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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@Final Op ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: C  , , ( N N " Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard. 1392(d). BQ d   ( , , The Act also contains a savings clause, which states: Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.  Je 1397(k).  The Secretary has delegated the authority to promulgate safety standards to the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 49 CFR 1.50(a) (1994). In 1970, the pre"  Ԯdecessor to NHTSA issued regulations concerning vehicles equipped with air brakes, which are used in trucks and tractortrailers. Known as Standard 121, this regulation imposed stopping distances and vehicle stability requirements for trucks. See 36 Fed. Reg. 3817  J8 (1971).8 uB ԍStandard 121 required airbrake equipped vehicles to stop within certain distances at various speeds without deviating from a 12footwide lane, and without any wheel lockup. 49 CFR 571.121 S5.3.1 (1972). The initial stopping distance requirement from 60 miles per hour was 217 feet on a dry surface. The regulation also established brake actuation and release times, as well as other aspects of brake perfor uB mance. Ibid. Because these stopping distances were shorter than those that could be achieved with brakes without ABS, several manufacturers notified NHTSA that ABS devices would be required. Some manufacturers asked NHTSA to alter the standard itself because they believed that ABS devices were unreliable and rendered vehicles dangerously unsafe when combined with new,  J more effective brakes. In 1974, NHTSA responded that Standard 121 was practical and that ABS devices did  J not cause accidents. See generally Paccar, Inc. v.  J NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632, 637!638 (CA9), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978).  Several manufacturers and trade associations then sought review of Standard 121 in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court remanded the case to NHTSA because a careful review of the extensive record indicated that the Standard was neither reasonable nor practicable at the time it was put into effect. 573 F.2d, at 640. The court found that NHTSA had failed to consider the high failure rate of  J ABS devices placed in actual use, id., at 642, and that there [was] a strong probability that [ABS] has created a potentially more hazardous highway situation than  J existed before the Standard became operative, id., at"   643. Until NHTSA compiled sufficient evidence to show that ABS would not create the possibility of greater danger, the court concluded, the Standard would remain  J suspended. Ibid.  J`  After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Paccar, the agency amended Standard 121 so that the stopping distance and lockup requirements no longer applied to trucks and trailers. NHTSA nevertheless left the unamended Standard 121 in the Code of Federal Regulations so that the affected sections [could] most easily be  Jp reinstated when the agency met Paccar's requirements.  JH 44 Fed. Reg. 46849 (1979). NHTSA also stated that the provisions would remain in place so that manufacturers would know what the agency still considers to be reasonable standards for minimum acceptable perfor J mance. Ibid. Although NHTSA has developed new stopping distance standards, to this day it still has not taken final action to reinstate a safety standard governing the stopping distance of trucks and trailers.  9H1 d dy7III؃  D2  Despite the fact that Standard 121 remains suspended, petitioners maintain that respondents' lawsuits are expressly preempted. We disagree. The Act's preemption clause applies only [w]henever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard ... is in effect with respect to the same aspect of performance regulated by a state standard. 15 U.S.C. 1392(d). There is no express federal standard addressing stopping distances or vehicle stability for trucks or trailers. No NHTSA regulation currently establishes a minimum standard for ... motor vehicle equipment performance, 1391(2), nor is  J any standard stated in objective terms, 1392(a). There is simply no minimum, objective standard stated at all. Therefore, States remain free to establish, or to continue in effect, their own safety standards concerning those aspect[s] of performance. 1392(d)."  Ԍ Petitioners insist, however, that the absence of regulation itself constitutes regulation. Relying upon  J our opinion in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), petitioners assert that the failure of federal officials  i ! `affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of  J the statute.' ]!  Id., at 178 (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co.  J v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,  J 774 (1947). Unlike this case, however, we found in Ray that Congress intended to centralize all authority over the regulated area in one decisionmaker: the Federal  J Government. 435 U.S., at 177. Here, there is no evidence that NHTSA decided that trucks and trailers should be free from all state regulation of stopping  J distances and vehicle stability. Indeed, the lack of federal regulation did not result from an affirmative decision of agency officials to refrain from regulating air brakes. NHTSA did not decide that the minimum, objective safety standard required by 15 U.S.C. 1392(a) should be the absence of all standards, both  J federal and state.J uB  ԍBecause no federal safety standard exists, we need not reach respondents' argument that the term standard in 15 U.S.C. 1392(d) preempts only state statutes and regulations, but not common law. We also need not address respondents' claim that the savings clause, 1397(k), does not permit a manufacturer to use a federal safety standard to immunize itself from state commonlaw liability. Rather, the lack of a federal standard stemmed from the decision of a federal court that the agency had not compiled sufficient evidence to justify its regulations.  