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Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116!117 (1941)).  In my view, the dissent is wrong about the holding  J and reasoning of Gibbons. Because this error leads the dissent to characterize the first 150 years of this Court's case law as a wrong turn, I feel compelled to put the last 50 years in proper perspective.  ;H2 d d8A؃  Jb  b2  In Gibbons, the Court examined whether a federal law that licensed ships to engage in the coasting trade preempted a New York law granting a 30year monopoly to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton to navigate the State's waterways by steamship. In concluding that it did, the Court noted that Congress could regulate navigation because [a]ll America ... has uniformly understood, the word `commerce,' to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. 9Wheat., at190. The Court also observed that federal power over commerce among the several States meant that Congress could regulate commerce conducted partly within "   a State. Because a portion of interstate commerce and foreign commerce would almost always take place within one or more States, federal power over interstate and foreign commerce necessarily would extend into the  J` States.  Id., at 194!196.  At the same time, the Court took great pains to make  J clear that Congress could not regulate commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other  Jp States. Id., at 194. Moreover, while suggesting that the Constitution might not permit States to regulate interstate or foreign commerce, the Court observed that [i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State were but a small part of that immense mass of legislation ... not surrendered to a  JX general government. Id., at 203. From an early moment, the Court rejected the notion that Congress can regulate everything that affects interstate commerce. That the internal commerce of the States and the numerous state inspection, quarantine, and health laws had substantial effects on interstate commerce cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, they were not surrendered to the general government.  Of course, the principal dissent is not the first to  J misconstrue Gibbons. For instance, the Court has stated  J that Gibbons described the federal commerce power  J with a breadth never yet exceeded. Wickard v. Filburn,  Jx 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). See also Perez v. United  JP States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971) (claiming that with  J( Darby and Wickard, the broader view of the Commerce Clause announced by Chief Justice Marshall had been restored). I believe that this misreading stems from  J two statements in Gibbons.  First, the Court made the uncontroversial claim that  J` federal power does not encompass commerce that does` "   not extend to or affect other States. 9 Wheat., at 194 (emphasis added). From this statement, the principal dissent infers that whenever an activity affects interstate commerce, it necessarily follows that Congress can regulate such activities. Of course, Chief Justice Marshall said no such thing and the inference the dissent makes cannot be drawn.  There is a much better interpretation of the affect[s] language: because the Court had earlier noted that the commerce power did not extend to wholly intrastate commerce, the Court was acknowledging that although the line between intrastate and interstate/foreign commerce would be difficult to draw, federal authority could not be construed to cover purely intrastate commerce. Com J merce that did not affect another State could never be said to be commerce among the several States.  But even if one were to adopt the dissent's reading, the affect[s] language, at most, permits Congress to  J0 regulate only intrastate commerce that substantially  J affects interstate and foreign commerce. FTN  9 XgEpXFr  ff  There is no reason to believe that Chief Justice Marshall was as J serting that Congress could regulate all activities that  J affect interstate commerce. See Ibid.  The second source of confusion stems from the Court's praise for the Constitution's division of power between the States and the Federal Government: BQ C  , , (  The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the  J government. Id., at 195. {vBQ d  ( , , In this passage, the Court merely was making the well/ "   understood point that the Constitution commits matters of national concern to Congress and leaves local mat J ters to the States. The Court was not saying that whatever Congress believes is a national matter becomes an object of federal control. The matters of national concern are enumerated in the Constitution: war, taxes, patents, and copyrights, uniform rules of naturalization and bankruptcy, types of commerce, and  J so on. See generally U.S. Const., Art. I, 8. Gibbons' emphatic statements that Congress could not regulate many matters that affect commerce confirm that the Court did not read the Commerce Clause as granting Congress control over matters that affect the States  J generally.   J S uB` ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < None of the other Commerce Clause opinions during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure, which concerned the dormant Commerce Clause, even suggested that Congress had authority over all matters sub uB stantially affecting commerce. See Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.  uB< 419 (1827); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829). Gibbons simply cannot be construed as the principal dissent would have it.  ;H2 d d8B؃  2  I am aware of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our substantial effects test. My review of the case law indicates that the substantial effects test is but an innovation of the 20th century.  