WPC=] 2ABcR Z23|[ "m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^HJS<aa}FSFFFF}oaa}<a]XX}kaaSFSS*SSSSSSSSSS]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]XXXXX}}}}kkkX}kNF}J}}}\\VV<xx}SS}}<xVF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2&cc!c"m^018``(AASe.8..``````````..eeeS}xJlxoxxxoAeAeS(fl]o`Afr>;o;rfolWSGrfffZAeAe8.888888888888f>fffff]````J>J>J>J>rffffrrrrxffoffxffofff]]]]o````ffffffrrJ>J>J>J>lox;x;x;x;x;rrrrffWWWoSoSoSoSxGxGxGrrrrrrxfoZoZoZox;rWoSxGxfxfofrNe.}S1SSS```==`9}}`9(PPS88SSrr(P9ee\\w.e77\\\wwweeeCe.wR)EreewwwwIeenR\\\wwwxio\eEfRfIfRxe|W87y\r\rxWlRx\\]\ceIfIs`Wx\rriIe77\``rigewiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiIIIIIIIeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee777777777777\\\\\\\````````````rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrxfx8xs8s\"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"X^?Sf}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}FFoSaSFSu}So}o}oS}}FF}F}}}}SaF}}}}ox2xS?SS*SSSSSSSSSS}FooooooooooSFSFSFSF}}}}}}}}}}o}}}}}}ooooooo}oooo}}}}}}}}SFSFSFSFa}FFFFF}}}}}}SSSaaaaFFF}}}}}}}ooo}F}SaF}}}}}NX?q}So}}}}}EN}K}K-oo}SS}}SoKF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2I4 c& c * c- c0"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXgwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkklWdPZH\I\I\IlWoY2(mWgRklWaMlWs\SCYG\IhSr\lWw_s\_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^#22KI-72222222222777(BAAAFAHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>12DQczEbHs?OP"m^ #-AAa_'':G ' AAAAAAAAAA GGG4VTTT[TN[a/A[Nn_[N[TJN_TrRRG'G'G:AA4C:'?G%#E%hG:CA46-G?[??8'G'G' ''u''''''''''C%TATATATATAu]T4T:T:T:T:/%/%/%/%_G[:[:[:[:_G_G_G_GR?TA[C[:[:R?[:NCTATATAT4T4T4T4[CT:T:T:T:[?[?[?[?[?[?aGaG/%/%/%/%A[EN%N%N%N%N%_G_G_G_G[:[:uaT4T4T4J6J6J6J6N-N-N-_G_G_G_G_G_Gr[R?G8G8G8[CN%_GT4J6N-R?R?[C[:_GNG G:#422AAA'#aaA'VVAa'--Au::uGGu-u'GG@@S G&&@@@SZSSGssFFz/G `S:0P]sssFFzZSSSS3`ZZZFFM:@e@@SSSTJN@F0G:G3G:TFV='&T@P@hGT=K:T@Z@A@EF3G3QCY=T@]PZPJ3F&&@CCPJHFSJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ3333333FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF&&&&&&&&&&&&@@@@@@@CCCCCCCCCCCCPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPTGT'TQZ'Q@&)o=3no P['C&P &%e8.|e P['CP&8SF> P['CPd:SHvX pTCd'l80lX pTCDS?3s\  PCPDS??皝4  p(AC& u![2*d[ P['CP  u![2*P[e xzCX&r!Y1)LY P['CP )o=3no P['C&P )o=3PRoe xzC&X&]I(!̤PI P['ChP u![2*d[ P['CP &UC%D4C P['CJP&F66 P['CP&[G' ԦGG P['C^Pu>|Ru]SY6W5+|R]]|GYBY1YQu_&Q:|RuiIÐt iID YH_2|R t8:Rt CiIH*ÐKt iID9X_2|RK~Opin InitInitial Opinion codesdpЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@BQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( 2\\ovQHRH-UuWFTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: J"   his exclusion from the House of Representatives (and his consequent loss of salary) presented an Article III case  J or controversy. But Powell does not help appellees. First, appellees have not been singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies. Their claim is that the Act causes a type of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative power), which necessarily damages all Members of Congress and both Houses of Congress  J equally. See n.7, infra. Second, appellees do not claim that they have been deprived of something to which they  JH personally are entitled"such as their seats as Members  J of Congress after their constituents had elected them. Rather, appellees' claim of standing is based on a loss of political power, not loss of any private right, which would make the injury more concrete. Unlike the injury claimed by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, the injury claimed by the Members of Congress here is not claimed in any private capacity but solely because they are Members of Congress. See Complaint 14 (purporting to sue in their official capacities). If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead. The claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) with the Member's seat, a seat which the Member holds (it may quite arguably be said) as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power. See The Federalist No. 62, p.378 (J.Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ( It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents and prove unfaithful to their important trust).  The one case in which we have upheld standing for  J legislators (albeit state legislators) claiming an institu J tional injury is Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Appellees, relying heavily on this case, claim that they,` "    J like the state legislators in Coleman, have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effective J ness of their votes, id., at 438, sufficient to establish  J standing. In Coleman, 20 of Kansas' 40 State Senators voted not to ratify the proposed Child Labor Amendment to the Federal Constitution. With the vote deadlocked 20!20, the amendment ordinarily would not have been ratified. However, the State's Lieutenant Governor, the presiding officer of the State Senate, cast a deciding vote in favor of the amendment, and it was deemed ratified (after the State House of Representatives voted to ratify it). The 20 State Senators who had voted against the amendment, joined by a 21st State Senator and three State House Members, filed an action in the Kansas Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus that would compel the appropriate state officials to recognize that the legislature had not in fact ratified the amendment. That court held that the members of the legislature had standing to bring their mandamus action,  J but ruled against them on the merits. See id., at 436!437.  