9H1 d d7IV؃  T2  Even if 1392(d) does not expressly extinguish state tort law, petitioners argue that respondents' lawsuits are preempted by implication because the statelaw princi6"  Ԯple they seek to vindicate would conflict with federal law. We have recognized that a federal statute implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to  J` occupy a field exclusively, English v. General Electric  J8 Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78!79 (1990), or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law. We have found implied conflict preemption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal require J ments, id., at 79, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full  JH purposes and objectives of Congress. Hines v.  J ԚDavidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  ;H2 d d8A؃  4 2  As an initial matter, we must address the argument that we need not reach the conflict preemption issue at all. According to respondents and the Court of Appeals,  J Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. ___ (1992), held that implied preemption cannot exist when Congress has chosen to include an express preemption  Jv clause in a statute. This argument is without merit. In  JN Cipollone we did hold that the preemptive scope of the two statutes at issue was governed by the language in each act. That conclusion rested on a familiar canon of statutory construction and on the absence of any reason to infer any broader preemption. Instead of announcing a categorical rule precluding the coexistence of express and implied preemption, however, the relevant passage in the opinion stated:  BQ C  , , ( N N " In our opinion, the preemptive scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act is governed entirely by the express language in 5 of each Act. When Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a `reliable indicium of congresa"  Ԯ J sional intent with respect to state authority,' Malone  J v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S., at 505, `there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws from the substantive provisions' of the legisla J` tion. California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.  J8 Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987) (opinion of  J Marshall, J.). Such reasoning is a variant of the  J familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio  J alterius: Congress' enactment of a provision defining  J the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted. In this case, the other provisions of the 1965 and 1969 Acts offer no cause to look beyond 5 of each Act. Therefore, we need only identify the domain expressly preempted by each of those sections. As the 1965 and 1969 provisions differ substantially, we  J consider each in turn. Cipollone, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 11).D BQ Xd   ( , ,  The fact that an express definition of the preemptive  Jl reach of a statute implies"i.e. supports a reasonable inference"that Congress did not intend to preempt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied preemption. Indeed, just two paragraphs after the quoted passage in  J ԚCipollone, we engaged in a conflict preemption analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,  JT 79 Stat. 282, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., and found no general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state common law damages actions. 505 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). Our subsequent decisions  J have not read Cipollone to obviate the need for analysis  Jd of an individual statute's preemptive effects. See, e.g.,  J< CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. ___, ___, n. 12 (1993) (slip op., at 14, n.12). ( We reject petitioner's claim of implied `conflict' preemption ... on  J the basis of the preceding analysis.). At best, Cipollone"   supports an inference that an express preemption clause forecloses implied preemption; it does not establish a rule.  ;H2 d d8B؃  2  Petitioners' preemption argument is ultimately futile, however, because respondents' commonlaw actions do not conflict with federal law. First, it is not impossible for petitioners to comply with both federal and state law because there is simply no federal standard for a private party to comply with. Nothing in the Safety Act or its regulations currently regulates the use of ABS devices. As Standard 121 imposes no requirements either requiring or prohibiting ABS systems, tractortrailer manufacturers are free to obey state standards concerning stopping distances and vehicle stability.  Second, we cannot say that the respondents' lawsuits frustrate the accomplishment and execution of the full  J purposes and objectives of Congress. Hines, supra, at 67. In the absence of a promulgated safety standard, the Act simply fails to address the need for ABS devices at all. Further, Standard 121 currently has nothing to say concerning ABS devices one way or the other, and NHTSA has not ordered truck manufacturers to refrain from using ABS devices. A finding of liability against petitioners would undermine no federal objectives or purposes with respect to ABS devices, since none exist.  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed.  J ` BIt is so ordered.  J  Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment.