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Ante, at 10. The majority's question, however, does not accord with the text of the statute. To take advantage of the exemption, a local, state, or federal law need not impose  J( a restriction establishing an absolute maximum number of occupants; under 3607(b)(1), it is necessary only that such law impose a restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants. Surely, a restriction can regar[d] "or concern, relate to, or bear on"the maximum number of occupants without establishing an absolute`"    J maximum number in all cases.Vp  uBh ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < It is ironic that the majority cites Uniform Housing Code 503(b) (1988), which has been incorporated into petitioner's zoning code, see ECDC 19.10.000, App. 248, as a prototypical maximum occupancy  uB restriction that would qualify for 3607(b)(1)'s exemption. Ante, at 10. Because 503(b), as the majority describes it, caps the number  uB of occupants a dwelling may house, based on floor area, ante, at 9  uB (emphasis added), it actually caps the density of occupants, not their  uBi number. By itself, therefore, 503(b) surely does not answer the question: `What is the maximum number of occupants permitted to  uB occupy a house?' !  Ante, at 10. That is, even under 503(b), there is no single absolute maximum number of occupants that applies to every house in Edmonds. Thus, the answer to the majority's question is the same with respect to both 503(b) and ECDC 21.30.010: it depends. With respect to the former, it depends on the size of  uBj the house's bedrooms, see ibid. (quoting 503(b)); with respect to the latter, it depends on whether the house's occupants are related.V  I would apply 3607(b)(1) as it is written. Because petitioner's zoning code imposes a qualified restrictio[n] regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling, and because the statute exempts from the FHA any such restrictions, I would reverse the Ninth Circuit's holding that the exemption does not  J apply in this case.  uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < I would also remand the case to the Court of Appeals to allow it to pass on respondents' argument that petitioner's zoning code does not satisfy 3607(b)(1)'s requirement that qualifying restrictions be reasonable. The District Court rejected this argument, concluding that petitioner's fiveunrelatedperson limit is reasonable as a matter of law, App. to Pet. for Cert. B!10, but the Court of Appeals did not address the issue.  9H1 d d7II؃  2  The majority's failure to ask the right question about petitioner's zoning code results from a more fundamental error in focusing on maximum occupancy restrictions  J and family composition rules. See generally ante, at 4!8. These two terms"and the two categories of zoning rules they describe"are simply irrelevant to this case.f "  Ԍ ;H2 dЙd8A؃  2  As an initial matter, I do not agree with the majority's interpretive premise that this case [is] an instance in which an exception to `a general statement of policy' is sensibly read `narrowly in order to preserve the primary  Jj operation of the [policy].' !  Ante, at 5 (quoting Commis JB sioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)). Why this  J case? Surely, it is not because the FHA has a policy; every statute has that. Nor could the reason be that a narrow reading of 3607(b)(1) is necessary to preserve the primary operation of the FHA's stated policy to provide ... for fair housing throughout the United States. 42 U.S.C. 3601. Congress, the body responsible for deciding how specifically to achieve the objective of fair housing, obviously believed that 3607(b)(1)'s exemption for any ... restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling is consistent with the FHA's general statement of policy. We  Jb do Congress no service"indeed, we negate the primary operation of 3607(b)(1)"by giving that congressional  J enactment an artificially narrow reading. See Rodriguez  J v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam)  J ( [I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent  J simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the stat Jr ute's primary objective must be law); Board of Gover JJ nors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986) ( Invocation of the `plain purpose' of legislation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself ..., in the end, prevents the effectuation of congres J sional intent).J uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The majority notes precedent recognizing the FHA's `broad and inclusive' compass, and therefore according a `generous construction'  uB to the Act's complaintfiling provision. Ante, at 5 (quoting Traffi uB7 cante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972)).  uB What we actually said in Trafficante was that [t]he language of the  uB Act is broad and inclusive. Id., at 209. This is true enough, but"## we did not therefore accord a generous construction either to the  uBG FHA's antidiscrimination prescriptions, see ante, at 11, n.11, or toits complaintfiling provision, 810(a), 42 U.S.C. 3610(a) (1970 ed.) (repealed 1988). Instead, without any reference to the language of the Act, we stated that we could give vitality to 810(a) only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute. 409 U.S., at 212. If we were to apply such logic to this case, we would presumably give vitality to 3607(b)(1) by giving it a generous rather than a narrow construction.m "  Ԍ In any event, as applied to the present case, the majority's interpretive premise clashes with our decision in  J Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456!470 (1991), in which we held that state judges are not protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 621!634 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). Though the ADEA generally protects the employees of States and their political subdivisions, see 630(b)(2), it exempts from protection state and local elected officials and appointee[s] on the policymaking level, 630(f). In concluding that state judges fell within this exemption, we did not construe it narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the ADEA. Instead, we specifically said that we were not looking for a plain statement that judges are excluded from the  J Act's coverage. Gregory, supra, at 467. Moreover, we  J said this despite precedent recognizing that the ADEA  u ! `broadly prohibits' !  