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Stat. Ann. 32:2!23.28(j) (West 1990) (defining larger area in which Port Authority has obligation to supply commuter buses to authorized operators); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 7202(10) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (same).>   The Port Authority was conceived as a financially independent entity, with funds primarily derived from  J private investors. United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v.  J New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 4 (1977). Tolls, fees, and investment income account for the Authority's secure  Jp financial position. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a!61a.[pl; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < At the end of 1993, the Port Authority had over $2.8 billion in net assets and $534 million in its General Reserve Fund. See Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 49, 64 (1993) (hereinafter 1993 Annual Financial Report).[  Twelve commissioners, six selected by each State, govern the Port Authority. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!5, 32:12!3 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6405 (McKinney 1979); 1930 N.Y. Laws, ch. 422, 6. Each State may remove, for cause, the commissioners it appoints. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!5, 32:12!5 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6405 (McKinney 1979); 1930 N.Y. Laws, ch. 422, 4. Consonant with the Authority's geographic domain, four of New York's six commissioners must be resident voters of New York City, and four of New Jersey's must be resident voters of the New Jersey portion of the Port of New York District. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!5 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6405 (McKinney 1979). The Port Authority's commissioners also serve as PATH's directors. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!35.61 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6612 (McKinney 1979)."  Ԍ The governor of each State may veto actions of the Port Authority commissioners from that State, including actions taken as PATH directors. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!17, 32:1!35.61, 32:2!6 to 32:2!9 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6417, 6612, 7151!7154 (McKinney 1979). Acting jointly, the state legislatures may augment the powers and responsibilities of the Port Authority, see N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!8 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6408 (McKinney 1979), and specify the purposes for which the Port Authority's surplus revenues are used. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!35.142 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 7002 (McKinney 1979).  Debts and other obligations of the Port Authority are not liabilities of the two founding States, and the States do not appropriate funds to the Authority. The compact and its implementing legislation bar the Port Authority from drawing on state tax revenue, pledging the credit of either State, or otherwise imposing any charge on either State. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!8, 32:1!33 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6408, 6459 (McKinney 1979).  The States did agree to appropriate sums to cover the Authority's salaries, office and other administrative expenses, N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!16 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6416 (McKinney 1979), but this  J undertaking is notably modest.&; uBX ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Compact article XV, the provision for expense coverage, reads in full:   Unless and until the revenues from operations conducted by the [P]ort [A]uthority are adequate to meet all expenditures, the legislatures of the two states shall appropriate, in equal amounts, annually, for the salaries, office and other administrative expenses, such sum or sums as shall be recommended by the [P]ort [A]uthority and approved by the governors of the two states, but each state obligates itself hereunder only to the extent of one hundred thousand dollars in any one year. N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!16 (West 1990); N.Y."## Unconsol. Laws 6416 (McKinney 1979).  By its terms, it appliesG"   only until the revenues from operations conducted by the [P]ort [A]uthority are adequate to meet all expenditures. The promise of support has a low ceiling: $100,000 annually from each State. Thus, the States in no way undertake to cover the bulk of the Authority's operating and capital expenses. Further, even the limited administrative expense payments for which the States provided are contingent on the advance approval  J of both governors, see ibid., and the States' treasuries may not be tapped until both legislatures have appropriated the necessary funds. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!18 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6418 (McKinney 1979). A judgment against PATH, it is thus apparent, would not be enforceable against either New York or New Jersey.  ;H2 d d-C؃  2  The Third Circuit's assessment of PATH's qualification for Eleventh Amendment immunity conflicts with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit  J on the same matter. See Feeney v. Port Authority  Jv TransHudson Corporation, 873 F.2d 628, 631 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990). The Second Circuit concluded:BQ &C   , , (  No provision [of the compact or of state legislation pursuant to the compact] commits the treasuries of the two states to satisfy judgments against the Port Authority .... We believe that this insulation of state treasuries from the liabilities of the Port Authority outweighs both the methods of appointment and gubernatorial veto so far as the Eleventh Amendment immunity is concerned. 