This Court affirmed. By a vote of 5!4, we held that  J the members of the legislature had standing. uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Chief Justice Hughes wrote an opinion styled the opinion of the  uB Court. Coleman, 307 U.S., at 435. Four Justices concurred in the judgment, partially on the ground that the legislators lacked stand uB ing. See id., at 456!457 (opinion of Black, J., joined by Roberts,  uB Frankfurter, and Douglas, JJ.); id., at 460 (opinion of Frankfurter, J., joined by Roberts, Black, and Douglas, JJ.). Two justices dis uBB sented on the merits. See id., at 470 (opinion of Butler, J., joined by McReynolds, J.). Thus, even though there were only two Justices who joined Chief Justice Hughes's opinion on the merits, it is apparent that the two dissenting Justices joined his opinion as to the standing discussion. Otherwise, Justice Frankfurter's opinion denying standing would have been the controlling opinion. In explaining our holding, we repeatedly emphasized that if these legislators (who were suing as a bloc) were@ $ "   correct on the merits, then their votes not to ratify the amendment were deprived of all validity: BQ C  , , (  Here, the plaintiffs include twenty senators, whose  J votes against ratification have been overridden and  J virtually held for naught although if they are right  J{ in their contentions their votes would have been  JS sufficient to defeat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct, and adequate interest  J in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. Id., at 438 (emphasis added). [T]he twenty senators were not only qualified to  Jc vote on the question of ratification but their votes, if the Lieutenant governor were excluded as not being a part of the legislature for that purpose,  J would have been decisive in defeating the ratifying  J resolution. Id., at 441 (emphasis added). [W]e find no departure from principle in recognizing  JK in the instant case that at least the twenty senators  J# whose votes, if their contention were sustained,  J would have been sufficient to defeat the resolution ratifying the proposed constitutional amendment, have an interest in the controversy which, treated by the state court as a basis for entertaining and deciding the federal questions, is sufficient to give  J3 the Court jurisdiction to review that decision. Id., at 446 (emphasis added).  J pvBQ d  ( , , It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman stands  J (at most, see n.8, infra) for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been "    J completely nullified.o uBh ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < See also Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 544!545, n.7 (1986) (in dicta, suggesting hypothetically that if state law authorized a school board to take action only by unanimous consent, if a school board member voted against a particular action, and if the board nonetheless took the action, the board member might claim that he was legally entitled to protect `the effectiveness  uB of [his] vot[e],' Coleman[, 307 U.S., at 438,] ... [b]ut in that event [he] would have to allege that his vote was diluted or rendered nugatory under state law).  It should be equally obvious that appellees' claim does  J not fall within our holding in Coleman, as thus understood. They have not alleged that they voted for a specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated. In the vote on the Line Item Veto Act, their votes were  J given full effect. They simply lost that vote.p  uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Just as appellees cannot show that their vote was denied or  uBv nullified as in Coleman (in the sense that a bill they voted for would have become law if their vote had not been stripped of its validity), so are they unable to show that their vote was denied or nullified in a discriminatory manner (in the sense that their vote was denied its full validity in relation to the votes of their colleagues). Thus, the various hypotheticals offered by appellees in their briefs and discussed during oral argument have no applicability to this case. See Reply Brief for Appellees 6 (positing hypothetical law in which firstterm Members were not allowed to vote on  uB appropriations bills, or in which every Member was disqualified on grounds of partiality from voting on major federal projects in his or her own district); Tr. of Oral Arg. 17 ( QUESTION: But [Congress] might have passed a statute that said the Senators from Iowa on hogfarming matters should have only halfavote. Would they have standing to challenge that?). Nor can they allege that the Act will nullify their votes in the  J future in the same way that the votes of the Coleman legislators had been nullified. In the future, a majority of Senators and Congressman can pass or reject appropriations bills; the Act has no effect on this process. In addition, a majority of Senators and Congressman can o"   vote to repeal the Act, or to exempt a given appropriations bill (or a given provision in an appropriations bill) from the Act; again, the Act has no effect on this  J process. Coleman thus provides little meaningful  J` precedent for appellees' argument.K ` uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Since we hold that Coleman may be distinguished from the  uB instant case on this ground, we need not decide whether Coleman may also be distinguished in other ways. For instance, appellants  uB have argued that Coleman has no applicability to a similar suit brought in federal court, since that decision depended on the fact that the Kansas Supreme Court treated the senators' interest in their votes as a basis for entertaining and deciding the federal  uB questions. 