J&  Even before Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall, writing  J for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821), noted that Congress had no general right to  J punish murder committed within any of the States, id., at 426, and that it was clear that congress cannot pun J^ ish felonies generally, id., at 428. The Court's only qualification was that Congress could enact such laws6"   for places where it enjoyed plenary powers"for in J Ԛstance, over the District of Columbia. Id., at 426. Thus, whatever effect ordinary murders, or robbery, or gun possession might have on interstate commerce (or on any other subject of federal concern) was irrelevant  J8 to the question of congressional power.8S uB ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < It is worth noting that Congress, in the first federal criminal Act, did not establish nationwide prohibitions against murder and the like. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. To be sure, Congress outlawed murder, manslaughter, maiming, and larceny, but only when those acts were either committed on United States terri uB3 tory not part of a State or on the high seas. Ibid. See U.S. Const., Art.I, 8, cl.10 (authorizing Congress to outlaw piracy and felonies on high seas); Art. IV, 3, cl.2 (plenary authority over United States territory and property). When Congress did enact nationwide criminal laws, it acted pursuant to direct grants of authority found in the Constitution. Compare Act of April 30, 1790,  uB} supra, 1 and 14 (prohibitions against treason and the counterfeiting of U.S. securities) with U.S. Const., Art.I, 8, cl.6 (counterfeiting); Art. III, 3, cl. 2 (treason). Notwithstanding any substantial effects that murder, kidnaping, or gun possession might have had on interstate commerce, Congress understood that it could not establish nationwide prohibitions.  Likewise, there were no laws in the early Congresses that regu uB~ lated manufacturing and agriculture. Nor was there any statute which purported to regulate activities with substantial effects on interstate commerce.  J  United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41 (1870), marked the first time the Court struck down a federal law as exceeding the power conveyed by the Commerce Clause. In a twopage opinion, the Court invalidated a nationwide law prohibiting all sales of naphtha and illuminating oils. In so doing, the Court remarked that the Commerce Clause has always been understood as limited by its terms; and as a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the  J separate States. Id., at 44. The law in question was plainly a regulation of police, which could have consti "  Ԯtutional application only where Congress had exclusive  J authority, such as the territories. Id., at 44!45. See  J also License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 470!471 (1867) (Congress cannot interfere with the internal commerce  J` and business of a State); TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (Congress cannot regulate internal commerce and thus may not establish national trademark registration).  J  In United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), this Court held that mere attempts to monopolize the manufacture of sugar could not be regulated pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Raising echoes of the discussions of the Framers regarding the intimate relationship between commerce and manufacturing, the Court declared that [c]ommerce succeeds to manufac J ture, and is not a part of it. Id., at 12. The Court  J also approvingly quoted from Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888): BQ 0C  , , (     `No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly expressed in economic and political literature, than that between manufacture and commerce .... If it be held that the term [commerce] includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested ... with the power to regulate, not only manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining"in short, every  Jk Ԛbranch of human industry.' %  E.C. Knight, 156 U.S., at 14.՗BQ Cd   ( , , If federal power extended to these types of production comparatively little of business operations and affairs  J/ would be left for state control. Id., at 16. See also/"    J Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 257 (1921) ( It is settled ... that the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce does not reach whatever is essential thereto. Without agriculture, manufacturing, mining, etc., commerce could not exist, but this fact does not suffice to subject them to the control of Congress). Whether or not manufacturing, agriculture, or other matters substantially affected interstate commerce was irrelevant.  As recently as 1936, the Court continued to insist that the Commerce Clause did not reach the wholly internal  JH business of the States. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (Congress may not regulate mine labor because [t]he relation of employer and em J ployee is a local relation); see also A.L.A. Schechter  J Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543!550 (1935) (holding that Congress may not regulate intrastate sales of sick chickens or the labor of employees involved in intrastate poultry sales). The Federal Government simply could not reach such subjects regardless of their effects on interstate commerce.  These cases all establish a simple point: from the time of the ratification of the Constitution to the mid1930's, it was widely understood that the Constitution granted Congress only limited powers, notwithstanding the  J Commerce Clause. nS uB ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < To be sure, congressional power pursuant to the Commerce Clause was alternatively described less narrowly or more narrowly  uB during this 150year period. Compare United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 78 (1838) (commerce power extends to such acts, done on land, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise of the power to regulate [interstate and international] commerce such  uB as stealing goods from a beached ship) with United States v. E.C.  uB Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) ( Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the several States, the transportation and its instrumentalities ... may be regulated, but this is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce). "## During this period, however, this Court never held that Congress could regulate everything that substantially affects commerce.  