873 F. 2d, at 631.KBQ d eG"  Ԍ J  ( , ,  We affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment in Feeney, but we bypassed the question whether PATH enjoyed  J the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Port  J Authority TransHudson Corporation v. Feeney, 495 U.S.  J` 299 (1990). Assuming, arguendo, that the suit in Feeney  J8 was tantamount to a claim against the States,?J8; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Our assumption was in accord with prior state and federal  uBW decisions typing the Port Authority a state arm or agency. See, e.g.,  uB Howell v. Port of New York Authority, 34 F.Supp. 797, 801 (NJ  uB 1940); Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 14 N.Y. 2d 119, 123,  uB| 198 N. E. 2d 585, 586 (1964); Miller v. Port of New York Authority, 18 N.J. Misc. 601, 606, 15 A.2d 262, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1939).? we ruled that New York and New Jersey had effectively  J consented to the litigation. See id., at 306!309 (relying on N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!157, 32:1!162 (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101, 7106 (McKinney 1979)). Consent is not arguable here, because Hess and Walsh commenced suit too late to meet the 1year prescription  J specified by the States. See supra, at 2. Accordingly, we confront directly the sole question petitioners Hess and Walsh present, and we hold that PATH is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.  9H1 d d,II؃  2  The Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in federal court without their consent, leaving parties with claims against a State to present them, if the State permits, in the State's own tribunals. Adoption of the Amendment responded most immediately to the States' fears that federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their  J financial ruin. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.  J Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens, J.,  J^ dissenting); see also Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge  J6 Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276, n. 1 (1959); Missouri v.6"    J Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933). J; uBh ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < As Chief Justice John Marshall recounted: [A]t the adoption of the [C]onstitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts prompted swift passage of the Eleventh Amendment.  uBD Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406 (1821). See generally 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 96!102 (1922). More pervasively, current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system: BQ C   , , (  The Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity. See  J+ Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890). It thus accords the States the respect owed them as mem J bers of the federation. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and  J Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. ___ (1993) (slip op., at 7).T\BQ d   ( , ,  Bistate entities occupy a significantly different position in our federal system than do the States themselves. The States, as separate sovereigns, are the constituent elements of the Union. Bistate entities, in contrast, typically are creations of three discrete sovereigns: two  J States and the federal government./ %; uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < If the creation of a bistate entity does not implicate federal  uBh concerns, however, federal consent is not required. See Virginia v.  uB Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517!520 (1893)./ Their mission is to address  ]! `interests and problems that do not coincide nicely either with the national boundaries or with State lines'  ! "interests that  k! `may be badly served or not served at all by the ordinary channels of National or State political action.' !  V. Thursby, Interstate Cooperation: A Study of the Interstate Compact 5 (1953) (quoting National Resources Committee, Regional Factors in National Planning and Development 34 (1935)); see Grad, FederalState Compact: A New Experiment in Co  "  ԫoperative Federalism, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 825, 854!855 (1963) (Compact Clause entities formed to deal with broad, regionwide problems should not be regarded as an affirmation of a narrow concept of state sovereignty, but as independently functioning parts of a regional polity and of a national union.).  A compact accorded congressional consent is more than a supple device for dealing with interests confined within a region.... [I]t is also a means of safeguarding  J the national interest .... West Virginia ex rel. Dyer  Jp v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951). The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey exemplifies both the need for, and the utility of, Compact Clause entities:BQ C   , , ( N N  From the point of view of geography, commerce, and engineering, the Port of New York is an organic whole. Politically, the port is split between the lawmaking of two States, independent but futile in their respective spheres. The scarcity of land and mounting commerce have concentrated on the New York side of the Hudson River the bulk of the terminal facilities for foreign commerce, while it has made the Jersey side, to a substantial extent, the terminal and breakingup yards for the east and westbound traffic. In addition, both sides of the Hudson are dotted with municipalities, who have sought to satisfy their interest in the general problem through a confusion of local regulations. In addition, the United States has been asserting its guardianship over interstate and foreign commerce. What in fact was one, in law was many. Plainly the situation could not be adequately dealt with except through the co?rdinated efforts of New York, New Jersey, and the United States. The facts presented a problem for the unified action of the lawmaking of these three governments, and law heeded facts. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution"A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 "   Yale L.J. 685, 697 (1925) (footnote omitted).gBQ d   ( , ,  Suit in federal court is not an affront to the dignity of a Compact Clause entity, for the federal court, in relation to such an enterprise, is hardly the instrument of a distant, disconnected sovereign; rather, the federal court is ordained by one of the entity's founders. Nor is the integrity of the compacting States compromised when the Compact Clause entity is sued in federal court. As part of the federal plan prescribed by the Constitution, the States agreed to the power sharing, coordination, and unified action that typify Compact Clause  J creations.J  ; uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < See Port Authority TransHudson Corporation v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 314!316 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (observing that no single State has dominion over an entity created by interstate compact and that state/ federal shared power is the essential attribute of such an entity); M. Ridgeway, Interstate Compacts: A Question of Federalism 297!300 (1971) (emphasizing limits of individual State's authority over interstate compact entities).J Again, the federal tribunal cannot be regarded as alien in this cooperative, trigovernmental arrangement. This is all the more apparent here, where the very claims in suit"the FELA claims of Hess and  J Walsh"arise under federal law. See supra, at 3!4.  Because Compact Clause entities owe their existence to state and federal sovereigns acting cooperatively, and  J not to any one of the United States, see supra, at 2, n.2, their political accountability is diffuse; they lack the tight tie to the people of one State that an instrument of a single State has:BQ C   , , ( N N  An interstate compact, by its very nature, shifts a part of a state's authority to another state or states, or to the agency the several states jointly create to run the compact. Such an agency under the control of special interests or gubernatorially appointed representatives is two or more stepso H "   removed from popular control, or even of control by a local government. M. Ridgeway, Interstate Compacts: A Question of Federalism 300 (1971).JuBQ d   ( , , In sum, within any single State in our representative democracy, voters may exercise their political will to direct state policy; bistate entities created by compact, however, are not subject to the unilateral control of any one of the States that compose the federal system.  Accordingly, there is good reason not to amalgamate Compact Clause entities with agencies of one of the United States for Eleventh Amendment purposes. This  J Court so recognized in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.  J Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the only case, prior to this one, in which we decided whether a bistate entity qualified for Eleventh Amend J ment immunity.  ; uBt ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 279,  uB+ 281!282 (1959), and Feeney, supra, at 308!309, also involved Eleventh Amendment pleas by bistate agencies; we upheld the exercise of federal court jurisdiction in both cases on the ground that the asserted immunity from suit had been waived.  J  Lake Country rejected a plea that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), an agency created by compact to which California and Nevada were parties, acquired the immunity which the Eleventh Amendment accords to each one of TRPA's parent States. TRPA had argued that if the Amendment shields each State, then surely it must shield an entity so important that it could not be created by [two] States without a special Act of  J Congress. Id., at 400. That expansive reading, we said, was not warranted, for the Amendment specifies the State as the entity protected: BQ ,C  , , (  By its terms, the protection afforded by [the Eleventh] Amendment is only available to `one of the United States.' It is true, of course, that some # "   agencies exercising state power have been permitted to invoke the Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself. But the Court has consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such  J entities exercise a `slice of state power.' !  Id., at 400!401 (footnotes omitted).BQ d   ( , , We then set out a general approach: we would presume the Compact Clause agency does not qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity [u]nless there is good reason to believe that the States structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States themselves, and that Congress concurred in  J that purpose. Id., at 401.  J  The Court in Lake Country found no justification for reading additional meaning into the limited language of the Amendment. Indeed, all relevant considerations in that case weighed against TRPA's plea. The compact called TRPA a political subdivision, and required that the majority of the governing members be county and  J city appointees. Ibid. Obligations of TRPA, the compact  J directed, shall not be binding on either State. TRPA's prime function, we noted, was regulation of land use, a function traditionally performed by local governments. Further, the agency's performance of that function gave rise to the litigation. Moreover, rules made by TRPA  J were not subject to veto at the state level. Id., at 402.  This case is more complex. Indicators of immunity or  J the absence thereof do not, as they did in Lake Country, all point the same way. While 8 of the Port Authority's 12 commissioners must be resident voters of either New< "   York City or other parts of the Port of New York  J District, ; uB@ ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Cf. Farias v. Bexar Cty. Bd. of Trustees for Mental Health  uB Mental Retardation Servs., 925 F.2d 866, 875 (CA5) (entity held autonomous, and thus not shielded by Eleventh Amendment, where board members had to be qualified voters of the region), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 866 (1991). this indicator of local governance is surely offset by the States' controls. All commissioners are state appointees. Acting alone, each State through its governor may block Port Authority measures; and acting together, both States, through their legislatures, may enlarge the Port Authority's powers and add to its responsibilities.  