WPC6 2iBcR ZZ3|["m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2W#cc5c\"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXBQ d   ( , , And, the Court said that this conceptual distinctness made the immediately appealable issue separate from the merits of the plaintiff's claim, in part because an BQ C  , , (  appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions or, in cases where the district court has denied summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that even under the defendant's version of the facts the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law, whether the law clearly proscribed the actions the defendant  J claims he took. Id., at 528 (footnote omitted).6ABQ d   ( , ,  ;H2 d d8B؃  O2  We now consider the appealability of a portion of a district court's summary judgment order that, though entered in a qualified immunity case, determines only  J  a question of evidence sufficiency, i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial. This kind of order, we conclude, is not appealable. That is, the District Court's determination that the summary judgment record in this case raised a genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners' involvement in the alleged beating of respondent was not a final decision within the meaning of the relevant statute. We so decide essentially for three reasons.  J  First, consider Mitchell itself, purely as precedent.  Jy The dispute underlying the Mitchell appeal involved the application of clearly established law to a given (forQ"   appellate purposes undisputed) set of facts. And, the Court, in its opinion, explicitly limited its holding to appeals challenging, not a district court's determination about what factual issues are genuine, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c), but the purely legal issue what law was clearly established. The opinion, for example, referred specifically to a district court's denial of a claim of  J qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an  J issue of law. 472 U.S., at 530 (emphasis added). It emphasize[d] ... that the appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged (by the plaintiff, or, in some cases, the defendant) support a claim of viola J tion of clearly established law. Id., at 528, n.9. It distinguished precedent not permitting interlocutory appeals on the ground that a qualified immunity ruling ... is ... a legal issue that can be decided with reference only to undisputed facts and in isolation from  JX the remaining issues of the case. Id., at 530, n.10. And, it explained its separability holding by saying that [a]n appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correct J ness of the plaintiff's version of the facts. Id., at 528. Although there is some language in the opinion that sounds as if it might imply the contrary, it does not do  J@ so when read in context. See, e.g., id., at 526 (referring to defendant's entitlement to summary judgment, not to appealability, by saying that defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue).  Jx  Second, consider, in the context of an evidence  JP sufficiency claim, Cohen's conceptual theory of appealability"the theory that brings immediate appealability within the scope of the jurisdictional statute's final decision requirement. That theory finds a final district court decision in part because the immediately appealable decision involves issues significantly different from those that underlie the plaintiff's basic case. As`"    J we have just pointed out, Mitchell rested upon the view that a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim. 472 U.S., at 527. It held that this was so because, although sometimes practically intertwined with the merits, a claim of immunity nonetheless raises a question that is significantly different from the questions underlying plaintiff's  J claim on the merits (i.e., in the absence of qualified  J immunity). Id., at 528.  Where, however, a defendant simply wants to appeal a district court's determination that the evidence is sufficient to permit a particular finding of fact after trial, it will often prove difficult to find any such separate question"one that is significantly different from the factrelated legal issues that likely underlie the  J plaintiff's claim on the merits. See Anderson v. Liberty  J Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (district court's task, in deciding whether there is a genuine issue of fact, is to determine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving  J party); see also Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d, at 341 ( whether the defendants did the deeds alleged ... is  J precisely the question for trial) (emphasis in original),  Jh cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074, 1121 (1992); Wright v.  J@ South Arkansas Regional Health Center, Inc., 800 F.2d 199, 203 (CA8 1986) (saying that this question is ... less clearly separable from the merits than the question  J in Mitchell); see also Brief for United States 18 ( [i]n one sense, a ruling regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is closely intertwined with the merits).  JP  It has been suggested that Mitchell implicitly recognized that the need to protect officials against the burdens of further pretrial proceedings and trial justifies a relaxation of the separability requirement.  J 15A Wright & Miller 3914.10, at656; see id., 3911, at  J 344!345; id., 3911.2, at 387; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 20 ( where the right not to be tried is at stake, [closer]` "   association with the merits is tolerated) (argument of the United States). Assuming that to be so, and despite a similar interest in avoiding trial in the kind of case here at issue, we can find no separability. To take what  J` petitioners call a small step beyond Mitchell, Brief for Petitioners18, would more than relax the separability requirement"it would in many cases simply abandon it.  J  Finally, consider the competing considerations that  J underlie questions of finality. See supra, at 3!4. We of course decide appealability for categories of orders rather  Jp than individual orders. See Digital Equipment Corp. v.  JH Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 4!5). Thus, we do not now in each individual case engage in ad hoc balancing to decide issues of appealability. See generally P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 1810 (3d ed. 1988). But, that does not mean that, in delineating appealable categories, we should not look to the competing considerations underlying all questions of finality"`the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the  J danger of denying justice by delay on the other.' G!  Eisen  J v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974)  Jh (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)). And, those considerations, which we discussed above in Part II!A, argue against extend J ing Mitchell to encompass orders of the kind before us.  For one thing, the issue here at stake"the existence, or nonexistence of a triable issue of fact"is the kind of issue that trial judges, not appellate judges, confront almost daily. Institutionally speaking, appellate judges enjoy no comparative expertise in such matters. Cf.  J Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560!561 (1988); id., at 584 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the special expertise and experience of appellate courts lies in assessing the relative force of ... applications of legal norms) (internal quotation` "   marks omitted). And, to that extent, interlocutory appeals are less likely to bring important errorcorrecting benefits here than where purely legal matters are at  J issue, as in Mitchell. Cf. RichardsonMerrell, 472 U.S., at 434 (stating that the fact that [m]ost pretrial orders[of the kind there at issue] are ultimately affirmed by appellate courts militated against immediate appealability).  For another thing, questions about whether or not a record demonstrates a genuine issue of fact for trial, if appealable, can consume inordinate amounts of appellate time. Many constitutional tort cases, unlike the simple we didn't do it case before us, involve factual controversies about, for example, intent"controversies that, before trial, may seem nebulous. To resolve those controversies"to determine whether there is or is not a triable issue of fact about such a matter"may require reading a vast pretrial record, with numerous conflicting affidavits, depositions and other discovery materials.  J This fact means, compared with Mitchell, greater delay.  For a third thing, the close connection between this kind of issue and the factual matter that will likely surface at trial means that the appellate court, in the many instances in which it upholds a district court's decision denying summary judgment, may well be faced with approximately the same factual issue again, after trial, with just enough change (brought about by the trial testimony) to require it, once again, to canvass the record. That is to say, an interlocutory appeal concerning this kind of issue in a sense makes unwise use of appellate courts' time, by forcing them to decide in the context of a less developed record, an issue very similar to one they may well decide anyway later, on a record that will permit a better decision. See 15A Wright & Miller 3914.10, at664 ( if [immunity appeals] could be limited to ... issues of law ... there would be less risk that the court of appeals would need to waste time in` "   duplicating investigations of the same facts on successive appeals).  J  The upshot is that, compared with Mitchell, considerations of delay, comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise use of appellate resources, argue in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law. Considering these competing considerations, we are persuaded that [i]mmunity appeals ... interfere less with the final judgment rule if they [are] limited to cases presenting neat abstract  JH issues of law. Ibid.; cf. Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 511 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (noting the argument for a distinction between factbased and lawbased appeals, but seeing no basis for drawing it with respect to the particular kind of order at hand); 15A Wright & Miller 3914.10, at85 (1995 pocket part).  We recognize that, whether a district court's denial of summary judgment amounts to (a)a determination about preexisting clearly established law, or (b)a determination about genuine issues of fact for trial, it still forces public officials to trial. See Brief for Petitioners 11!16. And, to that extent, it threatens to undercut the very policy (protecting public officials from  J@ lawsuits) that (the Mitchell Court held) militates in favor of immediate appeals. Nonetheless, the countervailing considerations that we have mentioned (precedent, fidelity to statute, and underlying policies) are too  J strong to permit the extension of Mitchell to encompass appeals from orders of the sort before us.  ;H2 d d8C؃  2  We mention one final point. Petitioners argue that our effort to separate reviewable from unreviewable summary judgment determinations will prove unwork JF able. First, they say that the parties can easily manipulate our holding. A defendant seeking to create a "   reviewable summary judgment order might do so simply by adding a reviewable claim to a motion that otherwise would create an unreviewable order. [H]ere, for example, they say, petitioners could have contended that the law was unclear on how much force may be exerted against suspects who resist arrest. Brief for Petitioners 29, n.11.  We do not think this is a serious problem. We concede that, if the district court in this case had determined that beating respondent violated clearly established law, petitioners could have sought review of  JH that determination. But, it does not automatically follow that the court of appeals would also have reviewed the here more important determination that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether petitioners participated in (or were present at) a beating. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that it may sometimes be appropriate to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction  J0 over such a matter, but cf. Swint v. Chambers County  J Comm'n, 514 U.S. ____, ____ (1995) (Slip Op. at 14!15), it seems unlikely that Courts of Appeals would do so in a case where the appealable issue appears simply a means to lead the court to review the underlying factual  Jh matter, see, e.g., Natale v. Ridgefield, 927 F.2d 101, 104 (CA2 1991) (saying exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is proper only in exceptional circumstances);  J United States ex rel. Valders Stone & Marble, Inc. v. C J Way Constr. Co., 909 F.2d 259, 262 (CA7 1990) (saying exercise of such jurisdiction is proper only where there are   ! `compelling reasons' ! ).  JP  Second, petitioners add, if appellate courts try to separate an appealed order's reviewable determination (that a given set of facts violates clearly established law) from its unreviewable determination (that an issue of fact is genuine), they will have great difficulty doing so. District judges may simply deny summary judgment motions without indicating their reasons for doing so. ` "   How, in such a case, will the court of appeals know what set of facts to assume when it answers the purely legal question about clearly established law?  This problem is more serious, but not serious enough to lead us to a different conclusion. When faced with an argument that the district court mistakenly identified clearly established law, the court of appeals can simply take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason. Knowing that this is extremely helpful to a  Jp reviewing court, Anderson, 477 U.S., at 250, n.6, district courts presumably will often state those facts. But, if they do not, we concede that a court of appeals may have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed. Regardless, this circumstance does not make a critical difference to our result, for a rule that occasionally requires a detailed evidencebased review of the record is still, from a practical point of view, more manageable than the rule that petitioners urge us to adopt. The petitioners' approach would make that task, not the exception, but the rule. We note, too, that our holding here has been the law in several circuits for  J@ some time. See supra, at 3. Yet, petitioners have not pointed to concrete examples of the unmanageability they fear.  9H1 d dy7III؃  2  For these reasons, we hold that a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualifiedimmunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is therefore  J `zJAffirmed.