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U.S. Const., Amdt. V; cf. Bullington v.  J Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 444!46 (1981). The Alabama scheme has the same practical effect. As the Court  JN recognizes, ante, at 9, Alabama trial judges almost always adopt jury verdicts recommending death; a prosecutor who wins before the jury can be confident that the defendant will receive a death sentence. A prosecutor who loses before the jury gets a second, fresh opportunity to secure a death sentence. She may present the judge with exactly the same evidence and arguments that the jury rejected. The defendant's life is twice put6"   in jeopardy, once before the jury and again in the repeat performance before a different, and likely less  J sympathetic, decisionmaker. A scheme that we assumed would provid[e] capital defendants with more, rather  J` than less, judicial protection, Dobbert v. Florida, 432  J8 U.S. 282, 295 (1977),o8 uB ԍ   XFrXFrI have always believed the legislative decision to authorize an override was intended to protect the defendant from the risk of an erroneous  uB jury decision to impose the death penalty. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428  uB U.S. 242, 252!53 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). States have in the past argued that the override would serve to  uB3 protect defendants. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent in Dobbert v. Florida, O.T. 1976, No. 76!5306, p. 17 ( It cannot be said that Florida's new [override] procedure reduces the possibility of mercy. In fact, it is enhanced). has perversely devolved into a procedure that requires the defendant to stave off a  J death sentence at each of two de novo sentencing hearings.  Not surprisingly, given the political pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to impose  JH the death penalty. This has long been the case,^nH  uB ԍ   XFrXFrSee H. Zeisel, Some Data on Juror Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment 37!50 (1968).^ and the recent experience of judicial overrides confirms it. Alabama judges have vetoed only five jury recommendations of death, but they have condemned 47 defendants  J whom juries would have spared. m  uB ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < Statistics from Florida and Indiana confirm that judges tend to override juries' life recommendations far more often than their death recommendations. Between 1972 and early 1992, Florida trial judges imposed death sentences over 134 juries' recommendations of life imprisonment. See Radelet and Mello, DeathtoLife Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 195, 196 (1992). During the same period, Florida judges  uB overrode only about 51 death recommendations. Id., at 210!211. In Indiana, between 1980 and early 1994, judges had used overrides to impose eight death sentences and only four life sentences. Memorandum from Paula Sites, Legal Director, Indiana Public Defender Council, to Supreme Court Library (Feb. 8, 1994) (lodged with the"## Clerk of this Court). The even more extreme disparity in Alabama may well be attributable to Alabama's unique failure to adopt the more stringent standard that governs overrides in the other states.  uB See infra, at Part III. The Court acknowl l"  Ԯ J edges this ostensibly surprising fact, ante, at 9, but dismisses it as inconclusive, because [w]e do not know ... how many cases in which a jury recommendation of life imprisonment is adopted would have ended differently had the judge not been required to consider the  J8 jury's advice. Ibid. This attempt to shrug off the reality of Alabama capital sentencing misses the point. Perhaps Alabama judges would be even more severe, and their sentences even more frequently inconsistent with the community's sense of justice, if Alabama provided for no jury verdicts at all. But the proper frame of reference is not a sentencing scheme with no jury;  J rather, it is a sentencing scheme with no judge"the scheme maintained by 29 of 37 States with capital punishment. In that comparison, the fact that Alabama trial judges have overridden more than nine juries' life recommendations for every vetoed death recommendation is conclusive indeed. Death sentences imposed by judges, especially against jury recommendations, sever the critical link between contemporary community  J values and the penal system. Witherspoon, 391 U.S., at 519, n. 15. They result in the execution of defendants whom the community would spare.  Death sentences imposed by judges over contrary jury verdicts do more than countermand the community's judgment: they express contempt for that judgment. Judicial overrides undermine the jury system's central tenet that sharing in the administration of justice is a  J phase of civic responsibility. Thiel v. Southern Pacific  Jx Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Overrides also sacrifice the legitimacy of jury verdicts, at potentially great cost. Whereas the public(l"   presumes that a death sentence imposed by a jury reflects the community's judgment that death is the appropriate response to the defendant's crime, the same presumption does not attach to a lone government official's decree. Indeed, governmentsanctioned executions unsupported by judgments of a fair cross-section of the citizenry may undermine respect for the value of human  J life itself and unwittingly increase tolerance of killing.  uBP ԍResearch has provided evidence that executions actually increase the level of violence in society. For example, a controlled, 56!year study in New York State revealed that an average of two additional homicides occurred in the month following an execution. See Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is the Effect of Executions?, 26 Crime and Delinquency 453 (1980). A 10year study in California produced less conclusive but similar results. See Graves, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in California, in The Death Penalty in America 322, 327!331 (H. Bedau ed., 1967). Experienced prosecutors recognize this  reality. Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N. Y. Times (Feb. 7, 1995), at A25 ( [B]y their brutalizing and dehumanizing effect, executions cause more murders than they prevent.). A court's unilateral decree of a death sentence surely magnifies the risk of such perverse  consequences. This Court's recent refusal to stay an execution provides an illustration. After a jury had sentenced the defendant, the prosecutor announced that a different person had pulled the trigger. Nevertheless, the state executed the condemned man without giving him a chance to  uBw present this information to a jury. See Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. ___,  uB. ___ (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution). Six days later, a news account described death penalty supporters' lack of concern about the danger of executing innocent people. One [proponent of capital punishment] likened the death penalty to a childhood vaccine approved by the government with full knowledge that at least one child, somewhere, would die from an adverse reaction. Verhovek, When Justice Shows Its Darker Side, N.Y. Times (Jan. 8, 1995), sec. 4, p. 6. As Justice Brandeis reminded us, government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is conta JH gious. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). Unless the imposition of the death penalty consistently rests on the most scrupulous o "   regard for fair procedure and the application of accepted community standards, it may well teach a lesson that aggravates the very dangers it was intended to deter.  9H1 d dy7III؃  J  2  If the Court correctly held in Spaziano that the Constitution's concerns with regularity and fairness do not bar judges from imposing death sentences over contrary jury verdicts, one would at least expect the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require that such schemes maintain strict standards to regularize and constrain the judge's discretion. The Court today refuses to impose any standard, holding that to do so would be micro J management. Ante, at 7. But this case involves far more than a mundane administrative detail.  Alabama stands alone among the States in its refusal to constrain its judges' power to condemn defendants over contrary jury verdicts. The Florida statute upheld  J in Spaziano, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, requires the prosecutor to satisfy a more stringent standard before the judge than before the jury, prohibiting a judicial override unless the facts supporting the death sentence are so clear and convincing that  J virtually no reasonable person could differ. Tedder v.  J State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (1975). If that standard is satisfied, a judge may rationally presume that the jury's verdict did not fairly reflect the judgment of the community. Delaware and Indiana impose similar require J6 ments for overrides. See Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d  J 1368, 1377!1378 (Del. 1992); Martinez-Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1989).  J  We have repeatedly cited the Tedder standard with approval, suggesting that the Constitution requires such  Jn a constraint on a jury override provision. See Spaziano,  JF 468 U.S., at 465; Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,  J 294!295 (1977); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 "    J (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Today the Court dismisses those statements. After Justice Blackmun stated in his opinion for the  J Court in Spaziano that [w]e are satisfied that the  J` Florida Supreme Court takes [Tedder] seriously and has not hesitated to reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's role, he added, as the majority notes, that [o]ur responsibility, however, is not to secondguess the deference accorded the jury's recommendation in a particular case, but to ensure that the result of the process is not  Jp arbitrary or discriminatory. 468 U.S., at 465. The majority reads this second statement to mean that the hallmark of the analysis is not the particular weight a  J State chooses to place upon the jury's advice. Ante, at 7. That reading is overly ambitious at best. The ques J tion whether the Constitution requires the Tedder rule  J goes squarely to the result of the process. The Spa JX ziano Court declined to upset the result in the particular case before it based on the way the Florida Su J preme Court had applied Tedder in that case. It did not announce that it would have reached the same  J result had Florida abjured Tedder entirely; rather, it  J appears to have made Tedder's role in the Florida scheme a necessary consideration in its evaluation of Florida overrides. The Court's reading of Justice Black J mun's opinion in Spaziano is tenable, but a more likely  J reading is that his opinion meant to echo our previous suggestions that a jury override scheme is unconstitu J tional without Tedder.  Jx  I would follow those suggestions and recognize Tedder as a constitutional imperative. As I have explained, an unfettered judicial override of a jury verdict for life imprisonment cannot be taken to represent the judg J ment of the community . A penalty that fails to reflect the community's judgment that death is the appropriate sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment  J` under our reasoning in Gregg. Remarkably, the Court` "   attempts to bolster its holding by citing our reversal of a Florida death sentence for error before the advisory  J jury. Ante, at 8, citing Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. ___ (1992). The Court forgets that the difference between Florida and Alabama is precisely what is at stake  J8 in this case. The Constitution compelled Espinosa for  J the same ultimate reason it compels Tedder: the community's undistorted judgment must decide a capital  J defendant's fate. J uB( ԍOf course, the majority is correct to reaffirm the importance of remedying prejudicial error before advisory juries. When the Court next has occasion to review an Alabama juryrelated error and the sentencing judge has not revealed the degree of her reliance on the jury's advice, the majority apparently will be content to presume that the error, and  uB the jury decision it tainted, mattered to the result. FTN   XFrXFr ddf <  Proper attention to Espinosa would lead the Court to reject the conclusion it reaches today.  In reaching its result the Court also fails to consider our longstanding principle that the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.  J Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Spaziano Court held that the rejection of capital jury sentencing by all but seven States, and of capital jury overrides by all but (at that time) three, did not demonstrate an  J0  evolving standard disfavoring overrides. Spaziano, 468 U.S., at 463!464. Surely, however, the rejection of standardless overrides by every State in the Union but  J Alabama is a different matter. Cf. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789!793 (1982).  The Court today casts a cloud over the legitimacy of our capital sentencing jurisprudence. The most credible justification for the death penalty is its expression of the community's outrage. To permit the state to execute a woman in spite of the community's considered judgment that she should not die is to sever the death penalty from its only legitimate mooring. The absenceH  "   of any rudder on a judge's freefloating power to negate the community's will, in my judgment, renders Alabama's capital sentencing scheme fundamentally unfair and results in cruel and unusual punishment. I therefore respectfully dissent.