age discrimination in the workplace.  J0 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,  J 120 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577  J (1978)). Cf. ante, at 5 (noting precedent recognizing the  J FHA's `broad and inclusive' compass (quoting Trafficante  J v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972))).  Jh  Behind our refusal in Gregory to give a narrow construction to the ADEA's exemption for appointee[s] on the policymaking level was our holding that the powerm "   of Congress to legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States is an extraordinary power in a federalist system, and a power that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly. 501 U.S., at 460. Thus, we require that  ! `Congress should make its intention clear and manifest if it intends to preempt the historic pow J ers of the States.' a!  Id., at 461 (quoting Will v. Michi J gan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)). It is obvious that land use"the subject of petitioner's zoning code"is an area traditionally regulated by the States rather than by Congress, and that land use regulation is one of the historic powers of the States. As we have stated, zoning laws and their provisions ... are peculiarly within the province of state and local legislative  J authorities. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508, n.18  J (1975). See also Hess v. Port Authority TransHudson  J Corporation, 513 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 13) ( regulation of land use [is] a function traditionally per J0 formed by local governments); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768, n.30 (1982) ( regulation of land use is  J perhaps the quintessential state activity); Village of  J Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ( I am in full agreement with the majority that zoning ... may indeed be the most essential function performed by local government). Accordingly, even if it might be sensible in other contexts to construe exemptions narrowly, that principle has no application in this case.  ;H2 d d8B؃  2  I turn now to the substance of the majority's analysis, the focus of which is maximum occupancy restrictions and family composition rules. The first of these two terms has the sole function of serving as a label for a category of zoning rules simply invented by the majority: rules that cap the number of occupants per dwelling, typically in relation to available floor space or the num"  Ԯber and type of rooms, that ordinarily apply uniformly  J to all residents of all dwelling units, and that have the purpose ... to protect health and safety by preventing  J dwelling overcrowding. Ante, at 6!7. ) uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < To my knowledge, no federal or state judicial opinion"other than three 3607(b)(1) decisions dating from 1992 and 1993"employs the term maximum occupancy restrictions. Likewise, not one of the model codes from which the majority constructs its category of zon uB ing rules uses that term either. See ante, at 6!7 (citing authorities). Accordingly, it is difficult to conceive how Congress, in 1988, could have enacted 3607(b)(1) against the backdrop of an evident distinction between municipal land use restrictions and maximum  uB occupancy restrictions. Ante, at 6.  In this context, the majority seizes on a phrase that appears in a booklet published jointly by the American Public Health Association and the Centers for Disease Control"  w! `the maximum number of individuals permitted to reside in a dwelling unit, or rooming unit.' D!   uB; Ante, at 7, n.6 (quoting APHACDC Recommended Minimum Housing Standards 2.51, p. 12 (1986)). Even if, as the majority boldly asserts, this phrase bears a marked resemblance to the formulation  uB` Congress used in 3607(b)(1), ibid., I fail to comprehend how that would add to our understanding of the statute. The majority surely cannot hope to invoke the rule that where  ! `Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster ofideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will con uBa vey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.' !  Molzof v.  uB United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992) (quoting Morissette v. Unit uB ed States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)). The quoted phrase from the APHACDC publication can hardly be called a ter[m] of art"let alone a term in which is accumulated the legal tradition and mean uB ing of centuries of practice. See also NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (applying the rule to terms that have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law).  The majority's term does bear a familial resemblance to the statutory term restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling, but it should be readily apparent that the category of zoning rules the majority labels maximum occupancy restrictions does"   not exhaust the category of restrictions exempted from the FHA by 3607(b)(1). The plain words of the statute do not refer to available floor space or the number and type of rooms; they embrace no requirement that the  J` exempted restrictions apply uniformly to all residents  J8 of all dwelling units; and they give no indication that such restrictions must have the purpose ... to protect health and safety by preventing dwelling overcrowding.  