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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@BQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( 2YHvQSX RYFootnotestntesFormats for normal footnotes&Kn#[ P['CdP# ddf < X01Í Í01Í Í #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: Clause, Art. IV, 3, cl. 2. Since Utah Div. of State  J Lands concerned congressional enactments, it discloses little about the circumstances under which action by the Executive will defeat a State's equal footing claim to submerged lands.  As authority for inclusion of submerged lands within the Reserve, the Master focused on the Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847, also known as the Pickett Act. The Act stated: BQ C  , , (  [T]he President may, at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States including the District of Alaska and reserve the same for waterpower sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other public purposes to be specified in the orders of withdrawals, and such withdrawals or reservations shall remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress. 1, 36 Stat. 847 (repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94!579, 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792).iBQ ad *"  Ԍ ( , , The Pickett Act nowhere specifically mentions submerged lands, and Alaska therefore challenges the Master's conclusion that the Pickett Act gave the President the express authority to dispose of them. Its argument rests mainly on the proposition that the Pickett Act's reference to withdraw[al] of public lands cannot include submerged lands, because such lands are not subject to sale, settlement, or entry under the general land laws  J and therefore need not be withdrawn. Cf. Utah Div.  J of State Lands, 482 U.S., at 203 (1888 Act stated that lands designated for reservoir sites were   `reserved from sale as the property of the United States, and shall not be subject... to entry, settlement or occupation'  ; rejecting claim that Act authorized inclusion of submerged lands in part because such lands were already  J exempt from sale, entry, or occupation); Mann v. Tacoma  J Land Co., 153 U.S. 273, 284 (1894) ( the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does  J0 not extend to tide lands); Shively, 152 U.S., at 48 ( Congress has never undertaken by general laws to dispose of land under navigable waters).  J  Assuming arguendo that Alaska's construction of the Pickett Act is correct, it does not control the outcome of this case. We conclude that Congress ratified the terms of the 1923 Executive Order in 11(b) of the Statehood Act. Despite Alaska's protestations to the contrary, there would have been no barrier to Congress retaining a petroleum reserve, including submerged lands, at the  J point of Alaska's statehood, provided it satisfied Utah  Jx Div. of State Lands' requirements of demonstrating a clear intent to include submerged lands within the Reserve's scope and a clear intent to defeat Alaska's title. It follows that Congress could achieve the same result by explicitly recognizing, at the point of Alaska's statehood, an executive reservation that clearly included  J submerged lands. Cf. Utah Div. of State Lands, supra, at 205!207 (examining United States' claim that refer`+"  Ԯences to the bed of Utah Lake made by the Geological Survey in reserving Utah Lake, taken together with 1890 Act providing that reservoir sites selected by the Geological Survey shall remain segregated and reserved from entry or settlement, signaled Congress' ratification of the reservation of the lake bed; rejecting claim on the ground that Congress was not on notice that the Geological Survey had reserved the bed of the lake);  J Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 247 (1872) (rejecting Property Clause challenge to President's treaty with Cherokee Nation; although terms of treaty exceeded express delegation of authority by Congress to the President, Congress had repeatedly recognized the validity of the treaty by enacting appropriation statutes).  J As discussed supra, at 35!39, the 1923 Executive Order reflected a clear intent to include submerged lands within the Reserve. That instrument placed Congress on notice that the President had construed his reservation authority to extend to submerged lands and had exercised that authority to set aside uplands and submerged lands in the Reserve to secure a source of oil for the Navy. Congress acknowledged the United States' ownership of and jurisdiction over the Reserve in 11(b) of the Statehood Act. Accordingly, Congress ratified the inclusion of submerged lands within the Reserve, whether or not it had intended the President's reservation authority under the Pickett Act to extend to such lands.  ;H2 d d8D؃  2  In sum, we conclude that the United States retained ownership of submerged lands beneath certain coastal features within the National Petroleum Reserve at  J Alaska's statehood. Under the strict standards of Utah  Jn Div. of State Lands, the Executive Order of 1923 reflected a clear intent to include submerged lands within the Reserve. In addition to the fact that the,"   Order refers to coastal features and necessarily covers the tidelands, excluding submerged lands beneath the coastal features would have been inconsistent with the purpose of the Reserve"to secure a supply of oil that would necessarily exist beneath both submerged lands and uplands. Section 11(b) of the Alaska Statehood Act, which noted that the United States owned the Reserve and which included a statement of exclusive legislative jurisdiction under the Enclave Clause, reflects Congress' intent to ratify the inclusion of submerged lands within the Reserve and to defeat the State's title to those lands.  