307 U.S., at 446. They have also argued that Coleman has no applicability to a similar suit brought by federal legislators, since the separationofpowers concerns present in such a suit were  uB not present in Coleman, and since any federalism concerns were eliminated by the Kansas Supreme Court's decision to take jurisdiction over the case.  Nevertheless, appellees rely heavily on our statement  J in Coleman that the Kansas senators had a plain, direct, and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. Appellees claim that this statement applies to them because their votes on future appropriations bills (assuming a majority of Congress does not decide to exempt those bills from the Act) will be less effective than before, and that the meaning and integrity of their vote has changed. Brief for Appellees 24, 28. The argument goes as follows. Before the Act, Members of Congress could be sure that when they voted for, and Congress passed, an appropriations bill that included funds for Project X, one of two things would happen: (i) the bill would become law and all of the projects listed in the bill would go into effect, or (ii) the bill would not become law and none of the projects listed in the bill would go into effect. Either way, a vote for the appropriations bill meant a vote for a package of projects that were inextricably linked. Afterh "   the Act, however, a vote for an appropriations bill that includes Project X means something different. Now, in addition to the two possibilities listed above, there is a third option: the bill will become law and then the  J` President will cancel Project X. ` uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Although Congress could reinstate Project X through a disapproval bill, it would assumedly take twothirds of both Houses to do so, since the President could be expected to veto the Project X disapproval bill. But see Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 Va. L. Rev. 403, 411!412 (1988) (political costs that President would suffer in important congressional districts might limit use of lineitem veto).  Even taking appellees at their word about the change in the meaning and effectiveness of their vote for appropriations bills which are subject to the Act, we  J think their argument pulls Coleman too far from its moorings. Appellees' use of the word effectiveness to  Jp link their argument to Coleman stretches the word far  JH beyond the sense in which the Coleman opinion used it. There is a vast difference between the level of vote  J nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional legislative power that is alleged here. To uphold standing here would require a drastic  J extension of Coleman. We are unwilling to take that step.  Not only do appellees lack support from precedent, but historical practice appears to cut against them as well. It is evident from several episodes in our history that in analogous confrontations between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch, no suit was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power. The Tenure of Office Act, passed by Congress over the veto of President Andrew Johnson in 1867, was a thorn in the side of succeeding Presidents until it was finally repealed at the behest of President Grover Cleveland in 1887. See generally W. Rehnquist, Grand "   Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson 210!235, 260!268 (1992). It provided that an official whose appointment to an Executive Branch office required confirmation by the Senate could not be removed without the consent of the Senate. 14 Stat. 430, ch. 154. In 1868, Johnson removed his Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton. Within a week, the House of Representatives impeached Johnson. 1 Trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, Before the Senate of the United States on Impeachment by the House of Representatives for High Crimes and Misdemeanors 4 (1868). One of the principal charges against him was that his removal of Stanton  J violated the Tenure of Office Act. Id., at 6!8. At the conclusion of his trial before the Senate, Johnson was  J acquitted by one vote. 2 id., at 487, 496!498. Surely Johnson had a stronger claim of diminution of his official power as a result of the Tenure of Office Act than do the appellees in the present case. Indeed, if their claim were sustained, it would appear that President Johnson would have had standing to challenge the Tenure of Office Act before he ever thought about firing a cabinet member, simply on the grounds that it altered the calculus by which he would nominate someone to his cabinet. Yet if the federal courts had entertained an action to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act immediately after its passage in 1867, they would have been improperly and unnecessarily plunged into the bitter political battle being waged between the President and Congress.  Succeeding Presidents"Ulysses S. Grant and Grover Cleveland"urged Congress to repeal the Tenure of Office Act, and Cleveland's plea was finally heeded in 1887. 24 Stat. 500, ch. 353. It occurred to neither of these Presidents that they might challenge the Act in an Article III court. Eventually, in a suit brought by a plaintiff with traditional Article III standing, this Court` "   did have the opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of the provision contained in the Tenure of Office Act. A sort of miniTenure of Office Act covering only the Post Office Department had been enacted in 1872, 17 Stat. 284, ch. 335, 2, and it remained on the books after the Tenure of Office Act's repeal in 1887. In the last days of the Woodrow Wilson administration, Albert Burleson, Wilson's Postmaster General, came to believe that Frank Myers, the Postmaster in Portland, Oregon, had committed fraud in the course of his official duties. When Myers refused to resign, Burleson, acting at the direction of the President, removed him. Myers sued in  J the Court of Claims to recover lost salary. In Myers v.  