conduct"is not supported by our precedents, which`"   make clear that a defendant in that situation is punished, for double jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of which the defendant is convicted.  Traditionally, [s]entencing courts have not only taken into consideration a defendant's prior convictions, but have also considered a defendant's past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior.  J Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip  J op., at 9). We explained in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949), that both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. That history, combined with a recognition of the need for individualized sentencing, led us to conclude that the Due Process Clause did not require that courts throughout the Nation abandon their ageold practice of seeking information from outofcourt sources to guide their judgment  J toward a more enlightened and just sentence. Id., at 250!251. Thus, [a]s a general proposition, a sentencing judge `may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may  J come.' < !  Nichols, 511 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 9)  J (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446  J (1972)). See also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 7).  Against this background of sentencing history, we specifically have rejected the claim that double jeopardy principles bar a later prosecution or punishment for criminal activity where that activity has been considered  J at sentencing for a separate crime. Williams v. Okla J homa, 358 U.S., at 576, arose out of a kidnaping and murder committed by the petitioner while attempting to`"   escape from police after a robbery. Following his arrest, Williams pleaded guilty to murder and was given a life sentence. He was later convicted of kidnaping, which was then a capital offense in Oklahoma, and the sentencing court took into account, in assessing the death penalty, the fact that the kidnaping victim had been murdered. We rejected Williams' contention that this use of the conduct that had given rise to the prior conviction violated double jeopardy. Emphasizing that the exercise of a sound discretion in such a case required consideration of all the circumstances of the crime, we made clear that one of the aggravating circumstances involved in this kidnaping crime was the fact that petitioner shot and killed the victim in the course of its commission, and rejected the claim that the sentencing judge was not entitled to consider that circumstance, along with all the other circumstances involved, in determining the proper sentence to be  J0 imposed for the kidnaping crime. Id., at 585!586. We then disposed of the petitioner's double jeopardy claim as follows: [I]n view of the obvious fact that, under the law of Oklahoma, kidnaping is a separate crime, entirely distinct from the crime of murder, the court's consideration of the murder as a circumstance involved in the kidnaping crime cannot be said to have resulted in punishing petitioner a second time for the same of J fense.... Id., at 586. We thus made clear that use of evidence of related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime within the authorized statutory limits does not constitute punishment for that conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  J  We find this case to be governed by Williams; it makes no difference in this context whether the enhancement occurred in the first or second sentencing proceeding. Here, petitioner pleaded guilty to attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it, in` "   violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. The statute provides that the sentence for such a crime involving 100 kilograms or more of marijuana must be between 5 and 40 years in prison. 841(b)(1)(B). By including the cocaine from the earlier transaction"and not just the marijuana involved in the offense of conviction"in the drug quantity calculation, the District Court ended up with a higher offense level (40), and a higher sentence range (292 to 365 months), than it would have otherwise under the applicable Guideline, which specifies different base offense levels depending on the quantity of drugs involved. USSG 2D1.1. This higher guideline range, however, still falls within the scope of the legislatively  J authorized penalty (5!40 years). As in Williams, the uncharged criminal conduct was used to enhance petitioner's sentence within the range authorized by statute. If use of the murder to justify the death sentence for the kidnapping conviction was not punish J0 ment for the murder in Williams, it is impossible to conclude that taking account of petitioner's plans to import cocaine in fixing the sentence for the marijuana conviction constituted punishment for the cocaine offenses.  Jh  Williams, like this case, concerned the double jeopardy implications of taking the circumstances surrounding a particular course of criminal activity into account in sentencing for a conviction arising therefrom. Similarly, we have made clear in other cases, which involved a defendant's background more generally and not conduct arising out of the same criminal transaction as the offense of which the defendant was convicted, that [e]nhancement statutes, whether in the nature of criminal history provisions such as those contained in the Sentencing Guidelines, or recidivist statutes which are common place in state criminal laws, do not change  J the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction. Nichols, 511 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (approving consideration` "   of a defendant's previous uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in sentencing him for a subsequent offense). In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes, we have rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes, but instead as a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive  J one. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948). See  Jp also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967); Oyler  JH v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895) (under a recidivist statute, the accused is not again punished for the first offence because  o ! `the punishment is for the last offence committed, and it is rendered more severe in consequence of the situation into which the party had previously brought himself' ! ).  In addition, by authorizing the consideration of offenderspecific information at sentencing without the procedural protections attendant at a criminal trial, our cases necessarily imply that such consideration does not  J result in punishment for such conduct. In McMillan  Jh v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), we upheld against a due process challenge Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, which imposed a 5!year minimum sentence for certain enumerated felonies if the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense. Significantly, we emphasized that the statute at issue neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of  J` a firearm. Id., at 87!88. That is, the statute simply` "   took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment"the instrumentality used in committing a violent felony"and dictated the precise weight to be given that factor if the  J` instrumentality is a firearm. Id., at 89!90. For this reason, we approved the lesser standard of proof provided for in the statute, thereby reject[ing] the claim that whenever a State links the `severity of punishment' to `the presence or absence of an identified fact' the State  J must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.,  Jp at 84 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977)). These decisions reinforce our conclusion that consideration of information about the defendant's character and conduct at sentencing does not result in punishment for any offense other than the one of which the defendant was convicted.  We are not persuaded by petitioner's suggestion that the Sentencing Guidelines somehow change the constitutional analysis. A defendant has not been punished any more for double jeopardy purposes when relevant conduct is included in the calculation of his offense level under the Guidelines than when a preGuidelines court, in its discretion, took similar uncharged conduct into  Jh account. Cf. McMillan, 477 U.S., at 92 (perceiving no difference in the due process calculus depending upon whether consideration of the sentencing factor was discretionary or mandatory). As the Government argues, [t]he fact that the sentencing process has become more transparent under the Guidelines ... does not mean that the defendant is now being `punished' for uncharged relevant conduct as though it were a distinct criminal `offense.'  !  Brief for United States 23. The relevant conduct provisions are designed to channel the sentencing discretion of the district courts and to make mandatory the consideration of factors that previously would  J have been optional. United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (CA1 1989) (Breyer, J.) (explaining that, very` "   roughly speaking, [relevant conduct] corresponds to those actions and circumstances that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines'  J enactment). See also Burns v. United States, 501 U.S.  J` 129, 133 (1991); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363!367 (1989). Regardless of whether particular conduct is taken into account by rule or as an act of discretion, the defendant is still being punished only for the offense of conviction.  J  Justice Stevens disagrees with our conclusion because, he contends, [u]nder the Guidelines, an offense that is included as `relevant conduct' does not relate to the character of the offender (which is reflected instead by criminal history), but rather measures only the  J character of the offense. Post, at 5. The criminal history section of the Guidelines, however, does not seem to create this bright line distinction; indeed, the difference between criminal history and relevant conduct is more temporal than qualitative, with the former  J referring simply to a defendant's past criminal conduct (as evidenced by convictions and prison terms), see USSG 4A1.1, and the latter covering activity arising out of the same course of criminal conduct as the instant offense, see USSG 1B1.3.  To the extent that the Guidelines aggravate punishment for related conduct outside the elements of the crime on the theory that such conduct bears on the character of the offense, the offender is still punished  J only for the fact that the present offense was carried out in a manner that warrants increased punishment, not  JP for a different offense (which that related conduct may or may not constitute). But, while relevant conduct thus may relate to the severity of the particular crime, the commission of multiple offenses in the same course of conduct also necessarily provides important evidence that the character of the offender requires special punishment. Similarly, as we have said in the recidivism` "   cases, a crime committed by an offender with a prior conviction is considered to be an aggravated offense  J because a repetitive one. Gryger, 334 U.S., at 732. Nothing about the labels given to these categories controls the use to which such information is put at sentencing. Under the Guidelines, therefore, as under  J the traditional sentencing regimes Justice Stevens approves, it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether a given offense has affected the judge's assessment of the character of the offender, the character of  Jp the offense, or both. Post, at 4 (Stevens, J., dissent JH ing). Even under Justice Stevens' framework, the structure of the Guidelines should not affect the outcome of this case.  The relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, like their criminal history counterparts and the recidivism statutes discussed above, are sentencing enhancement regimes evincing the judgment that a particular offense should receive a more serious sentence within the authorized range if it was either accompanied by or preceded by additional criminal activity. Petitioner does not argue that the range fixed by Congress is so broad, and the enhancing role played by the relevant conduct so significant, that consideration of that conduct in sentencing has become a tail which wags the dog of  J the substantive offense. McMillan, 477 U.S., at 88; cf.  J Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 700 (1975). We hold that, where the legislature has authorized such a particular punishment range for a given crime, the resulting sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of the double jeopardy inquiry. Accordingly, the instant prosecution for the cocaine offenses is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause as a second attempt to punish petitioner for the same crime.  9H1 d"  Ԍdy,III؃  2  At its core, much of petitioner's argument addresses not a claim that the instant cocaine prosecution violates principles of double jeopardy, but the more modest contention that he should not receive a second sentence under the Guidelines for the cocaine activities that were considered as relevant conduct for the marijuana sentence. As an examination of the pertinent sections should make clear, however, the Guidelines take into account the potential unfairness with which petitioner is concerned.  Petitioner argues that the Sentencing Guidelines require that drug offenders be sentenced in a single proceeding for all related offenses, whether charged or uncharged. See Brief for Petitioner 20!23. Yet while the Guidelines certainly envision that sentences for multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal  J activity ordinarily will be imposed together, they also explicitly contemplate the possibility of separate prosecutions involving the same or overlapping relevant conduct. See USSG 5G1.3, comment., n. 2 (addressing cases in which a defendant is prosecuted in ... two or more federal jurisdictions, for the same criminal conduct or for different criminal transactions that were part of the same course of conduct). There are often valid reasons why related crimes committed by the same defendant are not prosecuted in the same proceeding, and 5G1.3 of the Guidelines attempts to achieve some coordination of sentences imposed in such situations with an eye toward having such punishments approximate the total penalty that would have been imposed had the sentences for the different offenses been im J2 posed at the same time (i.e., had all of the offenses been prosecuted in a single proceeding). See USSG 5G1.3, comment., n. 3.  Because the concept of relevant conduct under the Guidelines is reciprocal, 5G1.3 operates to mitigate the"   possibility that the fortuity of two separate prosecutions will grossly increase a defendant's sentence. If a defendant is serving an undischarged term of imprisonment result[ing] from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account [as relevant conduct] in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, 5G1.3(b) provides that the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment. And where 5G1.3(b) does not apply, an accompanying policy statement provides, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense. USSG 5G1.3(c) (policy statement). Significant safeguards built into the Sentencing Guidelines therefore protect petitioner against having the length of his sentence multiplied by duplicative consideration of the same criminal conduct; he would be able to vindicate his interests through appropriate appeals should the Guidelines be misapplied in any future sentencing proceeding.  Even if the Sentencing Commission had not formalized sentencing for multiple convictions in this way, district courts under the Guidelines retain enough flexibility in appropriate cases to take into account the fact that conduct underlying the offense at issue has previously been taken into account in sentencing for another offense. As the Commission has explained, [u]nder 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds `that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.'  !  USSG 5K2.0 (policy statement). This`"   departure power is also available to protect against petitioner's second major practical concern: that a second sentence for the same relevant conduct may deprive him of the effect of the downward departure under 5K1.1 of the Guidelines for substantial assistance to the Government, which reduced his first sentence significantly. Should petitioner be convicted of the cocaine charges, he will be free to put his argument concerning the unusual facts of this case to the sentencing judge as a basis for discretionary downward departure.  9H1 d d,IV؃  2  Because consideration of relevant conduct in determining a defendant's sentence within the legislatively authorized punishment range does not constitute punishment for that conduct, the instant prosecution does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is  J `z;Affirmed.