The compact and its implementing legislation do not type the Authority as a state agency; instead they use  Jp various terms: joint or common agency; ! np#; uBk ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!1 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6401 (McKinney 1979). body corpo JH rate and politic; ! %H ; uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!4 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6404 (McKinney 1979); accord, N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!7 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6407 (McKinney 1979). municipal corporate instrumentality of the two states for the purpose of developing the port and effectuating the pledge of the states in the ...  J compact. o ! n ; uB^ ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:1!33 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 6459 (McKinney 1979). State courts, however, repeatedly have typed the Port Authority an agency of the States rather  J than a municipal unit or local district. See, e.g., Whalen  JX v. Wagner, 4 N.Y. 2d 575, 581!583, 152 N. E. 2d 54, 56!57 (1958) (legislation authorizing specific Port Authority projects does not pertain to the  w property, affairs or government   of a city because the matters over which the Port Authority has jurisdiction are of State concern).  Port Authority functions are not readily classified as typically state or unquestionably local. States and@$ "   municipalities alike own and operate bridges, tunnels, ferries, marine terminals, airports, bus terminals,  J industrial parks, also commuter railroads.; uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Other Authority facilities, such as the World Trade Center, an office complex housing numerous private tenants, see 1993 Annual Financial Report 33!35, and the Teleport, a satellite communications  uB= center, see id., at 30, are not typically operated by either States or municipalities. This consideration, therefore, does not advance our Eleventh Amendment inquiry.  Pointing away from Eleventh Amendment immunity, the States lack financial responsibility for the Port Authority. Conceived as a fiscally independent entity  J financed predominantly by private funds, see United  J States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 4 (1977), the Authority generates its own revenues, and for decades has received no money from the States. See  J Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998, 1002 (CA2 1944), ( In the compact ... the states agreed to make annual appropriations (not in excess of $100,000 for each state) for expenses of the Authority until [r]evenues from its operations were sufficient to meet its expenses. These annual appropriations were discontinued in 1934 because the revenues from the bridges, the Holland Tunnel and Inland Terminal had become sufficient.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945).  The States, as earlier observed, bear no legal liability for Port Authority debts; they are not responsible for the payment of judgments against the Port Authority or  J@ PATH. The Third Circuit, in Port Authority PBA, assumed that, if the Authority is ever in need, the States would pay. 819 F.2d, at 416. But nothing in the compact or the laws of either State supports that  J assumption. See supra, at 6!7. As the Second Circuit concisely stated:BQ xC #"  Ԍ , , (  The Port Authority is explicitly barred from pledging the credit of either state or from borrowing money in any name but its own. Even the provision for the appropriation of moneys for administrative expenses up to $100,000 per year requires prior approval by the governor of each state and an actual appropriation before obligations for such expenses may be incurred. Moreover, the phrase `salaries, office and other administrative expenses' clearly limits this essentially optional obligation of the two states to a very narrow category of expenses and thus also evidences an intent to insulate the states' treasuries from the vast bulk of the Port Authority's operating and capital expenses, including personal  J injury judgments. Feeney, 873 F.2d, at 631.G ? uB8 ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Concerning the Third Circuit's decision in Port Authority PBA, the Second Circuit said:  !  That decision ... was based on the Third Circuit's understanding that, in the event that `a judgment were entered against the Authority that was serious enough to deplete its resources, the Authority would be able to go to the state legislatures in order to recoup the amount needed for its operating expenses.' To the extent that this  uBZ statement implies that the states must make such an appropriation,  uB it appears to be in error. Feeney, 873 F.2d, at 632 (quoting Port  uB Authority PBA, 819 F.2d, at 416).NBQ d   ( , ,  9H1 d dy,III؃  H2  When indicators of immunity point in different directions, the Eleventh Amendment's twin reasons for being  J* remain our prime guide. See supra, at 8!9. We have already pointed out that federal courts are not alien to a bistate entity Congress participated in creating. Nor is it disrespectful to one State to call upon the Compact Clause entity to answer complaints in federal court. See  Jb supra, at 11. Seeing no genuine threat to the dignity of New York or New Jersey in allowing Hess and Walsh to:"   pursue FELA claims against PATH in federal court, we  J ask, as Lake Country instructed, whether there is here good reason to believe the States and Congress designed the Port Authority to enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. 440 U.S., at 401.  