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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@BQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( FTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:K  i uB ԍ   See, e.g., Richardson v. Chevrefils, 131 N.H. 227, 231, 552 A. 2d 89, 92 (1988) ( Although all of the court's rulings ... would normally be  uB  treated as interlocutory, ... [w]e have followed Mitchell in accepting the State defendants' appeal from the order denying their motion for  uBw summary judgment); Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 626, 587 A. 2d 975,  uB. 977!978 (1991) ( In [Mitchell], the Supreme Court held that a trial court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity met these [collateral  uB order] requirements, and we agree with this determination); Park  uBS County v. Cooney, 845 P. 2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1992) ( We believe the state  uB  decisions which allow appeal, for the reasons detailed in Mitchell ... are better reasoned; and we therefore hold that an order denying dismissal of a claim based on qualified immunity is an order appealable to this court).> we have never suggested that federal law compelled them to do so. Indeed, a number of States employ collateral order doctrines that reject the limita Jp tions this Court has placed on 1291.%p&i uBn ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < See, e.g., Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 727,392 S.E. 2d 735, 737 (1990) (disqualification of counsel is appealable under state collateral order doctrine notwithstanding"##  uB RichardsonMerrell,Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985)); Hanson v.  uBG Federal Signal Corp., 451 Pa. Super. 260, 264!265, 679 A. 2d 785, 787!788 (1996) (same for class certification denial notwithstanding  uB Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978)). Idaho could, ofpl"   course, place the same construction on its Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) as we have placed on 1291. But that is clearly a choice for that Court to make, not one that we have any authority to command.  9H1 d d,IV؃  2  Petitioners also contend that, to the extent that Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) does not allow an interlocutory appeal, it is preempted by 1983. Relying heavily on  JV Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), petitioners first assert that preemption is necessary to avoid different outcomes in 1983 litigation based solely on whether the  J claim is asserted in state or federal court, id., at 138. Second, they argue that the state procedure impermissibly burden[s] the federal immunity from suit becauseit does not adequately protect their right to  J> prevail on the immunity question in advance of trial.w> li uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < See Brief for Petitioners 22. w  For two reasons, petitioners have a heavy burden of persuasion in making this argument. First, our normal presumption against preemption is buttressed by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state rule regarding  JN the administration of the state courts. &%N#i uBI ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Unlike the noticeofclaim rule at issue in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S., at 140!145, Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) does not target civil  uB rights claims against the State. See also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 380!381 (1990). Instead, it generally permits appeals only of [j]udgments, orders and decrees which are final, without regard to the identity of the party seeking the appeal or the subject matter of the suit. Petitioners claim that the rule is not neutral because it permits interlocutory appeals in certain limited circumstances but denies an appeal here. But we have never held that a rule must be monolithic to be neutral. Absent evidence that Appellate Rule"## 11(a)(1) discriminates against interlocutory appeals of 1983 qualified immunity determinations by defendants"as compared with other types of appeals"we must deem the state procedure neutral. As we exN "  Ԯ J plained in Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990):BQ C   , , (  When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts, we must act with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain the claim.  J{ See Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340  JS U.S. 1 (1950); Georgia Rail Road & Banking Co. v.  J+ Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (per curiam); Herb  J v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Douglas v. New  J York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented. The general rule, `bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.' Hart, [The Relations Between State and Federal Law], 54 Colum. L. Rev. [489, 508 (1954)]; see also  J# ԚSouthland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 33 (1984)  J (O'Connor, J., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. [742, 774 (1982)] (opinion of Powell, J.) The States thus have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.MBQ d   ( , ,  A second barrier to petitioners' argument arises from the nature of the interest protected by the defense of qualified immunity. Petitioners' argument for preemption is bottomed on their claims that the Idaho rules are interfering with their federal rights. While it is true that the defense has its source in a federal statute (1983), the ultimate purpose of qualified immunity is to "   protect the state and its officials from overenforcement of federal rights. The Idaho Supreme Court's application of the State's procedural rules in this context is thus  J less an interference with federal interests than a  J` judgment about how best to balance the competing state interests of limiting interlocutory appeals and providing state officials with immediate review of the merits of  J their defense.& i uBP ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < It does warrant observation that Rule 12(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that the State Supreme Court may grant permission to appeal from an interlocutory order or decree ... which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal ... may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. Presumably, petitioners could have sought review under this permissive provision, and the Idaho Supreme Court might have granted review if, in the view of that court, the officials' claim to immunity was so substantial that the suit should not proceed.