9H1 d d8V؃  \ 2  The United States excepts to the Master's conclusion that submerged lands within a federal reservation in northeastern Alaska, now known as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, passed to Alaska upon its admission to the Union in 1959. In November 1957, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife submitted an application to the Secretary of the Interior for withdrawal of 8.9 million acres of land to establish an Arctic Wildlife Range within all or such portion of the described lands as may be finally determined to be necessary for the preservation of the wildlife and wilderness resources of that region of northeastern Alaska. Alaska Exh. 81 (Application for Withdrawal by Public Land Order, p. 1). This application was still pending in July 1958, when Congress passed the Alaska Statehood Act, and in January 1959, when Alaska was formally admitted to the Union. On December 6, 1960, the Secretary of the Interior issued Public Land Order 2214, which reserved the area for use of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service as the Arctic National Wildlife Range. 25 Fed. Reg. 12598. In 1980, Congress expanded the Range to include an additional 9.2 million acres and renamed it the Arctic National Wildlife-"   Refuge. Pub. L. 96!487, 303(2)(A), 94 Stat. 2390.  Before the Master, the parties disputed whether the 1957 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife application for withdrawal and creation of the Range"filed before but granted after Alaska's admission to the Union"could prevent title to submerged lands within the Range from passing to Alaska at statehood. The Alaska Statehood Act transferred to Alaska certain real property used for the conservation and protection of wildlife, but withheld from the State lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife. Pub. L. 85!508, 6(e), 72 Stat. 341. Among other things, the United States argued that the lands within the Range, including coastal submerged lands, had been set apart by the combined effect of the application and a Department of Interior regulation in force when the application was filed and when Congress passed the Alaska Statehood Act. That regulation provided that the filing of an application shall temporarily segregate such lands from settlement, location, sale, selection, entry, lease, and other forms of disposal under the public land laws, including the mining and the mineral leasing laws, to the extent that the withdrawal or reservation applied for, if effected, would prevent such forms of disposal. 43 CFR 295.11(a) (Supp. 1958). Accordingly, under the United States' principal theory, the 1957 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife application had the legal effect of segregating or setting apart all lands within the projected boundaries of the Range, including submerged lands, as a wildlife refuge. If this were so, 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act withheld such lands from Alaska at statehood.  The Special Master rejected this approach. He focused on the fact that 6(e) prevents transfer only of those  J lands set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife. (Emphasis added.) The Master concluded that, taken together, the 1957 application and`."   the Department of Interior regulation caused land to be  J set apart for the purpose of a wildlife reservation, but  J found that the land was not yet set apart as a refuge or reservation upon Alaska's admission to the Union, because the application had not yet been granted. Report 464 (first emphasis added). Since the application and regulation did not withhold the lands within the Range from Alaska under 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act, the Master concluded that coastal submerged lands within the Range passed to Alaska upon its admission to the Union. Because real property used for conservation of wildlife, but not set apart as a wildlife refuge or reservation, would have been transferred to Alaska, the Master's approach arguably calls into question federal  J ownership of uplands as well as submerged lands within  J the Range. See infra, at 60!61.  Alaska had argued in the alternative that, even if the application was effective to prevent submerged lands within the Range from passing to Alaska at statehood, the boundaries of the Range did not embrace certain submerged lands between the mainland and the barrier islands along Alaska's northeastern coast. The Master's recommendation in Alaska's favor on the effect of the application, if accepted, would have made irrelevant the dispute concerning the boundaries of the Range. The Master nevertheless addressed Alaska's alternative argument and resolved the boundary dispute in the United States' favor. Report 478!495. The Master also  J considered the effect of Montana and Utah Div. of State  Jx Lands on Alaska's ownership of submerged lands within the Range. In supplemental briefing submitted after we decided those cases, Alaska argued that the 1957 application reflected no clear intent to include submerged lands within the Range. Even if the application embraced submerged lands, Alaska asserted, the United States had identified no evidence that Congress intended to defeat Alaska's title to those lands. Relying princi`/"  Ԯpally on a statement of justification attached to the 1957 application, the Master found a clear intent to include submerged lands within the Range. That statement