PATH urges that we find good reason to classify the Port Authority as a state agency for Eleventh Amendment purposes based on the control New York and New Jersey wield over the Authority. The States appoint and can remove the commissioners, the governors can veto Port Authority actions, and the States' legislatures can determine the projects the Port Authority undertakes.  J See supra, at 5!6. But ultimate control of every statecreated entity resides with the State, for the State may destroy or reshape any unit it creates. [P]olitical subdivisions exist solely at the whim and behest of their  J State, Feeney, 495 U.S., at 313 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), yet cities and counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.  J See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v.  J Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County v.  J Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). Moreover, no one State alone can control the course of a Compact Clause  Jh entity. See supra, at 11!12, and n. 11. Gauging actual control, particularly when an entity has multiple creatorcontrollers, can be a perilous inquiry, an uncertain and unreliable exercise. See Note, 92 Colum. L. Rev.  J 1243, 1284 (1992); see also id., at 1302, and n. 264 (describing degree to which the state controls the entity as a criterion neither [i]ntelligible nor judicially manageable).  Moreover, rendering control dispositive does not home in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury. See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1129 (1983) (identifying the award of money`"   judgments against the states as the traditional core of  J eleventh amendment protection).J; uB@ ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The dissent questions whether the driving concern of the Eleventh Amendment is the protection of state treasuries, emphasizing  uB that the Amendment covers any suit in law or equity. Post, at 6. The suggestion that suits in equity do not drain money as frightfully as actions at law, however, is belied by the paradigm case. See  uB Jarndyce and Jarndyce (Charles Dickens, Bleak House (1853)). Accordingly, Courts of Appeals have recognized the vulnerability of the State's purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh  J` Amendment determinations. See, e.g., Baxter v. Vigo  J8 Cty. School Corp., 26 F. 3d 728, 732!733 (CA7 1994) (most significant factor is whether entity has power to  J raise its own funds); Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F. 3d 996, 999 (CA6 1993) ( The most important factor ... is whether any monetary judgment would be paid out of the state  Jp treasury.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. ___ (1994); Metcalf &  JH Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 991 F.2d 935, 942!943 (CA1 1993) ( First, and most fundamentally, [the entity's] inability to tap the Commonwealth treasury or pledge the Commonwealth's credit leaves it unable to exercise the power of the purse. On this basis, [the entity] is illdeserving of  JX Eleventh Amendment protection.); Bolden v. South J0 eastern Pa. Transp. Authority, 953 F.2d 807, 818 (CA31991) (in banc) ( [T]he `most important' factor is `whether any judgment would be paid from the state  J treasury.' j  ) (quoting Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail  J Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (CA3) (in banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989)), cert. denied, 504  J@ U.S. ___ (1992); Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis  J Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1087 (CA8 1991) ( Because Missouri and Illinois are not liable for judgments against BiState, there is no policy reason for extending the states' sovereign immunity to BiState.);  Jx Feeney v. Port Authority TransHudson Corporation, 873x"   F.2d, at 631 ( In cases where doubt has existed as to the availability of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Supreme Court has emphasized the exposure of the state treasury as a critical factor.), aff'd on other grounds,  J` 495 U.S. 299 (1990); Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton  J8 Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 440 (CA5 1985) ( One of the most important goals of the immunity of the Eleventh Amendment is to shield states' treasuries.... The purpose of the immunity therefore largely disappears when a judgment against the entity does not entail a judgment against the state.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986). In sum, as New York and New Jersey concede, the vast majority of Circuits ... have concluded that the state treasury factor is the most important factor to be considered ... and, in practice, have generally accorded this factor dispositive weight.  J Brief for States of New Jersey, New York et al. as Amici  JX Curiae 18!19.  The Port Authority's anticipated and actual financial independence"its long history of paying its own way,  J see supra, at 6!7, and n.7, 15!16"contrasts with the situation of transit facilities that place heavy fiscal tolls  J on their founding States. In Alaska Cargo Transport,  Jh Inc. v. Alaska R. Corp., 5 F. 3d 378 (CA9 1993), for example, Eleventh Amendment immunity was accorded a thinly capitalized railroad that depends for its existence on a stateprovided financial safety net of broad  J dimension. Id., at 381. And in Morris v. Washington  J Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 781 F.2d 218 (CADC 1986), Eleventh Amendment immunity was accorded an interstate transit system whose revenue shortfall Congress and the cooperating States anticipated from the start, an enterprise constantly dependent on funds from the participating governments to meet its  J sizable operating deficits. See id., at 225!227. As the  J Morris court concluded: [W]here an agency is so structured that, as a practical matter, if the agency is to`"   survive, a judgment must expend itself against state treasuries, common sense and the rationale of the eleventh amendment require that sovereign immunity  J attach to the agency. Id., at 227.; uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The decision in Morris is compatible with our approach. See  uB supra, at 13. Thus, we establish no per se rule that the Eleventh  uB^ Amendment never applies when States act in concert. Post, at 2  uB (O'Connor, J., dissenting). There is no such requirement where the agency is structured, as the Port  J8 Authority is, to be selfsustaining. Cf. Royal Caribbean  J Corp. v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 973 F.2d 8, 10!11 (CA1 1992) (Breyer, C.J.) (rejecting Eleventh Amendment immunity plea, despite Commonwealth's control over agency's executives, planning, and administration, where agency did not depend on Commonwealth financing for its income and covered its own expenses, including judgments against it).  