J Ibid.  Of course, the majority does not contend that the language of 3607(b)(1) precisely describes the category of zoning rules it has labeled maximum occupancy restrictions. Rather, the majority makes the far more narrow claim that the statutory language surely encompasses  J that category. Ante, at 8. I readily concede this point.  uB8 ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < According to the majority, its conclusion that 3607(b)(1) encompasses all maximum occupancy restrictions is reinforced by H.R.  uB Rep. No. 100!711, p. 31 (1988). See ante, at 8, n.8. Since I agree with this narrow conclusion, I need not consider whether the cited Committee Report is either authoritative or persuasive. But the obvious conclusion that 3607(b)(1) encompasses maximum occupancy restrictions tells us nothing about  JX whether the statute also encompasses ECDC 21.30.010, the zoning rule at issue here. In other words, although the majority's discussion will no doubt provide guidance in future cases, it is completely irrelevant to the ques J tion presented in this case.  The majority fares no better in its treatment of family composition rules, a term employed by the majority to describe yet another invented category of zoning restrictions. Although today's decision seems to hinge on the majority's judgment that ECDC 21.30.010 is a clas J sic exampl[e] of a ... family composition rule, ante, at 9, the majority says virtually nothing about this crucial category. Thus, it briefly alludes to the derivation of family composition rules and provides a single exampleP #"    J of them.:o uBh ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < See ante, at 6 ( To limit land use to singlefamily residences, a municipality must define the term `family'; thus family composition rules are an essential component of singlefamily residential use re uB strictions); ante, at 7 ( East Cleveland's ordinance `select[ed] certain categories of relatives who may live together and declare[d] that others may not'; in particular, East Cleveland's definition of `family'  uB made `a crime of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson'#( P['C P#Ѡ# [ P['CdP#  uBi (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498!499 (1977) (plurality opinion))).: Apart from these two references, however, the  J majority's analysis consists solely of announcing its conclusion that the formulation [of 3607(b)(1)] does not fit  J family composition rules. Ante, at 8. This is not rea J` soning; it is ipse dixit. Indeed, it is not until after this conclusion has been announced that the majority (in the course of summing up) even defines family composition  J rules at all. See ibid. (referring to rules designed to preserve the family character of a neighborhood, fastening on the composition of households rather than on the total number of occupants living quarters can contain).  Although the majority does not say so explicitly, one might infer from its belated definition of family composition rules that 3607(b)(1) does not encompass zoning rules that have one particular purpose ( to preserve the family character of a neighborhood) or those that refer to the qualitative as well as the quantitative character of a dwelling (by fastening on the composition of households rather than on the total number of occupants liv J ing quarters can contain). Ibid. Yet terms like family character, composition of households, total [that is, absolute] number of occupants, and living quarters are noticeably absent from the text of the statute. Section 3607(b)(1) limits neither the permissible purposes of a qualifying zoning restriction nor the ways in which such a restriction may accomplish its purposes. Rather, the exemption encompasses any zoning restriction"whatever its purpose and by whatever means it accomplishes "   that purpose"so long as the restriction regard[s] the  J maximum number of occupants. See generally supra, at 2!5. As I have explained, petitioner's zoning code does  J precisely that.  uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < All that remains of the majority's case is the epithet that my reasoning is curious because it yields an exceptiontakestherule  uB^ reading of 3607(b)(1). Ante, at 11, n.11. It is not clear why the majority thinks my reading will eviscerate the FHA's antidiscrimination prescriptions. The Act protects handicapped persons from traditionally defined (intentional) discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(1), (2), and three kinds of specially defined discrimination: refusal to permit ... reasonable modifications of existing premises; refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services; and failure to design and construct [multifamily] dwellings such that they are accessible and usable, 3604(f)(3)(A), (B),  uB (C). Yet only one of these four kinds of discrimination"the reasonable accommodations prescription of 3604(f)(3)(B)"is even arguably implicated by zoning rules like ECDC 21.30.010. In addition, because the exemption refers to local, State, or Federal restrictions, even the broadest reading of 3607(b)(1) could not possibly insulate  uB` private refusals to make reasonable accommodations for handicapped  uB persons. Finally, as I have already noted, see n.3, supra, restrictions must be reasonable in order to be exempted by 3607(b)(1).  In sum, it does not matter that ECDC 21.030.010 describes [f]amily living, not living space per occupant,  J ante, at 10, because it is immaterial under 3607(b)(1) whether 21.030.010 constitutes a family composition rule but not a maximum occupancy restriction. The sole relevant question is whether petitioner's zoning code imposes any ... restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. Because I believe it does, I respectfully dissent.