of justification described the seacoast as provid[ing] habitat for polar bears, Arctic foxes, seals, and whales, Alaska Exh. 16 (Memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife to the Bureau of Land Management, Nov. 7, 1957, p. 2); the Master reasoned that the drafters of the application [could] not have thought this habitat was only upland, Report 496. In addition, the Master noted that the original boundary of the Range was the high water mark along the Arctic Coast; the drafters changed the boundary to the extreme lowwater mark so as to include the tidelands within the  J Range. Ibid. The Master also found that the application reflected an intent to defeat Alaska's title, pointing out that the reservation was meant to have permanent effect, not merely to hold whatever submerged lands were made part of the Range until Alaska's admission  J to the Union. Ibid.  The United States excepts to the Special Master's conclusion that the 1957 application and the Department of Interior regulation, read together, did not have the effect of setting apart lands within the Range as [a] refug[e] ... for the protection of wildlife. Alaska defends the Master's conclusion concerning the legal effect of the application. Alaska also defends on alternative grounds the ultimate conclusion that submerged lands within the Range passed to Alaska, arguing that the United States did not clearly intend to include submerged lands within the Range and that the United States did not clearly intend to defeat Alaska's title to those lands. In essence, Alaska challenges the Master's conclusion that the 1957 application met the require J ments of Montana and Utah Div. of State Lands"a conclusion appearing in a section of the Report to which it did not except. See Report 495!499. As will become`0"   clear, however, although the Master considered separately whether the application had the effect of setting apart lands within the Range within the meaning of  J 6(e) and whether the requirements of Montana and  J` Utah Div. of State Lands had been met, those inquiries overlap considerably. We therefore must address the  J application of Montana and Utah Div. of State Lands to this case.  ;H2 d d8A؃  2  As with the National Petroleum Reserve, the boundaries of the Range, as drawn by the Master, encompass both submerged lands beneath tidelands and inland navigable waters"which would ordinarily pass to Alaska under the equal footing doctrine as confirmed by the Submerged Lands Act"and submerged lands beneath the territorial sea"which would pass to Alaska only by virtue of its Submerged Lands Act grant. As discussed  J supra, at 32!35, Congress has chosen in the Submerged Lands Act to exercise its paramount authority over submerged lands beneath the territorial sea by granting such lands to a coastal State, unless the Federal Government expressly retained the lands in question when the State entered the Union. 43 U.S.C.  J Ԛ1313(a); see 1301(a). Applying the logic of Montana  J and Utah Div. of State Lands, therefore, we ask whether the United States clearly included submerged lands within the Range and intended to defeat state title to such lands. If it did, the United States will have demonstrated that it expressly retained the coastal submerged lands at issue in this case, including tidelands and lands beneath the territorial sea.  ;H2 d d8B؃  2  The Master examined the legal effect of the 1957 application in one section of his Report and applied the  J analysis of Montana and Utah Div. of State Lands in another. These inquiries overlap significantly, as the1"   Government's argument makes clear. The Government claims that the 1957 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife application reflected the United States' clear intent to include submerged lands within the proposed  J` Range, satisfying the first inquiry under Utah Div. of  J8 State Lands. As for the second inquiry, the Government argues that the United States expressly retained all lands within the Range, including submerged lands, with 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act. That subsection prevented the transfer to Alaska of any lands set apart as a refuge. The Government maintains that the legal effect of the 1957 application was to set apart the Range as a refuge. If so, the Government argues, 6(e) reflects a clear congressional intent to defeat state title. We address the terms of the application and the proper interpretation of 6(e) in turn.  =H3 d d81؃  2  It is clear that the 1957 application by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife for withdrawal of lands in northeastern Alaska included submerged lands. The application contained a boundary description beginning from the line of extreme low water of the Arctic Ocean at the Canadian border and following westerly along the said line of extreme low water, including all offshore bars, reefs, and islands to Brownlow Point. Alaska Exh. 81, p.3. Because the boundary follows the line of extreme low water, the Range necessarily encompasses the periodically submerged tidelands. The boundary description also expressly refers to certain submerged lands, including offshore bars and reefs. Moreover, a statement of justification accompanying the application illustrates that the Range was intended to include submerged lands beneath other bodies of water. The statement explained that countless lakes, ponds, and marshes [within the proposed Range] are nesting grounds for large numbers of migratory waterfowl that2"   spend about half of each year in the United States.... The river bottoms with their willow thickets furnish habitat for moose. This section of the seacoast provides habitat for polar bears, Arctic foxes, seals, and whales. Alaska Exh. 16, p.2. As the Master concluded, the drafters of the application would not have thought that the habitats mentioned were only upland. Report 496.  