J United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), more than half a century after Johnson's impeachment, this Court held that Congress could not require senatorial consent to the removal of a Postmaster who had been appointed by the  JX President with the consent of the Senate. Id., at 106!107, 173, 176. In the course of its opinion, the Court expressed the view that the original Tenure of  J Office Act was unconstitutional. Id., at 176. See also  J id., at 173 ( This Court has, since the Tenure of Office Act, manifested an earnest desire to avoid a final settlement of the question until it should be inevitably presented, as it is here).  If the appellees in the present case have standing, presumably President Wilson, or Presidents Grant and Cleveland before him, would likewise have had standing, and could have challenged the law preventing the removal of a presidential appointee without the consent  JP of Congress. Similarly, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Attorney General would have had standing to challenge the oneHouse veto provision because it rendered his authority provisional rather than final. By parity of reasoning, President Gerald Ford could have sued to challenge the appointment provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act which were struck` "    J down in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and a Member of Congress could have challenged the validity of President Coolidge's pocket veto that was sustained in  J The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).  There would be nothing irrational about a system which granted standing in these cases; some European constitutional courts operate under one or another  J variant of such a regime. See, e.g., Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in Constitutionalism and Rights 38, 41 (L. Henkin & A. Rosenthal eds. 1990); Wright Sheive, Central and Eastern European Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review, 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1201, 1209 (1995); A. Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France 232 (1992); D. Kommers, Judicial Politics in West Germany: A Study of the Federal Constitutional Court 106 (1976). But it is obviously not the regime that has obtained under our Constitution to date. Our regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts, well expressed by Justice Powell in his concurring  J opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974): BQ C  , , (  The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by  J Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)] lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests.  J Id., at 192. vBQ d  ( , ,  9H1 d "  Ԍd7IV؃  2  In sum, appellees have alleged no injury to themselves  J as individuals (contra Powell), the institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed  J (contra Coleman), and their attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form is contrary to historical experience. We attach some importance to the fact that appellees have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and  J indeed both Houses actively oppose their suit.  uB2 ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Cf. Bender, 475 U.S., at 544 ( Generally speaking, members of collegial bodies do not have standing to perfect an appeal the body  uB itself has declined to take); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892) ( The two houses of Congress are legislative bodies representing larger constituencies. Power is not vested in any one individual, but in the aggregate of the members who compose the body, and its action is not the action of any separate member or number of members, but the action of the body as a whole).  See  J n.2, supra. We also note that our conclusion neither deprives Members of Congress of an adequate remedy (since they may repeal the Act or exempt appropriations bills from its reach), nor forecloses the Act from constitutional challenge (by someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act). Whether the case would be different if any of these circumstances were different we need not now decide.  We therefore hold that these individual members of Congress do not have a sufficient personal stake in this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete  J injury to have established Article III standing. %H uB  ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < In addition, it is far from clear that this injury is fairly traceable to appellants, as our precedents require, since the alleged cause of appellees's injury is not appellants' exercise of legislative power but the actions of their own colleagues in Congress in passing  uB the Act. Cf. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (CA2 1973) ( Representative Holtzman ... has not been denied any right to vote on [the war in Cambodia] by any action of the defendantsT "## [Executive Branch officials].... The fact that her vote was ineffective was due to the contrary votes of her colleagues and not the defendants herein). The "   judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  J ` BIt is so ordered.ă