PATH maintains that the Port Authority's private funding and financial independence should be assessed differently. Operating profitably, the Port Authority dedicates at least some of its surplus to public projects which the States themselves might otherwise finance. As an example, PATH notes a program under which the Port Authority purchases buses and then leases or transfers them without charge to public and private transportation entities in both States. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 32:2!23.27 to 32:2!23.42 (West 1990); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws 7201!7217 (McKinney Supp. 1994); 1993 Annual Financial Report 66. A judgment against the Port Authority, PATH contends, by reducing the Authority's surplus available to fund such projects, produces an effect equivalent to the impact of a judgment directly against the State. It follows, PATH suggests, that distinguishing the fiscal resources of the Port Authority from the fiscal resources of the States is unrealistic and artificial.(l"  Ԍ This reasoning misses the mark. A charitable organization may undertake rescue or other good work which, in its absence, we would expect the State to shoulder. But none would conclude, for example, that in times of flood or famine the American Red Cross, to the extent it works for the public, acquires the States' Eleventh  J Amendment immunity.; uBx ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < It would indeed heighten a myster[y] of legal evolution were we to spread an Eleventh Amendment cover over an agency that consumes no state revenues but contributes to the State's wealth. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 4  uBT (1924); see also Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,213!216, and n. 1, 359 P.2d 457, 458!460, and n. 1 (1961) (Traynor,J.). The proper focus is not on the use of profits or surplus, but rather is on losses and debts. If the expenditures of the enterprise exceed receipts, is the State in fact obligated to bear and pay the resulting indebtedness of the enterprise? When the answer is No"both legally and practically"then the Eleventh Amendment's core concern is not implicated.  9H1 d d,IV؃  4 2  The conflict between the Second and Third Circuits, it bears emphasis, is no longer over the correct legal theory. Both Circuits, in accord with the prevailing  J view, see supra, at 18!19, identify the `state treasury' criterion"whether any judgment must be satisfied out of the state treasury"as the most important consideration in resolving an Eleventh Amendment immunity issue. Brief for States of New Jersey, New York et al.  J& as Amici Curiae 2 (acknowledging, but opposing, this widely held view). The intercircuit division thus persists only because the Second and Third Circuits diverge in answering the question: Are the Port Authority's debts  J those of its parent States? See ibid.  J^  Two Third Circuit decisions issued after Port Authority  J6 PBA, both rejecting Eleventh Amendment pleas by public6"   transit authorities, indicate the narrow compass of the  J current Circuit split. In Bolden v. Southeastern Pa.  J Transp. Authority, 953 F.2d 807 (CA3 1991) (in banc), cert. denied, 504 U.S. ___ (1992), the Third Circuit held a regional transit authority not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in federal court. The most important question, according to Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals confirmed, was whether any judgment would be paid from the state treasury. 953 F.2d, at 816 (internal  Jp quotation marks omitted). Earlier, in Fitchik v. New  JH Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (CA3 1989) (in banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989), an FELA suit, the Third Circuit concluded that the New Jersey Transit Corporation did not share the State's  J Eleventh Amendment immunity. As in Bolden, the court  J in Fitchik called most important the question whether any judgment would be paid from the state treasury. 873 F.2d, at 659.  J  Accounting for Port Authority PBA in its later Bolden decision, the Third Circuit acknowledged that it had relied primarily on the interstate compact provision calling for state contributions unless Port Authority revenues were   `adequate to meet all expenditures.' [   J@ See Bolden, supra, at 815 (quoting compact article XV,  J set out supra, at 6!7, n.7). As earlier indicated, howev J er, see supra, at 6!7 and 15!16, the Third Circuit drew from the compact expense coverage provision far more than the text of that provision warrants. 3 Stars (*** 3 Stars A discrete entity created by constitutional compact among three sovereigns, the Port Authority is financially selfsufficient; it generates its own revenues, and it pays its own debts. Requiring the Port Authority to answer in federal court to injured railroad workers who assert a federal statutory right, under the FELA, to recover>"   damages does not touch the concerns"the States' solvency and dignity"that underpin the Eleventh Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is  J accordingly reversed, and the Hess and Walsh cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J ` 3It is so ordered.ă