The express reference to bars and reefs and the purpose of the proposed Range each distinguish this case  J from Montana and Utah Div. of State Lands. In those cases, we concluded that submerged lands beneath certain bodies of water had not been conveyed or reserved, despite the fact that the bodies of water fell within the boundaries of the conveyance or reservation. Neither case involved an instrument of conveyance or reservation that, properly understood, referred to  J submerged lands. See Montana, 450 U.S., at 548, 554;  JX Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S., at 203. Moreover, in each case, we focused on the purpose of the conveyance or reservation as a critical factor in determining  J federal intent. See supra, at 35!37. In Montana, we reasoned that a conveyance of a beneficial interest in submerged lands beneath a river on the Crow Reservation would not have been necessary to achieve the Government's purpose in creating the reservation, because fishing was not important to the Crow Tribe's  J way of life. 450 U.S., at 556. Similarly, in Utah Div.  J of State Lands, we concluded that the Federal Government could prevent settlers from claiming lands adjacent to waters suitable for reservoir sites and could control the development of those waters, even if lands beneath the waters in question passed to the State. 482 U.S., at 202, 208. Here, in contrast, the statement of justification accompanying the 1957 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife application demonstrated that waters within the boundaries of the Range were an essential part of the habitats of the species the Range was designed to`3"   protect, and that retention of lands underlying those waters was critical to the Government's goal of preserving these aquatic habitats.  Alaska resists the conclusion that the application reflected an intent to include submerged lands within the Range on two grounds. First, Alaska focuses on the fact that the application sought only to withdraw lands within the Range from  ! `all forms of appropriation under the public land laws' except mineral leasing and mining locations. Reply Brief for State of Alaska 17 (quoting  Jp Alaska Exh. 81, p. 1). Relying on language in Utah Div.  JH of State Lands, Alaska argues that submerged lands are not subject to disposal under the public land laws and there would have been no need to exempt them from appropriation under those laws. Alaska Opposition Brief 17; see 482 U.S., at 203 (rejecting claim that 1888 Act authorized inclusion of submerged lands in part because such lands were already exempt from sale, entry, or occupation).  Alaska misreads the application. Although the application did seek to preclude appropriation of lands within the proposed Range under the public land laws (presumably where those laws would otherwise apply), the application had a far broader purpose: to establish a reservation for the use of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. See Alaska Exh. 81, p. 1 ( The purpose of this withdrawal is to establish an Arctic Wildlife Range within all or such portion of the described lands as may be finally determined to be necessary for the preservation of the wildlife and wilderness resources of that region of northeastern Alaska). Because the application was not designed solely to prevent appropriation of lands governed by the public land laws, focusing on whether the public land laws reach submerged lands cannot end our inquiry into whether the application embraced submerged lands.  Second, Alaska argues that no international duty or`4"   public exigency supported the inclusion of submerged lands within the application. As we concluded earlier, however, the United States need only identify an appropriate public purpose for conveying or reserving  J` submerged lands. See supra, at 39. Creation of a wildlife refuge is an appropriate public purpose that is served by including submerged lands within the refuge. Alaska also appears to suggest that an application alone  J can never reveal an appropriate public purpose, because until the application is granted it cannot be known whether submerged lands are necessary to achieve that purpose. See Reply Brief for State of Alaska 14. If the Secretary of the Interior had granted the withdrawal application before Alaska's statehood"thereby confirming that an appropriate public purpose supported the reservation of submerged lands"Alaska presumably would have no claim that the application had never covered submerged lands in the first place. It follows that Alaska objects not to the notion that the application covered submerged lands, but rather to the proposition that Alaska's title to submerged lands covered by the application could be defeated even though the application was still pending when Alaska was admitted to the Union. We address below whether the United States could have defeated Alaska's title to lands not yet part  J of a completed reservation. See infra, at 57!59.  