Moreover, there was no question"   that activities wholly separated from business, such as gun possession, were beyond the reach of the commerce power. If anything, the wrong turn was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's from a century and a half of precedent.  9H1 d d7IV؃  t2  Apart from its recent vintage and its corresponding lack of any grounding in the original understanding of the Constitution, the substantial effects test suffers from the further flaw that it appears to grant Congress a police power over the Nation. When asked at oral argu J ment if there were any limits to the Commerce Clause, the Government was at a loss for words. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. Likewise, the principal dissent insists that there are limits, but it cannot muster even one example.  J> Post, at 10!11. Indeed, the dissent implicitly concedes that its reading has no limits when it criticizes the Court for threaten[ing] legal uncertainty in an area of  J law that ... seemed reasonably well settled. Post, at 17!18. The one advantage of the dissent's standard is certainty: it is certain that under its analysis everything may be regulated under the guise of the Commerce Clause.  The substantial effects test suffers from this flaw, in part, because of its aggregation principle. Under socalled class of activities statutes, Congress can regulate whole categories of activities that are not themselves either interstate or commerce. In applying  J6 the effects test, we ask whether the class of activities as  J a whole substantially affects interstate commerce, not whether any specific activity within the class has such  J effects when considered in isolation. See Maryland v.  J Wirtz, 392 U.S., at 192!193 (if class of activities is"    u  `within the reach of federal power,'   courts may not  J excise individual applications as trivial) (quoting Darby, 312 U.S., at 120!121).  The aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point. Suppose all would agree that gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school does not substantially affect commerce, but that possession of weapons generally (knives, brass knuckles, nunchakus, etc.) does. Under our substantial effects doctrine, even though Congress cannot single out gun possession, it can pro Jp hibit weapon possession generally. But one always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce. Under our jurisprudence, if Congress passed an omnibus substantially affects interstate commerce statute, purporting to regulate every aspect of human existence, the Act apparently would be constitutional. Even though particular sections may govern only trivial activities, the statute in the aggregate regulates matters that substantially affect commerce.  9H1 d d8V؃  2  This extended discussion of the original understanding and our first century and a half of case law does not necessarily require a wholesale abandonment of our  J more recent opinions.S uB> ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Con uBc sideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean. It simply reveals that our substantial effects test is far removed from both the Constitution and from our early case law and that the Court's opinion should not be viewed as radical or another  J6  wrong turn that must be corrected in the future.u n6#S uB1 ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < Nor can the majority's opinion fairly be compared to Lochner v.  uB New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See post, at 1!7 (Souter, J., dis"##Ԯ uB senting). Unlike Lochner and our more recent substantive due process cases, today's decision enforces only the Constitution and  uB not judicial policy judgments. See post, at 5. Notwithstanding  uB Justice Souter's discussion,   ! `commercial' character'   is not only a  uBl natural but an inevitable ground of Commerce Clause distinction.  uB# See post, at 6 (emphasis added). Our invalidation of the GunFree School Zones Act therefore falls comfortably within our proper role in reviewing federal legislation to determine if it exceeds congressional authority as defined by the Constitution itself. As John Marshall put it: If [Congress] were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard .... They would declare it void. 3 Debates 553 (before the Virginia ratifying convention); see also The Federalist No. 44, at 305 (James Madison) (asserting that if Congress exercises powers not warranted by [the Constitution's] true meaning the judiciary will  uB defend the Constitution); id., No. 78, at 526 (A. Hamilton) (asserting that the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments). Where, as  uB% here, there is a case or controversy, there can be no misstep, post, at 13, in enforcing the Constitution.u 6 "   The analysis also suggests that we ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Unless the dissenting Justices are willing to repudiate our longheld understanding of the limited nature of federal power, I would think that they too must be willing to reconsider the substantial effects test in a future case. If we wish to be true to a Constitution that does not cede a police power to the Federal Government, our Commerce Clause's boundaries simply cannot be defined as being  ! `commensurate with the national needs' h!  or selfconsciously intended to let the Federal Government  ! `defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of  J the national economy.' !   See post, at 12!13 )Breyer, J.,  J dissenting) (quoting North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946)). Such a formulation of federal power is no test at all: it is a blank check.  "  Ԍ At an appropriate juncture, I think we must modify our Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Today, it is easy enough to say that the Clause certainly does not empower Congress to ban gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school.