&  Petitioner's arguments for preemption are not strong enough to overcome these considerable hurdles. Contrary to petitioners' assertions, Idaho's decision not to provide appellate review for the vast majority of interlocutory orders"including denials of qualified immunity in 1983 cases"is not outcome determinative in the sense that we used that term when we held that Wisconsin's noticeofclaim statute could not be applied to defeat a federal civil rights action brought in state courts under  JX 1983. Felder, 487 U.S., at 153. The failure to comply  J0 with the Wisconsin statute in Felder resulted in a judgment dismissing a complaint that would not have been dismissed"at least not without a judicial determination of the merits of the claim"if the case had been filed in a federal court. One of the primary grounds for our decision was that, because the noticeofclaim requirement would frequently and predictably produce different outcomes depending on whether 1983 claimsm "   were brought in state or federal court, it was inconsis J tent with the federal interest in uniformity. Id., at  J 138. i uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < See also Brown v. Western R. Co. of Ala., 338 U. S. 294, 296!299 (1949) (Federal Employers' Liability Act preempted different state pleading requirements when effect was to defeat plaintiff's  uB= cause of action); Garrett v. MooreMcCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 243!244 (1942) (federal Jones Act preempted different state burden of proof regarding releases when effect was to defeat plaintiff's cause of action).  J  Petitioners' reliance on Felder is misplaced because outcome, as we used the term there, referred to the ultimate disposition of the case. If petitioners' claim to qualified immunity is meritorious, there is no suggestion that the application of the Idaho rules of procedure will produce a final result different from what a federal ruling would produce. Petitioners were able to argue their immunity from suit claim to the trial court, just as they would to a federal court. And the claim will be reviewable by the Idaho Supreme Court after the trial court enters a final judgment, thus providing the petitioners with a further chance to urge their immunity. Consequently, the postponement of the appeal until after final judgment will not affect the ultimate outcome of the case.  Petitioners' second argument for preemption of the state procedural rule is that the rule does not adequately protect their right to prevail in advance of trial. In evaluating this contention, it is important to focus on the precise source and scope of the federal right at issue. The right to have the trial court rule on the merits of the qualified immunity defense presumably has its source in 1983, but the right to immediate appellate review of that ruling in a federal case has its source in 1291. The former right is fully protected by Idaho. The latter right, however, is a federal procedural right  "    J that simply does not apply in a nonfederal forum. i uBh ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Petitioners' reliance on Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U. S.  uB 359 (1952), is therefore misplaced. In Dice we held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) preempted a state rule denying a  uB right to a jury trial. In that case, however, we made clear that  uBD Congress had provided in FELA that the jury trial procedure was to  uB be part of claims brought under the Act. Id., at 363 (citing Bailey v.  uB Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U. S. 350, 354 (1943)). In this case, by contrast, Congress has mentioned nothing about interlocutory appeals in 1983; rather, the right to an immediate appeal in the federal court system is found in 1291, which obviously has no application to state courts.  The locus of the right to interlocutory appeal in 1291, rather than in 1983 itself, is demonstrated by our  J` holding in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995). In that case, government officials asserting qualified immunity claimed entitlement to an interlocutory appeal of a District Court order denying their motion for summary judgment on the ground that the record showed a genuine issue of material fact whether the officials actually engaged in the conduct that constituted  JH a clear violation of constitutional law. Id., at 307!308. We concluded that this circumstance was different from  J that presented in Mitchell, 472 U.S., at 528, in which the subject of the interlocutory appeal was whether a given set of facts showed a violation of clearly established law, and held that although 1291 did allow an interlocutory appeal in the latter circumstance, such an appeal was not allowed in the former.  In so holding, we acknowledged that whether a district court's denial of summary judgment amounts to (a) a determination about preexisting `clearly established' law, or (b) a determination about `genuine' issues of fact for trial, it still forces public officials to trial. 515 U.S., at 317. But we concluded that the strong countervailing considerations surrounding appropriate m "   interpretation of 1291 were of sufficient importance to outweigh the officials' interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation.  The countervailing considerations at issue here are  J` even stronger than those presented in Johnson. When preemption of state law is at issue, we must respect the principles [that] are fundamental to a system of federalism in which the state courts share responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal law.  J Howlett, 496 U.S., at 372!373. This respect is at its apex when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to undertake something as fundamental as  J restructuring the operation of its courts. o i uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < We have made it quite clear that it is a matter for each State  uB? to decide how to structure its judicial system. See, e.g., M.L.B. v.  uB S.L.J., 519 U.S. ___ (1996) (slip op., at 6) (states under no obliga uB tion to provide appellate review) (citing cases); Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 299 (1895) ( [T]he right of review in an appellate court is  uB purely a matter of state concern); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894) ( [W]hether an appeal should be allowed, and if so, under what circumstances or on what conditions, are matters for each State to determine for itself). We therefore cannot agree with petitioners that 1983's recognition of the defense of qualified immunity preempts a State's consistent application of its neutral procedural rules, even when those rules deny an interlocutory appeal in this context.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho dismissing petitioners' appeal is therefore affirmed.  J ` 3It is so ordered.ă