Finally, it is important to point out what Alaska does  J not argue at this stage of the proceedings. Alaska does not defend the Master's ultimate recommendation on the alternative ground that the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife lacked the authority to include submerged lands within an application to set aside lands for a wildlife refuge. In connection with its exception to the Master's recommendation that the United States retained submerged lands within National Petroleum Reserve, Alaska argued that the Congress had not properly delegated to the Executive its authority under`5"   the Property Clause, Art. IV, 3, cl. 2, to divest a future State of its title to submerged lands. Alaska makes no parallel argument here. Tr. of Oral Arg. 80!81. In any event, the Government does not claim here that Executive actions alone establish in this case that the United States retained submerged lands within the Range. Rather, the Government relies squarely on congressional intent underlying 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act. Our prior discussion of ratification of Executive action  J applies equally here. See supra, at 43!44. There would have been no constitutional impediment to Congress designating a wildlife refuge encompassing submerged lands and retaining title to it upon Alaska's admission to the Union, provided Congress' actions were sufficiently clear to meet the requirements of our submerged lands cases. It follows that Congress could accomplish the same result by recognizing prior Executive actions. We discuss below whether Congress did so here. See  J0 infra, at 55!59.  In sum, we conclude that the application by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife to withdraw lands for a wildlife refuge reflected a clear intent to reserve submerged lands as well as uplands. The Range's boundary was drawn so that the periodically submerged tidelands were necessarily included within it; the boundary description referred on its face to submerged features such as bars and reefs. Moreover, the purpose of the federal reservation"protecting the habitats of various species found along the coast and in other navigable water bodies within the Range" supported inclusion of submerged lands within the Range.  =H3 d d82؃  <2  We now consider whether, prior to Alaska's admission to the Union, the United States defeated the future State's title to the submerged lands included within the6"   proposed Range.  The Alaska Statehood Act set forth a general rule that the United States would retain title to all property it held prior to Alaska's admission to the Union, while the State of Alaska would acquire title to all property held by the Territory of Alaska or its subdivisions. Pub. L. 85!508, 5, 72 Stat. 340. There were several exceptions to that provision. Of primary relevance here is 6(e), which transferred to Alaska [a]ll real and personal property of the United States situated in the Territory of Alaska which is specifically used for the sole purpose of conservation and protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska ...[provided] [t]hat such transfer shall not include lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wild J life.... Id., at 340!341.  In our view, under 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act, the United States retained the Arctic National Wildlife Range as lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife, rather than transferring the lands to Alaska. As discussed above, the 1957 application reflected an intent to include submerged lands within the Range. Shortly after the application was filed, the Secretary of Interior publicly announced the action. See U. S. Exh. 12 (Department of the Interior Press Release, Nov. 20, 1957); U.S. Exh. 32 (statement of Secretary Seaton). Formal notice of the application was published in the Federal Register in January 1958. 23 Fed. Reg. 364. Moreover, later in 1958, while Congress was considering Alaska's admission to the Union, the Secretary of the Interior informed Congress that the application for the Range was pending and submitted maps showing the area as a federal enclave embracing submerged lands. See U.S. Exh. 61 (Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Alaska: Federal Land Withdrawals7"    J and Reservations, July 1958, Section No. 8).& uBh ԍAlaska claims that the map submitted to Congress did not depict the Range, but a 1943 withdrawal under Public Land Order 82, 8 Fed. Reg. 1599, revoked, 25 Fed. Reg. 12599 (1960). Five million acres of the land to be included in the Range were covered by PLO 82, and the Secretary of the Interior announced a modification of the terms of PLO 82 and the filing of the application for the Range at the same time. See U. S. Exh. 12, p. 2; U. S. Exh. 32, p. 2. The importance of the map is not that it precisely depicts the Range's current boundaries, but that it shows the area encompassing the Range as a proposed federal enclave embracing submerged lands. By virtue of that submission, Congress was on notice when it passed the Alaska Statehood Act that the Secretary of the Interior had construed his authority to withdraw or reserve lands, delegated by the President, see Exec. Order No. 10355, 3 CFR 873 (1949!1953 Comp.), to reach submerged lands. If the 1957 application in fact had the legal effect of withdraw[ing] or otherwise set[ting] apart lands within the proposed Range as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife within the meaning of 6(e), then the United States retained title to submerged lands as well as uplands within the Range. This is so despite 6(m) of the Statehood Act, which applied the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 to Alaska. The Submerged Lands Act operated to confirm Alaska's title to equal footing lands and to transfer title to submerged lands beneath the territorial  JX sea to Alaska at statehood, unless the United States clearly withheld submerged lands within either category prior to statehood. In 6(e) of the Statehood Act, Congress clearly contemplated continued federal ownership of certain submerged lands"both inland submerged lands and submerged lands beneath the territorial sea"so long as those submerged lands were among those withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife.  J  Under Montana and Utah Div. of State Lands, an8"   intent to defeat state title to submerged lands must be clear. As this discussion illustrates, the operative provision of the Alaska Statehood Act, 6(e), reflects a very clear intent to defeat state title. The only remaining question is whether an application by the head of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, upon which the Secretary of the Interior had not yet acted, had the effect of withdraw[ing] or otherwise set[ting] apart lands within the proposed Range as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife within the meaning of 6(e).  Under a Department of Interior regulation first promulgated in 1952 and in effect at the time Congress passed the Statehood Act, an application for a withdrawal temporarily segregated the lands covered by the application. That regulation provided: BQ C  , , (  The noting of the receipt of the application ... shall temporarily segregate such lands from settlement, location, sale, selection, entry, lease, and other forms of disposal under the public land laws ... to the extent that the withdrawal or reservation applied for, if effected, would prevent such forms of disposal. To that extent, action on all prior applications the allowance of which is discretionary, and on all subsequent applications, respecting such lands will be suspended until final action on the application for withdrawal or reservation has been taken. 43 CFR 295.11(a) (Supp. 1958).BQ d   ( , , The regulation temporarily foreclosed any use of the land that a decision by the Secretary of Interior to grant the application would prevent. It also suspended all pending discretionary applications and all subsequent applications for other uses of the land. This temporary segregation remained in effect unless and until the Secretary of Interior denied an application. 295.13(c).  The Special Master adopted the United States' view/9"   that the application and the regulation together set apart all lands within the Range. Report 464. We agree that this conclusion follows from a straightforward application of 295.11. Alaska argues that the regulation was not intended to operate on submerged lands. The object of the regulation is quite clear: to prevent, during the pendency of an application, any use of the land that would frustrate federal control if the application were ultimately granted. That goal is implicated wherever a threat to future federal control exists"whether the lands in question are uplands or submerged lands. The State focuses on the fact that the regulation segregates lands from sale, entry, or other forms of disposal, and argues that submerged lands are ordinarily not subject to such forms of disposal. Cf.  J Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S., at 203. But the  J language in Utah Div. of State Lands on which Alaska relies reflects the Court's recognition that under the  J0 general land laws opening up lands for settlement, private parties ordinarily cannot lay claims to sub J merged lands. In Alaska, however, specific laws had opened up certain submerged lands for mining well prior  J to the filing of the application for the Range. See, e.g., Act of June 6, 1900, 26, 31 Stat. 329!330 (providing that land and shoal water between low and mean high tide on the shores, bays, and inlets of Bering Sea... shall be subject to exploration and mining for gold and other precious metals); Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 297, 52 Stat. 588 (extending provisions beyond the Bering Sea to the shores, bays, and inlets of Alaska); Act of Aug. 8, 1947, 61 Stat. 916 (extending provisions to lands beneath nontidal navigable waters). In light of these provisions, Alaska's premise"that there would have been no need to withdraw or set apart submerged lands to preserve ultimate federal control"is flawed.  Although the Master concluded that the application and regulation together set apart all lands within the`:"   Range, the Master accepted Alaska's argument that the  J lands had not been set apart as [a] refug[e] ... for the protection of wildlife within the meaning of 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act. (Emphasis added.) The Master found that the application did not have the same effect as a reservation of lands, dedicating them to a specific public purpose. Report 464. The Master reasoned that under the proviso to 6(e), the United States would retain ownership only of wildlife refuges or reservations  J already established at statehood. Ibid. (emphasis added). Because the application had not yet been granted, the proviso to 6(e) would not prevent the transfer of lands within the Range to Alaska.  We disagree. Under the Master's interpretation, 6(e) applies only to completed reservations of land. But Congress did not limit 6(e) to completed reservations. Rather, Congress provided that the United States would  JX not transfer to Alaska lands withdrawn or otherwise set  J0 apart as refuges for the protection of wildlife. (Emphasis added.) The Master's reading of 6(e) would render the broader terminology superfluous. The Court will avoid an interpretation of a statute that renders some  J words altogether redundant. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995). In light of Congress' clear intent, it was error for the Master to conclude that the lands within the Range were not otherwise set apart as [a] refug[e] unless the United States could point to a completed reservation. In the phrase set apart as [a] refug[e], the word as does not carry the requirement that the refuge be presently established; the phrase aptly describes the administrative segregation of lands designated to become a wildlife refuge. Accordingly, the application and regulation, taken together, placed the Range squarely within the proviso of 6(e), preventing a transfer of lands covered by the application to Alaska.  The partial dissent's contrary conclusion rests on the view that the lands covered by the application had no`;"   certainty of ever becoming a refuge or reservation.  J Post, at 10 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But the dissent identifies nothing in 6(e) requiring certainty that a projected final action will in fact occur, converting lands designated for a particular use into lands so used, in order for 6(e)'s proviso to prevent the transfer of such lands to Alaska. Moreover, our reading of the proviso of 6(e) is reinforced by  J Alaska's concession that the uplands within the Range are held by the United States, not Alaska. Tr. of Oral Arg. 79; Letter from Attorney General Bruce M. Botelho to the Clerk of the Court, Mar. 3, 1997, p. 1. If the Master were correct that the application and regulation  J did not operate to set apart submerged lands in the proposed Range within the meaning of 6(e), then it follows that the same instruments could not set apart  J uplands within the Range. Nevertheless, Alaska disclaims ownership of the uplands. The State argues that it could only have claimed uplands within the Refuge under 6(b) of the Alaska Statehood Act, which authorized Alaska to select a specified amount of vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved federal land. Since Alaska did not select the uplands before the Secretary of the Interior approved the application for the Range in 1960, and since after 1960 the uplands were no longer vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved, the  J State cannot now argue that it owns the uplands. Ibid. But the State's argument ignores the main clause of 6(e). Under that clause, the United States transferred to Alaska [a]ll real and personal property of the United States situated in the Territory of Alaska which is specifically used for the sole purpose of conservation and protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska .... The State does not explain why all of the lands within the Range"uplands as well as submerged lands"would not have been transferred to Alaska at statehood as real property used for the protection of wildlife unless`<"   covered by the proviso. Unless all lands"submerged lands and uplands"covered by the application were set apart within the meaning of the proviso to 6(e), they would have passed to Alaska under the main clause of 6(e). There is no basis for concluding that the United States retained uplands but not submerged lands within the Range.  ;H2 d d8C؃  $2  In sum, we conclude that the United States did not transfer to Alaska submerged lands within the Arctic National Wildlife Range at statehood. The 1957 application to create the wildlife refuge clearly encompassed submerged lands. Since its seaward boundary is the lowwater line along Alaska's coast, the Range necessarily encompasses the tidelands. Further reflecting an intent to withhold submerged lands is the statement of justification accompanying the application, which describes the habitat of various species along the coast and beneath inland waters. A Department of Interior regulation in effect when the application was filed and when Congress passed the Alaska Statehood Act operated to segregate the lands for which the application was pending. Section 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act expressly prevented lands that had been set apart as [a] refug[e] from passing to Alaska. It follows that, because all of the lands covered by the 1957 application had been set apart for future use as a refuge, the United States retained title to submerged lands within the Range. We therefore sustain the United States' exception to the Master's recommendation.  9H1 d d7VI؃  "2  We overrule Alaska's exceptions to the Special Master's recommended rulings that (1) Alaska's submerged lands in the vicinity of barrier islands should be measured as a 3mile belt from a coastline following the normal baseline under the Convention on the Territorial="   Sea and the Contiguous Zone; (2)Dinkum Sands is not an island constituting part of Alaska's coastline under the Submerged Lands Act; and (3) submerged lands beneath tidally influenced waters within the boundary of the National Petroleum ReserveAlaska did not pass to Alaska at statehood. We sustain the United States' exception to the Special Master's recommended ruling that offshore submerged lands within the boundaries of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge passed to Alaska at statehood.  The recommendations of the Special Master are adopted to the extent that they are consistent with this opinion. The parties are directed to prepare and submit an appropriate decree for this Court's consideration. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such writs as from time to time may be determined necessary or advisable to effectuate and supplement the forthcoming decree and the rights of the respective parties.  The parties shall bear their own costs.  J ` BIt is so ordered.ă